

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Human society is characterised by individuals and groups of varying socio-economic and political backgrounds with individual differences in choice, aspiration, interest, ideology, class, power, belief, idea and affluence. They live and relate in a conflicting network of interactions, pursuing and defending the above values. Thus, conflict remains an integral part of social interactions everywhere in the world. It brings social change when constructively managed but becomes a destructive phenomenon if not kept in check. Thus, the inability to manage human differences effectively has posed great challenges to mankind over the ages. As conflicts occur among individuals and groups, so they happen among states with each using resources available to it to pursue its overt and covert interests both within and outside its borders. Highly worrisome, is the way internal insurgencies and imperial power game combined to internationalise internal conflicts in different states of Africa. Series of these clashes emerge as post-election violence, land disputes or struggle for freedom and political emancipation.

Adetula (2015) reports that African continent still faces some of the most daunting global security threats. He identifies secession, ethnic nationalism, self-determination, military intervention, citizenship and land ownership as sources of these conflicts, and believes that until recently little attention has been paid to regional and global dynamics affecting the causes, conducts and resolution of armed conflicts in Africa. Ostby (2015) observes that civil war is a constant threat in many poor and badly governed countries in Africa.

As such, efforts at national, regional and global levels to curtail violent conflicts have increasingly become engaging; using institutions and organizations as avenues for checking man's excesses against his fellow man as ways to achieve social peace, security and order. Against this background, Okanya and Okenyi (1999) posit that given the character of global politics, regional or continental grouping is now in vogue. Hettne and Soderbaum (1998) perceive regionalisation in terms of increasing process whereby a geographical region is transformed into capacity to articulate the interests of the emerging region leading to formal inter-governmental regional cooperation, distinct identity, institutionalized actor capacity, legitimacy and structure of decision making.

With advancement in modern transportation system, information and communications technology and deregulated international legal framework, regional organizations can now organise their members at the continental level. For instance, Europe slowly evolved from its weakness and built a European Union (EU) as a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form of cooperation among sovereign states. Her process of integration began after World War II with six countries, but today the union is composed of 28 member states including most of the central and Eastern Europe and has helped to promote peace, stability and economic prosperity throughout the European continent. EU member states share a customs union, a common agricultural policy, common currency for 19 EU members, a single market in which goods, people and capital move freely and a common security and defence policy (Archick, 2016). The EU has been increasingly active in civilian military crisis management across the world, and has been involved in diplomacy since the days of European political cooperation (Stewart, 2016).

In South America, the Union of South American States (USAN) created a space for integration, and a union in the culture, social, economic, political fields among its people; giving priority to political dialogue, social policies, education, finance among others (Sanchez, 2011). Organisation of American States (OAS) as an inter-continental organisation stands for North and South Americas for solidarity and cooperation among her member states. Today, the Organization American States concentrates on four broad objectives: democracy promotion, human right protection, economic and social development and regional security cooperation (Meyer, 2014). Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) aims at fostering Asian cooperation at the continental level and integrating the several regional cooperation organisations (Norafidah, 2013). Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), though not a continental union, is the whole arrangements and treaties established to regulate the behaviours of states operating within the Antarctica continent as its members are drawn from other continents. North American Union is under way, undergoing debates on its establishment or otherwise. A union for the Australian continent is underway, undergoing politics associated with state sovereignty and continental integration.

In Africa, the African Union(AU),formerly known as the Organisation of African Unity, (OAU) was in 2002 established as an umbrella organisation of African States. Its efforts in combating intra and inter-states violent conflicts resulted to the establishment of Peace and Security Council (PSC), an AU's organ for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. Its Constitutive Act 4(h), unlike in OAU mandates the union to intervene in war situations, genocide or serious threat to lives of civilian population in any member state. Imobighe, (2008) states that since the transformation of the OAU to AU in July 9, 2002 there has been optimism that this change which included

few new clauses and institutions would automatically make it an effective role player in the high-tech global environment of the 21st century, especially in finding solutions to problems facing the continent.

Despite this optimism, violent conflicts in Africa have continued to occur after the 2002 establishment of the AU. Prominent among such crises include the Burundi Crisis, the Somali Crisis, the Darfur Crisis, the Tunisia, Egypt and lately Libya, and the Mali Crises, with Boko Haram waging wars against Nigerian people. AU's conflict response deficiency has been visibly obvious. This was evident in an address by Hamady Ould Hamady, the Mauritanian Foreign Minister, to the UN Security Council on behalf of the AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee on the Crisis in Libya where he expressed surprise and disappointment at attempt to marginalise the Africa Union in the management of Libyan conflict. His expression was an indication that AU was not a recognised force in the UN empowered Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya.

AU's deficient behavioural pattern in responding to conflicts manifested in pre-Libyan conflicts that ravaged the continent since its creation in 2002. Ivorian, Zimbabwean and Darfur in Crises are some reference points. AU's inability to prevent Libyan crisis has given great concern to scholars, political analysts and stakeholders in African Politics. Failure to manage or resolve the crisis has manifested in the huge loss of human and material resources in Libya. The matter became very pitiful, when you consider AU's helplessness while the war between Col. Muammar Gaddafi's forces and the National Transition Council (NTC) led opposition forces raged on. The attendant loss of lives and properties in the light of the union's inability to take effective actions was a clear manifestation of conflict response deficiency in management and resolution of

the crisis. The way and manner the AU's Zuma led delegation was disgraced out of Libya having failed to secure the confidence of the NTC in an arbitration mission were seen as indications of great weakness on the side of the AU. NTC bluffed AU's delegation because the group had secured the support of members of NATO. Koko and Bakwesegha, (2013) presents a pictorial display of such support. AU development partners: EU, US, UK, China etc. that normally contribute to AU's conflict resolution missions disappointed AU's by refusing to offer their usual support funding for AU resolution of the Libyan Crisis. This was because they did not accept AU's diplomatic approach to the Libyan Crisis against their preference of military intervention which came in form of United Nations Responsibility to Protect in Libya, implemented by NATO for their economic and political foreign policy objectives in Libya.

At its 265th meeting held on 10 March 2011 at the level of heads of states and governments, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) agreed to a roadmap for resolving Libyan crisis. Accordingly, the AU's High Level Ad-hoc Committee on Libya was mandated to implement the roadmap with the following terms of reference: to cause, **(a)** immediate cessation of hostility in Libya; **(b)** cooperation of the concerned Libyan authorities to facilitate the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy population; **(c)** protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants workers living in Libya; **(d)** dialogue between the Libya parties and establishment of a consensual and inclusive transition government in Libya. The general objective was to ensure that the legitimate aspiration of Libyan people to democracy was achieved (Ping, 2011).

The Libyan Crisis, Kamba (2011) observes, has opened up a lot of controversies regarding western intervention in Africa and what ought to be the role of the

African Union. Certain contentions trail the crisis beyond 2011. They comprise issues surrounding the Libyan Crisis, the nature of AU's responses to the crisis and factors that undermined her efforts. Ikejiaku and Dauda (2011), Alaaldin (2012), Mammadova (2011), Sikkema (2011), Sevilla (2012) among others argue that Libyans' living conditions were unacceptable to them. Gaddafi, according to them, tried in Libya's economic and educational sectors, but his political reforms were not able to convince many Libyans, particularly people from the Benghazi area, of equal opportunities with those close to Gaddafi. His reforms, they argued, did not allow political rights and freedom and so the struggle for power, survival, security, identity, wealth, status, prestige, and recognition became necessary. On the other hand, Ebaye et al (2012), Birrel (2012), Ping (2011), Waal (2013) see western interest and the resultant instigation of Libyans as the causes of the crisis. On the nature of AU's response, Kamba (2011), Tran (2011), MCKaiser (2012), Ajish, (2011), Alberts (2011), Ayithey (2011) argue that AU's responses were ineffective, inadequate and at worse a failure. However, AU supporters: Ping (2011), Waal (2013), Mugabe (2013) claim that western media failed to report AU and its activities in the crisis and that AU could have succeeded but for lack of international support, NATO's interference and intervention.

AU inability to resolve the Libyan Crisis during the 2011 uprising is attributed to her internal deficiencies while others attributed her poor performance to external factor beyond the union's control. Expectations were that AU could have used its Peace and Security Council (PSC) to prevent, manage or resolve the Libyan Crisis. In the light of heavy loss of lives and property in Libya, western capitalist warlords under the auspices of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) saw in what they called humanitarian intervention or "Responsibility to Protect (R2P)" the opportunity to intervene, liquidate

Muammar Gaddafi's government and initiate capitalist-democratic, socio-economic and political developmental programmes in Libya. This humanitarian intervention is very costly to Libya considering political and economic motives underlying NATO's involvement in the crisis or their interest in Libya oil, post war reconstruction contracts and establishment of liberal democratic environment conducive for the establishment, expansion and consolidation of western multinational corporations in Libya for the 21st century neo-colonial exploitations. Poor legal empowerment, funding, inadequate manpower, political imperialism, poor UN-AU relations, weak institutional structures and policy inaction have been suggested as some of the major challenges facing the union's conflict response system. Others are corruption, undue loyalty to friendship in neglect of official responsibility and fear of Gaddafi; poor management skills and leadership ineptitude.

It is worrisome when it seems that African states cannot strengthen their continental union to enable it serve them efficiently, especially in this 21st century when globalisation has rendered the strength of individual states in the global political arena highly inadequate.

However, there is currently an ongoing effort by UN-AU Joint Task Force geared towards establishment of a Government of National Accord in Libya.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Wars have constituted major obstacles to peace, security and development of the African Continent. Like other continental organizations, the African Union has the primary responsibility to ensure security of the continent. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act mandates the union to intervene in any member state experiencing genocide, gross violation of human rights or serious threat to lives

of civilian population resulting from government's refusal or inability to defend the population. Such responsibility and mandate notwithstanding, AU's responses to wars and causes of wars in Africa have not yielded the required results. Responses to the Libyan Crisis took a new and more dangerous dimension. NATO hid under the UN's Responsibility to Protect and recklessly bombarded Libya, and effected a regime change while the AU watched helplessly. After being pressurised out of Libya, AU was only able to condemn the bombardment and called for its end without the capacity to stop it. The development resulted to another stage of the crisis-the Post-Gaddafi Stage. Gaddafi's forceful dethronement and murder threw up series of arms conflicts among power seekers in Libya.

The above situation questions AU competence in conflict resolution and raised fears over the peace and security of states and people of Africa. Confusion abounded over what actually caused the Libyan Crisis and what the AU did to resolve it. AU's responses to the crisis were relatively unknown to international public to the extent that some people argue that AU did not do anything to resolve the crisis. This led to lopsided evaluation and destructive criticism of the union. Again, it was not clear what actually incapacitated the union's attempt to resolve the crisis. Extant texts identified numerous challenges that led to the union's inability to resolve the crisis. Such unguided identifications created further confusion by mixing up AU's major handicaps and their results as all part of challenges that incapacitated the union. Besides, most measures suggested on the ways to strengthen AU's response capacity to conflicts are presented in piecemeal – not capable of providing a holistic approach to the matters under investigation.

Thus, there was a need to determine actual causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, AU's responses and factors that incapacitated the union's attempt to resolve the crisis. This is with a view to suggesting holistic measures capable of strengthening AU response capacity and resolving the ongoing crisis in Libya. Accordingly, the study has the following research questions.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are major causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis?
2. How did the African Union respond to the Libyan Crisis?
3. What factors incapacitated AU's responses to the crisis?
4. What possible measures can make the AU efficient machinery for conflict resolution in Africa?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

General Objective

The general objective of this study was to appraise African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis and proffer measures to make it better machinery for resolving conflicts.

Specific Objectives

Specific objectives were to:

1. identify major causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis?
2. investigate African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis

3. ascertain factors that incapacitated AU's response to the crisis and

4. proffer possible measures that can make the AU efficient machinery for conflict resolution.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Theoretical Significance

(a) Offering better Understanding of the Causes of the Crisis: By specifically identifying major causes of and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, the study has offered a better understanding of the remote and immediate causes of the crisis.

(b) Bringing to light AU's efforts to resolve the crisis: It helps to publicise AU's response to Libya and now serves as one of the contributions to solving the lingering problem of AU activities not being publicised by western media as claimed by the AU chairperson Jean Ping.

(c) AU's image maker: More so, the study corrects the erroneous impression that the AU did not do anything to resolve the Libyan Crisis. It is capable of checking increasing condemnation of AU and erosion of the people's confidence in the AU and to this end serve as AU's image maker particularly when placed online.

(d) Presenting AU's Problems in holistically: The study offers broader understanding of AU's problems by holistically identifying multi-dimensional challenges that led to AU's failure to resolve the Libyan Crisis and to that extent

save extant literature from the inadequacies of presenting AU's problems in piecemeal.

Practical Significance

(a) The study exposes internal conditions that caused the Libyan Crisis and as such serves as a warning to such African countries that have similar conditions to address them or face similar crisis

(b) It exposes a new dimension of how developed countries hide under UN's Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to invade and forcefully effect regime change in developing countries for political and economic purposes and as such provide lessons for political dictator and potential insurgents in Africa.

(c) The thesis is an embodiment of policy support recommendations capable of injecting a new and effective life into the AU's conflict response mechanism.

(d) The dissertation provides lessons as well as warnings to Africans on the dangers of conflict and rekindles the zeal for African solidarity in solving African problems.

(e) The study is useful for understanding the nexus between political theory and practical international politics in conflict resolution process. It creates more realistic perception in us as scholars and stakeholders of conflict resolution in Africa.

1.6 Scope of the Study

Huge human and financial resources involved in covering more crises, and the need to do a detailed work have made it necessary to use a particular conflict to appraise the union. Though, we made brief overviews of Ivorian, Darfur and

Zimbabwean crises in 5.2 to ascertain AU's conflict response pattern, this study is an appraisal of African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis 2005-2016. The 2011 intervention became the highpoint of AU's responses and as such constitutes the centre of the appraisal. It covers 2005-2016 because a crisis that erupted in 2011 had, in 2005, started throwing up what eventually became the crisis and has continued up to 2016.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

At the beginning of the study, we were faced with scarcity of scholarly written material. Information on the Libyan Crisis was mainly in Wikipedia encyclopaedia, newspapers, magazines and official pronouncements on radios and televisions. However, this challenge was addressed by subsequent influx of international journals, official documents and books written on this area of study.

Efforts to obtain individual interviews to supplement secondary data were not easy considering the cost and difficulties in accessing the required respondents and making them yield to request. Contact with the AU office Abuja only referred us to AU's Desk in the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where we got some websites on AU responses to the Libyan Crisis. AU Desk referred us to AU's Office, Addis Ababa for interviews. Getting a person for interview at AU Office, Addis Ababa was the peak of our difficulty until Chiagozie Udeh of Unizik FM gave me a contact. Still, it involved a lot of appointments and patience to be able to pin each of the respondents down for an interview due to their busy schedules. However, the interviews were finally successful.

Poor internet network and restricted access to some works were part of the limitations in downloading relevant material from the internet. Yet, it required our patience, rigor and compliance with some of the internet providers to achieve our goals.

1.8 Operationalisation of Key Terms

Certain concepts or phrases are used in special ways in this work other than their general usage and meaning. Their definitions are based on their meanings in the context within which they are used here. The researcher explains them here to make readers understand and appreciate their specific usage and meaning within the context in which they are used.

Responses to Libya Crisis: Responses to conflict or crisis is a phrase used here to refer to AU's intervention in the Libyan Crisis. It involves all AU's policies or decisions, actions, activities and programmes targeted at resolving the crisis in Libya. In general sense, response may involve prevention, management and resolution of conflict. However, AU's response to the Libyan Crisis was mainly the attempt to resolve it. If there was any preventive measure known prior to the crisis, it was AU's repeated calls for dialogue between Gaddafi and Libyan protesters or agitators.

Appraisal: This refers to an evaluation of African Union's efforts to resolve the Libyan Crisis. It involves examination of what the union did, its achievements and what it was unable to achieve. This is with a view to making recommendations for her improvement in conflict resolution. To understand and evaluate AU's responses to the Libyan Crisis, there is need to understand major issues surrounding the crisis particularly, its historical

overview, causes and consequences of the crisis. This is because such issues have relevance to AU's responses and results.

The Libyan Crisis: The crisis is a political war in Libya that exists between those who consider continuous Muammar Gaddafi reign as Libyan leaders unacceptable and those who support his reign. The crisis or conflict featured Muammar Gaddafi and his forces and the rebel led National Transitional Council (NTC) supported by NATO. In post-Gaddafi era it involves series of armed factions laying claims to Libyan state power.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

In this chapter, we review the opinions and views of previous writers on the issues raised in our research questions and concepts contained on them. This is with a view to identifying their usefulness to the study and finding the gap in the existing literature. We should recall that our research questions sought to know the causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, AU's responses to the crisis and factors that incapacitated the union's efforts to resolve the crisis.

2.1 Review of major Causes and Consequences of the Libya Crisis

Mammadova (2011) in response to the causes of 2011 crisis presents three viewpoints. First, he argues that the repressive and authoritarian political system with decades of ruling that was similar to that of other Arab states of MENA and the ridiculous ideologies of Muammar Gaddafi could be regarded as the cases of discontent with the regime. Secondly, the crisis according to him represents the revolt of Cyrenaica against Tripolitania's authority since their relationship has always been characterised by historical rivalry. Thirdly, the economic discontent of Libyans, the paper argues was not unemployment or

poverty; rather they were dissatisfied that despite Libya's oil wealth there were pervasive corruption and underdevelopment in Libya. The perception of the Libyans, according to the paper, was that with the resources, Libya should be like Dubai. The comparison with poor African countries was not acceptable to them.

As the paper points at the age long rivalry between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania regions, it would be recalled that former Libyan leader King Idris, overthrown by Gaddafi, came from Cyrenaica and since then political rivalry over who rules the state of Libya has been on with Gaddafi taking a 42-year old shot at the throne. His reign was therefore, not convenient to Cyrenaica region thus the need for resistance. Such long time deprivation of state power to Cyrenaica region of Libya, particularly under suppressive and corrupt regime like Muammar Gaddafi's for four decades was, likely to contribute to political crisis. Again, his last point is a disclosure that economic expectations of Libyans were not met despite Libya's better living standard in comparison with most African social formations. Libya is an oil rich state and the population is not up to 7million. Libyans therefore, expected higher living standard, and Gaddafi's reforms failed to meet the expectations.

(J. M. Okeke, personal interview, May 21, 2016) revealed that political and economic marginalisation of the people of Benghazi area is the root of the Libyan Crisis triggered by the Arab Spring. For him, politics of the Sahel region is also relevant in understanding the causes of the Libyan Crisis. He cautioned against the belief that Gaddafi's western enemies caused the crisis, without corresponding supportive evidence to back it up. The speaker is specific in identifying internal condition in Libya as the cause of the crisis. This view point derives from objective mirroring of the internal source of the crisis without

recourse to bias mindedness. It relies solely on available evidence as a means of reliable information and ignores speculation.

Burton in Ikejika and Dauda (2009) posits that human needs most salient in understanding social conflict are not only material (food and shelter) but as well include needs of identity, recognition, security and personality development. The study emphasises that the failure of the modern state systems to meet these needs is the primary sources of modern ethno-nationalist struggles. He however, points out that the level of importance of any or combination of these needs depends on the level of socio-economic, political, and cultural development of the country and further, sees aggressions and conflicts as direct result of institutional and social norms incompatible with social needs.

In what he calls “Silent Protest,” Sevilla (2012) argues that Libyans had been protesting silently against prolonged economic hardship and political marginalisation due to unsuccessful economic reforms, brutish and autocratic nature of Gaddafi’s regime. This silence, however, turned to violent revolt encouraged by spontaneous spark of democratic violence in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. The Libyan revolt then created humanitarian situation that called for humanitarian intervention and long awaited opportunity for anti-Gaddafi forces to wage in. However, he agrees that Gaddafi instituted reforms that improved literacy and health services, but many Libyans remained sceptical about the motives behind those reforms. This, he said, was because ordinary Libyans did not believe those reforms could transform greater economic opportunities for them in relation to their rich and influential countrymen close to Gaddafi. Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, according to the paper, brought economic hardship, political marginalisation against Libyans and concentrated

power and wealth around Gaddafi families, friends, loyalists, and politically isolated Libya in the comity of nations.

Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) are of the view that successive political leaders in Africa resorted to rapacious material accumulation and failed to respond to the needs of the people. They add that African leaders use their political status to accumulate wealth by consolidating their positions through electoral malpractices and suppression of the citizens. Seat tight syndrome of some African leaders, according to them, has been widespread. In this category, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, Todoro Obiang Mbong of Equatorial Guinea, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, others include Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, King Mswati of Burkina Faso and the Olusegun Obasanjo's third term bid in Nigeria as points of reference. They further argue that these leaders have shown lack of the ability, strength and experience needed to meet developmental expectations of the people African.

Ikejiaku and Dauda (2011) contend that the primary cause of the crisis is the failure of governments to provide basic needs of the people. In such situation, the AU was expected to have started in time to prevent the conflict from being violent by causing the governments to consider the people's material and non material needs as paramount priority if the organization has got such powers and will. This shows that response to conflict is better started before the conflict gets to violent stage. It is in the light of this necessity that the paper states that the AU should stress the improvement of institutions of governance so as to be able to persuade governments to provide basic needs to their populations.

Hettne and Soderbaum (1998) believe that causal relationship between armed conflict and underdevelopment is complex and the analyses and prognoses that link them require qualification. Recent studies, the paper argues, suggest that while poverty can create the desperation that fuels conflict, their precise causal linkage is not quite evident because there are remarkable poor societies that are peaceful, and richer societies that are mired in violence. This paper draws our attention to the fact every conflict cannot be seen as an outcome of poverty and underdevelopment without specific analysis of the relationship between the two variables in the case in question.

In his response to general political leadership in African, Wyk (2007) posits that perspectives on political leadership in African vary from “Criminalization” of the state to political leadership as dispensing patrimony, the recycling of elites and the use of state power and resources to consolidate private political and economic powers. He pinpoints dictatorship and political monopoly as major problems facing the continent. This goes in line with Gaddafi’s averred dictatorship and political monopoly of Libyan state system, an issue perceived as part of the causes of the crisis.

Shinkaiye (2006) argues that one of the challenges facing Africa bothers on the difficulties of actualising AU’s democracy and human right goals. According to the paper, the rules governing democracy are yet to be clearly defined and internalised, such that the outcomes of major democratic processes, such as elections, could become both predictable and readily acceptable. It claims that some of those who wield political power are disposed to bending the rules of the game in their favour, while those who perceive themselves as outsiders have constantly challenged democratic processes. The paper also points at religion and ethnicity as two other major issues that have been politicised in many

African polities resulting in serious conflicts that have been a setback to the continent's democratic agenda. In continuation, the paper makes it clear that attempts by the incumbents to amend the constitution to enable them extend their tenures are some of the major challenges which AU has to tackle. This paper points at very important causes of conflict like that of Libya. The causes bother on the absence of democracy principles and ethnicity two of which are issues mentioned as causes of the crisis Libya.

Gaddafi (2011) emphasises that al-Qaeda took advantage of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt to register its presence in Libya and invade Libyan military bases. According to him, Libyans liked him (Gaddafi) and there was no problem in Libya until al-Qaeda's entry into Libya. He also revealed that the West accused him of supporting terrorism because he supported revolutions for the liberation of people of Africa. He was of the view that he had global idea on genuine democracy different from western representative democracy. It is not necessary to doubt Gaddafi's assertion; rather what is obvious is that the entry into Libya by Al-Qaeda or any other group was preceded by protests by Libyans, whether the protests were silent as Sevilla (2012) claims or violent.

Similarly, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, President of the Equatorial Guinea and 2011 Chairperson of the African Union blamed outside agents for sparking pro-democracy demonstrations in countries across Africa. He avers that intervention for human rights is nowadays causing a massive scourge in Africa (Malabo, 2011). Nguema was the presiding chairperson of the AU when Libyan crisis was ongoing in 2011. He is one of the dictators such pro-democracy protests tended to oust from power. As a dictator, he was not expected to support anti-establishment protests, particularly when he is afraid of being affected by such actions. He fails to tell his audience how sit-tight syndrome and suppressive rule

in Africa contributed to agitations and opportunity for imperial intervention. We agree that outside agents instigated the civilian population but that was possible because of the unaccepted conditions such population found themselves and they accepted external support as a measure for freedom. Internal realities should first be put into consideration before the outside agents are blamed. If the likes of Nguema, Gaddafi, Mugabe and Diya of Cameroon organised their houses, NATO and other such outside agents could not have seen the opportunity to strike.

Sevilla (2012) maintains that the “Arab Spring” phenomenon is undeniably the most significant event that has changed the political landscape of Middle East and North African regions. According to him, the phenomenon combined the economic and political elements of revolution with the power of social media tools such as Twitter and Facebook. The paper identifies three important causative issues to the crisis namely: the absence of highly organised political groups to challenge Muammar Gaddafi, the online importance of Twitter and Facebook and persistent demands to oust Gaddafi.

Simply put, the paper tries to express that due to absence of highly organised group which could have pressurised Gaddafi to yield to the people’s demands, the available option became the crisis. Secondly, it shows the causative importance of Twitter and Facebook in sensitising and mobilising the people and the world for the crisis, and finally the unanswered demands for Gaddafi to relinquish power. The paper reveals that much of Libyan wealth under Gaddafi was concentrated among Gaddafi’s families, friends and business conglomerates while the expectations of the Libyan populace were continuously unmet by the government.

He argues that many Libyans remained skeptical about Gaddafi's reforms and did not believe that those reforms could transform into greater economic opportunities for them in relation to their rich and influential countrymen. Their dissatisfaction, he says, only resulted in "silent protest" due to Gaddafi's zero tolerance to political opposition but fire of uprising in Tunisia and Egypt created a spontaneous reaction in Libya, leading to humanitarian situation that eventually attracted intervention from global community who for many decades had been waiting for the opportunity to see Libya without Gaddafi.

On the other hand, some scholars see external conditions and factors as the causes of 2011 Libya crisis. Chipaike (2012) emphasises that Libyan crisis is the beginning of the renewed militarisation of the scramble for African resources of this present age. He posits that notwithstanding the need for political reform in a dictatorship, as Libya was under Gaddafi, the involvement of the Western backed NATO clearly displayed extra motives. According to him, in an age where the United States is acting like an international war monger on the loose, mainly with economic and security interests in mind, Libya has become another unfortunate example of a country destroyed for purposes of making profit out of the wreckages and debris of war. An earlier example in which, he quotes Klein (2007), was Iraq where, according to him, various corporations snapped profits from oil and reconstruction contracts.

In his attempt to unveil the interplay of political and economic interests on one hand and humanitarian intervention on the other hand underlying Libyan revolution, Nwozor (2012) declares that though Gaddafi has been swept away by the Libyan Revolution, it was the coalition of Western Powers rather than Libyan people that achieved that feat. While Libya is free from Gaddafi, the paper maintains that it is not free from the stranglehold of capitalist interests of

NATO countries. Libya, it argues, will have to contend with the quest for another freedom to carve its way of development outside Euro-American orthodoxy. According to the paper, NATO's intervention in Libya was motivated by oil interest, access to Mediterranean coast and the desert for military bases. It concludes that having ousted Gaddafi, Libya has been brought under the umbrella of new imperialism. As if he knew, the situation in Libya today is the fact that powerful economic and political nations are now in contest over who will neo-colonially control Libya and this has made the post-Gaddafi conflict difficult to resolve as the interests of these major contenders clash. Each tries to protect her interest in the resolution chess board.

Nwozor's central view on the motive behind western intervention in Libya is in consonance with that of Sevilla (2012) which though pinpoints on the internal dissatisfactions of Libyans, but emphasises on political and economic motivations that informed the UN powered western intervention. Their views are clear interpretations of the nature of Euro-American foreign policy actions and their causative effect to conflicts in Africa. They expose high cost of western humanitarian intervention in Africa and implies the reason why AU's conflict response options would have been better and safer if it had succeeded. Their opinion justifies not only this study but as well others that have the same intention of strengthening the AU for better conflict capacity. When blended with Mackie and Bossuyt (2010) exposition of imperial EU partnership with AU, they are capable of offering meaningful insight into the external factors that worked for AU's failure in Libya

As part of what actually contributed to the causes of the Libyan crisis, Birrel (2012) has this to say:

Just under a year ago, I travelled around Libya posing as a tourist to talk to the people planning the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi... the activists were pessimistic that they would manage to overthrow the dictator who had ruled for 42 years; one put the chance of success at just 20 percent. Yesterday, I spoke to the same man, Ramada Jarbou, a prominent writer about the astonishing events that have transformed his nation since we met. The gamble paid off, he said, although at the cost of 50,000 Libyan lives, with thousands more injured. This is the price you pay for freedom.

For Alaaldin (2012) Libyan crisis erupted after the protesters took to the street following the arrest on February 14th of human rights lawyer Fathi Teibil, who represented relatives of more than one thousand prisoner massacred by security forces in Tripoli's infamous Abu Salim jail in 1996. The report shows that close to two thousand people gathered outside the regime's office to demand Salim's release. A day of rage was finally announced for February 17th at which point protest erupted across the country especially, at the eastern towns and cities which had the history of rebelling against Gaddafi's regime.

Laporte and Mackie (2010) contend that political intentions have not always been translated into actions. According to them, it has become clear that many African leaders did not want to give up any of their national sovereign. They see the constitutive Act of 2002 that underpins the creation of the AU as a compromise between partisans of federal union (endowed with supranational competences) and those who resisted this ambitious vision and did not want to give up their national sovereignty.

Shah(2011) states that the crisis in Libya came in the context of a wider unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa. According to the paper, the surge of what looked like spontaneous and ground up pro-democracy protests had been spreading throughout a region long controlled by authoritarian regimes from left and right of political spectrum, and both pro and anti-West. The paper further states that since Libya's Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, he

had been seen as international pariah and his brutal willingness to kill civilians that threatened his position had been clear for all to see. Yet, until the recent crisis, the west had been opening up to him and was keen to do mostly oil and arms business with him as they have been doing with various others in the region.

For Vira, et al (2011), there has been speculation that Libya could become a jihadist sanctuary for groups allied to al-Qaeda, which may be overblown, but must be taken into consideration. Vira points at the major fear of western powers about Gaddafi. The west has been fearful of any revolutionary power in the Middle East particularly the likes of Gaddafi's Libya that have anti-capitalist philosophy.

Mammodova (2011) believes that Muammar Gaddafi's monopoly and personalisation of the power he claimed to be with the people's committees and congresses and Tripolitania-Cyrenaica-Fezzan political rivalry were the causes of the Libyan conflict.

Akpuru-Aja, (2007) states that conflict involves two or more parties in opposition to interests, principles, practices or strategies. As a working definition he defines conflict as an attitude, behaviour, action or a process that induces strains and stresses in the relationship between two or more parties on say the attainment of a set of interest or goals. He is of the view that insensitivity to conflict indicators creates a situation of violence. Conflict can be avoided if parties are sensitive and responsive to addressing the early conflict signals before they graduate or transit into an explosive conflict situation.

He explains that conflict can be functional or dysfunctional. Dysfunctional conflict, according to him, can disintegrate a system if allowed to escalate and is negative, with destructive intent, actions and inactions that can work against system maintenance. In the functional dimension, he maintains that conflict is constructive or functional when it improves quality of decision, stimulates creativity and innovation or become productive in a way that improves the system. Conflict, he says can result from: (a) poor communication (b) lack of openness between people and (c) inability to detect and work on the early signs or indicator of conflict like clash of political, economic, military, strategic, ideological and territorial interests.

Akpuru-Aja (2007), Burton (2009) and Ofoeze (2009) among others see conflict as an integral part of social interaction and can bring about positive change but is destructive if not managed. The above scholars are of the view that insensitivity to conflict indicators can cause violence and escalation of violent conflict. They emphasise the need for proactive response to conflict situation. They agree that struggle for power, status, survival, personality development, wealth, recognition, identity and security are the basic causes of conflicts.

Baylis, et al (2011) argue when the state losses the legitimacy to rule, the domestic order breaks down to disorder and the resulting anarchy inside the state is analogous to the anarchy among states in the international system. In such a situation, structural realists like Kennet Waltz and Jean Jacques Rousseau argue that different groups inside the state will vie for power in an attempt to gain sense of security. According to them, when sovereign authority of the state collapses, internal wars happen for many of the same reasons that wars between states happen. (Baylis, et al 2011)

In an attempt to examine the effect of globalization on socio-political conflicts in Nigeria, Oddih (2009) conceptualizes the word conflict to connote a serious disagreement, an argument, a struggle, a fight, a serious difference of opinions, a clash and opposition between parties etc. Njoku (2009) submits that conflict is part of human condition, and it cannot be avoided in all human organisations. He avers that personal differences, animosities, and competition for scarce resources among others can cause conflict.

Importantly, Zartman in Okolie (2009) states that conflicts can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories and interests. Okolie has looked at the three components of conflict response mission emphasizing that conflict can only be prevented, managed and resolved when apparent demands are made without necessarily eradicating sentiments, memories and interests. His explanation is educative on the three components of conflict response stages: prevention, management and resolution.

For Ifesinachi (2009), conflict is the pursuit of incompatible interest and goals by different groups and armed conflict the resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals.

Onu, (2009), is of the view that conflict can be defined as manifestation of hostile attitude in the face of conflicting interests between individuals, groups or states. The interests according to him can be on resources, identity, power, status or values. His understanding tends to unite Marx's, Weber and Burton's views on the causes of conflict.

Conflict according to Anderlini and Stanski (2012) exists in all countries and in every level of society. They maintain that conflict *per se* is by no means a negative force, rather it is a natural expression of social difference and of humanity's perpetual struggle for justice and self-determination. They are of the view that conflict if managed non-violently can be positive, a source of immense creativity and progress. However, the challenge according to them is to avoid the violent expression of conflict without suppressing the root causes completely.

Wikipedia (2011) calls the crisis Libyan Civil War, revolution or uprising which was an armed conflict in the North African State of Libya fought between forces loyal to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and those seeking to oust his government. It explains that the war began as a protest and escalated into a rebellion that spread across the country with the forces opposing Gaddafi establishing an interim governing body, the National Transitional Council. The encyclopaedia does not attempt to form an opinion about Libyan Crisis; rather it gives understanding of what the war was all about. Its explanation is only capable of making a fresh reader have a brief knowledge of what the war was all about.

Nibishaka, (2011) is of the view that the revolt in Libya was part of the series of protests that called for democracy and regime change that resonated across the Arab world starting with mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt that toppled the leaders of both countries and reaching as far as Syria, Sudan and Bahrain. The political protests, according to the paper, demanded an end to Muammar Gaddafi's 41-year reign.

The writer unlike some other author demonstrates the idea that 2011 Libyan crisis was not only demanding democracy but as well change of Gaddafi's regime as part of the causes of the crisis.

2.2 Review of AU's Responses to the Libyan Crisis

For Alberts (2011), AU seemed slow to act when the conflict has escalated. That was even when the UN and International Court of Justice had made their decisions clear. Alberts argues that AU's reluctance for action was perceived by international community as tactical backing of Muammar Gaddafi. Albert was of the view that AU was suspicious of France and Britain's motivation for humanitarian intervention in Libya and perceived the enterprise as a project in regime change disguised as humanitarian intervention. According to him, whatever anybody may say of AU's position on Libya, it has been perceived as at odds with the international consensus articulated in the implementation of resolution 1973 on the bases of which NATO justified her intervention in Libya. UN Resolution 1973 authorised UN members to use all necessary measures to

(J. M Okeke, individual interview, May 21, 2016) explained that African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis were based on what he calls political track as a strategy for resolving the crisis. This according to him was against the security tract adopted by the UN/NATO. For him, the imbalance between AU's political and UN/NATO security tracts contributed to AU's inability to resolve the Libyan Crisis. AU political track for Libya contained in AU Roadmap, paragraph 7 adopted for Libyan Crisis (i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities (ii) the cooperation of component Libyan authorities to facilitate the time delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy population (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including the African migrants living in Libya (iv) the adoption and implementation of the political reforms necessary for the

elimination of the causes of the current crisis (Dewaal, 2011). The approach resolved to establish an all-inclusive transitional government which would pave way for election. It was based on the aspiration of Libyan people to democracy and respect for human rights. On the other hand, UN/NATO security track contained in Chapter VII of the United Nations' Charter authorises member states that have notified the Secretary General, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements and acting in cooperation with the Secretary general to take "all necessary measures," notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory (UN Security Council, 2011). Okeke is of the view that the AU relies on the EU and other development partners for support and funding. But they disappointed the union because they preferred security track as a strategy for resolving the Libyan Crisis. Thus, the AU lacked the resources to implement the political track. Okeke added that AU members - Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon - were tricked into believing that UN intervention in Libya was solely for protection of Libyans. Thus, NATO bombardment of Libya and forceful dethronement of Gaddafi betrayed the principle on the basis of which they signed Resolution 1973. According to him the above AU members were misled by the United Nation's Security Council and there was no political will to stall AU's political strategy for Libya.

Kamba (2011) argues that AU's mission in Libya was a confused response and the same confused response to a dangerous situation was exhibited by AU in the Ivorian case until the capture of Laurent Gbagbo where Alassane Ouattara rejected the mediator appointed by AU on the ground that he was a friend of Laurent Gbagbo. She argues that African voices and sensitivities were brushed

aside by western powers. Some of the AU positions including a roadmap which came quite belated and its requests and demand were more and more ignored in western capitals like Paris, Washington and the UN.

According to the paper, apart from excessive use of diplomacy and political capital, by Western powers to meet their ends, it is the failure of the AU to take its leadership role that made Africa vulnerable to Western-led military interventions. She stresses that before March 17th 2011 when Resolution 1970 adopting no-fly-zone was passed, AU had failed to provide a firm and practical programme of intervention on the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi and that was not an isolated case but an unfortunate pattern of behaviour. She also accepts the fact that NATO ignoring the AU was a sign of AU's weakness in international affairs and declares that Africa's voice has always been suppressed and ignored, and blames it on the West and AU. Whichever way the argument goes, the fact that the AU was unable to resolve the Libyan Crisis remain unfortunate.

Kamba, maintains that AU failed to provide military intervention to stop Gaddafi genocide against Libyan protesters long before UN's resolution 1970 and 1973 were adopted. She submits that no institution of African descent is more responsible for our inability to address rising crisis than the A.U. and the institution is in greater need for actively taking stand on the settlement of the conflict in Libya. She is of the view that the AU was slow and confused in contrast to the Arab League, and Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) which called for imposition of no-fly-zone. According to her, A.U's position was correct but came with less clarity and without a sense of urgency. AU's position is contained on her roadmap as presented above.

Again, she stresses that the opposed position of the AU and the voting of the three African UN Security Council members in favour of resolution 1970 and 1973 portrayed a confused and uncoordinated response to Libyan case and reflected lack of agreement among African leaders over the situation in Libya. That, she said, provided the pretext for western powers to come in quickly and decidedly. The A.U, she maintains, has consistently spoken of African solution to problems facing Africa but has continuously failed to implement its policies any time the opportunity comes. Many, she says, pointed at A.U's weak statement as an example of the Peace Security Council (PSC)'s timidity in facing up to the behaviour of the western nations.

Gant (2011) avers that the A.U is widely regarded as a body ordinarily more interesting in safeguarding the rights of unelected leaders than of their long - suffering people. Gant is the Director for Global Security and Terrorism at the Henry Jackson Society, London. He argues that the African Union was right to try and negotiate a settlement of the conflict in Libya, but made no mention of the need for Gaddafi to leave power, consequently, the effort was destined to fail. Gant's position is similar to those who believe that AU worked in favour of Gaddafi. It is a pointer to the bias mindedness in the side of AU diplomacy in Libya. It is important to add that apart from bias, there were also signs of fear and unavailability of a strong military force that could face Gaddafi's army particularly when the west failed to give the expected support to the AU.

Ping (2011) expresses his surprise at what he calls erroneous reports which claim that the AU's actions in Libya were motivated by a desire to protect Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's regime and that following his downfall, the union is delaying recognition of the new Libyan authority in order to force the inclusion of Muammar Gaddafi's supporters into government. Ping therefore,

responds that these assertions run contrary to the decisions taken by relevant AU organs on the Libyan matter, as they do not follow-up actions that have been taken by the AU Commission. He expresses that such false assertions necessitated his public address on the issue on behalf of the African Union.

Ping admits that the situations in Tunisia and Egypt did not correspond to any of the cases envisaged by the AU's 2000 Lome Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government and that the AU like other international players did not anticipate the development in Libya, it nonetheless reacted creatively. He argues that indeed the AU exhibited the necessary flexibility, basing its response not on a dogmatic interpretation of the existing texts, but rather to contribute to the attainment of the overall AU objective of consolidating democracy in the continent.

According to him, the AU strived to secure a Libyan consensus on the establishment of inclusive transition institution that would manage the country until elections were held and that certainly implied Colonel Muammar Gaddafi relinquishing power to those new institutions. AU's ultimate objective, he says, was to avoid war and as a regional organisation, diplomacy remains her main weapon, and the use of force is always a last resort when all other options have been exhausted. Ping notes that an aspect highlighted by the Libyan crisis related to the reluctance of some members of international community to fully acknowledge AU's role in the crisis.

He maintains that the AU adopted the UN's first resolution on the situation in Libya, but at the 265th meeting of 10th march 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) agreed on a roadmap for resolving the Libyan crisis. The council, he explains, established a high level ad hoc committee to implement the

roadmap. In what he calls “letter from the president” Ping (2011) argues that the main objective of the AU was to ensure that the legitimate aspiration of the Libyan people to democracy was achieved. According to him, there was no conflict in the African continent that will be out of bounds for the African Union. He however, agrees that we need to see how we can expedite political transformation to keep external intervention at bay and avoid situation in which outsiders are arbitrating out internal differences.

At least Ping (2011) has made an attempt to prove that the AU made efforts to resolve Libyan crisis. Yes, it will not be analytically balanced for anybody to argue that there was no attempt by AU to resolve the crisis. Yet, the argument arose as a result of the union’s inability to resolve the crisis, particularly its failure to send military force to wage the war between the two parties. This is especially when we consider the fact that dictatorship like Muammar Gaddafi’s needed some measure of coercion to understand and accept AU’s diplomatic message.

In what Bodomo (2011) calls African Unions role in Libyan crisis, the AU chairperson, Jean Ping argues that:

...the case of the AU’s intervention in Libya is a classic example of how African efforts to solve the continent’s challenges go unreported or are twisted to suit a hostile agenda. Africa has long suffered either from a lack of exposure in the mainstream media, marginalisation, and misrepresentation or from outright silencing. The AU Commission has been baffled by erroneous reports that the AU’s actions in Libya were motivated by the desire to protect Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime...

Despite voting by the African members of the UN Security Council, Gabon Nigeria and South Africa in favour of resolutions 1970 and 1973 approving a no fly zone sanction in Libya and foreign humanitarian intervention, the chairman of AU commission, Jean Ping, reaffirmed in a local radio station RFI Paris that AU stood against military intervention in Libya.

He argues that AU's High Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libyan crisis would not oppose any discussion by the international community, but marked her reserves by abstaining before France sent its war planes to bomb Libya targets. (China Daily Information Co.) (CDIC)

The African Union's High Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya had said it opposed any foreign military intervention. A member of the panel, President Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania was of the view that the situation in Libya demanded urgent action and Africa solution could be found to that serious crisis. He maintained that solution to the Libyan Crisis must take into account the AU desire that Libya's unity and territorial integrity be respected, as well as the rejection of any kind of foreign military intervention. The Panel was composed of Ould Abdel Aziz, South African President Jacob Zuma, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, President of the Republic of Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso and Malian President. Amadou Toumani Toure. It was mandated to engage the warring parties and find solution to the crisis through all-inclusive dialogue.

Adegamhe (2008) expresses that despite the commitment to the territorial integrity of African states, the AU Constitutive Act explicitly acknowledges the right of the union to intervene in a member state in order to restore peace and stability, prevent genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Art.4(h), yet AU failed to intervene effectively. Yes, but the Act fails to provide workable and corresponding avenues for generating resources to finance the intervention. Therefore, AU's approach to the crisis was limited to diplomacy ineffective to persuade a dictator as Gaddafi to relinquish power or NATO backed NTC to accept AU's roadmap when military warlords: France, the U.K. and the U.S.A. may have promised them victory.

Sudane in Dembinski and Reinold (2011) avers that the AU's High Level Panel was criticised as an ineffective gathering of self-congratulatory African leaders who were ultimately forced to watch from the sidelines while NATO tried to bomb Gaddafi out of office. He further states that AU's credibility to act as an impartial mediator in the conflict was questionable, considering Gaddafi's central role as a prime financier of the continental organization. On the other hand, Dembinski and Reinold (2011) submit that though the three African members of the UNSC voted in favour of Resolution 1973, the AU PSC rejected foreign intervention in Libya. The rejection according to them was based on the suspicions of double standards in the application of R2P and hidden agenda pursued by the West.

The picture above depicts mutual suspicion between the AU and the West. The West, particularly NATO warlords did not believe that their interest in Libya would be protected by AU's political and diplomatic formula; otherwise they would have supported the AU with military force to stand between forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and NTC forces while AU's mediation went on. On the other hand, the AU believed that NATO had different imperial motives beyond the protection of the Libyan civilians and such motive was detrimental to Africa's independence.

In the opinion of Tran (2011) AU Peace Mission in Libya received a frosty welcome in Benghazi, because the NTC had little faith in the visiting mediators, whom it said were mostly allies of Gaddafi. It will be recalled that African Union sent a High Level Ad-Hoc Committee, led by President Zuma of South Africa to Libya to mediate between Gaddafi and the National Transition Council (the opposition rebel group). For a mediator to succeed in his function, he must enjoy the acceptance of the parties in dispute. AU delegation lacked

this acceptance and that is what Tran has pointed out. The inability to command respect and cooperation among the parties in dispute is a fundamental deficiency on the part of the AU.

MCkaiser (2012) reveals that by May 2011, AU's diplomats had succeeded in convincing Gaddafi to step down for a new regime in Libya – a fact little known to the West - but failed to implement the roadmap fully. Zuma, he says, never made clear, that he saw no role for Gaddafi in democratizing Libya, which left some foreign diplomats to assume that he still backed him. Yes, Zuma might have been reluctant and shaky in decision about Gaddafi relinquishing power. That was because of fear of Gaddafi and friendship as co-presidents.

He maintains that Africa's reluctance and support for foreign intervention in Libya was explained as misguided historical loyalty at best and hypocritical at worst, with variation of timidity and naivety characterising the bulk of the response. He argues further that more empirical explanation has focused on the relative weakness of institutions and mechanisms of the AU. He cited Paul Simone Handy as saying that the AU lack hard and soft powers, and generally is constrained by a deficit of leadership. His submission explores into Ping's view in his "letter from the chairperson." Ping admits that AU aimed at securing-democratic institution that would manage Libya until election was conducted.

He further reports that President Jacob Zuma of South Africa appealed at the UN Security Council meeting for better relations between the UN and the AU. According to the report, Zuma blamed the West for the weakness of ties between the two organisations. Sighting intervention in Libya, he accused NATO of running roughshod over the African Union's preferences on how to

prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa. This contributed to the AU's inability to resolve the crisis.

MCkaiser (2012) actually acknowledged what he called remarkable and largely correctness of Zuma's address but faulted his failure to blame AU and South Africa's shortcomings in Libyan struggle. MCkaiser was of the view that Zuma's handling of his country's foreign policy undermined UN-AU relations and AU's effectiveness in Libya. He accused Zuma to have in that address accepted AU's failure in Libya in the first instance and argued that western intervention in Africa constitutes part of the handicaps preventing the AU from taking decisions needed for it to perform its functions effectively.

He offered an insight into what might have been the reason for suspicion and mistrust between the AU and international community, particularly the West. Besides, the report does not only explain the nature but as well internal deficiencies and challenges pertaining to AU's responses to the crisis.

While analysing President Zuma's blame of the West/NATO for AU's failure in Libya, MCkaiser (2012), posits that AU was weak because powerful members of the organization like Nigeria and South Africa failed to finance the organisation adequately. He further stresses that African Union has no standby peace keeping force to do the Libyan intervention or take over from NATO. He blamed Zuma for failing to identify how the organisation was hamstrung by its own foibles. He reasons that Zuma should have understood that AU's weakness made NATO's intervention necessary.

Having pointed out these truths, MCkaizer should at the same time be reminded that without foreign backing, the NTC could not have snubbed the AU in the manner it did.

To this end, Waal (2013) argues that many African leaders feel aggrieved the way in which African response to Libyan conflict was thwarted and misrepresented. According to him, the South African President Jacob Zuma speaking at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) heads of state meeting in January 2012 said,

Your Excellencies, it is the view of the AU that the 1973 Resolution of the UN Security Council was largely abused in some specific respects. The resolution adopted on 17 March, 2011 as Gaddafi's forces closed in on the city of Benghazi, authorized UN member states to take 'all necessary measures to' 'protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack' provided only that they act in cooperation with the UN secretary general and keep him and the Security Council informed (para. 4). The resolution's previous paragraphs also called for a ceasefire and access for humanitarian relief, and acknowledged the AU peace initiative (para.2).

Mahadew, (2011) admits that the AU Commission and the PSC decided to adhere to a political solution to the Libya Crisis. The paper maintains that force is not the only way of settling crisis; accordingly, diplomacy, humanitarian and other peaceful means should be given priority. The AU should have resorted to force as the last resort to achieve its goals but was unable to do so.

Ajish, (2011) is of the view that AU initially kept low profile about Libyan crisis. Many African leaders, the paper argues have been receiving generous financial supports from Gaddafi which is probably a reason why none of them came out openly against him. The paper reveals that after personal phone call from Barak Obama, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1973 permitting foreign intervention in Libya. However, Zuma according to the paper also came out against airstrikes in Libya. It reports that the chairman of AU Standing Commission, Jean Ping stated that AU was

not consulted before the UNSC Resolution 1973 was passed and airstrikes started.

For Afrol News (2014), the African Union (AU) Chief and Equatorial Guinea dictator Teodoro Obiang Ngueme twice called Colonel Gaddafi to secure AU's support but other African countries rather support Libya's rebels. The diversity in interest here indicates lack of unity among members of the African Union.

Nsongurua in Ikejika and Dauda (2011) while responding to AU and conflict resolution in Africa posits that the AU was established in order to respond to the problem of conflicts in Africa. According to him, when African leaders adopted the AU's Constitutive Act in 2000, they were crucially conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflict in Africa constituted a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent. There was the need to promote peace, security as a prerequisite for the implantation of development and integration agenda. His submission is clear indication of what is expected of the African Union particularly on conflict resolution, peace and security of the continent. It was therefore, disappointing that the AU was unable to prevent, manage or resolve the Libyan Crisis.

Ayittey (2011) is of the opinion that each time a crisis erupts in Africa, the instinct reaction of the African Union is to bury its head in the sand or look for a foreign conspirator and then appeal and appeal to the international community for relief assistance. When crisis erupted in Libya, few according to him, expected African Union to distinguish itself by resolving the crisis. After all, it is a den of dictators, led by a dictator – President Teodoro Obiang Mbasog of Equatorial Guinea.

Ayittey's submission does not see any hope in AU as a way of resolving Libya crisis. He derives from AU antecedents to draw his conclusion. However, we should not allow such conclusion to blindfold our minds. Though, the AU was not successful in Libya, its previous inabilities to resolve conflicts were not enough to conclude that it should fail in Libya because change could occur at any time. His analysis should be based on peculiarities and circumstances surrounding the crisis than generalize out right. Every conflict has its unique components that differentiate it from others and such components should be part of the analysis. We may recognise similar occurrences but individual characteristics are as well are important aspects of analysis.

Shinkaiye (2006) makes it clear that despite efforts by the Union to resolve intra and interstate conflicts, such conflicts have persisted. This, according to the paper, has constituted a big hindrance to governance in African. The paper however believes that African Union despite these challenges is determined through its constitute Act and various actions, governance instruments and declaration to meet the aspirations of the African peoples.

Murithi (2009) AU's experiences in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia suggested that the organisation has much to do to improve its ability to deliver peace and security for African citizens. He relies on the historical occurrences to conclude what should have been expected of the AU.

Conflict prevention according to Akpuru-Aja (2007) is a pro-active measure that depends on communication channels and intelligence coordination to control and manage strained relationship before threats materialize as a conflict situation. It takes an advantage of Early Warning System (EWS) that is

designed to detect and respond to early threat or conflict signs for the prevention of norms and rules of peaceful co-existence.

Akpuru-Aja (2007) notes that conflict management is not an imposition on the two parties but works out better when the facilitators of conflict management are perceived to be neutral and objective rather than being an instrument of one party against the other. He perceives conflict management as a process that span the full spectrum of: **(a)** early warning system **(b)** peace education **(c)** conflict avoidance or conflict prevention by peacemaking **(d)** peace keeping **(e)** Peace enforcement and **(f)** Post-conflict confidence building measures

Imobighe (2008) believes that conflict is an inherent character of society as a result of contradiction in interests arising from struggles over material and non-material values of society. For him, society has to promote peace in its life so as to prevent violent conflict but if this conflict occurs, it has to be managed by preventing it from escalating. If it eventually escalates, processes of resolution set in. He sees conflict management as an integrated process or integrated system of activities comprising conflict prevention and/or peace promotion/consolidation; conflict control/abatement, and conflict resolution. According to him since conflict management is concerned with the ways and means of controlling and harmonizing conflictual relationship, and hence it automatically combines conflict resolution functions. This according to him is so because you cannot normalise relationship without dealing the conflicts between the parties involved.

Human beings, Imobighe (2008) explains, must of necessity interact and in the process make demands on their environment, their society, and fellow human beings. In the process of such interactions, conflict could arise due to the

incompatibility of the goal they pursue, or the means they use in pursuing their chosen goals. Conflict he concludes can be seen as a product of a clash of interests between those involved in some form of relationship.

For Imobighe, conflict management takes the following processes: (a) the prevention of conflict or peace promotion and consolidation (b) conflict control and abatement if the conflict occurs so as to prevent escalation of hostility and (c) conflict resolution, the level at which measures are put in place to deal with all the fundamental issues affecting the conflict. He adduces that when these processes are passed, conflict management is adjudged to have gone through full circle.

Okolie (2009) avers that conflict management seeks to promote the use of non-violent approaches to conflict as much as permissible. He however adds that when conflict degenerates to escalating crisis, other unconventional means including brutal force could be used to bring the crisis to appreciable control. He observes that the basic elements for collaborative process for conflict management are: (a) grass root community-based activity (b) good governance (c) communication (d) collaboration (e) negotiation (f) conciliation (g) mediation (h) arbitration (i) adjudication and (j) crisis management which sometimes could involve the use of law enforcement agencies to maintain peace

Conflict Management, Akpuru-Aja says, is basically the use of open and clear dialogue to assist opponents or parties not only to have agreement against hostile images or actions, but compliance to agreed resolution and strategies. It is a whole effort, process that spans through conflict phases to prevent conflict or its escalation, or restore confidence of greater safety to parties even when a given conflict is considered under control.

Weissman in Onu (2009) contends that conflict management refers to the measures that limit, mitigate and or contain a conflict without necessarily solving it. Ghali in Ifesinachi (2009) understands conflict management to span the broad spectrum of peace processes such as early warning systems, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post conflict peace building for intervention. Ifesinachi, (2009) made us to know that conflict resolution is the operationalization and responses to enforcement of the strategic provisions, goals and ideals of conflict resolution agenda. Conflict resolution, he says, emerged as an alternative means of resolving rather than mere pacific settlement of disputes. Conflict resolution he says is about abating violent conflict. He opines that conflict resolutions emerged as an alternative means of resolving rather than mere pacific settlement of disputes. Conflict resolution he says is about abating violent conflict.

Haus argues in Ikejiaku and Dauda (2011) that conflict resolution refers to all those activities that are concerned with transforming destructive and armed conflict along constructive and non-violent channels. He maintains that various conflict resolution mechanisms, such as mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and peacekeeping have been employed by different bodies or agencies to achieve the targets. His view is a demonstration of the importance of transforming destructive conflict into constructive and nonviolent channels through the instrumentalities of mediation, arbitration, negotiation and peacekeeping. These become effective especially when they soothe flared nerves and result to return of peace and order among the people.

The South African Development of Defense (SADD) identifies the following nine conflict management and resolution techniques (a) peace mission (b)

peace support operation (c) preventive diplomacy (d) peace keeping (e) peace keeping operations (f) peace enforcement (g) peace-building (h) humanitarian assistance (i) humanitarian intervention (Apkuru-Aja, 2007). AU actually did not intervene in the early stage of the Libyan Crisis apart from calls for diplomacy and dialogue among conflicting Libyan parties. Her intervention in form of peace mission occurred when war had escalated between NTC and Gaddafi forces. There was no preventive action to conflict signals and since AU peace mission failed, there was no room for peace enforcement. However, it is important to note that non-interference principle in the AU Charter does not permit the union to intervene at that early stage of the conflict. AU Constitutive Act article 4(h) only allows the union's intervention when it is clear that civilian population is in danger. More so, AU is still in cooperation with the UN to resolve the Post-Gaddafi conflict in Libya.

Onu (2009) explains conflict resolution as the resolution of underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party's existence.

Swanstrom and Weissman in Onu (2009:87) state that conflict resolution can either aim at resolving or terminating conflicts in an open and predictable process in accordance with legal principles or focus on efforts to increase cooperation among the parties.

2.3 Review of Factors That Incapacitated AU's Responses to the Libyan Crisis

Ping (2011) informs the world that African issues have long suffered from either a lack of exposure in the mainstream media, marginalization and misrepresentation or from outright silencing. According to him, the case of African intervention in Libya was a classic example of how African efforts go unreported or are twisted to suit a hostile agenda.

We agree with Ping that the AU may have been marginalised, misrepresented and outright silenced. However, it is important to tell ourselves that any effort to prevent African issues from getting to international public knowledge is only possible if we allow it. If AU's policies and actions are aired by at least national televisions and radios of the 54 member states of the union, such news must become world news. So it is only when we fail to report our news that it lacks public knowledge. Again, action speaks louder than voice. If AU had acted effectively in the Libyan Crisis, the world could have heard her.

(J. M. Okeke, personal interview, May 21, 2016) believed that AU does not have efficient leadership for viable strategy since 2011. For him, it might have been different if it were during Obasanjo or Mbeki's tenures. According to him AU's use of back door diplomacy was not inadequate. For him, while back door diplomacy convinced Gaddafi to accept AU's roadmap, it was unable to convince the NTC to tow the same way. The above views are responses to factors that incapacitated AU's intervention to the Libyan Crisis. They centre on leadership ineptitude of the union. Okeke earlier noted, while responding to AU's intervention in Libya, that the union was denied support by her development partners particularly the European Union.

Rupiya (2012) states that the AU found itself engaged in attempts to resolve complex conflict situations, with the international community as an active participant. According to the paper, the union has to fight credibility battle as an African organisation not taken seriously, undermined by former colonial powers and marginalised in the international security system. With limited resources, but boasting political legitimacy over African member states, to enforce the compelling tools at its disposal – such as mediation forums, suspension of

membership, withdrawing recognition of legitimacy and even imposing sanctions on truant political players and members states.

Rupiya has raised very important issues on the challenges facing the African Union. They bother on the fact that the union is not taken seriously in some quarters; pinpoints interferences by former colonial power, marginalisation in the international security system and with limited resources to perform these other tasks listed above. Are these not enough hindrances and incapacitation to cause a failure of success in conflict resolution mission? These are some of the issues we emphasize that have to be seriously considered in attempts to evaluate AU's performance in Libya.

Mugabe (2013) argues that Africa and the Middle East are facing renewed western imperialist conquest and the AU has failed the first test in Libya. For him AU failed to organise strong Africa resistance to western invasion of Libya and this has opened a door for further similar invasion. It is his view that Libyan war by the western countries was inspired to grab the country's rich oil and gas resources and he warns of a New Berlin Conference-style division of Africa by the big powers. For him, imperialist nations will not succeed if Africans unite and speak with one strong voice when faced with western threats. One voice requires also one action for Africa to achieve her goal in the international arena.

Kasaija (2013) concludes that the Libyan Crisis demonstrated that beyond rhetorics, the AU does not have the capacity to effectively respond to crisis facing Africa. The crisis, he says, rendered the notion of African solution to African problems' moot and it demonstrated that at the moment the AU lacks the requisite functional tools to actually operationalise the notion. He adds that AU did not have a standby military force that could continue from where AU's

diplomacy failed to achieve its goals or prolong the diplomatic process. He maintains that Gaddafi ignored AU's call for cease fire because he understood AU's weakness or inability to stop the warring factions militarily. He is also of the opinion that one of the reasons why AU failed to resolve the crisis was its inability to influence national policies of her members concerning the crisis in Libya. Kasaija is of the view that the AU's failed to resolve the Libyan Crisis due to lack of operational tools and her inability to influence her members to stick to AU roadmap.

He further declares that generally, the AU's interventions to resolve conflicts in member states have suffered lack of financial resources. He quoted that the failure to fund the AU observer mission in Darfur, Sudan is very instructive. Due to lack of financial resources the AU was forced to depend on donation to fund the mission resulting in the AU's ability to defend Darfurians being negligible (Zhengyu and Taylor, 2011). Kasaija's submission implies that AU encountered similar financial problem in the case of Libya as was in Darfur.

Again, he adds that AU has been saddled with the problem of fissures within its ranks, so that even when she intervenes in a member state the intervention is feeble. Her members, he argues, have not often spoken with one voice on issues concerning the continent and that was one of the reasons why AU failed in Libya. In addition, he concludes, that AU did not have the means beyond rhetoric to respond to Libyan crisis; the instrument which is a standby force that could have been deployed is still in progress.

For Chipaike (2012), AU's earlier inability to wedge a military intervention in Libya by adopting Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act authorizing its intervention made the ability of the union to resolve crisis in the continent without outside

assistance questionable. He believes that voting by three AU members at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for Resolutions 1970 authorizing the establishment of no-fly zone and 1973 for foreign intervention which resulted to the bombardment of Libya by NATO implies that AU does not trust its own capacity to deal with a conflict of such magnitude in Libya. He laments that the effectiveness of African solution to African Problem can certainly be questioned in the case of Libya and declares that AU's failure to wedge western militarization of the renewed scramble for African resources was caused by the union's inability to decide and organize military intervention in the crisis when earlier diplomatic option failed.

Reasons for AU's failure, according to the Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013) was first the decision by western powers involved in NATO offensive namely France, the United States and the United Kingdom to ignore, undermine and sideline the AU. It is clear from Bellamy and Williams' submission in Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013) that NATO began moving ships to the Libyan Coast at least a week before the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973. It was a clear indication that military intervention was their preferred course of action against the Libya regime of Muammar Gaddafi. The reason for this option they argue was due to their western historical stance against the Gaddafi regime, the geo-strategic importance of Libya and their need to control Libyans strategic resources.

Secondly, the paper further argues that internal intricacies of African politics among the AU states contributed in incapacitating the AU. It contends that though Libya under Gaddafi was contributing 15% of AU's operational budget, Gaddafi's interference in internal affairs of some states earned him very few genuine friends among African leaders. It adds that voting at the UN Security

Council by three African representatives: Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa in favour of Resolution 1973 illustrated a lack of strategic coordination between the AU Commission and these African representative countries.

Yes, one can agree that Gaddafi's relationship with some African leaders was bad and may have contributed to their support to the use of force by anti-Gaddafi NATO interventionists, yet we should not ignore Gaddafi's influence on AU roadmap and failure of AU Commission and Africa states to call for and contribute soldiers to Libya. There was an iota of sympathy and fear of Gaddafi in AU dealings.

In addition, the paper argues that AU partly failed in Libya because the NTC refused to accept its roadmap because the council was bolstered by the overwhelming backing it had received from NATO powers, Arab League, the United Nations and even some individual African nations.

Alberts (2011) reveals that AU's reluctance and slow in action were perceived by international community as tactical backing of Muammar Gaddafi and this suspicion adversely affected her performance and relationship NATO members.

According to Bryce-Pease (2014) President Jacob Zuma told the United Nations General Assembly that African Union's efforts towards peace in Libya were never given a chance. Zuma she says calls into question the UN's mediation role in conflict situations, urging member states to defend the independence of the world body as recent international developments had made UN's reform agenda more urgent. Zuma pointed at weak UN positions and the need for urgent reforms as the AU was not given a chance to prove its capacity in Libya.

Adogamhe (2008) argues that AU's Constitutive Act is short of workable adequate avenues for generating resources to finance the intervention and therefore, AU's approach to the crisis was limited to diplomacy ineffective to persuade a dictator as Gaddafi to relinquish power or NATO backed NTC to cease accept AU's roadmap when the military warlords: France, UK and the USA have promised them victory.

Feldman (2008) emphasizes that without strong AU military forces capable of providing effective intervention; many African conflicts will either remain unresolved or depend on forces outside the continent to attempt to impose a non-African solution on them. Feldman's submission has indicated the absence of a viable military force in AU which could have supplemented AU diplomacy in Libya or continued from where the diplomacy failed. He explains further that there are not enough trained troops, money and political will-power among the nations that comprise the AU to effectively intervene in all of African conflicts.

We may agree that African leaders lack the willpower to engage seriously in conflicts ravaging the continent. We can as well agree that money and lack of trained troops constitute major challenges to AU's response to conflicts in Africa. What baffles us is lack of commitment by African states to AU projects. We believe that serious commitments are enough to provide these needed resources. Rather their commitments are more to their individual national interests and personal motives. Conflict we know does not start everywhere at the same time in Africa and the people involved in the conflict are the same people which Feldman says lack trained troops and money. The question now is why can't members of the AU contribute money, troops and muster the courage and political will to face Libyan problem. The level of immediate and decisive attention ECOWAS gave to Burkina Faso coup saga in 2015 made the coupists

surrender and the interim head of state reinstated. Why did AU members fail to contribute troop to stop the two warring factions, keep the peace and find diplomatic or military solution to such crisis than allow such foreign intervention and the cost associated with it. No one country can defeat the rest in Africa if appropriate diplomatic and military arrangements are put in place especially from the beginning of the conflict.

Macke and Bossuyt (2010) points at the risk of a heavy preponderance of donor funding from the EU and other development partners, and raises the question of ownership and legitimacy of the AU under such donor funding. Macke and Bossuyt have made vital points on the economic influence of the EU on the AU under the guise of development partnership. Such partnership only worked for influencing AU by EU members like France and Britain but cannot work out effective plans capable of uniting African states the way European states are united under EU. Lack of unity among African states in addressing Libyan crisis could be seen as an outcome of such manipulative and imperial partnership. It is actually a dependence on EU not a partnership and reliance to such partnership faced a disappointment that contributed to AU's failure in Libya.

Thomson (2004) notes that the OAU soon developed the reputation of just being a "talking shop" and emphasizes that the continent's lack of resources and competing interests among states limited the organization's impact. In an effort to revive the potentials of the Pan African co-operation, the OAU, he says, was replaced by a restructured African Union (AU). AU serves as a unifying force for African people for continental development and defence in the global arena. Despite its efforts, intra and inter-state conflicts have remained some of the major challenges facing peace, security and development of the continent.

Sesay(2008) gave an insight into what transpired at the Claude Ake Peace Memorial Lecture, Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University. He acknowledges that some participants believed that AU marked a significant departure from OAU, while others argued that AU was the OAU without the 'O' and simply a new wine in an old bottle. This position is an indication that AU's failure in Libya was one of those OAU's failure transferred to the AU due to absence of a meaningful reform or change that can guarantee efficiency in the union's operations. It directs our eye to the weakness that has trailed the union from OAU to its present day AU.

Imobighe (2008) concurs that what has been taking place under the present AU arrangement is a packaging of the various elements of OAU's conflict management mechanism presented in a more holistic and detailed manner within the framework of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) instead of the Ministerial Council. He argues that OAU was deficient in peace keeping force, mediation and resource support, yet there has been no concrete arrangement under AU to deal with these basic problems. He emphasises further that the AU must find an effective solution to these problems if it is to do a better job than the OAU. It is clear from this submission that there was no fundamental transformation of AU's Peace and Security Council from what was inherited from Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In such situation the previous problems facing the organization in this area are bound not only to continue but to escalate. Libyan crisis and weaknesses exhibited by the AU in that crisis seem to be the outcome of an escalated deficiency of the Peace and Security Council, AU's machinery responsible for humanitarian intervention in and among member states. This creates the picture that nothing meaningful was done to have a better security or conflict management outfit than the one

inherited from OAU. Since the Constitutive Act Article 4(h) authorised the union to intervene in conflicts among members, the Act supposes to provide the tools for such enormous task.

Optimistically, Imobighe (2008) explains that since the transformation of the organization OAU to AU in July 9, 2002, there has been optimism that this change which includes a few new clauses and institutional bodies will automatically make it an effective role player in the high-tech global environment of 21st century especially in finding solutions to problems facing the continent. This optimism, he says, is hinged on the fact that this time around, there is a provision for a new mechanism, Peace and Security Council (PSC) which is expected to take over the functions performed by Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) and later from 1993 by the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution.

Hengari (2013), argues that the AU is equipped with more meaningful institutions, and therefore carries a stronger mandate, and has a more appropriate framework to intervene in armed conflicts than its predecessor. The formation according to the paper resulted to major shifts in African policies away from norms of non-intervention to an activist view of collective responsibility. The contention here is if AU is equipped with more appropriate framework for conflict intervention than its predecessor, how has the equipment improved her response to Libyan crisis and how collective were AU's member states in their response to the crisis?

Doubtful of this optimism, Ogwu and Alli (2008) argue that the AU must overcome certain challenges before Africans can confidently talk about a continental organisation that is comparable to European Union. According to

her, the major problems facing Africa lie in the realm of its economy, trade, transportation, communication and low physical and social infrastructural development. Ogwu and Alli have demonstrated the fact that African Union has some fundamental problems that needed to be tackled before it could be seen as a continental organization capable of doing what such organisations do. This revelation may have explained partly AU's deficiencies in Libyan crisis. We shall subsequently see the relevance or otherwise of this submission to AU's failure in conflict mission in Libya.

Laporte and Mackie (2010) believe that the constitutive Act of the AU has remained rather vague on the African Union Commission's autonomous role, its powers and the distribution of responsibilities among the various AU organs. They see this weakness as one of the reasons that prevented speedy African integration. The paper submits that making the AU work is by definition a long term and sometimes painful process. It points out that there are still huge contradictions that need to be managed carefully which need real leadership, strong and effective institutions at all levels. Importantly, the paper speaks of lack of internal integration and co-ordination of efforts to make the AU projects work. This has bothered on the inability of the AU leadership to bring African states together in pursuance of its goals. This may further explain the inconsistencies in policy and actions between AU and its members in the UN Security Council regarding their voting behaviour contrary to AU roadmap to Libyan crisis. While they supported the AU roadmap at the AU meeting, they voted contrary to the principles establishing the roadmap.

The paper further explains that since the start of the new millennium, the African Union (AU) has sought, a Pan-African institution to unite African so as to better confront multiple global and continent challenges. But in a rapidly changing global and African policy environment like this, there is need for more

powerful and effective AU institution with the capacity to assume strong leadership on continental and global matter. This, the paper argues, is partly an internal Africa issue but equally is about ensuring a unified African representation with a strong voice in international environment. They argue that the AU has made substantial progress in taking a strong lead in the integration of the African continent but still has a long way to go before it can claim to be effective and influential.

Other challenges according to Laporte and Mackie (2010:13) include the extent at which AU institutions will be able to enhance participatory governance and ownership of the pan African project by African citizens. To respond to these problems, the paper argues, the AU may well need to undertake profound and rapid reforms of its institutional architecture. This aspect of the report points at institutional weaknesses of the union.

Laporte and Mackie (2010)'s view is an indication that prior to the Libyan Crisis, the AU had not got a strong institutional framework that could back her integration and democratisation process. The Libyan Crisis and AU's response to it were two issues that bother on democratisation and integration. Our result will show if weak democratisation of institutions and inadequate integration capacity were internal factors that caused the Libyan Crisis or AU's deficient response to the Libya Crisis.

Shinkaiye (2006) reveals that despite governance and development in Africa the challenges of coping with large number of states (53) that differ with historical experiences and inheritances has to be addressed. This, the paper claims, has resulted in differences in the ways in which individuals or groups of African countries have tended to interpret and perceive the continental governance

agenda defined by AU and its related programmes. Shinkaiye points at social differences among African people which undermine unity in perception and interpretation of AU agenda for Africa. Though, he is not specific on whether this affected AU's performance in Libya, this submission reminds us of the inconsistencies between AU's roadmap and the behaviours of her member states at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voting on Libya.

Shinkaiye (2006) opines that international response to governance issues in the continent of African is treated with double standard and national interests by international community, particularly major global powers. This point explains AU-NATO relationship particularly their failure to agree on the ways to deal with Libyan crisis

Reviewing the campaign to promote African Integration based on an assessment of past efforts, Olukoshi (2010) stresses that despite equipping the AU with the Constitutive Act which gives fresh impetus to Africa's integration and unity, many challenges remain untaxed. According to him, lack of consistent African political support for integration and heavy dependence on external donor or support. In the paper, he called for a strong AU Commission or Authority endowed with necessary political clout, capacity and resources to be able to assume a driving role in the continental integration process. This according to him is an important political issue that require strong leadership and strategic vision. He adds that like-minded African countries need to entrust their collective sovereignty to common institution that are given appropriate powers of action.

For Salin (2008:15) the creation of the AU has the ultimate objectives of enhancing unity, strengthening cooperation and co-ordination as well as

equipping the African continent with a legal and Institutional framework which will enable the continent gains its rightful place in the community of nations. According to him, the cardinal motivation behind the establishment of the AU was the desire to deepen and enhance the cohesion, solidarity and integration of the countries and people of Africa.

AU's failure in Libya should therefore be seen partly from the absence of this cohesion, solidarity and integration of AU member states bearing in mind also that Mugabe has contended that with unity among states in Africa, the west cannot interfere at will.

Ero (2013) maintains that the question of African solution to African problems remains about the quality and capacity of African troops. According to him, many African armies have pretty dismal or depressed track record in their own countries and are often poorly equipped and trained to deal with complex peace operations. He argues that even Africa's strongest armies have been lacking. He adds that while African solution sounds more legitimate, intervention by African states are often no less controversial than more international ones.

Ero finds fault with the quality and capacity of Africa's armies and points at the issues of soldiers been dismal or depressed. This opinion raises the issues of lack motivation, incentives and general welfare of the military. It is an important factor in building a strong and loyal military force capable of quenching conflict in Africa. The controversial aspect of her view cannot be any other problem than the fact that when requirements for efficient response to conflict is lacking, the reactions that follow generates controversy.

Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) maintain that the AU has the limitations of financial barriers and dead of technical capacity. Their opinion has made reference to yet

another important variable required for AU to stand on its feet in conflict response missions. Technical knowhow and expertise in military, diplomacy, strategy and other conflict related fields are of paramount importance for the achievement of success.

Sesay and Omotosho (2012) say that African solution to African problem policy and its likes came due to several factors namely: lack of funds, inadequate logistics and dependent on development partners for peacekeeping operations even under the AU. Yes, Sesay and Omotosho are stating that the need for home grown solutions for tackling African challenges of conflict arose to tackle financial, logistic and dependency problems of the African Union internally. It is important to not also that AU problems requiring internal solutions do not end with the ones mentioned above. They traverse across other obstacles which include lack of unity and western interference.

2.4 Review of Previous Suggestions for Improving AU's Response Capacity in Conflict Resolution

Ero (2013) suggests that the goal should not be to find African solutions but to achieve better coordinated responses to specific conflicts, and ensure the better practice of conflict prevention. She argues that the AU and its member states are not short of ideas, whether appropriate or not.

Her point on achieving better coordination is a sound one. Again, her view has shown that the AU does not lack ideas but how to put it into workable and successful practice or actions. The workability is what requires a home grown solution which does not prevent copying of what others have done and giving it an indigenous character to achieve success and long term objectives of the AU in democracy, human rights and rule of law.

Agu and Okeke (2013) are of the suggestion that for the African Union to be thoroughly effective in conflict resolution it must be able to make its member states comply with AU's decisions and the AU has to critically develop the resolve to solve problems. The paper adds that AU has the build-in ability to become an effective player in conflicts in Africa but faces challenges that can only be overcome with extensive external support.

We can concur with Agu and Okeke that AU has the build-in ability to become an effective player in African conflicts. However, they contradict this opinion with their succeeding submission that only extensive external support can overcome AU's challenges in the matter. We disagree with this second submission on the ground that external support cannot lay a solid foundation for enduring conflict resolution system in Africa considering the imperial resolve by these external "supporters" to satisfy their national interest in the course of such supports. Their foreign policy objectives seek power in order to first satisfy their national interests. Any external support to AU is secondary to the primary interest of the donor and in most cases their primary foreign policy interests or the underlying motives behind the supports are detrimental to the interests of the recipients of the supports.

Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014) suggest that the AU should appropriate over 70% of her annual budget to a special fund for swift response to conflict emergencies. In as much as we accept the importance of appropriating fund adequate for swift response to urgent crisis situations, more attention should be given to programmes that will prevent such crisis. As such, if the AU appropriates 70% of her annual budget for conflict emergencies, what goes to such programmes

and other efforts aimed at entrenching democracy, respect for human right and rule of law in the continent.

Sesay and Omotosho (2012) advocate that the alternative way would be predicated on sustainable local funding, ownership and above all, do-ability, affordability and sustainability if it is to be successful. The above views are supportive of African solution for African problems. Local funding and ownership of the entire response package by Africa are necessary to make it home grown, workable and culture friendly.

Chipaike (2012) recommends that African leaders should not hold their people at ransom by monopolising political space as this creates room for world powers that thrive on creating chaos in the hope of gaining scores in the new scramble for African resources. His recommendation is a warning to those who still think that dictatorship or monopoly of power in Africa is still a fashionable adventure. It is a reminder that political oppression in Africa offers the opportunity for western powers to intervene selfishly.

Murithi (2009) states that the AU will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take decisive and necessary actions without which the challenges of ensuring successful peace operations will not be met. Yes, a leadership that is capable of bringing African states to speak with one voice and act accordingly.

Ogwu (2008) is of the view that the AU will first face challenges relating to economy, trade, transportation, communication and low physical and social infrastructural development in Africa. Yes, this is true but it is important to note

that conflicts in Africa do not only prevent such developmental possibilities but in addition destroy the existing ones.

Laporte and Mackie (2013) emphasise that AU needs real leadership, effective institutions and internal integration and co-ordination for it to function properly. They fail to tell us how these suggestions should be achieved.

Mugabe (2010) contends that with unity among states in Africa, the west cannot interfere at will. His suggestion is wonderful but he should have stated how this unity would be achieved and join hands with like minds to achieve it since he has been a long time player in AU.

Feldman (2008) avers that there must be a strong military force for conflicts in Africa to be resolved otherwise they remain unresolved. The same absence of how to apply suggestion is the case here. Feldman should have explained further to include how to apply his suggestions.

2.5 Summary of the Review

Fundamental causes and spark of Libyan crisis constitute contentious issues among scholars under review. Mammodova (2011), Sevilla (2012), Ikejiaku and Dauda (2011), and Oguonu and Ezeibe (2014)) are among those who see Libyans' dissatisfaction with Gaddafi's political dictatorship, repressive rule and corruption as the causes of the crisis. There is strong belief among this group that the inability of Gaddafi's reforms to convince most Libyans of equal opportunities with those close to Gaddafi in family relation, friendship and economic and political alliances was part of the root causes of the crisis. They also believe that Tripolitania-Cyrenaica long aged political rivalry contributed to 2011 political catastrophe.

On the other hand, Kamba (2011), Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013), Mugabe (2010), Nwozor (2013) and Chipaike (2012) belong to the group that points at the spread of the Arab Spring, western imperialism and western instigation of the NTC as the causes of the upheaval. For them, western interest in Libyan oil, and their attempt to gain strategic access to the Mediterranean region created diplomatic discord between them and Gaddafi's regime and the resultant power play between them led to the instigation of the NTC rebel group that resisted Gaddafi's 42 years old rule.

Our review on African Union's response to the Libyan Crisis features Mohadew (2011), Kamba (2011), Alberts (2011), Ayittey (2011) and Tran (2011) among others. This group believe that AU's response was highly ineffective and characterised by internal deficiencies. They point at the failure of AU's powerful members to finance AU Libyan mission adequately. In addition, they identify inaction, slow implementation, and poor leadership, diplomatic ineptitude and poor communication of AU intents as reasons for AU's failure.

However, Ping (2011) argues that the AU reacted creatively, tried its best and was consistent on her resolve for an all inclusive political institution that would transit Libya to a democratic rule. He is of the view that diplomacy was AU's best option in Libya and force the last resort when other options have failed.

Furthermore, our review on the challenges that incapacitated AU's mission in Libya features Rupiya (2012), Mugabe (2010), Kasaija (2013) Chipaike (2012) and their like minds. They believe that the mission was undermined by lack of credibility, poor organization, no military force and lack of finance. For them, AU lack unity, political will and actions needed for success.

On the other hand Ping (2011) believes that AU's mission in Libya was sidelined, ignored and not given adequate support by the international community and that constituted a major setback to the union.

Suggestions on the way to improve AU's performance emphasise on internal adjustments and rearrangements of the AU machineries and are presented in piecemeal. Most of them fail to explicate the way to apply their recommendations. Ero (2013) calls for better coordinated response. Agu and Okeke sue for cooperation among AU members, Oguonu and Ezeibe (2013) and Sessay and Omotosho believe in local funding while Chipaike (2012) prefers political pluralism. For Murithi (2009) political orientation is the answer and Lapote and Mackie (2013) proffers effective institutions. Mugabe (2010) and Feldman (2008) stand for unity and a strong AU military force respectively.

2.6 Gap in Literature

There is uncertainty over what caused the Libyan Crisis to the extent that it does not allow for proper differentiation of major causes of the crisis from their consequences. Also, AU's responses to the Libya Crisis are relatively unknown to the international community. The existing texts, as shown in the literature above, create a picture as if the union did not make any effort to resolve the conflict. Summary on AU's responses to the Libya crisis exposes lopsided literature that lacks analytical balance needed for true understanding of the subject matter. Ping (2011) is left to defend the AU alone as most of the scholars find the AU guilty of the unsuccessful outing. Even scholars like Imobighe (2008), Ogwu and Alli (2008) and Adoganhe (2008) who wrote before 2011 uprising were not optimistic that the AU would perform better without first tackling numerous challenges facing it. Yes, they might have

spoken the truth but their assertions whole have served AU better if they were more of encouragement and solutions.

Specific factors that incapacitated African Union's intervention in Libya were no clear. Existing literature mentioned, for instance lack of fund as a bottleneck to AU mission with clarifying how lack of fund undermined AU efforts in Libya. In addition, responses to the four basic issues raised by our research questions are provided in piecemeal without comprehensive and more encompassing identifications and analyses of possible answers available on the subject matters. This shortcoming hinders the acquisition of complete knowledge and undermines better understanding of the matter under investigation. Again, most authors fail to explain the applicability of what they have recommended and this is a major challenge to policy implementation.

The above gaps constitute major obstacles to efforts targeted at strengthening the AU in conflict response tasks. Thus, this study becomes a necessity.

2.7 Justification of the Review

In the first instance, the review has exposed the issues raised by our research questions. The significance of the review manifests in the fact that it has helped us to understand the basic opinions and uncertainties on the causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, AU responses, challenges that incapacitated the mission and recommended measures for strengthening the AU in conflict response task. We have been able to decipher uncertainties, gaps, paradigm shift, trends, similarities and differences in views and opinions contained in the existing literature. The review has helped us to grasp the direction of the study by exposing to us what previous writers have done, what they failed to do and projected us to what our research should focus on. As such, previous writers

have been able to point at numerous causes of the Libyan Crisis and basically emphasise on the usual handicaps that undermined previous AU missions. They were unable to specify the actual causes and consequences of the Libyan crisis. They failed to fill the gap created by public ignorance on what AU did in the Libyan Crisis and were unable to pinpoint at specific factors that incapacitated the AU in the Libya Crisis. The study therefore had the responsibility to determine specifically major causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, what AU actually did in terms of her general responses to the crisis and factors that specifically undermined AU efforts in the Libyan Crisis. This is because before our review of literature, the Libyan Crisis and AU's responses to it were even to us very blurring, fuzzy and highly unclear. Before the review, we belonged to the group that thought AU did not do anything reasonable.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter shows the blueprint, plan or methodology by which the study was executed. It enables our readers understand the way by which we undertook the study and helps give direction to the study. The chapter is the aspect of the study that explains the mechanics and technicalities involved in the study. It presents type of design, target population, sample, and sources of data. Others include method of data collection, data presentation, and analysis. It also shows the theories and hypotheses of the study.

3.1 Research Design

Historical Research Design: The study is a qualitative research. It employed historical research design. Historical research is the one that deals with the determination, evaluation and explanation of past events essentially for the purpose of gaining a better and clearer understanding of the present and making a more reliable prediction of the future (Obasi, 1999). As such the study appraised or evaluated African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis with a view to acquiring better understanding of the matters at present and making suggestions on what the AU will do to tackle her challenges and resolve the crisis.

Target Population and Sample: The research population is made up of the seventeen members AU Peace and Security Council's Committee of Experts. Three of them were selected as sample using purposive technique of non-

probability sampling. This technique allows researcher's discretion to hand-pick, from the population, individuals who have uncommon ideas, insights and experiences on the issue under investigation (Obasi, 1999). The technique was useful in tackling challenges associated with quality, accessibility and cost associated with the study. This decision is based on the fact that we gathered a variety of views from literature on this matter, and in addition we wanted to secure special knowledge to augment it. To this end, data from the African Union's headquarters Addis Ababa became attractive and suitable for our purpose. We realised that only a special few who were directly involved in policies, operations, information and communication pertaining to the Libyan Crisis at AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa could competently respond to questions of the study. Thus, members of Peace and Security Council's Committee of Expert were chosen as target population. The Committee is the brain that power AU Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa. Sampling method therefore falls within what is called purposive sampling. It is a non-probability technique that allows researcher's discretion to select from the population sample suitable for his research requirements. We believe that the sample can serve our purpose in representing the population of the study.

3.2 Sources of Data: Secondary sources of data were widely exploited for the study. They were supported with individual interviews. Such secondary data were sourced from textbooks, official documents, journals, internet materials, statistical records, conference papers, seminar materials, encyclopaedia and monographs. Others were interviews with the Head, Policy Development Unit, Department of Peace and Security, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Muammar Gaddafi's video documentary interview. Official documents included AU Constitutive Act, Libyan Green Book, African Union's Handbook 2014 and 2016 and AU's Roadmap on Libyan Crisis. We also used

AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) Report on Libya Crisis and Communiqués of the meetings of AU High Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya crisis. Others were Letter of the United Nation Secretary General Ban Kin-Moon to the President of AU Peace and Security Council on Libyan crisis; Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Index and South Africa's President Zuma's Address to the United Nations Security Council on situation in Libya. The study also used Report of the AU Chairperson on situation in Libya; NEPAD report on the meeting of the AU High-Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya, World Bank Report on Unemployment; chronology of 2011 Libyan Crisis and the US Arm Control Association's 2014 chronology of Libyan Disarmament and US relations. Video documentary interview was that of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of March 2011.

3.3 Method of Data Collection: In the course of this task, we visited P. N Chikendu Library of Political Science, Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nnamdi Azikiwe University Digital Library, Awka, Kenneth Dike Library, Awka, Anambra State and Centre for Early Warning, International Peace and Conflict Resolution, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka. Materials from those places were of tremendous benefits to the study. We also obtained website addresses for internet materials from AU's Desk in Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs as directed by the AU office Abuja. There were individual telephone interviews from three officials of AU Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A Video documentary interview of Gaddafi was obtained through internet download.

3.4 Data Presentation and Analysis

Data are presented and analysed in textual, pictorial, tabular, map and chart forms. They include (a) maps showing geographical divisions of Libya by the

Italian colonial administration (b) a table showing Libya's position in the World Corruption Index (c) an image showing anti-Gaddafi protesters as a sign of their dissatisfaction against his regime (d) a table of the AU funding showing expenditure and contributions from members and foreign partners (e) a bar chart showing AU financial dependences on foreign donors (f) a pie Chart showing local and foreign financial contribution to the African Union (g) a table showing few AU members who paid their fees on time and (h) a pie chart showing Libyan contributions to the African Union.(i) an image showing US Pan Am 103 Flight involved in the Lockerbie Bombing in Scotland before the bombing (j) an image showing US Pan Am 103 Flight Involved in the Lockerbie Bombing in Scotland after the bombing (k) a list of casualties and states affected by the Lockerbie Bombing (l) a map showing the strategic position of Libya along the Mediterranean (m) a map showing British Prime Minister and French President joined hands with NTC leader in united support for NTC in 2011 (n) an image showing NATO Secretary-General being received by NTC leader on arrival at Libyan Airport (o) a table showing the list of the US Post-War assistance to Libya (p) an image of members of AUPSC discussing the formation of inclusive government in Libya (q) an image of NATO fighter jets bombarding Libya during the 2011 R2P (r) an image of Libyans roasted by NATO bombardment of Libya in R2P (s) an image of Tripoli, Libya being bombarded and polluted with smoke by NATO (t) an image of air pollution in Tripoli caused by NATO bombardment (u) an image of fleet of cars burnt by NATO bombardment in Tripoli (v) an image of buildings destroyed by NATO bombardment in Tripoli (w) an image of a pillar of smoke burning in Tripoli due to NATO bombardment (x) an image of a NATO fighter jet burning Tripoli (y) an image of NATO fighter jets for bombardment of Libya (z) an image of a pillar of fire burning in Tripoli due to NATO bombardment.The idea is to

enhance the form in which our data appear and as a way to improving understanding of the study.

The study is qualitative research that applied thematic method of analysis. Its explanation falls within the adopted theoretical frameworks.

3.5 Trustworthiness, Rigor and Quality

Trustworthiness, rigor and quality of the study anchored on our adherence to rules, regulations, procedures and principles guiding the research. After rigorous review of a cross-section of perspectives on validity and reliability Golafshani, (2003) concludes that reliability and validity are conceptualized as trustworthiness, rigor and quality in qualitative research. As such the goodness of this study is based on the following efforts:

- (a) Serious attempts were made to avoid errors in reasoning
- (b) The study was strictly contained within the explanatory frameworks of the adopted theories
- (c) We avoided bias as much as possible in capturing and analysing viewpoints generated in the study.
- (e) Choice of data was based on relevance and needs of the study.

3.6 Identification of the Key Variables: The African Union and the Libya Crisis are two major variables in the topic of the study. African Union is the independent variable while the Libyan Crisis is the dependent variable. The research established the relationship that existed between them. It unravelled and evaluated how the later attracted the attention of the former and how the former responded and challenges that resulted to its failure to resolve the crisis. Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006) emphasises the importance of dependent and independent variables in a research and the relationship that exist between them.

3.7 Theoretical Framework

Baylis et al (2011) gives an insight into a number of theories of international relations ranging from realist, liberal, neo-realist to neo-liberal theories; Marxist, post structural, dependency, post-colonial, power, and centre-periphery theories. Others include system, conflict, cybernetics, and theory of eclectic synergism.

The nature of our study is one that deals with a national conflict that escalated to international scale with the interventions of the African Union, United Nations, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In these organisations, sovereign states constitute major actors and determinants of actions, inactions, successes and failures in what the organisations do. As such we adopt and apply realist theory of international relations due to its high explanatory capacity in the behaviour of states which determined the nature of the African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis and the challenges that undermined her efforts. In addition, we use conflict theory as it offers explanatory insight into the remote causes of the Libyan Crisis. These theories empower our explanations of both national and international dimensions of the Libya Crisis. They offer better explanatory insights into the internal and external conditions that caused the crisis and reveal what the AU did and the reasons behind AU's failure in Libya.

3.7.1 Realist Theory of Power

Realists claim that the theory is one of the dominant theories in international relations that provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war that is a regular condition of life in the international political system (Baylis et al 2011). It attempts to explain the behaviours of states as they are or from the realist point of view, not necessarily as they ought to behave.

Realist theory originated from the assumptions and works of Athenian General, Thucydides on the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta of the classical Greece, Machiavelli's *The Prince* and the ideas of others included in the classical cannon of western political thought. They look at issues with high sense of objectivity and from reality standpoints. Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Reinhold Niebuhr are some of the proponents of the theory. Thucydides and Machiavelli wrote during city-states' era while Kenneth Waltz, Hans J. Morgenthau wrote after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that established the sovereignty of the modern state system. This state-centric idea of international relations makes realist assumption state-centric in nature. Realism was inspired by inadequacies of the liberal or idealist theory which failed to recognize the central role of power among states in the international system by overestimating human rationality and mistakenly believed that since nation-states share a set of common interest, humankind can overcome wars. The outbreak of World War II proved the liberals wrong and this gave rise to the emergence of realist theory of power as a new explanation to international politics.

Realists emphasise three core elements namely statism, survival and self-help (Baylis et al, 2011). Waltz in Slaughter (2011) declares that international system is defined by anarchy or absence of a central authority. In such anarchic system, state power is the key and indeed the only variable of interactions because only through power can states defend themselves and hope to survive (Slaughter, 2011). States according to him are sovereign and autonomous of each other. Hans J. Morgenthau argues that international politics like all politics is a struggle for power to achieve national goals or interests of states (Baylis et al, 2011). War for them, is thus inevitable and a true condition of our competitive lives.

International politics is driven by an endless struggle for power which has its root in human nature. Justice, law and society have either no place or are circumscribed.

Hans Morgenthau in Oddih (2003) sees power as man's ability to control his fellowman's minds and actions. For Oddih, (2003) indices of power include actor's capacity to alter or influence the policies, priorities and choice of other actors; actor's capacity to wage a war or withstand external attack; actor's capacity to realise its vital interests in the international system; geographical location (power of proximity); manpower resources; technological skills; diplomatic skills; military might; transportation facilities; food; nuclear capacity; mass media propaganda; national economy and economic capacity. Power is influential. It directs policies and actions, sets socio-economic and political trends and orders and it is demanding, coercive and intoxicating. Power rules, dominates, achieves goals and it is dictatorial.

Realists see state as the legitimate representative of the collective will of the people. Realist theory of power is known for the following standpoints.

1. The promotion of national interest is according to realists an iron law of necessity. Each state actor is responsible for ensuring its own well-being and survival and should not entrust its safety and survival on another actor or international institution due to anarchic nature of international system or absence of a central authority.
2. Apostles of this theory emphasise the existence and importance of power in the international system and the competitive nature of politics among

nations and that states with greater powers are likely to survive more in the international system.

3. Thucydides and Kenneth Waltz argue that statism, survival and consistent self-help are the principles of action in the anarchical international system where there is no global government (Baylis et al, 2011).
4. Realist theory of power argues that national interest should be the guiding principle for national policies and actions in the international system. Friendship, partnership and international cooperation not guided by search for national interest is rather dangerous for the survival of the state.
5. Due to anarchic nature of the international system, the power theorists draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics/arenas and argue that when the state loses the legitimacy to rule, the domestic order breaks down to disorder and the resulting anarchy inside the state is analogous to the anarchy among states in the international system. In such situation, structural realists including Rousseau argue that different groups inside the state will vie for power in an attempt to gain a sense of security. According to them, when sovereign authority of the state collapses, internal wars happen for many of the same reasons that wars between states happen. (Baylis et al, 2011)
6. When different ethnic, religious, and cultural groups suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security, it is natural to expect that security will be their first priority and they will seek the means to perpetuate their own existence. As in the case of states, one group's attempt to enhance its security will create uncertainty in the mind of rival

groups which will in turn seek to augment their own power. Realists, therefore, argue that this revolving spiral of distrust and uncertainty leads to intense security competition and often to military conflict among the various independent groups who were earlier subjected to the sovereign powers of the state. (Baylis et al, 2011)

7. States under threat should form alliance and aim at achieving balance of power. Unfortunately, lack of unity and western manipulations of African States did not allow this to happen in protection of Gaddafi.
8. Reason of states or *raison d'état* is the fundamental principle of international conduct, the state's first law of motion (Meinecke, 2010) Realists are skeptic of the idea that universal moral principles exist and therefore warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interest in order to adhere to some indeterminate notion of ethical conduct. The need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality which attaches a positive value to caution, piety and the greater good of humankind as a whole. Machiavelli argues that these principles are positively harmful if adhered to by state leaders. (Baylis et al, 2011)
9. The theory teaches political leaders a kind of morality different from traditional Christian virtues but with political necessity and prudence. It has dual moral standard: one for individual citizens living inside the state and one for the state in its external relations with other states. It however notes that the state is a moral entity because it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist domestically.

10. The realists have suggested that anarchy can be eliminated by creating a central government. According to them, creation of multi-ethnic states might be a noble endeavour; they do not have a very good success rate. (Baylis et al, 2010:88)
11. For power to be effective and stable, it often takes the character of “authority” which also comprehends legitimacy or the capacity to secure willing obedience. (Gaub, 2003:249)
12. Use of force, coercion or sanction may be resorted to only when legitimacy fails to work. It is important to understand the relationship between power, authority and legitimacy (Gaub).

Though, realist theorists have made their points on the importance of power for state survival, man’s selfish nature and the anarchic nature of the international system; yet they somewhat failed to recognize the need for and existence of cooperation, friendship and partnership as other instruments of relations among states. In addition, realism is said to be state-centric, neglecting the impact of other non-state actors in its analysis of what happens in the international system. Despite this shortcoming, the theory remains one of the best theoretical packages to explain relations in international system and thus is adopted for our analysis. The above weaknesses have been credited to the theory, yet its potency or usefulness in explaining actions or behaviours of states in the international system cannot be overemphasised.

Categorisation of periods or periodisation of this intellectual package may differ among authors; the following categorization serves our purpose. (a) Classical realism: this is mostly depicted as beginning with Thucydides’ text on the

Peloponnesian War between the Athens and Sparta plus the ideas of others included in the classical cannon of western political thought.(b) Modern realism: 1939-79 including the first great debate between inter-war scholars and end of World War II. (c) Structural or neo-realism spanning from 1979 onwards including Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*

3.7.2 Conflict Theory

Conflict theory is multi-dimensional and as such we are more concerned here with Marxist, Webern and Burton aspects of the struggle for wealth, power, class, identity, security and survival as the sources of conflict.Machiavelli (1961) and Hobbes (1968)present human natural inclination as instinctually selfish and aggressive. Conflict theorists, Karl Marx, and Marx Weber, argue that struggle over scarce resources by individuals and groups of opposing interests creates conflict among them. Such conflict leads to social change or destruction depending on the way the conflict is managed or escalated. Theorists in this field believe that conflict is an integral part of the social interaction. It exist in social relationship in every society due to differences in interests, beliefs, orientation, aspiration, choice, ideology, class, power, status, prestige and wealth.

Conflict theory was founded by Karl Marx and elaborated by different scholars in different places and times. Other scholars who influenced conflict theorists include Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1909), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), George Simmel (1858-1918) and other founding fathers of European sociology. Max Gluckman (1911-1975) and John Rex (1925) expounded the theory in the United Kingdom, Lewis A.Coser (1913-2003) and Randall Collins (1941) in the United States and Dahrendort Ralf (1929) in Germany. They were all

influenced by Karl Marx (1818-1883), (Wikipedia Encyclopaedia, 2012 and New World Encyclopaedia, 2012)

Marx argues that the state gives cognizance to private ownership of property, making struggle for property a political one between the owners and renters, capitalists and workers, and other opposing groups. Material status enables one class to propagate its views and ideologies more easily to other classes in the society and dominate them. For Marx, conflict arises in production process over the struggle for wealth. Capitalists, he says, exploit workers through underpayment of wages and appropriation of the surplus values accruing from social production. This exploitation generates conflict between the owners of means of production (capitalists) and their employees (workers). While the capitalists or the bourgeoisie use the machinery of state to perpetuate its hold and exploitation of the dominated class, the exploited class resists the exploitation and these lead to conflict between the two classes.

In Marxist perspective, Nnoli (2003) argues that the struggle among different groups in society has resulted in the emergence of a victorious class (the dominant class) which establishes the state and its institutions to maintain its dominance and exploitation on other classes. Marx and Engels argue in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* “that history of every society hitherto in existence is the history of class struggle” What is discernible in Marxist conflict theory is that struggle exists between two classes over wealth of the society. It is between those who hold the economic power and those who do not hold power and those who hold power exploit those who do not hold power.

For Max Weber conflict does not exist only in the struggle for wealth, because non-material wealth like status, class and power are also resources that generate struggle that results to conflict.

Burton in Ikejika and Dauda (2009) is of the view that human needs, most salient in understanding social conflict are not only material (food and shelter) but as well include needs of identity, recognition, security and personal development. He emphasises that the failure of the modern state systems to meet these needs is the primary source of modern ethno-nationalist struggles. He however, points out that the level of importance of any or combination of these needs depends on the level of socio-economic, political, and cultural development of the country. Burton further, argues that aggressions and conflicts are direct result of institutions and social norms incompatible with social needs. Burton shows clearly here that ethno-nationalist struggles do not just occur without cause. They are stimulated by social circumstances in the failure of the modern states systems to provide not only material needs of the people but importantly needs of identity, security, recognition and self-development.

His submission depicts limit to human endurance against deprivation of basic material and non-material needs of the people. His theory is useful in explaining to dictatorial governments the need to take social responsibilities very seriously. It further stretches that in as much as material needs of the people is very important in making them happy and supportive to government, it is not enough since other non-material needs like identity, security and personal development are as important as material needs. This theory has explanatory capacity on the relationship between Libyans and the government of Muammar Gaddafi and can explain the causes of the conflict.

The basic arguments of the conflict theorists could be summarily itemized in the following manner:

1. Variation in class, status, power, wealth and high emotional involvement in group relationship cause conflict.
2. Human relationships are characterized by competition over the scarce resources.
3. Class consciousness of deprivation due to exploitation creates class conflict.
4. Violent conflict is an outcome of a deep emotional involvement with a threatened group.
5. Inequalities in power and reward are built into all social structures, while individuals and groups who benefit from the structures struggle to maintain them and those who do not benefit strive for a change.
6. Non-material needs of the people like identity, security and personal development also cause conflict if not met.
7. The failure of modern state systems to meet basic human needs is the primary sources of modern ethno-nationalist struggles in the society.
8. Conflict is caused by unmet psychological and physiological human needs not only by conflicting interests.

3.8 Application of Realist and Conflict Theories to the Study

Going by realist and conflict theories, conflict erupted in Libya as a result of government's loss of legitimacy to rule Libyans under Muammar Gaddafi as a result of failure to meet their material and non-material needs. The causes of the crisis are also understood from the behaviours of western imperial states that interfered in Libya in pursuit of their foreign policy interests. The crisis escalated to a civil war when Libyan state sovereignty became challenged by

the insurgents. The internal order degenerated to disorder and struggle for power reigned between Muammar Gaddafi and his supporters on one hand, and the National Transition Council (NTC) on the other hand. The crisis was internally caused by the struggle for power as a means for survival, security, recognition, identity, wealth and personality development of those who felt neglected by the government of Muammar Gaddafi's regime especially people of Benghazi areas who compare their social conditions with that of those close to Gaddafi regime. On the side of Muammar Gaddafi and his supporters, the need to retain state power, status, prestige and security were the desired variables which the regime fought to keep. The opposition group fought to regain their rights as bonafide citizens of Libya after a long period of humiliation, deprivation, intimidation and threats from the regime while the regime struggle to retain power in order to secure those principle, structures and systems it has built over the years.

This struggle, at a point, took international dimension when Gaddafi's increased abuse of human right attracted the attentions of the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Arab League and other international interests. AU's political diplomacy to the crisis could not achieve an amicable end to the crisis mainly because, as realist theory of power emphasises, states in the international system who were the major decision makers in the crisis considered their national interests first in their behaviour to the crisis. This primacy of national interest over other considerations explains the behaviours of members of the African Union as well as those of NATO, UN and Arab League. Contestation of power among states in the anarchic international environment determined the nature and outcome of the AU's response to that crisis. It explains the reason why AU member states were not able to speak in one voice as each considered its own national interest first. The

resultant effect was AU's inability to decisively resolve the crisis. AU members followed what suited their individual interests and left AU with unfulfilled attempt to resolve the crisis in Libya.

In what was called "Responsibility to Protect" and humanitarian intervention, the UN passed resolutions 1970 and 1973 for no-fly-zone and foreign intervention in Libya respectively. The situation created opportunity for economically and politically motivated NATO states to intervene in what Huntington (1996) calls "Clash of Civilizations" the clash between the socialist oriented Libyan Arab Jamahiriya order of Muammar Gaddafi regime and capitalist oriented liberal democracy propagated by capitalist NATO countries. While Gaddafi regime wanted socialist order, the NATO led capitalist countries wanted the imposition of liberal democracy in Libya as a way of creating conducive environment for expansion and consolidation of western multinational corporations and political control of Libya in what the US calls Middle East Transition (MET). Internal causes of the crisis and the resultant resistance waged by the NTC were the issues that ignited the burst of an age long hostility between Gaddafi regime and western capitalism – thus the clash. These two internal factors gave NATO countries the impetus to "intervene or interfere" in the crisis and by extension joined in the struggle for Libyan state power.

NATO's overt and covert manoeuvres, disappointment and disagreement with the AU overwhelmed, side-lined and undermined the AU's diplomatic approach and this gave rise to the argument over the strength and weaknesses of the AU and factors responsible for AU's failure. The theory, therefore, helps us to present and analyse the nature of AU's intervention and challenges that accounted for its failure in Libyan revolution.

3.9 Hypotheses

In response to our research questions, this study has the following hypotheses:

1. The Libyan Crisis was more fundamentally, caused by unaccepted internal conditions and Gaddafi-West's power game manifested in the struggle for power among relevant interests.
2. The African Union may not have succeeded in resolving the Libyan Crisis, yet, her diplomatic approach contained in her roadmap on the crisis remains a workable option for Libya.
3. AU was incapacitated by lack of funds, donor disappointments, no strong military force, and leadership ineptitude.
4. The African Union requires efficient leadership and a strong military force to control its members, finance itself, control western imperialism and conflicts in Africa.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIBYA CRISIS

Introduction

This chapter dwells in determining the causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis. To achieve a good result, historical overview of the crisis is necessary so as to show the background from which the crisis emanated. The way and manner NATO intervened and bombarded Libya generated the argument as to what actually caused the crisis. Both Gaddafi and AU were suspicious of the underlying intents of NATO interventionists in Libya. And there was this suspicion that external forces might have contributed to the causes of the crisis to achieve some economic and political interests. On the other hand internal economic and political conditions in Libya were seen as the root of the crisis. Existing literature was unable to clarify these contending issues. The confusion

that followed left no room for a reliable understanding of the fundamental causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis. Thus, this chapter, tests the following hypothesis:

The Libyan Crisis was more fundamentally, caused by unaccepted internal conditions and Gaddafi-West's power game manifested in the struggle for power among relevant interests.

4.1 Historical Overview of the Libyan Crisis

Divide and rule method adopted by different colonial administrations in Libya left two major regions, the Cyrenaica and Tripolitania with distinct socio-political identities. The division was a successful attempt to discourage the unity and integration of different segments of Libyan social system and thereby making them vulnerable to foreign exploitation. At the eve of independence in 1951 Libya had developed into two different political blocs (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) contesting over who will replace the colonial leader. The division created hostile political conditions and antagonistic relations associated with Libyans' struggle for power, wealth, identity and security. This hostility did not encourage integration of Libyans as one people with common destiny but rather engineered political rivalry that has continued to endanger peace and unity of Libyan people. Consequently, politics between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania regions manifested in suspicion, antagonism and hatred as well as political intrigues which at the peak led to the Libyan Crisis.

It will be recalled that Libyan leadership fell in the hands of different colonial administrations in different historical epochs. At the time of European scramble for African resources precipitated by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Libya fell under the control of Italy and was at different times divided into

Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan regions with differing and far spaced headquarters at Benghazi, Tripoli and Sebha respectively. When Italy fell during the World War II, Cyrenaica fell under British control while Tripolitania and Fezzan were controlled by France. At the eve of Libyan independence in 1951, the struggle for power and replacement of British and French colonial administrations had severed the political antagonism between the two colonies. King Idris, the former, Emir of Cyrenaica became independence leader of Libyan monarchy. The discovery of oil in 1959, politics of distribution of this wealth and Idris' closeness to western powers created more enemies for him, particularly from Tripolitania. Relationship between the two regions continued to be inharmonious that in 1969 Muammar Gaddafi from Tripolitania region overthrew King Idris and perpetuated a 42 year administration accused of concentrating development, wealth and powers in Tripolitania region and among those close to him. His government was forcefully overthrown in NATO supported National Transition Council (NTC), based in Benghazi, Cyrenaica region of Libya.

Maps showing Geographical divisions of Libya by the Italian Colonial Administration



Fig. 4.1

Source: Wikipedia via <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyrenaica>




Fig.4.2

Source: Wikipedia (2015) via https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subdivisions_of_Libya

The above maps show how Italian colonial administration divided and ruled Libya in three different geo-political divisions that created distinct socio-political identities and later contributed to political rivalry in the country. Tripolitania and Fezzan were later merged under the trusteeship of France while Cyrenaica fell under Britain at the fall of Italy during the World War II. The struggle over the control of Libya therefore occurred mainly between Cyrenaica region operating from Benghazi and Tripolitania operating from Tripoli.

4.2 Causes and Consequences of the Libyan Crisis

4.2.1 Cyrenaica and Tripolitania Political Rivalry

The above historical overview of the Libyan Crisis exposes a continuous existence of political rivalry between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica contesting for Libya state power and resources. The rivalry thickened as time passed. People of Tripolitania origin believed that King Idris favoured Cyrenaica more and when Col. Muammar Gaddafi, from Tripolitania took over power in 1969 it was a sigh of relief for Tripolitarians. The scenario presented above clearly shows that political rivalry was one of the root causes of the Libyan Crisis because the two regions had, as a result of the rivalry, developed different antagonistic identities. It led to the overthrow of Idris Government by Gaddafi, opposition to Gaddafi and Gaddafi's marginalization of Cyrenaica region. Cyrenaica suffered prolonged marginalisation in the hand of Muammar Gaddafi government and when they could no longer bear it, they started looking for an opportunity to resist his rule. Arab Spring and support from NATO countries provided the opportunity. Even post Gaddafi hostility among different armed groups, the picture of Cyrenaica Versus Tripolitania contestation of power is clearly visible. This position is vindicated when interviews with Okeke, (2016), Aghali, (2016) and Sanusi (2016) fingered internal marginalization of Cyrenaica region as the cause of the crisis.

4.2.2 Libyans' Dissatisfaction with Gaddafi's Corrupt and Repressive Rule

We should recall that in our literature review Mammadova (2011), Sevilla (2012) and Ikejiaku and Dauda (2011) argue that the crisis in Libya was caused by unacceptable living conditions of the Libyan people who compared their living conditions with that of those close to Muammar Gaddafi's regime. Libyans compared themselves with the people of Dubai and their fellow Libyans who as friends, relatives or political acolyte were either connected or

close to Gaddafi. Having found their situation inferior compared with them, they concluded that considering Libyan wealth, their living conditions were to them, unacceptable. They saw their political deprivations, economic and social inequality under Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship unacceptable. This is particularly true among those from Benghazi region. If not anything, the protesters frowned against Gaddafi's heavy-handed approach in political governance and his antagonism against representative democracy and human rights activists. This placed Libya among world pariah states (Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula, 2013). Gaddafi (2011) argues that representative democracy is undemocratic as it denies the people of their sovereignty and places it with their representatives. Gaddafi's strong hold on power suppressed the opposition and continued with his 'Jamahiriya' philosophy. He made Libyan state power private by using his children and close associates to occupy important government positions with the view to ensuring that state power did not elude his grip.

Again, Gaddafi was accused of different corrupt practices ranging from illegal amassing of public fund, reportedly stashed in foreign banks include US banks. He was accused of enriching his family members, relatives and political acolytes.

See appendix 3 for Libyan position in world corruption index 2008-2011. The table is an indication of corruption in Libya during Muammar Gaddafi's regime. It presents Muammar Gaddafi's Libya as the 16th most corrupt country out of the 182 countries under review. The least corrupt, New Zealand takes no. 1 position in the table while the most corrupt, North Korea takes no. 182. The table shows a slight improvement in Libya's corruption index from 2.0 in 2008, 2.2 in 2009, 2.5 in 2010, to 2.6 in 2011. However, that improvement remained

insignificant compared to Libya's position in the World Corruption Index ranking during those years. Nadeau, (2015) reveals that there is a matter of 2 billion Euro worth of Gaddafi's frozen assets in Italy including a fleet of Luxury cars, villas and land in islands of Sardinia, and Pantelleria, lavish apartments in Milan and Rome and shares in Fiat, Finmeccanica, Eni, Unicredit, Ubae, ABC International Bank, Bank of Emilia Romagna and the Juventus Soccer team owned by the Agnelli dynasty.

Considering the dissatisfaction and unacceptable living conditions in such corrupt and repressive environment which had dragged for decades, it became a matter of time for crisis to erupt. What is important to note is the internal conditions prevailing before the crisis. Again, Libyans did not take to the street because they were the poorest populations in Africa. Rather it was their comparison between their living conditions in one hand and those of people connected or close to Gaddafi's regime and people of Dubai in the other hand; and their experiences as Libyans that triggered their umbrage and zeal to agitate for change and when this change was delayed for a long time it became a matter of time for something to trigger violent protest; an opportunity they saw in the Arab Spring. We can therefore conclude that dissatisfaction and unacceptable living conditions of Libyans were parts of the remote causes of Libyan crisis. Their protest as shown below is evident that they did not accept the situations in which they found themselves. A comfortable person does not protest. It is the aggrieved that protests. In their judgement, Gaddafi government had lost legitimacy and realist theory of power argues that when state loses legitimacy, the internal order changes to disorder and different groups take up arms and struggle for their survival, security, and identity (Baylis et al, 2011). In addition, conflict theory identifies the struggle for power, wealth, identity, security and survival as some of vital variables that cause conflict.

More so, 2008- 2010 world democracy index conducted by The Economist's Intelligence Unit in 2010 showed Gaddafi's Libya as one of the worst authoritarian regimes.

Image showing anti-Gaddafi Protesters as a Sign of their Dissatisfaction with his Regime



Fig. 4.4 Anti-Gaddafi protesters outside the hotel where AU representatives were meeting Libya's rebel leadership in Benghazi (11 April 2011). **Source:**Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013)

The above image is an evidence of anti-Gaddafi agitators showing their dissatisfaction and demand for an end to Gaddafi's regime. They wanted immediate democratization of Libya. For Sikkema (2011), despite Gaddafi's efforts to build a socialist state, distribution of wealth has remained far less than equal. Libya has gained much of its wealth from petroleum resources, even becoming the world's 12th largest oil exporter. He reveals that Libya was one of the strongest economies in Africa but yet was deemed a rentier state which

receives its primary source of income by renting out its national resources rather than producing domestically. Thus the distribution of national wealth circulated among the elite leaving the youths and young adults in retched lives. They therefore, rebelled to get their shares of the national cake. This view is an indication that availability of resources may not entirely be a guarantee for good life; rather equitable distribution has a significant role to play in the improvement of the people's lives just as well as sense of belonging. Again, the way people think of their living conditions is another issue of consideration. This is because people from country "A" may be living better than those of country "B" yet those of "A" may consider their condition worse and are readier to revolt than those of country "B". When dealing with government, they may consider their security, survival, identity, equity, fair play, human right, democracy, individual and group development, recognition and their general sense of belonging as Libyans of equal citizenship. It is the way they understand their living conditions in relationship with the government that informs their behaviour towards the government. Libyans for sure had experienced long period of political deprivation. Muammar Gaddafi overstayed his welcome in Libyan seat of power. Those not favoured by his regime had wallowed in displeasure for too long. Even among those favoured by the regime you would see someone who might likely feel for a change of government, believing that he can equally lead Libyans better. Some remained with him due to fear. This pointer explains partly why some members of Gaddafi government defected to the rebels' side the moment they considered it safer.

In addition, Sikkema identifies increase in unemployment as one of the reasons for rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi regime. He argues that unemployment had reached 20% before the revolution, which had driven over 33,000 Libyans to live in slums and shacks unable to provide for themselves. Other factors according to him were his disregard for human rights and intolerance to political

opposition. He cites Law 73 of 1973 which outlawed dissents from the government – explicitly depriving Libyans from freedom of expression. The Libyan dictator he adds had the history of ordering assassination of political dissidents and such political terrorization went beyond Libya to the United States. Gaddafi, according to him, monopolised the control of communication and media with all news, whether in newspapers or television, being controlled by the government. We argue here that the perception of the Libyan people on their general living conditions in relations to the government resulted to the withdrawal of their legitimacy and resultant revolt against Muammar Gaddafi's regime.

Part of the causes of the Libyan Crisis is the allegation that Muammar Gaddafi's regime indulged in corrupt practices particularly the excessive amassment of public fund. He was said to have superbly enriched himself, his family members, political acolytes, relatives and friends with public funds and these fraudulent activities had taken place for decades. According to Gaddafi's critics he maintained huge foreign bank accounts particularly in the US and owned variety of properties.

The need to consolidate his hold on Libyan power, particularly when he started losing legitimacy from Libyans had contributed to Gaddafi's brutal practices. As legitimacy continued to diminish, struggle to hold on to power continued to bleed more and more autocracy and corruption until the situation led to demonstration and subsequent armed resistance that ousted and consumed Muammar Gaddafi's.

However, three years after Gaddafi's fall, Hauslohner in Tharoor (2014) reports that Libya is currently in the grip of perhaps its worst crisis since the bloody

2011 Civil War, when NATO-backed rebels eventually captured and killed the long-entrenched dictator, Muammar Gaddafi and dethrone his regime.

It is on the basis of the above severe antagonistic and hostile condition between Gaddafi government and the National Transitional Council that Okeke (2016) saw internal political and economic conditions in Libya as major causes of the Libyan Crisis.

4.2.3 Gaddafi-West's Power Game and Western Instigation of the NTC

Libyan colonial history, oil, Gaddafi's terrorist activities and production as well as strategic position of Libya along the Mediterranean region created economic, political, strategic and security interests which the west struggled to protect at all cost – with the desire to establish a neo-liberal democratic Libya as an underlying motive. Gaddafi's attempt to curb western interferences, exploitations and influences in Libya, Middle East and Africa and the desire to be Africa's super power got him entangled in some terrorist activities and production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which constituted a major threat to the west. Gaddafi stood firm to fashion out an independent socio-economic and political design for Libya different from that of the west. His *gimairiya* philosophy was anti-western capitalist and neo-colonialist philosophies. His foreign policy goals were Arab unity, anti-Israel, advancement of Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside, particularly western, influences in the Middle East and Africa and support for a range of “revolutionary” causes (Wikipedia, 2015).

Thus, Libya-west's opposed interests and disagreements resulted in some power games between his regime and major power blocs in the west, particularly the United States, Britain, France and Italy. The situation led to series of Libyan-Western attacks and retaliations.

Images shown below depict the conditions of what is known as Pan Am 103 Flight, model: Boeing 747-121 belonging to Pan American World Airways. The

flight was a victim of December 21, 1988 bomb attack for which the US accused Libya of involvement. Among series of attacks and counter attacks between Gaddafi and the West, the bombing was one of the most devastating blows on Gaddafi-West's relationship. The table below in fig. 4.3.3 shows levels of involvement in the number of victims the affected countries mostly around Europe and America with the United States having the highest share of 189 victims.

Images Showing US Pan Am 103 Flight Involved in the Lockerbie Bombing in Scotland before and after the Bombing













Fig. 4.5 Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_103



Fig 4.6 Images of the US Pan Am 103 Flight involved in the Dec. 21, 1988 Lockerbie bombing, Scotland

List of Casualties and States affected by Lockerbie

Nationality	Passengers	Crew	On ground	Total
 Belgium	1	0	0	1
 Bolivia	1	0	0	1
 Israel	1	0	0	1
 Jamaica	1	0	0	1
 Japan	1	0	0	1
 South Africa	1	0	0	1
 Spain	0	1	0	1
 Switzerland	1	0	0	1
 Trinidad and Tobago	1	0	0	1
 Argentina	2	0	0	2











 Italy	2	0	0	2
 Canada	3	0	0	3
 France	2	1	0	3
 India	3	0	0	3
 Ireland	3	0	0	3
 Sweden	2	1	0	3
 Hungary	4	0	0	4
 West Germany	3	1	0	4
 United Kingdom	31	1	11	43
 United States	178	11	0	189
Total	243	16	11	270

Fig 4.7 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_103

Fig 4.8 Map Showing the Strategic Position of Libya along the Mediterranean



Source:

Gaddafi-US Discords: The United States supported UN resolution for Libya independence in 1951. It raised its consulate general to a legation while Libya opened a legation in Washington in 1954 both of which were later elevated to embassies. However, nationalization of Libyan oil industry in 1972 following Gaddafi's ascension to power after 1969 coup, strained Libya-US relations. That was followed by a series of Libya-US power tussles and discords in their diplomatic relations. For instance, the US withdrew her ambassador from Libya in 1972 and embassy staff in 1979 due to bomb and fire attacks on American embassy in Libya. On August 19, 1981 two Libyan Sukhoi-su22 jets fired at U.S. aircraft participating in a routine naval exercise over international waters of the Mediterranean claimed by Libya. The U.S. planes returned fire and shot down the attacking Libyan aircrafts. When Libya was implicated in the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing, which killed two American servicemen, the United States, in what it called Operation El Dorado Canon, responded by launching an aerial bombing attack against targets near Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986. The US labelled Libya a "state sponsor of terrorism" (Wikipedia, 2015). Several sanctions were imposed on Libya following Gaddafi's refusal to hand over for trial two Libyan suspects for December 21, 1988 Lockerbie Bombing of the United States Pan Am Flight 103 at Lockerbie, Scotland which killed 270 persons (mostly western nationals). Though, Gaddafi initially denied any involvement, he later accepted responsibility and paid US\$2.7 billion compensations to the families of 270 people who died in the bombing. His instalmental payment went along with lifting of several sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN and western nations. Despite Gaddafi's acceptance of responsibility for the bombing, the convicted suspect, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi continuously claimed innocence until he was released on compassionate ground after staying about 8years in prison.

US Arms Control Association (2014) chronologically summarizes key issues in the U.S.-Libya relations as well as UN weapons inspection and disarmament activities in Libya during which Libyan weapons were exported to the US and Russia for destruction. See appendix 3 for a chronology on major issues in US-Libya relations.

Gaddafi-Italy Discords: In their title, *Italy and Libya, a Tale of Money, Oil and Colonial Scars*, Desiderio and Maronta (2009) posit that Libya was a key country for Italy in its relationship with the southern Mediterranean shore. However, Libya-Italy relations became soured after 1969 Muammar Gaddafi's accession to Libya state power. One year after Gaddafi took over power, he drove Italian nationals out of Libya and nationalised their estates by denouncing Italy-Libya agreement of 1969 meant to put in order the previous colonists' condition. Gaddafi's support for international terrorism led to the United States retaliation, Operation El Dorado Canyon which bombed Tripoli attempting to kill Gaddafi in response to Libya's bombing of La Belle Club in Berlin. Italian government's involvement in the retaliation was ambiguous and Libya reacted by launching Scud missiles against US installations on Lampedusa, an Italian island which though lost the target but almost drove the two countries into war (Liberti, 2011).

Libya and Italy have been historical allies that despite different diplomatic discords, Italy's ENI, the first and most important Italian hydrocarbon company working in Libya has never left the Libya. Italy is the first exporting country such that 17.5% of Tripoli's imports come from Italy; whereas Libya is the fifth suppliers of Italy (Liberti, 2011). However, Gaddafi's anti-west stance and involvement in terrorism aligned Italy with her anti-Gaddafi western allies and

her reluctant involvement in instigating and supporting resistance against Gaddafi.

In the case of 2011 Libyan crisis, Italy was caught between supporting his North African ally or its European and Atlantic solidarity and it reluctantly decided to side with western allies knowing the implications for failure in western alliance and Libya NTC which was likely to take over Libyan state power. Initially Italy was against airstrike in Libya but later offered logistic support and western pressure made possible for Italy to be NATO's military bases for the use of airplanes to enforce UN no-fly-zones in Libya. Italian government would have preferred diplomatic negotiation in Libya but it could not stand against its western allies due to dangerous implications such action would attract. It finally decided to put 8 bombers and 7 aerial bases at the allies' disposal.

Gaddafi-France Discords: France is a Middle East arms dealer propelled by its economic and security interests more than any other consideration. French interests in Libya centre on energy and arms, as well as the fact that Mediterranean region is strategic to international power blocs. French's double standard in simultaneous supply of arms to Libya and Israel during Israeli-Palestinian crisis was one of the seeds of discord between Libya and France. Gaddafi was backing Palestine. Again, the two countries found themselves in opposing sides during the Chadian Civil War. Libya accused France of direct responsibility for the escalation of the war. France-Libya dissension deteriorated when on 19 September 1989, a McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner operated by French airline UTA as UTA Flight 772 was destroyed by bombing killing 170 passengers and crew, including 54 French nationals. France blamed Libya for the attack and found six Libyans guilty of the attack. Gaddafi International

Foundation for Charity Association accepted to pay a compensation of \$170 million US dollars (Wikipedia, 2015).

Gaddafi-UK Discords: Libya was Italian colony for much of the early 20 century until it was invaded in World War II with Tripolitania and Cyrenaica occupied by the United Kingdom and Fezzan occupied by France. United Nations organised Libyan independence which became successful on 24 December 1951 under the leadership of King Idris. King Idris maintained a close relationship with the United Kingdom even after UK relationships with other Arab nations soured due to the 1956 Suez Crisis.

However, Libya-UK relations became poor after 1969 Muammar Gaddafi accession to power due to Gaddafi's combative anti-western stance, attacks and retaliations that trailed Gaddafi relations with the west. In this category were the murder of Yvonne Fletcher, the 1986 United States' bombing of Libya and the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in which the United Kingdom recorded some casualties (Dario, 2014). In addition, Gaddafi's involvement in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) made the UK jittery. It contributed to British support for ousting of Gaddafi. Thus, the instigation and support of the NTC for resistance against Gaddafi became a necessity.

As a result, western desire to oust Gaddafi out of Libya state power became a priority. When internal conditions, particularly, Libyans' dissatisfaction with Gaddafi's corrupt and repressive rule created the opportunity for the west to actualise their aims, instigation and support of the NTC for resistance against Gaddafi became their necessity and what followed was struggle for power among states to actualise their established aims.

At this juncture, we have seen that Gaddafi-West relations were characterised by power tussle which led to western desire to oust Gaddafi. Gaddafi did not accept their incursion into Libya, Middle East and Africa's internal affairs. Their interests in oil, Mediterranean region and establishment of democracy in Libya did not enjoy free access as they had wanted. The situation became worse following Gaddafi's activities and support for terrorism around Arab and Africa. Attempts by the United States, France, United Kingdom and their allies to tame him proved abortive. His alleged involvement in the production of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) constituted enough threat. Their responses were imposition of numerous socio-economic, political and military sanctions against Gaddafi and his regime and proposal for UN inspection and disarmament of Libyan production and stockpiling of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Western invasion and destruction of Iraqi Saddam Hussein was a lesson that contributed to Gaddafi's eventual acceptance of the western-inspired UN inspection and disarmament. With the destructions of Gaddafi's nuclear weapons, Libya became vulnerable to western invasion. The situation joined with internal conditions in Libya, particularly, Libyans' dissatisfaction over Gaddafi's corrupt and repressive rule created the opportunity for the west to actualise their aim. Instigation and support of the NTC for resistance against Gaddafi became their priority. They therefore, instigated and supported the NTC which in turn created the impetus for internal resistance against Gaddafi regime. When their tacit support to the NTC failed to achieve their aim, western invasion to oust Gaddafi became the next line of action. Their victory in the UN resolution 1973 created the opportunity for the United States, France Britain and their allies to mobilize for Libya invasion. Internal disagreement over the leadership and control of the invasion was resolved by inviting NATO, their umbrella organization to lead, thus Invasion Destroy Gaddafi, his Regime and Military, Tripoli became a reality.

Internal conditions for the Libyan Crisis had been there but for the courage to challenge and resist Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship. Before 2011, the fear of Gaddafi in Libya was the beginning of wisdom. With instigating support from western capitalist powers particularly the USA, UK, and France, Libyans got the courage to prepare for resistance against Gaddafi. The support was Gaddafi's punishment for disagreement and power tussle with the west. Part of these instigative actions is presented by Birrel (2012) when he says:

"Just under a year ago, I travelled around Libya posing as a tourist to talk to the people planning the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi... The activists were pessimistic that they would manage to overthrow the dictator who had ruled for 42 years; one put the chance of success at just 20 percent. Yesterday, I spoke to the same man, Ramada Jarbou, a prominent writer about the astonishing events that have transformed his nation since we met. The gamble paid off, he said, although at the cost of 50,000 Libyan lives, with thousands more injured. This is the price you pay for freedom."

Birrel is talking about their trips in 2010 to Libya where they addressed the would-be Libyan rebels on how to overthrow Gaddafi. Such secrete visits were parts of the instigations that built Libyans' courage to join Tunisians and Egyptians in the struggle against autocracy in the Middle East region. As such it contributed to the causes the Libyan Crisis. Without western instigation and support, Libyans could not have started the Libyan Revolution to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. This is especially when they considered the brutish nature of Gaddafi's approach to rebellion.

4.2.4 Global Democratisation Spread and Arab Spring

The end of Cold War between the NATO led capitalist west and War Saw led communist east, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, created capitalist socio-economic and political trends orchestrated to establish, expand and consolidate capitalism across the globe. The USA, France Britain

and their allies across the world became the propagators and apostles of this movement. Attempt to establish capitalism in sovereign states across the world required the existence of friendly governments that can allow flow of capital, information, people, products and the abolition of law detrimental to capitalism. For such governments, to exist, liberal democratization of states became a common culture for the apostles of capitalism to dissolve anti-capitalist dictatorships across board. It became a reign of struggle for power among nations, the apostles of capitalism and those who were under the tutelage of dictatorship or autocracy. The instrumentalities of the United Nations Organisation and its agencies became useful in creating the legal framework for global entrenchment of human rights, democratisation and rule of law. Democratisation therefore became a trend drifting across the world and dictatorship an outlawed phenomenon. This is even when democracy was not mention in the UN Charter by those who drafted it (UN Charter Article 1).

To the glory of the propagators of capitalism, the trend gained tremendous inroad into Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia but was delayed by prolonged despotism across Middle East and North African regions. Yet, western capitalism continued to give more impetus to democratisation of the region particularly in what the USA calls the Middle East Transition (MET). It therefore, became a matter of time for democratisation trend to gain momentum in the region. The result of the trend is what is known as Arab Spring where resistance to absolute rule became a commonplace. Libyan crisis was one of such anti-dictatorial revolt orchestrated by the ongoing democratization trend sweeping across Arab and injecting the impetus to resist autocracy. It show therefore, that democratisation trend contributed to the causes of the Libyan Crisis.

As the propagators of capitalism, prominently the USA, Britain, France and the allies followed democratisation trend, supporting those trapped by unrepentant despotism; Libya became under focus having been in west's black book for dictatorship and terrorism under Muammar Gaddafi's for four decades. As such, western foreign policy strategies for democratising Libya came into play. The need to mobilize Libyans for the struggle to "liberate" themselves became of paramount importance.

Birrel (2012) narrates how he went to Libya in 2010 pretending to be a tourist, to talk to Libyan activists preparing to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. According to him, one of them expressed his pessimism over the success of their move to overthrow Gaddafi. When he saw him again in 2011 after the successful ousting of Gaddafi, he expressed the success of their operation but regretted the high cost of human lives lost in it. Birrel's confession is an indication of western instigation and support for rebel group planning Muammar Gaddafi's deposition.

International media captured, as shown below, the picture of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy (left) and British Prime Minister; David Cameron (right) joined hands in united support with the NTC leader, Mustafa Abdul Jalil in Benghazi.

Fig.4.9



France's President Sarkozy (left) NTC head, Mustafa Abdul Jalil (middle) and Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron (Right) Join hands in a show of united support in Benghazi (15 Sept. 2011). **Source:** Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013)

Birrel's confession and the above picture are indicative evidences of western instigation and support respectively, to the National Transition Council (NTC) to resist Gaddafi government for their freedom. This support and successful overthrow of Gaddafi is celebrated in a show of joy by NATO as its secretary hailed the NTC leader on arrival at Mitiga Airport as shown below:

Fig.4.10



NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (left) walks beside the NTC's Defence Minister Jalal al-Digheily (right) upon his arrival at Mitiga airport in Tripoli (13 October 2011). Rasmussen hailed the end of the alliance's military intervention in Libya, which helped bring about the overthrow and death of Muammar Gaddafi. **Source:** Koko and Bakwesegha-Osula (2013)

We therefore, argue that the above instigation and supports of the NTC by western powers were part of the causes of the Libyan Crisis. This is because the unacceptable living situations of Libyans had being in existence before 2011 outbreak of war but for lack of courage enough to erase fear of Gaddafi from the minds of disgruntled Libyans. Western powers provided the courage by instigating and supporting discontented Libyans as a way of achieving their foreign policy thrust on democratization. This argument is vindicated by what followed after the 2011 Civil War. United States involvement in Libya development has provided the blueprint for developing Libya to a capitalist state. The US Special Coordinator for Middle East Transition (MET) said that

United States has strategic interest in democratically stable and prosperous Libya and is supporting Libya's democratic transition in cooperation with the UN and other international partners. Extract from MET fact sheet below shows some of the US assistance plan for Libya after the 2011 crisis.

Fig. 4.11 Table Showing the list of US Post-War Assistance plan for Libya

Area of Assistance	Nature of US Assistance to Libya
Democracy, Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights	The US collaborates with UN, civil society, government & media to ensure transparent, and broad public supported constitutional development to achieve Libyan constitution
Election Management and Administration	The US provides technical assistance and support for election, management and administration e.g creating voters registry in close cooperation with Libyan government, EU & UN
Independent Media	The US is working to strengthen local and independent media, and provide training for journalistic standards
Elections Monitoring	The US supported International Election Observer Mission for Libya's first national election
Political Party Development	The US provided technical assistance to new political parties.
Supporting New Representative Bodies	The US helped in developing programming to support representative bodies at national and local levels.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration	Assisting Libyan Government in Navigating the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia members
Justice and Security Sector	US is working with Libyan authority to support the delivery of justice and security
Transitional Justice	Working with government, civil society, and other informal community leaders to build transparent justice and reconciliation systems in Libya
NGO Development	Providing technical assistance to NGOs throughout Libya to bolster their administrative, financial and programmatic capacities
Public Financial Management	Providing targeted technical assistance to government of Libya to promote financial transparency and improve governance of Libya financial and economic resources.
Economic Growth and Facilitation	Providing technical advice to the government of Libya on public infrastructure-related projects and facilitating meetings with US businesses who can source services and equipments for reconstruction.
African in Diaspora Marketplace	United states added Libya to the 2012 African Diaspora Marketplace (ADM) initiative which encourages sustainable economic growth and employment by supporting US based Diaspora entrepreneurs' startups and established business on the Africa continent.
Women's Economic Empowerment	The US is developing an assistance to bolster

	economic empowerment opportunities for women by providing business skills training activities to women and key actors in the business communities.
Conventional Weapons Destruction	The US is supporting international mine action NGOs to clear unexploded ordnance and destroy unsecured conventional weapons.
Weapons Abatement	The US committed significant assistance for conventional weapons mitigation efforts, including the survey, inventory and disposal of known weapons and ammunition storage sites in Libya.
Border Security Training	The export control and border security programme is resuming engagement with government of Libya with targeted technical assistance focused on land border security.
Ministry of Defense Advisory Support	The Department of Defense is providing advisory support through the Defense institution Reform Initiative to Libyan Ministry of Defense to assist in the process of establishing defense institutions and armed forces that are unified, capable and subject to civilian control and the rule of law.
Chemical Weapons Security and Destruction	The US has provided support for improving the near-term security of Libya's chemical weapon and is working closely with the Libyan authority to facilitate the eventual destruction of these weapons.
Support for the War Wounded	The US facilitated collaboration between the government of Libya and US hospitals to provide advanced medical treatment to warrior who were severely injured in combat. The US also assist Libya to improve management and technical capacity of the Libyan health care system to care for the war wounded.
Refugee and IDP Relief	In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the US provided humanitarian assistance to international organizations and NGOs aiding internally displaced persons, refugees, logistics, water sanitation and hygiene activities as well as distribution of emergency relief supplies and food assistance
High education Tax Force	In may 2012, the US and Libya launched the US-Libya Higher Education Tax Force to expand educational exchanges and cooperation
Fulbright	Libyan students who were scheduled to participate in the Fulbright programme prior to the revolution have had their candidacies restored. In 2012-2013 academic year, Libya will send 14 fulbrights to the United States.
English Language	The English Access Micro scholarship Programme has three active programs in Libya – one in Tripoli and two in Benghazi – with a total of 80 Libyan students ages 14-18.
Cultural Preservation	The US is providing resources toward a partnership between Oberlin College and the Libyan Department of Antiquities to document and preserve endangered archeological sites.
International Visiting Leadership Programme	Approximately 30 Libyan government officials, youth

	and civil society representatives, women leaders and journalist will participate in three-week professional development during the FY 2012 fiscal year

Cultural Preservation	The US is providing resources toward a partnership between Oberlin College and the Libyan Department of Antiquities to document and preserve endangered archeological sites.
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Source: Extract from Fact Sheet, Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transition (MET) US Department of States

US-Libya relations as shown above are clear departures from what used to be of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi. The relations are not in consonant with Gaddafi's Green Book but programmed towards western capitalist-democratic system. The US is not only involved in the implementation of the programmes but is the sole architect of the blueprint modeled in line with US foreign policy objectives for Libya.

Mead (2001) identifies four schools of thought in US foreign policy which we consider as the determining forces behind the US interests in Libya. They include: a Hamiltonian concerned with US economic well-being at home and abroad, a Wilsonian impulse to propagate US values throughout the world; a Jefferson focus on protecting American democracy in a perilous world and a bellicose populist Jacksonian commitment to preserving US interests and honour in the world

Arab Spring: Demonstrations and subsequent armed resistance in Tunisia and Egypt to depose their heads of government triggered off the 2011 stage of the Libyan catastrophe. 2011 armed conflict in the Middle East/North Africa in what is popularly known as Arab Spring did not just start without remote causes. In Libya, there had been colonial antecedents and the resultant Cyrenaica-Tripolitania political rivalry, unaccepted socio-economic and political conditions of the Libyans, liberal democratization trend, official

corruption and western instigation of the would-be Libyan rebels before the political calamity started. What happened in Tunisia and Egypt or what is called Arab Spring only serves as a spark of the conflict. We can therefore, conclude that Arab Spring was not one of the remote causes of the Libyan Crisis rather it erupted or triggered an already existing antagonistic condition into a revolt or resistance against Muammar Gaddafi Regime in Libya.

4.2.5 Struggle for Libya's State Power

Violent murder of Col. Muammar Gaddafi and the resultant struggle for Libyan state power accounted for post-Gaddafi crisis in Libya. The crisis is an aspect of the Libyan Crisis. It was fueled by the murder of Gaddafi, dethronement of his regime and the struggle to form a new government of Libya. The crisis worsened by the fractionalization of pro and anti-Gaddafi armed groups. The situation provided for multi-faction involvement in the crisis and conflict resolution processes organized by the United Nations. Pro-Gaddafi forces have not accepted defeat even years after the death and dethronement of Gaddafi regime. The NTC on the other hand is claiming superiority over other factions based on its defeat of Gaddafi and continuous support from western super-powers. Interferences from prominent members of NATO: the US, UK, Italy and France in pursuit of the foreign policy objectives in Libya constitute part of the factor prolonging the crisis.

CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICAN UNION'S RESPONSES TO THE LIBYAN CRISIS

Introduction

African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis were said to be unclear, ineffective and partly secret. As a result, AU's effort in Libya was not understood or appreciated in relation to circumstances surrounding the Union. The blurring nature of the responses was so bad that some critics claim that the

AU did not do any meaningful thing in Libya. Though, Ping, (2011), argues that western media failed to publicise AU's activities, criticism against the AU's continues to grow. If left unchecked, such lopsided criticism without adequate consideration of conditions and factors that surrounded the AU and her responses to the crisis is capable of completely eroding Africans' confidence in their continental union. This chapter therefore, becomes necessary to make African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis clear and understood in relation to factors and conditions within which the union operated. Thus, we test the following hypothesis:

The African Union may not have succeeded in resolving the Libyan Crisis yet, her roadmap on the crisis remains a workable option for Libya.

5.1 Historical Overview of the African Union

Africa's experiences in slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism and general domination and exploitations of African people in the world gave room for Pan African activities that tended to uphold African culture and civilisation and resist any form of suppression of Africans anywhere in the world. The formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963 became a manifestation of this Pan African Movement of the 21st century. Thirty out of the thirty-two independent African states in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia took part in the conference that gave birth to OAU. The countries include: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote de Ivoire, Benin, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zaire – Morocco and Togo though not at the conference, signed later as also founding members. Twenty-one other independent countries joined gradually making a 53 member

organization in 2002 when Organization of African Unity was transited to the African Union. At independence in 2011, South Sudan raised the membership to 54.

It was in 1999, the OAU Heads of State and Government issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of a new African Union. They saw and debated the need to establish a new African Organization built on the foundation of the OAU by amending OAU structures to reflect challenges of the changing world. The need to unite all African states to face new realities of globalizations and the roles of emerging powers that were shifting the power relations between the North and the South resulted to the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002 (Adi and Sherwood, 2003).

The main objectives of the OAU as set out in its Charter were to promote the unity and solidarity of African states; safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of Member States; rid the continent of colonization and apartheid ; promote international cooperation within the United Nations framework; and harmonise members' political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies. The African Union's objectives were improved upon the above foundation. Three major summits that saw to the establishment of the AU were:

1. Lome Summit (2002), which adopted the AU Constitutive Act
2. Lusaka Summit (2001) which drew the roadmap for implementing the AU
3. Durban Summit (2002) which launched the AU and convened its first Assembly of Heads of State and Government

Objectives of the African Union (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act)

- a. Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the people of Africa.

- b. Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members;
- c. Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- d. Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people;
- e. Encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- f. promote peace, security and stability on the continent;
- g. promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- h. promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- i. establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and international negotiations;
- j. Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as integration of African economies;
- k. Promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of Africa peoples;
- l. Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the union;
- m. Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, particularly in science and technology;

- n. Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

Principles of the African Union (Article 4)

- (a) sovereign equality and independence among member states of the union;
- (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence;
- (c) participation of African people in the activities of the union;
- (d) establishment of a common defence policy for African Continent;
- (e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union through such appropriate means as maybe decided upon by the Assembly;
- (f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union;
- (g) non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
- (h) The right of any Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
- (i) peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security;
- (j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security;
- (k) promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union;
- (l) promotion of gender equality;

- (m) respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;
- (n) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development;
- (o) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities;
- (p) condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments.

Organs of the Union (Article 5)

- (a) The Assembly of the Union;
- (b) The Executive Council;
- (c) The Pan-African Parliament;
- (d) The Court of Justice;
- (e) The Commission;
- (f) The Permanent Representatives Committee;
- (g) The Specialized Technical Committees;
- (h) The Economic, Social and Cultural Council;
- (i) The Financial Institutions;

Source: The African Union Handbook 2014

5.2 Previous AU's Responses to Ivorian, Darfur and Zimbabwe Crises

Ivorian Crisis: The crisis between the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo and the presumably winner of the 2011 Ivorian presidential election Alassane Quattara attracted the attention of the AU when the impasse continued to consumed lives of many Ivorian. Self-declaration of winners and the resultant establishment of governments by both Gbagbo and Quattara set the two parallel forces against each other. The AU intervened mainly for the death and enormous displacement of person caused the calamity. UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that over 500 000 Ivorians were displaced and 94,000 fled the country to Liberia (Mahadew, 2011) The intervention was mediatory and

diplomatic as the chairperson of the AU Commission ruled out the use of force to oust President Gbagbo. As such the AU chose Tabo Mbeki of South Africa and Raila Odinga of Congo as mediator between Gbagbo and Quattara. The AU condemned April 4th French military operation and UN's support for use of force to oust President Gbagbo. The chairman of the AU, Teodoro Obiang Nguema was of the view that Africa did not need foreign influence in Ivorian crisis and will manage the problem by itself. With the intervention of France and the UN in Ivory Coast the AU's mediatory moves were forestalled and therefore, became an inconclusive and unsuccessful outing having been unable to resolve the crisis.

Darfur Crisis: The crisis that started in 2003 was the result of conflicts between ethnic groups over land rights and expounded ideology of Arab superiority over Africans. The rebels have taken up arms in grievances over domination and discrimination of African population by the Arabs in Darfur, Sudan. The crisis was between the rebel forces and the Janjawee militia supported by the government of Sudan. The Arabs have continued to claim their superiority and as such have profound dominance over African population. International community has described the war as genocide and crime against humanity. The UN international Commission of Inquiry established by resolution UNSC 1562 reported that genocide and war crimes had been taken place in Darfur. Even the US Secretary of States concurred that genocide was taking place in Darfur, but the AU called such views a Big Mistake. As the crisis continued, the AU played the role of a mediator between the rebel and the government. It deployed the military force in 2004 to monitor the N'djamena ceasefire and later became the guarantor of the Darfur Peace Agreement. In 2004 the AU founded the African Mission in Darfur (AMID) with initial 150 troops in 2005. Though the number was increased to 7000 but it remained

inadequate and ineffective. With the endorsement of UNSC Resolution 1706, the UN troops joined the African Mission. Despite the Sudanese non-consent of the AU/UN mission, the UN passed the Resolution 1769 to bypass Sudanese non-consent and the mission was operationalized.

It is clear that AU's military involvement in Darfur was inadequate, ineffective and failed to contain the violence that claimed so many lives and properties. AU lacked the resources and logistics to execute the operation and mediation approach to the crisis proved highly ineffective. The crisis required strong military force capable of standing between the warring factions while mediation and diplomacy progressed. AU's failure there made UN intervention necessary.

Zimbabwe Crisis: Post election violence broke out in 2008 Zimbabwe following refusal by Mugabe government to accept defeat and allow the announcement of national election. The result of the second round of the election teleguided by Mugabe's government was announced in favour of Mugabe but was reported to be short of free and fair process. Attempt by the opposition, Movement for Democratic Change to stop Mugabe from clinging to power resulted to violence leading to intimidation, raping, and killing. Military men from Zimbabwe Defence Force were said to be used against agitators.

AU paid deaf ear to the call to suspend Zimbabwe from the union. On 30 June 2008, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called the Union to suspend the country until free and fair was conducted. It was however, surprising when on the same day at the AU summit in Sharm el-sheikh, Zimbabwe case was not mentioned. This was despite worldwide attention the matter attracted. It was on this note that Mahadew (2011) sees AU's approach to Zimbabwe case as unconvincing. Zimbabwe lost its sovereignty for not been able to defend its

citizen's against avoidable death and violence and such situation created need for AU's intervention, yet AU did not intervene. What the AU did was to call for government of national unity despite knowing that Mugabe stole election victory.

The above scenario shows a pattern of behaviour which chooses diplomatic solution to crisis even when there is need for intervention based on law and necessity. AU chose diplomatic option even in the face of gross loss of lives and property. In cases where the AU intervened, they were either late, ineffective or both and usually after great loss of lives like in Darfur crisis. In addition, the AU has been inconsistent in its response to crisis without adhering to steady guidelines and principles for decisions and actions on intervention. The AU was clear in the Ivorian case that Gbagbo should go unlike in Zimbabwe where Mugabe was accused of using unconstitutional means to achieve election victory, yet the AU allowed him to attend 2008 AU Summit and called for government of national unity in Zimbabwe. Why was such approach adopted in respect to Gbagbo. There is clear indication here that the personalities of the embattled presidents and their relationships with other Heads of States took precedence over principles and rules in determining AU's behaviours.

5.3 AU Responses to Pre-2011 Political Agitations in Libya

Between 1969 and 2011 Muammar Gaddafi was a major player and determinant of Libyan politics. As Libyan Head of State within this period, he dominated economic and political spheres of Libyan State power. His dominance did not go down well with democratic radicals, human rights activists and other political opposition groups particularly in Cyrenaica region of Libya. In the 1980s, struggle for power between Libya Government in one hand and military hierarchies and revolutionary committees generated internal squabbles.

Consequently, Libyan in exile, with internal support, carried out an aborted coup in 1984. It led to short reign of terror resulting to interrogation and imprisonment of those suspected to be involved. Okaneme, (2015) observes that despite the fact that life was relatively and averagely good for the masses in Libya under Gaddafi, freedom was lacking. He pointed that freedom of association and expression were lacking in Libya. Libyans according to him lived in fears and Gaddafi government never tolerated opposition of any sort.

However, the following groups proclaimed themselves political oppositions to Gaddafi government: National Transition Council, Libyan Youth Movement, Committee for Libyan National Action in Europe, National Front for the Salvation of Libya, Libyan Freedom and Democracy campaign, Libyan League for Human Rights etc. The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO) formed in 2005 helped to organise some protests which later led to Libyan Civil War. Libyan government under Gaddafi continued to block internet contents relating to political opposition, contents critical to government and websites that advocated Libyans human rights were blocked to control criticism against and external sympathy. Though, Gaddafi was making some moves to reduce terror in Libya by dismantling production of weapons of mass destruction, Libyan political space and human rights situation remained bad. Internet was badly affected because Libyan opposition started using internet as a major medium of communication.

While all these went on, the African Union continued to call on relevant parties in Libya to toe the line of diplomacy and dialogue to resolve their differences. It is important to note that non-interference principle of the AU Charter does not allow AU's intervention at that stage of the disagreement. However, members of AU leadership were expected to mount back door pressure on Gaddafi to

make serious moves in addressing political and human rights situations in Libya.

5.4 AU Responses to the 2011 Libyan Crisis

5.4.1 Implementation of AU's Roadmap on Libya: The African Union High Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya was established by the 265th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Addis Ababa, on 10th March, 2011. It was made up of selected heads of state. The committee was mandated to: (i) engage with all the parties in Libya and continuously assess the evolution of the situation on ground; (ii) facilitate an all-inclusive dialogue between the Libyan parties on the appropriate reforms to be carried out; and (iii) engage AU's partners, particularly, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations to facilitate coordination of efforts and seek their support for early resolution of the crisis. AU's High Level ad hoc Committee on Libya held its second meeting, at the level of Heads of States, in Nouakchott, Islamic Republic of Mauritania on 9th April, 2011. The meeting was an avenue for reviewing the situation in Libya after the first meeting of 19th March 2011 held in Nouakchott. According to its communiqué, the committee took stock of activities undertaken in discharging its mandate and promoting the AU roadmap for the resolution of Libya crisis, in particular, the consultative meeting on Libya held in Addis Ababa on 25th March, 2011, attended by the AU member states and partners. It reviewed the technical consultation on modalities for an early ceasefire and the establishment of an operational monitoring mechanism, convened at the initiative of the AU, in Addis Ababa, on 31 March 2011, with the participation of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the European Union (EU).

The Chairperson of the Commission seized the opportunity to brief other members of the High Level ad hoc Committee on his discussions with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary in London, the EU and NATO officials in Brussels and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome. The April 9th meeting also had exchange of views on international initiatives on the crisis in Libya.

Preparatory to visit Muammar Gaddafi and the rebel group led by the NTC, in Tripoli and Benghazi respectively, the High Level ad hoc Committee made an appeal to the Libyan parties to resolutely be committed to peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis and give them cooperation needed to do their assignment. The committee further reiterated its commitment to spare no efforts in ensuring early and speedy resolution of the crisis in accordance with the AU's roadmap as articulated by PSC. The roadmap called for: (i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities (ii) the cooperation of the concerned Libyan authorities to facilitate the diligent delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy populations (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including African migrant workers living in Libya and (iv) dialogue between the Libyan parties an inclusive transitional period, with a view to adopting and implementing the political reforms necessary for the elimination of the causes of the current crisis, with due consideration for the legitimate aspirations of the Libya people for democracy, political reform, justice, peace and security, as well as socio-economic development (from the Communiqué of the April 9, 2011 meeting of the AU High-Level ad hoc Committee on Libya).

The committee's meeting of March 19th 2011 was attended by presidents and ministers representing their presidents. The meeting provided an opportunity and avenue for exchange of views on the situation in Libya and modalities for implementing the committee's mandate. It noted that the committee was faced

by a critical moment in Libyan history when continuous fighting was resulting to serious humanitarian consequences and a time marked by the commencement of the implementation of Resolution 1973 adopted by the United Nations Security Council on the 17th March 2011 which imposed a no fly zone over Libya. The committee noted that the Resolution acknowledges the role of the AU High Level ad hoc Committee on Libya in facilitating a dialogue that will lead to political reforms necessary to finding peaceful resolution to the crisis in Libya (Communiqué of the 19th March 2011 meeting of the AU High Level ad hoc Committee).

The High Level ad hoc Committee on Libya reiterated AU's deep concern at the prevailing situation and its humanitarian consequences and stressed the serious threat that this situation posed for peace, security and stability in the region as a whole. It reaffirmed the AU's conviction on the need for an urgent African action revolving around the following:

- (i) the immediate cessation of all hostilities;
- (ii) the cooperation of the concerned Libyan authorities to facilitate the diligent delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy population;
- (iii) the protection of foreign nationals, including African migrant workers living in Libya; and
- (iv) the adoption and implementation of political reforms necessary for the elimination of the current crisis. The meeting reaffirmed the legitimacy of the aspirations of the Libyan people for democracy, political reforms, justice, peace and security, as well as socio-economic development, and the need to ensure that these aspirations are fulfilled in a peaceful and democratic manner. The members of the committee expressed their regret for not being able, as they envisaged, traveling to Libya, on 20 March 2011, to meet with the parties, both of which had agreed to discuss with it. The committee, in conformity with the

resolution 1973 of the United Nations Security Council, requested the required permission for the flight carrying its members to Libya but was denied permission. The High Level ad hoc Committee made: (i) made an urgent appeal to the Government of Libya and the national Transitional Council (NTC) to observe, without any further delay, a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and to take other measures aimed at defusing tension and ensuring the protection of the civilian population. (ii) Reaffirmed the relevance of the elements of the Roadmap articulated by the PSC. It invited the Libyan authorities and the NTC to a meeting in Addis Ababa to discuss the Roadmap, in particular the establishment and management of an inclusive transitional period that would lead to political reforms meeting the aspiration of the Libyan people; (iii) requested the AU Commission to convene, in Addis Ababa on the 25 March 2011 a meeting that will bring together high representatives of the League of Arab States, the OIC, the EU and the United Nations (Secretariat and the five permanent members) as well as other partners and stakeholders in order to agree on ways and means for an early resolution of the crisis on the basis of the committee's objectives and United Nations Resolution 1973.

The committee expressed its regret of not being a mechanism for continued consultations and concrete joint actions to be taken by the UN. It decided to organize, under the aegis of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of its member countries and AU Commission. The committee reaffirmed its determination to carry out its mission, in the face of the worrying development in the situation in Libya. It called for restraint from armed international intervention and agreed to spare no efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis within an African framework taking into account the aspirations of the Libyan people. Members of the committee appealed to the international community as a whole to provide

unreserved support to its efforts (Communiqué of the 19 March 2011 meeting of the AU High Level ad hoc Committee).

Fig.5.1 Image of Members of AUPSC Discussing the Formation of Inclusive Government in Libya



Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh (left), Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni (middle) and South Africa's President Jacob Zuma (right) talk during an emergency summit of the African Union's Peace and Security Council in Ethiopia, following the African Union's call for the formation of an inclusive transitional government in Libya (26 August 2011). **Source:** Sadiki Koko and Martha Bakwesugha-Osula (2013)

The foregoing is an exposure of an aspect of the AU's responses to the Libyan Crisis. It is a team of consultation and dialogue with relevant parties, partners and shadow actors in and outside Africa, with a view to achieving a speedy and all inclusive settlement of the crisis in Libya. Unfortunately the efforts did not yield the expected fruits due to fundamental incapacitations that surrounded the AU.

Finally, the AU High-Level ad-hoc Committee gained permission from the United Nations and travelled to Libya but was disgraced out of Libya by NTC's

rejection of its peace proposal and NATO intervention pressure as NATO made it clear that AU's travel to Libya was unsafe. NATO members started bombing Libya shortly after the AU had been pressurised out of the country.

5.4.2 Rejection and Recognition of the NTC by the AU: AU's initial rejection and later recognition of the national Transition Council as the legitimate authority in Libya were mutually contradictory. In the first instance, the AU through its Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra vehemently rejected the National Transition Council as a legitimate government for Libya. The rejection came as an outcome of an emergency meeting of the AU's Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The fifteen member emergency committee meeting was divided almost in half. Rather than accepting the National Transition Council, the AU opted for an inclusive transitional government in Libya; establishment of a constitutional and legislative framework for democratic transformation of Libya; organization of election and National reconciliation process. In its 291st meeting of AU Peace and Security Council, the AU official failed to recognize the National Transition Council (NTC) in Libya. It indicated that it would only grant recognition when all-inclusive transition government was established. AU's position was based on its conviction that only a negotiated and all-inclusive transitional government could, as of that time, soothe Libyan political situation. The council strongly reaffirmed that AU was still solidly behind Libyan people and called all concerned parties in Libya to come together and negotiate a peaceful process for democracy in Libya.

The leader of AU delegation to Libya, President Zuma Jaccob of South Africa also said that the AU would not recognise the NTC as long as fighting continued in Libya. Zuma claimed that since there was fighting; the Union

could not recognise the NTC because the picture of what would be the outcome was not certain. According to him that position was AU's usual stand in places where there were fighting between different groups.

It is clear here that AU's change of opinion was not spontaneous but a slow process and an outcome of continuous recognition of the NTC by more members of international community and the NTC's improving victory over Gaddafi forces. The AU was therefore, left with no option than to follow suit. This gradual nature of the AU's change in opinion is demonstrated first by an outright rejection of the NTC, followed by conditions for acceptance and finally acceptance of the council as the legitimate authority in Libya.

When it was dawned on the AU that the NATO-backed NTC had become victorious against Muammar Gaddafi, and following combined pressure within and outside Africa the Union finally recognised the government of the National Transition Council. According to AU statement, the union was encouraged by the assurances made by the NTC to the Chairman of the AU Commission, Jean Ping on its strategic commitment to the African continent to give priority to national unity and bring together all Libyan stakeholders, without any exception, to rebuild the country; and a commitment to protect all foreigners within Libya including African migrant workers (Patel, 2011).

5.4.3 AU's Rejection of Foreign Intervention in Libya: The African Union was not hesitant to make its position on foreign intervention in Libya clearly known to the world. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) expressed solidarity with Libyans and rejected foreign military intervention in any form. The decision was informed by AU's suspicion of members of NATO and their underlying motives beyond 'Responsibility to Protect' civilian population in

Libya. The AU did not consider external force controlled externally as a legitimate means of enthrone democratic culture and institutions in Libya. It therefore preferred the Libyan people to initiate an inclusive process of political reform guided by their genuine aspiration and elimination of the causes of the crisis. The African Union has an objective to protect African continent from foreign domination, particularly of the western capitalist states like the USA, United Kingdom, France and their allies. Besides, continuous intervention from foreign powers will render the union irrelevant and question its effectiveness and importance in the establishment and consolidation of democratic culture in African.

Deriving from the above premise therefore, it became clear that AU's approach to the Libyan Crisis differed in instrument and methodology with western approach; a difference rooted in mutual suspicions. The AU suspected that NATO had more interests in Libya beyond Responsibility to Protect (R2P), particularly, a forceful removal of Muammar Gaddafi from office to ease their penetration of Libyan economy, politics and environmental strategy. The union did not consider such possibility desirable for peaceful and enduring democratic culture in Libya. NATO's subsequent expansion of its target to include Gaddafi's compound in Tripoli, fuelled such fears in Africa of hidden neo-colonial agenda. On the other hand, NATO believed that a peaceful resolution of the crisis by the AU would directly or indirectly make a place for Muammar Gaddafi's continuous relevance in Libyan politics. This is a situation unacceptable to NATO and this explains why NATO did not consider it necessary to involve the African Union in its intervention process in Libya.

Though, AU's rejection of foreign military intervention might have soured AU-NATO relationship or possible cooperation, we need to consider the rationale behind the use of NATO as a platform for intervention. Why did United Nations

fail to organise such intervention on its own platform? Why did NATO members or members of the UN not render military support to AU to enable it stand between Muammar Gaddafi's and the NTC's forces for AU's diplomatic process to be concluded. The outcome of NATO intervention justifies AU's suspicion because heavy bombardment of military installation in Libya and murder of Col. Gaddafi have not entrenched democratic culture or restored peace in Libya.

Another important issue that affect AU's rejection of foreign military intervention in Libya was the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 by the three African representatives in the UN namely Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon. Approved in New York on 17 March 2011, the Resolution empowered members of the UN to use 'necessary measure' to intervene in Libya. The three African members voted in favour of foreign intervention against their early decision in AU on the matter and without being in control of the implementation. Their voting behaviour was seen as a betrayal to AU and African people as a whole and it gave credence to foreign intervention and opportunity to those who saw it as a means for achieving their ulterior or underlying motives in Libya. However, it is important to note the fact that at the time of the voting many Libyans were dying without protection and the three African countries did not know that the intervention would take such high scale of reckless bombardment of Libya. Again, Ping (2011) maintains that the three African representatives in the United Nations did not betray AU but voted based on the need to save Libyans and believing that the intervention was actually to protect civilians and nothing more.

5.4.4 Condemnation of NATO's Bombardment of Libya: In addition to rejecting foreign intervention in Libya, the AU out rightly condemned NATO's military bombardment of Libya. The United Nations considered that the

widespread and systematic attacks taking place in the Libya Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population might amount to crimes against humanity. Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, the heavy civilian casualty in Libya; and intimidation of journalists and media personnel, the council passed Resolution 1973 in favour of no-fly zone over Libya and any necessary measures to protect civilian population. The council further expressed its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel.

The military operation in Libya was a coalition of 10 European and Middle East states which later increased to 17. NATO assumed command of the operation on 31 March, 2011. Military intervention began on 19 March 2011 as fighter jets from French Air Force destroyed several pro-Gaddafi vehicles advancing on rebel stronghold, Benghazi. U.S. and British submarines then fired over 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets throughout Libya, severely disabling the regime's air defence capacity and allowing a wider enforcement of the no-fly zone to begin.

When the bombardment became too bad, the AU openly condemned it and called for NATO withdrawal from Libya. It was a huge destruction of the people NATO claimed to protect and other physical structures and military establishments and installations. The following pictures show some of the affected areas and persons.

Images of NATO Bombardment of Libya During the 2011 R2P



Fig 5.2



Fig. 5.3



Fig. 5.4



Fig.5.5



Fig.5.6



Fig.5.7



Fig.5.8



Fig.5.9



Fig.5.10



Fig.5.11

Source:https://www.google.com.ng/?gws_rd=ssl#q=images+for+NATO+bombardment+of+Libya

The images shown above are the pictures of destruction and reckless bombardment of the state of Libya by U.S. led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). What attracted AU's lamentation, condemnation of the bombardment and calls for NATO to disengage from Libya was the confusion that what ought to be a military intervention to protect Libyan civilian population against attack turned out to be a full blown war against Libyan state and the same people NATO claimed to protect. The intervention ought to have wedged the war between the warring factions to enable diplomacy find solution

to the crisis. Rather, we can see how people were roasted in fig 5.3, physical structures destroyed fig. 5.4-7 and Libyan environment polluted through demonstrations of acts of war, using advanced military technology and sophisticated military arsenals as shown in figs 5.9-10 to ruin and reduce Libya to debris of warfare. Such tragedy made AU's agitation most necessary.

5.5AU's Efforts in Post-Gaddafi Libyan Crisis

On the 20th October 2011, Col. Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed in his home town Sirte by the NTC led rebels. Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam was captured in November 2011. Following NATO-determined NTC victory over Gaddafi's regime, the group took control of Libyan leadership, announced successful liberation of Libya and their plan to conduct elections in eight months interval. Shortly after the victory, clashes erupted among the former rebels in Benghazi. This led to the resignation of the Deputy NTC leader, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga. In March 2012, NTC officials in Benghazi, East Libya launched a campaign for re-establishing autonomy for the region. The campaign pitched them against the central NTC in Tripoli. By August 2012, the Transitional Government handed over power to the General National Congress, which was elected in July. An elected member of the congress and Chairman, Liberal National Front Party, Mohammed Magarief, became the Interim Head of State. In September 2012, the US Ambassador and three officials were killed following Islamic Militia attack on US consulate. The attack resulted to driving out militiagroup by crowds in Benghazi and Head, General National Congress, Mohammed al-Magarief vowed to disband all illegal militias (BBC News, 2016).

Ali Zeidan, a liberal and leading opposition was elected Prime Minister by the General Congress while the former Prime Minister faced trial for complicity to killing of Libyans and transferring of \$25m public funds to Gaddafi loyalist.

Muhammad al-Magarief resigned as Chairman of the General National Congress in obedience with a new law banning Gaddafi-era officials from holding public positions. A member of the Baber Minority Tribe, Nuri Abu Sahmein was in June 2013 elected the Chairman, General National Congress. BBC News shows that by August 2013, the Militia Guards had started blocking oil exportation terminals.

Libyan protests entered another level when in February, 2014 the General National Congress refused to dissolve after their mandate expired. The situation led to yet another civil war now not against Gaddafi but among post-Gaddafi factions struggling over Libyan states power and wealth. The GNC sacked the Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan and elected Ahmaed Maiteg as the new Prime Minister. Khalifa Haftar launched military attack on land and air against militant Islamic groups in Benghazi and tried to seize parliament building. He accused the Prime Minister Maiteg of secret deals with Islamic groups. Maiteg resigned following Supreme Court ruling declaring his appointment illegal. Parliamentary election was marred by low turn-out due to security fear and boycotts. In July 2014, fight erupted between the new and out-going General National Congress. UN staff pulled out, embassies shut, foreigners evacuated and security situation deteriorated. The crisis affected Tripoli International Airport while Ansar al-Sharia seized control of Benghazi. UN through its Secretary General brokered peace talk between the new parliament and government based in Tobruk and Islamist Libyan Dawn Militias holding Tripoli (BBC News, 2016).

In spite of AU's inability to resolve Libyan Crisis during the 2011 uprising, the union relentlessly joined hands with the United Nations in continuous search for peace and establishment of a unity government in Libya. The search is ongoing

to this present day. In January, 2015 the UN and AU sponsored a peace process for Libya parties in Geneva. On 12 January, 2016, the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui met with the new Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, General Martin Kebler at the AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa to discuss the prevailing situation in Libya and how to strengthen cooperation between the AU and the UN in the joint effort to address various challenges facing Libya. The Commissioner underscored AU's strong resolve to strengthen its cooperation with the UN in Libyan peace process. He declared, "We will work hand in glove with the UN to achieve the goal" (AU Peace and Security Department, (2016). The Commissioner explained that the AU has been following closely the political negotiations and was committed to assist the Libyan stakeholders in taking the peace process forward in collaboration with countries of the region, relevant international partners, the United Nations and the EU. The Commissioner expressed concern over the deteriorating security situation in the country which has created more space for Islamic States Terrorist Group. He emphasised the urgent need for establishment of Unity Government that will bring together Libya National Army to confront terrorism in the country.

United Nations-African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security held its eleventh consultative meeting on 2 October, 2015. The two organisations were represented by their officials. Areas of mutual collaboration on peace and security of Burkina Faso, Burundi, Libya and South Sudan were discussed. The Task Force expressed concern over the ongoing conflict in Libya and called on the parties currently engaged in a dialogue facilitated by the former Special Representative of the United Nations' Secretary General, Bernardino Leon to reach consensus and sign a peace agreement. The meeting accepted the need for the United Nations and Africa Union's collective support to the next phase of

transition in Libya. The two organisations agreed to ensure that all partners work together to maximise support to Libya.

The UN-AU Joint Task Force held its twelfth consultative meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York on 22 March 2016. The two organizations were represented by their representatives. UN and AU Special Representatives, General Martin Kobler and President Jakaya Kikwete respectively were present at the meeting. The two organisations agreed to work together to support the swift implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and help the Presidential Council in Libya to broaden support for the agreement. The two organisations agreed to collaborate and exchange information towards the establishment of Government of National Accord in Libya.

As it is now, the two warring parliaments have on Tuesday 9th August 2016 signed an agreement brokered by UN-AU Joint Task Force under the auspices of Presidential Council. The agreement was on the establishment of Government of National Accord.

5.6 AU's General Achievements in the Libya Crisis

Despite AU's inability to resolve the Libyan Crisis, we consider it analytically unbalanced to present what the AU did in Libya without identifying any achievement in her responses. It is usually academic to look at the both side of an issue. Abubakar (2014) admits that despite different challenges and lack of support from important members of the international community, the AU never relented in its efforts to act within the framework of its own decision and the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The thesis observes that the AU addressed the Libyan Crisis in a manner that took into account both immediate and long term challenges. The issues raised by the AU on the Libya Crisis

remain valid today as they were when they were raised. They include the need for all inclusive transitional government in Libya; use of diplomacy, and commitment to the achievement of the general will of the Libyan people. AU observed that despite diplomatic achievement of the organization in the crisis, its actions were misconceived, ignored and unreported by western media and forces.

The Roadmap: Importantly, we should appreciate AU's thoughtfully designed roadmap on the Libya Crisis - a political initiative prepared to end all hostilities and usher in an inclusive transitional government in Libya for further processes that will transform the country to a more secure and democratic society. Initiators and promoters of the roadmap were major insiders in African politics and were committed in restoring peace in Libya. They designed a programme of invents that was supposed to accommodate varying interests in Libya and prepare the country for a peaceful future. Events after 2011 AU's intervention in Libya has vindicated the initiators of the roadmap and shown that the roadmap would have been the best option if it were implemented fully. It marshalled out ways of reaching the warring parties for dialogue and set out programme of political development and progress of Libya. It is a plan marshalled out as an outcome of several meetings and consultations by the AU Peace and Security Council. We therefore commend the AU efforts and believe that it will improve on its response capacity to crises in Africa.

5.7 Implications of AU's Inability to Resolve the Libyan Crisis

The fact that the AU has been unable to resolve the crisis in Libya attracted certain consequences to the AU, Libyans, Africa and the world in general.

Loss of Lives and Property: So many lives and property have been lost in the Libyan Crisis. Aside deaths recorded during Gaddafi-NTC faceoff, NATO bombardments of Libya also recorded colossal loss of lives and property. Destruction of Libya has continued even after Gaddafi's death. This was orchestrated by continuous fractionalisation and wars among different pro and anti Gaddafi groups. Importantly, interferences from notable members of NATO who have foreign policy or business interests have contributed to wars and loss of lives and property in Libya. The contest of who will take over Libyan state power has attracted increased casualties in death and destruction of infrastructures in Libya.

Discontent of AU's Capacity and Image: It takes an unbiased research on AU responses to the Libyan Crisis for one to understand and appreciate AU's predicaments in conflict resolution in Africa as a whole. Public perception about AU's capacity and efforts in resolving conflicts in Africa, particularly that of Libya is low and doubtful. It is common knowledge that the AU has been unable to resolve the Libyan Crisis but little is known about challenges that face the continental union in this task. This has resulted in misconception, unbalanced judgement and increased contempt and degradation of AU image in international public arena. Available literature shows that a good number of scholars believe that the AU did not do any reasonable thing to resolve the crisis in Libya without bringing challenges facing the union to bear on their judgemental analysis.

Fear for Sovereignty of States in Africa: Peace of Westphalia Treaty makes provisions for sovereignty of the modern state system granting every sovereign nation the right to decide for itself without external interference. The United Nations Charter granted its members the right to self-rule. The African Union

also embodies the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states. What these provisions meant is that a state is backed by international laws to determine the direction of its affairs without interferences from external forces. Far from these provisions, the rate at which superpowers interfere in the internal affairs of weaker states in the international arena is not only alarming, it is as well increasing. United Nations Resolutions 1970 and 1973 granting no-fly zone and foreign intervention in 2011 Libya respectively have become grand styles by which non-interference principle is negated. Superpowers' dominance of the United Nations decision making system has given them the opportunity to interfere in states where they have economic and political interests.

As such, AU's inability to resolve the crisis in Libya has made the country a victim of such UN empowered interference. It has constituted fear over the sovereignty of states in the region. Sovereignty of states in Africa is undermined in the process of implementing United Nations Resolutions. We should recall that the African Union did not approve of foreign intervention in Libya. Yet, her disapproval was ignored and NATO bombarded Libya. It was on that note the Mugabe pointed at a renewed scramble for African resources and militarization of the continent. The situation in Libya has become precedence for what might happen to any other state in Africa. It has undermined states' confidence in their sovereignty, particularly, when their continental organisation is unable to defend them.

Increased Imperialism in Africa: AU's incapacitated condition in conflict resolution is likely to increase such external interferences and interventions and make Africa more vulnerable to western imperialism. AU's inability to resolve conflict in Africa will increase the tempo of seeking revolutionary support and

instigation from the makers and distributors of apparatuses of war beyond Africa. It will cause illegal proliferation of purchase, distribution and use of military wares across Africa, particularly, in states where government is not living up to the people's expectations or where ethnic differences are not properly managed. Such states abound in Africa with Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan as few examples.

CHAPTER SIX

FACTORS THAT INCAPACITATED AFRICAN UNION'S RESPONSES TO THE LIBYA CRISIS

Introduction

This chapter looks at the basic factors that incapacitated the African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis. This becomes necessary following the failure by the existing texts to adequately expose and consider deep-rooted factors that incapacitated AU's effort in Libya. In addition, the need for corrective measures to strengthen AU's conflict response capacity requires academic understanding of the basic challenges that undermined the union capacity. To this end, the chapter tests the following hypothesis:

AU was incapacitated by lack of fund, donor disappointments, no strong military force and leadership ineptitude.

6.1 Legal Handicaps and AU's Leadership Ineptitude

Deficiency of the AU Constitutive Act: Analysis or appraisal of the African Union's responses to the Libyan Crisis should consider the fact that diplomacy was AU's option for resolution of the crisis. As such, mediation supposed to have started earlier before the parties resorted to arm hostility. Unfortunately, AU's Non-interference principle does not allow such an early interference into

what, at that early stage was regarded as internal affairs of Libya. The union's Constitutive Act only allowed in Article 4(h) for intervention when the government has lost control of the state, occurrence of genocide or gross human right violation. The Act was silent on early warning response which supposed to have provided the opportunity for early diplomatic mediation by the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya. It is important to note that following AU's Constitutive Act, the union could not have mediated successfully at the point military actions were the order of the day without having military backup to deliver her diplomatic message to already charged warring factions. It was a clear case of legal handicap at the early stage when diplomatic solution was most suitable and legal consent at the stage when diplomacy was already surrounded by hostile militarized environment. The Constitutive Act should have added a clause that would enable the union start mediation earlier in a crisis state without necessarily constituting interference in the internal affairs of that state. AU's Constitutive Act, Article 3(a-n), provides a number of objectives and functions for the union without creating conducive environment and instruments for their implementation. It aims to:

- a. achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- b. defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- c. accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- d. promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people;
- e. encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- f. promote peace, security and stability on the continent;

- g. promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- h. promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- i. establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent play its rightful roles in the global economy and international negotiations;
- j. promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as integration of African economies;
- k. promote co-operation in all fields of human activities to raise living standards of African peoples;
- l. coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the union;
- m. advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology;
- n. work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The above objectives, no doubt provide the AU with an all-encompassing task of ensuring the general well-being of the continent of Africa and its people, resolution of conflict inclusive. Therefore, AU's involvement in issues that may lead to conflict should be early enough without constituting interference.

UN Resolution 1973 and Its No-Fly-Zone Ban: The United Nations' Resolution 1973 placed ban on flights within Libya air space in what it called no-fly-zone. By that resolution, the AU had to take permission from the United Nations before it could travel to Libya. Zuma led AU High-Level ad-hoc

Committee on Libya was initially denied permission to enter Libya in furtherance of its mediation process. The committee was shocked and demoralised for not being allowed to enter a member state for mediation exercise known to the United Nations. Though the permission was later granted after some delay, but that was when NATO had concluded its readiness to intervene in Libya. The atmosphere at that time was more of war than diplomacy and it contributed to AU's untimely departure from Libya. Thus, AU was fundamentally handicapped by legal provisions which did not allow her to operate freely. It therefore, becomes unacademic when such handicaps are not put into serious consideration when assessing AU's performance.

Deficiency in AU's Roadmap: Despite highly commendable potency of the AU roadmap, it failed to state the position of Muammar Gaddafi in the transition to democratisation programme for Libya. Though, members of the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee agreed and Gaddafi initially accepted not to be part of the transition. The implication was that Gaddafi would step aside from Libya seat of power. Unfortunately, this understanding was not contained in the roadmap and this omission was a major reason expressed by the NTC leader, Mustafa Abdel Jilil for rejecting the roadmap. This inadequacy in the roadmap contributed to denying the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee its expected success in the Libyan mediation.

AU's Leadership Ineptitude: Leadership of a continental organization like the AU should be a firm and well-articulated body capable of holding its member to her principles and opinions. Unfortunately, what transpired in 2011 response to Libyan crisis was an indication where foreign policy, external as well as internal friendship and personal interest could not allow AU leadership hold the entire African states together to speak in one voice over the union's decisions on Libya.

The capacity to lead efficiently was lacking and that resulted in the inability of the union to gather resources required for the mission. It resulted to the difference between the union's position on foreign intervention in Libya and the votes of the three African representatives to the United Nations Security Council namely Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon who voted in favour of foreign intervention (Resolution 1973) in Libya. Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon are all leading members of the African union but were not adequately controlled by AU leadership to tow the union's way and provide the resources to support the decision.

It is obvious that fifty four member states of the AU can finance the union if they are sincerely committed to AU projects. However, it requires a leadership competent enough to cause the submission of all members to the union's course. The inability to mobilize adequate men and resources to wage hostility in Libya while negotiation went on was a clear indication of leadership incompetence. If AU leadership was competent, the union could have gathered adequate support from the United Nations to encourage her diplomatic option for Libya crisis. Such weakness in leadership should be an issue of serious consideration in evaluating or appraising the African Union's response to Libya crisis. The union's leadership was surrounded by people friendly to Muammar Gaddafi and their sense of friendship and spirit-d-corps to group of fellow Heads of State did not allow them mount adequate pressure on Gaddafi to relinquish power long before the United Nations Resolution 1973 on Libya came into being. Again, there was fear among leading Heads of State that an AU military force if organized and used in Libya may one day affect them. AU was therefore left with mediation that was not backed by a military force that could have wedged the war for the mediation to continue. This situation was at the background of what contributed the AU's failure.

6.2 Rejection of AU's Roadmap by the NTC and Gaddafi

The African Union's Roadmap on the Libya Crisis was designed to be a workable formula for the crisis that claimed thousands of lives and property in Libya. Yet failure to embrace the programme by the warring parties constituted a major challenge to the success of the implementation by the AU High Level ad-hoc Committee on Libya. It was widely publicized that Col. Muammar Gaddafi accepted the document in principle.

On the opposing side was the NTC, the group that rejected the roadmap from the first presentation, arguing that the document did not specify Gaddafi's position in the programme. The rebel group argued that any arrangement short of immediate vacation of Libyan seat of power by Gaddafi would not gain its acceptance and since the roadmap did not include Gaddafi's immediate withdrawal from Libya state power, it rejected the roadmap out rightly. The leader of the group, Mustafa Adbel Jalil accused members of AU's mediation panel of partiality in favour of Gaddafi.

The rejection from both sides greatly undermined AU's effort and constituted a major obstacle in AU mediation image among comity of nations. It created the opportunity for NATO to bombard Libya since they did not see any immediate progress in AU's mediation between the two authorities in Libya and considering the continuous loss of lives and properties in Libya. AU's endeavour could have been successful if the two warring factions had cooperated with her mediation committee. Acceptance of AU's roadmap would have resulted to the establishment of all inclusive transition government that would conduct election and return the state to democratic society as it was the aspiration of the majority of Libyans.

Implications NTC's Rejection of AU Peace Proposal: The rejection resulted in AU's inability to achieve the expected success in resolving the crisis. It brought doubt to bear on the workability and possibility of an African solution to African problem widely advocated by pan-African protagonists and supporters. It created the opportunity for NATO to bombard Libya and create the impression that Africans still, cannot solve their problems themselves. The rejection also indicated disrespect for the African Union by Gaddafi and the NTC and a show of shame by people who claim to have the interest of Libyan people at heart.

6.3 AU-NATO Mutual Suspicion and Disagreement

Relationship between the African Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the Libyan Crisis was far from cordial due to differences in interest and method of approach to the crisis between the two organizations. In the first instance, the AU's interest in Libya was to establish an inclusive transition government that will share power among different warring factions and interests and finally conduct free and fair election for Libyans. On the other hand, NATO wanted Muammar Gaddafi's exit more than any other interest. Major Powers in NATO were not in good terms with Gaddafi following their inability to have free imperial access to Gaddafi's Libya. Their interest in Libyan politics was to gain access to Libyan oil and have free access to Mediterranean region. Attempts to wedge these interests had placed Libya and the United States in conflicts over the past few decades.

As such their opposed interests and method placed the two associations in mutual suspicion and disagreement about the way to resolve the Libyan Crisis. African Union was suspicious that foreign intervention in Libya will give anti-

Gaddafi NATO war lords the opportunity to oust Muammar Gaddafi by force or engage in military actions that might cause more problems for Libya. NATO on the other hand had warned AU delegation to Libya that their security was not guaranteed if they embark on the trip to Libya a day after the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which placed no-fly-zone order on Libya. The two organisations disagreed in philosophy and method and these explain why NATO would not give the AU military support but rather chose to bomb outright Libya without regard to AU's objection to foreign intervention. In fact NATO's bombardment chased AU delegation out of Libya. AU's departure from Libya marked the failure of that mission to resolve the crisis and that was because NTC backed by NATO refused to accept AU roadmap as a way for resolving the crisis.

It is important at this juncture to declare that NTC's outright rejection of AU's option was due to the fact that it had NATO's backing otherwise the rebel group should have requested for an amendment that would see to the end of Gaddafi as Libyan Head of State and remain committed to AU mission at least till AU's partiality or otherwise proves itself.

6.4 Lack of Funds and Donors' Disappointments of the AU

Intervention in armed conflict at the international level is a capital intensive project and the African Union was not financially sufficient to give Libyan crisis the needed response. Such intervention at the level of escalated armed struggle needed a strong military force that could stand between the forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and the NTC led rebel forces while the AU's High Level ad-hoc Committee went on with its mediation. Lack of finance made the existence of such military force not possible and the same problem hampered a quick formation of a military force at that time the crisis had started. The union

therefore relied only on diplomatic approach to the crisis while military hostility from the two sides increasingly continued to claim lives and properties in Libya. AU's financial incapacitation is also clear when you consider the fact that most of her development partners that would have supported her financially did not accept her response proposal to the crisis and so the union was left alone to suffer her financial weakness which led to its inability to give her response the required funding. NATO hampered AU financially and politically. EU for instance sponsors a major part of AU's conflict response budget including a small but flexible fund for rapid response for political emergencies but in Libyan case, the response to AU's request for funding was delayed.


AU development partners as they are called include Canada, Sweden Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, China and Turkey as well as organisations such as the World Bank and European Union. These donors contribute about two-third of AU annual budget. In order to demonstrate our argument let us look at the income and expenditure of the African Union and amounts contributed by AU member states and foreign partners between 2007 and 2015.

AU Budget Estimate and Sources of Funding 2007-2015 (in US\$mn)									
Financial year	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Estimate	133.0	140.0	164.3	250.5	256.8	274.9	278.2	395.2	522.1
Contribution from MS	96.7	107.7	93.8	111.8	122.6	na	122.9	137.9	147.3
Contribution from FP	36.3	32.4	57.4	133.7	134.1	na	155.4	257.3	374.8
Diff. b/w MS & FP Contr.	60.4	75.3	36.4	21.9	11.5	-	32.5	119.4	227.5

Fig 6.1 Source: Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council's data published in Engel U.


The above table reveals the nature of the African Union's funding. It shows African Union's budget estimate and sources of funding 2007-2015. The first row shows AU's annual budget estimate of the respective years while the second row represents contributions from AU member states (MS) and the third row carries the contributions of the AU foreign partners (FP). A close look at the table reveals that AU budget estimates continued to increase from 133.0 in 2007 to 522.1 in 2015. Important information also in the table is that contributions from member states were only greater than those of the foreign partners in 2007, 2008 and 2009 but as from 2010 -2015, foreign partners continued to dominate AU funding. This is an indication of the fact that when development partners like the US, EU, Britain, France, World Bank and other western donors rejected AU's roadmap to Libya, funding became a fundamental handicap. AU at that point had no option than to organise her programme of action according to funds at her disposal. It is important to note also that even in occasion where these partners assisted in the funding of AU operations, they did not transfer the money to AU; rather they manage the fund themselves. In the case of the Libyan Crisis, AU's request for fund was delayed and denied.

We therefore, argue that lack of fund and foreign donors' disappointment were part of the factors that undermined AU's responses to the Libyan Crisis. This argument is in recognition of the fact the revenue accruing to the AU comes from contributions of the member states according to a scale of assessment, additional voluntary contributions by members to the Solidarity Fund and funds provided by external partners. To this end, failure by either members or foreign partners is likely to undermine AU plan of action. This manifested itself during the 2011 Libyan crisis when foreign partner disappointed the union by delaying their contributions. Her dependence on foreign donors also reflects in the bar chart below:

Bar Chart for AU Funding from Member States and Foreign Partners 2007-2015 (in US\$ mn)**Fig 6.2 Source:** Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council's data published in Engel U. (2011)

The above chart shows funding of the African Union by her member states and foreign partners from 2007 to 2015. The blue bars represent contributions from AU member states standing side by side with orange colour bars representing contributions from foreign partners (FP). The Y axis indicates respective financial years while X axis represents funds contributed in these years in United States million dollars. The chart proves that the AU was continually dependent on foreign donors and this is attributed to lack of commitment by the member states and failure of many of them to transfer their dues to the AU. The dependence as we can see is in increasing progression rising from 36.3US\$m in 2007 to 374US\$m in 2015 with high percentage. See pie charts below:

Fig. 6.3 Pie Chart Showing Local & Foreign Financial Contributions to the African Union in 2011



Source: Constructed from the AU Assembly and Council's data published in Engel U. (2011)

This pie chart shows the gap between what the AU can provide and what it sourced externally to make up its budget in 2011. It shows great financial weakness in the part of the AU. AU's proposal could not have based on the actual amount needed for its annual business but must recognize the fact that the union could only raise about one-third of its budget. Every other consideration on the budget had to be mindful of what foreign development partners could offer. The implication of that situation was the facts that the AU was not financially competent to provide the needful due to its weak financial base and dependence on foreign donors. It has to depend on what was available not what was required to carry out its functions – humanitarian intervention inclusive. The situation is worse when you consider the fact that many AU members fail to pay their dues as at when due. The bar chart below shows the few responsive members out of 54 member nations of the union.

Table Showing Few AU Members Who Paid their Fees on Time




Fig. 6.4 Source: <http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/african-union-finances/>

Fig. 6.3 above shows a few AU member countries that paid their dues on time in 2014. It shows South Africa, Angola, Nigeria and Algeria as the only members that paid their dues on time. Egypt, Libya (after Gaddafi's death), Sudan and Cameroon were struggling to pay their 2013 arrears. Other members remained indebted to the union. Such indebtedness is a major bottleneck to boasting AU's financial base and such behaviour had been there before the Libyan Crisis. It worsened after the crisis considering the death of Muammar Gaddafi, a major contributor to the union's fund. Green bars on the chart show contributions made by AU members while gold colour represents arrears.

6.5 Absence of a Strong AU Military Force

The AU could not provide a strong military force capable of standing between the forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi and that of NTC because member failed to make the required contribution of soldiers to monitor and observe AU cease fire call to the warring parties. This contributed to the reasons why force was not AU's last resort; rather the union resorted to only diplomacy and dialogue as her best options for Libya. In addition to the failure to contribute soldiers by AU members, the AU saw the use of force in Libya as not possible. Again, we should consider the fact that major instruments of war today are produced and supplied by major world powers. In doing this, they may want to achieve their imperial or foreign policy objective. So, they may not support supply of weapons for military operation they did not accept. NATO members are major producers of weapons of war and they did not support AU's response programme in Libya.

More so, support to the warring factions as in Syria can only bring destruction opposed to AU's developmental vision for Africa. It will be recalled that the AU planned to mediate between the two warring factions in Libya and see to a reform that will incorporate the NTC into Libya government. When that failed, the peace mission sought for the disengagement of Muammar Gaddafi from power and the formation of all inclusive government that would have both Gaddafi supporters, NTC and other identified groups as members. MCKaiser (2011) reveals that AU's diplomatic mission to Libya had persuaded Gaddafi to step down. In addition, the AU continued to discuss with international communities like the UN, NATO, EU and AU member states on the way to resolve the conflict in Libya. Unfortunately, continuous loss of lives and the resultant NATO intervention did not allow the consultation to continue.

AU's diplomatic vision is vindicated by post Gaddafi continuation of hostility in Libya. It shows that force alone is not capable of engineering enduring peace in crisis-ridden society of our present day world. It is an indication that peace when broken and amended through force cannot last because the aggrieved will always look at the wall where the crack was and may still seek further redress which is likely to generate further crisis. We regret the fact that a number of factors combined to undermine AU's diplomatic plan in Libya.

If the AU had a strong military force, it could have stood between Gaddafi and NTC forces for AU's diplomatic process to continue. Lack of funds, absence of efficient military technology in Africa, and AU's inability to coerce her members to achieve such goals accounted for the absence of a strong AU military force for conflict resolution.

6.6 Division and Lack of Commitment among African Heads of States

One major handicap to the African Union's response to Libya crisis was that AU member states failed to unite themselves in policies and actions relating to the crisis in Libya. Those who were Gaddafi's close associates did not want Gaddafi disgraced out of power while others believed he had overstayed his welcome, lost legitimacy and as such should go. Museni, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Zuma of South Africa still wanted Gaddafi. Sudan supported National Transition Council. Ethiopian Prime Minister was not in good relationship with Gaddafi over Libya's support for Eritrea and to that extent wanted him out. Nigeria wanted him out considering his utterances in support of division of Nigeria into two different North and South states. The division contributed to AU's delays in policies and actions concerning the crisis. Gaddafi was a major player in AU politics and Libya during his regime contributed up to 15% of AU's annual budget. See the pie chart below.

Pie Chart Showing Libyan Contributions to the African Union




Fig.6.5

Those who benefited from his continuous stay in power wanted to see if there was a way he could remain relevant in Libyan politics. On the other hand, his interference in internal affairs of some member states won him some enemies. Those who saw his stay in power as further threat wanted him to go. The AU therefore suffered a state of disunity among its members. The situation prevented the union from taking necessary actions as at when due. As stated in its Constitutive Act, Article 3(d), the AU has such objective to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its people. Such objective was not defended by major member states of the union and it undermined the effectiveness of the union in the crisis.

As if that was not enough, the three African representatives in the United Nations Security Council namely: Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon voted against the union decision against foreign intervention. They all voted in favour of foreign intervention in Libya which was against AU resolution. Each of the three states are strong member of the AU and was part of the decision by AU to reject foreign intervention in Libya. Failure by the three African states to remain

united in AU decision made NATO intervention and disgrace of the AU out of Libya possible.

Thirdly, AU member states were not committed to the mission, otherwise why did they refuse to volunteer their troops for military observer mission in Libya to ensure compliance with AU declaration of cease fire in Libya? No African state agreed to contribute its soldiers for that purpose. Even those who wanted Gaddafi out were not committed enough as to involve their soldiers. Their concern was for Gaddafi to go but they were not ready to offer supportive hands in making it a reality. This failure explains why AU diplomatic mission suffered absence of a military force that could help to deliver AU's diplomatic message to the warring factions in Libya. Libya could not have been stronger than other African states put together if they had united to stop the war in Libya for mediation to continue.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

Findings show that the Libyan Crisis was caused by unaccepted political and economic conditions in Libya, western instigations and supports of the rebels, power struggle and Arab Spring. Distinct political identities institutionalised by Italian colonialism and British and French Trusteeships created political rivalry between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania regions in Libya. Such rivalry found a trigger in Muammar Gaddafi repressive rule and economic marginalization of Cyrenaica. It became an armed conflict when these internal conditions found impetus and momentum for a revolution in western instigation of the rebels and Arab Spring. Libyans' dissatisfactions with prolonged experiences of tight political space and pronounced economic disparity in Libya describe the unaccepted internal conditions while Gaddafi-West's power game accounted for western support and instigation of the Libyan rebels against Gaddafi regime. The study demonstrated the manner western underlying interests in Libyan oil, democratization of Libya and strategic importance of Libya-Mediterranean waterway hid under the need for protection of human rights to instigate and cause a war that resulted in massive loss of lives and property and achieved a regime change and gruesome murder of an anti-neo-colonial, anti-racist and west-resistant, Col. Muammar Gaddafi. In other words, the findings revealed the interplay of internal and external dynamics of interests and powers that resulted in the Libyan Crisis.

In response to the second research question, findings show that though the African Union responses to the Libyan Crisis were unsuccessful, yet, her roadmap on the crisis remains a workable option for Libya. The AU had a

workable roadmap for Libya but run short of required instruments and resources to implement it. The roadmap proved AU's resolve to peaceful settlement of the crisis but for the incapacitating factors beyond her control.

Responding to the third research question, the study found out that African Union was unable to establish a strong military force capable of standing between forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi and the NTC led rebel forces for her diplomatic process to continue. The union also lacked funds to take necessary measures in Libya due to absence of international support and disappointment from foreign donors. NATO's covert interests in Libya required a different approach to the crisis and to that end prominent members of NATO namely the US, France, Britain and EU tactically frustrated the AU in the crisis to allow for their entry into Libya for a regime change and liberal democratisation of Libya preparatory for western exploitation of the country. NATO discouraged its member donors from funding AU's mission and her support to the NTC saw to NTC's outright rejection of AU's roadmap for mediation in Libya.

The NTC rejection of African Union's roadmap on Libya was also viewed as a major blow to AU mediation process. Findings brought to the fore, the fact that AU leadership was unable to command the behaviours of her members and this contributed to her internal deficiencies. The study shows a monumental dependence on western finance for AU conflict missions and NATO's principal donors to AU funds capitalised on this weakness to undermine AU's response to the conflicts. The situation explained the dependent relationship between super powers and developing countries and illustrated how low finance base has provided a leeway for developed countries to manipulate Less Developed Countries (LDCs).

7.2 Conclusion

Having arrived at this concluding section and on the basis of data presented and analysed, we submit that the Libyan Crisis was a manifestation of the dynamics of internal and external contestations of values. Though, AU's responses were unsuccessful, her roadmap remains a viable option for Libya. As AU's responses were incapacitated by inefficient leadership and non-existence of a strong AU military force and resources the union should not be crucified for her inability to resolve the crisis. AU is better evaluated based on circumstances that surrounded her responses rather than destructive criticism. AU is still challenged by continuing Post-Gaddafi Crisis in Libya orchestrated by fractionalisation of anti and pro Gaddafi Militia Groups and interferences of prominent members of NATO in the United Nations' resolution process. AU's unsuccessful responses to the Libyan Crisis were mainly an outcome of internal and external realities that were beyond its control not necessarily the weakness of the roadmap.

7.3 Recommendations

The first step to the challenges of conflict in Libya and African in general is to make the African Union a strong, responsive and effective organisation capable of controlling the continent of African. The union requires an efficient leadership that can command the behaviours of her member states in order to achieve unity and oneness in policies and actions and control events in the continent. The leadership and staff of the AU should be entrusted in competent hands of people who combine braveness, vision, intelligence, wisdom, knowledge, morality and diplomacy. Such leadership must maintain the supremacy of rule of law as principle for strong and firm institutionalisation of Africa. Africans must be committed to building a strong African Union.

The AU also requires instruments of duty adequate to efficiently execute her responsibilities to the continent. Such instruments include a strong financial base through direct generation from source some percent of revenue accruing from immigration, importation and exportation of goods in all states of the continent in addition to the already existing dues. AU can as well borrow leaf from the EU funded from Member State's contributions based on a percentage of their Gross National Income; import duties on goods entering from outside the EU countries and a percentage of each Member State's national VAT rate (Cipriani, 2014). This is to avoid disappointments caused by failure to pay annual dues by member states. The union must not depend on external funding to run its programmes as this has proved to be disappointing.

With good financial base, the union should develop military technology and a force capable of defending the continent against external invasion and stronger than any other military force within its continental territory. A strong AU with efficient leadership, sound financial base and strong military capacity can look into the entire socio-economic and political fabrics of the continent by addressing those issues that cause violent conflict. It will free the continent from corrupt and repressive regimes and ensure fair treatment to all citizens irrespective of their differences in sex, religion, ethnicity and political affiliations by their respective governments. It will take the following steps toward meeting her objectives:

- i. Such strong African Union should be up and doing in ensuring that governments of her member states provide good governance which recognises citizens' rights, privileges and welfare without bias on ethnic, religious and political affiliations. There should be in AU such punitive

measures for discriminatory and dictatorial regimes before their actions get out of hand. Such role will go a long way in uniting ethnic groups as well as states in Africa and reduce resentments and dissatisfactions against the government. It will serve as a great source of integration of ethnic nationalities and platform for directing erring governments of member states without unnecessary interference.

- ii. The union should not wait until there is a crisis to cause the incumbent regime to adhere to rule of law and listen to the aspiration of the people. The union need to intervene in matters that may cause violent conflict in their early stages and be a watchdog for good governance throughout the continent of Africa. Such role needsto be provided in the Constitute Act in such a way that it does not undermine internal affairs of the states. In doing so, a conflict resolution department with diplomatic experts in conflict resolution should be in AU offices in every state headquarters with the responsibility to attending to any matter that may lead to violent conflict particularly those between the citizens and the government which the government has been unable to resolve.
- iii. A strong African Union can defend the interest of the continent in the global arena. It will serve as a platform for collective bargaining of African states in maters like IMF, World Bank Loans and conditionalities, the role of multinational corporations in Africa, currency, migrant crises, and other regional affairs between African governments and their counterparts in other parts of the world. Such role will check western interference in African and hostility between individual African states and their counterpart or organizations in other parts of the world.

- iv. African Union of such capacity can define Africa brand of democracy with high regards to African people and culture. It will unite democratic system in Africa towards African accepted principles and practices devoid of western dictates and exploitation.
- v. Such regional organisation will be in a position to cause the entire Africa states to speak in one voice in the global arena unlike in the Libyan uprising where the AU stood against foreign intervention in Libya while her members (Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon) voted in favour of it in the United Nations Security Council Summit.
- vi. It is under such unity and cooperation among African states that AU's African solution to African problem or such roadmap for the Libya Crisis can successfully be implemented with adequate punishment for those who may want to reject it the way the NTC and Gaddafi did.
- vii. Under this situation, NATO or any other international organisation cannot risk the act of jumping the AU to invade any state in Africa and the opportunity to such action would not be there.
- viii. AU in such capacity will have respect from Africans and the world in general as the association in charge of Africa and will be consulted on matters that affect the continent or its people.

Contribution to Knowledge

The study improved on the existing literature in this area of study by doing a more holistic review on the issues raised by research questions. Apart from

generating a more holistic and better organised knowledge on the causes and consequences of the Libyan Crisis, AU responses and factors that undermined her effort in the crisis; this study has provided new insight on what caused the Libyan crisis, the way AU responded and specific factors that incapacitated the union's efforts. These insights include the fact that the study has revealed that internal and external factors combined to cause the Libyan Crisis. It has also exposed the disagreement between the AU and UN/NATO on the use of political (diplomacy) or security (force) tract as an approach to the Libyan Crisis. This disagreement partly explains why AU's responses were unsuccessful. The study has demonstrated the need for balanced analysis of data in scientific research by looking at AU's achievements, no matter how little, despite high condemnation and lopsided criticism of the union by so many authors on this area of study. It is a major instrument that exposes new dimensions of conflicts and foreign intervention in Africa depicting a situation where UN Responsibility to Protect civilian population was manipulated into invasion of state and forceful change of Libya government. The study has to this extent provided a warning to dictators and potential insurgent in Africa particularly those who may have similar internal conditions like Libya.

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Appendix 1

Chronology of the 2011 Libyan Uprising

November 19 Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Moammar Gadhafi's son, was captured after a firefight in southern Libya.

October 31 The National Transitional Council elected Abdurrahim El-Keib as acting prime minister, with the support of 26 of the 51 members who voted. NATO secretary general announced the official end of the NATO mission in Libya.

October 27 The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to end military operations in Libya. The adopted resolution effectively canceled the NATO mission in Libya as of October 31, 2011.

October 23 Libya's interim leaders declared the nation's freedom in Benghazi, where uprisings against Gaddafi's regime began in February.

October 20 Muammar Gaddafi was killed after being captured by rebel forces in his hometown Sirte, Libya. According to Pentagon spokesman George Little, U.S. Defense Department costs for operations in Libya stand at about \$1.1 billion as of September 30, which includes daily military operations, munitions, the drawdown of supplies and humanitarian assistance.

September 29 U.S. Senator John McCain led a Congressional delegation to Libya. They met with members of Libya's interim governing council, military commanders and ordinary Libyans. They also visited a prison to see the conditions.

September 20 NTC Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, at the U.N. General Assembly, said that he expected Libya to have a new government within 10 days. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon congratulated the National

Transitional Council for the revolution in Libya and directed that the country's new flag be presented alongside the U.N. flag.

September 16 Niger told a delegation representing the National Transitional Council that it would not hand over Saadi Gaddafi, believed to be hiding in a safe house in Niger's capital. The U.N. General Assembly announced that the National Transitional Council would represent Libya during the annual General Assembly later in September. The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to establish a support mission for Libya for the next three months.

September 15 British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy travelled to Libya to pledge support for the National Transitional Council.

September 1 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe announced that France was releasing 1.5 billion Euros, frozen at the start of the war, to the NTC. Russia recognized the National Transitional Council as Libya's official government. 60 countries met in Paris to discuss Libya's transition from Gaddafi's rule to democracy. A British RAF C-17 transport plane delivered 280 million dinars (approximately \$226,502,853 US) to the Central Bank of Libya. Interim leader Mustafa Abdel Jalil addressed supporters in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli and said, "We aim to establish a state of law, a state of welfare, a state where Islamic Sharia law would be the main source of legislation."

September-October Fighting continued across Libya, concentrating in Sirte.

August 30 Rebel commander Hisham Abu Hajer claimed that more than 50,000 Libyans have been killed in the uprising.

August 29 Algeria's state press agency announced that Gaddafi's wife Safia, daughter Aisha, sons, Hannibal and Mohammed, and a number of grandchildren were in Algeria. Mahdi al-Harati, the vice chairman of the rebel's Military Council, tells CNN that Gaddafi's son, Khamis, was killed in battle and buried.

August 25 an agreement was reached in the U.N. Security Council to release \$1.5 billion in frozen Libyan assets to the country's rebel government.

Aug. 24 Buoyed by their seizure of Col. Gaddafi's compound, rebels sought to strengthen their control of Tripoli, placing a nearly \$2 million bounty on the Libyan leader's head and dispatching fighters toward one of his last bastions of support, his tribal hometown of Sirte.

Aug. 23 Rebel fighters flooded into Col. Gaddafi's sprawling compound, overwhelming what remained of its defenses and running pell-mell through the grounds.

Aug. 22 The euphoria that followed the rebels' triumphant march in Tripoli gave way to confusion and wariness, as Col. Gaddafi remained at large, his son Seif al-Islam made a surprise appearance at a hotel with foreign journalists, and pockets of loyalist forces stubbornly resisted rebel efforts to take control of the capital.

Aug. 21 Rebels surged into Tripoli, the Libyan capital, meeting only sporadic resistance from troops loyal to Col. Gaddafi and setting off raucous street celebrations by residents hailing the end of his 42 years in power. The rebel leadership announced that insurgents had captured two of Colonel Qaddafi's sons, including Seif al-Islam, his heir apparent.

Aug. 20 Witnesses in Tripoli reported heavy fighting across the capital, even as rebel forces claimed to have encircled the city by taking major towns to its east, west and south.

Aug. 19 Rebel soldiers fought running street battles in Zawiyah, just a half-hour's drive from the Libyan capital of Tripoli, and there were new signs that worried foreigners in Tripoli were urgently trying to leave.

Aug. 18 Rebel fighters gained complete control of the oil refinery in Zawiyah, routing government soldiers after days of battle and advancing into other parts of the strategic port city. There have also been increasing signs that Tripoli, Colonel Gaddafi's last stronghold, is fracturing. People fleeing the capital said that there was no electricity and that prices of basic goods have soared amid shortages.

Aug. 15 Colonel Gaddafi's interior minister, Nassr al-Mabrouk Abdullah, arrived unexpectedly with his family in Cairo in an apparent high-level defection from the government. If confirmed, Mr. Abdullah's defection would signal a new crack in the Qaddafi government after weeks of seeming stability.

Meanwhile, fighters opposing Colonel Gaddafi advanced on several fronts, seizing ground in the strategic city of Zawiyah.

Aug. 8 Rebel leaders dissolved their own cabinet in an effort to placate the family of assassinated rebel military leader Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes and quiet discord in a movement already struggling to remove Col. Muammar Gaddafi, from power. The move left the rebels without several of its leaders — including the ministers of defense, finance, interior and justice — as they try to fight a three-front war, run dozens of cities under their control and rein in armed militias that have multiplied since the February uprising.

Aug. 3 After six months battling a rebellion that his family portrayed as an Islamist conspiracy, Col. Muammar Gaddafi's son and one-time heir apparent said that he was reversing course to forge a behind-the-scenes alliance with radical Islamist elements among the Libyan rebels to drive out their more liberal-minded confederates. The leading Islamist whom Mr. Gaddafi identified as his main counterpart in the talks acknowledged their conversations but dismissed any suggestion of an alliance. He said the Libyan Islamists supported the rebel leaders' calls for a pluralistic democracy without the Gaddafis.

Aug. 1 The mysterious circumstances surrounding the death of Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, the rebel leader, raised new questions about his own loyalties, and about the unity and discipline of the rebel troops. Rebel fighters waged an eight-hour gunfight in Benghazi against what their leaders called a "fifth column" of Gaddafi loyalists who had posed as a rebel brigade, the latest sign of discord and trickery in the rebel ranks to emerge since the killing.

July 28 The top rebel military commander, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, was killed in murky circumstances, and members of his tribe greeted the announcement with gunfire and angry threats. The violent outburst stirred fears that a tribal feud could divide the forces struggling to topple the Libyan dictator, Col. Muammar Gaddafi.

July 27 Britain said that it would join France and the United States in extending formal diplomatic recognition to Libya's rebels. Britain also followed the lead of France and the United States in holding out the possibility of an outcome to the Libyan conflict that would allow Colonel Gaddafi to remain in Libya, but have no authority.

July 15 The United States formally recognized the rebel leadership in Libya as the country's legitimate government, a move that ratcheted up the diplomatic

pressure on Col. Muammar Gaddafi amid a continuing NATO-led bombing campaign to push him from power.

July 12 Rebels in the mountains in Libya's west looted and damaged four towns seized in June, part of a series of abuses and apparent reprisals against suspected loyalists that have chased residents of these towns away, Human Rights Watch said. In Paris, lawmakers reauthorized France's participation in the NATO-led bombing campaign, while French officials said they were increasingly optimistic about the possibility of a negotiated end to the conflict.

July 7 Military leaders in the rebel capital, Benghazi, have boldly predicted lightning advances by their fighters and an imminent rout of Col. Gaddafi's forces in Tripoli. But a senior rebel military officer in Rujban who said he defected in June from the Libyan Army called the prospects of a collapse by the colonel's forces highly unlikely.

In Washington, the House voted down a measure that would have prevented the United States military from using force in Libya, but it also blocked military support to the Libyan rebels as Congress continued to wrestle with how to respond to the Obama administration's decision to participate in the NATO-led air war.

July 6 Rebels seized control of the village of Qawalish in the mountains, extending their hold in western Libya and inching toward a supply route to the capital that they hope to sever.

July 4 Russia stepped up its efforts to negotiate a resolution to the war in Libya, with officials in Moscow receiving the president of South Africa, who has offered his services as a mediator, and the secretary general of NATO.

July 3 The leader of Libya's opposition movement said that rebel leaders had offered Col. Gaddafi the option to leave power and remain in his country, but he said that the offer, which seemed to represent a considerable softening of the rebel position, had not elicited a reply.

July 1 In a defiant speech broadcast to an unusually large gathering of his supporters, Col. Gaddafi threatened attacks on Europe if NATO did not halt its bombing campaign, even as he also seemed to leave open a door to negotiations.

June 30 Britain is providing limited assistance to the Libyan rebels fighting the Col. Gaddafi's forces, including protective clothing for police officers; Foreign

Secretary William Hague said a day after France acknowledged providing light weapons to the rebels.

Prominent American and European investment funds managed hundreds of millions of dollars in Gaddafi regime assets poorly, charging tens of millions of dollars in fees and producing low returns, according to a document obtained by the advocacy group Global Witness.

June 29 France confirmed that it has provided weapons to the Libyan rebels, the first instance of a NATO country providing direct military aid to the forces seeking to oust Col. Muammar Gaddafi.

June 28 A resolution authorizing American intervention in Libya was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hours after members skeptically grilled the administration's legal adviser over his assertion that airstrikes and other military measures did not amount to hostilities. As the rebel offensive has faltered in other parts of Libya, it seems to have picked up momentum in the west, where a sprawling military base was captured.

June 27 The International Criminal Court in The Hague issued arrest warrants for Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, his son Seif al-Islam and his chief of intelligence, Abdullah Senussi, on charges of crimes against humanity, including murder and persecution, stemming from the first two weeks of the uprising in Libya that led to a NATO bombing campaign.

June 24 The House resoundingly rejected a measure that would authorize the United States's mission in Libya, with 70 Democrats deserting President Obama on an issue that has divided their party and became a major Constitutional flashpoint between Congress and the White House. Hours later a Republican bill restricting the American military role in the mission also failed, with 89 Republicans coming out against it.

June 21 In an effort aimed at countering a House Republican plan to defund American military operations in Libya, Senators John Kerry, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a Democrat, and John McCain, a Republican, announced the introduction of a joint resolution authorizing the limited use of United States Armed Forces in Libya.

The leader of Libya's rebel opposition arrived in China for talks, where a foreign ministry spokesman for the first time described the opposition as "an important political power in Libya."

June 20 The House appeared likely to vote soon on a measure that would limit financing for the American military efforts in Libya, using the chamber's appropriations power to push back against the White House, which did not seek Congressional authorization for the mission.

June 13 Germany, which declined to participate in the NATO air campaign against Libya, recognized the opposition National Transitional Council as the legitimate representative of Libya. The announcement came after weeks of hesitation by Germany over which rebel leaders or movements, if any, it should recognize as an alternative to Colonel Gaddafi's government.

June 10 The nations leading the air campaign against Libya — the United States, Britain and France — prodded other NATO nations to do more, but there were few signs that the five countries that were the main targets of the appeals — Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Turkey — were willing to forsake their political reservations and commit themselves more deeply.

June 9 The nations intervening in Libya pledged as much as \$1 billion in support for the opposition there as senior officials continued to predict that the collapse of Col. Muammar Gaddafi's government could be imminent.

June 7 NATO warplanes dropped bombs in repeated low-flying raids on targets in and around Col. Muammar Gaddafi's compound in their most intense daytime strikes on the Libyan capital since the aerial campaign began two months ago what appeared to be bunker-busting bombs laid waste to an area of about two acre. The country's labor minister, Al-Amin Manfur, added his name to the growing exodus, declaring at a meeting in Geneva that he was now supporting the rebel government.

June 6 Britain's foreign minister said he had pressed the rebel leaders to make early progress on a more detailed plan for a post-Gaddafi government that would include sharing power with some of Colonel Gaddafi's loyalists.

June 4 In a move to intensify pressure on Col. Muammar Gaddafi's forces, NATO introduced attack helicopters into its air campaign against Libyan forces for the first time. NATO officials have said that they regard the introduction of attack helicopters as potential game changers in a conflict that has shown signs of settling into a stalemate.

June 3 The House of Representatives voted to harshly rebuke President Obama for continuing to maintain an American role in NATO operations in Libya without the express consent of Congress, and called for detailed information

about its cost and objectives. The resolution, which passed 268 to 145, was offered by Speaker John Boehner to siphon off swelling Republican support for a measure sponsored by Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, an Ohio Democrat, which calls for a withdrawal of the United States military.

June 1 In Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the alliance would extend its mission for 90 days, saying “This decision sends a clear message to the Gaddafi regime: We are determined to continue our operation to protect the people of Libya.” Antigovernment unrest was reported in Tripoli for the first time in months.

May 31 In talks with South Africa's president, Jacob Zuma, the Libya leader Col. Muammar Gaddafi “emphasized” that he will not leave Libya despite air attacks and international pressure, according to Mr. Zuma, who went to Tripoli to mediate on behalf of the African Union.

May 27 Russia has offered to use its contacts in the Libyan government to facilitate Col. Muammar Gaddafi's departure from power, top officials announced at a meeting of the Group of 8 countries. The announcement, which came after intensive talks between President Barack Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev, represents a marked shift in Russia's tone on the conflict.

May 24 In the heaviest attack yet on the capital since the start of the two-month-old NATO bombing campaign, alliance aircraft struck at least 15 targets in central Tripoli, with most of the airstrikes concentrated on an area around Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's command compound.

May 22 The European Union's foreign policy chief visited Benghazi, and rebels said the high-profile trip was evidence of growing international recognition for their cause.

May 20 NATO officials expressed increased confidence that Col. Muammar el-Gaddafi's military position was weakening, and that allied airstrikes had prevented his forces from making sustained attacks on rebel forces and had driven him into hiding.

May 17 The oil minister of Libya fled to neighboring Tunisia over the weekend, the Tunisian Interior Ministry said, in what appeared to be another high-level defection from the increasingly isolated government of Col. Muammar el-Gaddafi.

May 16 The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague sought arrest warrants for Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, his son and his brother-in-law on charges of orchestrating systematic attacks against civilians that amount to crimes against humanity.

May 15 Two months into the NATO bombing campaign against Col. Muammar Gaddafi's forces, Britain's top military commander has said that the Libyan leader could remain "clinging to power" unless NATO broadened its bombing targets to include the country's infrastructure.

May 12 A day after rebels reclaimed the airport in the contested western city of Misurata, explosions echoed across Tripoli early as NATO warplanes struck a large compound belonging to Col. Muammar Gaddafi and other areas of the capital. President Obama and his legal advisers are deliberating about how the United States military may lawfully continue participating in NATO's bombing campaign in Libya after the air war soon reaches a legal deadline for terminating combat operations that have not been authorized by Congress.

May 11 Rebels in the besieged city of Misurata stormed the city's airport, reclaiming it from the military of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in one of the most significant rebel victories in the Libyan conflict. The western area of Misurata appeared by nightfall to be out of range of the most common of the Gaddafi forces' heavy weapons, which have killed large numbers of rebel soldiers and civilians over the last two months.

May 10 A string of killings in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, still unsolved, have raised the specter of a death squad stalking former Gaddafi officials. The killings have unsettled an already paranoid city, where rebel authorities have spent weeks trying to round up people suspected of being Gaddafi loyalists, and could pose a challenge to a movement trying to present a vision of a new country committed to the rule of law.

May 9 Rebel fighters made significant gains against forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi in both the western and eastern areas of the country, in the first faint signs that NATO airstrikes may be starting to strain the government forces.

May 8 Military forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi struck the fuel terminal of the rebel-controlled city of Misurata with ground-to-ground rockets, igniting a fire that threatened the city's fuel supply.

May 6 France, which has taken a lead role in supporting rebels fighting Col. Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, expelled 14 Libyan diplomatic officials. The Foreign Ministry made the announcement shortly after Western nations announced plans to provide the insurgents with financial support. Earlier in the week, Britain expelled Libya's ambassador and other diplomats from London.

May 5 The United States announced that it would try to release some of the more than \$30 billion in assets seized from Col. Muammar Gaddafi, as international officials said they would create a fund to give money directly to the Libyan rebels. The meeting seemed to bolster a NATO-led military intervention that to critics appeared stalled.

May 4 Behind the rebel resistance in the besieged city of Misurata lies a clandestine network of rebel workshops, where makeshift weapons have been designed, assembled and pushed out.

May 3 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, a key regional powerbroker, told reporters that Col. Muammar Gaddafi had chosen "blood, tears, oppression" and must "immediately step down." Turkey has historic and business ties to Libya and has tried to act as an intermediary between Colonel Gaddafi's government and rebels seeking his ouster. But Mr. Erdogan now appeared to draw a line, telling a televised news conference that Colonel Gaddafi had violently resisted calls for change and must leave power for the good of the country and the Libyan people.

May 1 Even as Col. Muammar Gaddafi denied killing civilians, shells continued to rain down on Misurata, where clinics and hospitals had confirmed at least 530 deaths from war-related trauma. This count does not include many people who did not reach medical care before they died, and were buried by their families. Estimates for the conflict as a whole have ranged as high as 30,000.

April 30 A NATO airstrike struck a house in Tripoli containing several of Col. Muammar Gaddafi's family members and killed his youngest son, Seif al-Arab Muammar Gaddafi, and three of the colonel's grandchildren. Col. Gaddafi and his wife had been staying in the house, but were reported to be unharmed. The attack came shortly after Mr. Gaddafi gave a speech offering to hold talks with the rebels, but not to leave the country.

April 29 Libyan forces in more than a dozen military vehicles and armed with anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers crossed into Tunisia as fighting with rebels raged along the western frontier, witnesses said. Tunisia's government

was furious after clashes broke out on its territory and demanded Libya halt all incursions.

April 27 NATO warplanes attacked a rebel position on the front lines of Misurata, killing 12 fighters in what the rebels called a friendly fire accident. The American ambassador to Libya, speaking in Washington, said that estimates of the death toll from the violence range from 10,000 to 30,000.

April 26 NATO planners said the allies are stepping up attacks on palaces, headquarters, communications centers and other prominent institutions supporting the Libyan regime, a shift of targets that is intended to weaken Col. Muammar Gaddafi's grip on power and frustrate his forces in the field. The strikes are meant to reduce the regime's ability to harm civilians by eliminating, link by link, the command, communications and supply chains required for sustaining military operations. The hope is that they will lead to mass defections or a coup.

April 25 NATO warplanes struck Col. Muammar Gaddafi's compound and bombed a state television facility in an escalation of the air campaign to aid the rebellion against his four decades in power. The attack suggested that nonmilitary targets would be hit in an effort to break down the instruments of Colonel Gaddafi's broader control.

April 24 Rebel leaders said they had consolidated their control of the western city of Misurata, taking over the last two government outposts there even as government forces continued to shell the city from its outskirts.

April 23 In a sudden shift after nearly two months of heavy siege, government forces withdrew from the western city of Misurata. The departure came so quickly that even rebel leaders puzzled over whether the withdrawal was a true military victory, a subterfuge by pro-Gaddafi forces who might return in plain clothes, or a strategic redeployment to new fronts in the mountains along the western border with Tunisia. The government said the army had ceased operations in order to give tribal leaders a chance to negotiate a resolution to the siege.

April 22 The government of Col. Muammar Gaddafi suffered setbacks on multiple fronts as rebels in the western mountains seized a Tunisian border crossing, fighters in the besieged city of Misurata said they were gaining ground and President Obama authorised the use of armed drones for close-in fighting against the Gaddafi forces.

April 21 Libyan rebels said they had control of a post on the Tunisian border, forcing government soldiers to flee over the frontier and possibly opening a new channel for opposition forces in Col. Moammar Gaddafi's bastion in western Libya. And a survey of weapons carried by hundreds of rebels fighting on two fronts presents a picture of an uprising that is both underequipped and in custody of many weapons with no utility in the war. The rebels also possess weapons that if sold, lost or misused, could undermine their cause. President Obama authorized the use of armed Predator drones against Libya government forces fighting the rebellion, as NATO struggles to regain momentum since taking command of the operation from the United States.

April 20 The French and Italian governments said that they would join Britain in sending a small number of military liaison officers to support the ragtag rebel army in Libya, offering a diplomatic boost for the insurgent leader, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, as he met with President Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris.

April 19 Britain would send experienced military officers to Libya to advise rebels fighting forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The soldiers marching orders are to help the rebels' makeshift force "improve their military organizational structures, communications and logistics," Britain's foreign secretary, William Hague, said in a statement.

April 15 Forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi, surrounding Misurata and vowing to crush the rebellion there, fired into residential neighborhoods with heavy weapons, including cluster bombs, which were banned by much of the world. And divisions in NATO over the intensity of the air campaign emerged again on the second day of a gathering of foreign ministers. While the British foreign secretary said efforts to persuade more countries to adopt a tougher military posture toward the forces of Colonel Gaddafi were "making a bit of progress," the Italian defense minister said his country would not order its pilots to open fire over Libya.

April 14 NATO foreign ministers gathered to wrestle with increasingly complex questions raised by the stalled conflict in Libya, seeking a formula for political progress in the absence of any decisive military gains. Pentagon officials disclosed that American warplanes had continued to strike targets there even after the Obama administration said the United States was stepping back from offensive missions and letting NATO take the lead.

April 13 NATO, Arab and African ministers met with Libya's rebels here in a show of support for insurgents who are seeking to overthrow Col. Muammar Gaddafi against a backdrop of division over the pace of coalition air attacks on

pro-Qaddafi forces. France and Britain had openly called on the alliance and its partners to intensify airstrikes on Libyan government troops to protect civilians, prompting an unusual public retort from NATO's command.

April 11 African Union negotiators faced a chilly reception upon arriving in eastern Libya to try brokering a cease-fire with Libyan rebels, a day after Col. Muammar Gaddafi's military forces appeared to falter in their assault against the rebel side in the battle for the strategic city of Ajdabiya.

April 9 Military forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi pressed a coordinated ground attack on Ajdabiya, bringing the front lines of the battle with Libyan opposition forces back to the doorstep of this strategically vital rebel city.

April 6 Stung by criticism from rebel leaders, NATO officials said that the pace of attacks on the forces of Col. Muammar Gaddafi was increasing, after a slight slowdown as the coalition handed off responsibility earlier in the week. Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes, the head of the rebel army, had lashed out at his Western allies during a news conference in Benghazi, accusing NATO of tardiness and indecision.

April 5 Forces loyal to Col. Muammar Gaddafi battered rebel fighters on the road outside the strategic oil town of Brega with rocket fire, mortars and artillery, driving them many miles to the north and leaving them in disarray. Colonel Gaddafi's son, Seif al-Islam, promised in a television interview to usher in a new era of constitutional democracy in which his father would be a mere figurehead "like the queen of England."

April 4 The United States began to remove its warplanes from front-line missions in Libya and focus on a support role there. The changeover came as diplomatic maneuvering quickened with Turkey announcing efforts to secure a cease-fire and Italy saying it was recognising the rebels seeking to oust Col. Muammar Gaddafi, only the third country to do so. The Obama administration also dropped financial sanctions against Moussa Koussa, the top Libyan official who fled to Britain, saying it hoped the move would encourage other senior aides to abandon Col. Muammar Gaddafi, the country's embattled leader.

April 3 At least two sons of Col. Muammar Gaddafi were proposing a resolution to the Libyan conflict that would entail pushing their father aside to make way for a transition to a constitutional democracy under the direction of his son Seif al-Islam Gaddafi. At the same time, as the struggle with Colonel Gaddafi threatened to settle into a stalemate, the rebel government here was showing growing strains that imperil

its struggle to complete a revolution and jeopardize requests for foreign military aid and recognition.

April 1 A senior aide to one of Col Muammar Gaddafi's sons held secret talks in London with British authorities, adding to the confusion swirling around the Tripoli regime. East of Brega, the Libyan rebels prepared for a further attempt to wrest the momentum of ground fighting away from Colonel Gaddafi's forces after days of see-sawing advances and retreats. In Washington, President Obama's top two national security officials signaled that the United States was unlikely to arm the rebels. Members of the NATO alliance said they had sternly warned the rebels not to attack civilians. Timeline: Gaddafi

March 31 Col. Muammar Gaddafi's forces pushed rebels into a panicked retreat and seized valuable oil towns they ceded just days ago under allied airstrikes. Libya's foreign minister, Moussa Koussa, defected to London, dealing a blow to Colonel Gaddafi's government even as his forces made military advances. American officials revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency has inserted clandestine operatives into Libya to gather intelligence for military airstrikes and to contact and vet the beleaguered rebels.

March 30 Leaders of four dozen countries meeting in London agreed that Col. Muammar Gaddafi would have to relinquish power - even though regime change is not the stated aim of the United Nations resolution authorising military action against his forces. With the momentum of ground combat tilting in favor of forces loyal to Colonel Gaddafi, rebels seeking to oust him embarked on a large-scale withdrawal from the coastal oil town of Brega, falling back toward the strategically located city of Ajdabiya. The Obama administration engaged in a fierce debate over whether to supply weapons to the rebels, with some fearful that providing arms would deepen American involvement in a civil war and that some fighters may have links to Al Qaeda.

March 29 In his first major address since ordering American airstrikes, President Obama defended the American-led military assault in Libya, saying it was in the national interest of the United States to stop a potential massacre and that the assault would be limited. An array of diplomats and public figures gathered in London to shape their political vision of a post-Gaddafi era. In Libya, rebels seeking the ouster of Colonel Gaddafi traded rocket fire with loyalist forces, who have blunted the insurgents' westward advance. At the same time, American warplanes appeared to have opened a new line of attack on pro-Gaddafi forces, firing on three Libyan vessels off the contested western port of Misurata.

Sources: The New York Times via

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/timestopics/libyatimeline.html?_r=0

and Extract from 2015 CNN Library's Fast Facts on 2011 Libya Civil War via <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civil-war-fast-facts/>

April 1, 2015

Appendix 2

Chronology of Major Issues in US-Libya Relations

December 2, 1979: A mob attacked and set fire to the U.S. embassy in Tripoli. Embassy officials were subsequently withdrawn and the embassy shut down.

December 29, 1979: The U.S. government placed Libya on a newly created list of state sponsors of terrorism. Countries on the list were subject to a variety of U.S. sanctions.

1978-1981: Libya purchased more than 2,000 tons of lightly processed uranium from Niger. The Soviet Union completed a 10 megawatt nuclear research reactor at Tajoura.

July 1980: Libya's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. Such agreements allowed the IAEA to inspect certain nuclear-related facilities within a country to verify that the government was not misusing civilian nuclear programs for illicit military purposes.

May 6, 1981: The United States closed Libya's embassy in Washington and expelled Libyan diplomats.

August 19, 1981: U.S. aircraft shot down two Libyan combat jets that fired on them over the Mediterranean Sea.

January 19, 1982: Libya ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC prohibits states-parties from developing, producing, and stockpiling offensive biological agents.

January 7, 1986: President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order imposing additional economic sanctions against Libya in response to Tripoli's continued support for international terrorism.

April 15, 1986: U.S. forces launched aerial bombing strikes against Libya in response to Tripoli's involvement in an April 5 terrorist attack that killed two American servicemen at a Berlin disco.

December 21, 1988: Pan Am Flight 103 en route from London to New York exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people on board and 11 bystanders on the ground. In November 1991, investigators in the United States and United Kingdom named two Libyan officials as prime suspects in the bombing.

September 19, 1989: The French airliner UTA Flight 772 bounded for Paris exploded, killing all 171 people on board. Investigating authorities found evidence of terrorism and indicted two Libyan suspects in 1991.

January 21, 1992: The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 731 demanding that Libya surrender the suspects in the Pam Am bombing, cooperate with the Pan Am and UTA investigations, and pay compensation to the victims' families.

March 31, 1992: The Security Council adopted Resolution 748 imposing sanctions on Libya, including an arms embargo and air travel restrictions.

November 11, 1993: The Security Council adopted Resolution 883 which tightened sanctions on Libya. The resolution included a limited freeze of Libyan assets as well as a ban on exports of oil equipment to Libya.

July 1995: According to the IAEA, Libya made a "strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment."

April 1996: Libya joined the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone by signing the Treaty of Pelindaba. The treaty prohibits member states from developing, acquiring, and possessing nuclear weapons, but had not yet entered into force.

August 5, 1996: The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) became law. The act authorised the president to impose sanctions against foreign companies that invest more than \$40 million a year in Libya's oil industry.

April 5, 1999: Libya handed over two suspects--each reportedly linked to Libyan intelligence--to Dutch authorities for trial in the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103.

May 1999: Libyan officials offered to eliminate their chemical weapons programs during secret talks with the United States, according to Martin Indyk, then assistant secretary of state.

January 31, 2001: Three judges handed down verdicts in the Pan Am trial. One man, Abdel Baset Ali Mohamed Al-Megrahi, was found guilty of 270 counts of murder. The other suspect, Lamien Khalifa Fhimah, was acquitted.

February 12, 2003: CIA Director George Tenet, in written testimony to Congress, noted that “Libya clearly intended to re-establish its offensive chemical weapons capability.”

Early March 2003: Libyan intelligence officials approach British intelligence officials and offered to enter negotiations regarding the elimination of Libya’s WMD programs. The subsequent negotiations, which included U.S. officials, are kept secret.

April 5, 2003: Bolton said in an interview with Radio Sawa that the invasion of Iraq “sent a message” to Libya, as well as Iran and Syria, “that the cost of their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was potentially quite high.”

October 4, 2003: German and Italian authorities interdicted a ship en route to Libya containing centrifuge components manufactured in Malaysia. Bush later touted the interdiction as a key intelligence success during a February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defence University.

December 19, 2003: Libya's Foreign Ministry publicly renounces the country's WMD programmes. Tripoli promised to eliminate its chemical and nuclear weapons programmes, adhere to its commitments under the NPT and BWC, as well as accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

January 4, 2004: The London *Sunday Times* publishes an interview with Gaddafi's son, who reports that Libya obtained designs for a nuclear weapon from the Khan network.

January 6, 2004: Libya ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits the explosive testing of nuclear weapons.

January 18, 2004: U.S. and British officials arrived in Libya to begin elimination and removal of WMD designs and stockpiles. Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 26 that the Libyan officials were "forthcoming about the myriad aspects" of Libya's WMD programmes.

January 27, 2004: U.S. officials airlift about 55,000 pounds of documents and components from Libya's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes to the United States. The nuclear-related material includes uranium hexafluoride (the feedstock for centrifuges), two complete second-generation centrifuges from Pakistan, and additional centrifuge parts, equipment, and documentation.

February 4, 2004: Khan revealed that, for two decades, he secretly provided North Korea, Libya, and Iran with technical and material assistance for making nuclear weapons.

February 28, 2004: At the end of an African Union summit, Gaddafi called upon other states to abandon their WMD programmes. Nuclear weapons, he said, make states less secure.

March 4, 2004: The OPCW reported that “over 3,300 empty aerial bombs, specifically designed to disperse chemical warfare agent, had been individually inventoried, then irreversibly destroyed under stringent international verification.”

March 5, 2004: Libyan officials submitted a complete declaration of the state’s chemical weapons stockpile and facilities. According to the OPCW, the declared stockpile included approximately 23 metric tons of mustard gas and more than 1,300 metric tons of precursor chemicals, but no filled munitions.

March 8, 2004: The United States, with assistance from British and IAEA officials, arranges for 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, a fissile material, to be airlifted from Libya to Russia for disposal.

May 13, 2004: Libya announced it would end military trade with countries it deemed “source(s) of concern for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” U.S. officials explained that the Libyan announcement followed a private agreement for Libya to end all its military dealings with Syria, Iran, and North Korea. However, the Libyan foreign ministry later denied that the announcement was aimed at Syria.

October 11, 2004: European Union foreign ministers lifted a 20 year-old arms embargo on Libya, allowing EU countries to export arms and other military equipment to that country. Part of the EU rationale for lifting the embargo was

to improve Libya's capacity to patrol its maritime borders and prevent illegal immigration to the EU from North Africa, a particular concern of southern European states such as Italy.

March 25, 2005: In a letter to *The Washington Post*, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan declared for the first time publicly the U.S. assessment that the uranium hexafluoride found in Libya originated from North Korea. According to McClellan, this material was transferred to Libya via the A.Q. Khan illicit trafficking network.

October 20, 2005: Libya signed an agreement with Russian nuclear fuel manufacturer TVEL to provide its Tajoura research reactor with low-enriched uranium (LEU) as part of an effort to convert the reactor from using HEU to LEU.

June 26, 2006: The United Kingdom and Libya signed a "Joint Letter of Peace and Security," in which London pledged to seek UN Security Council action if another state attacked Libya with chemical or biological weapons.

July 27, 2006: IAEA and U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration officials helped remove the last remaining quantity of fresh HEU from Libya. Three kilograms of Russian-origin HEU from the Tajoura research reactor in Libya were returned to Russia for disposal.

June 14, 2007: Libya annulled its contract on chemical weapons destruction with the United States due to dissatisfaction with its provisions on liability, financing, and facility ownership. Under its agreement with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, these chemicals must be eliminated by

the end of 2010. Libya did not indicate how it intended to meet this commitment.

July 25, 2007: France and Libya signed a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy cooperation.

August 14, 2008: The United States and Libya signed the U.S -Libya Claims Settlement Agreement, providing full compensation for victims of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of the Berlin disco. Under the terms of the agreement, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice certified to Congress that Libya paid \$1.5 billion to cover terrorism related claims against Tripoli. The agreement also addressed Libyan claims arising from U.S. military actions in Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 to the amount of \$300 million.

December 21, 2009: Libya allowed a Russian-chartered plane to leave the country carrying the last of its HEU spent fuel stocks for disposal in Russia after a month-long delay.

October 2010: The destruction of one of Libya's chemical reagents, sulfur mustard, was initiated.

February 23, 2011: OPCW spokesperson Michael Luhan tells the Associated Press that Libya destroyed “nearly 13.5 metric tons” of its mustard gas in 2010, accounting for “about 54 percent of its stockpile.”

Source: Extract from US Arms Control Association (2014), summary of issues in Libya-US relations.

Appendix 3

Table showing Libya's position in the World Corruption Index

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
1	New Zealand	9.5	9.3	9.4	9.3
2	Denmark	9.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
2	Finland	9.4	9.2	8.9	9
4	Sweden	9.3	9.2	9.2	9.3
5	Singapore	9.2	9.3	9.2	9.2
6	Norway	9.0	8.6	8.6	7.9
7	Netherlands	8.9	8.8	8.9	8.9
8	Switzerland	8.8	8.7	9	9
8	Australia	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.7
10	Canada	8.7	8.9	8.7	8.7
11	Luxembourg	8.5	8.5	8.2	8.3
12	Hong Kong	8.4	8.4	8.2	8.1
13	Iceland	8.3	8.5	8.7	8.9
14	Germany	8.0	7.9	8	7.9

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
14	Japan	8.0	7.8	7.7	7.3
16	Austria	7.8	7.9	7.9	8.1
16	Barbados	7.8	7.8	7.4	7
16	United Kingdom	7.8	7.6	7.7	7.7
19	Ireland	7.5	8	8	7.7
19	Belgium	7.5	7.1	7.1	7.3
21	Bahamas	7.3			
22	Qatar	7.2	7.7	7	6.5
22	Chile	7.2	7.2	6.7	6.9
24	United States	7.1	7.1	7.5	7.3
25	Uruguay	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.9
25	France	7.0	6.8	6.9	6.9
25	Saint Lucia	7.0			
28	United Arab Emirates	6.8	6.3	6.5	5.9
29	Estonia	6.4	6.5	6.6	6.6
30	Cyprus	6.3	6.3	6.6	6.4
31	Spain	6.2	6.1	6.1	6.5
32	Portugal	6.1	6	5.8	6.1
32	Botswana	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.8
32	Taiwan	6.1	5.8	5.6	5.7
35	Slovenia	5.9	6.4	6.6	6.7
36	Israel	5.8	6.1	6.1	6
36	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	5.8			
38	Bhutan	5.7	5.7	5	5.2
39	Puerto Rico	5.6	5.8	5.8	5.8
39	Malta	5.6	5.6	5.2	5.8
41	Poland	5.5	5.3	5	4.6
41	Cape Verde	5.5	5.1	5.1	5.1
43	Korea (South)	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.6
44	Brunei	5.2	5.5	5.5	0
44	Dominica	5.2	5.2	5.9	6
46	Mauritius	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.5
46	Macau	5.1	5	5.3	5.4
46	Bahrain	5.1	4.9	5.1	5.4

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
49	Rwanda	5.0	4	3.3	3
50	Costa Rica	4.8	5.3	5.3	5.1
50	Oman	4.8	5.3	5.5	5.5
50	Lithuania	4.8	5	4.9	4.6
50	Seychelles	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
54	Hungary	4.6	4.7	5.1	5.1
54	Kuwait	4.6	4.5	4.1	4.3
56	Jordan	4.5	4.7	5	5.1
57	Saudi Arabia	4.4	4.7	4.3	3.5
57	Czech Republic	4.4	4.6	4.9	5.2
57	Namibia	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.5
60	Malaysia	4.3	4.4	4.5	5.1
61	Turkey	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.6
61	Latvia	4.2	4.3	4.5	5
61	Cuba	4.2	3.7	4.4	4.3
64	South Africa	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.9
64	Georgia	4.1	3.8	4.1	3.9
66	Slovakia	4.0	4.3	4.5	5
66	Croatia	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.4
66	Montenegro	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.4
69	Ghana	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9
69	Samoa	3.9	4.1	4.5	4.4
69	Macedonia, FYR	3.9	4.1	3.8	3.6
69	Italy	3.9	3.9	4.3	4.8
73	Tunisia	3.8	4.3	4.2	4.4
73	Brazil	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.5
75	Romania	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.8
75	China	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6
77	Vanuatu	3.5	3.6	3.2	2.9
77	Lesotho	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.2
77	Gambia	3.5	3.2	2.9	1.9
80	El Salvador	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.9
80	Thailand	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5
80	Peru	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.6
80	Greece	3.4	3.5	3.8	4.7

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
80	Colombia	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.8
80	Morocco	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.5
86	Panama	3.3	3.6	3.4	3.4
86	Bulgaria	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.6
86	Serbia	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.4
86	Jamaica	3.3	3.3	3	3.1
86	Sri Lanka	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.2
91	Trinidad and Tobago	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.6
91	Liberia	3.2	3.3	3.1	2.4
91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.2	3.2	3	3.2
91	Zambia	3.2	3	3	2.8
95	Albania	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4
95	India	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.4
95	Kiribati	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.1
95	Swaziland	3.1	3.2	3.6	3.6
95	Tonga	3.1	3	3	2.4
100	Malawi	3.0	3.4	3.3	2.8
100	Djibouti	3.0	3.2	2.8	3
100	Mexico	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.6
100	Burkina Faso	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.5
100	Sao Tome & Principe	3.0	3	2.8	2.7
100	Argentina	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9
100	Benin	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.1
100	Gabon	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.1
100	Indonesia	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.6
100	Tanzania	3.0	2.7	2.6	3
100	Madagascar	3.0	2.6	3	3.4
100	Suriname	3.0			
112	Egypt	2.9	3.1	2.8	2.8
112	Senegal	2.9	2.9	3	3.4
112	Moldova	2.9	2.9	3.3	2.9
112	Algeria	2.9	2.9	2.8	3.2
112	Kosovo	2.9	2.8	0	0
112	Vietnam	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.7
118	Bolivia	2.8	2.8	2.7	3

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
118	Mali	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.1
120	Guatemala	2.7	3.2	3.4	3.1
120	Kazakhstan	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.2
120	Solomon Islands	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9
120	Mongolia	2.7	2.7	2.7	3
120	Mozambique	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.6
120	Ethiopia	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6
120	Ecuador	2.7	2.5	2.2	2
120	Bangladesh	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.1
120	Iran	2.7	2.2	1.8	2.3
129	Dominican Republic	2.6	3	3	3
129	Armenia	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.9
129	Syria	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.1
129	Honduras	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.6
129	Philippines	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.3
134	Guyana	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.6
134	Eritrea	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6
134	Niger	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.8
134	Lebanon	2.5	2.5	2.5	3
134	Nicaragua	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
134	Sierra Leone	2.5	2.4	2.2	1.9
134	Pakistan	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.5
134	Maldives	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.8
134	Cameroon	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.3
143	Timor-Leste	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.2
143	Belarus	2.4	2.5	2.4	2
143	Uganda	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6
143	Azerbaijan	2.4	2.4	2.3	1.9
143	Togo	2.4	2.4	2.8	2.7
143	Nigeria	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.7
143	Mauritania	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.8
143	Comoros	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.5
143	Russia	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.1
152	Ukraine	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.5
152	Tajikistan	2.3	2.1	2	2

Transparency International World Corruption Index (1=least corrupt)					
2011 rank	Country/Territory	CPI 2008 Score	CPI 2009 Score	CPI 2010 Score	CPI 2011 Score
154	Zimbabwe	2.2	2.4	2.2	1.8
154	Nepal	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.7
154	Paraguay	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.4
154	Côte d'Ivoire	2.2	2.2	2.1	2
154	Congo Republic	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.9
154	Papua New Guinea	2.2	2.1	2.1	2
154	Guinea-Bissau	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.9
154	Central African Republic	2.2	2.1	2	2
154	Laos	2.2	2.1	2	2
154	Kenya	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1
164	Yemen	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.3
164	Cambodia	2.1	2.1	2	1.8
164	Guinea	2.1	2	1.8	1.6
164	Kyrgyzstan	2.1	2	1.9	1.8
168	Libya	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.6
168	Congo, Dem Rep	2.0	2	1.9	1.7
168	Angola	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9
168	Chad	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6
172	Venezuela	1.9	2	1.9	1.9
172	Equatorial Guinea	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7
172	Burundi	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9
175	Haiti	1.8	2.2	1.8	1.4
175	Iraq	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.3
177	Sudan	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6
177	Turkmenistan	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.8
177	Uzbekistan	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
180	Myanmar	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3
180	Afghanistan	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.5
182	Somalia	1.0	1.1	1.1	1
182	Korea (North)	1.0			
SOURCE: Transparency International via http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/dec/01/corruption-index-2011-transparency-international					

Appendix4

Interview Schedule

Please, accept my appreciation and thanks for accepting my request despite your busy schedules. I am very optimistic that your wealth of knowledge on this area of study would through this interview strengthen my thesis. My research is a PhD dissertation on *The African Union and Challenges of Conflict Resolution: An Appraisal of 2005-2015 Responses to the Libyan Crisis* being conducted in the Department of Political Science, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka-Nigeria. Our objectives here are to obtain informed data on major causes and consequences of Libyan crisis, the way AU responded to the crisis and why the union was unable to resolve the crisis. This is with a view to bringing to light AU's efforts in that crisis and underscore some fundamental factors that incapacitated the implementation of AU's roadmap on the Libyan Crisis. The study will serve as a check to lopsided and destructive criticisms against the union, and importantly, recommend workable options capable of strengthening the union.

You can please Sir, respond to the following questions

A. Major Causes and Consequences of Libyan Crisis

1. Were colonial antecedents and Cyrenaica-Tripolitania political rivalry part of the causes of the Libyan Crisis?
2. How did Libyans' dissatisfaction with Gaddafi's rule contribute to the crisis?
3. How did Gaddafi-West power game and western support of the NTC affect the crisis?
4. How did global democratization spread and Arab Spring influence the crisis?
5. What other factors contributed to the Libyan Crisis?

B. African Unions Response to the Libyan Crisis

6. How did the AU implement her roadmap on Libyan crisis?
7. Why did the AU reject and later recognise the NTC?
8. What accounted for AU's rejection of foreign intervention in Libya?
9. How did the AU condemn NATO bombardment of Libya?
10. Despite failure to resolve the crisis, what did the AU achieve in the Libyan Crisis?

C. Factors that Incapacitated AU's Responses to the Libyan Crisis

11. Did legal handicap and AU's leadership challenges affect AU's responses to the Libyan Crisis?
12. How did the rejection of AU's roadmap by the NTC contribute to her inability to resolve the crisis?
13. How did AU-NATO relations affect AU's intervention in Libya?
14. How did lack of fund and disappointments from development partners affect AU's performance in Libya?
15. Did the absence of a strong AU military force contribute to AU's challenges in Libya?
16. How did division among AU member states on the crisis affect AU's intervention?
17. What other factors contributed to AU's challenges in Libya?

It has been a wonderful time with you Sir. Please, accept our immeasurable thanks and appreciation for this service to scholarship and humanity. May God continue to bless you.