

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background to the Study

One of the most fundamental conditions for human existence is security. The role of the state in providing security for its citizens has long been canvassed by several scholars (Miliband, 1969; Raphael, 1976; Giddens, 1985; Grindle, 1996; Nnoli, 2006,). For John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, security is the reason for the coming into existence of the state and government. Kola (1988:64), also asserts that it is the traditional function of the state to ensure the security of the citizens within its territorial boundary. Imobighe (2001:39-40) clearly articulates the importance of security as follows:

without security, individuals within a state will find it difficult to engage in productive activities. Similarly, without security, the state is bound to experience great difficulty in harnessing its human and material resources towards meaningful development and the promotion of the general well being of the people.

The task of maintaining security in a state is entrusted to the government of a state which, according to Onyeoziri (2005:56), is the most important agent of the state. Appadorai (1968:12), similarly states that the government is saddled with the responsibility of maintaining security because, ‘essentially it is the agency or machinery through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realized.’

What the above implies is that the state through the agency of the government is the principal addressee of security challenges in any given state. Security challenges according to Yusuf (2012:60), ‘are understood and protected from two dimensions: internal and external’. In order to deal with security challenges, the state’s claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within its territory is assumed

and exercised by the government through its coercive institutions like the Police, military and para- military forces.

Ordinarily, in most countries, while the maintenance of the internal security is the primary responsibility of the Police, Prisons, and Immigration, the maintenance of external security is the responsibility of the armed forces. However, Imobighe (2003:65) rightly states that the overlapping nature of the security functions of the state requires that the army can also be of assistance in maintaining internal security, especially in emergency situations. In a similar vein, Lutterbeck (2004:45) also argues that the dividing line between internal and external security in the post – cold war era has increasingly become blurred as a result of the emergence of a growing number of transnational risks and challenges.

Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a steady decline in the rate of external security challenges. At the same time, states, especially the new ones, most of which are in Africa, came to be faced with rising incidence of internal security challenges. According to Nnoli (2006:6), security has become a big issue in Africa today because of the various forms of carnage, brutality, pogroms, and even genocide associated with incessant civil wars and other forms of violent conflicts on the continent.

Since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent state, it has experienced several challenges in the management of its internal security. In the first republic, class, ethnic, religious and political conflicts culminated in a 30 month civil war and, also, the introduction of military rule. Within this period, the internal security situation in Nigeria seriously threatened the continued existence of the Nigerian State. The continued existence of military rule after the 30 month civil war further exacerbated the internal security problem as numerous violent conflicts erupted in various parts of the Nigerian State. As reported by Elaigwu (2005:87), between 1980 and 2005, there were 145 cases of violent conflicts in the country. Recently, Philips (2010:26) also reported that between 1999 and April 2010, Nigeria has recorded 187 ethno – religious conflicts.

Nwabueze (1992:2-4) attributed the political environment that engendered the situation described above to two major reasons. First, is the inability of military rule to ensure social justice. This, according to him, specifically manifested in ‘the absence of a free and just society; a virile civil society; an ordered and stable society; and the equal treatment of all citizens by the state’. Second, is ‘the weakening of the machinery and foundations of constitutionalism which resulted to the absence of the rule of law’.

After twenty-six years of cumulative military rule, the Nigerian State inaugurated its Fourth Republic on May 29, 1999. This came with the expectation that the end had come for the era of militarization of society which characterized the state shortly after independence and during the military era. Toward the last years of military rule, the internal security situation in Nigeria had become very worrisome. Thus, Ugochukwu (1997:24), notes that despite the operations of the internal security forces such as the police, the state security service (SSS), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), etc, the rate of murder, robbery, rape, cultism, ethno-religious militancy, vandalism and arson during this period had become alarming.

The Nigerian State identifies security as a fundamental factor of national existence and development. For example, the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, provides in Chapter 2 Section 14 (2) (a) that ‘the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government’. Secondly, in several other sections of the constitution, provisions are made for institutions that are charged with the maintenance of the security of Nigerian citizens. On that premise, the government of Nigeria responds to the various internal security challenges that have threatened the existence of the state. These responses, according to the Institute of Peace and Conflict Management (in Ibeanu and Momoh, 2007:33), have been in five major dimensions, namely: providing security by the police and the army; provision of relief items to victims of conflicts; setting up of panels and commissions of enquiry; public enlightenment and mobilization, and the setting up of the Niger Delta ministry. More recently in the wake of the Boko Haram

insurgency, under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration, the government has, among other actions, set up a Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, amended the Terrorism Prevention Act, and also declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

These facts notwithstanding, since the return to democratic governance in 1999, the internal security situation in Nigeria has remained a serious problem. As evidenced by the numerous terrorist attacks by the Boko Haram sect in the Northern geo-political zones and the litany of commercial kidnappings, killings, and youth militancy in the Southern geo-political zones, there is widespread doubt about the capability of the Nigerian Government to provide adequate security for her citizens and others living within its territorial boundaries.

The implications include loss of confidence in the state, retreat from committing personal and corporate resources to the development of the economy, and the 'privatization' of security as increasing number of people and corporate organizations are now relying more on non-governmental security operatives for their security. The growth and spread of private security outfits in Nigeria tend to suggest increasing loss of confidence in the ability of the state to protect the lives and properties of its citizens.

Interest in this study was, therefore, prompted by the serious concern about the commitment and capability of the state and its security agencies in providing and maintaining internal security in Nigeria. The challenge of this work, therefore, is to critically investigate the role of the state in providing and maintaining internal security in Nigeria, using Anambra State (1999-2013) as case study.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Since the inauguration of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999, threats to the internal security of the country have been persistent and hydra-headed. In the Southeast where Anambra State is located, the phenomenon of insecurity has assumed a

worrisome dimension as factors of insecurity such as kidnapping, intra and inter community violent conflicts, and related criminal acts have been on the increase.

The security challenge in Anambra State is a subject of great concern. Residents of the state since the return to civil rule in 1999 have continued to witness the disturbing and increasing level of crime, unimaginable political crises caused mainly by politics of godfatherism and the high incidence of commercial kidnapping that scare many of her citizens from returning to their home towns. All these issues have continued to raise disturbing questions that revolve around the state and the provision of security. A crucial aspect of the issue is the structure of Nigerian federalism that denies the constituent states the right to organize and provide their own security.

Of the quite extensive literature published on the state and security (Imobighe, 1990, 2001, 2003; Nnoli, 2006, 2012; Bisler, 2004; Isima, 2007; Mijah, 2007; Ibeanu and Momoh, 2008; Fayemi and Olonisakin, 2009; Nwagboso, 2012; Iduh, 2011;), none paid detailed attention on any of the states of Nigeria as we intend to do in this work. Although some other studies such as Nwanegbo (2009) and Iwuamadi (2012) have looked into some aspects of insecurity in Anambra State, they did not pay much attention to the role of the State in the hydra-headed phenomena. There has been, therefore, very little concerted study of the roots, patterns and impacts of security challenges in Anambra state. The existing literature has, therefore, not captured some crucial aspects of the problem of insecurity in the state.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

In the light of the issues raised above, this study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the factor responsible for the character of insecurity in Anambra State?
2. Has the governance of security in Anambra State adequately responded to insecurity in the state?

3. Does the people's perception of insecurity in Anambra state negatively affect their relationship with the state?

#### **1.4 Objectives of Study**

The broad objective of the study is to critically investigate the role of the state in the maintenance of internal security in Anambra state. In other words, the study seeks to accomplish the following specific objectives:

1. To ascertain the factor responsible for the character of insecurity in Anambra State.
2. To investigate the effectiveness of governance in the maintenance of security in Anambra state.
3. To ascertain the effect of the people's perception of insecurity in Anambra State on their relationship with the state.

#### **1.5 Significance of the Study**

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. At the practical level, the findings of this study will assist policy makers and security agencies such as the Nigeria Police, State Security Service and other security operatives with data based information required to deal with security challenges in Anambra State. It will also enable the government to unravel the factors of insecurity and their networking in the state. In that regard, the study will make useful contribution to the creation of a conducive environment for good governance and sustainable development.

At the theoretical level, the study will contribute extensively to the existing literature on security studies and as a result, be of immense benefit to future researchers in the field.

## **1.6 Operational Definitions**

Two key concepts in this work require operational definition for a clear understanding of their import in this work. They include: the state and internal security.

### **1.6.1: The State**

The concept of the state has been interpreted in various ways, based on ideological, normative and historical factors. Thus, Ake (1985:105) remarks that ‘the nuances and analytic difficulties of the generic concept of the state have made it a difficult subject of study’. In this study, the state is seen in line with Raphael (1976:53) as:

*an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of law backed by force and recognized as having sovereign authority.*

Following from this definition is the fact that it is the responsibility of the state to guard against all forms of insecurity in the society. This responsibility is performed by the coercive institutions of the state. Another implication of this definition is that the dysfunctionality of the state engenders and/or exacerbates insecurity in the society.

The other import of the state conceptualizes it as a constituent unit or part of the nation-state. It is in this context that we refer to the state when we say Anambra State.

### **1.6.2: Internal security**

The concept of internal security is an aspect of the broader and multi dimensional concept of security. The other aspects of the concept of security are: human security, national security, environmental security, food security. Security has been defined from a socio-economic perspective by Damus (cited in Akinyeye, 2001:16) as ‘the prevention of property damage, injury and loss of lives caused by military means as well as limitation of such damage, casualty and death in the event of war’.

From the traditional point of view, security has to do with making sure that the territorial boundaries of a given state is secured from all forms of external and internal aggression.

Internal security in this study refers to a situation that guarantees the safety of life and property of individuals and corporate bodies occupying a given locality. This operational definition enables us to perceive social pathologies such as kidnapping, cultism, armed robbery, sectarian insurgency, etc as indicators of a state of insecurity.

### **1.7 Scope of the Study**

The work focused on Anambra State of Nigeria, 1999-2013. The period that this study covers is significant in the sense that it affords us the opportunity to do a comparative analysis of the issue of security under different administrations.

Anambra state is recognized by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as one of the thirty-six federating States. It is made up of twenty one Local Governments Areas. It has a total of one hundred and seventy seven communities.

### **1.8 Limitation of the Study**

First is the nature of the subject matter. Security is a sensitive matter and, as such, the state officials and security operatives are hardly willing to provide the required information. That fact notwithstanding, the researcher succeeded in eliciting enormous relevant data for this dissertation.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 The Concept of the State

The concept of the State is contentious. Its meaning and origin have created a lot of disagreements among scholars. This has created some difficulties in defining the state as acknowledged by several scholars (see for example, Laski, 1967; Ake, 1985; Onyeoziri, 2005; Kukathas, 2008, Nwabueze, 2010). Mitchell (1991:76) states that at a point, the concept of the state was abandoned as advocated by the exponents of the behavioural approach in political science and replaced with the concept of political system. The argument is that the concept of the state is so vague and too narrow to be the basis of a general science of politics. Mitchell (1991:78) notes that the reaction of some scholars was to avoid engaging in the conceptual controversy and, rather, perceive the state as a subjective system of decision making.

In a recent critique of the concept of the state, Kukathas (2008:11-12) argues that the difficulty in defining the state stems from the following reasons: First, the state is a form of association with a history and, as such, cannot be easily captured in a snapshot. Second is that the concept of the state itself has a history and this demands that any use of the term has to acknowledge the fact that the concept has been used in subtly different ways. Third, there are differences that exist among entities that are recognized as states. Fourth is that since the state is a political entity, any account of it must use normative concepts such as legitimacy that are themselves as contentious as the notion of the state.

Because of the difficulty in defining the state and the resultant developments as pointed out above, it is possible to view the definitions by scholars from various perspectives namely: ideological, normative, historical and descriptive. These

various perspectives can equally be grouped into two broad categories of theoretical traditions namely: the western liberal theory and the marxist theory.

One of the earliest and popular liberal definitions of the state was articulated by the famous German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920). According to Max Weber (in Onyeoziri, 2005:31), the state “is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. To some extent, Weber’s well known definition is inadequate. The extent of a state control, including its authority over the use of the instruments of violence, varies considerably with the state, not only legally but also in fact. Watkin (in Gauba, 2003:174) defines the state as “a geographically delimited segment of human society united by common obedience to a single sovereign”. Inherent in Watkin’s definition is the issue of sovereignty. This implies that the decision of the state is final in the society.

According to Laski (in Appadorai, 1975:44), a state is ‘an organization to enable the mass of men to realize social good on the largest possible scale’. For Roberts (1971), a state is ‘a territorial area in which a population is governed by a set of political authorities, and which successfully claims the compliance of the citizenry for its laws and is able to secure such compliance by the monopolistic control of legitimate force’.

In a more comprehensive definition of the state, Raphael (1976) presents the state as ‘an association designed primarily to maintain order and security, exercising universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries by means of law backed by force and recognized as having sovereign authority’. From this definition, Raphael further lists the distinctive features of the state as:

- a. Universal jurisdiction within territorial boundaries: This implies that everybody within the territory of a state is subject to its rules and regulations.
- b. Compulsory jurisdiction: This means that once you are within the territorial boundary of a state, then you are subjected to its laws.
- c. Functions: The state is entrusted with a lot of functions, but its primary function is the keeping of order and the maintenance of security. Raphael

distinguished two kinds of security: security within the community (internal) and security against external sources (external).

- d. Methods: the main method whereby the state carries out its functions is the system of law, that is, rules backed by coercive power.
- e. Sovereignty: This implies that the state has supreme final authority in a community and that its rules override the rules of any other association.

Raphael's definition exposes the link between the state and security in its internal and external contexts.

More recent liberal definitions of the state include Giddens (1985), Vincent (1987), Grindle (1996) and Nwabueze (2010). According to Vincent (1987:9), "the state is a continuous public power above ruler and ruled-its acts have legal authority and are distinct from the intentions of the individual agents or groups". For Giddens (1985:20), a state can be defined as a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule. One serious deficiency in Giddens' definition is that it fails to explain how the state mobilizes the means of violence to sustain its rule. Grindle (1996:3) opines that "the state is a set of ongoing institutions for social control and authoritative decision making and implementation".

Nwabueze (2010), in his contribution, also acknowledges the fact that the concept of the state is a controversial one. As he puts it, 'the state is today a common, universal phenomenon, yet there is no agreement on what constitutes it, nor are the ideas underlying it widely understood' (Nwabueze, 2010:24). Nwabueze, (2010:25), however, asserts that the state is:

An organization of people at a certain level of development in various fields of human endeavor, inhabiting a given territory, which, through various institutions and instrumentalities, and by means of law, particularly coercive force-mainly physical force of which it claims monopoly-regulates, orders and manages the affairs

of its members for the common good or welfare of all as a society of men and women.

Nwabueze (2010: 26-27) further lists the features of the state that distinguish it from all other forms of association. They include:

- a. The people as several individuals: it is the different individuals existing in a given territory that gives meaning to the idea of the state since the state itself is an abstraction. Individuals are critical to the existence of the state because they are the source from which the main aspect of the state sovereignty is derived.
- b. Society: comprising of individuals associating and sharing life together as a community, the state is a product of organized human society.
- c. Territory: This is a defined area of certain size under effective occupation by a settled population which is also of a certain size.
- d. Government: Although it is inextricably tied to the state, the government is different from the state. It is the agency of the state involved in the practical conduct of public affairs through various organs and instrumentalities.
- e. Law: Law is a necessary attribute as well as a necessary instrument of the state. Law is made by the state but the state itself is grounded on law. Without law, the state cannot exist because law gives meaning to state power.
- f. Organization of coercive force: An organized force is needed for the protection of the life, liberties and property of individuals in the society, the enforcement of laws of the society, the maintenance of order among its members and the safeguarding of society's collective security. Traditionally, this organized force is maintained by the army and the police.

According to Laski (in Okolie, 2006:168), the western liberal theory of the state contends that the state is an independent force and a neutral observer that caters for the interest of every member of the society. The western liberal theory of the state has been criticized by the Marxists for being unable to capture the true essence of the state. Although Hay (1999:152), acknowledges the fact that it is difficult to identify a precise analytical Marxist definition of the state as an object of inquiry, he also notes that Marxist views about the state have been reduced to four main strands,

namely: 'the state as the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, the state as an instrument of the ruling class, the state as an ideal collective capitalist and the state as a factor of cohesion within the social formation'.

Social class is central to understanding the concept of the state from the Marxian perspective. Thus, Marx (in Knuttila and Kubik, 2000: 101) explains that:

The state is the product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises when, where and to the extent that class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the state proves that class antagonisms are irreconcilable.

Another leading Marxist view of the state as presented by Ake (1985:105), sees the state as:

a specific modality of class domination. This modality is one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society, and appears as an objective force standing alongside society.

Whether from the Marxist or liberal theoretical perspective, what is significant is the institutional centrality of the state in the daily existence of the individuals living in its jurisdiction. In this regard, the role of the state in the socio-economic and political well being of individuals has long been established by several Scholars. According to Miliband (1969:59):

more than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want to achieve individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state's sanction and support. It is possible not to be interested on what the state does but it is not possible to be unaffected by it.

Similarly, Morris (in Bhargara and Acharya, 2008:171) argues that “you may not be interested in the state, but the state is certainly interested in you”.

In conclusion, it is important to stress the fact that the character of the state in colonized societies such as Nigeria has greatly affected the character of the post-colonial state. Scholars such as Gana (1985), Ake (1996), and Nwabueze (2010) have critically discussed the incidence, trend and implications of the colonial legacy on African states. They share the opinion that the colonial epoch negatively affected the emergence, character, and development of the state in Africa. According to Ake (1996:1), an examination of the development crisis in Africa must begin with colonialism and its political legacy. Ake, also argues that the absolute and arbitrary character of the colonial state has remained with the postcolonial state, even after political independence. This singular factor is responsible for the crisis of development in Africa.

For Gana (1985:115), the colonial legacy which made the African state a product of the class forces of the metropole, is solely responsible for the continued integration of the African continent into the orbit of capitalist imperialism. In the opinion of Nwabueze (2010:21), no explanation of the problem associated with the struggle for state power, abuse of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Africa is realistic or complete unless it is set in the context of the colonial factor.

## **2.2. The Concept of Internal Security**

Internal security is an aspect of the broader concept of security. Thus, an understanding of the meaning of internal security cannot be achieved without examining the concept of security. Despite the general importance and popularity attached to the issue of security, the concept has not gained a universally accepted meaning. This is because the concept of security is a multidimensional or multifaceted one that covers all spheres of human life. It is in this sense that people talk of National Security, human security, social security, economic security, environmental security, internal security etc. Each aspect of security is concerned with certain type of threat.

A survey of the literature reveals a lot of definitions. According to Lokibe (1996:15-16), security is the ability to protect oneself, other people, or society from threats and challenges to safety and existence. Damus (1977:13) sees security as the prevention of property damage, injury and loss of lives caused by military means, as well as limitations of such damage, casualty and death in the event of war. Damus emphasizes the socio economic implication of the lack of security. Nnoli (2006) brings to fore the objective and subjective sense of security. Objectively, according to Nnoli (2006), security can be measured by absence of threat, anxiety and danger. Subjectively, security can be measured by the absence of fear that threat, anxiety or danger will materialize.

Broadly, the various conceptions of security can be grouped into two namely: the realist conception and the neo-realist conception. The realist conception is also seen as the traditional view of security. In the words of Imobighe (2001:40), “the realist school of thought views security in narrow military terms and concentrates on the various forms of military response in the management of threats to security”. The realist conception of security also sees security as the ability of a state to defend itself against external threats. In this sense, it equates the security of a state with National security.

Scholars such as Handreder and Buel, McNamara, Wolfer (in Akinyeye, 2001) and Carolina (2010) have all defined security from a realist perspective. According to Carolina (2010), ‘national security is the integrity of the national territory and its institutions, as well as the state’s ability to defend itself against external threats’. For Wolfer (1965), security is concerned mainly with such indices as the military aspect of a nation’s goals, competition between satisfied and dissatisfied powers, strategic issues of super power, alliance-building processes, independence and sovereignty forces, conflict spots in international relations and problem of maintaining systematic balance.

Nnoli (2006) provides a radical perspective to the conception of national security. He incorporates the safety of individuals and groups in the task of national security.

Nnoli (2006:16) defines national security as a cherished value associated with the physical safety of individuals, groups or nation – states, together with a similar safety of their other most cherished values.

In the philosophy of the neo – realist school of thought, the individuals are seen as the most proper referent object of security and not the state. It is against this background that human security emerged as a challenge to the ideas of the realist conceptions of security. The 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme which is considered a milestone publication in the field of human security, states ‘that insuring “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity and enhance human security (UNDP, 1994). According to Kofi Anan (2000:1), human security:

...embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national security.

The African Union Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, (2004), has also provided an elaborate conceptualization of human security. According to the document

Human security means the security of the individual needs of life in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and respect for human rights, good

governance, and the guarantee for each individual of opportunities and choices for his/her own development.

Recently, Nwolise (2012) has added a spiritual perspective to the discourse of human and national security. He contends that, human and national security cannot be fully studied, understood, and predicted without proper grasping of the spiritual factors at work. Nwolise also believes that since life has two aspects namely physical and spiritual, then it is a disservice to human and national development efforts to neglect the spiritual aspects of security.

Spiritual security, which Nwolise (2012:17), defined as ‘the safety of the human spirit and body from spiritual threats and attack’, involves three lines of action namely:

1. Taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability to spiritual threat or attack.
2. Carrying out strategic spiritual intelligence(SSSI) occasionally to detect source and nature of spiritual attack
3. Embarking on quick and effective remedial action to neutralize actual spiritual attacks whose occurrence has been confirmed to avoid attacker’s intended outcome.

Nwolise (2013) further listed the sources of spiritual threats against human and national security.They include the following:

1. The wrath of God the creator
2. Local Deities
3. Juju
4. Witchcraft
5. Curses
6. Oath- taking and breaking
7. Merchantile native doctors
8. Possessed plants, animals and stones
9. Ghosts/ ancestral spirits
10. Bewitched or charmed objects

11. Spiritual covenants
12. Desperate and greedy wealth seekers
13. Secret societies and Man – made deities
14. Familial spirits

As can be seen from the above, the realist and neo-realist perspectives share a common element which is protection against threats. While the realist perspective pays attention on protection against threats to the state, the neo-realist perspective is mainly interested in protection against threats to the individual.

As mentioned earlier in this study, we are concerned with the internal security of the state. Although internal security is crucial to the existence of every nation, it has attracted little scholarly attention among Nigerian scholars (Imobighe, 1990:13). Outside the works of Imobighe (1989, 2003), Ekoko and Vogt (eds.) (1990), Yusuf (2012) and a few others, the concept has received only a peripheral treatment in the literature.

Globally, the concept of internal security has gained more public attention since the 9/11 incident in America (Kettle, 2004). It is generally associated with the stability of the state and/or with the notion of the security of its citizens. The two intricately related aspects of the concept coexist as they cover vast scope of subjects such as conventional security of the state and its citizens, economic stability, availability of natural resources, environmental security, etc.

Internal security as part of the broader concept of security has also been conceived as the duty of the state. Along this line of thought, the National Parliament of Timor-Leste opines that “internal security is the activity developed by the state to guarantee order, security and public tranquility, to protect people and goods, to prevent criminality and contribute to ensure the normal functioning of the democratic institutions, the exercise of fundamental freedoms by citizens and the respect for democratic legality” (National Parliament, 2003:27).

Similarly, Wojtaszezky (2009), also rightly asserts that internal security is one of the crucial functions of the state. It includes countering, eliminating or mitigating the threats to the constitutional system and to law and order (security of state institutions), as well as providing protection of the public interest of members and the society as a whole (personal security), and safeguarding each citizen (security of existence). Thus, internal security operations (ISPOs) refer to ‘actions carried out by domestic security agents, such as the Police, Customs Service, Immigration Service, etc, for the purpose of containing domestic threats to the security of the country. These threats often relate cases of riots, demonstrations, strikes, communal clashes, terrorism, etc, which normally fall outside the constitutional duty of the military (Nwolise, 2007:231).

The involvement of the military in such security scenarios is necessitated when the situation is adjudged to have overwhelmed the police, or other public security agencies. In that context, the government can call out the military, operating alone or jointly with the police, to assist the government to bring the situation under quick control (Nwolise 2007).

Iwueze (1990:238) conceptualized internal security as ‘a total of the nation’s equilibrium state which needs to be maintained so that the nation can carry out its normal functions without unnecessary interruptions from anywhere’. He further notes that ‘internal security involves government coordination of all those actions that would ensure that the equilibrium of the state is constantly maintained or quickly brought back to normal whenever it is threatened by any form of civil disturbances’. It is in this line of thinking that Vohra (2007:5), opines that ‘internal security is the maintenance of security within a country and it is crucial for the existence of government’. Internal security has also been conceived by Imobighe (1990:224) as:

Freedom from or absence of those tendencies which undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the nation and its ability to maintain its vital institutions for the promotion of its core

value and socio-political and economic objectives, as well as meet the legitimate aspirations of the people. Finally, internal security also implies freedom from danger to life and property and the presence of a conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interest within the society.

Imobighe (1990:225-232) further lists the potent and conventional threats to Nigeria's internal security. The potent threats include:

1. Religious and political intolerance
2. Gross mismanagement of resources

The conventional threats include:

1. Subversion
2. Sabotage
3. Espionage
4. Smuggling
5. Alien influx
6. Armed robbery
7. Mutiny and coup d'etat
8. Civil unrest/ revolutionary insurgency

Imobighe's work was published over two decades ago. Presently, with the spread of globalization and the socio- economic and political realities existing in Nigeria, threats to internal security have changed drastically. In line with present day realities, Yusuf (2012:60) defines internal security 'as the capacity of a state to effectively contain the domestic threats to its security to such a level that the people, institutions, installations, structures and infrastructure are safe'. He further opines that:

The threats to internal security include armed robbery, kidnapping and hostage taking, communal conflicts, chieftaincy tussles, religious riots, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, bad leadership which may lead to violence and revolutions as experienced by Somalia and Nigeria, militancy as in Nigeria's Niger- delta, as well as climate

change, natural disasters such as flood, fire, tsunamis, hurricane etc, hunger, corruption, unemployment, poverty, as well as debilitating diseases such as HIV/ AIDS.

Similarly, Amujiri and Agu (2012:306) outlined the internal security challenges confronting the Nigerian nation to include: kidnapping, armed robbery, hired assassins, religious intolerance, cross border crimes, subversion, sabotage, mismanagement of the nation's resources, smuggling, espionage, and alien influx.

In the context of this study, internal security refers to a situation that guarantees the safety of life and property of individuals and corporate bodies occupying a given locality. In this context, social pathologies such as kidnapping, cultism, armed robbery, and sectarian insurgency are all indicators of internal insecurity. This conception is applicable in this study because it gives vent to the intricate connection between the state and security.

### **2.3 The State and Security**

The Weberian conception of the state posits that it is the traditional responsibility of the state to provide security. In other words, the state is designed primarily to maintain order and security (Raphael, 1976:53). It is the security provided by the state that ensures that a conducive environment exists for the citizens to pursue their legitimate needs.

In an examination of the impact of Globalization and State Transformation on Public security, Bislev (2004) opines that Max Weber's classical definition of the state as holding a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence rests upon the notion that social order is crucial to the state. It is therefore in order to ensure social order that the state must provide security. Bislev captures this issue thus: 'the maintenance of security is a necessary function of the state something without which it cannot exist ... without the state to ensure basic security, there would be no civilization, no civil society' (Bislev, 2004:48).

Along this viewpoint, Nnoli (2003:28) also argues that states are formed solely for the sake of obtaining security, especially against the aggressiveness of other men since men are essentially selfish and seek only their own good. Using the social contract theory, Nnoli (2003) further explains that the modern state emerged at the point people in order to preserve humanity decided to give up their rights and liberties to the state and agreed to obey the laws prescribed by the government set up by the state. The state in return was required to ensure the maintenance of law and order and also the security of the subjects of the state. Nnoli concluded that if it could be shown that the state can no longer guarantee security and prosperity, then it has lost the justification for existence.

Gamble (1981) holds a similar view with Nnoli about the state and the provision of security. He succinctly argues that:

The state emerged as a result of the contract between the citizens and itself. It is established to serve the interests of the citizenry so long as the state preserves security, individuals have a moral obligation to obey the commands and laws of the state. But if the state ceases to maintain the security of its subjects, they have the right to resist the state by force of arms if necessary (Gamble, 1981).

An emerging view in the literature on security sector governance and reforms point to the fact that despite the traditional role of the state in providing security, the processes of globalization and privatization together with the weakness of some states, especially in developing countries, has necessitated the intrusion of the private sector in the provision of security. To that end, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006:6) assert that ‘bringing the private sector into the business of security is crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the security situation in most countries and any attempt to ensure better security for all must take account of the activities and operations of private security providers’. In the context of Sub Saharan Africa, Abrahamsen and Williams (2006:7) argues that this assertion comes to fore in the face of “the declining ability and/or willingness of the state to provide adequate protection of life and property”.

## **2.4 The Character of Insecurity in Nigeria**

Events since May 29, 1999, have shown that the greatest threat to the current democratic dispensation is insecurity. Several scholars have critically discussed the incidence, character and implications of insecurity in Nigeria. Mijah (2007) argues that the state of insecurity in Nigeria can be traced to two main factors namely, the character of the Nigerian State and the context of democratic politics. With regard to the character of the Nigerian state, he argues that the problem of internal security in Nigeria is derived from, and is aggravated by the inclusion and or /exclusion of certain groups from access to opportunities and resources of the state, as a result of the structural imbalance inherent in the Nigerian federation. According to Mijah, the structural imbalance in the ethnic, religious and regional composition of the Nigeria state and the manipulation of such identities are responsible for the various ethno-religious and even communal conflicts in Nigeria. Also related to this issue is the desperation for political offices and the unrestrained access to state resources which accompanies the occupation of these political offices.

Secondly, Mijah (2007:4), also argues that there is evidence of a correlation between the context of democratic governance and the state of insecurity in Nigeria. This is derived from the fact that ‘since 1999, democratic governance has not instituted sufficient policies and programmes to alter the structures of imbalance and inequity imposed on the character of the state by the forces of colonialism and prolonged military rule’.

Locating the problem of insecurity in Nigeria within the context of the politics of Security Decision – Making, Ibeanu and Momoh (2008:13) state that what constitutes security for the Nigerian State and political elites is traditionally rooted in the state’s monopoly and control of all legitimate instruments of coercion, and its ability to contain both internal insurgency and external aggression. They also argue

that the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria arises from the character of the state and the character of the state security agencies.

According to Ibeanu and Momoh (2008:15), the sincerity of the Nigerian State to respond to insecurity has repeatedly appeared to be questioned by the citizens because the state has spent more time on nation – building and far less on state building. They further noted that the character of the state security agencies threatens the security of lives and property because of the politicization of security.

In their words:

State security agencies constitute a veritable threat to the security of the citizens of Nigeria. More often, rather than restore peace and order, they exacerbate crises, ramping up social and political tensions (Ibeanu and Momoh, 2008:14).

Nnoli (2006) in his discourse on national security in Africa, points to the collapsed character of the state as a serious aspect of the problem of African security. According to Nnoli (2006:9), political exclusion, economic marginalization and social discrimination which are at the heart of the crises of the state in Africa, have so much threatened the security of the citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In this context, Nnoli further asserts that physical safety has become the preeminent concern of most Africans, since the state is no longer able to generate the fundamental conditions for the protection of life.

In a recent work, Nnoli points to the undemocratic character of the Nigerian state as a serious aspect of the problem of national security. According to Nnoli (2012:6), state violence and internal conflicts are at the heart of the security crisis in Nigeria. After a critical evaluation of the numerous violent internal conflicts which include the boko-haram insurgency, Nnoli argues that ‘violent conflicts have persisted and even intensified in various parts of the country because democracy has remained elusive’ (Nnoli, 2012:14). He further argues that the undemocratic character of the state also stands in the way of resolving the security crisis. This is because the

alienation of the masses creates a problem for intelligence gathering which is a very important tool in maintaining security. As he succinctly puts it:

Since the central issue of national security in Nigeria concerns internal security, the need for good intelligence gathering in the country is critical. The consequence of the alienation of the masses from the undemocratic state is their unwillingness to provide the necessary intelligence as they need to. In fact, they tend to provide intelligence to those opposed to the state or they feign ignorance of what is going on. (Nnoli: 2012:22)

Isima (2007), shares a similar view with Nnoli (2006) on the relationship between the character of the state and the problem of insecurity. He asserts that the outsourcing of non-core security functions of the state to private military and security companies is not an African phenomenon, but rather a global development that is propelled by globalization and privatization. Isima further argues that the fragility of the states in Africa together with their weak institutional capacity is responsible for the expanding scope of the private sector into the core security functions of the state. As he succinctly puts it:

It is the low institutional capacity of the African state to deliver the public good of physical security for citizens efficiently and effectively that creates the security vacuum, which is increasingly being filled by the private sector in response to genuine demands of citizens for protection (Isima, 2007:23).

Olorode (2011) similarly shares the views of Nnoli (2006) and Isima (2007) on the relationship between the character of the Nigerian state and the problem of insecurity, only that he adds a cultural dimension to the debate. For Olorode (2011:9), it is necessary to situate the Nigerian security crisis in a global context, 'since insecurity cuts across national and international boundaries and has implications on the global economy and political stability'. To this end, the ideological struggle to entrench capitalism on developing countries and colonialism

which helped to ensure the propagation of the capitalist ideology, are important factors which he believes should not be ignored in trying to understand the security crisis. Olorode further asserts that ‘to understand the issue of insecurity and the attendant crisis in Nigeria, one must take cognizance of the involvement of the state (i.e governments at different levels), the state agencies (i.e the courts, police and similar agencies) and the cultural institutions (i.e religion, the media, educational institutions, etc)’. The cultural dimension that Olorode (2011) added to the debate on insecurity in Nigeria is informed by the fact that religious fundamentalism has been so manipulated by the political elites that it has also contributed to the problem of insecurity.

Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor-Robaro (2013) have also examined the character of insecurity in Nigeria. According to them, the remote and immediate sources of insecurity in Nigeria include:

1. Lack of institutional capacity resulting to government failure
2. Pervasive material inequalities and unfairness
3. Ethno- religious conflicts
4. Conflict of perception between the public and government
5. Weak state security system
6. Loss of socio-cultural and communal value system
7. Porous borders
8. Unemployment
9. Rural/urban migration
10. Terrorism

In a recent contribution, Imobighe (2013) argues that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria is closely tied to the attitude of Nigerian leaders to threat assessment. According to him, threat which is part of the main determinants of defence and national security planning has not been properly managed in Nigeria and some other African countries. To this end, he further argues that the misplacement of defence and national security efforts and the haphazard treatment of threats which

focus solely on regime perpetuation and how to silence opposition elements are crucial factors responsible for the increasing incidence of insecurity in the country.

Security of life and property is a fundamental human right guaranteed under the constitution of Nigeria. The effective sustenance of any society, no doubt, is hinged on an efficient law enforcement process (Obasanjo and Mabogunje, in Onyeozili, 2005:44). This accounts for efforts by successive administrations in Nigeria, especially since 1999, to provide adequate security for Nigerians. However, growing poverty, wide income disparities, high level of unemployment, social dislocation caused by massive rural –urban migration and the breakdown of societal values leading to business frauds and widespread community unrest account for the growing concern about the level of uncertainty and security in parts of the country.

The institutions that are established to guarantee security to the ordinary citizen are incapacitated by limited manpower and skills relative to society's demand, poor funding, poor equipment and general lack of proper orientation and commitment by some operatives (Otubu and Coker, in Daniel, 2011:69). Ameh( in Nwagboso,2012:245) points out that the security situation between 2007 and 2011 in Nigeria obviously took different dimensions. This period, he maintained, witnessed a consistent pressure on the government by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MOSSOB), increased spate of kidnapping in the South - East geo – political zone, incessant bombings in the northern parts of Nigeria by the Boko Haram group, politically motivated killings , among others. Thus, in this line of thought, Nwagboso (2012:245) concluded that:

*the inability of the managers of Nigeria's security to address the country's security challenges during the above period raised yet another critical question on the preparedness of Nigeria to attain desired political, social and economic heights in the year 2020. It further poses serious threats to the unity and corporate existence of Nigeria as a sovereign state.*

A major question begging for answer here is the reason for the spate of crimes in the country. To this, Kew (in Fagbadebo, 2007), opines that one of the major factors responsible for political instability, is the failure of the political class to sufficiently adhere to the basic tenets of democracy and constitutionalism. This situation “has given rise to abuse of power, brazen corruption, disregard for due process and the rule of law, intolerance of political opposition, abuse of the electoral process and the weakening of institutions” (Harriman, 2006:2).

The present security challenges in the country have not only raised critical questions bordering on formulation and implementation of Nigeria's internal security policies, but also the recruitment/ effectiveness of the security agencies in Nigeria to perform their statutory responsibilities.

## **2.5 Governance and Insecurity**

As earlier stated, it is the primary responsibility of the government to make adequate provision for the security and welfare of her citizens and others living within her territorial jurisdiction. In that context, the relationship between governance and security cannot be ignored. According to Oyeboade (2011:27), ‘security has become the touchstone of governance in modern society’. Vohra (2007:8) also captures the nexus between governance and internal security thus:

If internal security is not maintained, governance cannot be delivered and there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. Likewise, internal security cannot be safeguarded if governance is delivered by an inefficient and corrupt administration.

The nexus between governance and security is further seen in the fact that the absence of good governance adversely affects the security of the state. It is along this line of thought that good governance became a reverberating variable in the discussions of the neo – realist conception of security. Infact, the existence of human security is largely tied to good governance.

Scholars like Nweke (1990) and Imobighe (1990) have tried to link the problem of internal security to the attitude of the Nigerian government to the doctrine of internal security. They both argue that the relative neglect by successive governments in Nigeria in the area of evolving a well defined doctrine of internal security is responsible for the state of internal security challenges in the country.

Anah (2014) has tried to examine the nexus between governance and security within the context of Africa. According to him, the apparent intractability of governance and security problems in Africa has resulted to insecurity and poor governance which also have provided the basis for the interventionist efforts of international donor agencies and non – governmental organizations. Anah (2014) also debunks the mainstream view that poor institutions and the instrumentalization of disorder are responsible for insecurity and poor governance in Africa. Using a political economy approach, he links poor governance and insecurity in Africa to external factors such as the declining terms of trade between Africa and the industrialized economies of the world. He further highlights the following three major historical facts which to a large extent have shaped security and governance in Africa:

- (1) The quest for raw materials by the industrialized developed countries
- (2) The scope and nature of international politics that characterize the cold war era
- (3) The institutional structures put in place at the end of the era of empires.

Since Nigeria is seen as the giant of Africa, we believe that Anah's observations particularly present the Nigerian experience. For instance, the insecurity experienced in the Niger- Delta, which is fallout of the exploitative activities of the multinational corporations, is rightly linked to the quest for raw materials by the industrialized developed countries as opined by Anah. From another dimension, the seeming connivance of successive Nigerian governments could also be seen as part

of the institutional structures put in place by the colonialist to ensure a conducive environment for the exploitation of oil wealth.

In the wider Nigerian context, the insecurity problem that has continued to threaten the stability of the fourth republic has been linked by several scholars to the failure of governance. According to Omilusi (2013), the crisis of insecurity in Nigeria can only be understood within the context of governance failure. He argues that the inability of the Nigerian state to ensure the security of its citizens stems from the fact that the state has not been able to meet the minimum requirements of the social contract it entered with the citizens because of the forces of bad governance. The resultant effect of this, as he puts it, is that “there is thus a disconnection between the governed and the government” (2013:374). Omilusi also listed the following factors as some of the manifestations of the crisis of governance that are behind the problem of insecurity:

- (1) Inability of the government to guarantee a basic minimum standard of living that is in accord with human dignity.
- (2) Lingering conditions of political instability, repression and violence
- (3) Widespread petty and grand corruption
- (4) Economic decline resulting in capacity under – utilisation, structural distortion and huge debt burden
- (5) Very high unemployment rate especially among young people
- (6) Deterioration of socio – economic infrastructure
- (7) Widening inequality among individuals and between

In the context of Anambra State, Nwanegbo (2009), has critically examined the relationship between governance and human security between 1999 and 2007. With the use of the indices of human security such as health, education, poverty and food

security, and human rights, he concluded that governance has not impacted positively on human security in Anambra state.

In another development, Iwuamadi (2012), explored the governance underpinnings of insecurity in Anambra state. Iwuamadi (2012:82-85) argues that the causes of security and governance challenges in the state include the following factors:

1. Poor training and poor equipment for security agencies
2. Failure of social and educational institutions including the family to teach moral values to children and young people
3. Unemployment
4. Government neglect of community development
5. Instability in government

Iwuamadi (2012) also further highlights the responses of both the state and non state actors to the security and governance challenges in Anambra state They include:

1. The introduction of Bakassi boys
2. Engagement in value re-orientation by faith based organization
3. The use of vigilante group by different communities

Finally, Iwuamadi (2012:91) concludes that ‘there has not been a systemic approach towards addressing security challenges in the state by government’ because ‘the efforts being made by the state agencies to curb the menace of kidnapping and other forms of violence are not synchronized and not very effective’

## **2.6 Insecurity and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria**

The global manifestations of the impact of insecurity on socio- economic and political development have been acknowledged by several studies. Thus, Sohnen (2012:1) in relation to Mexico and Central America asserts that: ‘crime and

insecurity are undermining the region's economic and social prosperity by diverting public and private resources away from economically productive uses and eroding the trust between citizens and the state that is critical to sustain healthy and dynamic societies'. Sohnen (2012:4), also observe that 'crime, violence and insecurity can stunt countries' social, economic and political growth, rendering them vulnerable to stagnation and decay. If left unchallenged, crime and insecurity can prevent these societies from realizing their full developmental and economic potential'.

At the level of the individual, Sohnen contends that 'the direct financial losses of insecurity could include the loss of productivity due to death, or injury, the costs of medical care and legal services, and the costs of repairing or replacing damaged or destroyed property'. From his analysis, it appears that Sohnen seem not to be interested in the other aspects of the socio-economic impact of insecurity such as its impact on the corporate existence of the state, hence nothing was said about them in his study.

Achumba, Ighomereho and Akpor–Robaro (2013), have examined the impact of insecurity on business activities and sustainable development in Nigeria. According to them, the impact of insecurity on business activities can be viewed from two broad perspectives, namely: the potential business investment and the existing business enterprise. In the context of potential business investment, Achumba *et al* (2013:88), argue that insecurity has affected investments in Nigeria through the increased cost of doing business. Based on a Central Bank of Nigeria 2011 report, Achumba *et al* (2013) argue that insecurity has affected the flow of foreign direct investment. On the impact of insecurity on existing business enterprise, Achumba *et al* assert that 'insecurity has affected the business enterprise especially in the parts of the country where there is high cases of daily occurrence of insecurity'

## **2.7 Significance and Gap in the Literature**

The review of the existing literature brings to fore the fact that many of the studies on the state and security focused mainly on the national level without an attempt to look at the level of a constituent social formation such as Anambra state. Outside the

attempts of the works of Nwanegbo (2009) and Iwuamadi (2012) which looked at the centrality of governance in the provision of security, no other serious attempt has been made to look at the role of the state in the provision of internal security in Anambra State. Even then the duo did not systematically characterize the nature and pattern of security challenges specific to Anambra state. It is this gap in the literature that this present study intends to address and here lies the significance of the literature review.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1: Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the Marxist theory of the post-colonial state. The theory emerged in academic discourse as a result of the acknowledgment that the extent to which post-independent governments were caught within epistemological, economic, political, geographic and demographic cleavages were not of their own making (Jones, 2009). The theory begins with the assumption that the post colonial state is an object of intense and inordinate political competition, and that its nature defines the character of politics in the society.

Historically, the theory of the post-colonial state emanated from the Marxian theory of the state, which itself arose as a counter to the proposition of the western liberal theory that the state is an independent force and an impartial arbiter that not only caters for the overall interest of every member of the society but also regulates equitably their socio-economic transactions and processes. On the contrary, Marxist theorists maintain that the state is the product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms (Lenin, 1984). This, according to Jakutowski (1973:41), implies that ‘the state that arose from the conflict between classes is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful and economically dominant class that also becomes the politically dominant class and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed.’

The classical Marxist theory of the state has been further developed and employed in the elucidation and understanding of the peculiarity of the post-colonial state by scholars such as Alavi (1973), Ekekwe (1985), Ake (1985), and Ibeanu (1998). The major contention of these scholars is that the post-colonial state is a creation of imperialism and as such, has followed a developmental strategy dictated by the

interest of imperialism and its local allies rather than that of the majority of the indigenous population. According to Ekekwe (1985), the post-colonial state rests on the foundation of the colonial state whose major pre-occupation was to create conditions under which accumulation of capital by the foreign bourgeoisie in alliance with the ruling elite would take place through the exploitation of local human and other natural resources. Therefore, the post-colonial state that now emerged, though ostensibly independent and sovereign, was no less a creation of imperialism than the colonial state (Ekekwe, 1985).

One basic character of the post-colonial state, as articulated by Ake (1985), is that it has very limited autonomy. This means that the state is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so, is immersed in the class struggles that go on in the society. The post-colonial state is also constituted in such a way that it reflects and mainly caters for a narrow range of interests: the interests of the rapacious political elite in comprador and subordinate relationship with foreign capital. This lack of relative autonomy is one reason why the post-colonial state in Nigeria is incapable of mediating political conflicts (Ake, 1985).

Also, Ake (2003: 1) argues with respect to the post-colonial African states generally that:

The assumption so readily made that there has been a failure of development is misleading. The problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place. By all indications, the political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to development.

He traced these political conditions to the political legacy colonialism bequeathed on Africa, and which manifested in the absolutism and arbitrariness of the post-colonial states (Ake, 2003: 7).

For Ibeanu (1998), the colonial state, due to the distinct colonial experience at the stage of “extensive growth” of capital in which they emerged, did not strive for legitimacy as the *raison d’être* was “principally for conquering and holding down the peoples of the colonies, seen not as equal hands of individuals commodity bearers in integrated national markets, but as occasional petty commodity producers...” (Ibeanu, 1998:9). As a result of this, Ibeanu (1998:9-10) further argues that:

There was no effort made to evolve, routinize and institutionalize “principles for the non-arbitrary use of the colonial state by the colonial political class. And when in the post-colonial era this state passed into the hands of a pseudo capitalist class fervently seeking to become economically dominant, it becomes, for the controllers, a powerful instrument for acquiring private wealth, a monstrous instrument for pursuing private welfare to the exclusion of others” (Ibeanu, 1998: 9-10).

Similarly, Nwabueze (2010:32) explains that:

The colonial government in Africa was founded on the concept of service to the imperial government. Power was exercised, not for the benefit and service of the people, but for the purpose of their subjugation and exploitation. Its concern was not with the improvement and development of the social conditions of the people, but rather, with the maintenance of law and order to a degree sufficient to facilitate the continued subjugation and exploitation of the people.

Theorizing on the post-colonial state, Alavi (1972:257) stated that:

The essential problem about the state in the post colonial societies stems from the fact that it is not established by an ascendant native bourgeoisie but instead by a foreign capitalist bourgeoisie... The class basis of the postcolonial state is, therefore complex...the state

in postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely, the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded...

Buttressing this point, Ibeanu (1998:10) conceived of the state as ‘the totality of the materiality of political class domination in a society’, and surmised that since the postcolonial state is all-powerful and there are few safeguards on how its tremendous power is to be used in a moderate and civil manner, groups and individuals take a great stock in controlling the power of the state. So it is characteristic of the postcolonial state that its members put a premium on politics. Politics is everything and everything is politics, including life and death (Ibeanu, 1998: 11).

Ake (2003) also argues that since the post colonial state was built by conquest and subjugation, the state never acquired any enduring legitimacy or trust from the various indigenous groups and nationalities. As Ake clearly puts it ‘since the colonial state was for its subjects, at any rate, an arbitrary power, it could not engender any legitimacy even though it made rules and laws profusely and propagated values. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority’ (Ake, 2003:3). As a result, the postcolonial Nigerian state according to Falola (1998:52), ‘was coercive, primarily in order to establish power and attain narrow economic objectives’. Jega (2007:119) argued that “these characteristics have combined with one another, and with many others, in complex dynamics, to undermine the Nigerian state’s capacity to discharge those fundamental obligations of a modern state, such as socioeconomic provisioning, guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring law and order and facilitating peace and stability as preconditions for growth and development of citizens”.

Nnoli (2006) remarks that political exclusion, economic marginalization and social discrimination which are attributes of the post colonial state have threatened the security of the citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In desperation, the victimized citizens take the laws into their own hands as a means of safeguarding their fundamental values from the threat of unacceptable government policies. Nnoli also states that ‘the decline of the state as the guarantor of human security is serious; but its role as the creator of insecurity is even more serious’ (Nnoli, 2006:9). According to him, it was this that Hutchful (1998) saw as ‘security hazard’ in many African countries as he considered the use of governance, economic development, and legitimate force to subjugate fellow citizens as the common factor of insecurity in Africa.

Ngwu (2012:24) likewise made the point that aside from the pathologies associated with the post-colonial character of the Nigerian state, its role is further compounded by the paradox of autonomy arising from its rentier status. He notes that whereas as a post-colonial state, the Nigerian state enjoys a low-level of autonomy from the political and economic elite, on the other hand, its rentier character confers on it a very high level of autonomy from the people and divests it from the obligation for responsible and responsive policy formulation and implementation, and by implication its primary responsibility of guaranteeing the security of the citizens.

### **Application of the Theory**

The theory of the post-colonial state is apt to the study of the Nigerian state and internal insecurity in Anambra state. First, we take as our point of departure Ake’s contention that the state in its post-colonial ramification is institutionally constituted in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes, particularly the hegemonic social class, and so mainly caters for the interests of the rapacious political elite. It is arising from this view point that we can appreciate two related developments around the insecurity problem in Anambra state. First, is government’s betrayal of its constitutional responsibility of providing

effective internal security as evidenced by the spate of kidnapping and other crimes in Anambra State. Government's betrayal of its constitutional role of providing effective security attests to the delink between the state and the citizens. Secondly, it appears that the Nigerian state is only interested in the security of those in power. This is evidenced by the large retinue of security personnel that is attached to elected political office holders, their appointed allies and the financial oligarchs. It is from this background that the law enforcement agents have become increasingly elitist in orientation and more and more alienated from the public they ought to protect. They are more interested in the security of the political elite and would do anything to protect their interest. It is this kind of orientation that accounts for the lawlessness exhibited by the security agents in the 'discharge' of their duties as has been amply demonstrated by several documented evidence of police brutality in Anambra state within the period of this study.

Secondly and arising from Ibeanu's contention that the post-colonial state places a high premium on power and politics to the extent that politics is everything, including life and death, we can also understand the quest for state power by all means by the political elites and how it has inadvertently contributed to the problem of insecurity in the Anambra state. A good illustration of this abnormality was seen during the wanton destruction of lives and property in Anambra State in 2004, during the crisis between the Governor, Dr. Chris Ngige, and his erstwhile political godfather, Chief. Chris Uba. It was widely known that during the crisis, unemployed youths were engaged as agents of politicians who armed and used them as thugs. Having been initiated into the culture of violence by the political class who were out to acquire power by all means, these unemployed youths after they were abandoned, are now compelled to use violence to provide for their needs. This inadvertently has contributed to the state of insecurity.

### **3.2. Research Hypotheses**

In this research, the basic proposition is that there is a dialectical relationship between the state and the phenomenon of insecurity in Anambra State between 1999

-2013. Therefore, to be able to explore and prove or disprove this proposition, this study is guided by the following three interrelated hypothetical statements:

1. The structural – functional weaknesses of the Nigerian state accounts for the character of insecurity in Anambra state.
2. The governance of security in Anambra state has not adequately responded to insecurity in the state.
3. People’s perception of insecurity in Anambra state negatively affects their relationship with the state.

### **3.3 Research Design**

This research made use of the case study design. The primary aim of using this design is to enable the researcher to do an indepth study of a selected population. In that context, the choice of Anambra State for the case study will enable the researcher to do a concentrated in depth investigation of the phenomenon of internal insecurity in Nigeria. The choice of Anambra State is informed by the fact that it is one of the states that have been traumatized by several factors of internal insecurity, including kidnapping, armed robbery, inter and intra-communal clashes, students’ cultism, etc.

This research also complemented the case study design with the survey research design. The need for including the survey research design is based on the fact that the researcher cannot deal with the entire population involved in the study area. This research further adopted a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques. This enabled us to gain in depth understanding of all aspects of the research problem and also increase the validity of our findings.

#### **3.3.1 Population of Study**

Anambra State is made up of 21 local Government Areas, namely: Aguata, Anambra-East, Anambra-West, Anaocha, Awka-South, Awka-North, Ayamelum, Dunukofia, Ekwusigo, Idemili-North, Idemili-South, Ihiala, Njikoka, Nnewi-North, Nnewi-South, Ogbaru, Onitsha-North, Onitsha-South, Orumba-North, Orumba-South and Oyi. The State is bounded by Delta State to the West, Imo State to the

South, Enugu State to the East and Kogi State to the North. It has a total land mass of 4,416sq kilometers.

According to the results of the 2006 National Population Census (NPC), Anambra State has a total population of 4,182,032 persons, comprising 2,007,391 male and 2,174,641 female. The National Bureau of statistics (NBS) 2010 household survey reveals that household distribution of employed persons in Anambra is 1,867,469, out of which 298,215.29 are informal sector owners. It further shows that 21.1 percent of Anambra state population is unemployed, among which 18.6 percent are males, while 23.6 percent are females.

Anambra State, just like other States in the South eastern part of Nigeria, is predominantly of the Igbo speaking extraction. The people also predominantly practice Christianity and the African traditional worship.

### **3.3.2 Sample and Sampling Techniques**

Because of the large size of the study area and population, the sample survey technique was used. A sample of 400 was drawn from the population of study. The size of the sample was determined using Yaro Yamane (1968) formula for selecting sample size. The Yaro Yamane formula is as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N (0.05)^2}$$

Where n = Sample size

N = population size

E = level of significance or percentage error (0.05)

I = unity (a constant value)

Then substitute for the population size, using the formula above:

$$\begin{aligned} n &= \frac{4182032}{1 + 4182032(0.0025)} \\ &= \frac{4182032}{1 + 4182032 (0.0025)} \end{aligned}$$

$$= \frac{4182032}{1 + 10455.08}$$

$$= \frac{4182032}{10456.08}$$

$$399.9 = 400 \text{ (approximated to the nearest hundred)}$$

The choice of four hundred as sample size for this study is also supported by two other scholarly opinions. First, Meyer's (1973) calculation for populations and sample sizes deems 384 as appropriate for an infinite population. Secondly, according to Nwana(1981:72), 'choosing a representative sample has no fixed number or fixed percentage...for instance if the population is a few hundred, a 40% or more sample will do; if many hundred a 20% sample will do; if a few thousands a 10% sample will do; and if several thousands, a 5% or less sample will do'.

In selecting the sample, we operationalized the people of the state to include all residents of the state, irrespective of whether they are indigenes of the state or not.

The study adopted the multi-stage sampling method which involves sampling in successive stages such that at each stage selection is made using any of the known probability and non probability sampling methods (Asika 1991:47). The first stage involved the selection of Local government areas. At the first stage, we randomly selected three local governments (one urban, one rural and one semi-urban) from each of the Senatorial Districts. So Awka South (Urban), Idemili North (semi-urban), and Anaocha (rural) were selected from Anambra Central Senatorial District. Onitsha North (urban), Oyi (semi-urban), and Ogbaru (rural) were selected from Anambra North Senatorial District. Nnewi North (urban), Ihiala (semi urban) and Orumba South (rural) were selected from Anambra South Senatorial District.

At the second stage, in each of the selected local governments we structured the towns that make up the local government into three main categories. The first category is made up of the leadership of the town which includes the following: town union presidents, traditional rulers, and elected members of the house of assembly or national assembly (if any). The second category consisted of the leadership and members of the security organization in the town (that is the vigilante group). The third category is the general populace in the community. We further divided this group into two sub groups. The first sub group consisted of those who possess the capacity to provide their own personal security by engaging private security guards and the other sub group consisted of those who cannot provide personal security for themselves. This was how we got the four hundred respondents used for the study (see details of sample composition in Appendix seven).

### **3.3.3 Methods of Data Collection.**

The data for this study was generated from primary and secondary sources. The primary source is made up of the different categories of individuals that we outlined in our sampling population in the preceding section. The primary source of data was generated using the questionnaire and interview instruments.

The secondary sources of data basically consisted of second hand information gathered from critical studies of relevant books, journal articles, media reports, magazines, newspapers, periodicals, government documents, and official websites of relevant security agencies.

Data collection for this study took place in the months of October and December, 2013, with the help of ten trained research assistants.

### **3.3.4 Instruments for Data Collection**

A pre – coded 15 item questionnaire was used as the data collection instrument (see appendix eight). The questionnaire instrument was designed to reflect the five point Likert scale approach. The questions addressed the research questions and hypotheses for the study. Because of the sensitive nature of the research, we did not

group the questions into segments that are tied specifically to each research question.

The pre-test and validation of the research instrument were done in four weeks. Forty respondents were involved. The purpose of the pretest exercise was to test the validity of the field instrument and assess if the items in the instrument were best suited to address the research questions. All ambiguities noticed during the pretest were cleared before data collection.

### **3.3.5 Methods of Data Analysis**

This study adopted two major instruments of data analysis. The analysis of quantitative data was done using proportion analysis emanating from hierarchical ranking of responses obtained from the selected respondents. The qualitative data was analyzed using the content analytical method. The use of content analysis ensures the identification of themes in texts and documents that focus on the major propositions under investigation. It suffices to note that the benefit of combining both quantitative and qualitative instruments of data analysis is to ensure that the technicalities of both quantification of real information from the field and the extraction of important facts from existing literature will together lead us to a more reliable conclusion.

### **3.4 Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Population**

Data for this study were generated from a field survey undertaken between October and December 2013, from each of the local governments selected in the sample.

#### **Response Rate**

Although a total of 400 questionnaires were distributed, only 384 were returned. This represents a 96% response return rate.

#### **Sex Distribution of Respondents**

With a ratio of 226:158 most of those who responded to the questionnaire were males (58.9%). This left the female with 41.1%. We believe this is a fair

representation because of the fact that females usually do not take serious interest in political issues.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Respondents by Sex

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	226	58.9	58.9	58.9
Valid Female	158	41.1	41.1	100.0
Total	384	100.0	100.0	

### Age Distribution of Respondents

As shown in table 3.2, majority of the respondents were between the ages of 25 and 44. 104 representing 27.2% are between 25 and 34, while 107 representing 27.9% are between 35 and 44. 49 respondents representing 12.8% were between 55 and 64.

Table 3.2 : Distribution of Respondents by Age

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
35-44	159	40.4	40.4
45-54	146	37.6	24.5
55-64	49	12.8	12.8
65 and above	29	7.6	7.6
Total	383	99.7	100.0
Missing Data	1	.3	
Total	384	100.0	

### Educational Attainments of Respondents

Majority of those who responded to our questionnaire were all literate people. As table 3.3 clearly shows, all the different categories of educational attainment account for 95.2% of the respondents.

Table 3.3 Respondents Highest Educational Qualification

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No formal education	18	4.7	4.7
	FLSC	67	17.4	22.3
	WAEC/GCE	127	33.1	55.5
	National Diploma/First Degree	129	33.6	89.3
	masters/ph.d	41	10.7	100.0
	Total	382	99.5	100.0
Missing	Missing Data	2	.5	
Total		384	100.0	

## CHAPTER FOUR

### STRUCTURAL–FUNCTIONAL WEAKNESSES OF THE NIGERIAN STATE AND THE CHARACTER OF INSECURITY IN ANAMBRA STATE

#### 4.1 The Socio – Political Context of Insecurity in Anambra State

A brief examination of the socio-political environment in Anambra state is necessary for us to adequately understand the problem of insecurity in the state. What is today known as Anambra State is a product of the state creation exercise by the General Ibrahim Badamosi Babaginda's administration in August 27, 1991 which split the old Anambra state into two states: Enugu and Anambra. The name 'Anambra' according to the Oxford business group (2012:1), is derived from the anglicized version of 'Oma Mbala' river. The Omambala River is a tributary of the river Niger. The capital and seat of government is at Awka, while Onitsha, Nnewi and Ekwuluobia are the biggest commercial and industrial cities in the state. A small population of Igala people can also be found in the north western part of the state. Following the discovery of oil in Aguleri-otu area of the state, the state has joined the list of oil producing states in Nigeria.

The society in Anambra state is socio-culturally a patriarchal one as the man is seen and regarded as the head and leader of the family. There is strong preference for the male child in order to ensure the continued existence of family lineage. There is also strong attachment to the extended family system. It is the attachment to the extended family system that has produced an environment where people are meant to be their brother's keeper. As a result of this, the community life system used to be strong among the people. Nwankwo (2012:154-155) has captured the social context of life in Anambra state in the following words:

...the state is one of the states housing the Ibo ethnic unit – a very enterprising group. Each of the local communities is genealogically defined in a web of patriarchal descent. This is the foundation of the social network where everyone knows everyone with its control,

development and security implications. Any one not rooted in the genealogy of a particular community is a stranger, even if he is from the next community...Over four million indigenes of the state, not usually captured in the official census live in various parts of the country and beyond. In terms of land use, financial resources and consequent development of local communities and indeed of the state in general, these absentee members of the community are of great importance. Wherever they may live they organize themselves as branch of the home community and make significant contributions to its development. The city can cease to exist any day but not the village: the true home

An interesting aspect of the socio- political context of Anambra state which is crucial to this study is the character of politics in the state since the return of democracy in 1999. Between 1999 and 2006, politics in the state was characterized by a peculiar and disturbing kind of machine politics which resulted to unimaginable political machinations. First was the rift between Chief Emeka Ofor and his political Godson, Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju shortly after the 1999 election. The crisis brought the state to a standstill. At the root of the crisis was the disagreement between the Governor and Chief Emeka Ofor. Chief Emeka Ofor is said to have financed the election of the Governor and that of the members of the State House of Assembly. The struggle boiled down to the sharing of political offices such as the office of the speaker, the selection of candidates for political appointment and the sharing of contracts and other political largesse. While all these happened, the machinery of the Peoples Democratic Party on whose platform the Governor was elected became factionalized between the Governor and his erstwhile political godfather. While some party members remained in the party and operated with the name Odera organization, those loyal to Chiefs Emeka Ofor left to form what was called Anambra Peoples Forum (APF). The crisis affected the governance of the state in many sectors. For example, primary and secondary schools were closed down for close to two years because the government was unable to pay salaries to the teachers. Pensioners were also not paid and were

referred to as 'dead woods'. The health sector was not left out as doctors and nurses also went on strike. Nwanegbo (2009:4) has captured the general impact of the crisis in Anambra state. According to him, 'from 1999-2003, the state and its administration had a sustained record of administrative crises that obviously made it very difficult for the state administration to plan and administer for the development of the state'. This was the situation as at the time the state approached the 2003 general election. Following the crisis, the governor who was denied the ticket of the Peoples Democratic Party after having won the party primaries twice, decamped to another party- Alliance for Democracy (AD) under whose platform he contested the 2003 gubernatorial election.

The 2003 gubernatorial election in Anambra state produced the most contentious result and was the most widely contested in the tribunals and courts. This lasted for close to three years. The legal battle was between Dr Chris Nwabueze Ngige of the Peoples Democratic Party who was declared winner by INEC and Mr Peter Obi, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) candidate in the said election. While the legal battle was taking place in the court, another political battle ensued between the Governor Chris Ngige and another political godfather - Chief Chris Uba. Reminiscent of the Governor Mbadinju's era, at the root of the political imbroglio was disagreements over the share of the spoils of office. Yet it is important to point out that the Ngige- Uba saga was more bizarre as seen in the following unimaginable acts: abduction /arrest of the Governor organized by a retiring Assistant Inspector General of Police for Zone 9, Raphael Ige, the invasion of the state by thugs who burnt government properties at Awka and Onitsha, the involvement of a Judge in Enugu state who ruled that Chris Ngige be removed as Governor.

It was in the mist of the above political crisis that Mr Peter Obi was declared the winner of election and sworn in as the Governor in March 2006. Some months after Peter Obi assumed office, the interplay of power took another dimension. This time the struggle was between the Governor who was elected on the platform of the All Progressive Grand Alliance and the House of Assembly which was dominated by

the Peoples Democratic Party. The climax of the political intrigues came in November 2006, when in the wee hours of the morning in a hotel at Asaba the capital of Delta state, the House of Assembly after suspending most of its members, impeached the Governor. The impeachment brought in the Deputy Governor Dame Virgy Etiaba as Governor and Mr. Peter Obi again returned to the law court to reclaim his mandate. The Governor eventually reclaimed his mandate when the court later declared that his impeachment was illegal. Mr. Peter Obi has also made history when he became the first Governor of the state to get re elected for a second term in office in 2010.

The above narrative which centers on the negative impact of machine politics is not peculiar to Anambra state. However, it gives an insight into the character of Anambra state during the period under study. The political machinations became not only direct sources of insecurity but also made the state fertile for all forms of insecurity. For instance it is alleged in many quarters that the state has not known peace since the Chris Uba/Ngige saga because during the crises all sorts of thugs came into the state.

#### **4.2 The Character and Incidence of Insecurity in Anambra State**

The character and incidence of insecurity in Anambra state is not significantly different from what obtains in the rest of the southeast states of Nigeria, where, according to Mejabi (2012:186), the spate of kidnapping and related criminal activities have been on the increase daily. The situation in Anambra state is, in fact, even more challenging, considering the fact that the state, as noted in the preceding section, has more than any other state in the southeast severally experienced political crises caused by politics of godfatherism.

The character of insecurity in Anambra state is denoted by several factors. First, is the disturbing level of crime such as kidnapping and armed robbery. Since the return of democracy in 1999 till date, Anambra state is generally ranked amongst the unsafe states in the federation given the constant threat, which armed robbery and hooliganism pose to lives and property particularly in the major commercial

cities. The electronic and print media is always awash with stories of kidnapping and crimes taking place across both in different urban and rural communities of the state.

To empirically understand the crime situation in the state, we relied on the official crime statistics which is the traditional indicator of the level and pattern of criminality in every society. According to available crime statistics obtained from the Anambra State Police command, from 1999 to 2013, the state recorded a total number of 17, 092 cases of different crimes. As shown in Appendix One below, within the period under review, theft/ other stealing had the highest frequency (8,612 cases). This is followed by armed robbery with 1,293 cases and house breaking with 1,136. Kidnapping had a total of 527 cases, while rape/ indecent assault had 927 cases. (See details in appendix 1 below)

The data from the Police command in Anambra state when juxtaposed with the daily experiences of people in the state, and reports from the print and non – print media within the period raise a lot of suspicion about its reliability. This is because there is a wide disparity between the data provided by the police and the daily experiences of people living in the state. Our suspicion of the crime data obtained from the Police is further reinforced and supported by Sutherland and Cressey's (1978:31) assertion that 'many crimes that occur in the society are not known to the police and therefore do not appear in the official crime statistics. These are usually referred to as the dark figures. Crimes known to the police which appear in the criminal statistics constitute only a tip of the iceberg'. In a similar vein, Alemika (2013:1) also asserts that:

Two major problems impinge on the collection of reliable statistics on criminal activity and victimization. The first problem is referred to as the phenomena of 'dark' and 'grey' crime figures, which respectively imply 'unknown or undetected or unreported crime' and 'detected, reported but recorded' incidents of crimes and victimization. These problems indicate that the crime statistics

produced by criminal justice agencies –police, courts, prosecutors and prison – are not true or accurate reflection of the extent and pattern of criminal activities and victimization in society. The second problem associated with the collection of reliable crime and victimization statistics relates to national and organizational failures and capacity with respect to information management as tool of planning, decision making, monitoring and evaluation.

As a result of the limitations of official crime statistics as pointed out above, we decided to look at alternative sources of data to enhance our understanding of the character and incidence of insecurity in Anambra state. In this regard, the alternative sources of data include: the CLEEN foundation crime victim survey (2007- 2009, 2011, and 2012) and observations on the knowledge of insecurity as obtained from the respondents in the field. All these alternative sources of data arguably can be classified as the victim survey method which globally has come to be accepted by criminologist as appropriate means of obtaining information on criminality and victimization (see Tierney, 2010:30, Alemika, 2013:3).

In a crime victim survey covering 2007 – 2009 conducted by the Cleen Foundation in early 2010, 43.5% of respondents from Anambra state reported that they were personal victims of different kinds of crime. According to the survey, in 2005 while the national average for personal robbery victimization stood at 5.3%, Anambra state recorded 8.6%. This implies that the state had 3.3% above the national average. The survey also revealed that the rate of robbery victimization in the state grew from 4.3% in 2006 to 4.7% in 2009. In terms of personal rape victimization, while the national average stood at 3.3% in 2005, Anambra state recorded 8.6%. For theft of mobile phone victimization, while the national average was 10.0% in 2005, Anambra state had 13.6%. And in 2006 while the national average was 15.3%, Anambra state had 18.8%.

According to another survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation on the extent and pattern of crime victimization in Nigeria in 2011, Anambra State is among the ten

states with high level of personal crime victimization. In the survey, 54.9 % of respondents in Anambra state stated that they were personal victims of crime in 2011. With regards to the patterns of crimes in Nigeria, the survey further revealed that Anambra state was among the states with the highest records of victimization of household members in the following forms of crime: robbery (46.4%), domestic violence (34.5%), physical assault (28.9%), theft of money (34.2%) and burglary (15.8%). Finally, the survey also indicates that when compared to other states, Anambra state with (8.2%) had the highest number of victims of kidnapping.

In the 2012 National Crime and Safety Survey, while the national average for fear of crime stood at 75%, Anambra State had 63% and was among the states with the highest level of victims of personal crime.

Secondly, is the excesses of non – state actors in the maintenance of security which invariably has contributed to the problem of insecurity. Following the seeming inability of the police to rise to the challenge of insecurity in Anambra state, immediately after the return to democratic governance in 1999, the involvement of non- state actors in informal policing have become pervasive. These non – state actors are basically of two kinds namely: the civil society/ community based security agencies and the private security organizations. The civil society/community based security agencies popularly called vigilante groups since its introduction in 2000 by a law enacted by the Anambra state House of Assembly, have contributed indirectly in diverse ways to the escalation of the problem of insecurity in the state. They have engaged in negative activities such as harboring criminals, torture and extra judicial executions which invariably have contributed to the spate of insecurity. In August 2000, it was reported that Hon. Ifeanyi Ibegbu who was the leader of opposition in the Anambra state House of Assembly was abducted and seriously tortured by the Bakassi Boys. It took the intervention of the Inspector –General of Police for him to be released (Human Rights Watch/ Cleen Foundation, 2001). Similarly, in November 2000, Prophet Eddie Okeke of Anioma Healing Centre Nawgu was arrested, tortured and later

killed. Many instances abound of people who were arrested, tortured and killed by the Bakassi Boys.

Recently, as reported by Chimezie (2013), the Onitsha Ado Vigilante group tortured Mr. Oseloka Egbuche to death after a heated argument with members of the group. As acknowledged by Chris Udeze, a consultant to the Anambra state Police command on vigilante matters, in an interview, the vigilante groups in Anambra state have negatively contributed to the insecurity problem in Anambra state through the following ways: violating the human rights of the civil populace, engaging and abating criminality and exhibiting excesses in their operation by taking over the work of the police – arrest, detention and prosecution. In a similar vein, Umeagbalasi (2014) also opines that ‘it is a fact to note that vigilantism is part of insecurity in Anambra state particularly in the areas of crimes against persons and properties’.

It is important to point out that before the recent effort of the vigilante reform committee set up by the state government in 2012, across the state, different community/ civil society based security agencies operate without adequate supervision. Infact, up till now, there is no accurate data on the operation of vigilante groups in the state. This must have led the Intersociety of Nigeria (2010) to assert that there are more than 1,000 legal and illegal vigilante groups existing in Anambra state

Thirdly, is the nature of violence used by the operatives of the security agencies such as the police force which inadvertently has contributed to the state of insecurity in the state. The incident and pattern of police brutality, torture, unnecessary use of excessive force, lethal use of firearms including extra – judicial executions of suspects and most often innocent citizens, among others have placed residents of the state in a permanent state of fear. People lose their lives in the hands of the security operatives that are meant to protect them. The media is always awash with reports of police violence against residents of the state.

The climax of police violence in the state was witnessed in early 2013 when over 50 corpses were found in the Ezu River in Amansea, very close to a police check point. Although investigation is still on, it is widely held that the police should account for that bizarre incident.

Fourthly, is the nature of inter and intra communal conflicts in the different communities across the state. Between 1999 and 2013, Anambra state experienced quite a number of inter and intra communal conflicts with political, social, and economic dimensions. A study conducted by Ibeanu and Onu(2001) recorded that within a period of ten years, Anambra state experienced seventy two communal conflicts of varying magnitude. A profile of major inter and intra communal conflicts in Anambra state reveal that between 1999 and 2013, the state witnessed seventy two conflicts (see details in appendix two). Arising mainly from pivotal factors such as land disputes, chieftaincy and town union leadership tussle, renaming of ancestral home, etc, these communal conflicts have affected the security situation in the state. The devastating effect of these conflicts in terms of their material and human cost has also been alarming. For instance, as reported by Ibeanu (2003:200), in the 1999 Aguleri – Umuleri communal conflict which centered on the ownership of Otuocha land, ‘some estimates put the numbers of death as high as 1000’ and ‘some reports hold that half a million people were displaced’. In 2007, the crisis in Ogbunike community over the Osile communal land, as reported by Onu (2012:31), claimed five lives while sixty two houses were burnt. In the 2011 Owerri Ezukala and Ogbunka crisis over land, Ujumadu (2011:28), reported that more than three persons were killed, 11 houses were burnt down and property worth several millions of naria destroyed. In the 2012 Umuchukwu crisis over the change of the name of the town from Nkerehi to Umuchukwu, Onu and Odogwu (2012:42) reported that ‘over 30 persons were murdered in cold blood, property worth billions of naria destroyed, and thousands of innocent indigenes displaced’.

Fifth, is the emerging culture of armed violence perpetuated by factional groups of revenue collectors, the uncivilized method of operations by officials of Anambra

State Traffic Agency (ASTA), the militant activities of members of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), motor park touts and restive youths, particularly in the commercial cities of Onitsha, Nnewi and Ekwuluobia. This emerging culture of armed violence arguably can be seen as the fall out of, for instance, increasing youth population without meaningful employment, ungoverned urban centers and abysmal failure of law enforcement agencies and other government institutions. The incidence and pattern of armed violence is such that have also placed residents and visitors of the commercial cities in a state of fear. People lose their lives in the course of doing their legitimate business as a result of the impunity with which agents of legal and illegal revenue collectors, Motor Park touts, members of MASSOB, and some indigenous militant youth association have carried on with their nefarious activities. As reported by Obe (2013), a deadly clash between rival groups over the collection of revenue in Aba Park in Onitsha in May, left four persons dead and ten others seriously injured. Particularly worrisome in the whole scenario are the activities of the numerous revenue collectors who harass and maim visitors to the markets and motor parks all in the name of issuing receipts for revenue collection. The activities of these groups usually have led to the disruptions of business and economic activities. The irony of the situation is that these incidents sometimes do take place in the presence of the law enforcement agencies particularly the Nigerian Police.

The incidence of insecurity in Anambra state like in many other states of the Nigeria federation has principally led to two major developments. First, there is a growing public resentment against the Nigerian state and its management of the insecurity problem. This resentment is driven by the fact that insecurity is becoming more complex, widespread and unmanageable. Secondly, and as a result of the above, some Nigerians are beginning to perceive the Nigerian state as a failed state (Adibe, 2012:32). This is because the state, as demonstrated by the forces of kidnapping, Boko-Haram, youth militancy, etc, have lost the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence required for providing security for its citizens.

Taken together, the factors outlined above constitute the character of insecurity in Anambra state.

### 4.3: Empirical Assessment of Insecurity in Anambra State

In this section, efforts will be made to enhance our understanding of the incidence and character of insecurity in Anambra state by obtaining observations on the matter from respondents in the field.

#### 4.3.1: Level of Security in Anambra State

Following the widely held opinion that Anambra State is among the unsafe states in Nigeria, we sought to know from the respondents their feelings about the incidence and character of insecurity in the state. In this respect, the respondents were asked, “How would you assess the level of security in Anambra state?” The responses to this question are presented in table 4.1.

Table 4. 1 : Respondents' Assessment of the Level of Security Anambra State

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Very good</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Bad</b>	<b>Very bad</b>	
<b>50</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>382</b>

**Source: Field Work, Dec 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best security situation (i.e.very good). Hence the larger the score obtained, the higher the level of perception of security.This rating will reflect in the interpretation of the proportion to be obtained, that is, the larger the proportion the higher the level of security. From the summary of responses in table 4.1, the score 5 had 50 responses, 4 had 173 responses, 3 had 33 responses, 2 had 80 responses and 1 had 46 responses, giving a total of 382 responses. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of levels of security are:

$$(50 \times 5) + (173 \times 4) + (33 \times 3) + (80 \times 2) + (46 \times 1) = \underline{1,247}$$

The maximum level of security, which is rated 5, would yield, for 382 respondents,  $382 \times 5 = \underline{1910}$

Therefore the level of security is indicated by the proportion of response level of security, which is 1045, out of the expected maximum level of security obtainable, which is 1910 is;

$$P_{12} = \frac{1247}{1910} = 0.653$$

Because this proportion is a sample result, it is necessary to use an interval instead of one figure as the estimate of the level of insecurity. The conventional interval is the 95% confidence interval. This proportion is normally distributed with mean  $P_{12} = 0.653$  and a standard deviation of

$$\sigma_p = \frac{\sqrt{P_{12}q_{12}}}{N_2}$$

Where  $q_{12} = 1 - P_{12}$

And  $n_2$  is sample size which is 382. Hence

$$\sigma_p = \frac{\sqrt{(0.653)(1-0.653)}}{382} = 0.024$$

Therefore, the 95% confidence interval for the level of security is given as

$$P_{12} \pm (Z \alpha/2) = \sigma_p = 0.653 \pm (1.96) (0.024)$$

Where 1.96 is the 95% fractile of the normal distribution obtained from the normal distribution table

i.e. 0.606 to 0.700 .

One may approximate the level of security to be between 61% and 70%.The implication of this result is that majority of the respondents believe that the security situation in Anambra state is encouraging.

#### **4.3.1: Feeling of Personal Safety**

Still in the bid to understand the character of security in the state, it was necessary to know the feelings of the respondents about their personal safety. Respondents were asked “How secure do you feel in Anambra state?” The responses are displayed in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Respondents' Feeling of Personal Security

<b>5</b> <b>Highly secure</b>	<b>4</b> <b>Secure</b>	<b>3</b> <b>Undecided</b>	<b>2</b> <b>Insecure</b>	<b>1</b> <b>Highly insecure</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>44</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>357</b>

**Source: Field work Dec. 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best situation (i.e highly secure). Hence the larger the score obtained, the higher the level of the feeling secured. With this rating, the interpretation of the proportion to be obtained will be that the larger the proportion, the higher the level of the feeling secured. As shown in table 4.2, the scores 5 had 44 responses, 4 had 144 responses, 3 had 55 responses, 2 had 112 responses and 1 had 28 responses giving a total of 357 responses. Following the same procedure as in question 2, we have

$$P_{15} = \frac{(44 \times 5) + (144 \times 4) + (55 \times 3) + (112 \times 2) + (28 \times 1)}{357 \times 5}$$

$$= \frac{1213}{1,785} = 0.680$$

Thus, the 95% confidence interval estimate is given as

$$P_{15} \pm Z_{\alpha/2} \frac{\sqrt{P_{15} q_{15}}}{\sqrt{n}}$$

$$= 0.680 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.680)(1-0.680)}}{\sqrt{357}}$$

$$= 0.632 \text{ to } 0.728$$

i.e from 63.2% to 72.8%

The implication of the result is that majority of the respondents feel safe in the state. This result contradicts the 2012 result of the Cleen Foundation survey which placed Anambra state as one of the states with the highest level of fear of crime. In that survey, Anambra state scored 63%.

**4.3.2: Location and Insecurity**

Finally and still in the bid to understand the character of insecurity in the urban and rural areas, a statement was posed to the respondents thus: “Insecurity in Anambra state is more pronounced in the urban areas than the rural areas”. The responses are presented in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Respondents' Assessment of Urban/Rural Security Situation in Anambra state

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	
<b>90</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>386</b>

**Source: Field Work, Dec 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5. These responses measure the level to which respondents agree that urban areas are more insecure than the rural areas, with 5 being the highest level of agreement. The proportion to be obtained will be interpreted as the larger the proportion, the higher the level of agreement with the statement. According to table 4.1, 5 had 90 responses, 4 had 157 responses, 3 had 44 responses, 2 had 67 responses and 1 had 26 responses. Following the same procedure adopted earlier:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{16} &= \frac{(90 \times 5) + (157 \times 4) + (44 \times 3) + (67 \times 2) + (26 \times 1)}{386 \times 5} \\
 &= \frac{1370}{1930} = 0.71
 \end{aligned}$$

The 95% Confidence interval estimate is

$$0.710 \pm (1.96) \sqrt{(0.71)(1-0.710)}$$

= 0.687 to 0.733

About 69% to 73%

This opinion holds true for between 69% to 73% of respondents. The implication of the above is that majority of the respondents believe that insecurity in Anambra state is more pronounced in the urban areas than the rural areas.

In summary, the empirical assessment of security in Anambra state points to the fact that the security situation in the state is not as serious as we assumed. This finding appears contradictory to the general perception of the state as highly insecure. The explanation for the contradiction between the general perception of the state as highly insecure and the observations from the respondents as outlined above could be located in the context of the prevailing security situation during the period of data collection. It is our belief this must have greatly influenced the immediate response from the respondents.

It is logical at this point to explore the hypothesis which states that ‘the structural-functional weaknesses of the Nigerian state accounts for the character of insecurity in Anambra state’.

#### **4.4 Factors of Insecurity in Anambra State**

The structural – functional weakness of the Nigerian state has manifested in the constellation of some external and internal factors that affect the security situation in Anambra state. The external factors refer to those factors that affect the security situation from outside the state. Anambra state is part and parcel of the Nigerian state and as such cannot be completely insulated from the problems of the Nigeria state. Also given the complexity of Nigeria’s federal governance structure, it is difficult to demarcate the external factors from the internal problems of insecurity in the state. On the other hand, the internal factors of insecurity are seen as those factors of insecurity that is generated from the state.

##### **1. The dysfunctionality of the Nigerian state.**

The basic problem of insecurity in Nigeria, like in other parts of the Africa continent, as Nnoli (2006:5) has observed is ‘the collapse or near collapse of the state. The state is no longer able to generate the fundamental conditions for the protection of life’. Nnoli (2006:9) further explains that:

Political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination threaten the security of citizens to such an extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival. In desperation, the victimized citizens take the laws into their own hands as a means of safeguarding their fundamental values from the threat of unacceptable government policies. People who believe that the government no longer represents their best interests seek, by all means to overthrow it or otherwise establish an alternative state. The decline of the state as the guarantor of protection and human security is serious, but its role as the creator of insecurity is more serious.

The preceding observations of Nnoli aptly explain the role of the state in the crisis of insecurity in Anambra state. A situation where the state fails to take concrete steps in providing for the citizens’ welfare then insecurity is abound to be the end result. As revealed by the respondents that were involved in the study, unemployment, economic hardship and the character of politics were among the sources of insecurity in Anambra state. These sources of insecurity are issues that can be addressed by the state.

Taking cognizance of the new security paradigm which emerged with the cessation of the cold war and which places high premium on the individual, including the promotion of human rights, human dignity, women empowerment, enhancement of the well being of children, democratic governance and development, the call for a reexamination of the debate over the role of the state in the provision and maintenance of security in Nigeria has been a burning issue. To do this, it bears repeating that the Nigerian state that emerged since independence has been notoriously authoritarian. As a movement of capitalist class domination, the

postcolonial Nigerian state presents a number of structurally linked characteristics. First, it is all powerful. It intends to intervene in all spheres of life, especially the economy.

Second, the postcolonial state is arbitrary. This arbitrariness also manifests itself in the management of the affairs of the state including the security sector. Like its colonial antecedent, this state is capricious.

Third, since the state is all-powerful and there are few safeguards on how its power is to be used in a moderate and civil manner, groups and individuals take a great interest in controlling the power of the postcolonial state. So, it is characteristics of the postcolonial state that its members put a high premium on politics. As Ibeanu (1998:11) has observed, ‘politics is everything and everything is politics, including life and death. Whoever wins in politics wins everything, and whoever loses, loses everything, including lives and livelihoods’.

Closely linked to the high premium placed on power is the character of democracy. It is the character of democracy that conditions the struggle for power. The conception of democracy propagated by the Nigerian state is such that is at variance with the values and principles of the rule of law, justice, equity, and fairness. The travails of democracy in Nigeria which manifest in lack of credible election, social and political exclusion, absence of the rule of law, etc, cannot assist the security situation positively. This is because the state has not only failed in generating the fundamental conditions for the protection of life as pointed out earlier, but has also succeeded in alienating the ordinary people from the state. Many Nigerians still see the state as an alien institution. This explains not only the extreme cruelty displayed in the litany of Boko Haram violent attacks, but also the near absence of intelligence gathering in security management in Nigeria. Nnoli (2013:21) explained this matter better in the following words: ‘the consequence of the alienation of the masses from the undemocratic state is their unwillingness to provide necessary intelligence as they need to. In fact, they tend to provide

intelligence to those opposed to the state or they feign ignorance of what is going on’.

Okoye and Alumona(2014) also have underscored the nexus between the practice of democracy and the challenges of internal security in Nigeria. They assert that ‘despite the restoration of civil rule in Nigeria more than a decade ago, the Nigerian people have not been provided security of life and property as part of the dividend of democracy that the leaders often flaunt’(Okoye and Alumona,2014:195).

Fourth, arbitrariness, lack of moderating political institutions and the narrow social base of the postcolonial state lead to a general lack of faith in it by the people. As a result, the people regard the state as an enemy and treat it as such. Adibe (2013:54) have elaborately captured the impact of this scenario in Nigeria in the following words:

The Nigerian state, contrary to the media hype, is regarded as the enemy, not just by Boko Haram, but by several Nigerians and groups, each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram’s bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal: politicians entrusted to protect our common patrimony steal the country blind, law enforcement officers see or hear no evil at a slight inducement, government workers drag their feet and refuse to give their best while reveling in moonlighting, organized labour including university lecturers in public institutions go on indefinite strike on a whim while journalist accept brown envelopes to turn truth on its head or become uncritical champions of a selected anti-Nigerian state identity. What all these groups have in common with Boko Haram is that they believe the premise on which they act is justifiable and that the Nigerian state is unfair to them, if not an outright enemy

Arising from the above situation is the problem of low legitimacy which further denudes the confidence of disadvantaged groups in the capacity of the state to

protect their interests. Low legitimacy further undermines the development of institutional mechanism for moderating political competition. In the end, the post colonial state is incapable of transforming dominance into hegemony; that is by increasingly substituting ideology for force as a means of social control. Nor can it transform power into authority, that is, by eliciting voluntary compliance of the people to its dictates. In the final analysis, the state remains unable to appear as an independent and autonomous power standing above social antagonisms as a representative of the entire people or nation.

Fifth, because the state remains essentially the state of sectional interests rather than a representative of the collective interests of the people, there is no sense of unity in its powers. Instead, it exists as prebends parceled out to various sectional interests, in the Nigerian case ethnic groups in particular. Thus, politics becomes fiercely prebendal as ethnic and other sectional interests engage themselves in a fatal contest for increasing, allocating and defending their share of the powers of the state (Joseph, 1987 cited in Ibeanu, 1998: 12).

## **2. Nigeria's Federal Governance Structure**

The origin and development of the federal practice in Nigeria has adequately been captured in the literature (see Nwabueze 1983, 2007, 2013, Amuwo, Agbaje, Suberu and Herault, 1998, Suberu, 2004, Onwudiwe and Suberu, 2005). Although Nigeria has practiced federalism for quite some time, it is also well known that there have been numerous problems in the workings of the federal practice. The centralization of powers at the centre is one crucial aspect of the problems of the federal system. This has made scholars to conclude that the Nigeria federal system is a unitary system in disguise (Nwabueze, 2013:56). Of the numerous pathologies arising from the centralization of the federal system in Nigeria, none threatens the stability of the constituent states such as the maintenance of security. The high degree of centralization in the Nigeria federal practice has adversely affected the governance structure. This abnormality has become so glaring in the maintenance of security especially as regards the use and control of the police. As regards the maintenance of public order and safety, the 1999 constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria in Section 2, makes it the concurrent responsibility of both the federal and state governments. Yet, the coercive institutions such as the police, the army and other para military agencies are solely controlled by the federal government. The controversy over the use and control of the police has been a source of confrontations between the federal government and the states.

Viewed against the above background, issues surrounding the use and control of the police are part of the Nigeria federal governance structure that has contributed to the insecurity problem in Anambra state. The worrisome aspect of the governance structure is that the federal government exercises the coercive powers of the state without any significant input from the states. The present governance structure where the state Governor is seen and regarded as the Chief Security Officer of the state and yet he has no control over the security agencies undermines security. A good illustration of this abnormality can be seen in the following cases.

First, is the manner through which the federal government proscribed the vigilante group popularly known as the Bakassi Boys in Anambra state in July 2002. The Bakassi Boys was a security outfit invited by the state Governor at the behest of the insecurity situation in Onitsha and its environs. The operations of the organization were later given a legal backing by the State house of Assembly in the passage of the Anambra State Vigilante Services Law No.9 2000. Despite the shortcomings of the group, the general perception was that they had helped to reduce the crime rate in the state.

Secondly, is the seeming silence of the police during the wanton destruction of lives and property in Anambra state in 2004, during the crisis between the Governor, Dr. Chris Nwabueze Ngige and his erstwhile godfather, Chris Uba. During the crisis, the governor was helpless as the event took place without any form of intervention by the police. The implication of the police in the matter eventually led to the retirement of the Assistant Inspector-General of Police for Zone 9, Raphael Ige, who supervised the attempted abduction of the Governor.

Thirdly, is the strained relation between the police and the state government throughout the period of Dr. Chris Nwabueze Ngige as Governor. Following the implication of the police in the attempted abduction of Dr. Chris Ngige, the relationship between the police and Governor got sour that it also affected the sustenance of support from the state government because the governor withdrew all forms of assistance to the police. As captured by Isima and Chukwuma (2010:26):

Between 2003 and 2006, when Dr Ngige was Governor, the police worked closely with competing local PDP stalwarts against the governor. The police withdrew the official security aides of the governor and unleashed and watched the PDP militias invade the seat of government on several occasions. Many allegations of police collusion with the PDP in the incidents were made against the police high command and they were never denied.

The implication of the centralized federal system on security maintenance cannot be overemphasized. Recently, Comrade Adams Oshiomhole, the governor of Edo State expressed the frustration of state governors as regards the maintenance of security in the context of the Nigerian governance structure. In this regard, Oshiomole (2013) argues that:

The tools or the institutions primarily responsible for security are federal institutions: the army, police, state security services and lately the civil defense corps. All these are federal agencies...what a state government can do and what virtually all of us in varying degrees is doing is to try to provide support. But what makes a system work, is how we administer the carrot and the stick.

### **3. The Parasitic Character of the Governing Class in Anambra State**

The parasitic character of the governing class in Anambra is also linked to the problems associated with machine politics which has not only devalued the power of the votes in state, but has also engendered and encouraged unaccountability, lack of probity, corruption. The impact of these vices on society inadvertently

contributes to the insecurity problem in state. As was seen during the regime of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju, the parasitic and rentier character of the governing class resulted to a situation where state funds were diverted into private pocket. During the regime of Dr. Chris Ngige, the attempt to put a stop to the continued pillage of state funds was the major reason behind the crisis between him and his erstwhile godfather. In that situation, the absence of development by the governing class, contributed to insecurity. The parasitic and rentier character of the governing also accentuates the obstructive role of insecurity to development. Because the traumatic state of insecurity scares even indigenes of the state from returning to their home towns, even during festive periods. This is particularly the case in areas where kidnapping is rampant. In that situation, hardly would anybody invest on economic ventures that would expose him to all forms of miscreants that operate with impunity.

#### **4. The Excessive Premium on Power**

The quest for state power by all means by the political class has also contributed in no mean measure to the insecurity situation in Anambra state. Excessive premium on power converts politics into warfare rather than a process of bargaining, discussion and orderly transfer of power. It was in this sense that lives and property were destroyed in Anambra state in 2004 by forces that were no longer comfortable with the style of the Governor. It is widely known that most of the unemployed youths that engage in armed robbery and kidnapping were initiated into the culture of violence through their role as agents of politicians who armed and used them as thugs during the struggle for power. After elections, they are abandoned, thereby compelling them to use the same lawlessness to provide for their need and greed. The excessive premium on power by the parasitic political class has best been illustrated by a sitting Nigerian president who described an upcoming election which he was supposed to superintend as a “do or die affair”. The consequence was that the election in question was adjudged to be the worst election ever witnessed in Nigeria.

In this chapter we have tried to examine the incidence and character of insecurity in Anambra state. Taken together, the incidence and character of insecurity in Anambra state with the factors responsible for insecurity in the state supports our hypothesis that the structural – functional weaknesses of the Nigerian state accounts for the character of insecurity in the state.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE STATE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY IN ANAMBRA

#### 5.1: Security Structures in Anambra State

In modern times, every state ensures the security of its citizens and others living in its territory through some basic structures or institutions which assist the government in maintaining law and order. These state structures are the institutions or apparatus through which the maintenance of security is effectively carried out. Speaking about these state structures, Onyeoziri (2005:58) opines that ‘the Marxist refers to them as the repressive apparatus of the state while liberal theorist would stick to the more neutral label of ‘management of violence’ or security services’. Further, he also asserts that ‘they enable the state, represented by the government, to back up its legal powers with force’. In every state, these security structures play a vital role in the governance of security.

Since the state cannot be seen and is represented by the government, it also implies that it is the government that fulfils the obligations of the state. It is in the process or set of activities through which the government fulfils the obligations of the state to the citizens that governance takes place. Governance according to Fukuyama (2013:3) is defined as ‘government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not’. Similarly Omodia (2013:36) also asserts that ‘governance entails the proper management of state institutions and structures to enhance socio- economic and political transformation of society’. It is in the processes of governance that state structures or institutions do perform the essential function of security maintenance.

In the Nigerian context, the management of security lies solely with the Federal government which exercises control over all the security agencies. This has resulted to a situation where State Governors as chief security officers of their respective

states have no control over the security situation in the state because they cannot control any of the security agencies.

The 1999 Federal Constitution delineates the maintenance of security into two broad categories: internal and external. The task of maintaining internal security principally rests with the Nigerian Police Force. The Police are supported by other agencies such as the Nigeria Prisons Service, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Nigerian Custom Services, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps and the State Security Service. Despite their challenges these security agencies have tried to ensure the safety of life and property in Nigeria. Yet, scholars such Alemika and Chukwuma (2000) and Alemika (2003) are agreed that their level of effectiveness and efficiency has been unsatisfactory due to factors that are internal and external to security agencies.

In Anambra state, the Police have been the main structure responsible for the maintenance of internal security. But as the rate crime increased in the state particularly after the transition to civil rule in 1999, the different administrations that have governed the state have had to adopt different structures and processes in managing the security problem. It is within this context that non state actors particularly the vigilante groups have come to be an important part of the security structure in the state. Since their transformation and institutionalization in 2000 with the enactment of the Anambra State Vigilante Law, these Vigilante groups have continued to play a prominent role in the security sector that no meaningful discussion about the security sector in the state can be achieved without adequate reference to their activities.

As earlier noted, the legal framework for the management of the different security structures is provided by the Nigerian state in the 1999 constitution and other extant laws. Two sections of the 1999 constitution relate to the role of these structures. These are:

1. Section 214 which provide for the establishment of the Nigeria Police Force
2. Section 217 which provide for the establishment and composition of the Armed Forces of the federation.

The Armed Forces Act Cap A20 of 2004 and the National Security Agencies Act Cap 74 of 2004 also provides legal backing for security agencies in Nigeria. The Armed Forces Act provides for the establishment and functions of the Armed forces made up of the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force. Specifically, the Armed Forces according to the act “shall be charged with the defence with the Federal Republic of Nigeria by land, sea and air and with such other duties as the National Assembly may from time to time prescribe or direct by act”

The National Security Agencies Act of 2004 provides for the establishment of three agencies that shall ensure the effective conduct of national security, These agencies are: the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Intelligence Agency and the State Security Service. It is necessary to point out that the State Security Service used to be part of the Nigerian Police until 1986 when it was made a distinct security agency. According to the National Security Agencies Act of 2004 in section (3) the State Security Service, is charged with:

- a. ‘The prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime against the internal security of Nigeria.
- b. The protection and preservation of all non- military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria; and
- c. Such other responsibilities affecting internal security within Nigeria as the National Assembly or the President, as the case may be, may deem necessary.

## **5.2: Security Structures and Security Management in Anambra State**

In this study, we raised the question as to how effective is the governance of security in the provision and maintenance of security in Anambra state. We also hypothesized that the governance of security in Anambra state has not adequately responded to insecurity in the state. The reason for this as we will demonstrate later in this chapter points to the politicization of security structures and governance

processes involved in security management in Anambra state. This phenomenon has negatively aggravated and sustained insecurity in the state.

When we speak of security structures our focus is basically on the Police, the Vigilante groups and private security companies. These are the common institutions that managed the maintenance of security in Anambra state within the period under study. While the Police and the private security companies as pointed out already are controlled by the Federal government, the State government has tried to use the Vigilante groups to augment the services provided by the Police. Between 1999 and 2013 the state under the leadership of Dr Chinwoke Mbadinuju, Dr Chris Ngige and Mr. Peter Obi as governors made use of the combination of the Police and the Vigilante groups as institutions for fighting insecurity. The involvement of the vigilante groups and the private security companies in the management of security in Anambra state could be located within the paradigmatic change that has taken place in the current theoretical literature on the notion of security. According to Kumar Das (2001:1), ‘one area in which the paradigmatic change has become visible is in the notion that the state is no longer seen as the sole agency responsible for ensuring and providing security. It is in this sense that the issue of security in modern times is seldom regarded as the exclusive domain of the state’.

### **5.2.1: The Nigeria Police Force**

The Nigeria Police Force is a federal institution constitutionally empowered to ensure the maintenance of internal security in Nigeria. As part of what Ekeh (1980) has classified as ‘migrated social structures’ the Nigerian Police is a creation of colonialism. Historically, the origin of the Nigeria Police can be traced to 1861 when the British colonial government established a consular guard to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the newly created colony of Lagos. The history of the development of the Police has well been documented in the literature. (see for example Tamuno, 1970& 1993, Nwolise 2004).

The role of the Police in internal security management has been articulated by several legal instruments. The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in sections 214, 215 and 216 made provisions for the establishment of Nigeria Police Force, the appointment of Inspector- General and control of Nigeria Police force, and the delegation of powers to the inspector of police.

The major law which provides for the powers and duties of the police is the Police Act of 2004. This can be found in Cap. P19, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (LFN 2004). Apart from the Police Act, sections 3- 11 of the criminal Procedure Act found in Cap C41 LFN, 2004 and sections 7- 15 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act found in Cap S6 LFN, 2004, among other laws, also provide for special and particular powers and duties of the police.

In relation to the management of internal security, the Police Act of 2004 which is an enabling statute of the constitution specifically stipulates that:

the police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order; the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and shall perform such military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by them by, or under the authority of, this or any other Act

The contingents of the Nigeria Police in Anambra State are functionally under the Anambra State Command. The command, subject to the authority of the Inspector – General as provided in the Police Act 2004 is under the supervision of a commissioner of police who is assisted by three deputy commissioner. The Anambra state police command has a personnel strength of 6195 men and officers distributed across the different categories of officers as shown in appendix three below. With a population of 4,182,032 persons in the state, this gives an average of 1 policeman to 677 persons. This falls far below the standard police –population

ratio set by the United Nations Organization of 1 police man to 400 persons. Equally worrisome is the wide gap that exists in the quality of policing for the ordinary Nigerian and that of ‘those in power’. As evidenced by the large routine of police personnel that are attached to elected political office holders, their appointed allies and the financial oligarchies, policing in Nigeria appears elitist.

The command has a state criminal investigation department situated in Awka, three area commands in Nnewi, Awka and Onitsha, 36 divisional police offices and forty- five police posts. There are also several special forces such as the Paramilitary Mobile Police (MOPOL) based in Agu-Awka and the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) situated at Awkuzu. From 1999 to 2013, the command has been under the leadership of 16 different Commissioners (see appendix four below for details).

The role of the Police in crime control in Anambra state raises a lot of issues. First, despite the presence of the police all over the place (in their check points) especially in urban and semi - urban cities such as Onitsha, Awka, Nnewi, Ekwulobia, Umunze, Nteje, and Akwuzu, the level of crime has not abated. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, between 1999 and 2013, Anambra state recorded 19, 388 categories of different crimes. Prominent among the categories of crime is Kidnapping, burglary, car snatching. The situation has gotten so bad that these forms of crime have become a regular feature of life in most parts of the state.

There was this case that involved the wife of the researcher that is worth mentioning here. In the month of July 2012, in front of her office- Post Primary School Service Commission, armed robbers accosted my pregnant wife after they had blocked her with an old Mercedes car and drove off with her new Toyota Corolla. They headed toward Onitsha with a very high speed and passed Aroma junction where she had met some police at their “check point” while going to work that morning. The speculations of passerby were that the Police at Aroma Junction will stop those criminals. This did not happen. The irony of the whole story was that when later I went to her office to take her to the Police station, the same Police

men who were still at the “check point” at aroma junction stopped us and was demanding for all kinds of vehicle papers and also searched my boot.

When we finally got to the Police station (B division), we also met three other persons who came to report the similar incidents of car snatching that took place that same morning. In the course of that visit, I found out from the Investigating Police Officer (IPO) that they lack the necessary equipment with which they can swing into action. He told me that if I want any urgent action that I should pay for radio message. This was after I had paid 2000 for file and papers that were used in taking down my wife’s statement. At the end of the day the car was not found and the police have not said anything.

Secondly, the alleged involvement of the police men in aiding crimes especially kidnapping has continued to attract attention. For instance, it is widely held that police officers have been involved in the kidnapping business in the state. There was this case of a certain man whose father was kidnapped in January 2010. The matter was reported to the police. While the negotiation for ransom was going on, the man kept the police abreast of all the discussions between him and the kidnappers. At no time did the police make any serious effort towards rescuing the man rather they kept on encouraging the man to source money and settle the kidnappers. Surprisingly when the man was finally released and the man went to the police to report his release, the police officers were so much interested in knowing how much was paid as ransom. The man’s refusal to disclose the amount resulted to a serious verbal attack from the police officers.

The above narration typifies the experience of many residents of urban cities in Anambra state who have fallen victims of car snatchers and kidnappers. The resultant effect of the above situation is that an increasing number of residents of the state have lost hope in the Nigerian Police Force as an agent of crime control. For example in a study on the effectiveness of the Nigerian Police in Anambra state, Obioha(2004:26) found out that people believe that the Police have severally failed their test of function, especially in the areas of response to urgent distress and

getting hold of criminals, their ability to conclude criminal investigations fruitfully, fighting and conquering the criminals, and coverage of the entire parts of the state in their patrol.

The Police in Anambra state have also been responsible for supervising the activities of vigilante groups in the state. This it was doing directly until 2006 when following lack of adequate supervision by the District Police Officers who were charged with the responsibility, the command engaged the services of a consultant to handle the management of the affairs of the vigilante groups. The consultant – Exotic Solution Providers Ltd has been managing the affairs of the vigilante groups in the state since 2006 till date except for a brief period in 2010 when the consultancy was not renewed. The Police era in the management of the vigilante groups manifested a lot of problems which are principally tied to the uncoordinated nature through which the different District Police Officers handled their affairs in the different communities.

At this point, it is necessary to point out that outside the statutory support from the Federal government, the different administration in Anambra state within the period of this study has supported the Police command in the state in diverse ways such as providing operational vehicles and equipments and financial assistance.

### **5.2.2 Vigilante Groups**

Vigilante groups are part of what in the literature is referred to as non state security actors (Risse and Lehmkuhl, 2007; Merz 2010). Generally, vigilantes and other non state security actors such as private security companies and ethnic militias have received greater attention because of their prominent involvement in providing security in developing and weak states. According to Omeje (2005:73), ‘as in many sub- Sahara African countries, vigilantism plays a prominent role as a concept and practice of security provision in Nigeria, having existed as local security arrangements for centuries’ As a result of the violent activities of vigilantism not only in Nigeria but in other parts of Africa, the dominant view in the literature has come to see vigilantism as a ‘reversion to the violent indigenous institutions of law

and order based on secret societies and occultist practices or as a product of the contemporary institutional environment of clientelism and corruption in which youth struggle for their share of patronage resources' ( Kate, 2007:124).

The origin of vigilantism in Anambra state could be traced back to the early 1970's when, according to Onyeonoru (2003:374), the high crime rate that followed the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, forced Onitsha traders to rise to the occasion with what was then known as the "boys oye-e" who went on campaigns to fish out suspected criminals and burn them alive. Although it was a temporal arrangement, the group helped to solve the insecurity experienced at that time.

In the early 1990' the rising crime situation in Onitsha and other cities also led residents to form neighborhood watch groups that took turn to provide security in the different neighborhood. Within this period the Onitsha Market Amalgamated Traders Association (OMATA) and other similar associations operated security outfits that helped in providing security for residents of a particular area.

What is today known as the Anambra Vigilante Group (AVG) "was established through an act of Anambra State House of Assembly in the year 2000 with the aim of instituting an alternative more effective security delivery system"(Anambra State Security Trust Fund, 2012:6). According to the present House of Assembly Committee Chairman on Security and Police Affairs, Hon. Victor Okoye in an interview, it was the Bakassi Boys that were invited by Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju that formed the nucleus of the group and the name- Anambra Vigilante Group was adopted when the government made efforts to legalize the activities of the Bakassi Boys following the widespread criticism that greeted the operations of the group.

Similarly, according to Ajagu (2013:261), the Anambra state Vigilante Group came into existence as part of the effort of Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju's administration to complement the work of the Anambra state Troopers AST scheme which aimed at providing security and peaceful environment in the state.

The Bakassi Boys that metamorphosed into Anambra State Vigilante Group came into existence following the widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the Nigeria Police Force in crime control and the rampant cases of police collusion with armed robbers as reported widely by the press (Onyeonoru, 2003:375).

Since inception in 2000 the Anambra State Vigilante Group has passed through series of transformation under the three different regimes that have governed the state during the period of this study. At the root of the different transformation that taken place in the Anambra State Vigilante Group, it could be discerned that political interest has a played prominent role and this has resulted to inconsistencies about the operation of the group. For instance, between 1999 and 2013, there have been four acts enacted by the State House of Assembly. Each elected government repealed the existing law and replace it a new one. After the initial Anambra State Vigilante Services Law of 2000, there have been three others in 2004, 2007, 2013. It appears every government repeals the existing law to suit its own idea and concept about vigilantism. This state of affairs has resulted to a state of confusion among those in the security sector. As acknowledged by one of the leaders of the vigilante group in Onitsha metropolis, Mr. Ifejika Nwando in an interview, most often members of the group are at a loss over the particular law guiding their operation. As he puts it ‘before now we were told that the law in operation is the law of 2007 but in a recent meeting we were also informed about the law of 2013 which they said is still awaiting the Governor’s assent’. The report of the committee on Anambra State Vigilante Group Reform set up by the Anambra State Security Trust Fund in 2012 also lends support to Mr. Nwando’s observation. According to the committee in the course of its investigation, it found out that ‘only the police appeared to know that the extant law was the law of 2007(Anambra State Security Trust Fund, 2012:7).

It has to be acknowledged that Anambra State Vigilante Group has contributed immensely to the maintenance of security in the state. According to a Deputy Commissioner of Police in the Anambra State Police Command, the vigilante groups have made remarkably achievements in assisting the police in crime

management. He pointedly remarks that “it was with the collaboration of the Anambra State Vigilante group that we (the police) was able to arrest the notorious kidnapper called Ofeaku in Orafito town in 2012 and there are many other instances” . The Anambra State Special Adviser to the Governor on Security Matters, Rtd.Col.Akunnia Ikem Molokwu, in his assessment of the contributions of the vigilante groups to crime management in the state avers that ‘without the activities of the vigilante groups operating across the 177 communities in Anambra State, hoodlums, criminals and kidnappers could have taken over the state because the activities of these bad boys is too much for the police to deal with’. According to the Consultant Mr. Chris Udeze, the basic problem about the vigilante groups is that most often some overzealous vigilante security operatives do overstep their bounds by engaging in issues that are outside their basic functions. When this happens it results to some form of friction with the police forces

Despite the positive contributions of the Anambra State Vigilante Group, the operations of the group in the state have been confronted with numerous challenges. As outlined by the Committee Report on Anambra State Vigilante Group Reform (2012:7-9), the observed problems with the group are as follows:

1. There is no established mechanism for the effective supervision of the activities of the AVG. Supervision by the civil Police has not yielded the desired result.
2. The poor process of registration and documentation of members of AVG led to the proliferation of all types of vigilante groups and weapons in the state. In some cases questionable characters including criminals have found their way into the ranks of the AVG.
3. Parallel vigilante units have been formed in some communities as a result of power tussle between prominent members of the communities. For instance, in some communities, the Igwe and the President General have their separate vigilant units. In some, rich and prominent citizens have constituted rival vigilante units over and above the community organized vigilante units. There have been reported clashes between parallel vigilante groups in some

communities. Good examples exist in Urum, Nteje, Ebenebe, Isuanaocha and Osumenyi.

4. Private security companies were registered as vigilante units to enable their operatives bear arms while serving their customers.
5. A formal process for senior appointment and approvals in the vigilante structure must be put in place and also for communicating them to those who need to know especially the Governor, his security adviser and all security agencies. The process should not permit approval of arms for people who cannot otherwise legally bear same. Ad hoc or field appointments and approvals should not be allowed to become permanent without formal ratification.
6. The Police contracted the production and maintaining of the vigilante records to consultants who kept the records. Such records should be kept with the police and the vigilante supervisory body. The records must also be modernized for easy referencing and use in crime detection.
7. Only the Police appeared to know that the extant law was the law of 2007.

It is also important to point out that lack of an accurate data base is part of the problems confronting the management of Vigilante groups in the state. With the registration taking place presently there is a total number of seventy nine vigilante groups in the state (see appendix five for the details)

### **5.2.3 Private Security Companies**

Private security companies are also part of the non state security actors. They have become part of the architecture of security maintenance not only in developing countries such as Nigeria but also in developed countries. The global existence of private security companies can be appreciated in the remark by Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing (2003:333) that ‘nowhere is the finite capacity of public police more boldly evident than in the growth of the private security industry in western industrial societies, where private security officers now outnumber public police by a factor of at least three to one’. Generally, the origin of private security companies can be traced to the incapacitation of the state to adequately meet the growing

demands of providing public security ( Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 2003:332) and the need for the corporate private security providers to complement the efforts of the state actors in crime prevention (Ekhomu,2004). Securitas in Abrahamsen and Williams (2009:1) assert that ‘worldwide, the commercial private security market is now valued at \$165 billion, and its growth is forecast to continue at an annual rate of 8% for the foreseeable future’.

In the Nigerian context, the responsibility of licensing, monitoring and supervision of the activities of private guard companies, lies with the private guards department of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). According to the NSCDC, the organization is “a para- military agency of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that is commissioned to provide measures against threat and any form of attack or disaster against the nation and its citizenry”. Further, “the corps is statutorily empowered by law Act no 2 of 28<sup>th</sup> June, 2003 and amended by Act no 6 of 4<sup>th</sup> June, 2007. Since its inception in 1967 as the Lagos Civil Defence Committee, the agency has undergone several transformation and restructuring.

The officers of the NSCDC in Anambra state are structurally under the Anambra state command. The command is under the State Commandant who reports to the Commandant General at the Corps headquarters in Abuja. The State Commandant in Anambra state is assisted by four deputy commandants who are in charge of the following departments: legal, private guards companies, administration and ICT.

In Anambra state, private guard companies have been involved in the provision of security for private organizations such as petrol filling stations, eateries, schools, corporate companies, supermarkets, etc. At present, available records from the Anambra state command of the NSCDC reveals that there are thirty registered private guard companies operating in the state (see appendix six for details).

Private security companies have not really played a significant role in the management of security in Anambra state. This is because of the pervasive

involvement of the vigilante groups in providing security. Across the different communities in the state we find vigilante group members also providing security for wealthy individuals and corporate organization because of the financial gratification involved. Ordinarily this should be the job of the private security companies. The encroachment by vigilante groups in the provision of private security in the state has been succinctly captured by the Committee Report on Anambra State Vigilante Group Reform (2012). According to the report:

the Anambra State Vigilante Group seems to have encroached on the turf of the private security organization in the state. It is now common to see armed men at private and corporate places throughout the state. It is disturbing however, that some registered private security organization have taken advantage of the general state of confusion to arm their staff and operate as AVG members and still provide security details for individuals, organizations and markets. This state of affairs portends grave danger to security in the state and must be addressed appropriately.

The nature of private security provision as described above has also been confirmed by the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps. As pointed out by the Deputy Commandant and Head of Private Guard Department in Anambra State Command of the NSCDC, Adebisi Adeyemi, in an interview: ‘the private guard companies in Anambra state have been seriously paralyzed because of the encroachment of the vigilante groups into the functions of the PGC because the vigilante groups in state are somehow poorly supervised. The encroachment is such that the private guards are almost becoming useless’

Arising from the need to adequately understand the effectiveness of the governance of security in the provision and maintenance of security in Anambra state, we decided to investigate the feelings of respondents about the role of security structures in security maintenance. In this respect, we posed two questions to the respondents. First, we asked them: how satisfied are you with the efforts of security

operatives such as the police in responding to insecurity in Anambra state? The responses to this question are indicated in table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Respondents' Level of Satisfaction with the Efforts of the Police in Responding to insecurity in Anambra state

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly satisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Highly dissatisfied</b>	
<b>45</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>378</b>

**Source: field work Dec. 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best (i.e highly satisfied).The proportions to be obtained will thus be interpreted along this line, that is, the higher the proportion, the more satisfied the people are. From the summary of responses provided in table 5.1, 5 had 45 responses, 4 had 97 responses, 3 had 53 responses, 2 had 40 responses and 1 had 143 responses. The number of valid responses to this question is 378. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of level of satisfaction is:

$$P_{2,10} = \frac{(45 \times 5) + (97 \times 4) + (53 \times 3) + (40 \times 2) + (143 \times 1)}{378 \times 5}$$

$$= \frac{995}{1890} = 0.526$$

A 95% confidence interval estimate for the level of satisfaction with the efforts of the police in responding to insecurity in the state is

$$0.526 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.526)(1-0.526)}}{378}$$

$$= 0.476 \text{ to } 0.576 \text{ which is about } 48\% \text{ to } 58\%.$$

This means that the level of satisfaction the people have in the police managing security in Anambra state is between 48% to 58%.

Secondly we asked the respondents “How satisfied are you with the efforts of the vigilante groups in responding to insecurity in Anambra state”. The responses to this question are presented in table 5. 2.

Table 5.2: Respondent’s Level of Satisfaction with Efforts of Vigilante groups in Responding to Insecurity in Anambra State

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly satisfie</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Highly dissatisfie</b>	
<b>50</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>384</b>

**Source: field work Dec. 2013**

As indicated in the table above, 5 had 50 responses, 4 had 116 responses, 3 had 28 responses, 2 had 37 responses and 1 had 151 responses. The valid number of responses is 384. A rating of 5 shows the highest level of satisfaction, hence the higher the proportion the more satisfied the people are with the efforts of the vigilante groups in managing insecurity in Anambra state. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of level of satisfaction is

$$P_{2,11} = \frac{(50 \times 5) + (116 \times 4) + (28 \times 3) + (37 \times 2) + (151 \times 1)}{384 \times 5}$$

$$== \underline{1023}$$

$$1920 = 0.533$$

The 95% confidence interval for the true proportion is  $0.533 \pm (1.96)$

$$\frac{\sqrt{(0.533)(1-0.533)}}{384}$$

$$= 0.483 \text{ to } 0.583. \text{ i.e } 48\% \text{ to } 58\%$$

The implication of the result is that not so many of the respondents are satisfied with the efforts of the vigilante groups in responding to insecurity in Anambra state.

### **5.3. Governance and Security Management in Anambra State**

As implied in our hypothesis, the problem of insecurity in Anambra state cannot be properly understood without reference to the “governance of security”. By the governance of security, we mean the set of activities through which the government plans and executes policies in the security sector. Since it is the primary responsibility of the government to make adequate provision for the security and welfare of her citizens and others within her territory boundary, then the link between the governance factor and the insecurity in Anambra state has to be examined.

Theoretically, scholars such as Vohra (2007), Akpan (2010) and Ukiwo and Chukwuma (2012) have all captured the nexus between governance and security. According to Vohra (2007:1):

If internal security is not maintained, governance cannot be delivered and there would be grave threats to the very unity and integrity of the country. Likewise, internal security cannot be safeguarded if governance is delivered by an inefficient and corrupt administration.

Akpan (2010:36) collaborate the assertion by Vohra in his remark that:

Essentially, there is a strong correlation between governance and national security. Governance that enhances the delivery of public goods and improved standard of living for the people has the capacity to guarantee improved security of lives and properties and minimize potential risks to national security.

In a similar vein, Ukiwo and Chukwuma (2012:9) also assert that ‘governance deficits and pervasive insecurity...are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’.

In the context of Anambra state, it is hypothesized that governance of security has not adequately responded to insecurity in the state. This is because security

structures and governance processes have become politicized. The context of this statement will be examined under the three different administrations that have governed the state.

### **5.2.1 Anambra State, 1999 – 2003**

Following the successful transition programme of General Abdulsalami Abubakar, a democratic elected government was inaugurated in Anambra state on May 29, 1999, under the leadership of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju who was elected under the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

At the beginning of the civilian administration in 1999, the increasing violent crime situation in Anambra state particularly in Onitsha, Nnewi and its environs was very worrisome. As captured by the News Magazine of May 29, 2000:

It is in Onitsha that hoodlums can seize container loads of goods in the presence of the police and demand settlement as a condition for release. In Onitsha robbers don't just snatch anything from anybody in broad daylight as they do in some other places. They accost you in a very busy street, ask you for whatever they want and you have no option but to willingly hand it over to them.

Mbadinuju (2012:321) recalls the insecurity situation of the period thus:

It wasn't for nothing that Onitsha earned the reputation as the worst town in the whole of Nigeria. Robberies were the order of the day. People were afraid to walk about carrying a bag, a brief case or even a bulging pocket. At the sight of any of these, robbers who literally swarmed everywhere would swing into action, leaving tears and sorrow after every operation. No single day passed in Onitsha without an incident of death caused by robbers in the course of their operations.

It was the above situation that led the administration of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju to take some steps in order to solve the problem. According to Onyenoru (2003:373),

in his resolve to deal with the state of insecurity in Anambra, Governor Mbadinuju established a three-tier security outfit, consisting of a police squad called Anambra State Troopers, members of the State Security Service (to provide intelligence service), and village based vigilante groups under the supervision of local Divisional Police Officers – to provide domestic intelligence on criminals at the village/community level.

First, the government responded to the situation by giving support to the Nigeria Police Force. The government bought vehicles, communication equipments, gave them allowances so that their morale would be beefed up. Second, the government invited the dreaded security group known as the Bakassi Boys. The activities of the Bakassi boys were later granted full backing by a law made by the Anambra State House of assembly in August 2000 which renamed it Anambra State Vigilante Services (AVS). Onyeonoru (2003:374) has captured the story of the Bakassi Boys in the maintenance of security during the period. According to him:

Before the Bakassi Boys came to the scene in the first week of July, life had become unbearable for residents of Onitsha, as robbers were daily unleashing terror on the people. But within three weeks of their arrival in Onitsha, sanity has returned to the city as the Bakassi Boys went from one part of the city to another flushing out suspected robbers.

The Anambra State Vigilante Services law, 2000 became the first legal backing to the operations of vigilante operations in the state. Some critical areas of the law will suffice here for our discussion. First, the law in section five vested in communities, group of persons, or an association, the powers to organize vigilante groups and register such groups with the Divisional Police Station in their area or local Government Area.

Secondly, in section six the law made provisions for the establishment of a vigilante group which ‘shall augment the maintenance of security in their various communities and shall in particular render all lawful help and assistance to the police in:

- (a) The prevention and detection of crimes
- (b) Making available relevant information on criminals
- (c) Taking measures to ensure that hoodlums do not operate in their communities
- (d) Preserving law and order;
- (e) Protecting lives and properties’.

The law further granted the Vigilante groups the powers to:

- (a) Arrest any person who commits a crime before them;
- (b) Patrol the street or villages at any time of the day and especially at nights;
- (c) Maintain security barricades at nights in appropriate places;
- (d) Question and hand over to the police, any person of questionable character or suspicious movement; and
- (e) Enter and search any compound into which a questionable person runs while being pursued.

Thirdly, the law also established a co-ordinating body for vigilante groups called the Vigilante Services Co-ordinating Committee and charged the body with the following functions:

- (a) Co-ordinate the activities of vigilante groups in the communities;
- (b) Monitor and supervise the activities of the different groups in the different communities;
- (c) Advise the Governor on the programmes and activities of these groups;
- (d) Effect the provision of necessary funds and materials by the state to the groups;
- (e) Identify the areas of need of the groups and bring them to the knowledge of the Governor; and
- (f) Carry out such other activities in the state as are necessary and expedient for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the services as set out in this law

The maintenance of security in Anambra state during the administration of Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju reveals a lot of governance deficits and the intrusion of political considerations. The deficits were reasons why despite the good intentions of the government, insecurity still remained a serious problem in the state. The governance deficits manifested in the following areas.

First, the law envisaged the existence of vigilante groups managed by groups or associations across the different communities in the state. But in actual practice, the processes of the management of the vigilante groups deviated greatly from the provisions of the law and the essence of the state as the sole guarantor of security. By giving groups or associations the powers to organize vigilante groups, the state opened the security sector to all manners of person who took advantage of the law to establish private armies with which they fought their political and business opponents. As a result of this fact, the state became the domain all sorts of vigilante groups with questionable and ulterior motive. As recorded by Attah (2013:18), the situation has also contributed to the proliferation of small and light fire arms in the state. In another vein, the operations of the vigilante groups contravened the provisions of the law in the sense that they were supervised by the Bakassi boys and not the Police.

Secondly, the unconventional mode of operations of the Bakassi boys who engaged in extra judicial execution of criminals violated not only the enabling law but also the rule of law and fundamental human rights as enriched in the Nigerian constitution. People were killed by the group in the most inhuman method even as the group also engaged in other issues such as settling of disputes that were not under its original jurisdiction. The activities of the group were more than augmenting the efforts of the Police. In fact, they replaced the Policemen in the state. In a similar vein, since the Bakassi Boys was not owned by any particular community, group or association but was rather managed by the state government through the office of the special adviser to the Governor on security, its existence contravened the provisions of the law. Closely linked to this issue is also that the Bakassi boys according to reports began operation in Anambra state in June 2000

while the enabling law for the group became effective in August 2000. This implies that the group had operated for two months before their activities were backed up by the law.

Another dimension through which the governance processes impacted on the maintenance of security during the Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju's administration was in the failure of the administration to cater for the basic social welfare needs of the people. This was evidenced in the near collapse of all sectors of government. The primary and secondary schools and public health institutions were shut down for a long period of time.

### **5.2.2. Anambra State, 2003 – 2006**

After the 2003 gubernatorial election which produced the most contentious result in Anambra State, the administration of Dr. Chris Ngige also took steps to contend with the insecurity problem in the State. He maintained the Anambra State Vigilante Service and used it as an avenue for offering employment to unemployed youths who were before then were either suspected criminals or political thugs. After one year in office, the administration in May, 2004, repealed the Anambra State Vigilante Services Law, 2000 with the Anambra State Group Vigilante Law, 2004. The law in section 4(1) established the Anambra State Vigilante Group and in section 8 charged the group with the following functions:

- (a) To prevent and detect crimes
- (b) To make available relevant information on criminals
- (c) To take measures to ensure that criminals do not operate in their communities
- (d) To preserve law and order
- (e) To protect lives and properties
- (f) To recruit and train security personnel
- (g) To arrest criminals and hand them over to the police for investigation and prosecution when necessary; and
- (h) To give further assistance to the Police where required in the production of the witnesses.

The law also in sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 made provisions for the establishment and composition of town/ village and market vigilante committees for the different towns and markets in the state.

The Anambra State Vigilante Services Law 2004 appeared to be an improvement on the Anambra state Vigilante Services Law, 2000 in some respects. First, in the area of the supervision of the activities of the vigilante groups, the law decentralized the supervision of the vigilante groups by creating a supervisory body at the state, town/village and market level. Unlike the law of 2000 that allowed groups and associations to form and register vigilante groups, the 2004 law vested in the chairman of the vigilante group at the state, town and market level the powers to recruit in consultation with the members of the group, security guards, who must be of Anambra State origin.

Since the administration pursued a one point agenda of road construction much was not done in the area of security governance.

### **5.2.3 Anambra State, 2006 – 2013**

Mr. Peter Obi took over as Governor in March 2006 after a long legal battle to claim his electoral mandate. The administration of Mr. Peter Obi adopted several strategies in the management of the problem of insecurity in the state. First, through the instrumentalities of the town union, the administration annually provided a grant of five hundred thousand naria to all the communities in the state for security maintenance during the Christmas celebration when most indigenes who reside outside do return home to be with their people. As good as the idea might seem, it raises a lot of issues about the processes of governance. First, there was no law backing the involvement of the town unions in security maintenance. Secondly, there were no strict measures to ensure accountability on the part of the town unions who now saw the grant as part of the largesse from the government in power. No measures were put in place to ensure that the grants were actually spent on security provision. As gathered from respondents in Akwuzu, Nteje, Ogidi, and Atani during the course of this study, the grant was shared equally among the

different villages who were asked to use it to provide security within their villages during the Christmas period. The provision of the grant has also given rise to a new form of contestation for the control of the town union in the different communities.

Town union elections have degenerated to a do-or-die affair. Related to this fact, is that the processes of recruiting the vigilante boys have torn most communities apart. Without laid rules, town union executives have come to see the recruitment process as a means of compensating friends and relatives and also as means of raising their own private army who now in turn protect their interests in the local village politics.

In another vein, following the manner through which monies meant for security purposes were openly disbursed in political rallies to traditional rulers and presidents of town unions, it could be argued that the process was meant to score political gains for the Governor and the ruling party rather than tackle the problem of insecurity. Related to this is the fact that the processes of recruiting the vigilante group members is also seen to be politicized as only party loyalists in the different communities were recruited. The involvement of the vigilante groups in only the rallies and functions of the ruling party further lends support to the above accusation.

Another novel governance process through which the administration has managed the security problem in the state is through the establishment of the Anambra State Security Trust Fund. The fund is more of a partnership between government and public. This was done through the enactment of an Act by the House of Assembly. The law which is cited as the Anambra State Security Trust Fund Law, 2010 came into force on the 11<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2010. The fund was launched on 6<sup>th</sup> Dec, 2011 with the Anambra state government donating 300 million naria and Prince Arthur Eze donating 50 million naria in cheque( Osondu, 2011:21).

Specifically, the objectives of the fund as provided in section 4 of the law is to:

provide money for the acquisition and deployment of security equipment and such human, material and financial resources as shall be found necessary for effective functioning of all Federal, State, Local Government and other security agencies operating in the state and for the training and retraining of security personnel

For management of the fund, the law made provision for a board of trustees which shall hold office for four years and shall be eligible for re-appointment for one further term of four years and no more. The composition of the board is as follows: a chairman, three members-one from each senatorial zone and appointed from the private sector to represent business and financial community, two members appointed from the public service of the state, a representative each of the following security agencies in the state: Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Army, Department of State security and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and one representative from the traditional and religious institutions.

The day-to-day administration of the fund is done by an Executive secretary who is also assisted by some civil servants.

Since its establishment, the Anambra state security trust has tried to provide assistance to security agencies in the state. As at November 2013, the fund has provided 604 patrol vehicles for the Nigerian Police, 362 patrol vehicles for the Nigerian Army, 341 motorcycles for the Police and Market Vigilante units, 3 vehicles for office of the special adviser on chieftaincy and town union affairs and 235 patrol vehicles for vigilante groups. In addition, the fund has also provided quarterly grants to all security agencies in the state, paid for security information and maintained a service bay where all the patrol vehicles are serviced (Nwokoye, 2013).

Following its dissatisfaction with the existing modus operandi of the vigilante groups in the state and also as part of the recommendations of the Anambra state vigilante reform committee, the Peter Obi administration in 2012 sent an executive

bill to the state House of Assembly to repeal the existing Anambra State Group Vigilante Law, 2007. The bill which seeks to establish the Anambra State Group Vigilante and Supervisory Committees is cited as the Anambra State Group Vigilante Law, 2013. The bill has been passed into law by the House but unfortunately was not signed by the Governor before he left office in March 2014. The provisions of the 2013 Law are basically the same thing with that of 2007. The only remarkable difference is that the 2013 law in section 3(4) introduced the issue of thorough screening of members of the vigilante group and in section 6, 7 and 8 introduced the use of identity cards by members of the vigilante groups. These two issues were part of the measures suggested by the Vigilante Reform Committee to enhance supervision of the activities of the vigilante groups in the state.

Another serious area where governance process has negatively affected the maintenance of security in Anambra state could be seen in the duplication of security functions by the Nigeria Police Force and the Anambra State government. For instance, at the present, there is a consultant to the Anambra State Police Command, who the command in his letter of appointment, expects to do the following:

1. Devise means of implementing the Anambra vigilante reform guideline.
2. Provide computerized records of all vigilante units, operatives and arms and ensure that they are updated as the need arises.
3. Conduct vigilante workshops/seminars
4. Issue security coded vigilante identity cards
5. Provide an acceptable uniform by which all vigilante operatives in Anambra state shall be identified.
6. Effectively monitor vigilante operations to avoid the infiltration of fake vigilantes
7. Superintend the formation of special vigilante squad that will be supervised by the Area Commanders or the Police Operations department.
8. Any other duty that may be assigned to you by the Commissioner of Police been charged with

The Consultant is expected to perform all the aforementioned functions at no cost to the Command but is expected 'to liaise with the communities and relevant government office to fund your operations'.

Yet, there is a body called the Anambra State Vigilante Evaluation and Supervisory Cadre that is under the supervision of the Office of the Special adviser to the Governor on Security, which is also charged with nearly all of the functions contained in the appointment letter cited above. The Anambra State Vigilante Evaluation and Supervisory Cadre came into existence as a result of the recommendations of the Vigilante Reform Committee Report submitted to the Governor in January 2013. The idea of the Vigilante Reform Committee was that the Vigilante Evaluation and Supervisory cadre should have a legal backing and so it was incorporated into the executive bill on the Anambra state Vigilante bill 2013 that was sent to the House of Assembly. The bill has not been passed into law, yet the Vigilante Evaluation and Supervisory Cadre has been functioning. The duplication of functions as described above have resulted to a situation where rather than find a synergy of efforts and ideas among the different actors involved in security management, what is seen is rivalry and confusion. As acknowledged by a member of the Vigilante group in Uli, Ihiala Local Government Area, the duplication of functions which has resulted to the issue of registering and obtaining identity cards from two different places is not only causing a problem of loyalty but is also a serious financial burden for the communities who funds the activities of the vigilante groups. The rancor caused by the above led the House Committee on Police Affairs and Security to institute a public hearing on the matter. Although the report of the public hearing as characteristic of most public hearing instituted by the legislature in Nigeria has not been released, revelations by key actors during the public hearing reveals that the problem borders on lack of institutionalized mechanism for control and corruption.

Still as part of its effort to checkmate the rate of Kidnapping, the executive arm of government under Mr. Peter Obi sought an amendment to section 315(3) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap. 36 Vol, 1991. The amendment sought to prescribe a

death penalty for kidnappers and also sought to invest in the State Security Council the power to demolish any building that is being used for the business of kidnapping.

As good as the above idea may appear, the amendment which has not been passed into law has aggravated the problem of insecurity in the state. The reasons are not far fetched. As demonstrated by the demolition of Top Class Hotel in Onitsha in August, 2013, over an allegation that fresh human heads were found in the hotel, it runs contrary to the principles of justice, fair hearing and the fundamental law of the Nigerian state, for the state government to demolish the building of an individual because it was used for the business of kidnapping without trying to find out if the individual was even aware that the building was being used for such a purpose. It could amount to jungle justice which was the greatest criticism leveled against the processes of maintaining security with the Bakassi Boys option.

Secondly it is a misnomer and unlawful to invest in the State Security Council the powers to execute such a serious assignment when the council is unknown to the law operating in the state. At the moment, no law in the state recognizes the existence and operations of the state security council which is made up of the Governor, the heads of all the military agencies in the state, the Commissioner of Police and the Attorney - General of the state.

The above mindset must have informed the resistance of civil society groups to the amendment when it was submitted and debated at the state House of Assembly. Luckily, the state legislature saw reasons with the arguments of the civil societies and did the amendment in such a way that followed the principles of fair hearing. The amendment is still waiting for the Governor's assent. Considering the weighty nature of the issue, the amendment as passed into law by the state legislature is quoted in ex tenso here:

“(d) whenever a report is made to the State Security Council that any property is identified as being used or having been used for the

purpose of detaining kidnap victims or is used for any other purpose directly connected with the offence of kidnap, the State Security Council on being satisfied with the report, shall have power to secure and seal such property pending the trial of any person charged to court in respect of an offence connecting such property.

“(e) Upon any finding by a court of law that the owner, caretaker or lawful occupier of any property secured and, or sealed pursuant to subsection (d) of this section is a party or an accessory before or after the fact to the offence of kidnap, the ownership of such property shall upon such finding transfer to the state permanently the property as State property

Without any legal backing, the Anambra state under Mr. Peter Obi adopted a policy of extra legal demolition of properties of persons accused of kidnap crime. In August 2012, the governor sealed a hotel located at Nkpor near Onitsha and two houses in Nri in Anaocha Local Government.

Insecurity is presently a cancerous cankerworm that is affecting the entire Nigerian nation and the fight against it is, without doubt, a very laudable cause that demands the wholehearted support of all. But support for the fight obliges us to make a choice between on the one hand, a total fight against insecurity untrammelled by reference to the law or the limitations on power as contained in the law, and, on the other hand, fighting insecurity within and subject to the framework of the law and the limitations on the exercise of power as contained in the law.

As gathered from members of the vigilante groups and some civil servants, the confusion as to who supervises the activities of the vigilante groups is another area where the processes of governance have negatively affected the maintenance of security. In one vein official communication concerning vigilante groups are rooted through the ministry of Local government and Chieftaincy affairs and in another

instance is rooted through the office of the special Adviser to the Governor on Security. This has often created a sort of confusion among actors in the security sector. For instance in January 2014, the special adviser to the Governor on security wrote a letter to traditional rulers and presidents of town unions on a subject matter that the traditional rulers had concluded with the commissioner for local government and chieftaincy affairs in October 2013.

Following the need to understand the feeling of the people about the provision of security by the government, we posed two questions to them. We asked them: ‘How satisfied are you with the efforts of government in Anambra state under Mbadinuju in addressing the insecurity problem in Anambra State?’ The responses to this question are presented in table 5.3 below.

Table 5.3. Respondents’ Level of Satisfaction with the Efforts of Govt under Mbadinuju in addressing insecurity problem

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly Satisfi</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>High dissatisfied</b>	
<b>138</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>380</b>

Source: Field work Dec. 2013

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best situation(i.e highly satisfied).Hence the larger the proportion obtained, the higher the level of satisfaction with the efforts of Anambra state government under the administration of Mbadinuju and Ngige to provide security. As shown in table 5.3. 5 had138 responses, 4 had 68 responses, 3 had 70 responses, 2 had 56 responses and 1 had 48 responses. The number of valid responses is 380. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of level of satisfaction is

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{28} & \frac{(138 \times 5) + (68 \times 4) + (70 \times 3) + (56 \times 2) + (48 \times 1)}{380 \times 5} \\
 & = \frac{1332}{1900} = 0.701
 \end{aligned}$$

A 95% confidence interval estimate for this proportion of level of satisfaction is

$$0.701 \pm (1.96) \sqrt{\frac{(0.701)(1-0.701)}{380}}$$

= 0.655 to 0.747 i.e 66% to 75%. This implication of this result is that more than half of the respondents are satisfied with measures adopted by the Mbadinuju's administration in addressing the insecurity problem.

Secondly we asked the respondents: 'How satisfied are you with the efforts of Anambra state government under Chris Ngige in addressing the insecurity problem in the state?' The responses to this question are presented in table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Respondents' Level of Satisfaction with the Efforts of Government under Chris Ngige in addressing insecurity in Anambra state

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly satisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Highly dissatisfied</b>	
<b>45</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>378</b>

**Source: Field work Dec. 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the best (i.e highly satisfied).The proportions to be obtained will thus be interpreted along this line, that is, the higher the proportion, the more satisfied the people are. From the summary of responses provided in table 5.1, 5 had 45 responses, 4 had 97 responses, 3 had 53 responses, 2 had 40 responses and 1 had 143 responses. The number of valid responses to this question is 378. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of level of satisfaction is:

$$P_{2,10} = \frac{(45 \times 5) + (97 \times 4) + (53 \times 3) + (40 \times 2) + (143 \times 1)}{378 \times 5}$$

$$= \frac{995}{1890} = 0.526$$

A 95% confidence interval estimate for the level of satisfaction with the efforts of the police in responding to insecurity in the state is

$$0.526 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.526)(1-0.526)}}{378}$$

= 0.476 to 0.576 which is about 48% to 58%.

Finally, we asked the respondents: ‘How satisfied are you with the efforts of Anambra state government under Peter Obi in addressing the insecurity problem in the state?’ The responses to this question are presented in table 5.5.

Table 5.5. Respondents’ Level of Satisfaction with Efforts of Government under Peter Obi in Addressing Insecurity in Anambra state.

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly Satisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>High dissatisfied</b>	
<b>112</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>382</b>

**Source: Field work Dec. 2013**

As indicated in the table above, 1 had 112 responses, 2 had 78 responses, 3 had 44 responses, 4 had 27 responses and 5 had 76 responses. The number of the valid responses is 382. These scores when multiplied by their ratings of level of satisfaction is

$$P_{29} = \frac{(112 \times 5) + (78 \times 4) + (44 \times 3) + (27 \times 2) + (76 \times 1)}{382 \times 5}$$

$$= \frac{1134}{1910}$$

$$1910 = 0.594$$

A 95% confidence interval estimate for the level of satisfaction is

$$0.594 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.594)(1-0.594)}}{382}$$

= 0.545 to 0.643 i.e 55% to 64%

The above revelations about the efforts of the various regimes in addressing the insecurity problem is really important in the sense that it also once again brings to fore the impact of the governance processes on the problem of insecurity. When compared with the official crime statistics, the opinion of the respondents exposes a lot of issues. For example, in the crime statistics, the period of 1999- 2003 recorded the lowest number of crime. And it was during this period that the Bakassi boys operated in the state.

In conclusion, it is necessary to observe that the deficits caused by the governance processes in security management have deepened inequality in the access to security because an increasing number of persons and corporate bodies no longer rely on the state for security. In this regard, those who cannot afford to provide their own personal security by engaging the private security operators are left at the mercy of the criminal elements in the society.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE CITIZENS AND CHALLENGES OF INSECURITY IN ANAMBRA STATE

#### 6.1 Citizens' Insecurity in Anambra State

In the modern state system the citizens are the principal focus of the state's protection. It is in this sense that the primary and fundamental responsibility of every state is to provide security for its citizens and others living within the confines of its territorial boundary. When the state fails to fulfill this fundamental obligation, it implies that the state has failed in its own part of the social contract that subsists between the citizens and the state. To that end, the continued existence of the state becomes useless in the perception of the citizens who believe that it is no longer necessary for the state to continue to exist or enjoy the monopoly of the means of violence. This line of thought appears to have gained support among citizens of the modern state because of the principles of the social contract theory and the moral foundations of political obligation. According to the tenets of the social contract theory, 'it is contended that the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is the conditions for security and peace and the origins of the state itself lie in peoples' search for security' (Krahmann, 2010:8).

Insecurity has become a serious challenge with negative implications for human development and the state itself. The global nature of the challenge of citizen insecurity is demonstrated by the fact that international and regional organizations have been concerned with efforts on how to reduce the phenomenon of insecurity. Aria *et al* (2013;4) in relation to Latin America assert that 'citizen insecurity has negative impacts on human development. Crime, violence and fear severely limit the capabilities and freedoms of people, the way in which they organize their lives in society and the way they relate to the state and other institutions'.

As already pointed out in the preceding chapters, insecurity in Anambra state has attracted attention because of its character and the fact that it has been sustained by the inability of the governance of security to adequately to respond to insecurity in state. The impact of this on the citizens in Anambra state has manifested in different dimensions. It has affected the orientation of people living outside the state towards coming home and the philanthropic disposition of the people. In another vein, it also affected business and economic activities. Arising from this, it is not surprising that the issue has become a major public concern among the citizens. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the issue has also occupied the attention of political decision makers in the state who have fashioned out different strategies towards solving the problem.

Against the above background, this chapter is concerned with finding out how the people's perception of insecurity in Anambra state has affected their relationship with the state. It is our hypothesis that people's perception of insecurity in Anambra state has negatively affected their relationship with the state.

## **6.2 Insecurity and Social Life in Anambra State**

The disturbing incidence of insecurity in Anambra state has affected its citizens in different dimensions. A serious aspect of the impact of insecurity on the citizens in Anambra state is in the social context. The factors of insecurity in Anambra state such as Kidnapping, communal conflicts, armed robbery, youth violence etc have had negative impacts on interpersonal relationship and social interaction which form the basis of society. The social structure in Anambra state, especially at the micro level, has also been debased by the insecurity challenge. The norms and values that shape peoples' behavior and orientation within the society have been seriously affected. People no longer feel free to interact with others. Friendly disposition to strangers is now a thing of the past. In the same vein, philanthropic disposition both at the family and community level has gradually fading out.

Following the character and incidence of armed robbery and kidnapping in Anambra state, it is widely held that most wealthy indigenes of the state no longer

return home. Some of those who do return home most often surround themselves with police or private security men and, also, do not sleep in their home town. Out of fear they prefer to sleep in hotels. Against this background, we sought to find out from the respondents their opinion on the matter. So we posed a statement: ‘The perceived insecurity in Anambra state has affected the orientation of Anambra people living outside the state towards coming home’. The response to the statement is displayed in table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Respondents' perception of the impact of insecurity on the orientation of Anambra people outside the state towards coming home.

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	
<b>141</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>380</b>

**Source: Field work Dec. 2013**

The responses from the respondents are scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest (i.e strongly agree). Hence the larger the proportion obtained, the higher the level of agreement. The above table indicates that 5 had 141 responses, 4 had 126 responses, 3 had 30 responses, 2 had 32 responses and 1 had 51 responses. The valid number of responses is 380.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_3,12 &= \frac{(141 \times 5) + (126 \times 4) + (30 \times 3) + (32 \times 2) + (51 \times 1)}{380 \times 5} \\
 &= \frac{1434}{1900} = 0.755
 \end{aligned}$$

The 95% confidence interval estimate is

$$\begin{aligned}
 &0.755 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.755)(1-0.755)}}{380} \\
 &0.755 \pm 0.043 \\
 &0.712 \text{ to } 0.798
 \end{aligned}$$

The incident of insecurity is also said to have affected the philanthropic disposition of people in Anambra state. There have been oral reports of people who were kidnapped after they had publicly given financial support to either the church or community. As a result of this, it is widely held that because of the fear of insecurity, especially kidnapping and armed robbery, people no longer feel free in giving donations in the public. Some do not even honour invitation to functions that will expose them to these kidnapers and other miscreants who operate with impunity. In some cases, people do not like their financial contributions to either the church or community to be made public.

Arising from this, we decided to find out from our respondents their feeling about the matter. So we posed a statement: ‘The sense of insecurity has also affected the spirit of making public donations for development in Anambra state’. The responses to the statement as shown in table 6.2 indicate 5 has 154 responses, 4 had 119 responses, 3 had 19 responses, 2 had 57 responses and 1 had 33 responses.

Table 6.2: Respondents' perception of the impact of insecurity on philanthropic disposition among Anambra people

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	
<b>154</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>382</b>

**Source: Field work Dec. 2013**

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{3,13} &= \frac{(154 \times 5) + (119 \times 4) + (19 \times 3) + (57 \times 2) + (33 \times 1)}{382 \times 5} \\
 &= \frac{1450}{1910} = 0.759
 \end{aligned}$$

The 95% confidence interval estimate is

$$0.759 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.759)(1-0.759)}}{382}$$

$$0.759 \pm 0.043$$

$$0.716 \text{ to } 0.802$$

The implication of the above is that it is no longer mere speculation that insecurity has affected the spirit of making donations in Anambra state.

### **6.3 Insecurity and Economic Development in Anambra State**

In all societies, insecurity and violence are serious obstacles to human development. According to Clark (2013), insecurity affects the citizens 'because without peace there can be no development, and without development there can be no lasting peace'.

The issue of development which is a socio – economic cum political phenomenon has been in the front burner in Anambra state since the return of democracy. To solve the hydra headed problem of development, the different administrations that have governed the state within the period of this study have tried to put in place different approaches.

Following the transition to civil rule, the administration of Dr.Chinwoke Mbadinuju that took control of government from the military, introduced what was called Joint Action on Development. As part of the state integrated development programme launched by the administration in October 1999, the Joint Action on Development scheme, according to Ajagu (2013:259), 'is a combined effort of the state government, local government and the communities working in concert towards the provision of necessary development infrastructure, namely: roads, water and electricity. The scheme is planned to be simultaneous and sporadic'.

After the inauguration of Mr. Peter Obi as Governor in 2006, the administration adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as its development goals. This model was christened Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS) and the model sought to develop all sectors of the state simultaneously. The model was also meant to guide the actions and inactions of the government towards development. The ANIDS programme has tried in giving the state a new face lift in all sectors. Across all the communities in the state there are numerous projects in the following sectors: education, health, road construction, rural electrification,

housing and urban development. Yet, critics are of the view that the impact of the programme is not so much felt among the populace in the state. According to Chukwuemeka and Chukwujindu (2013:95), ‘five years of ANIDS implementation made minimal impact on the living conditions of people in the state. Poor implementation, failure to carry the people along and political interest are the impeding against the programme’.

Despite the efforts of the various governments in ensuring the economic development of the state and the seeming infrastructural transformation that have taken place in the state since 1999, it is still worrisome that the character of insecurity has remained alarming.

Arising from the above background, we decided to pose one basic statement to our respondents. ‘The state of insecurity has affected business and other economic activities in Anambra state’. The goal is to empirically investigate the view that the insecurity in the state is affecting its socio economic development. The responses to the question are presented in table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Respondents' perception of the impact of insecurity on business and economic activities in Anambra state

<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Highly Satisfi</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Undecided</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>High dissatisfied</b>	
<b>159</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>382</b>

Source: field work Dec. 2013

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{3,14} &= \frac{(159 \times 5) + (103 \times 4) + (30 \times 3) + (36 \times 2) + (54 \times 1)}{382 \times 5} \\
 &= \frac{1423}{1910} = 0.755
 \end{aligned}$$

The 95% confidence interval estimate is

$$0.745 \pm (1.96) \frac{\sqrt{(0.745)(1-0.745)}}{382}$$

= 0.745±0.044

i.e. 0.701 to 0.789

i.e. about 70 to 79% of the people stated that insecurity has adversely affected business and other economic activities in the state.

Another angle of the economic impact of insecurity on the citizens in Anambra state can be seen in what could be referred to as the political economy of the privatization of security. The first aspect of the political economy of privatization of security lies with the exploitative nature of private security companies. The scenario is that individuals following the inability of the state to remain the main guarantor of security have come to see security provision as a lucrative business. These individuals incorporate private security companies and hire guards who are posted to different locations to provide security for their clients. While these private security companies no doubt make money from their clients, they pay little or nothing to the security guards who are in the fields. The end result of this is that the security guards who most often are questionable characters in the society now engage in nefarious activities such harassing innocent citizens and collecting illegal toll fees from motor bike operators. These are seen as survival strategies by the security guards. The revelations from some of these security guards in Awka metropolis are quite shocking. While these private security companies collect as much as 50,000 from their clients, the security guards are paid not more than 15,000. In the Crescent where the researcher resides in Awka, the private security companies collects 40,000 every month per security guard from the management committee of the crescent, but the security guards receive 15,000 per month.

It is in the light of the above, that one begins to appreciate the encroachment of the vigilante groups in the provision of security to private individuals. The leaders of the vigilante groups now see providing security for individuals and corporate organizations as a lucrative way of making money.

The second aspect of the issue has to do with the corruption that has besieged the management of some gated communities, streets and estates. In most cases, the

crisis of probity and accountability over security levies collected from members of the communities, streets and estates by their management committees have generated further problems for the citizens.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter sets out to summarize the study; draw conclusions from the findings of the study and on that basis make recommendations.

#### 7.1 Summary

This study has examined the role of the state in the provision and maintenance of internal security in Anambra state. The study was basically informed by the problem caused by the increasing incidence and sophistication of insecurity in the state which is also characteristic of all other parts of the country. The character and incidence of insecurity in Anambra state have not only raised serious doubts about the role of the Nigerian state in protecting the lives and property of its citizens, but have seriously questioned the widely held view that the state is the guarantor of peace and security.

After an extensive review of the existing literature on the subject matter, this study was guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the factors responsible for the perceived character of insecurity in Anambra state?
2. How effective is governance in the maintenance of security in Anambra state?
3. How does the peoples' perception of insecurity in Anambra state affect their relationship with the state?

Three hypotheses were posed. To test these hypotheses, the study relied on primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources of data came from responses to likert scale structured questionnaire, interviews and observation technique. The survey instrument involved the distribution of 400 questionnaires out of which 384 were returned. The multi- stage sampling method was used in selecting the sample size. The secondary sources of data were derived from baseline data, published and unpublished reports, journal articles, textbooks, etc.

The study was also anchored on the theoretical assumptions of the Marxist theory of the post- colonial state. The theory afforded us the opportunity to appreciate related developments around the problem of insecurity in Anambra state, such as the high premium placed on power by the political elites who, for example, employed the services of largely unemployed youths in the wanton destruction of lives and property in the state in 2004, during the crisis between the Governor, Dr. Chris Ngige and his erstwhile political godfather, Chief Chris Uba.

In the presentation and analysis of data, we relied on a combination of both qualitative and quantitative tools of data analysis. Tables were used to present our field work results.

## **7.2: Conclusions**

In the course of this study, a number of findings were made. The major ones are stated concisely below. They are:

- The character of insecurity in Anambra state is denoted by five main factors namely: the disturbing level of crime particularly kidnapping, burglary/stealing and armed robbery; the excesses of non – state actors such as vigilante groups involved in security maintenance; the nature of violence used by operatives of the state security operatives, particularly the Police; the nature of inter and intra communal conflicts; and an emerging culture of armed violence perpetuated by various groups such as revenue collectors, officials of Anambra State Traffic Agency, motor park touts, members of MASSOB and restive indigenous youth associations.
- The post – colonial character of the state in Nigeria characterized by political exclusion, economic marginalization, social discrimination, corruption and high premium on power and politics has inadvertently contributed to the problem of insecurity in Anambra state.

- Unemployment, economic hardship, and the character of politics in the state are the prominent sources of insecurity in the state.
- Insecurity in the state is more pronounced in the urban areas than in the rural communities.
- Despite the character of insecurity in the state, residents of the state still believe that the security situation is good enough and as such they feel secured living in the state.
- The Police, the vigilante groups and the private guard companies are the main state structures that have managed the maintenance of security in Anambra state.
- Security structures and governance processes in the management of security did not conform to the laid down procedures but rather manifested instances of the interference of politics. This has negatively affected and sustained insecurity in several ways.
- Given the population of Anambra state which is 4,182,032 persons, the police personnel strength of 6195 is grossly inadequate and falls below the standard set by the United Nations Organization.
- Policing in Anambra state appears elitist, considering the wide gap that exists in the quality of policing available to the ordinary citizen in the state and that available to political office holders, their appointed allies and financial oligarchies.
- Private security companies in Anambra state have been seriously paralyzed in the management of security because of the encroachment of the vigilante groups in the provision of private security.
- The social structure of the society in Anambra state especially at the micro level has been debased

by the challenge of insecurity. This has affected the norms and values that shape peoples behaviour and orientation.

Having examined the impact of the character of the state on the phenomenon of insecurity, this study has made some major findings which have been concisely stated in the preceding section. Following these findings which are in line with the stated objectives of the study, we can safely make the following conclusions.

First, character of insecurity in Anambra state is a manifestation of the structural – weaknesses of the character of the Nigerian state. This assertion is supported by the fact that sources of insecurity in the state as evidenced in unemployment and an emerging culture of youth violence are basically linked to the inability of the government both at the federal and state level to generate the fundamental conditions necessary for human existence.

Secondly, the governance of security in Anambra state has not adequately responded to insecurity in the state. The reason for this has to do with the politicization of security structures and the governance processes involved in the management of security. The non adherence to known regulations in the management of the security sector and the interference of political interest rather than solve the insecurity problem have aggravated and sustained it.

Thirdly, citizen's perception of insecurity in Anambra state has negatively affected their relationship with the state. It is along this line that we can appreciate the present practice where people no longer feel safe to invest in the state. The fear of insecurity has also affected the philanthropic disposition of most citizens.

### **7.3: Recommendations**

This study has revealed that there is an urgent need to tackle the problem of insecurity in not only Anambra state but the entire Nigeria. To this end, a number

of decisive measures should be taken in order to deal with the phenomena of insecurity. These measures are highlighted and discussed below.

- **Engaging the traditional institution in Security Management.**

There is need for a departure from the present practice whereby it appears that the traditional institution is engaged in security management just for the purpose of scoring political goals. In practical terms, the traditional institution both at the town and village level must be adequately mobilized to complement government efforts in curbing insecurity. To achieve this, the Igwe – in- Council and different village heads should develop a data base of all resident members of their communities. This will also help in intelligence gathering at the community level.

- **Technological Advancement in Crime Management.**

As presently practiced, the lack of trained personnel and modern digital technology has remained a serious impediment in curbing crime in Anambra state. Following the technological advancement in all sectors of human endeavour including criminal activities, there is need to engage experts in crime detection and also provide them with modern digital technology for surveillance and crime detection.

- **Equity And Reorientation in Policing**

The present structure of policing which is skewed so much in favour of the ruling class and the financial oligarchies has to be reversed. There is also the need to bring the Police- population ratio to meet the acceptable international standard. On the other hand, there it is also necessary to develop strategies on how to reorientate the Nigerian Police Force. The Police should no longer be seen as a dumping ground for semi illiterates. The Nigerian Police Force should strengthen its research and training base as part of the reorientation exercise.

### **Effective Intelligence Gathering**

The incidence of insecurity in Anambra state has exposed the lack of intelligence gathering on the part of the Police and other security agencies in the State. There is need to adopt effective means of intelligence gathering as this will help to curb the incidence of insecurity in the state.

- **Reforming the Security Governance Processes**

There is need to reform the governance processes in the security sector to ensure transparency and accountability on the part of state and non state actors. The present practice where the annual government grant for security maintenance to the different communities is seen as part of the largesse coming from the government cannot enhance security in the state. There should also be measures to hold non state actors such as private security providers and management team of street/ estates neighborhood security associations accountable for their actions.

The present structure of the Police Force should be reviewed to be in line with the tenets of true federalism. A situation where a state Governor does not have control over the police in his state is not good for the system.

- **Reforming the Vigilante Services**

There is need to strengthen the vigilante system and ensure that the rules guiding their formation, operation and supervision are strictly followed. In doing this the government should also regulate the use of the operational vehicles and other equipments provided for the vigilante groups. As presently constituted the vigilante groups are seen as private armies of the different traditional rulers and the Presidents of town unions and also as part of the ruling party in the state. There is urgent need to deviate from this practice by regulating the mode of selection into the vigilante groups. And also ensure that individuals do not form and operate personal vigilante groups under any form of disguise.

- **Youth Empowerment/ Job Creation**

As evidence has shown earlier in this study, unemployment remains the critical source of insecurity in the state. To check the tide of the emerging culture of youth violence in the state, there is need to empower the increasing population of unemployed youths in the state. To this end, government should provide the enabling environment for private investors to create factories and industries which will provide employment for the youths. In another dimension the government should establish vocational skills acquisition centres and also provide soft loans to those who pass through such training centres.

- **Adequate Funding of Vigilante Services.**

There is need for government to provide adequate funds for the vigilante services. The present practice whereby the vigilante groups are given periodic grants appear inadequate and exposes the group to all form of manipulation by wealthy members of the communities.

- **Taming the Menace of Corruption**

Experience and available statistics have shown that corruption remains the greatest impediment to development not only in Anambra state but the entire Nigeria. The aforementioned recommendations can only yield results in a system not fraught with corrupt and sharp practices. To this end all hands must be on deck to curtail and eliminate corruption from all facets of life in the state.

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