

**NON-VIOLENT APPROACH TO INSURGENCY
IN NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA**

BY

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CERTIFICATION

I, ABALOGU, DIVINE MADUKA, with Registration Number 2015097001P, hereby certify that this Dissertation is original and has been written by me. It is a record of my research and has not been submitted before in part or full for any other diploma or degree of this university or any other institution or any previous publication.

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APPROVAL PAGE

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my Dearest and Lovely Wife, Dr. (Mrs.) Uche Ifeoma Nkem Abalogu and also to my lovely Daughters, Miss Chisom Emmanuela Favour Abalogu and Miss Ifeoma Amanda Ebube Abalogu, and Miss Ifechukwu Chizitere Angela Abalogu.

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Fig. 1: Map of Niger Delta Region



Source:<https://www.google.com/search?q=map+of+niger+delta+region&source=lnms&tbn>

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SAP	–	Structural Adjustment Programme
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
MOSOP	–	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People.
SPDC	–	Shell Petroleum Development Company.
EBA	–	Egbesu Boys of Africa.
SEA	–	Supreme Egbesu Assembly
TAB	–	The Atangbala Boys
NDV	–	Niger Delta Vigilante
NDPVF	–	Niger Delta People Volunteer Force
NDDF	–	Niger Delta Freedom Fighter
IYC	–	Ijaw Youth Congress
JTF	–	Joint Task Force
PDP	–	People’s Democratic Party
NDPVF	–	Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force
NDV	–	Niger Delta Vigilante
DSP	–	Deputy Superintendent of Police
MEND	–	Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta.
INC	–	Ijaw National Congress.
FNDIC	–	Federation of Niger Delta
COSEDEDCS	–	Council on Social and Economic Development of Coastal States.
MOU	–	Memorandum of Understanding
NDPCRC	–	Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee.
NDDC	–	Niger Delta Development Company
FGN	–	Federal Government of Nigeria.
UNDP	–	United Nation Development Programme
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
RCN	–	Revolutionary Council of Nigeria.

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ABSTRACT

Insurgency and its consequent security challenges in the Niger Delta region have become a matter of global concern. This insurgency is traceable to the nature and activities of the oil companies operating in the region. This has badly affected the economy of Nigeria as the Niger Delta people, mostly the youths, have resorted to both conventional and non conventional approaches to express their frustrations. Illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping of expatriates, pipe line vandalization and so on, have become regular issues in the Niger Delta region. Several attempts by the federal government to address the issue of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region not only have not yielded any positive result but appear to have aggravated the situation. This is particularly so as the Niger Delta people claimed that not only that the federal government have failed to address the problem of poverty, environmental degradation, unemployment and marginalization resulting from the activities of the oil companies in the region, but also have resorted to military expeditions to suppress and intimidate the people. The study adopts Karl Marx's theory of social conflict, which emphasizes class distinction in the society and which is possibly a major cause of insurgency in the Niger Delta region, and frustration aggression theory which looked at Niger Delta insurgency as emanating from the feeling of frustration by the people. This study discovered that insurgency in Niger Delta persisted most probably because approaches adopted earlier to address the issues were inappropriate which often lead to more conflicts. The study, therefore, recommended Mahatma Ghandi's non-violence approach in which the government, oil companies and Niger Delta people will engage on a sincerely tripartite dialogue with the hope to engender infrastructural development, employment, peace and sustainable development in the region. The study employed both secondary and primary method of data collection. The data employed were analyzed using phenomenological approach.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The Niger Delta region is widely known for its rich oil and gas reserves which contribute enormously to the economic prosperity of the Nigerian nation. The region has some unique characteristics which tend to make development difficult. According to

Akinbuwa (2008), it covers an area of about 70,000 Square kilometers and is noted for its peculiar and difficult terrain. The whole area is transverse and crisscrossed by a large number of streams, swamps, canals and creeks. These peculiarities of the region attracted the attention of even the colonial masters during the colonial era. Consequently, the British colonial government set up the Sir Henry Willink's Commission to recommend the best strategies for the development of the region, which has the most difficult terrain in the country. When the Commission turned in its report in 1958, according to Ann (2007), it specifically recommended that the Niger Delta region deserves special developmental attention and should therefore be made a special area to be developed directly by the Federal Government. It is pertinent to state that this was before the discovery of crude oil which is abundant in the region and later became the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. According to Abati (2009), prior to the discovery of crude oil in commercial quantities, people thrived on their traditional vocations of farming and fishing for which they depended on land, watershed and natural resources that were highly productive. However, since the commencement of oil exploration activities, the people have suffered environmental degradation, gross neglect and deprivation over the years despite its contribution to the nation's revenue base. The people in the region believe that the oil producing communities do not benefit as much as many other non-producing areas. According to Ikporukpo (2003), the type of federation operated in Nigeria is such that Government owns all oil and land resources; this removes the right of ownership from the indigenes. Obi (2010) also states that petroleum Act provides that "the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any land shall be vested in the state. In section 2, the Act granted the federal oil minister the sole right to

grant oil mining lease to oil companies. This feeling of exclusion, dispossession and disappointment according to Abayomi, Atilade, Matswamgbe, Onwumah and Lawrence (2005) were further reinforced by the progressive downward revision of the derivation principle of revenue allocation, which effectively reduced the 'share' of federal allocation to oil-producing ethnic minority states from 50 per cent in 1966 to 3 per cent in mid-1990s. In 1999, partly in response to the protests from the region, and to lend legitimacy to the new democratic government, the allocation was raised to 13 per cent. The revenue from oil is shared among all the 36 states of the federation and local government areas with very little consideration for those areas from where the oil is exploited. Governments renewed commitment to addressing the age long neglect and above concerns of the Niger Delta region led to the establishment of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1993 and later the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 with specific mandate on infrastructural development. This is outside the interventions put in place from independence. However, the people were not satisfied with the pace and quality of developmental projects, coupled with increasing environmental and ecological damage suffered from a number of oil drilling malaise and decided to form groups for peaceful protests. Gradually, the rather peaceful political struggle for resource control degenerated into violent agitations by the various militant insurgent groups that emerged to take over the struggle. In articulating the effects of violence in its report of 2002 the World Health Organization stated that, the main victims of the crisis are the youths, adolescents and young adults. Developmental goals of nations can hardly be achieved in hostile and volatile environments. Due to the lingering crisis in the region, thousands of workers have lost

their jobs with the oil companies because of decreased production and harsh operating environment. The World Health Organization states that Pipelines vandalization has worsened the problem of spillages, environmental pollution, degradation and further depletion of farmlands (2002). Developmental processes have been stalled due to the unfriendly investment environment which scares away potential investors and infrastructural improvement. The crisis has led to increased poverty, crime rate and insecurity as well as sharp drop in production of oil and the nation's revenue base.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Insurgency and its consequent security challenges in the Niger Delta Region have become a matter of Global Concern. This Insurgency is traceable to the nature and activities of the oil companies operating in the region which includes; shell BP, Mobil, Chevron, Agip and Elf and the attitude of the government towards it. The activities of the oil companies in the region has polluted the environment, and caused a lot of environmental degradation in their region. Sequel to this, their expectation of seeing the oil as a blessing to them has turn to be a curse as the oil companies and the government have not really done any meaningful thing to assuage the problems caused as a result of oil drilling in the region. This has led mostly the youths to engage in activities like insurgency, militancy, and kidnapping to force the oil companies and the government to see to their problems. This insurgency has badly affected the economy of the nation as insurgency groups have resorted to both conventional and non-conventional approaches to express their frustrations. Illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping of expatriates, pipe line vandalization, have become regular issues in the Niger Delta Region. Several attempts by the Federal Government to address the issue of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region have not failed to yield any positive result, but appear to have

aggravated the situation on the ground. This is particularly so as the Niger Delta people claim that not only have the Federal Government failed to address the problem of poverty, environmental degradation, unemployment and marginalization resulting from the activities of the oil Companies in the region, but also have resorted to carrying out violent military expeditions to suppress and intimidate the people. This study adopted the socio-conflict theory of Karl Marx, which emphasis class distinction in the society and which is possibly a major cause of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region. It also adds to this the frustration-aggression theory, which looked at Niger Delta Insurgency as emanating from the feeling of frustration by the people.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

In view of the enormous crisis in Niger Delta Region which have lasted so long, and the various attempts made by different individuals, groups and government to ameliorate them but have proved deficient due to its violent nature, this work is:

A. To portray with the tool of reason, from historical records, and from contemporary occurrences, what insurgency in Niger Delta Region is all about. It will attempt to identify the causes of insurgency in Niger Delta Region, the effects of these violent acts of insurgency, and the previous approaches towards curbing it and a more prudent possible solution towards ending insurgency in Nigeria.

B. To shed more light on why the already applied solutions have not succeeded. It will survey the psychological stance of insurgency in Niger Delta Region.

C. To equally set out and expose that combating insurgency in Niger Delta Region with violent or forceful approach is never the best solution to combat it, but will rather continue to ignite the wild fire behind insurgency in Niger Delta Region.

D. To look into the previous solutions to curbing insurgency in Niger Delta by various personalities, authors and governments and then will proffer calculated, systematic and practical solution to ending Insurgency in Niger Delta Region as to deal with the root causes. It will introduce imbibing the culture of peace in place of violence and insurgency rampant in Niger Delta. This study intends to prove that nonviolence when inculcated into the lives of the Niger Deltans, government and others will persuade them to tolerate one another, adhere to justice by respecting people's right, and work for the common good of all citizens. This in turn will eradicate the act of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region. This work is set out to map out strategies in which the frustration of the Niger Delta people can be addressed thereby curbing their aggression.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This study focuses on the act of insurgency in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. The region according to Hogasn (2013) is considered to be located within Nine Coastal Southern Nigerian States which includes: All Six States from the South South geopolitical zone, one state (Ondo) from South West geopolitical Zone and two states (Abia and Imo) from South East geopolitical zone. It consists of present day Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers State, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross Rivers State, Edo, Imo and Ondo States. It poses vividly that the worst form of violence is when it graduates to insurgency: Continuous destruction of life and properties. This work feature the activities of Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND),

the Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM) and the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), as insurgency groups that carry out acts of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region. It also looks into the activities of government, groups and individuals in curbing insurgency in Niger Delta.

This study asserts that violence is not the best option in the achievement of any peaceful and conducive environment in Niger Delta Region. This study rather proffers a better and more positive approach towards solving the problem non-violent as against the acts of violence of the insurgent groups in Niger Delta Region and the use of force by the government in combating insurgency in Niger Delta. Non-violence adherence by both parties will certainly give a lasting solution than current violence and force being employed in the region.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of the message of love, truth, non-injury, non-retaliation and non-violence at all cost directed towards the Niger Delta Region with every sincerity cannot be overemphasized. For any nation to make meaningful progress and provide a conducive and comfortable environment for her inhabitants, her political, social, economic and moral life must be based on love of humanity.

Since the topic under study is about insurgency in Niger Delta Region and the proffering of lasting and positive solutions which anchors on non-violence, it is expected to be of good help towards the reformation of the entire fabrics of Niger Deltan's life and the government, and promote welfare of the Niger Delta Region.

The research result will also motivate researchers and readers to unveil the hidden and silent means to solve the problem of insurgency in the Niger Delta region and other related conflicts in other places; replace the violent option with non-violence means. The knowledge gained in this study will contribute to the creation and sustenance of a lasting peace in the Niger Delta Region. The Nigeria government, students, social change agents and peace builders will seriously benefit from this study as it will give them confidence and insight that non-violence is the best option to curb insurgency.

1.6 Methodology

The nature and purpose of any research determines the sources and methodology of data collection. This research work is empirical and historical. It adopts the secondary means of data collection hence previous works of both indigenous and foreign scholars that wrote specifically on relevant issues about Insurgency in Niger Delta Region in Journals, magazines, newspapers, books of readings, personal authored books, lecture notes, seminar papers, symposia and internet materials will be consulted as secondary sources of data for reference purposes. These works will make valid and will give credence to the work.

This study also employed the primary sources (urban-ethnographic) of data collection which includes; personal communication or interview of key informants or resource persons which was conducted on the subject matter at hand. A follow up approach involved the use of observation as another primary data that was be systematically and objectively employed during documentary analyses of secondary and primary data. Verification of data was also helped ascertain the authenticity of data collected, studied, analyzed and applied to the researched. The data employed was analyzed and interpreted using phenomenological

approach owing to the fact the researcher presented the issue of insurgency the way it is without passing any judgment, biases or condemning anybody; rather the researcher only suggested a more profitable and peaceful approach in curbing insurgency in the Niger Delta Region and a more better approach to the insurgents in achieving their aim.

Finally, this work also applied the social conflict theory by Karl Marx and the theory of peace process projected by Ibeanu (2006), as means of gaining insight and building peace in the Niger Delta Region to displace and resolve the insurgency which appears to be in vogue in the region.

1.7.1 Definition of Terms

In order to properly place this dissertation in a clear understandable parlance, certain basic terms that will be constantly in use throughout this study will be contextually defined. These terms includes: Non-violence, Approach, and Insurgency.

Non-violence:

The researcher defines non-violence as the absence of physical violence against human beings. Gene (2012) describes it as the personal practice of being harmless to self and others under every condition. It comes from the belief that hurting people, animals or the environment is unnecessary to achieve an outcome and refers to a general philosophy of abstention from violence based on moral, religious or spiritual principles. It is the policy of using peaceful methods not force to bring about political or social change. It is the act of changing something, an idea or policy without causing any harm or damage. It is the opposite of violence.

1.7.2 Approach

According to Hornby (2005), approach is to come near to something in distance of time. It means to start dealing with a problem or task in a particular way. A way of dealing with somebody or something; a way of doing or thinking about something such as a problem or a task.

1.7.3 Insurgency:

Hall (2001) defined insurgency as “a rebellion against authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents (p. 246). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (cited by Valerie, 2002) defines insurgency as “the unlawful use or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual committed against person or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (p.31). Gray (2000) sees insurgency as a deliberate creation of terror by killing people, maiming others and injecting fear into the rest, in order to force and effect a change in the society to the tone or favour of the insurgents or their sponsors. Levin (2006) asserts that it is “the Unlawful use, or threatened use of violence by a group or individual... committed against person or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political, social, or personal objectives” (p. 6). This study, adopts the FBI’s definition as cited by Valerie (2000) which defines insurgency as “the Unlawful use or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual committed against persons or properties to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (p.31).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The focus in this Chapter is to carry out a systematic review on related and relevant literature which helps to establish that the subject of this study is original and researchable. It will also posit that there is a genuine gap to be filled in scholarly research by the present study. The review shall be considered under three principal headings; namely: Conceptual Frame work, Theoretical Frame work and Empirical Studies.

2.1. Conceptual Frame work

The Conceptual frame work of this research shall treat two basic issues in respect of the topic and they are insurgency and non-violence.

2.1.1. Insurgency

The need to seek a clear definition of insurgency can never be overemphasized. More often than not, people ask question as to why ever being perturbed regarding determining a clear cut definition of Insurgency. Hamilton (1998) in his attempt to make an impact affirmed that:

Insurgency is a condition subversive political activity, civil rebellion; revolt irregular forces are formed and engage in actions which may include guerilla warfare, that are designed to weaken or overthrow that government or occupying power (p.5).

As a part of this definition, the term counter Insurgency was described “according to Hamilton (1998) as “the entire scope of actions (military, police, economic, psychological, etc) taken by or in conjunction with the existing government of a nation to counteract, contain, or defeat an Insurgency” (p.5).

In the same vein, the US military settled on a document in 1980 as (cited by Hamilton, 1998) described Insurgency as:

A Law intensity conflict which is a limited Policio-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and Insurgency. Insurgency is generally confined to a geographic area and often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence (p.6).

In order to avoid misconception, Beckett (2004) opines that, it is important not to confuse the term Insurgency with other terms. Terms that may often be confused with Insurgency are: Subversion, Coup d’ e’tat, terrorism, guerrilla war, revolution, and even civil war. In order to expose the streamline difference, Beckett (2004). Used the English translation of the Latin word “Insurgere” to describe Insurgency. He viewed that Insurgency is recognized as having to do with internal political revolution perpetrated by certain group publicly acknowledged as being non belligerent.

Galula (cited by Hoffman, 2004) describes “Insurgency as a revolt against an established government not reaching the proportions of a full-scale revolution” (p.64). Under International Law, Hamilton (1998) consideres Insurgency to be “a rebellion not recognized as a belligerency or civil war” (p.13). He averts that “it is a term used in International law

that describes an uprising against a constituted government that falls short of revolution, rebellion or civil war” (p.14). Galulu cited by O’neillion (2009) wrote that counter-insurgency warfare is considered to be one of the first Western works to establish a hierarchy that attempts to explain insurgency as a separate concept, a part of political revolution and war. He went further by listing three stages of this hierarchy: revolution, Plot (Coup d’etat), and Insurgency. He points out that these terms embody the elements of revolutionary war, which is an explosive upheaval that can be better explained after the fact. He posits thus:

An Insurgency is protracted struggles conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the over throw of the existing order. To be sure, it can no more be predicted than a revolution, in fact, its beginnings are so vague that to determine exactly when an Insurgency starts is a difficult legal, political, and historical problem An Insurgency is usually slow to develop and is not an accident, for in an Insurgency, Leaders appear and then the masses are made to move (p.4).

To him, Insurgency is a civil war. But it is not clear whether or not he replaced the notion of civil war with Insurgency, or if he believes that insurgency is a growing discontent that leads to civil war. The criticism of his view is that he never expands upon the definition of Insurgency, but he only speculates on just how Insurgency differs from revolution.

In expanding the concept of Insurgency more, Paget (2001) states that:

Insurgency is a kind of armed rebellion against a government where, “the rebels have the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the populace; the methods that they adopt to achieve their aim of overthrowing the government may include guerrilla

warfare, but Insurgency may equally resort to civil disobedience, sabotage or terrorism Tactic (p.14).

Scott (2013) asserts that the term “insurgency refers to efforts to obtain political goals by an organized and primarily indigenous group (or groups) using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political techniques” (p.5). He went further to state that this definition excludes “sudden Coups, short-lived outbreaks of violence, or invasion by non-indigenous guerrilla forces” (p.5).

Scott makes a distinction between “insurgency and irregular warfare by saying that irregular warfare refers to only military activities, whereas insurgency is irregular warfare plus politics” (p.10). Scott develops the idea of insurgency around two political themes: protracted war strategy and indigenous movement, which he says is unexplainable. According to Scott, there is no real way of determining just when a conflict becomes protracted, and there is no specific way to determine how great a degree of outside intervention is compatible with a group being considered primarily indigenous. Scott (2013) believes that “without these two ingredients, there can be Insurgency. Insurgency is then reduced to a revolutionary political and social phenomenon”(p.10).

Further more, Kitson (2004) in his explanation of insurgency breaks it into two distinct parts. The first part represents pure tactics and is called “the Handling of Information”. The second part, entitled Direction, Units and Equipment, explains the logistical details needed for effectively countering and Insurgency. According to him, as a final phase in the overall scope of revolutionary guerrilla war:

Armed Insurgents comes out into the open and fight the forces of the government by conventional methods, but in the earliest stages the war is fought by people who strike at a time and place of their own choosing and then disappear. Sometimes their disappearance is achieved by the physical process of movement into an area of thick cover such as a jungle, and at other times by merging into population (p.95).

Kitson's treatment of the tactical aspect of Insurgency was accepted as a kind of phenomenon. He explains this time as a period of fixed beliefs about conventional warfare, and the focus was solely on a new kind of war for the atomic age. Because overt military response was unsuccessful as seen in some countries, the response needed was a more subtle, covert method in dealing with Insurgents.

In contributing to the study of Insurgency Thompson (quoted by Hamilton, 1998) asserts that Insurgency is not a people's revolutionary war. Using government intelligence figures, Thompson says that by 1965, the number of Insurgents and their supporters active in the world never exceeded one percent of the total population. He then concludes that Insurgency was not qualified to be a people's revolutionary war, but only a revolutionary form of warfare designed to enable a very small ruthless minority to gain control over the people.

Thompson's working definition and explanation is as follows:

Insurgency is a political-military conflict waged against a specific faction(s) implementing irregular military actions in support of a unified political outcome, short of revolution and civil war. While regular forces may be employed, irregular

operations rooted in political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations, play an integral, if not primary, role in the outcome. Political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations, play an integral, if not primary, role in the outcome. Political subversion, selective terrorism, and guerrilla operations are then tactics that, when combined, may or may not represent an Insurgency. Insurgency is a strategic political development that implements these tactics as a means to sustain itself until further development can occur. Consequently, an Insurgency, as a type of war, may lead to and be part of a large conventional conflict, revolution, or civil war. (p.21).

What's important to note is that when Thompson spoke of insurgency, he spoke directly about communist Insurgency, and thus communist subversion. He believed that Insurgency was a unique tool of the communists. However, his working definition does have universal qualities that set it apart as a separate strategic concept from revolution and civil war.

He identifies three major elements as tools in an Insurgency: Political Subversion, selective terrorism, and guerilla operations. Any other aspect, political or military, that might be attributed to an Insurgency will fall under one of these elements. Thompson divides an Insurgency into two phases. The first phase begins with subversive activity. If the subversion is successful enough to continue the Insurgency, but not successful enough to achieve the objective by subversion alone, then Insurgency moves to a second phase: open Insurgency or the armed struggle. The second phase consists of the use of guerrilla operations combined with terrorist activities and will typically result in a protracted struggle.

Burke (2004), in his own contribution, has this to say on Insurgency:

There are multiple ways of defining Insurgency, and all are subjective. Most scholars defines Insurgency as “the use or threat of serious violence” to advance some kind of “cause”. Some state clearly the kinds of group (sub-national, non-state) or cause (political, ideological, and religious) to which they refer. Others merely rely on the instinct of most people when confronted with innocent civilians being killed or maimed by men armed with firearms or other weapons. None is satisfactory, and grave problems with the use of the term persist. Insurgency is after all, a tactic (p.22).

The bone of contention here lies on the fact that whether one chooses to call insurgency “militant groups” or “Terrorist group” and refers their mode of operation as military or Terrorism; Insurgency is all about the tactics used, and is limited within a state or country and not that which is being projected by the culprits. An insurgent group can end up becoming terrorism; besides, a single individual can create high magnitude of crisis or violence in a society without even belonging to any insurgent cell. Insurgent groups as mentioned before is mainly sub-state group that are agitators and targets majorly state projects, the military and civil service facilities. However, once they end up inducing fear through violent means; they become insurgents.

Lutz brought out another psychological stance in examining insurgents in their definition of insurgency irrespective of the fact that his definition is lacking in the area of the motives and aims of insurgents. Thus Lutz (2008) declared:

Insurgency involves political aims and motive. It is violent or threatens violence. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience or

government that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable group. The violence involves a non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both; the acts of violence are designed to create power in a situation in which power previously had been lacking (p.9).

This definition however introduces the fact that ingests can be lovers of “power”, seeking power since they cannot achieve it through candid or normal channel. The power which may be either political or otherwise. Thus, some insurgents are simply “power drugged assassins and vandals”. This according to Lutz, majorly relates to state perpetrated insurgency by political leaders and individual persons suffering from one psychologically related ailment or the other.

Finally, it is pertinent to note that insurgency is, first and foremost a method and it is used in times of peace and conflict as Morris (2005) points out that, an insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. This definition, does not consider the morality of the conflict, or the different viewpoints of the government and the insurgents. It is focused more on the operational aspects of the types of actions taken by the insurgents and the counter-insurgents. It focuses on the type of violence employed (unlawful) towards specified ends (political, religious or ideological).

This characterization fails to address the argument from moral relativity that “one man’s insurgent is another man’s freedom fighter. In essence, this objection to a suitable definition submits that while violence maybe “unlawful” in accordance with a victim’s statutes, the

cause served by those committing the acts may represent a positive good in the eyes of neutral observers.

Bernard (1994) wrote that, “revolutionary warfare” (guerrilla warfare plus political action) might be a more accurate term to describe small wars such as insurgencies. To him, Insurgency shared the property of an attempt to disrupt the central government by means considered illegal by that government. Tomes (2004) offer an indirect definition of Insurgency, drawn from Trinquieer’s definition of counter insurgency: an interlocking system of actions; political, economic, psychological, military that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.

Metz (2007), observes that past models of insurgency do not perfectly fit modern Insurgency, in that current instances are far more likely to have a multinational or transnational character than those of the past. Several insurgencies may belong to more complete conflicts, involving “third forces (armed groups which affects the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), who may be distinct from the core insurgents and the recognized government. While overt state sponsorship becomes less common, sponsorship by transnational groups is more common. The nesting of Insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure. He suggests that contemporary insurgencies have far more complex and shifting participation than traditional wars, where discrete belligerents seek a clear strategic victory.

2.1.2. Non-violence

Non-violence means so many different things for different people depending particularly on their religious convictions and attitudes in life. Odey (2005) believes that:

for some people, “nonviolence is a dream which is at best too idealistic and impractical and at worst deceitful, enslaving and suicidal. It expects a person to love his real enemy and to pray for those who persecute him. It expects a person to avoid harm even in the midst of extreme violence. It promises what it cannot deliver and in the process perpetuates the suffering and often the death of the oppressed by a systematic suppression of their power of resistance (p.216).

According to Gandhi (1954), another group of people see “non-violence as the sentimental expression of the weak that would, under normal circumstances, resort to violence if they had the strength to do so in order to demand for their right. But since they do not have that strength, they hide their weakness in non-violent moral passion” (p.115).

Notwithstanding all the above idea of people on Non-violence, Gregg (2004), asserts that:

non-violence is the best method that could be used for the resolution of social conflicts. He neither sees it as cowardly nor as the only means available to the weak because they have no alternative. He admires nonviolence and those who advocate and practice it. However, his problem is that there are cases and circumstances under which it simply does not and cannot work. In such cases and circumstances, he will that it may not only be wise to use violence but morally imperative to do so (p.242).

Bertrand (1968) viewed that “nonviolence is a form of protest which its success or failure depends on the goodness or otherwise of those against whom it is used. He contended that nonviolence certainly has an important sphere” (p.192).

Louis (1954) conceded conditional success to nonviolence. He contended that “there were three factors which made the nonviolence struggle led by Gandhi in South Africa a Success” (p.49). The first of these factors was ;

Gandhi himself who neither cared for sensual pleasures, for comfort, for praise nor for promotion. His indefatigable determination to do what he believed to be right made him a dangerous and an uncomfortable person to deal with, because his body which could always be conquered gave his enemies little purchase over his soul” (p.49).

The second factor was “the heroism of the Indian men and women who stuck to his nonviolent action in South Africa” (p.49).“ The third factor concluded Fischer, was the president under whom Gandhi led the struggle, was not a dictator”(p.49).

To Williams (1986):

non-violence acts as a sort of moral “JiuJitsu” on the opponent, contending that when one person attacks another with physical violence, and the victim hits back, the violent response of the victim will give the attacker a certain reassurance, moral support and a stimulus to go ahead. However, when the victim refuses to respond with counter violence, but at stake, the attacker’s first reaction might be that the victim is afraid of him. However, the victims readiness to endure his attack without showing sign of fear and hatred will soon put him in an awkward position, and this is called non-violence (p.44).

Odey (2005) asserts that:

the concept of non-violence he viewed that it is a Japanese art of self-defense from which Judo was developed. In physical “JitJitsu” he who is able to maintain equanimity and equilibrium in a duel will gain the upper hand over his opponent because he will be in a better position to destroy the physical balance of the opponent. Reducing to its essentials, therefore, non-violence is to make the opponent lose his moral balance (p.96).

Gandhi (1963) concluded that:

non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind, rooted in the basic principle of Hindu, Islam and Christianity. In the physical non-killing, non-assaulting and non-oppression of others with physical, militant actions; hatred, is all wrong at any time. Non-violence involves one giving up his physical life in the face of violence rather than bow to evil or commit violence on others in order to fulfill selfish desire (p.77).

Hornby (2005) says “Non-violence is the policy of using peaceful method, not force, to bring about political or social change” (p.944).

According to Sharp (1973):

non-violence resistances are designed to avoid this trap by absolutely refusing to be drawn into a violent confrontation. It requires tremendous courage, self-control, as well as a willingness to endure pain and sometimes even death. It is the strategy for countering the power of violent force with the power of the integrative system (p.64).

Ignatius (2001), in his own idea, says that:

non-violence is a miniature chronicle of this rather mysterious man who sacrificed everything, endured every trial and braved every obstacle in order to teach the world that the doctrine of tit for tat is a doctrine of dark despair; that a battle which needs destructive weapons to win cannot appeal to the heart of men and that any venture which cannot win the heart of men carries the seed of its own destruction (p.130).

To sharp (1973):

Non-violence action is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing or refusing to do certain things without using physical violence. As a technique, therefore, non-violence is not passive; it is inaction. It is action that is non-violence (p.64).

Worhrle (1993) views that:

Non-violence is a means of breaking the cycle of violence; it is moral of social change which is neither passive nor violent; it requires human commitment and not military might and it seeks to change but not to completely destroy relationships. Employing nonviolence entails breaking from our traditional patterns of resolving conflicts: patterns which distribute power to the strongest and the most violent (p.209).

King (1967) agreed with Worhrle's view when he states that non-violence is the persistent and determined application of peaceable power to offenses against the community (p.184).

Although an alternative is needed that embodied the idea of it being more than the absence of violence, the term nonviolence has a rich tradition, is widely used and, at present, remains the best alternative. For some writers and activists like Cumming (1985) “the hyphenated nonviolence emphasizes the absence of violence” (p.9), whereas nonviolence, without the hyphen refers to according to Mark (2002) “the broader philosophy of social change and human relationship” (p.12). This thesis follows this convention by using non-violence for the former broader meaning but non-violence when discussing social change and human relationship using quotes from other sources which retain the hyphen. Applying these concepts to the beliefs and practice of non-violence in Nigeria makes an appreciable view of the concept of non-violence.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

This theoretical framework is based on the view point that non-violence and its practice interacts with social dynamics of identity, role relationships and ideological pursuit. Under this, consideration will be given to theory on functionalism, theories on conflict, interactionalism, frustration-aggression, and anomie. The choice of these theories is informed by the needs to ascertain what scholars have written in relation to nonviolence and insurgency, and its role in curbing insurgency in Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. These theories will broaden the understanding of the insurgency in Niger Delta Region and help to have a clearer understanding of how non-violence can help to assuage Insurgency in Niger Delta region.

2.2.1. Functionalism

Functionalism is a sociological theory adopted by Emile Durkheim and refined by Talcott Parsons. According to Haralambos and Holborn (2008);

functionalism viewed society as a system: that is as a set of interconnected parts which together form a whole basic unit of analysis in society and its various parts are understood primarily in terms of their relationship to the whole” (p.856.).

According to Ogunbameru (2008), “the focus of functionalist theory is macro-sociological with institutions and structures existing in society as a whole. This is the origin of the structural parts of functional approach (p.22). He went further to state that “the different part of each society contributes to the operation or functioning of the system as a whole. This is the functional part of the structural functionalist approach”(p.22). Durkheim (1965) believes that religion is for practical purposes true and its reality is found in the function that religion performs in the society. Dzurgba (cited in Abalogu, 2015) articulates the social functions of religion. It performs unity, harmony, solidarity and integration among people in any given society. Similarly, religion provides an ethical system which governs human behavior, relationships, institution, interactions, and individual actions. The idea of serving as an instrument of social control, concerned with the collective and corporate existence of a people. Durkheim according to Haralambos and Holborn(2008) has a “homo duplex” model of human nature:

He believes humans have two sides to their nature. One side is selfish or egotistical. Human are partly driven by selfish biological needs, such as the need to satisfy hunger. Inevitably this means that they tend to look after their own interests, which makes it difficult for individuals to be integrated into society. However, there is

another side to human nature: the ability to believe in moral values. Society has made use of this side of human nature if social life is to be possible (p.858).

Durkheim (1951) is of the view that religion has constantly provided for the people what they needed for their well-being. For instance, it was out of a concern for the social welfare of Christian members, according to Uche (cited in Abalogu, 2015), the early Jerusalem Church introduced a social welfare institution. This social welfare set out to care for widows, orphans and other categories of poor and among them. It was the same concern that may have inspired Christian missionaries in Nigeria to provide schools, hospitals, clinics, orphanage and other social welfare programs that helped in challenging the killing of twins, discourage and condemn human sacrifices, injustice, dehumanization and ritual killing. The above social welfare activities were what Emile Durkheim (1965) regarded as social functions of religion in society.

It could be deduced that the above social functions of religion have promoted individual integrity, dignity, reputation and prestige, which have been enhanced by religious taboos, sanction, and ethics which are seen as a system of discipline in which an apostate is excommunicated from a religious institution. The basis of functionalism is the assumption that institutions in the society are inter-independent and inter-related systems that tend towards equilibrium or balance. This implies that change in one institution will affect all the other institutions and society as a whole.

A critical look at the relationship between religion and non-violence will justify the above functional changes of religion, which may record greater success of non-violence is

more imbedded in religious beliefs, practices, norm and values in the society. Gandhi (1963) sees:

Religion and non-violence as the same as he viewed that all the teachings of the religions of the world teach non-violence. He went further to view that among other religions, the sources of his non-violence include Hinduism his own religion, Islam and Christian. He viewed that Islam as a religion means peace” (p.25).

He has the following to say after reading the sermon on the mountain:

Echoed something I had learnt in childhood and something which seemed to be part of my being ... this teaching was non-retaliation or non-resistance to evil ... not an eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth, but to be ready to receive two blows when only one is given and to go two miles when you are asked to go one. Non-violence is greatly attached to religion and it advocates the fairness of human attitude towards another so as not to be selfish or irrational in action (pp. 13-14).

Sequel to Emeil Durkienh’s theory of functionalism, every society has been structured accordingly and each unit in the society has a function and these functions are interrelated in the sense that each works for the betterment of others. In respect to insurgency in the Niger Delta, the duty of inter-relativeness has been breached by injustice; in the sense that a part of the structured society is working unfairly towards the other or a part of the society is not positively active or lacking in its responsibility. The distribution of social goods has been done unfairly and attitudes towards functions have not been properly done. Justice is needed so that there will be fairly distribution of social goods and in the absence of this, Niger Deltans seem to proffer another approach to achieve their social goods and by this they end

up in applying violent means. These violent means as can be seen has not really provided a total positive solution. Therefore, the researcher believes that the application of Non-violence will give a more substantive solution.

2.2.2. Social Conflict Theory

A. Karl Marx theories of conflict differ from each other in important respect. Some theories stress conflict between particular social groups. Marxist Conflict theories see society as divided into classes, the owner and workers having opposing interests; Feminist Conflict theories see society as divided by gender, with women generally being less privileged than men; anti-racist conflict theorists emphasize conflict across racial lines; anti-imperialist conflict theorists emphasize global conflict between wealthy and poor nations. Anugwom (2009) explains the concept of conflict theories thus:

Conflict theories are explanations or theoretical viewpoints that put forward the notion that conflicts are fundamental parts of social life. Conflict can never be totally eradicated except in the case of the Marxian conflict framework where conflict would lead to the emergence of a new egalitarian social order where equality ensures consensus (p.38).

In the course of this thesis, the researcher basically examined conflict from the perspective of Karl Max, Simmel and Dahrendorf.

Though conflict theories may have been there since the history of mankind however, Karl Marx has been outstanding in the study of conflict theories. Many scholars thus regard

other attempt in conflict theory as following the background he has made. Karl Marx is regarded as the father and chief proponent of conflict theories as Anugwom (2009) opines:

Karl Marx is without doubt the celebrated father of modern social conflict thinking in the social science. Marx was not just an avid thinker, but a revolutionary who believed in the power of the masses to record the social condition of their existence (p.40).

Marx conceived of social classes as some form of refined social relations, the interaction or relationship between men that have taken on an independent existence. He saw social classes as the outcome or arising from the relations of production. His notion of social conflict revolves around the emergence of social classes in the capitalist regime. This capitalism according to Marx, “the dominance of money” bestows on people power and abilities which they do not really possess. It creates a situation where a society can be divided or polarized naturally and inevitably into two classes viz: Those with access to or control of the means of production (bourgeoisie) and those without or the “have nots” who submit their labor power to the bourgeoisie in order to earn a living in the new social order. This second group is what Marx called the proletariat. Therefore, it is the advent of this class consciousness that Marx saw as the primal force for revolution.

Marx regarded people as both the producers and the products of society. They make societies and themselves by their own actions. The various parts of society are interconnected and influence each other. Thus, economic, political, legal and religious institutions can only be understood in terms of their mutual effect. Economic factors, however, exert the primary influence and largely shape other aspects of society. Social change proceeds from

contradictions build into society, which are a source of tension and ultimately the source of open conflict and radical change.

Marx (1848) states that the source of change lies in contradictions, that is, in the economic system in particular, and society in general. As a result of the priority he gives to economic factor- to material life, his views of history are often referred to as dialectical materialism. For Marx, the major contradictions that propel change are found in the economic infrastructure of society. At the dawn of human history, when humans supposedly lived in a state of primitive communism, those contradictions did not exist. The means of production and the product of labour were communally owned. Since each member of society produced both for themselves, and for society as a whole, there were no conflicts of interest between individuals and groups.

Marx continued that, with the emergence of private property and in particular private ownership of the means of production, the functional contradiction of human society was created. Through its ownership of the means of production, a minority is able to control command and enjoy the fruits of the labour of the majority. Since one group gains at the expense of the other, a conflict of interest exist between the minority who own the means of production and the majority who perform productive labour. The tension and conflict generated by these contradictions are the major seed of social change. In the light of Niger Delta conflict, Ugbomeh (2008) states thus:

Community oil companies conflicts are caused by the presence of installations in a community; incursion into community land; a threat or perceived threat to the continual existence of a community ineffective communication between

communities and oil companies, nonpayment of compensation for occupied land, inadequate payment or unduly delayed payment for compensation for polluted land and water resources, abject poverty due to displacement and loss of livelihood arising from pollution of farmlands of fishing waters. Thus disputes between communities and oil companies are therefore often of longstanding nature and difficult to resolve (p.865).

Omosho (2008) stated that the inability of the government to respond adequately to the problems of the Niger Delta leads the people in the region to react violently. The people of the region feel cheated, they provide over 90 percent of the wealth of the country, yet they get little or nothing in return.

Haralambos and Holborn (2008) state that Marx sees class division resulting from different relationships of members of society to the means of production as the cause of conflict in the society. The structure of all societies may be represented in terms of a simplified two-class model, consisting of ruling and subject classes. The ruling class owes its dominance and power to its ownership and control of the means of production. The subjection and relative powerlessness of the subject class are due to its lack of ownership and therefore lack of control of the means of production. Marx (1848) thus posits:

The conflict of interest between the two classes stem from the fact that productive labour is performed by subject class, yet a large part of the wealth so produced is appropriated by the ruling class. Since one class gains at the expense of the other, the interests of their members are incompatible. The classes stand opposed as exploiter and exploited, oppressor and oppressed. The labour of the subject class

takes on the character of forced labour. Since its members lack the necessary means to produce for themselves, they are forced to work for others (p.30).

Marx saw capitalism as characterized by a central struggle between these two classes which he called the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A class becomes a class for itself when the forces of production have developed to the point where they cannot be contained within the existing relations of production. Marx (1848) asserts that “for an oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself, it is essential that the existing forces of production and the existing social relations should be incapable of standing side by side” (p. 60). He saw the magnitude of these contradictions and the intensity of class conflict steadily increasing as capitalism developed. As capital accumulates, it is concentrated more and more into fewer hands – a process accompanied by the relative pauperization of the proletariat. In respect of this theory, it is obvious that non-violence is proactive in solving such problems that causes insurgency in Niger Delta as in class system. Ghandi (1963) maintains that all human are brothers and should not harm each other. Therefore nobody should exist or enjoy at the detriment of the other. If the government and the people of Niger Delta recognize this fact, the issue of insurgency will be reduced to the nearest minimum having the understanding that nonviolence brings peace more than violence.

B. Simmel

In the same vein, Simmel in his own views that, conflict is natural and unavoidable in human society. Simmel’s conflict theory acquires peculiarity in his idea that conflict and consensus are naturally complementary. Also, in his conflict theory, Simmel noted that if dissociating factors like envy, hatred, desire, needs are the causes of conflict or discord, then

conflict logically break out in order to resolve them. He opines that conflict is designed to resolve dualism as a way of achieving unity or consensus. Simmel makes two crucial points to buttress his ideas – he makes a distinction between individual and group conflict where conflict between individuals may be seen as damaging and negative. But when conflict is considered in relation to group, its effect cannot be totally negative.

According to Coser and Rosenberg (1976) Simmel's second argument is that since there is no social unit in which divergent and convergent current among members are not interwoven, inseparably, a totally pure harmonious social group (benefit of conflict) is not possible in human society. Dahrendorf in his own view upholds that society is characterized by both equilibrium (consensus) and conflict. Therefore, he recommends that consensus should examine value integration in human society while conflict focuses on interest as well as the coercion that holds the society together in spite of streams. Though Dahrendorf maintains the complementation of both conflict and consensus in any given society, but he is usually classified as a conflict theorist because he identifies with other outstanding conflict theorist as Karl Marx, George Semmel, in their report of Dahrendorf's conflict theory; Ritzer and Stempnisky (2014) opine:

the conflict theorists, society is held together by “enforce constrain thus, some positions in society are delegated power and authority over others. This fact of life led Dahredorf to his control thesis that the differential distribution of authority invariably becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflict (p.367).

C. Darhrendorf

In the same way, Dahrendorf, considering the root cause of conflict in the society noted two major concepts which are authority and interest. For him, the idea of authority means that in social organizations there are both positions of super ordination (those in position of authority) and subordination (those in the same organization who have no authority). Those who occupy positions of authority are expected to control those who are without authority. However, he went further to assert that the expectation of dominance is attached to positions and not the people occupying the position. This is obvious because power hitherto is controlled by another person. He went on to state that since authority is legitimate, then sanctions can be brought to bear against those who do not comply. Reaffirming Dahrendorf's concept of authority as a major cause of conflict in society; Anugwom (2009) notes:

Critical in the appreciation of the ideas of Dahrendorf is his postulation individuals while involved in so many social formations or groups/organizations do not occupy super ordinate positions in all of them. Therefore, the person with a super-ordinate position in one organization may occupy a subordinate position in another (p.45).

Similarly for Dahrendorf, authority within any organization is dichotomous as two conflict groups will emerge within one organization. That is, the super-ordinate and the subordinate groups with each of them being characterized by the interests. This will bring about the second basic issue or cause of conflict in an organization as postulated by Dahrendorf; it should be noted here that the respective interest of these groups are contradictory in substances and direction from the other group. In other words, their respective interest have different goals or aspirations that are contradictory to that of the other group. While the people in authority seek to maintain their position and retain

authority, the people without authority seek to change the *statusquo* and these contrary interests may exacerbate the conflict situation.

Dahrendorf (1959) continues his discussion when he states that a conflict of interest with any association is at least latent at all there's showing what the legitimacy of authority is always precarious. This conflict of interest needs not to be conscious in order for the super-ordinate or subordinates to act. The interest of super-ordinates and subordinates are objective in the sense that they are reflected in the exceptions attached to positions. Individuals do not have to internalize these expectations or even be in accord with them, If they occupy given positions, they will behave in the expected manner. According to Ritzer and Stepnisky (2014), individuals are "adjusted" or "adapted" to their roles when they contribute to conflict between super-ordinates and subordinates. The two types of interest are latent and manifest interest. Dahrendorf noted that latent interests are those unconscious role expectations while manifest interests are latent interest that have become conscious.

Also, for Dahrendorf, the major task of conflict theory is the transformation of latent to manifest interest as well as their relationship. That is the analysis of the connection between latent and manifest interests. Accordingly, he distinguished three broad types of groups. The first is the interest group. Then out of all the many interest groups emerge conflict groups as the third group. He further outlined three main factors that can intervene in the formation of these three groups. The factors are technical conditions such as adequate personnel; political conditions such as over all political climates and social conditions such as the existence of communication links.

As it concerns conflict in the Niger Delta, Nworah (2007) saw that the government and the oil companies did not reciprocate with adequate socio-economic development to the Niger Delta Region and as such they react violently. The dispute occurs over non provision of basic amenities for the people in the region and lack of distributive justice. Since the inception of the civilian government in 1999, major violent incidents have occurred in the region. Protests over the injustice and several lives have been lost in clashes between protesters and government security agencies. Ann (2007) posited that the political imbroglio that engulfed the region has affected the political order, socio-economic development in the region. The Federal Government crackdown in the region led to the deaths of several dozens of people, the torture and inhuman treatment of others; and the arbitrary detention of many more. These abuses took place as a response to demonstrations and insurgencies on the part of the militia groups in the Niger Delta. Some were summarily executed. The view of Ann gives a direct accusation on the Nigerian government as those cause and even fuel crisis in the Niger Delta.

Haralambos and Holborn (2008) observed that Dahrendorf in his argument states that conflicts were no longer based upon the existence of the two classes as identified by Marx, nor were they based upon economic divisions. Instead, Dahrendorf saw conflict as being concerned with authority. Inokoba and Imubua (2008) states that insecurity in the Niger Delta is directly proportional to the denial of the rights of the local people, directly proportional to corporate arrogance and dominance of the means of survival and existence. It is directly proportional to the denial of access of the people and communities to natural wealth. Thus the Niger Delta people are forced to insurgency and violence because the Nigerian State uses military power to repress them and deny them of justice. From all indication, this violent phase of insurgency, especially among the youths of the Niger Delta

will continue and no amount of military assault or bombardment can put them down until the Federal Government and the leaders of the region sincerely tackle the challenges of development in the region.

Baridam (2007) lamented the situation of conflict and insecurity in the region thus;

As it stands now the borderline between genuine agitation and barefaced criminality in the struggle can hardly be identified from a distance. All over the Niger Delta, armed gangs who have nothing to do with the peaceful agitation for resource control are on the loose, terrorizing innocent citizens and expatriates who are here to do legitimate business. We are now infested with the virus of criminality on the streets of the Niger Delta region (p. 12).

Omotal (2008) viewed it from a radical point of view when he stated that the proliferation and radicalization of dissent movements in the Niger Delta, engendered largely by the inequitable system of power relation has forced some violent responses from the state. This may not be unconnected with the very high state of oil in the Nigerian political economy, which constricts the state to a sluggish on the dialogue, negotiation and concessions, and expansive in terms of repressive responses. The final aspect of Dahrendorf's conflict theory is the relationship of conflict to change. Here, he noted that conflict leads to change and development, as well as to maintaining status quo. Looking at the situation critically, it is obvious that conflict theory and non-violence shared the same Gandhian idea that all mankind are the children of the same God and these are the irreversible factors behind his willingness to suffer for the good of others. That same conviction informed him that human evils are common and therefore need a common solution since all men are equal before God.

Again, the Niger Delta crises that resulted in the formation of various militant groups like the movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta peoples volunteer force (NDPVF), that ended up becoming insurgent in their mode of operation which learnt them as insurgency group can be related to the Marxian theory of class struggle. The Niger Delta indigenes believe that the Nigeria government is mining the oil in their land, not minding the destruction of agricultural means of their livelihood it leaves behind as the land is no longer good for farming while the fishes in the rivers die off. Besides, their youths do not gain much employment from the oil companies located in their land. They virtually see themselves as being used. This situation brings about their conclusion to apply conflict in solving the class struggle that exist between the government and the masses seeing clearly that this has not been resolved with conflict completely, hence the need to find an alternative solution. This is why the researcher opted to suggest the use of Non-violent approach in curbing insurgency in the Niger Delta Region.

2.2.3. Frustration–Aggression Theory

Frustration–aggression theory according to Dollard (1939) is a theory of aggression proposed by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939. It was further developed by Neal Miller in 1941 and Leonard Berkowitz in 1969. The theory according to Miller (1941) says that aggression is the result of blocking, or frustrating a person's efforts to attain a goal.

When first formulated, according to Berkowitz (1969), the hypothesis stated that frustration always precedes aggression, and aggression is the sure consequence of frustration. Two years later, however, according to Friedman (2014), Miller and Sears re-

formulated the hypothesis to suggest that while frustration creates a need to respond, some forms of aggression became available means. Therefore, the re-formulated hypothesis stated that while frustration prompts a behavior that may or may not be aggressive, any aggressive behavior is the result of frustration, making frustration not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for aggression.

Sear (1941) viewed that the theory attempts to explain why people became scapegoats. It attempts to give an explanation to the cause of violence. According to Dollard (1939) frustration is the "condition which exists when a goal-response suffers interference," while aggression is defined as "an act whose goal-response is injury to an organism (or an organism surrogate)." The theory says that frustration causes aggression, but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target. For example, if a man is disrespected and humiliated at his work, but cannot respond to this for fear of losing his job, he may go home and take his anger and frustration out on his family. This theory according to Whitley (2009) is also used to explain riots and revolutions, which both are believed to be caused by poorer and more deprived sections of society who may express their bottled up frustration and anger through violence.

The humiliation and distortive situation the Niger Delta people find themselves in as a result of government attitude towards the oil in their land is very sad. It is the frustration of the government towards the Niger Deltans that leads them into the aggression of engaging to violence as a way of showing their aggression. Frustration leads to aggression and the aggression evolves into violence.

In the light of these theories above, it is obvious that John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, and Robert Sears theory on frustration aggression is most appropriate and suitable as it relates to the conflict in the Niger Delta Region. This theory brings out the frustration that the Niger Deltans are passing through and the aggression which the insurgents resort to. Here one group gain at the expense of the other, so it triggers up conflict between the minorities who are the owners of the land and the majority who perform productive labour. Sequel to this, it brings societal change and attention to the means of production. This work maps out strategies in which the frustration of the Niger Delta people can be addressed thereby curbing their aggression.

2.2.4. Theory of Anomie

Anomie theory, sometimes also termed strain theory or means end theory or normlessness, social disorganization theory were formulated when people were unable to pursue socially accepted goals by culturally approved means therefore they resort to deviant means or illegitimate means to achieve the goal. This sometimes, result to violence, crisis, conflict, breaking down of norms etc.

Like Durkheim, Robert Merton (1968), approached deviance from the functionalist perspective strains associated with anomie or normlessness, social disorganization. For Merton (1968), the primary cause of deviance was social situation in which people were unable to pursue socially accepted goals by culturally approved means. Goals to him may become so important that if the institutionalism means fails, illegitimate means might be used. Ritzer (2007) opines that “Anomie means when greater emphasis on ends rather than means creates stress that leads to a breakdown in the regulatory structure” (p.251). If for

instance, if society impels its members to acquire wealth, yet offered inadequate means for them to do so, the strain would cause many people to violate socio-political, legal, economic and moral norms. The only regulating agencies would be the desire for personal advantages and the fear of punishment; social behavior would thus become unpredictable. Merton (1938) typology describes five possible ways in which people respond to their anomie situation. These includes conformity, finding a new way to do an old thing, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion.

He viewed that conformity is when people accept socially approved goals and pursue them by culturally acceptable means even if they find that the means are not readily available to them. In contrast, the other four responses in Merton's typology result in the violation of social norms and perpetrators are usually defined as deviants.

Merton's second adaptive strategy is innovation which can be simply defined as finding a new way to do an old thing. Innovations internalize the dominant goal of society, but they either reject the culturally approved means of achieving the goal or because they find the approved means unavailable, and thus develop alternative means of pursuing the goals.

The third adaptive strategy is ritualism in which a person either rejects society's goals or realizes that he/she cannot achieve them but still "goes through the motions" so as to get into trouble or be disappointed. In this adaptation, the individual's allegiance shifts from the goals to the means.

The fourth adaptation mechanism is retreatism, which involves the rejection of both the socially approved goals and the culturally approved means of achieving them. Like

ritualists, retreatists have not internalized the success goals but unlike them, retreats are unwilling to play the game. Some retreatists instead, literally drop out of main stream society by becoming vagrants, hermits, or member of deviant subcultures. Retreatist may also figuratively retreat from society through the use of drugs and alcohol.

The fifth adaptive strategy is rebellion, which rejects society's goals and replaces them with antithetical goals. Rebels also reject culturally approved means in rituals which anthropologists refer to as rituals of rebellion by the society and replace them with deviant means. Of all the Merton's categories, rebels are usually viewed as the most threatening because they represent an overt threat to social order.

A critical look at the relationship between these theories and Gandhian philosophy of non-violence will show or portray the missing point between violence and peace. An increasing number of people see the missing point in the fact that society needs to be void of violence and this according to Jery (1985), means not fighting by means of violence. Violence is a sign of weakness and it is this weakness that brought about insurgency in Niger Delta Region. Whatever cannot win by influencing the heart tries to win by means of violence, the most spending and lasting battles known to history are the battles of human thought. The most ignoble and the shortest are the battles of violence. An idea which needs weapons to survive, will die by itself, the idea which prevails merely through the use of violence is perverted. A living idea conquers by itself. It is followed by millions.

The corruption amongst the political leaders in Nigeria and its gross negative impact on the economic growth of the country caused violent reaction that leads to insurgency from various quarters in Nigeria and Niger Delta in particular. The truth still remains that no reason

justifies indulgence in insurgency. Nonviolence can still lead to positive change. This principle points out that normlessness in a society is as a result of unfavourable attitude of the elits and unrulling reaction of the masses and this brings about insurgency.

2.3 Empirical Studies

The empirical studies of this dissertation will be reviewing six books on Insurgency and Nonviolence. Consideration will be given to books written by Ukoha (2011), Babatunde (2012), Engobo (2012), Ukeje (2009), Odey (1996), and Odey (1995).

2.3.1. Insurgency

2.3.1.1. Ukoha Ukiwe: *The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis*

The book; *The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis* is published by Ukoha Ukiwe in the year 2011. The work was published in New York by St. Martin's. It is a book of five chapters, with Ninety-Two (92) pages. It has epilogue and appendices. The cure motivation of this book according to the author is the wrong attitude of the government towards the Niger Delta Region who are the oil producing community and the unholy attitude of the government towards the distribution of oil revenues, and the inhuman treatment of the oil companies towards their host communities. In the first chapter of the book, the author x-rays a historical background of the Niger Delta people, their cultural background, geographical location and demographic features of the Niger Delta Region. He also went further to x-ray the background of the crisis in Niger Delta.

In revealing the background of the crisis in Niger Delta Region, He viewed that what ought to be a blessing to the region is turning to be a curse. This he backed up with his

reasons that the oil instead of enriching the oil communities has ended up to bringing crisis, environmental degradation, water pollution, air pollution, killing of many people and underdevelopment of their communities. He states that all these negative effects has brought about under-development of their communities and instead of enriching them, it is impoverishing them. Even though the revenues generated by the government from oil production is great, yet the distribution is nearly totally one sided. What is been generated in their community is used to develop another places leaving them in the danger of Air pollution, deseases and hunger. He states that it was in the light of the above condition that the masses started struggling for a better condition by negotiating with the government and whereas it could not give them a positive outcome, they ended up in violence by means of kidnapping oil expatriates and destroying oil facilities.

This, he states led to different negotiations up to the time of Late president Umaru Musa Yar'Adua who introduced the Amnesty program which gained some positive outcome but could not last due to his death. He viewed that the late president gave unconditional pardon to all those standing trial for militant activities and those involved in such activities once they gave up their arms and embrace peaceful resolution of the crisis. The book reports that success started falling when professor Ibrahim Gamban was appointed the convener of the high profile summit organized for the Niger Deltans and his appointment was been rejected by the Niger Deltans.

The book critically analyzed the activities of the government in mobilizing military force to subdue the militants, but they could not succeed and this brought about a prolonged insurgency. The militants insist on fair justice seeking for compensation from the

government and oil companies. This led to the Niger Delta Region requesting to be in charge of managing the oil and sending returns as taxation to the federal government.

The book concluded by proffering the following as solution to the Niger Delta Crisis:

First is the resource control across the Region; this is expressed in the petroleum industry bill;

This propagates for 10 percent of oil revenue to be given to the oil producing communities.

The second is the redesigning of the modality of the federation account with a view to enable oil producing states to collect oil revenues and remit an agreed percentage to the federal government account.

2.3.1.2. Babatunde Ahonsi: *Capacity and Governance Deficits in the Response to the Niger Delta Crisis*

The book *capacity and governance deficits in the response to the Niger Delta crisis* was authored by Babatunde Ahonsi in the year 2012. It was published in New York by Palgrave Macmillan. The book was dedicated to the oppressed people of Niger Delta and all the Conflict Resolution Experts. The entirety of the book contains five chapters which includes introduction, silent dimensions of the Niger Delta Conflict, elements of a comprehensive response, capacity and governance aspects of the response crisis, charting a way forward and conclusion.

The strength of this book covers many areas. The geographical location of the Niger Delta Region was e-rayed and a brief history of the region was presented in which was discovered that the region played a vital role in the trade in palm production among other

commodities. Sequel to this, the discovery of oil in the Twentieth country. Babatunde went further to assert that the process of oil exploration affected the region negatively which resulted to degradation of the environment and destruction of the regional economy. In expantiating on the silent dimensions of the Niger Delta Conflict, he viewed that the oil resources generated remain exclusively with the federal government thereby not allowing the region to have any glimps of the blessing of oil. This attitude of the federal government according to the author, led to the rising situation of conflict in the region. The regional people especially their youths got engaged in a conflict with the federal government in order to have a sense of belonging and benefit from the blessing of the oil.

He also identified five interrelated dimensions of the conflict which includes: The struggle for resource control and ownership by the oil bearing communities and its increasingly militant and violent nature, severe environmental degradation, the abject lack of political participation and democratic accountability, infrastructural underdevelopment, and deep and widespread poverty, especially youth unemployment.

Babatunde believes that for any response to the Niger Delta Conflict to stand any chance of success, it has to be holistic, multi-sectoral, long-ranging and based on broad-based political consensus among the key stakeholders within the conflict. He states that a similar inference has emerged from the broad-based response to the crisis led by the federal government by president Yar' Adua in September 2008. In view of Yar' Adua's efforts he stated that a lot of measures were put in place which includes:

Rapid improvement of the regions infrastructure and improvement of the region security situation; economic growth based on the regional development master plan prepared

in 2006 by the Niger Delta Development Commission. Also an amnesty program was commissioned for the militants.

He concluded by stating again that the way forward to the Niger Delta Insurgency is a strategic human capital development and the strengthening of the structures and capacities of the public service at the federal, state and local government levels.

2.3.1.3. Engobo Emeseh: *The Niger Delta Crisis and the Question of Access to Justice*

The book *the Niger Delta Crisis and the question of access to Justice* was authored by Engobo Emeseh in the year 2012. It was published in Port Harcourt by University of Port Harcourt Press. The book contains eight chapters with One Hundred and Seventeen pages.

The book covers many areas in reference to justice in the Niger Delta Region. The book examines the connection between obstacles preventing access of justice by aggrieved oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta and conflict in the Region. He viewed that the crisis is as a result of the fact that majority of the Niger Delta people feel deeply aggrieved because of their political marginalization and alienation from the benefits of oil production and the destruction of the environment and local livelihoods by oil pollution, but also because of their lack of access to justice, redress and compensation. The author states that lack of justice is the reason behind the crisis in Niger Delta Region. In explaining further, he says that simply reviewing laws without addressing the prevailing socio-economic and political environment within which they operate cannot effectively resolve the conflict in the Niger Delta Region.

He sees access to justice as a bundle of rights recognized under various international and national legal instruments, including section 36 of the constitution of the Federal

Republic of Nigeria 1999. He explained access to justice through its components. The principle of equality and fair trial as provided by Article 7-11 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. He asserts that access to Justice means that everyone, irrespective of age, sex, religion, ethnicity, status and other such factors, should have the means of obtaining justice under predetermined rules in an open and fair manner.

The author went further to state that it is the lack of access to justice that created an environment in Niger Delta Region where people, even “good” ones, resorted to extrajudicial or extra legal means of seeking redress.

At this point, he states that from a historical perspective, colonial rule displaced the indigenous systems of law and justice that it encountered. This he said had implications for the Nigerian legal system and issues related to access to justice. In post-colonial Nigeria, he stated that indigenous customary law and traditional justice institutions have very limited roles in the legal system and are generally subjected to statutes made either during the colonial administration or the various government’s post-independence.

Furthermore, he states that under military regimes, law such as the Petroleum Act 1969 and the land use Act of 1979, which effectively alienated the people from the oil wealth from their region, were enacted without the consultations usual in a democratic system. This he says rose to concern both of which are part of the central causes of the Niger Delta Region Conflict and pose challenges to its effective resolution. The first has to do with tensions arising from perception of the legitimacy of some of those “new” laws where they do not reflect or are in conflict with established and accepted customary law. Land ownership, which is a main source of conflict in the region, is one of particular concern, owing to the

enactment of the land use Act of 1979. The second is the efficacy of customary law and its institutions.

At this point, the author clearly states that the recurring feature of the conflict in the Niger Delta Region is the presence of the oil industry. On the one hand, there is the industry's impact on the environment and the socio-cultural, economic and political lives of the people. On the other hand, there are issues relating to the response of the government and the oil companies on this impact.

Finally, he concluded that the violence in the Niger Delta Region has reached very dangerous proportions and the crisis is rooted in the failure of the state to provide effective access to justice through the legal or justice system to address the legitimate grievances of the people of the region.

2.3.1.4. Charles Ukeje: *Changing the Paradigm of Pacification: Oil and Militarization in Nigeria's Delta Region*

The book *changing the paradigm of pacification: oil and militarization in Nigeria's Delta Region* was authored by Charles Ukeje in the year 2009. It was published in Texas by the University of Texas Press. The book did not trace the background of the causes of the problem in Niger Delta Region rather it started by revealing the response of the government towards the crisis in Niger Delta. The author states that this can be seen in the heavy presence of soldiers, naval offices and ratings, mobile policemen and a plethora of security agents deployed in and around the vicinity of oil installations to safeguard personnel and facilities. He states that since 1990s heavy military deployment and presence has become one of the state's main responses to rising community protest and resistance against oil multinationals,

making the Niger Delta Region the most militarized region in Nigeria. He went further to postulate that state repression of protests is evident from military campaigns against places such as Umuechem, and Ogoni, Odi, Gbaramatu, in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States. He viewed that the action often taken by the government or its agencies are often coercive in character, to suppress protest and defeat or destroy resistance or insurgencies. This he concludes is an act of inability of Nigerian government to exercise non-coercive and legitimized authority in addressing the festering crisis in the Niger Delta Region. The author writes that this government inability to use non-coercive approach is as a result of lack of relationship between the government security agencies and the different oil-producing communities. He went further to say that the militarization of the Niger Delta Region has had a long and complicated history. It has structured and continues to shape the following relationships: between oil states and oil communities, between oil companies and host communities, between oil company and host state and finally between oil-producing and oil importing/consuming countries.

The book went further to examine the role of multinational oil companies and their home government in the militarization of the Niger Delta Region and makes some suggestions for resolving the insurgency. He also identified three major consequences of the transnational oil companies' threat management strategies, which fuel militarization and insecurity in the Niger Delta Region. They include:

1. Security Communization which is a term used in describing the contractual engagement of members and youth groups of the local oil communities to provide security for oil installations and operations within their localities.

2. Security privatization as witness by the surge of specialized security companies and private military cooperations offering non-combatant – related security services that have a considerable measure of professionalization.
3. Corporatization of security whereby some large businesses are allowed to operate their own security outfits or have a detachment of state's defense forces assigned to protect the corporation's personnel and property.

The author concluded by suggesting that the first major step towards achieving sustainable peace in the Niger Delta Region is to repudiate the paradigm of military pacification and pursue a comprehensive project of demilitarization, peace and sustainable development of the Niger Delta Region. To him, to achieve this, the state, oil companies and local communities must come to terms with the fact that their dispositions and actions have contributed in significant measure to the spectres of militarization and insecurity evident across the region.

2.3.2 Non-Violence

2.3.2.1 Odey John Okweze: *A Profile in Love, Peace and Non-Violence*

In his book *A Profile in Love, Peace and Non-Violence* published in the year 1996 by Snaap in Enugu, gave a background study of the life of Gandhi and his works. He says at the time when colour-discrimination and prejudice were existing in the Asian world, and especially against the Indians whose colour is black, Mahatma Gandhi was born. Having been a victim of injustice and racial segregation on several occasions and on his first travel to South Africa in particular, it dawned on him that his colour is not acceptable at all by the people of other race. In describing the mode of Gandhi, in the course of this malady of injustice and

segregation, Odey (1996) noted “Gandhi was a man of action. He pondered over matters much, talked less, but accomplished much (p.62). Gandhi was not known for bragging and grandiloquence; but he will take time to ponder and deeply meditate over the issues and circumstance at hand. In so doing, when he arose to action, he would accomplish greatly.

In an avid consideration of how the whites maltreated the Blacks, denying them justice simply because of their colour, and having noted that these whites profess to be Christians bothered Gandhi who solemnly asked.

“If he (Christ) comes among us, will he not say to many of us, I know you not...? Will you re-read your New Testament? Will you ponder over your attitude towards the coloured population of the Colony? Will you then say you can reconcile it with the biblical teaching or the best British traditions” (p.70).

Gandhi’s practical experience of the ill-situation of the blacks according to Odey (1996) caused him to say: “Service of the poor has been my desire and it has always thrown me amongst the poor and enables me to identify myself with them” (p.70). He was so much concerned with how he can help to assuage the situation of the oppressed.

The vision of Gandhi who had earlier been noted for being quiet most times to open his mouth widely now in order to achieve his goal. It was on this ground that Fischer (2002) witting about Gandhi said: “Zeal for a cause dissolved his timidity and loosened his tongue”, (p.62), being so much committed to seeing the welfare and comfort of his people though it is not convenient for him, propelled Gandhi to say: “The cotton-thread of love that bound me to the community was too strong to break. The voice of the people is the voice of God and here, the voice of friends was too real to be rejected (p.75).

When the Transvaal government enacted a bill and passed it on as a law which was to further the sufferings of the black who stigmatized the law as the Black Act. His interest and devotion towards his goal made him to exhort his followers not to be discouraged when facing diverse trials as a result of the decision not to register in support of the Act. He exhorted them thus: “let us consider the presort as His majesty’s hotels, the suffering consequent upon disobeying he Black Act as perfect bliss and the sacrifice of one’s all and life itself in resisting it as supreme enjoyment”. When Gandhi saw the willingness of his people to suffer and to remain calm even in his absence at that most critical moment, he had Joy within him and expressed it according to Odey (1996) thus:

How long can you harass a peaceful man? How can you kill the voluntary dead? There is no zest in killing one who welcomes death and therefore soldiers are keen upon seizing the enemy alive. If the mouse did not flee before the cat, the cat would be driven to seek another prey. If all lambs voluntarily lay with the lion, the lion would be compelled to give up feasting upon lambs. Great hunters would give up lion-hunting if the lion look to non-resistance. Our victory was implicit in our combination of the two qualities of non-violence and determination (p.97).

For Gandhi, those who hunt after the life of a man who is not ready to hide or defend himself will become tired and discouraged for they know not the intention of his voluntary hunger for death. In so doing, the marginalized will not only achieve their freedom, but will also convict their oppressors. In buttressing this fact, Gandhiin Odey (1996) asserts “a styagraha is not interested in defeating his enemy but in letting him see, where he is wrong and helping him, through suffering, to mend his ways” (p.101).

Initially, Gandhi was fighting to achieve his goal based on the legal or civil requirement. But when he found out that even the judiciaries themselves and as well as the law are co-agents of oppression, he retorted to his concept of civil disobedience. Gandhi now sought for an opportunity to embark on the civil disobedience which he found at the government increment of the land-revenue tax-in Bardol: by twenty-two percent. He asks his people not to pay the tax no matter the hardship that may arise from the act, which they did without any form of violence. This civil disobedience, was now strengthened when Gandhi decided to hit on the salt tax. For him, the imposition of the salt tax was criminal and among the greatest wrongs done to India because it was a tax unwarranted imposed on the sweat and blood of the poorest people. Before he finally embarked on the civil disobedience, he wrote a letter to the viceroy-Lord Irwin thus:

Dear friend, before embarking on civil disobedience and taking the risk I have dreaded to take all these years, I would approach you and find a way out... I cannot intentionally hurt anything that lives, much less human beings, even though they may do the greatest wrong to me and mine. Whilst, I therefore, hold the British rule to be a curse, I do not intend harm to a single Englishman or to any legitimate interest he has in India... And why do I regard the British rule as a curse? It has impoverished the dumb millions by a system of progressive exploitation and by a ruinous expensive military and civil administration which the country can never afford. It has reduced us politically to serfdom. It has sapped the foundations of our culture... I fear... There has never been any intention of granting.... Dominion status to India in the immediate future... The British system seems to be designed to crush the very life out of him (the poor India) even the salt he must use to live is so taxed as to make the burden fall

heavier on him... The tax shows itself still more burdensome on the poor man when it is remembered that salt is the one thing he must eat more than the rich man (p.139).

Gandhi tries to explain the action he and his colleagues will take. He explained that since the British rule is bent on impoverishing the oppressed Indians the more by asking them to pay salt tax, then, there inevitable options is to turn against the law. Therefore, in order not to take the government unawares, he wrote to inform them. So, the Indians now have to disobey the civil or governments rules which seem to be a stumbling block in achieving their goal. He went further to express that though, they will be disobedient to the law, but they, will not hurt. Their weapon is a nonviolence one as he asserts:

Nothing but organized non-violence can check the organized violence of the British government... this nonviolence will be expressed through civil disobedience ... my ambition is no less than to convert the British people through nonviolence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done in India... I respectfully invite you to pave the way for the immediate removal of these evils, and thus open a way for a real conference between equals (p.140).

He, Gandhi, expressed their intention which was never to defeat the British government, but to convert them and convince them of their wrong doings. By so doing, Gandhi equally acknowledge that he was treading on a dangerous part, yet he was not disturbed but was rather stunted in his decision. He expressed this as follows: In all probability this will be my last speech to you....Possibly these may be the last word of life you hear... But let there be not a semblance of breach of peace even after all of us have been arrested... (p.140).

2.3.2.2 Odey John Okweze: *Martin Lurther King Jr.: His Life and Message*

In his book *Martin Lurther King Jr.: His Life and Message* written in the year 1995, published in Enugu by Snaap press, gives an account of how king Jr. practiced non-violent method among the black people of South America. King's experience of intimidation, discrimination, injustice and oppression made him resolve to fight this ill of marginalization with all his strength. On an occasion, when there were oppositions and attacks against king and colleagues, he advised his black brothers on how to fight in the following words:

Violence brings only temporary victories; violence, by creating many more social problems than it solves, never brings permanent peace. I am convinced that if we succumb to the temptation to use violence in our struggle for freedom, unborn generation will be the recipient of a long and desolate night of bitterness, and our chief legacy to them be a never-ending reign of chaos(p.3).

For king Jr., the victories and achievements derived from violent revenge are just for a while, they will not last long yet, they will generate many more social or societal problems than they tend to solve. It will not bring about a permanent peace. Though for the oppressed, violent option may be appealing to their present situation, but for the king, even generations yet unborn will suffer very long pains as a result of the violent revenge by their ancestors.

In King Jr.'s philosophy of human equality as against the racial and color prejudice in Africa, he says, "to believe that human personality is the result of the fortuitous inter play of atoms and electrons is as absurd as to believe that a monkey by hitting type writer keys at random will eventually produce a Shakespeare play Sheer magic" (p.6). Here, King emphatically stated to the oppressor that no human being came into existence by cosmic

accident. In explaining to his fellow blacks why they will not just remain silent and be continually humiliated after being made their leader, King Jr. says:

But there comes a time that people get tired we are here this evening to say to those who have mistreated us for long that we are tired, tired of being segregated and humiliated, tired of being kicked about by the brutal feet of oppression. We had no alternative but to protest. For many years, we have shown amazing patience. We have sometimes given our white brothers the feelings that we like the way we are being treated. But we come here tonight to be saved from that patience that makes us patient with anything less than freedom and justice. (p.14).

But as we rise to this challenge, let us see the method recommended by king as he says:

Our method will be that of persuasion, not coercion. We say to the people “Let your conscience be your guide”... Our actions must be guided by the highest principles of the Christian faith. Love must be our regulating ideal. Once again, we must hear the voice of Jesus echoing across the centuries: “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you”. If we fail to do this, our protest will end up as a meaningless drama on the stage of history, and its memory will be shrouded with the ugly garments of shame (p.15).

Though the suffering of the Blacks is enormous and dreadful but instead of fighting with coercion and violence, king advised they adopt the method of persuasion. He cautioned that failure to adopt this non-violence method will tantamount to a fruitless venture that will attract nothing but shame. When the oppression became more intensified in order to frustrate the non-violence method of the Blacks under King, at a time, the Black, population got

furiously frustrated and was tempted to return violence for violence. But King cautioned restraint, Christian forbearance and love. He gave his reasons thus:

Why should we love our enemies? The first reasons are fairly obvious. Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, and adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out hate, only love can do that. Hate multiplies hate; violence multiplies violence, and toughness multiplies toughness in a descending spiral of destruction (p.38).

King Jr. proved the proverbial saying that multiples of wrong cannot produce right, instead will continue to multiply wrong and evil. In spite of the enormous victimization and marginalization against King Jr. and his fellow Blacks, he remained firm in his conviction that when violence meets violence only a configuration of violence and ruins will be the result. He knew they must achieve their freedom and as such, will compromise their standard and commitment.

On the other hand, there are still some scholars who have recommended the seemingly generally-appealing option (violent) to fight against injustice and oppression. That is, fighting the Malady with human strength and might with the use of harmful weapons such as gun, machetes which mostly leads to killing and further crisis. At least, someone who is being maltreated will have to react against it. The reaction has to be in the same line that he is being oppressed. He has to show that he is not dead but alive by demonstrating his level of strength to the best of his might.

Considering the rate at which people oppress and cheat on their fellow human being, and the matter in which the seemingly privilege persons marginalize the less privilege, and

will actually adopt the mosaic declaration of “a tooth for a tat”. That is not retaliating much but let the oppressor equally feel the pains of oppression. While describing the dehumanization of the Africans by the imperialists, Tutu in his article on “The Theology of Liberation” In the African theology En Route Edited By Kofi Appian – Kubi and Sangio Torres Stated thus:

Liberation Theology tries to help victims of oppression to assert their humanity and so look the other chap in the eye and speak face to face without shuffling their feet and apologizing for their black existence.... It challenges churches everywhere to be true to their calling to exercise a prophetic ministry in speaking up for the dumb, the voiceless, for those too weak to speak up for themselves, to oppose, oppression, injustice, corruption, and evil whenever these may be found. This could be a call to martyrdom, but if God be for us who can be against us? Let God arise and let his enemies be scattered (p.168).

In the above statement, Tutu declares that people should at least show that they are still human beings in the face of oppressors by openly confronting their oppressions without fear and shuffling and without any apology to convict them of their evil deeds. He equally advises that churches should act as redeemers to the powerless victims of oppression and speak for them. They should openly oppose injustice and oppression entirely. Even if it leads to someone’s death, his reward awaits him, noting as well that God is always for the oppressed, he will grant them victory. He equally supported some of the modern day-choices-syndrome of “enemies must die” by quoting the psalmist statement of let God arise and his enemies (oppressors) be scattered and destroyed.

In the same vein, Fanon (1963), noted that “decolonization is always a violent phenomenon” (p.27). Thus is, for any nation under a colonial government to be free politically, she must be violent. He went further to explain that by violence, one will be able to know and utilize his rights. That the only weapon or means by which one can be bold and fearless is violence. He said that it is violence that will open people eyes to actually see their nakedness and deformed-state, and thereby bring about victory. Fanon affirmed this in the following words:

At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the nature from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect... When the people have taken violent part in the national liberation, they will allow no one to set themselves up as liberators; they show themselves to be jealous of the result of their action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fate of their country in the hands of a living god...Illuminated by violence, the consciousness of the people rebels against any pacifications (p.74).

For Fanon, the violence should not be the option of few persons but a collective effort of the entire citizens. This is meant to guard against any one assuming the position of a liberator or a living god in the country, rather, the glory should go to everyone as a country or nation. For him, the only way a victim of marginalization or ill-treatment can summon courage without fear is conflict. He equally maintained that collective violence helps to unite the people.

In the following words, Fanon encouraged leaders to be part of violence. He asserts; “Violence alone, violence committed by the people, Violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them” (p.118). When the violence in a nation for independence is for all and sundry, outstanding victory will be won.

2.4. Summary of Literature Review

Literature in the light of conceptual framework, theoretical framework and empirical studies had been treated strictly to generally give a bearing to the work. Many concepts by different scholars have been treated such as insurgency and nonviolence as it relates to the crisis in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Issues about conflict theories, functionalism, and Anomie theories gave the work a focus on the crisis situation in Niger Delta. These theories are discussed in a way that it will assist in discovering the relative problem of the insurgency in Niger Delta and assist in giving a lasting solution to the problems. These theories bring out the sharp gap between the bourgeoisies and the proletariats. This gap causes a social change as capitalism is seen as that which is major causes of crisis. These theories relates to the Niger Delta Insurgency where one group gains at the expense of the other. This calls for the principles of fair distribution of goods and services to everyone. The masses of the Niger Delta region are expected to be given serious attention and avoid any room for inequality. This will help to close the gap that exists between the bourgeoisies (the nation) and the proletariats (the Niger Deltans).

In respect of the empirical studies, it was discovered that the politics between the government and the oil companies even with some of the Niger Delta elite contribute so much to the

Niger Delta crises hence the insurgency. As discussed in the empirical studies, all the authors gave their suggestion on a possible approach to avert or curb insurgency in Niger Delta Region yet in all, no author subscribed for practical non-violence approach. Sequel to this, the researcher deemed it fit to suggest a more result oriented approach to Niger Delta Region which is Non-violence.

CHAPTER THREE

NIGER DELTA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

3.1. Geographic Location

The Niger Delta with an estimated land area of about 70,000km² is one of the World's largest deltas. It is located in the Central part of Southern Nigeria between and above latitude 5o33'49"N and 6o'31'38"E in the North. Its Western boundary is given as Benin 5o44'11"N and 5o03'49"E and its Eastern boundary is Imo River 4o27'16"N and 7o35'27"E. Figure 2.2 below shows the map of the Niger Delta(UNDP :2009).

The Niger Delta is located along the Atlantic coast which forms the southern boundary of Nigeria. It constitutes the entrance of Rivers Niger and Benue into the Atlantic ocean through a web of rivers, creeks, and estuaries. It is the largest wetland in Africa and the third largest in the world, with about 2370 square kilometres of rivers, creeks and estuaries (UNDP:2009). Its vegetation according to Alagoa, (2005) is predominantly of the forest type, with area 8600

square kilometres of swamp forest and about 1900 square kilometres of mangrove forests. The region situated in the southern part of Nigeria, is bordered in the east by the Republic of Cameroun and in the south, by the Atlantic Ocean. Within Nigeria, the region is defined geographically and politically as constituting south-south and part of the south-east with the later, being for revenue sharing purposes. The geographic Niger Delta includes the littoral States of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta Cross River and Akwa-Ibom which has land area of about 67,284 square kilometres with a combined population of 16,331,000 persons. The political Niger Delta includes these and in addition, Abia, Edo, Imo, and Ondo states, with a total area of 112,110 square kilometres of land as at 2006. The region represents about 12% of Nigeria's total surface area (NDDC, 2006).

The region has a lot of gas reserves which when sufficiently harnessed, could yield income far in excess of crude oil incomes. Nwilo and Badejo (2005) asserts that there are about 606 oil fields in the Niger Delta, of which 360 are on-shore while 246 are offshore. Most of the new oil fields are deep water fields being developed offshore.

3.2. Population / Ethnicity

The region is dominated by the Ijaw ethnic group. Other groups in the Western Delta include; the Isoko, Itsekiri, Kwale, Ndoshumili, Ika, Ikwerre, Okrika and Urhobo. In the eastern delta are groups like the Ekpeye, Andoni, Ikwerre, Ndoni and the Ogoni. The populations of the major states is as follows:

Table 1.1

STATE	CAPITAL	LAND AREA	POPULATION
Abia	Umuahia	4,877	3,230,000
Akwa Ibom	Uyo	6806	3,343,000

Bayelsa	Yenagoa	11,007	1,710,000
Cross River	Calabar	21,930	2,736,000
Delta	Asaba	17,163	3,594,000
Edo	Benin	19,698	3,018,000
Imo	Owerri	5,165	3,342,000
Ondo	Akure	15,086	3,025,000
Rivers	Port Harcourt	10,378	4,858,000
TOTAL	112,110	28,856,000	28,856,000

Table 1.2: The Geographical Niger Delta Statistics

Source: GTZ population projection based on 1991 census & NDRDMP

State	Capital	Land Area	Population
<u>Akwa Ibom</u>	Uyo	6806	3,343,000
Bayelsa	Yenagoa	11,007	1,710,000
Cross River	Calabar	21,930	2,736,000
Delta	Asaba	17,163	3,594,000
Rivers	Port Harcourt	10,378	4,858,000

Source: Extracted from Table 1.1

The Niger Delta region as presented by Akpan (2007) with its natural endowments of oil and gas, which drives the international economy is poverty ridden as a result of political marginalization, economic pauperization and environmental degradation occasioned by its small soil and oil company activities in the region and long years of reflect by the Federal Government of Nigeria.

3.3. Religion and Cultural Practices

Although the Niger Deltans according to John (2011) are now primarily Christians (65% profess to be), with Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism and Pentecostalism being the varieties of Christianity most prevalent among them, they also have elaborate traditional religious practices of their own. Veneration of ancestors plays a central role in Niger Delta traditional religion, and water spirits, known as *Owuamapu* figure prominently in the Region pantheon. In addition, the region practice a form of divination called *Igbadai*, in which recently deceased individuals are interrogated on the causes of their death. Niger Delta religious beliefs hold that water spirits are like humans in having personal strengths and shortcomings, and that humans dwell among the water spirits before being born. The role of prayer in the traditional Niger Delta system of belief is to maintain the living in the good graces of the water spirits among whom they dwelt before being born into this world, and each year the region hold renewal celebrations in honour of the spirits lasting for several days. Central to the festivities is the role of masquerades, in which men wearing elaborate outfits and carved masks dance to the beat of drums and manifest the influence of the water spirits through the quality and intensity of their dancing. Particularly spectacular masqueraders are taken to actually be in the possession of the particular spirits on whose behalf they are dancing.

The Niger Deltans according to Appiah (2010) are also known to practice ritual acculturation (enculturation), whereby an individual from a different, unrelated group undergoes rites to become Niger Deltan. An example of this is King Jaja of Opobo, the Igbo slave who rose to become a powerful Ibani (Bonny) chief in the 19th century. John (2011) also states that, there area small number of converts to Islam, the most notable being the

founder of the Delta People Volunteer Force, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari. While Jeremiah Omoto Fufeyin comes from the Ijaw ethnic group.

3.4. Colonialism in Niger Delta Region

Dappa-Biriye (1995) asserts that the British Colonial government in amalgamating the over 250 distinct ethnic nationalities in Nigeria between 1900 and 1914 was responsible for over 90 percent of the conflict in the region. Lord Lugard led British colonial government, which recognized those ethnic groups in the hinterland-Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa – fulani that they considered as the major ethnic groups in central Nigeria and in Nigeria and this affected development of minority ethnic groups in the Niger Delta Region. This spurred “Minority Politics” that is still contentious issue in Nigeria. The Region has suffered terribly because of the British Colonial Policies on trade and tax structure. Dappa-Binya in March 2000 reiterated that the British Colonial Policies Instigated conflicts in the region and were consolidated and formalized by the Arthur Richards Constitution of 1946. This Constitution introduced regionalism by splitting Nigeria into three regions – East, West and North along ethnic lines. Udoma (1994) considered that the “Niger Delta is one of the groups that deserve the special consideration of the Nigerian state for development, but were denied. The denials have in recent times spurred the activities of insurgents” (p. 91).

Ikoku (1995) said that “to a large extent, the Nigerian Independence where the reality of power and the control of the economy were still to be found in British Colonial Policies, especially in the area of promoting conflicts. He further described the mentality of the elites and the rulers of Nigeria as that of their mother country, Britain.

The agitation of the Niger Delta region and those of other ethnic minorities of central Nigeria during the colonial era according to Thomas (2008) resulted in the inauguration of the Willinks Commission of 1958. The declaration of the Niger Delta Republic by Isaac Adaka Borow and his Niger Delta Volunteer Force in 1966 indicated people's resentment to suzerainty and desire for self-determination. The federal government of Nigeria according to Rowel, Marriott and Stockman (2005) allegedly in collaboration with Shell British Petroleum over run by reason of superior force and subdue the twelve day revolutionists" (p.10). In agreement to this, Akporaro (2008) said that since 1975 till date, the regions oil resources accounts for 90 percent of the Nation's export earnings. Still, the region remains the sick man of the nation and the least developed constituency of the country in physical and socio-economic terms. Sequel to the above suffice, it to say that in Nigeria, there is domination of the super-structure by the sub-structure.

3.4.1. Western Niger Delta

The Western Niger Delta consists of the western section of the Coastal South – South Nigeria which includes the Delta area, and the Southern-most part of Edo and Ondo States. The Western Niger Delta is a heterogeneous society with several ethnic groups which includes the Urhobo, Isoko, Itsekiri, Ijaw (or Izon) and Ukwuani groups in Delta State, the Bini, Esan, Auchi, Esako, Oral, igara and Afenmai in Edo State; and the Yoruba (Ilaje) in Ondo State. Their livelihoods are primarily based on fishing and farming. Shah (2004) asserts concerning them that:

History has it that the western Niger Delta was controlled by chiefs of the four primary ethnic groups, the Itsekiri, Isoko, Ijaw and Urhobo with whom the British government had to sign separate “Treaties of protection” in their formation of “protectorates” that later became southern Nigeria. (p.5).

3.4.2. Eastern Niger Delta

The Eastern Niger Delta according to Shah (2004) consists of the eastern section of the coastal south Nigeria, which includes Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers States. The Eastern Niger Delta region has the Ijaw (including the Nember – Brass, Ogbia, Kalabari, Okrika, Ibani and Andoni clans) the Ikwere and the Igbo which consist of Ekpeye, Andoni, Etche, Ndoki, Ogba-Egbema subgroups, and the Ogoni. Others are Annang, the Efib-Ibibio, the Oron, the Eket and Ekio (Ogoja) people, who are all related with a common ancestor and language.

3.4.3. South-South Niger Delta

The South-South group of the Niger Delta consist of Akwa-ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo and Rivers States. According to Hogan (2013), during the colonial period, the core Niger Delta was a part of the defunct eastern Region of Nigeria which came into being in 1951. This region includes the people from colonial Calaba and Ogoja Division, the Ikwere, the Igbo people and the Ijaw. The Igbo was the majority and the then Professor Ita Eyo of Calabar was the Head (premier) of the region under the National Congress of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) which was the dominant ruling political party in the region. After the time Western or British Cameroon decided to cut-away from Nigeria to become a part of

Cameroon, the National Congress of Nigeria and Cameroon became National Convention of Nigeria Citizens. In the year 1953, the Eastern Region had a major crisis due to the expulsion of Professor Ita Eyo from office by the majority Igbo tribe of the old Eastern Region. Ita, an Efik man from Calabar, was one of the pioneer nationalists for Nigerian Independence. Using the platform of the Ibibio Union, the minorities in the region (non-Igbo), mainly people of the old Calabar Kingdom, the Ijaw and Ogoja demanded a region of their own, the Calabar – Ogoja – Rivers region. The struggle for creation of the Calaba – Ogoja – Rivers States continued and was a major issue concerning the status of minorities in Nigeria during debates in Europe on Nigerian Independence. As a result of this crisis, Professor Ita Eyo left NCNC to form a new political party called the National Independence Party (NIP) which was one of the five Nigerian Political Parties represented at the Conferences on Nigerian Constitution and Independence. A new phase of the struggle saw the declaration of an Independent Niger Delta republic by Isaac Adaka Boro during Nigeria President Irons' administration, just before Nigerian civil war.

During the Nigerian Civil War, in 1967, Cross Rivers, East Central and Rivers were created by Major General Yakubu Gowon. The creation of Rivers State was for the other minorities especially the Ijaw, and Ogoni. Cross Rivers State was later split into Cross Rivers and Akwa Ibom States in the year 1987 by Major General Ibrahim Badamusi Babangida. During the General Sani Abacha regime, Rivers State in 1996 was also divided into Rivers and Bayelsa States.

3.5. Slave Trade in Niger Delta

Slave trade in the Niger Delta Region occurred from 1442 to 1830. Etekpe (2008) asserts that: “the European plunderer commenced their activities in the Region with slave trade in 1442. Slave trade brought about severe social, economic and political crisis” (p.87). Faye (1965) Postulates that:

To begin with, unwary strangers were kidnapped and then neighbouring tribes were attacked with deliberate purpose of taking captives from the slave trade. This process was assisted by the fact that, through their trade with European, the people near the coast acquired fire arms before the inland people did. This resulted in unwanted intra-inter commonwealth wars where the abled-bodied young men were captured and brought to the British Merchants. There are records that the Itsekiri, Urhobo and Isoko clans for example, fought several inter-communal wars instigated by the British Merchants (p.79).

Sequel to the above, in an effort to protect and sustain their trade, the British merchants began to interfere in the politics and commerce of the city states in the Niger Delta Region. This conflicts among communities through creation of trade rivalries and the deposition of powerful traditional rulers that challenged their “unlimited power” and authority. There are records that by this process, the Ijaw became victims and were the first to be shipped as slaves from the West African Coast in 1442 to the Gold Coast (Ghana) to mine gold for the Portuguese. Ajayi (1965) states that about 900,000 slaves were exported to America alone, and of this number, those from the present Niger Delta constituted 8 percent. In 1699, the slave trading system was expanded from Primeriro, Escravos, Benin Forcados and Romos to Bonny City State in the present Rivers State and to the Western Niger Delta. It continued to 18th century where most of the slaves bought in the Benin River were obtained

from Itsekiri and Urhobo areas, though it was abolished in 1830 and replaced by the legitimate trade.

3.6. Settlement Pattern

Being a deltaic region, its settlement pattern is largely determined by the availability of dry land and the nature of the terrain. There is the absence of large settlements in the region, as a result of the low relief and poor ground drainage. The few large settlements according to NDRMP (2006) “occur in Delta States hinterland, which has better drainage conditions and accessibility”(p53). *The mangrove swamp* zone has cities like Port Harcourt, Sapele, Ugheli, and Warri, located at the head of the navigable limits of the coastal rivers and estuaries. There are a total of 13,329 settlements, 94% of which has a population of less than 5000 persons and 1% of which are urban. The urban settlements include Port Harcourt, Warri, Asaba, Benin, Akure, Calabar, Uyo, Umuahia, Aba, Owerri, and Yenagoa. Most settlements are small and scattered hamlets, majority of which are rural in nature. Most of these settlements lack essential amenities such as medical facilities, portable water, power supply and good transportation network. The few large settlements are usually According to NDRMP (2006) separated by their outer rotational farmlands, oil palm or rubber plantation, bush or stretches of secondary forest (p.53).

3.7. Economic Activity

The traditional predominant occupation economic activities of the communities can be categorised as follows:

Land based type on the drier parts of the northern end of the Delta, which includes farming, fishing, collecting and processing of palm fruits and hunting while Water based type of economy at the Southern parts of the Delta, includes fishing, gathering of sea foods, and

trading, with a less diversified economy. The crises of environmental degradation may be traced to the following factors:

- Rapid population growth
- Oil exploration
- Expansion of imports
- Consumption of a range of goods and services
- Growing levels of industrial and manufacturing activities
- Inefficient use of farmland through bush fallowing and
- Other forms of uncontrolled exploitation of nature's resources.

So far, there are no clearly formulated policies in Nigeria aimed at coordinating and monitoring the relationship between the environment and economic development, but there are a number of scattered and working articulated programmes and analyses, reveal the directions as well as limitations of environmental and natural resources management strategies in Nigeria

The region is endowed with both renewable and non-renewable natural resources. The major non-renewable resources include fossil fuels, crude oil and natural gas and construction materials such as gravel, sand, clay and earth. Sand is obtained from both land and river beds. Renewable resources include water resources, timber, pole wood, fuel wood, edible vegetables, fruits, nuts and seeds; medicinal plants, palm wine and other palm products; fibres and tannin, bamboo and grasses, wildlife and a rich aquatic life yielding abundant resources of shell and fin fish and crustaceans. There is an interface between environment and development which is of global concern. The exploitation of resources or raw materials

for use in economic activities, agro-processing and industrial activities impact negatively on the environment of the Niger Delta.

3.8. Occupation of the Niger Delta People

Base on the existence of the Niger Delta People, it has been discovered that the people are rooted in agriculture. They are seen to be more of farmers and fishermen. Akporaro (2008) states that “the predominant occupation of the people are farming and fishing” (p.286). Akinbuwa (2008) commenting on the sorry state of the region states “ecological devastation, which is occasioned by the activities of oil transactional corporations (TNCS) have rendered useless farming and fishing, which was previously the main occupation of these rural people” (p.301).

Sequel to the above, Onduku (2001) affirmed that ecologically, unfriendly activities of oil TNC’S and the state’s Petroleum Development Policies, lead to poverty in the Niger Delta region and poverty in turn leads to environmental degradation.

It is obvious that their farming is mostly on subsistence basis, but in the midst of this, they will still have enough to sell out on commercial basis. Fishing industry in the Niger Delta Region is so large that it is usually supplied to different parts of this country. However, some of their rivers, stream, even ocean have been polluted through oil spillage and it affects aquatic lives. Most places that experience oil spillage are made barren for crop production.

3.8.1. Indigenous Food Resources

Farming practices according to Okuneye (1985) involve principally, the traditional peasant subsistence/crop farming method, land and labour being the principal inputs of

production. It is characterized by very small farm sizes of less than one hectare per household in most cases. Major food resources of the region include

- Roots and tubers like cassava, yams, cocoyam, and sweet potatoes.
- Cereal groups like maize, rice
- Legumes such as cowpeas, melon, groundnut
- Fruits including plantain, bananas, citrus, pineapples, mango, guava, cashew, paw-paw, local pear.
- Vegetables like pumpkin, bitter leaf.
- Edible oils like palm oil and groundnut oil.
- meat types such as goat(sheep), mutton rabbits, pork (from pigs), poultry, beef cows or sea foods like fish, shrimps, crayfish and mollusks such as periwinkles, oysters and crabs. Others includes Wildlife obtained through hunting and trapping of grass cutters, antelopes, snails and bush pigs. Crop, animal, fish products over the years show a steady decline as the environment experienced serious pollution due to contamination by crude oil.

3.8.2. Fisheries and Forestry Production

The Niger Delta ecosystems crucial for fish production include; Inshore waters, brackish waters, mangroves, freshwater swamps, floodplains and rivers. Common species are divided into coastal marine, brackish stocks and freshwater stocks

Forestry resources include timber and non-timber resources. Timber resources include saw logs transmission poles, building poles, bamboo, fuel-wood, and chewing stick. Non timber

resources include oil palm, raffia palm, various fruits like bush mango (ogbono), spices, various roots, tree barks, leaves, climbers and giant snails.

3.8.3. Industries

Major industrial activities include palm oil processing; gin distillers; mining, sand, gravel and clay. The petroleum industry, producing crude oil and gas. Petroleum activities include drilling, well testing, pipelines, construction, dredging, marine transport, air and land transport and chemical equipment supplies. Crude oil and gas production generate the bulk of Nigeria's export earnings producing about 90% of export earnings. Table 1.3 shows the oil industry data at a glance, culminating in the industry's impact on the environment, since the subject of this study relates to the environmental impact of the oil industry.

Table 1.3:

Nigeria's Oil Industry at a Glance Major International Operators	Shell (Shell Petroleum Development Company, Nigeria, Ltd); Chevron (Chevron Nigeria, Ltd.); ExxonMobil (Mobil Producing Unlimited); Eni (Nigerian Agip Oil Company); Total (Elf) (Total E&P Nigeria Limited, formerly EPNL)
Main Terminals/Offshore	Bonny Island (Shell), Brass River (Eni/Agip), Escravos (Chevron), Forcados

Platforms	(Shell), Kwa Iboe platform (Mobil), Odudu platform (Total),and, Pennington (Chevron), among others
Oil Reserves	36 billion barrels—11th in the world, 2nd in Africa; estimated reserve life of 41 years
Natural Gas Reserves	187 trillion cubic feet—7th largest gas reserves in the world
Oil/Gas Pipelines	Over 7,000 km of pipelines; 606 oil fields
Gas Plants/LNG	30; NLNG Plant with 6 trains; 2 LNG plants in construction in Brass and Olokola
Environmental Contamination	1958–2010: est. 546 million gallons spilled; av. 300 spills or nearly 10.8 million/year 1986-2003: 50,000 acres of mangrove forest disappeared Q1 2010: 32% of associated gas flared.

Source: Author's survey

CHAPTER FOUR

INSURGENCY IN NIGER DELTA

4.1. History of Insurgency in Nigeria

Previous insurgencies in Nigeria vary in their scope, sophistication and intensity. There have been at least six instances. This work needs to briefly consider them in turn, based on a rough chronological order.

4.1.1. Declaration of Niger Delta Republic

The first known insurgency or terrorist attempt in Nigeria may be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro in 1966. Major Boro belonged to the Ijaw ethnic extraction in the Niger Delta region and, at the time of his rebellion, was a student at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His complaint was against the exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the Niger Delta by both the federal and regional governments in total disregard of the citizens of the area. Boro formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed military group composed of 150 of his kinsmen. He firmly believed that the people of the Niger Delta deserved a more equitable share of the wealth which accrued from oil. To press his point home, on 23 February 1966, the NDVF declared the Niger Delta Republic. The Republic lasted only 12 days before the federal military forces crushed the insurgency and arrested Boro. He and his followers were charged, tried and imprisoned for treason. However, on the eve of the Nigeria-Biafra war in July 1967, General Yakubu Gowon granted them amnesty. Boro enlisted in the federal forces in the war against the rebel Biafran forces of Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu. According to Odumegwu Ojukwu, he died a hero at Ogu, near Okrika in Rivers State, having participated in the successful liberation of the Niger Delta from the Biafran forces.

From this episode of Nigerian history, we can identify a number of issues that continue to this day. First, the Niger Delta issue is not new. It has been in existence since the 1960's. second, it has not been forgotten, matters of security, insurgency and, indeed, the continued existence of Nigeria. Third, a resurgence of the threat of insurgency will likely re-emerge, either as a response to similar threats elsewhere in Nigeria or where there is a lapse

in the policy thrust to remedy the imbalance which caused the insurgency in the first place. This is the background to the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which we discuss later in this section. Fourth, it is noteworthy that the causative factors in this insurgency are still very much visible in the entire Niger Delta region, namely, extreme poverty in the midst of extreme affluence, and degradation of the human living environment to levels requiring concerted humanitarian intervention. Others include discriminatory public policies resulting in political alienation of the human population, unsustainable extractive economies and, finally, the absence of environmental remediation policies and activities. All these, and maybe more, are likely to fuel discontent and exacerbate future conflicts and insurgent tendencies.

4.1.2 Nigerian Civil War

The Nigerian civil war (sometimes called the Nigeria-Biafra War) was fought from 6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970. The war followed a coup d'état of 15 January 1966, led by military men of the Ibo-speaking ethnic group, and a counter-coup d'état of 29 July 1966, led by military men mostly of the Hausa-Fulani-speaking Northern region. A great social upheaval followed these coups, including the destruction of lives and property of persons from the southern part of the country, particularly those from Eastern Nigeria. Their kinsmen had been identified as leaders of the first coup, which eliminated prominent leaders of the north, including Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, then Prime Minister of Nigeria, and the sardauna Ahmadu Bello, then Premier of Northern Nigeria. Mwekikagile (2001) asserts that Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared independence from the Nigerian Federation on 27 May 1967,

naming the new state the Republic of Biafra. The civil war that ensued was probably the most devastating that the African continent has ever witnessed.

Even though the Nigerian civil war ended more than 42 years ago, there are still some critical, lingering issues and lessons that might be learnt from the war. First, the ethnocentric cum religious issues that were part of the driving force towards belligerent insurgency have not abated, but there is a visible crescendo in their intensity and complexity. The fraternity which seemed to be the fundamental objective in General Gowon's pronouncement at the end of the war announcing a policy of 'No victor no vanquished' is still to be realised in many respects. Second, more than anything else, the religious gap between the Christians and Muslims in the country is not narrowing. Rather, there has been a rise in the levels of distrust, mutual suspicion and antagonism that might well be making inroads into the political class. It is there that the tragedy may lie. Third, notwithstanding their obvious successes in the professions, commerce, industry and government, the Igbos, who inhabit the major proportion of what was Biafra, do not feel fully integrated into the body politic of Nigeria, and this gives rise to a feeling of marginalisation and alienation. As the Igbo are a major ethnic group in the Nigerian demographic structure, such feelings could fan the desire to rekindle the Biafran flame with all the attendant consequences for security and stability of the polity. Fourth, the primary cause of the Nigeria-Biafra War was ethno-religious hegemony and the problem of the consequential control of economic resources. This factor is still very prominent in Nigerian politics and ethno-religious struggles for supremacy.

A final and related issue we should note in the Biafra saga is the continued insistence of the Ibos that their boundaries remain coterminous with those of the former eastern region

of Nigeria, including the present Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Bayelsa States. This may have had a significant impact on the outcome of the civil war. While the minority ethnic group which constitute those four states - the Ijaws, Ibibios, Ogojas, Efiks and others - insist that they have nothing to do with Biafra, the Igbos insist that they do. This constitutes a serious conflict between the rights of the minorities, on the one hand, and the ambition of the Ibos, on the other. The truth is that, from the onset of the civil war, there has been and still continues to be a deep-seated distrust between the minority ethnic and the Igbos, and none of the two sides seem to be making any effort to assuage the other. This situation is a ticking time bomb.

4.1.3 Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

More than two decades after the end of the Nigerian civil war, there emerged the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). This movement is led by Mr Ralph Uwazurike, a lawyer by training. This movement has a firm root in the five South-East states of Nigeria that are home to the Ibo people. MASSOB has been reported to be well armed and there have been reported cases of confrontation with the Nigerian police and military forces. MASSOB adopts the Biafran national flag and this can be seen displayed in the South-East political zone of the country. The conspicuous display of the Biafran flag in a territory that would otherwise be Nigerian sovereign territory suggests that a state of Biafra still exists - at least in the minds of the Igbos.

MASSOB is obviously a logical follow-up to the failed activities of the Biafran belligerents. The agony of defeat, coupled with the unsettled issues that continue to bedevil the Nigerian polity, naturally extends the erstwhile belligerent posturing into this new

strategy in anticipation of better opportunities to resuscitate full-scale belligerency. MASSOB has so far never claimed responsibility for any terrorist act, nor has anyone been attributed to its activities so far. However, MASSOB has introduced and circulated Biafran currency notes as legal tender. It has also issued passports for citizens of Biafra. MASSOB issued an 'official' statement in 2009, predicting the collapse and disintegration of the Nigerian state by 2013. The statement said that six republics are likely to emerge after the disintegration of Nigeria, namely, Biafra Republic (Igbo East), Arewa Republic (Hausa-Fulani North) and Oodua Republic (Yoruba West), and three other unnamed republics.

4.1.4 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and Related Insurgencies

More than 30 years after the demise of Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro, there was a resurgence of the armed protest against the federal government in Nigeria and the multinational companies engaged in the oil industry of the Niger Delta. Most of the armed groups were made up of raggedy, ill-equipped, restive youths, who are spread across the length and breadth of the Delta region. At its inception, this resurgence seemed to be decidedly unfocused as to who the target should be - whether it should focus on the oil companies, the government, or the chieftains and their middlemen as the primary culprits in the perceived scheme of denials of benefits from oil operations and from the associated injuries to the people and their environment.

Initially, therefore, there was great infighting among these armed youths. This came to a head in the late 1990s, as the main communities in Warri, Delta State, went into an all-out armed conflict, one ethnic group against the other. The war was centred on who should control the oil benefits coming to Warri, a centre of oil production, next in importance only to Port

Harcourt, Rivers State, in the West African oil industry. The Ijaws, Itshekiri's and the Urhobos fought a destructive war for the soul of Warri for more than five years. However, somehow the realisation that the common enemy was the federal government and its foreign company partners changed the campaign focus from an internecine fratricide to a major campaign against the government. By this time, the restiveness of the youths had spread across the entire Niger Delta and was growing in sophistication. There are allegations that corrupt politicians may have unwittingly aided the process of militarisation of the Niger Delta for personal reasons, unmindful of the consequences of their activities.

Earlier on there had been various movements and activists who opposed the perceived injustice. Muzan (1999) viewed that the Niger Delta people were forced to accept the government and its multi-national oil company partners. In most cases, including Umuechem and Ogoni in Rivers State, they were mostly non-violent. However, when Ken Saro-Wiwa, a non-violent environmental activist of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was executed by the Nigerian government, this fuelled an insurgency across the Niger Delta. At the height of the Niger Delta insurgency, some of the groups had a very sophisticated arsenal that would have been the boast of any group in the history of guerilla warfare. Among these groups were Ateke Tom's group and Alhaji Mujaheed Asari Dokubo's Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, both of which spread throughout the entire Niger Delta region. This period also saw the emergence of the group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

MEND considers itself to be an umbrella group, co-ordinating a large number of groups of various sizes and lethal capacity that spread the entire length and breadth of the

Niger Delta region. Their influence extend from the creeks of Ondo State in the west, to the mouth of the Cross River in the extreme east of Nigeria's Atlantic coast and up north to the point of primary bifurcation of the river Niger, in that triangular fashion. The tactics used by MEND and its Niger Delta insurgent groups are largely those of guerilla warfare. Using speed boats and highly-sophisticated weapons, they often quickly out-maneuver and overrun elite security operatives hired to guard the oil operations in the creeks, swamps and offshore areas. The insurgents completely shut down operational systems, and they also kill, maim and take hostages, demanding large sums of money in foreign currency for their release. There have been reported incidents of bombings attributed to MEND, including the incident in Abuja for which the leader of MEND, Henry Okah, was convicted in South Africa. Based on reported activities beyond the confines of the Niger Delta, MEND seems to have expanded beyond the Niger Delta region to become a virtually nation-wide insurgency.

4.1.5. Oodua People's Congress

The Western states of Nigeria are home to the Yoruba and the the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), a nationalist Yoruba organisation formed in 1997. The founding head of the organisation is Dr Fredrick Fasheun, and its militant arms are headed by Ganiyu Adams. The organisation came about as a natural outcome of the massive Yoruba protests which followed the death of Chief Mashood Abiola, who was widely regarded as the winner of the later annulled presidential elections of 12 June 1993. Adams (1999) postulates that clashes between the OPC and law enforcement agencies, primarily the police, intensified the activity of a dissident group within the OPC, which ultimately broke away to form the Oodua Liberation Movement, sometimes also known by the name Revolutionary Council of Nigeria

(RCN). This splinter group became far more militant in its operations. This group opposes Nigeria's federal system of government and wants the Yoruba to secede from Nigeria and form a sovereign Oodua Republic.

4.1.6. Northern Arewa Groups

We now turn to the northern part of the country known as Arewa. Until recently, the north had not seen any sustained terrorist attacks which could be characterised as approaching insurgency. There were, however, violent conflicts in the north in the late 1970s and 1980s. These were violent, intra-religious campaigns between different sects of Islam that resulted in the deaths of several thousand people. The Maitatsine sect led by Sheik Muhammadu Maruwa according to Ibrahim (1996) fought mainstream Muslims who refused to accept its path in Islam. Coincidentally, there were frequent violent and bloody intra-religious clashes between members of *Izalatul bidi'at wa Ikamatul Sunna (Izala)* and the *Tijaniyya Tariqa and Quadriyya Tariqah (Tariqah)* sects. Also Ibrahim (1996) asserts that the *Izala*, headed by *Shiekh Abubakar Muhammadu Gummi*, regarded the *Tariqah* sect as un-Islamic and prevented them from leading Jumat prayers. This prohibition led to violence that erupted.

Aside from the *Izala* and the *Tariqah* upheavals, there were hardly any serious conflicts in the north of a major dimension before the current Jos crisis. Though some other minor crisis like that of Kafanchan Kataf crisis 1987, Zakibiam crisis, and others. The Jos crisis involves issues similar to those facing the Warri in Delta State, including control of territory, ethnic hegemony and political, economic, socio-cultural rights. Religion and ethnicity are more prominent in the Jos crisis than it was in the Warri crisis and is crucial to a

lasting solution in Jos. The Jos crisis has had a long gestation period and has simmered for a long time. The sudden rupture and intensity of the conflict may not be entirely unconnected with recent changes in the Nigerian legal system, particularly constitutional issues relating to religion, local government and representation in the state and federal legislatures. Jos offers the best example in the north of Nigeria where pre-colonial and colonial history have produced a fusion of ethnicity, religion, politics, law and economics, which now produce upheavals that may last for a long time to come. It has been noted according to Ibrahim (1996) that the British colonial administrators placed several non-Hausa enclaves under Fulani rule under the emirs during their rule of the north while, at the same time, the indigenes of these areas were being converted to Christianity and not Islam, the religion of the emirs. According to Ibrahim (1996):

The result was that most of them became Christians. Their journey to Christianity also ensured that they got Western education, and in the context of the modern Nigerian State, that translated to power through holding state positions. These people now do not understand why some 'foreigners' should come and lord over them in their own land (p.32)

Ekeh (1996) makes that same point rather emphatically, as follows:

These non-Muslim areas have become the Christian north, one of the remarkable developments in Nigeria's history. But Christian Northern Nigeria carries with it scars of its past wounds inflicted by Fulani slave raids. Christianity in the north has

become much more than a mere profession of faith. It is a political statement of freedom from Fulani control.(p.12)

This 'political statement' is likely to be heard louder and louder as the Christian population grows in the north and the traditional Hausa-Fulani hegemony becomes increasingly challenged.

This realisation may have informed the establishment of the Arewa People's Congress. Even though the name 'Arewa' means 'north', a geographical description, the real focus may be northern elements of Hausa-Fulani extraction. Onimajesin (2014) states that, the Arewa People's Congress is a group established in Northern Nigeria in December 1999 to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria. It was probably established to counter the growing influence in the Western parts of Nigeria of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC), which was reported to have been engaging in increasing confrontations with the Hausa-Fulani in the west. Not much is known of the activities of the APC, and one can only speculate regarding the scope of interests of the Hausa-Fulani contemplated by the APC and how it goes about meeting that pronounced objective. However, this is regarded as closely allied with the wider Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), an umbrella socio-cultural body in the north which also includes non-Hausa Fulani elements.

4.1.7. Jama'atu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati wal Jihad (Boko Haram)

The latest upheaval in the north is Boko Haram which has, without a doubt, the character of an insurgency. The rise of the Boko Haram (meaning 'Western education is sinful') has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity like the Niger

Delta region insurgency. The group has probably only existed for about three years. It is based in the northern states of Nigeria and has attacked both the police and military, churches and other places of worship, schools, international agencies, market squares and other highly-public targets. Newspaper estimates place the number of casualties in the wake of the Boko Haram campaign in the hundreds of thousands, with many others maimed or wounded. The group's weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degrees of lethal capacity. The government is probably doing its best to contain the insurgency, but it is very clear that the task of bringing back the peace and tranquillity that once characterised the northern states must be everybody's concern.

4.1.8. Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru)

Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina Biladis Sudan, known as *Ansaru* (meaning *Vanguards for the protection of Muslims in black Africa*), is a self-proclaimed Islamist Jihadist militant group, which is based in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria. It was founded in January 2012, when it broke away from Boko Haram. Idris (2013) says that it is reputed to have a more international focus than Boko Haram. Ansaru's motto is '*Jihad fi Sabilillah*', which means 'Struggle for the cause of Allah'. This group is still very new and secretive in its operation. It is alleged to have abducted a Briton and an Italian from Kebbi State, a French national from Katsina State and, in February 2013, seven French citizens from Northern Cameroon. These kidnappings are the best known of this group's activities in its barely two-year history. More time will be needed to make conclusions as to whether the group's activities are escalating or de-escalating.

4.2. Insurgency in the Niger Delta

The activities of the multinational oil corporations and the government have not gone unchallenged in the Niger Delta. The earliest post-independence act of armed resistance was led by a former teacher, police-officer, students' union leader and activist of Ijaw ethnic minority extraction: Isacc Jasper Adaka Boro. In the early hours of February 23, 1966, just a decade after the discovery oil in the Niger Delta, Tebekaemi (1982) presents that Adaka Boro and his 59-man Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) declared "The Niger Delta Republic, distinct and separate from Nigeria" (pp.119-120). Adaka Boro and his compatriots' "12-Day Revolution" was provoked by what they saw as social neglect, ethnic chauvinism, political marginalization and economic deprivation, orchestrated by Nigeria's post-independent ruling elites. This much was made clear by Boro, while addressing his men according to Tebekaemi (1982):

Let us examine with some latitude whether the state of development is to any extent commensurate with a tint of the bulk of already tapped mineral and agricultural resources... Therefore, remember your seventy-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; remember also your poverty stricken people; remember too your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins, and then fight for your freedom. (p.116).

The Adaka Boro led uprising was however crushed by federal troops after twelve days. Boro was subsequently arrested alongside some of his men, tried for treasonable felony, found guilty and sentenced to death. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and he was released by the new military government that emerged after the July 1966 counter-coup and later fought on the federal side during the Nigerian civil war

(1967-1970). He was killed towards the end of the war in controversial circumstances, making some of his supporters suspect that he was assassinated.

The end of the Nigerian civil war coincided with the increase in oil prices, which propelled Nigeria from a relatively poor cash crop exporter into the rank of a wealthy petrodollar dominated economy. The resulting oil boom fuelled increased government expenditure at all levels. The rapid expansion of the economy following the quadrupling of global oil prices by 1973 also fuelled an import-dependent industrialization strategy. Agriculture which had been the Nigerian economic mainstay was neglected. Massive government expenditure on infrastructure, prestige projects and the rapidly expanding public sector was funded by oil exports.

The industrialization was however limited to light manufacturing and large-scale turn key projects in the petroleum sector, iron and steel and the automobile industry. Little effort was invested in heavy industry, research and development, and the diversification of the oil-based economy, the country's fortunes became tied to an "enclave" oil industry. Thus, it was not unexpected that the collapse in global oil prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s sent the Nigerian economy into a tailspin.

The global economic recession was sharply refracted into Nigeria, leading to a deep-seated economic crisis. By the mid-1980s, the post-war oil-boom that had buoyed massive government expenditure, consumption and profligacy, had effectively come to an end, forcing the government to seek an economic rescue package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In 1986, in spite of public rejection, the government signed and adopted an IMF/World Bank market-based economic reform package – the Structural

Adjustment Programme (SAP). Within five years, the deleterious social consequences of SAP had become obvious, as the living conditions of the vulnerable groups in society were severely impoverished and traumatized by the market-based “shock therapy” of the Bretton Woods institutions, which was further compounded by military repression and misrule, whose effects were felt throughout the country, but particularly in the Niger Delta where the exploitation of oil was intensified.

It was in the context of the socio-economic crisis partly occasioned by the collapse of the external oil sector, prolonged misrule and continued neglect of the Niger Delta by the government-oil companies’ partnership that the spirit of resistance in the region was revived. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer, activist, businessman and environmentalist founded a grass-root movement in early the 1990s called “Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People” (MOSOP). MOSOP campaigns as a grass-root organization demanded local autonomy for the Ogoni people, and Ogoniland. There was also a call for the recognition of the economic contributions of Ogoni to the Nigerian State, and restitution for poverty in Ogoni as well as the ecological damage to Ogoniland by oil and mining activities. MOSOP also protested the marginalization of the Ogoni and her people at the federal and state levels demanding equal citizenship rights as other groups in Nigeria (Ken Saro-Wiwa, 1992, 1995; Ike Okonta, 2008; Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, 2001; CLO, 2002). The Ogoni demands are contained in the “Ogoni Bill of Rights”, presented by MOSOP to the Nigerian government in 1990. The demands contained in the Bill of Rights were ignored by the federal military government.

MOSOP, under the leadership of the charismatic writer and Ogoni ethnic minority rights activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, targeted and successfully stopped Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and all oil activities in the whole of Ogoniland through

peaceful non-violent mass action in 1993. However, the Nigerian state under the authoritarian military regime led by General Sani Abacha repressed the Ogoni campaign using military force. Many MOSOP cadres and Ogoni people suffered from the military campaigns against the Ogoni, and some fled into exile or went underground. This culminated in the arrest, torture, detention, trial and the widely condemned execution by hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight leaders of MOSOP on November 10, 1995 on the orders of a special tribunal and sanctioned by the military ruling council (Human Rights Watch, 1999; CLO, 2001). In his last address to the special tribunal, Ken Saro-Wiwa predicted that the struggle would continue, and sounded a wake-up call to the ethnic nationalities of the delta and beyond Okonta and Douglas, (2001). In his words:

Whether the peaceful ways favored will prevail depends on what the oppressor decides what signals it sends out to the waiting public... I call upon the Ogoni people, the peoples of the Niger Delta, and the oppressed minorities of Nigeria to stand up now and fight fearlessly and peacefully for their rights.

After the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and some members of MOSOP's leadership, other ethnic minority resistance movements emerged in the Niger Delta. These included: Movement for Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), Movement for Reparation to Ogbia (MORETO), the Chikoko Movement, the Oron National Forum, Egi Peoples Coalition, Ikwere Youth Convention, the Ijaw Youth Council amongst others. All these ethnic movements favored the non-violent approach adopted by MOSOP.

The Nigeria government backed by oil corporations, however, did not accede to the demands of these groups. The militarization of the Niger Delta region and the repression of

the non-violent protests that followed, left trails of “sorrow, tears, blood” anguish and death. The heavy toll in terms of human rights abuses in the region according to Courson (2006, 2007) worsened matters. In some cases, entire oil-bearing communities were razed to the ground after the military were informed by oil companies that protesting communities were threatening oil facilities or staff. As Zalik (2004) noted, the Niger Delta is a “region that has been marked by a history of state and petroleum industry collusion both in social repression and environmental destruction”. For his part, Watts (2004) has described the Niger Delta region as being embroiled in “petro-violence”.

Apart from its repression of the IYC-led protests in December 1998, the military turned its attention to other oil-bearing communities of the delta including those in the Ijaw axis (Yenagoa, Mbiama, Bomadi, Kaiama). Partly in response to the excesses of the military forces in the region, the realignment of political forces in the run up to Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, and the view that non-violent protests were not achieving any substantial result, some irrepressible pressure groups emerged in various parts of Ijaw territories. The militarization of the region had begun to gradually elicit a response in the shift in local resistance from a non-violent to a violent form. The new groups include MOSIEND, Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), The Atangbala Boys (TAB), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF) amongst others. These pressure groups were initially formed with the aim of continuing the struggle for the emancipation of the people and the environment of the delta from the firm grip of the Federal Government and the oil multinationals.

However, some of them moved into a violent phase. Thus, the tension in the Niger Delta remained high as Nigeria transitioned from military dictatorship to democratic rule in 1999. The enthronement of democratic rule initially raised hopes that the crisis in the Niger Delta could be resolved democratically. But within a few years such hopes gave way to frustration, anger and the drift towards more violence.

4.2.1. Insurgency in Niger Delta after Military Rule.

The end of military rule and emergence of civil rule in Nigeria in May 1999 was meant to be a new start for good and responsive governance. The election of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 ended decades of military dictatorship, and was expected to open up the democratic space to enable Nigerians to participate in the governance of their country. To the disappointment of many, political corruption, cronyism and electoral fraud undermined Nigeria's post-military democracy.

In the Niger Delta, the return to democracy raised hopes that justice and equity would be delivered with regard to the Niger Delta question. These hopes were partly based on discussions between the President-elect and various ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta with a view to addressing their grievances.

However, within his first year in office President Olusegun Obasanjo deployed more troops to some troubled spots in the Niger Delta. Barely six months into the democratic dispensation, to be precise, on November 20, 1999; Odi, an oil-bearing community in Bayelsa state was razed to the ground by troops ordered in by the President. According to some estimates, about 2,483 persons (mainly women and children), lost their lives.² the invasion and massacre was attributed to the need to arrest a certain youth gang accused of

murdering nine police officers in the community. But five days later, Major General T.Y. Danjuma, then Minister of Defense revealed to the public that the action was taken to protect oil installations in the territory. Femi Fani-Kayode, an aide of President Olusegun Obasanjo, while justifying the military onslaught on communities in the Niger Delta stated as follows: when we need to be hard, we have been very hard. We were very tough when it came to Odi town where our policemen and our people were killed by these ethnic militants. And the federal government went in and literally leveled the whole place. And the proof of the pudding is in the eating. It has never happened again since that time. So, I think that policy works.

It can be deduced that the policy of the government was partly informed by the resort to the military option in dealing with oil producing communities seen to be protesting against oil companies or suspected of harboring militants. In this regard, the Odi invasion was followed by others in Odioma (2005) and Agge (2008) communities.

The federal government officially drafted a Joint Task Force (JTF) made up of the three arms of the military and security services, under a military campaign code named “Operation Restore Hope” to curb the restiveness in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Its mandate among others was to secure oil installations, curb oil community agitation and neutralize any threat to the oil industry.

The 2003 elections in Nigeria were another turning point in the history of the Niger Delta Insurgency. Some of the militias in the region were armed and used by political power elites and office seekers against real and perceived opponents. As a result, scores of politicians and people were intimidated, maimed or killed before and during the

elections. Youth groups backed by those in power and loyal to politicians were armed and used to rig the elections, while some oil corporations reportedly aided the effort.³ Such youth groups also operated with impunity and recklessly in collaboration with compromised agents of the state to ensure the victory of the ruling party (PDP). The Environmental Rights Action, a local non-profit organization, described the 2003 elections as “a low intensity armed struggle.”

The use of violence during elections also contributed to the acquisition and use of sophisticated weapons and firearms in various parts of the delta and even beyond setting the pace for a post-election armed resistance struggle in the Niger Delta. This is where greed rather than grievance crept into the conflict dynamics in the region. The youth gangs fell to the lure of political office holders and politicians due to the easy cash flow and state protection they received.

The Nigerian political space is dominated by corrupt, greedy and desperate elites who will stop at nothing just to acquire political power. Corruption has been institutionalized by the ruling elites in Nigeria; hence political leaders embezzle most of the money accruing from the sale of oil. A former anti-corruption czar in Nigeria, Mr. Nuhu Ribadu while granting an interview to the BBC in 2006 said, “More than \$380bn has either been stolen or wasted by Nigerian governments since independence in 1960”.⁵ He says when you fight corruption in Nigeria it fights you back, and posits that unless the problem of corruption is frontally addressed, Nigeria may not reach her desired destination due to greed by her political and ruling elites.

Alhaji Dokubo-Asari who had worked closely with the government of Rivers State before and during the election, reportedly fell out with his erstwhile patron, then Governor Peter Odii of Rivers State for criticizing the conduct of the elections as fraudulent and unacceptable to the Ijaws.¹ This incident later degenerated into a bloody conflict between Dokubo-Asari's Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) on the one hand, and the security agencies and Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) on the other.

The attack and counter-attack by these two groups left scores dead and property worth millions destroyed. Alhaji Dokubo-Asari changed tactics from attacking the military to attacking oil installations in the creeks of the Niger Delta. His strategy of attacking the soft underbelly of the Nigerian economy rather than the military (oil installations) adversely affected the international oil market, leading to increases in the price of oil whenever such attacks resulted in the shut-in of oil production, and reduced oil exports.

However, peace was restored between Dokubo-Asari and Ateke through the intervention of some youths in the region, and negotiations in the federal capital city Abuja, after which both men agreed to lay down their arms, and the federal government granted the militants amnesty. Although the violent conflict subsided, other political struggles continued. Some such struggles involved members of the Niger Delta ruling elite and their federal counterparts. At the heart of such fractional struggles was the question of power within the PDP as the party began early preparations for the 2007 elections. In September 2005, Ebitimi Banigo an Ijaw businessman was arrested and his bank basically shut down by the authorities citing certain technicalities. At the same time, D.S.P Alamieyeigha the governor of Bayelsa State (the only wholly Ijaw State) was arrested in far away London on money laundering charges. Also, Dokubo-Asari the NDPVF leader was arrested in the government house in

Port Harcourt on September 20 and taken to Abuja, where he was later charged with treason in relation to his campaign for resource control and the holding of a sovereign national conference. These events increased tensions and restiveness in the Niger Delta as the Ijaw felt that some of their leaders were being unfairly targeted by the federal government. Such feelings were further fed by the perceptions of the JTF as an “army of occupation” in the Niger Delta.

The arrest and detention of Dokubo-Asari and Alamieseigha among other things created conditions for the escalation of tensions in the Niger Delta, and the emergence of some radical tendencies within the Ijaw movement based on the feeling that the non-violent path to the struggle for resource control had failed to get the federal government and oil companies to change their attitude towards the plight of the people of the Niger Delta. This was the background to the coming together of various militias and armed groups in the region leading to the emergence of MEND.

4.2.2. MEND Insurgency: The Local-Global Dimension

In November and December of 2005, two explosives were detonated in the creeks of Rivers State, destroying two Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) pipelines located in Okirika and Andoni axis with no person or group (s) claiming responsibility. On January 11, 2006 an SPDC oil-field located about 20km offshore was attacked, damaged and four expatriates abducted by militants after a fierce gun duel with the military guarding the oil-field.² The dust had barely settled when Sunday January 15, 2006, MEND militants “attacked and destroyed one flow station and two military house-boats belonging to SPDC in Benisede, Bayelsa State”.³

MEND's objective, according to the spokesperson of MEND Jomo Gbomo "is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil". These attacks and shut-in of 400,000 bpd led to hike in the price of oil on the international market. Commenting on the strategy Boyloaf, then MEND Commander, explained that it was based on targeting oil facilities rather than the military. in his words:

I believe the economy is the power. Like you may have known, I don't believe in fighting human beings, I believe in crumbling the economy. On my way crumbling (sic) the economy, if any military man comes across me and tries to stop me, I mean those people will kiss their graves. My bullet, nozzle is always targeted at the flow stations, pipelines etc, I don't believe in fighting human beings. Before we formed the MEND, our people were fighting, but it was a war between the Ijaw and Itsekiri, that was not the Niger Delta struggle.

Sensing that the disruption of the oil flow from the Niger Delta to the global market would have a most potent and devastating effect on the federal government, oil companies and international community, the MEND militants withdrew from the cities of the Niger Delta and went into the maze of creeks. The attacks on the infrastructure of the oil industry, particularly oil production and oil export had the effect of cutting oil production and pushing up the price of oil in the tight and nervous global market.

MEND as a group/ movement has no clear leadership structure. The only known face of MEND is its anonymous or veiled spokesperson Jomo Gbomo, who is known only through press statement distributed to the media. The movement is a loose coalition of shadowy groups (cells) and a variety of leaders scattered across the states of the Niger Delta,

who sometimes are unaware of events undertaken by other cells until such events are publicized. The decision not to have a single command structure but a diverse and amorphous leadership is to make the movement elusive, but effective in guerilla warfare extending over the whole region. This is a strategy aimed at avoiding the fate in earlier movements in the region with a visible leadership such as MOSOP, NDPVF, and EBA etc, whose leadership/top hierarchy was easily targeted for elimination, or compromised by the oil companies and the government. This “invisible” nature of MEND is an important factor making it difficult for the government, oil companies and even the military to target the organization and effectively neutralize its activities in the troubled Niger Delta.

This use of local force to block the global oil trade has been significant in two ways: on the one hand, it has led to more global attention being focused on the situation in the oil producing communities in the region, particularly the plight and demands of the people, while on the other it has raised the energy security stakes of the world’s established and emerging powers in the region. MEND has tapped fully into acts likely to draw global attention to the Niger Delta: the taking of western nationals as hostages and the shut-ins resulting from oil facility destruction that contribute to the higher price of crude oil. These acts have been connected to a sophisticated strategy for engaging global media through the use of IT, and drawing the attention of intervention agencies to the crisis and plight of the people in the region.

The JTF has always stated that MEND and other militia groups in the region are criminals and miscreants who have over the years been involved in illegal oil theft and other illegal activities and must be removed for the free flow of oil. This view resonates in a leaked military report by the then commander of the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta (2006-

2008), former Brig. Gen. L.P. Ngubane (as he then was), entitled “Brief for Chief of Defence Staff on Strategies to Stem out Militant Activities within the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope Area of Responsibility”.¹ The report was reportedly intercepted by the militants and released to the media.

In the report organizations such as MOSOP, INC, IYC, NDPVF and FNDIC are tagged as militant groups that must be crushed. The document highlights militant leaders in the region and estimates their capacities, weaponry and manpower. Marked for total annihilation are Ijaw communities such as Oporoza, Kurutie, Kunukunuma, Okerenkoko and other villages in Gbaramatu clan, Delta State, seen as incubators of militia activity. The report also identifies Ijaw communities in Bayelsa and Rivers States that should also be covered by the military campaign against Niger Delta insurgents. It was very clear that maximum military force rather than political action was required by the federal government to stamp out militancy using coordinated military counterinsurgency tactics and operations. The military posits that the resolution of the crisis lies in maximum military expenditure in the region even though it will result in innocent lives lost.

In tandem with the militarized approach to enforcing security in the region, the Nigerian government and the oil corporations with some logistical support from some foreign countries, have deployed more troops into the creeks to neutralize the “militants”. The government on its part has described the Niger Delta militants as criminals, just as some international analysts have tagged them “terrorists” that threaten legitimate oil commerce, property and human lives.

The result has been an increase in the use of the state security and coercive apparatus in the attempt to discredit and crush MEND. The Governors of the Niger Delta have been supportive of the approach adopted by the federal governments and oil companies. Hence the Governments of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers contribute about two hundred and fifty million naira each monthly to the sustenance of the security outfit in the region.³ The MEND militants view most of the Niger Delta Governors as external impositions on the region and are in a state of constant friction with these Governors. The Governors on their part have also internally devised the strategy of financial inducement as pay-offs to “cooperative” factional leaders/commanders or militants located in their territories in order to get the desired peace.

On its part, MEND has alleged that the military deployment to the creeks has mainly led to human rights abuses, harassment, rape, the sacking of communities, and death of innocent citizens, often without provocation. Shadi, (2009) writing in the Stanford Progressive observes that:

the overarching theme of this and similar resistance efforts, the liberation of a land occupied by an irresponsible foreign goliath cannot be dismissed as “terrorism”. It is this versimplification that forces people into arms. Whenever we regard the pain of others, regardless of how many borders or oceans are between us, with indifference, we open the door for such violent groups. We invite them into a world which doesn’t recognize a shared purpose, but instead chooses to reward those who recklessly pursue power and wealth. Without addressing the problems we have all helped fashion, we have all but invited such extremism into our shared world.

On February 15, 2006, military helicopter gunships were deployed hovering around the Okerenkoko (an Ijaw territory, termed stronghold of MEND militants in military circles) and its surrounding villages emitting explosives from above and shooting indiscriminately into communities. The action was replayed on the 17 and 18 February 2006. The three days aerial bombardment and shooting reportedly led to the destruction of three communities (Perezuoweikorigbene, Ukpogbene and Seitorububor) all in Gbaramatu clan, and left 20 persons dead. The government in its defense said that the Nigerian military was merely attacking and destroying barges used by oil thieves in the area. MEND movement, interpreted the attack by the military as a deliberate targeting for bombardment of the communities seen as sympathetic to its cause.

Thus, it responded swiftly by attacking of Forcados oil export terminal and wreaking havoc on the facility, taking nine expatriate hostages both in retaliation for the attack on Gbaramantu and to stop further attacks on oil communities. MEND has constantly reminded the public that their action was propelled by the desire for justice and fairness. According to the organization's spokesperson: "We are asking for justice. We want our land, and the Nigerian government to transfer all its involvement in the oil industry to host communities which will become shareholders in these oil companies". This demand is consistent both with the historical quest for local autonomy and resource control by the ethnic minorities of the oil producing Niger Delta. What has changed in real terms is the form of protest and resistance, which has entered a violent phase.

In April 20, 2006, MEND extended its attack into the cities in the region by detonating two bombs: one in Port Harcourt (Bori camp military barrack), and the other at a petrol tanker garage in the city of Warri. The group described the bomb attacks as "symbolic

rather than strategic”. Then President, Olusegun Obasanjo who had hitherto been talking tough called for dialogue and created the Council on Social and Economic Development of Coastal States (COSEEDDCS) and offered other palliatives to citizens of the delta.⁶ The former President’s palliatives appeared not to go far enough and failed to attract the attention of the people and militias.

On August 20, 2006, 15 Ijaw citizens were ambushed and murdered by the military Joint Task Force (JTF) while on their way back from Letugbene.¹ The paradox here is that MEND had facilitated the release of a Shell hostage and was taking him to safety when they were ambushed and killed. The victims were said to be returning from Letugbene after rescuing a Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) staff member (Ujeya Nelson) kidnapped by the inhabitants of Letugbene over the refusal of SPDC to honor a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) freely entered into with the community over the years. The incident in FNDIC’s view was a set-up orchestrated by the military and SPDC, and attributed to the resolve to intervene in the Letugbene saga after due pressures from the Ijaw Interactive Assembly, government functionaries (federal and state), officials of SPDC, Chief of Army Staff and the JTF. The circumstances of the killings had the effect of hardening MEND’s resolve to fight on. MEND as an organization may have been polarized or even infiltrated by the government and MNOCs in the region but their operations have extended to all nooks and crannies of the delta making it ubiquitous and elusive to handle by the military.

However, signs that the federal Government was preparing for a showdown with MEND and other militias appeared in early 2007 when then Vice President Atiku Abubakar while commissioning his campaign headquarters in Abuja on January 30 2007, revealed to

the public that the “administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a few weeks ago, just approved \$2 billion to buy weapons to fight the militants in the Niger Delta”. The militants responded saying, “we are prepared for war”.The Presidency then subsequently denied the claim by the Vice President Atiku Abubakar.

After his failed bid for a third term, President Olusegun Obasanjo stepped down from office. Following the rather controversial 2007 Nigerian general elections, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan (Vice President) came to power. The elections were marred by fraud and irregularities and were condemned by international observers and local monitors for not meeting democratic requirements nationally and internationally. Unlike Olusegun Obasanjo, the new president met two of MEND’s conditions in 2007: Alhaji Dokubo-Asari and D.S.P Alamiyeseigha were released from prison. While Dokubo-Asari was granted bail on health grounds, Alamiyeseigha pleaded guilty to charges of corruption and was freed after serving his prison term.

Henry Okah, a MEND leader agreed to participate in the dialogue process initially supported the formation of the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee (NDPCRC), and nominated its chairman and secretary after a meeting with the Nigerian Vice President in 2007. But a few months later, Henry Okah was arrested in Angola for gun-running and extradited to Nigeria and charged with treason and other related offences. His incarceration and trial by the Nigerian government further jeopardized the peace process in the region leading to the declaration of armed campaigns (Hurricane Barbarosa and Hurricane Obama) in the region by MEND and other groups calling for his immediate and unconditional release. MEND’s operations spanned the various states of the region, but took place mainly in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States. Also, offshore oil facilities that were

regarded as safe havens from militants' attacks have come under attack. On June 20, 2008, the SPDC operated Bonga oil platform (the largest offshore oil platform in the Niger Delta) located 120km offshore was attacked by MEND fighters. The attack underscored the sophistication of MEND fighters and showed that oil platforms/facilities (onshore or offshore) were within the reach of MEND fighters.

The signals of coercion in the region became evident when Nigeria's new President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua presented the 2008 budget to the National Assembly in December 2007. In the budget to the National Assembly the government allocated the sum of sixty-nine billion naira to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) for the development of the Niger Delta region, while the sum of four hundred and forty-four billion naira was allocated to security in the Niger Delta. Leaders, elders, activists and militia groups in the region condemned this action of the government saying it was a tactical declaration of war in the region by the federal government of Nigeria.

In the first half of 2009, the securitization of the Niger Delta in the form of increased deployment of military force became more apparent. Government stepped up its military action in the region in May 2009. After two days (May 13 and 14) of ground fighting between the Military Joint Task Force and militants in the Gbaramatu axis of the western part of Delta State, the military deployed four jet fighters, twenty-four gun boats and three battalions of the Nigerian army into the area. The JTF attributed the renewed hostility on the militants' base to the killing of eighteen military officers guarding oil facilities by fighters loyal to a militia leader Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo). On their part, the militants insist that the military attack on their base was unprovoked, but rather was a calculated attempt by the military to drag them into a pre-planned military battle for control of the oil

industry in the region. Camp 5 a suspected stronghold of the Tompolo-led militia was attacked by the military using jet fighter and bombs and aided by ground troops and naval support. The bomb attack was extended to Oporoza, the headquarters of the Gbara matu Kingdom where a cultural festival attended by indigenes and visitors was ongoing.

In Oporoza, the community's guesthouse, the king's palace and several buildings were attacked, with scores of people either wounded or killed. The military cordoned off the waterways and creeks then raided suspected militants' camps in the territory. The military attack was extended to several communities in the area such as Kurutie, Benikurukuru, Kunukunuma, Okerenkoko, Goba, Abiteye (Kiangbene). The military air, land and sea attack on communities left several persons dead (mainly children, women and the elderly) and several others missing (the missing cannot be ascertained because the region remains cordoned off by the JTF); Oboko Bello, a community leader in the kingdom put the figure of missing and dead tentatively at between 500 and 2,000.

The militants on the other hand, declared "Hurricane Piper Alpha" which was later upgraded to "Hurricane Moses" which targeted oil facilities in the territory and beyond by blowing up pipelines, flow-stations and oil facilities with the intent of crumbling the oil economy. These attacks reduced the oil output from 2.6 million bpd to 1.8 million bpd within a month of renewed militia attacks on oil facilities.³ Under pressure from the international community and mindful of the tense security situation in the region, the government in June entered into dialogue with various stakeholders and groups in the region to explore ways for ending the conflict and restoring order in the Niger Delta. These consultations were followed by the announcement by the federal government of an amnesty to militants willing to lay down their arms and be ready to be re-integrated into society. This, along with the dropping

of charges against, and release of Henry Okah from prison contributed to the declaration of a ceasefire by MEND. It however criticized the amnesty as announced by the government as superficial as it did not address the core/fundamental issues at the root of the violent agitations in the region. MEND militants' declaration of a 60-day ceasefire was largely due to the release of its leader Henry Okah by the government in accordance with one of its key demands.

Analyzing the emergence of MEND and its modus operandi, Shadi Bushra observes that the organization was a child necessity because "all manners of peacefully resisting the environmental, social, and economic degradation of their country at the hands of the oil companies have proven to be futile. As such, their only recourse has been the violent and mutually unbeneficial "war on oil companies." Shadi further noted that MEND's activities "may have led to the loss of lives, destruction of oil facilities, kidnap of foreign nationals and instability in the region, but their ultimate aim is to free the Niger Delta and its people from the vicious grip of the MNOCs and a corrupt and irresponsible government".

MEND's emergence has redefined the socio-economic space and political ecology of the Niger Delta and Nigeria as a whole. By resorting to armed struggle, the organization has tapped into the local-global dimension of the quest for resource control in the Niger Delta. It has also sought to move the effort for resolving the conflict outside of the exclusive sphere of the Nigerian state, which it perceives as being unable to be an honest broker-due to its own vested interests in the exclusive control of oil and its role as the partner of oil multinationals exploiting the oil in the Niger Delta. Thus, MEND has consistently called for international mediation in the conflict. It has also rejected the terrorist and criminal tags, insisting that its struggle is for survival, equity, dignity and justice for the people of the Niger Delta.

From the foregoing, it can be surmised that at the core of the Niger Delta conflict is the struggle for constitutional and legitimate rights, a struggle against poverty, marginalization, and political repression, unjust treatment of the region, environmental devastation and the insensitivity of the rulers to the plights of the people. Although there is some ambiguity and complexity built into the conflict, it is basically a struggle for the rights and dignity as well as social justice for the people of the Niger Delta who have paid a high price for hosting a global oil industry. Unless and until these issues are fundamentally and equitably addressed the conflict will continue to fester and may assume more complex or violent forms.

4.2.3. The International Dimension to Government's Management of the Niger Delta Insurgency.

Although the Niger Delta crisis pre-dated the age of oil and was embedded in ethnic minority agitation for self-determination, oil added a volatile dimension to it. An early sign of things to come was Isaac Adaka Boro's 'twelve-day revolution', which was eventually crushed by federal troops. It is instructive to note that Boro had initially made overtures to the international community, seeking support for his cause from the Cuban embassy in a neighbouring country, but was rebuffed.

However, the struggle of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta resurged in the early 1990s, when the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) successfully linked up with transnational rights advocacy organizations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization

(UNPO) and a pro-human-rights company, the Body Shop, which supported its international campaign against the government and Shell.

The MOSOP campaign as stated by Obi (2009) was “largely anchored on Saro-Wiwa’s reading of the ‘relevance of global discourses and transnational networking as a way of challenging economic injustice, environmental degradation and political marginalization, based on the right to self-determination of ethnic minorities”(p.474). Obi (2009) went further to say that“Saro-Wiwa went on to tap into this discourse by framing the Ogoni ‘issue’ in the context of environmental problems caused by Shell in a local community in Nigeria”(p.476).

By targeting Shell, the leading oil producer, as being complicit with the state in exploiting Ogoni resources, and violating the human and environmental rights of its people, MOSOP, as a non-state actor working with global NGOs, rights groups and media, became a potent counter-hegemonic actor in ‘Nigeria’s’ external relations. Apart from this, MOSOP’s protests and international campaign hurt both Shell and the state, with the latter having to deal with a challenge from within and from outside. Government’s initial response was to ignore MOSOP, but when it became clear that its international campaign was effective, the response changed from ambivalent indifference to the military repression of Ogoni protests.

Thus, when nine Ogoni leaders, including the MOSOP president, Ken Saro-Wiwa, were hanged on the orders of a special court and the military ruling council in November 1995, in spite of international appeals for clemency, leading the summit of the Commonwealth heads of state to suspend Nigeria from the body, the country’s oil

diplomacy was in crisis. A lot of resources went into laundering Nigeria's image and managing the diplomatic furore that followed the crisis.

On the one hand the Nigerian state had come down hard on its own citizens protesting against the exploitative and environmentally destructive practices of an oil MNC with which it was wedded in partnership, but on the other it had suffered condemnation internationally, to which it had respond, at a price. As Okonta (2008) notes, "this situation reduced the ability of Nigeria to 'scarcely look beyond its borders to participate effectively in the game of international power politics amidst this domestic turmoil'" (p.123).

The foregoing is a scenario that has largely haunted Nigeria's oil diplomacy since the Niger Delta resistance became globalized in the 1990s. The morphing of resistance to violent and insurgent proportions contributed to the situation in which Nigeria's oil production dropped by a third between 2006 and 2008.

This was due to disruptions in oil production and exports as a result of acts of sabotage, attacks on oil installations and the kidnapping of oil company expatriate workers for ransom by armed groups and militias seeking to attract international attention to their cause. The resultant shortfalls in state revenues, company profits and oil exports in an already tight global oil market contributed to further insecurity and the internationalization of the Niger Delta conflict. Reduced oil meant that the capacity to pursue an activist foreign policy was somewhat curtailed, but beyond that it also suggested that the strategic importance of the oil supplies from the Niger Delta made the security of the region itself a key object of Nigeria's oil diplomacy.

4.3. Factors Responsible for Insurgency in Niger Delta Region

There is a broad enough consensus about the characterization of the Niger Delta Insurgency as an extreme manifestation of Nigeria's larger and long-standing twin crises of underdevelopment and nation-building (FGN 2009; Obi 2006; Kew and Phillips 2007; UNDP 2006). We identify five interrelated dimensions of the conflict that feature prominently in much of the relevant literature. These are the struggle for resource control and ownership by the oil-bearing communities and its increasingly militant and violent nature, severe environmental degradation, the abject lack of political participation and democratic accountability, infrastructural underdevelopment, and deep and widespread poverty, especially youth unemployment. Each is deserving of some brief elaboration.

4.3.1. Resource Control/Ownership Question and its Increasingly Violent Character

The Niger Delta according to UNDP (2006), Kew and Phillips (2007), Albin-Lackey (2007) has endured a long history of exploitation in the sense that for four decades it has accounted for much of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings (over 90 per cent), national GDP (over 40 per cent) and total government revenue (over 80 per cent), but has enjoyed only a small portion of these. For example, it has since the early 1970s produced several hundred billion dollars' worth of oil and gas with its net oil revenues alone (to Nigeria) exceeding \$45 billion in 2005, and yet most of its peoples and communities remain poor and unemployed while a few oil companies and individuals (predominantly from outside the region) have amassed and continue to amass stupendous wealth. According to G. Nwobiri (personal communication April 7th, 2018), the oil in Niger Delta Region is a blessing from God but the attitude towards it by both the oil Companies and the government has turn it from being a

blessing to the Niger Deltans to being a curse. Instead of the revenue generated from the oil to be used in developing the region, it is been used to develop the North who are not oil producing states. He views that they that suffers the damages of oil spillage do not enjoy the wealth generated from the oil rather people who do not suffer for it are enjoying good roads, employment, good health etc.

UNDP (2006) presents that over 85 per cent of the region's working populations have no connection with the oil and gas industry, with low-wage/low-productivity informal enterprises as its primary source of livelihood. This situation has fostered a widespread sense of extreme relative deprivation. It is a significant factor in the growing resentment and increasingly militant demand for greater access and control over the oil resources of the region by its peoples and leaders.

The continuing lack of response to this demand, and the widespread perception that it may never be peacefully met by government, seem to be fuelling the increasingly violent insurgency within the Niger Delta. But further compounding the conflict is the astronomical increase, especially since 2003, in the incidence of violent clashes between relatively organized youths in local communities and the personnel of oil and gas companies and the military/law enforcement agencies that protect them. One notable consequence of this situation has been a sharp rise in the kidnapping for ransom of oil company executives (especially the expatriates), top political and administrative office-holders, business tycoons and their relatives.

FGN (2009), Kew and Phillips (2007), CSN (2006) asserts that some of these militant groups, having recently developed a life of their own, and no longer depending on their

original patrons among the political elite, have very quickly hijacked what was once a peaceful and is still a very popular struggle for resource control to create a booming underground economy. It is an economy built around an intricate web of oil-stealing, arms proliferation and hostage-taking rings. Cole (2008) asserts that such groups would therefore not be expected to have much interest in a speedy, peaceful and comprehensive negotiated resolution of the conflict, especially given their increasing integration into the highly lucrative regional and transnational trade in illegally sourced crude oil. Nigeria's national security and economic stability are now in extreme jeopardy as a result of this increasingly international criminal component of the conflict and the recent calamitous increase in the disruption of oil production due to militant activities.

4.3.2.Environmental Degradation

There is no doubt that the Niger Delta is one of the most environmentally degraded regions in the world. Prior to the discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities in 1956 and commencement of its exportation in 1958, the Niger Delta region had the most extensive lowland tropical and fresh forests, aquatic ecosystems and biodiversity in West Africa. It supported a large percentage of Nigeria's fisheries industry, huge and diverse medicinal and forest resources, wood for energy and shelter, as well as a stable fertile soil for farming and a hospitable habitat for increasingly endangered wildlife such as the Delta elephant and the river hippopotamus. These resource endowments served to provide relatively sustainable means of livelihood for millions of people across the region.

But drawing on several sources, a recent study by Kew and Phillips (2007) captures as follows the extent and impact of the degradation of the Niger Delta environment associated with crude oil exploration:

1.5 million tons of oil has spilled into the Niger Delta over the past 50 years, making the region one of the five most polluted locations on earth. Oil slicks cover the region; blowouts and leaks affect creeks, streams and related traditional sources of livelihood, destroying mangrove forests, eroding soil plots, and killing aqua life. Hundreds of well-sites have flares, which come from the burning of associated gas. Resulting sulfuric acid mists damage plants and forests. Flares pollute rainwater, cause acid rain and contribute to climate change. Amid this pollution many Niger Delta residents suffer from oil poisoning. Oil poisoning causes respiratory ailments. In addition, residents suffer from a plethora of waterborne diseases such as malaria, dysentery, tuberculosis, typhoid and cholera. Life expectancy is low (pp.159-160).

Sibani (2012) supports the above view by asserting that the degradation has destroyed the topsoil and subsoil, and render land non-arable and agriculturally wasted and ruined. Umukoro D. (personal communication April 7th, 2018), states that the level of environmental degradation in the region has gone to a very dangerous state. Oil spillage has destroyed their aquatic animals; agriculture is an impossible mission because of the oil damage on their soil, no access to good water and other fundamentals of human life. He concludes by saying that both the government and the oil companies have done great injustice to their land and this has led them to serious suffering. One consequence of this hazardous environmental situation is the exacerbation of intra- and inter-regional youth migration to the cities. This worsens the urban unemployment situation and contributes to the intensification of numerous social

pathologies. Prominent among these according to UNDP (2006), NDDC (2006) Albin-Lackey (2007), Kew and Phillips (2007) are; cultism, gangster activities, growing sex industry, high rates of unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, spontaneous violence, and family instability, which have all become prominent features of life in urban centers across the region. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of will and capacity on the part of the federal and state governments to compel the oil-exploring companies to clean up the region, pay adequate compensation to degraded and polluted communities, and improve the safety standards of oil industry operations. CSN (2006) states that, apparent official indifference is frequently cited by leading resource control advocates as strong grounds for the oil-bearing communities to have greater participation in and ownership of the oil and gas industry. Indeed, without enhanced community engagement, it is difficult to see how, within Nigeria's presently warped federal structure, the unholy alliance between the oil MNCs and the federal and state governments can be broken to enable better environmental monitoring, remediation and restoration.



Source:<http://dai;ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-name>



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Source:<http://dai;ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-name>

The above pictures are showing the level of environmental degradation in Nigert Delta Region

4.3.3. Lackof Political Participation and Democratic Accountability

It is the case that both during the long period of military rule (especially between 1983 and 1999) and since the return to civil rule in May 1999, the peoples of the Niger Delta have experienced no real sense of political participation or responsiveness of the national, state and local council leaders to their needs and concerns. It seems, according to Kew and Phillips (2007) that, on the one hand, that with every election in Nigeria as a whole and in the Niger Delta in particular the people's votes count for less and less as elections are more and more blatantly rigged. On the other hand, national campaigns by civil society groups and social movements in the region demanding greater political and fiscal autonomy have

intensified since the early 1990s. Similarly, Ibeanu (2006) avert that at the state level, such demands on the governments in the region to become more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people and their local communities through improved governance and more devolution of power to the local council and community levels have significantly expanded. But these demands for change according to Albin-Lackey (2007), Kew and Phillips (2007) are increasingly frustrated by Nigeria's unyielding, godfather-centred *unitary* federalism.

It has been argued according to Obi (2004), Kew and Phillips (2007) that the rapid proliferation of militant groups in the Niger Delta is partly a result of the powerlessness and frustrations that the ordinary people of the region, especially the youths, feel in the face of a persistent lack of democratic choice and the prevalence of unaccountable, anti-people governance across the three tiers of Nigeria's federal system. According to Gokpa G. (personal communication April 8th, 2018), one basic annoyance of the Niger Delta People is the government attitude towards their agitation. Notwithstanding the impact of the revenue from the oil in their region in the nation's economy, their region has not really been given opportunity to occupy some relevant positions in the political seat of Nigeria. Election within the Region are mostly rigged.

4.3.4. Infrastructural Underdevelopment

Despite the stupendous amount of resources extracted from this region, it remains grossly underdeveloped. Sibani (2012) states that the development of the Niger Delta region is seriously lacking and the oil producing companies in the region have demonstrated a high level of inhuman nature as they keep the area in darkness yet they exploit and milk out billions of naira from the environment (p.96). According to the Niger Delta Regional Development

Mast Plan, despite the largely riverine terrain of the region, the state of water transport infrastructure is so poor that the cost of water transport for goods and people is typically higher than that of road transport, and transport time is often longer by water than by road. Even so, according to NDDC (2006):

40 per cent of the total length of paved roads in the region remains in poor condition, with most of the wetland areas being without roads and therefore inaccessible. The region lacks rail transportation, possesses very poor housing stock, and over 36 per cent of the households therein lack access to electricity supply and over 60 per cent to potable water respectively. Only about 10 percent of the region is served by the national postal system and the number of telephone users per 100 people is one of the lowest in the world (pp.81-86).

Given the vast amount of oil wealth generated from the Niger Delta, its state of infrastructural development can only be described as abysmally poor. From the agitation of nearly all the well-known resource control movements and from several needs assessments that have been conducted within the region, Ojaborotu (2008) avers that, it is clear that massive but effective investment in infrastructure by government and oil MNCs aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people has to be a major component of any comprehensive response to the Niger Delta conflict.



Source:<http://dai;ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-nam>



Source:<http://dai;ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-names/>

4.3.5. Poverty and Unemployment

The relatively high levels of poverty in the Niger Delta in the midst of stupendous oil wealth according to Albin-Lackey (2007), Obi (2006) have led to a large and growing proportion of the youth population seeing violence as a solution to their problems. Many unemployed young persons are easily attracted to the militants rampaging across the region by the immediate prospects of highly rewarding employment in the violent underground economy described previously. Sibani (2012) asserts that this is as a result of the injustice to the environment by the government and oil companies which has made the land infertile and has removed the interest of the youths in having interest in the traditional occupation thereby making them unemployed; leading them into insurgency. Obilor M. (personal communication April 7th, 2018), is of the opinion that the growth of insurgency in the region is as a result of unemployment and poverty level which Leads the youths into frustration making them to resort into insurgency seeing it as a means of living. Katty (personal communication April 7th, 2018), also concur with the above view by saying that it is heart breaking seeing the massive wealth gotten from the oil in the region used to develop other areas of the country while the region is in dilapidated form.

Comprising over a fifth of Nigeria's total population of about 145 million, the inhabitants of the Niger Delta are spread across nine states, residing mostly in largely rural communities in dispersed village settlements. The region's unemployment levels according to FGN (2009) "are higher than the national average (put at 5 per cent in 2000), reaching 16-19 per cent in three of the constituent states and manifesting as one in every seven young people in the region being unemployed" (p.105). And while its adult literacy rate according to UNDP (2006) of "(78 per cent) is significantly higher than the national average of 54 per

cent, more than a third of the region's under-five children are either severely or moderately malnourished, a strong indication of high levels of household poverty" (pp.13-15). In much of the region, life-chance-enhancing social amenities are concentrated in the state capitals, and while its overall poverty situation is not the worst in Nigeria, it is exceptionally high when compared to other oil-producing regions of the world, as the following extract from a recent report by the UNDP (2006) makes clear:

The region's human development index (HDI) score, a measure of well-being encompassing the longevity of life, knowledge and a decent standard of living, remains at a low value of 0.564 (with 1 being the highest score). While these ratings put the Niger Delta at a slightly higher level than Nigeria's overall HDI of 0.453, the area rates far below countries or regions with similar oil and gas resources (p.15)

4.4. The Nature of Insurgency in Niger Delta

There is clearly a tendency, both in international media as well as on the part of oil companies, to downplay the socio-economic causes behind MEND's actions and focus instead on the piracy tactics that the insurgency employs, and the terrorist card, which, if not played yet, could be played imminently. This is, however, not a conflict that can be solved by military means alone, and foreign involvement under the banner of the 'war on terror' could have disastrous effects.

After a wave of hostage-taking in August 2006, President Olusegun Obasanjo threatened to crush the so-called 'criminal elements' in the Niger Delta. However, the most tangible result was the razing of hundreds of slum houses in Port Harcourt, close to where a soldier had been killed during the kidnapping of foreign oil workers. These heavy-handed

tactics according to Lindsay (2006) have been tried in the past: they did not produce the desired outcome then, nor is there reason to expect they will be effective now. The growth of militias, whether defined as armed factions with a political agenda, bandits or something in between (for example, social bandits), is a consequence of local grievances that must be addressed.

Two aspects of the situation in the Niger Delta according to BBC (2006) are particularly noteworthy. First, there is little doubt that connections exist between militia groups and local political elites in the Delta. The second notable aspect of the Niger Delta rebellion is the degree to which the young armed men wear different hats.

4.4.1. Militia Groups and Political Elites

The link between militia groups and political elites was amply illustrated in the conduct of the 2003 and 2007 elections. The ‘convergence of militancy and politics’ according to International Crisis Group (2006) is not foreign to Nigerian elections in general, but in the Delta this has reached extreme proportions. Here, previous elections have featured the harassment of candidates and their supporters by armed groups, mainly consisting of young men, in the service of another candidate; and clashes between armed groups controlled by different political opponents. This type of political behavior started to emerge after the death of Sani Abacha, and in the Delta it exploded around the time of the 2003 election.

The starting point was Rivers state, and its capital Port Harcourt. Which is also the hub of the oil industry, making this state in theory the wealthiest in Nigeria. Here state governor Peter Odili spearheaded a strategy of violent vote-rigging in favour of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) with the help of Asari Dokubo’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer

Force (NDPVF) and Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV). Election violence therefore became widespread in Rivers, but was also successful for those that had initiated it as this strategy saw Odili receive 98 per cent of the popular vote in 2003.

However, as soon as the elections were won, Odili-along with other 'patrons of violence' – tried to distance himself from the most prominent gunmen that he had hired for his campaign. Some militiamen and their leaders accepted this 'remarginalization' as a fact of life in the Delta, but others reacted with anger, threatening violence and rebellion against their former masters. These included Asari Dokubo and the majority of his NDPVF fighters. The result was that Asari and the NDPVF were suddenly out of favour, and as they threatened to resume the violence of the election campaign, their former political sponsors responded by attempting a strategy of 'divide and rule' by encouraging Ateke Tom's group, which had remained loyal, to subdue Asari's men by force.

This had two immediate consequences. First, it started a 'small civil war' in and around Port Harcourt as rolling battles – in the streets as well as in the creeks and the local communities – killed not only militia members but also local civilians, and created large-scale displacement. The second consequence was a general proliferation of guns, gangs and violence in the period between 2003 and 2007 as the original insurgents fragmented into new groups.

In this period, various gangs and militias therefore acquired wealth through a series of violent activities, such as illegal 'oil bunkering', bank robberies and kidnappings, turning some of their leaders into figures of real authority in the Delta. Some of these groups were new, others old, but both old and new alike were related to the Nigerian 'cult' phenomenon.⁹

This is a phenomenon worth considering in some detail as its very existence reveals the embedded history of co-optation between elites and marginalized youths. The term ‘cult’ refers in the Nigerian context not to specific religious practices, but to the criminal gangs that originally appeared as fraternity organization among students at university campuses. However, since the establishment of the first ‘cult’ at the University of Ibadan in 1952, such groups have not only multiplied, but also morphed into violent and highly sophisticated criminal organizations, sowing terror on university campuses and beyond, particularly in the southern part of the country. Membership of the cults is open only to students on the campuses where the groups operate, but most cults have formed ‘street wings’ by recruiting off-campus members. As most leading politicians are university graduates it also means that many of them belonged (or even still belong) to cults, suggesting that the relationships they cultivate with militias today is not a novelty for them, but in fact a continuation of an intimate relationship between politics and violence that they internalized in the formative campus years of their life.

Conversely, many prominent militia leaders therefore started their careers as the off-campus hired thugs of these soon-to-be political and economic leaders. Some later rebelled – or at least partially, as experiences of betrayal led to the development of political grievances whereas others by and large returned to the service of their original masters when called for (during elections and at other times when their services were in demand). When not operating under ‘command’, the latter groups were ‘allowed’ to cater for their own needs as they saw fit with the tools at their disposal (guns and the readiness to use them) as long as their actions did not interfere too much with the business of the elite.

The very same period and the events within it therefore also indirectly constitute the birth of MEND as the betrayal that many militia members and leaders felt, which events after the 2003 election exposed them to, led some – obviously not all – to develop political grievances against their former political sponsors, whom they saw as having refused to fulfill promises of money, employment and education. Local communities and civilians also felt betrayed, but they could be ignored, whereas this was not as easy with the effective ‘insurgency machines’ that the politicians had created in order to win the 2003 elections. Having first acquired the tools of violence such groups are not too easily subdued into a position of obedient patronage, as violence can not only kill, it may also empower. Groups like the NDPVF and men like Asari therefore have a past as violent supporters of the regime that they would later claim to be rebelling against, but that does not in itself make the grievances they articulate any less real.

This may sound strange, but there is nothing particularly unusual about this (another example is Cote d’Ivoire’s Jeunes Patriotes), and the alliances and what happened later can be seen as first a marriage of convenience and later as a result of the failure of the elite to control the ‘monster’ they had created - owing either to unwillingness or inability to provide sufficient spoils or because the young men they initially hired and organized as a militia later developed agendas and interests of their own.

One obvious example in this regard is again Asari, who started off as a gang leader, but ended up charged with treason on the basis of the allegation that he declared that the Delta should secede from the rest of Nigeria. In this regard there is also another line of continuity from Asari’s NDPVF to MEND, which first emerged in 2005. The latter is just as much an idea as it is an amalgam of several groups operating across the Delta. It is much less

a cohesive force than a brand for large groups of insurgents, militias and gangs, and owing to its networked and fragmented nature also very hard to crush with one decisive military blow.

Given that many militiamen undoubtedly had grievances owing to the betrayal they felt exposed to after the 2003 elections, the pattern of 2003 repeated itself in the 2007 elections. The 2007 polls were universally condemned by foreign and domestic monitors as completely lacking credibility. More than three hundred died in election-related violence, and election day itself saw gangs of thugs hired by the ruling PDP stealing ballot boxes, chasing off voters and fabricating results – official results even indicated massive turnout figures in areas where no voting took place at all. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Niger Delta states. The history of 2003 repeated itself not only in the 2007 elections, but also in the violence that followed.

In 2005, a large group of the ‘Icelanders’ led by Soboma George broke away from Ateke Tom’s leadership, forming their own militia, the ‘Outlaw’. Swiftly, the Outlaws under George’s leadership managed to establish themselves as the preferred ‘thugs’ of high-ranking government and PDP officials, doing such a large amount of the dirty work needed during the 2007 elections that they seemed almost to have acquired a monopoly on government patronage and state-sponsored violence. Among other things, it was reported that George had been given control of a busy filling station owned by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), whose daily revenue therefore went directly into George’s and the Outlaws’ pockets.

The consequence was the formation of an alliance between other gangs and militias which saw their income drop as George and the Outlaws monopolized the networks of state

patronage. Thus, under the leadership of Ateke Tom, a diverse range of cults and gangs – including Axemen, Klansmen, Deebam and the Bush Boys – started to attack both the Outlaws’ members and areas perceived to be under the control of that group. The consequence was both deliberate and random violence in the form of ‘turf wars’ that created havoc, death and destruction in Port Harcourt, as well as neighbouring communities. Several dozen civilians were killed and at least 150 more shot and wounded, and this situation was allowed to continue for over a month before the Joint Task Force (JTF) intervened on 12 August 2007.¹² The JTF operation restored a nominal form of order in and around Port Harcourt, but apart from killing some militiamen and also some civilians caught in the crossfire, the only thing this operation accomplished was to increase the bitter grievances of young men with militia connections who once more realized that after the dirty business of elections was completed the political and economic elite had little if any concern for them. The result was therefore not less sabotage, but renewed attacks on oil installations and the infrastructure in the Delta under the banner of MEND.

4.4.2. The Many Faces of MEND

The violence of the Niger Delta is therefore not only some sort of crude resource war between different political and illicit elites; between the ‘cult’ and the ‘boys in the creeks’. The very same young men involved in this ‘war’ also use the banner of MEND to attack oil installations and take oil workers as hostages in order to put forward political demands for increased regional autonomy (such as ‘true federalism’) and control of oil revenues (‘resource control’).

In addition, the same people also sometimes deploy as the armed wing in support of the grievances of local communities – taking hostages for local communities, as a means of addressing – or at least highlighting – local company-specific grievances. This was for instance the case with four sailors taken hostage in August 2006. The hostages were taken by a group of armed young men, who then handed them over to a local community that had grievances against a Nigerian oil company, Peak Petroleum.¹⁴ Both the original kidnapping and the subsequent hostage situation leading to negotiations, although different in type and nature, could be considered political acts, stemming from legitimate grievances and demands. This is the same group of men who also take hostages purely for ransom, with no political pretence, and who work – as we have seen – as hired thugs for local strongmen and politicians, especially during election campaigns.

Thus roles and activities overlap. They are conducting an armed political insurgency, but also operating as bandits, and in the latter role are actively co-opted by the very elite they are rebelling against. As one role does not seem to exclude the other, the question is what logic will come to dominate the situation in the Niger Delta: the political logic of MEND or the personal economic logic of men like Ateke Tom and Soboma George?

MEND is sophistication – of argument and operation: a rebellion in which the gun is mightier than the pen, but the latter still not completely dysfunctional as MEND also pays a great deal of attention to its verbal communication with the world. Typical in this regard was the language of mockery it used to denounce the Nigerian offer of amnesty in the spring of 2009. In its verbal response MEND as written in Honwana (2006):

We call on political thugs, armed robbers, kidnappers, pirates etc., from other states Nigeria to take advantage of the government's offer by travelling to one of the centres in Niger Delta and trade their weapons for amnesty. Come with the whole gang and get rehabilitated with gains of free education, money to start legitimate businesses etc. this is unique opportunity in a country where so many graduates cannot find jobs and girls no longer marry for love. (p.46)

The statement is not only making fun of the government; the last sentence also vividly captures a perception of marginalization well known to Nigerian youth. The only way to make sense of the rebellion in the Niger Delta according to Honwana (2006) is therefore to approach it as a combination of efforts based on tactical as well as strategic agency. The insurgency is thus an attempt to address social injustice (a strategy) as well as a mode of production and a way to make a living (a tactic).

Whether the Niger Delta rebellion will continue to have a social profile or deteriorate solely into criminality remains to be seen. However, the way in which its participants are embedded in patrimonial *clientelistic relationships* with local strongmen, and the quantity of oil money and multitude of actors in the region, implies that those rebelling walk a very fine line between 'greed' and 'grievances'. If they overstep this boundary, they may turn what is still a legitimate rebellion into a market-based entity operating in a downward-spiraling, dysfunctional patrimonial order.

The amnesty offer made by the Nigerian government in June 2009 and MEND's unilateral ceasefire around the same time may constitute a political dialogue in its very infancy. However, a meaningful dialogue is possible only if the various elements of the

insurgency and its connections with the state it is rebelling against are sorted out. The question is not how to bring the insurgency under political control, as it was the very control by the political elite which created the context for the rebellion in the first place, but rather to facilitate the creation of autonomous spaces for dialogue as well as legitimate political resistance against the dysfunctional structures of the *neopatrimonialism* that informs politics in the Delta. MEND undoubtedly has many faces, but not only are all of them shaped by the political economy of oil in the Delta, some are also more legitimate than others.



Source:<http://dai:ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-names/>



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4.5. Persistence of Insurgency in Niger Delta Region

Insurgency in Niger Delta Region can be curbed irrespective of all odds. Government authorities only need to be patient in their approach because the fight against Insurgency in Niger Delta Region is always a long term affair and never the alternative. However,

Insurgency appears to prevail irrespective of the efforts to subdue it. The reason for this is not far fetched as have been gathered from the research of this work so far.

Karl Max conflict theory exposes the insurgents group are not difficult to groom nor finance. Little group of individuals can for an insurgent group base on their grievances which Karl Max explained as class struggle in his conflict theory. It need little finance to groom it.

Moreover, insurgents often in alchemic ways attract sympathizers that ends up financing them in large scales and equipping them as well as releasing vital informations to them. Again, in a country like Nigeria where by one will sincerely submit that good governance is rarely practiced gives more room to breed insurgency as there will continue to exist, grievances of being marginalized, unemployed, corruption, injustice and lack of basic social amenities provided for the average citizens nor within the reach of the Niger Deltans.

Corruption and lack of due process as expanded in the theory of anomie has hindered the progress or efforts to curb Insurgency as both the government and some elites are maximizing the insurgents attack to enrich their pocket by means of divert oil, diverting resources ment to be used in developing the region. If not for these, one will clearly see that the issue at stack which this research work map out as the causes of insurgency in the region can be sincerely handled but instead of trying to handle the basic issues, the institutions involve are seeking for a short court thereby inviting so many prominent individuals for dialogue and bribing them and leaving the issue of insurgence unattended.

Further more, a look at the conflict theory brings to knowledge that insurgents are duty bound by their belief system to stay connected to the course of the one at the helm of

affairs. They rarely derail nor lose focus. They always stay and maintain the course of their actions and goal till the end.

Finally, Insurgency persists because the state in fighting Insurgency through raising of military attack makes the mistake, and of course grievous mistakes of ending up becoming the demons that they strive to exorcise; that is to say that they end up becoming insurgents themselves. Insurgency triumphs more in a situation where in it is being matched with force.

4.6. The Challenges of Insurgency in Niger Delta Region

The grave implications of continued insurgency in the Niger Delta may be better appreciated against the background of the fact that, from historical experience, the Nigerian nation and especially the Niger Delta have had a prolonged familiarity with social struggle against colonial rule. The Niger Delta militants are drawing from this experience in prosecuting the current phase of confrontation with the Nigerian State. Like the struggle against colonialism, the present phase of the crisis has incubated over long periods of unaddressed grievances and disenchantments among communities in the region. Today, according to Ukeje(2004), emphasis is shifting from mere bread-and-butter issues to serious questions by the people of the region, regarding their status, role and place within the larger Nigerian polity. Their agitations have provoked trenchant clamours for greater fiscal allocation and resource control, fiscal federalism and minority rights. These agitations are also leading to more pungent questions about citizenship, rights, duties and obligations and the moral circumstances under which these could be challenged, negated, withheld or even jettisoned. The fact that government can no longer extract voluntary obedience from the citizens, as exemplified by the visible presence of soldiers on “internal peace enforcement” in the Niger Delta, points to a moral crisis of authority and a serious problem of legitimacy for

the federal government, in the region. Unfortunately, the state has lost its claim to the monopoly of violence, given the fact that the ethnic groups and individual communities in the region have illegally acquired sophisticated weaponry and trained militia that sometimes overwhelm and make mockery of government forces. There is an increasing fear and concern about the widespread availability and indiscriminate use of weapons and ammunitions by militant communities, cult groups, hoodlums and gangsters. With such weapons, the predisposition to use brute force to settle even the smallest disagreements is significantly enhanced. Soremekun(1995) states that, long years of military rule, and the propensity of politicians to rig elections and intimidate opponents through violence, have also infused a sense of impunity into society such that violence is now considered a continuation of politics by other means. It is also important to note that militant youth movements are mostly drawn from a growing cesspool of illiterate and unemployed youths whose attraction to violence is in pecuniary benefits and the social elixir such acts bring, especially as many of their leaders are highly educated, literate but unemployed. With the growing consciousness about the various causes of their disempowerment, Youth actions have begun to provoke serious inter-generational crisis, as they are seen by the elders as irresponsible, reckless, vulgar, rebellious and dangerous. Meanwhile Eyinla and Ukpo(2006) assert that the youths perceive the elders as self-centered, greedy reactionary and treacherously pro-establishment. Besides, many of the oil communities are moving away from their previous informal, isolated and ad-hoc social mobilization, to more formal, assertive and collective grassroots actions. The crisis of legitimacy is engendering a new generation of social tensions, that have now involved politically established cult groups and gangsters who are unleashing naked violence on rural and urban communities alike. In this way, and because of government's apparent inability or

lack of political will to address these issues, Ukeje(2004) states that the Niger Delta region is fast turning into a gangster's paradise. Government had on its own part taken some measures to address the problems of the region. The Babangida administration had set up the oil minerals producing areas development commission (OMPADEC). But the commission failed to achieve its objectives due to allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Then the Niger Delta Development Commission, (NDDC) Act of 1999. The commission has since set to work, and built schools in the creeks without roads leading to them, and sufficient number of qualified teachers to teach in them. It has built jetties in several communities and provided fishing gears to catch fishes, which have since migrated from the region due to gas flaring or have been completely decimated by oil spills. The NDDC has indeed provided pipe borne water in several communities in the creeks, most of whose inhabitants have been decimated, or have been sacked by inter-ethnic wars and political violence, while many others have been kept away from the water ways due to piracy, criminality and oil spills. What all of these translate to, is that the measures taken by the government in the past have failed to adequately address the problems of the Niger Delta. The failure of the government to effectively compel the oil companies to obey the various laws put in place to guide their operations, such as the laws on gas flaring, oil spills and environmental pollution does much to discredit government's efforts and question its sincerity. In addition, the problems of infrastructural development, unemployment, human capital development, hostilities between oil communities and companies, inter-communal and intra-communal conflict, the problem of land tenure, displacement of persons, inadequate compensation, poverty, crime and collapse of traditional social values, are all challenges the government must be prepared to accept in order to restore confidence and re-establish its authority and legitimacy.

Furthermore, government must begin to address the latest warning on the impending danger of oil Exploration and Production activities in the Niger Delta, that if care is not taken, the entire region may eventually be submerged under water on account of unpleasant climatic changes. In this region, Eyinla and Ukpo(2006) avert that it was estimated that a total of 850 km of coast line could be vulnerable to sea level rise. If this happens, the lives of over 10 million inhabitants would be in grave danger.

Finally, government must accept the challenge to re-assert its authority in the region. It must deal decisively with the criminal gangs now terrorizing the region to pave way for infrastructural development and constructive engagement with the true representatives of the people. In this regard, many political godfathers who arm and pay cult gangs to terrorize political opponents and rig elections, or intimidate rival ethnic groups must be reined in, by the Federal government. Moreover, the ever rising tide of corruption in high places must be seriously addressed, and effectively checkmated by government at all levels.

4.6.1. Challenges on National Development

The insurgency in the Niger Delta region through the activities of the different militant groups operating there, have brought about some negative impacts on oil and economic activities, and on development in general (EPU Research Papers, 2007). The sense of relentless crisis has deepened in recent times when the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and other groups intensified attacks on oil platforms and pumping stations, attacked and killed soldiers, kidnapped foreign oil workers as well as set off car bombs. A kind of insecurity has been created in the minds of people, thus bringing about some negative impacts with it. These impacts can be prompted into economic and security implications..

4.6.2. Security Implication of Insurgency in Niger Delta

The insurgency has brought about serious security implication for the country as a result of increased Criminal activities in the region. This is manifested in the following ways:

(i) **Confrontations with the Military**

The Nigerian Military, under the aegis of the Joint Military Task Force (JTF), have been fighting with the militants since 2006 when the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) started its violent activities. MEND and other militia groups have been able to withstand the military in several clashes they have had. They have been able to do this because of their access to sophisticated weapons which they use in attacking oil platforms and facilities.

(ii) **Kidnapping and Hostage Taking**

Kidnapping and hostage taking has become the order of the day with oil workers and individuals becoming the targets, thus worsening the security situation. According to the International Herald Tribune “Oil companies find themselves in an uneasy position, stuck in a crisis that they, in a sense, helped to create. For years, human rights groups accused them of turning a blind eye to the corruption of Nigeria’s successive military regimes while damaging the environment in the delta”. Besides expatriates, individuals and even toddlers have been kidnapped by militants for ransoms. As a result of the prevailing insecurity in the Niger Delta, expatriates have been abandoning their work and relocating from the region.

(iii) **Illegal Bunkering Activities**

The crisis has made illegal bunkering of oil to thrive, which is also the source of funds for the militants operating in the creeks of Niger Delta. According to a report of the Brussels based International Crisis Group, Nigeria loses about 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day to illegal bunkering, which is the equivalent output of a small oil producing country (ICG, Africa Report No 118, 2006). Illegal bunkering has been a key source of funds for anti-government militant groups. Several militant warlords have either publicly or privately admitted involvement and others said they consider the practice a defensible means of providing income for aggrieved and impoverished residents of oil producing communities. However, it must be noted that the activities of these bunkerers have become a serious threat to the security and well being of the Nigerian nation (EPU Research Papers, 2007).

CHAPTER FIVE

APPROACHES TO INSURGENCY IN NIGER DELTA REGION

The Nigerian government has adopted a mix of methods, which range from coercion through co-option to the establishment of various commissions in managing the Niger Delta Insurgency. Since the 1990s, when protests became pronounced in Ogoniland and other troubled areas of the Niger Delta, thousands of regular and mobile policemen, complemented by battalions of soldiers and plainclothes security agents, have been deployed to the region.

5.1. Establishment of Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission

Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission was established in 1992, by the Babangida administration. The Commission was charged, among other things, with the responsibility of: Rehabilitating and developing the oil-producing areas, Tackling ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals and Liaising with the various oil companies on matters of pollution control.

However, by 1999, it was dissolved. According to reports, by the time its pioneering chairman was removed from office, billions of naira had been sunk into either white-elephant or non-existent projects. For his own part, General Sani Abacha established the PTF, headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari (a former oil minister and military head of state). The PTF, as it turned out, largely confined its activities to the northern part of the country. This in itself was ironic, since the Niger Delta, where the oil came from, was in more need of development. Thus, by 1998, the Niger Delta had become a volatile zone, characterized by protests, agitation and communal conflicts – a reaction against perceived neglect and insensitivity by government. At the same time the social movements of the ethnic minorities put more pressure on the IOCs operating in the region.

5.2. The Policy of Co-optation

Another way in which attempts have been made to manage the Niger Delta problem is through the policy of co-optation. Co-optation involves a situation in which individuals as strategic social forces from within the Niger Delta elite are given top positions in the political life of the country, or offered ‘juicy’ contracts by the state or IOCs. It is arguable that co-optation appears to have reached its zenith with the selection of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the vice-president (and later president) of Nigeria, ensuring a situation in which, probably for the

first time in the history of Nigeria, there is ensconced in the presidency or Aso Rock (the official residence of the Nigerian president in Abuja, the Nigerian capital) an important politician and a number of aids who come from the Niger Delta.

This co-optation seems to be paying off in that the vice-president visited the various militants in their camps at Okerenkoko, Oporoza and other communities in the Niger Delta after being sworn into office in 2007. Moreover, he chaired the federal government committee that entered into negotiations with the leaders of militant groups in the region.

5.3.Amnesty Initiatives in the Niger Delta

The amnesty programme was inaugurated in May 2007 by President Umaru Yar'Adua. He according to Obi & Rustad (2011) promised to address the Niger Delta Insurgency and so recognized it in his seven-point agenda. In fulfillment of his promise, the Late President Yar'Adua in line with the suggestion of the Niger Delta elders inaugurated the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. This forty five member Committee according to Mitee (2009) was inaugurated on 8th September, 2008 to collate and review all past reports on Niger Delta, appraise their recommendations and make other proposals that will help the Federal Government to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta Region. The Committee under the Chairmanship of Ledum Mitee, MOSOP President had submitted its report (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008) to the Federal Government since 1st of December 2008. The Committee's recommendations include appointing a mediator to facilitate discussions between government and militants; granting of amnesty to some militant leaders; launching a disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation campaign, and increase in the percentage of

oil revenue to the Delta to 25 percent from the current 13 percent; establishing regulations that compel oil companies to have insurance bonds; making the enforcement of critical environmental laws a national priority; exposing fraudulent environmental cleanups of oil spills and prosecuting operators, ending gas flaring by 31st December 2008 as previously ordered by the Federal Government (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008).

In line with the determination of the government to address the Niger Delta problem, the government partly yielded to the report of the Technical Committee by setting up a Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta on the 5th of May, 2009 to implement the recommendation concerning the granting of amnesty to Niger Delta militants. In its recommendations, the Panel set out the terms, procedures and processes of the grant of an amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. Accepting the recommendations, President Umaru Yar'Adua pursuant to section 175 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria granted 'amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta' (Vanguard, 2009). Under Section 175, the President may, after consultation with the Council of State (a) grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions; (b) grant to any person a respite, either for an indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence; (c) substitute a less severe form of punishment for any punishment imposed on that person for such an offence; or (d) remit the whole, or any part of any punishment imposed on that person for such an

offence, or of any penalty, or forfeiture otherwise due to the State on account of such an offence.

The amnesty which was unveiled on 25th June, 2009 was scheduled to run between 6th August to 4th October, 2009, that is, a 60 day period; and was ‘predicated on the willingness and readiness of the militants to give up all illegal arms in their possession, completely renounce military in all its ramifications unconditionally, and depose to an undertaking to this effect’ (Federal Government of Nigeria, Niger Delta Amnesty Programme). During the declaration, the President acknowledged the fact that the challenges in the Niger Delta arose as a result of the inadequacies of the previous attempts at meeting the yearnings of the people of the region, which thus led to the restiveness witnessed in the Niger Delta. The high incidence of violence in the Delta led to the amnesty initiatives. As a matter of fact, in the first nine months of the year 2008, about 1,000 people lost their lives, 300 were taken hostage and the government lost \$23.7 billion to attacks, oil bunkering and sabotage (Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, 2008). Apart from the inability of Nigerian government to meet up with its OPEC quota and other negative economic effects, Nwozor (2010) asserts that the oil MNCs on their part reportedly lost billions of dollars to the conflicts. For instance, between 2003 and 2007, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) estimated that it lost US \$10.6 billion, with a total loss of not less than US \$21.5 billion by the oil MNCs as a whole since 2003.

It can be seen that a major drive for the use of amnesty in the management of oil-related conflicts in Nigeria is the belief that it is only through peace that sustainable development can be guaranteed in the Niger Delta.

5.3.1. Impact and Limitations of the Amnesty in Niger Delta

Nigeria's amnesty programme has catered to two batches of Niger Delta ex-militants since 2009. Following their acceptance of amnesty and surrender of ammunition across eight Niger Delta states (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo), the first set of ex-agitators, numbering 20,192, were demobilised at the Obubra Demobilisation Camp. The second set of militants, numbering 6,166, completed demobilisation in December 2011, bringing the total number of amnesty beneficiaries to 26,358.

A cursory glance at the statistics on participation in the amnesty programme according to Ikelegbe (2005) shows that around 85% of demobilised ex-militants are from the core oil-producing states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers which bore the brunt of the conflict. The gender imbalance between male and female participants is striking, as only 0.65% of total registered participants are female. This outcome raises questions about the exclusion of women by the amnesty programme, since women have been active participants in the Niger Delta struggle. The recovery of over 2,700 sophisticated guns and 300,000 rounds of ammunition surrendered by 15,000 militants to the Presidential Amnesty Committee in 2009 is a notable achievement of the amnesty programme. However, the exclusion of certain militant groups according to Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2011) arising from the balkanisation of the militant movement itself and deep-rooted scepticism and mistrust of the state's motives, resulted in the withholding of ammunition by some militant groups, while others, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND) commanders John Togo and Tamunotonye Kuna, who seemingly accepted the amnesty soon returned to the creeks, rearmed and continued their hostilities against the state.

After the demobilisation period, 7,556 former militants were placed in skills acquisition training centres in 33 locations across Nigeria. Militants were also sent on skills acquisition training to countries such as South Africa, the US, Russia, Israel, India, Poland, Cyprus, Poland, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, the Philippines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In reflection of the emphasis on building skills to encourage eventual reintegration in their communities, amnesty beneficiaries were presented with the choice of a specific vocation from a diverse bouquet, for which they would receive formal training.

As an indication of the impact of the reintegration phase of the amnesty programme, in 2012 according to Amaefule (2012), several ex-militants were offered jobs by training centres at home and abroad after completing skills acquisition; notably, the 89 ex-militants were offered employment in Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) after completing their training in maritime activities, welding and fabrication. Despite the Nigerian government's rhetoric on the success of the amnesty, the question arises on whether it has been inclusive and whether it addresses the underlying grievances of the Niger Delta indigenes which manifested in violence and criminality. Previous attempts to 'forgive' Niger Delta militants in 2004 and 2007 according to Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye and Okhomina (2007) were plagued by poor implementation. Cash for arms deals, which purportedly involved the exchange of arms for cash payments, did not make a dent on the conflict, and only aided more stockpiling of weapons by armed groups, ironically funded by cash transfers from the Nigerian state. The present amnesty programme according to

Oluwanni (2011) differs from previous attempts in its depth, given the level of organisation, political commitment and delivery of stated objectives. However, it has been dogged by criticisms of poor planning and implementation, large-scale corruption and the exclusion of important stakeholders. He supported his view by saying:

Firstly, Critics argue that the amnesty programme is too top-down and susceptible to the discretionary influence of powerful ex-militant commanders without reflecting local needs and aspirations. Critics argue that the amnesty programme is too top-down and susceptible to the discretionary influence of powerful ex-militant commanders without reflecting local needs and aspirations. This undermines the government's credibility, as the ex-commanders appear to have been more interested in newfound access to state patronage than in addressing the needs of their local fighters. Similarly, the monetisation of the grievances of oil-producing communities by undue emphasis on monetary payments to ex-militants is a questionable approach. Coupled with the wider access to political patronage for ex-militant commanders, these substantial monetary transfers paradoxically reinforce the vicious cycle of conflict that the amnesty was designed to break. (p.51).

They place unrealistic expectations on the provision of state largesse and employment, and raise the prospect of arms proliferation and further violence in the long term as job opportunities and easy money fail to materialise and idle youth seek refuge in the conflict economy. Relatedly, corruption and nepotism have taken root in an otherwise laudable initiative. The amnesty appears to have created a new 'peace industry' in Nigeria, with the emergence of contractors, consultants and mediators or 'peace ambassadors' who have cynically positioned themselves to benefit from state largesse. A damning review of the

rehabilitation component of the amnesty programme in 2010 according to Oluwanniya (2011) “revealed that 80% of the programme budget had been expended on payments to consultants and contractors, while just 20% was devoted to the rehabilitation of ex-militants” (p52).

Another important criticism of the amnesty is the exclusion of important conflict actors, which fuels grievances and could result in inter-communal strife. The scale of the amnesty programme, which has targeted about 27,000 former combatants in a region with high poverty and youth unemployment, is far from adequate and has created disaffection among militant groups that feel excluded from the entire exercise. For instance, the failure to include several MEND warlords and neutralise MEND's infrastructure created room for aggrieved MEND elements to continue with their violent struggle. While leading MEND commanders such as Generals Boyloaf, Ateke Tom, ‘Young Shall Grow’ and Government Ekpemupolo (a.k.a. Tompolo) have embraced the amnesty and rapidly established themselves as regional power-brokers, the detention and trial in South Africa of Henry Okah, another central figure in the group, points to the exclusionary, divisive legacy of the amnesty programme. This according to Davidheiser and Nyiayaana (2011) has allowed aggrieved MEND elements to carry out sporadic, deadly bombings such as the Independence Day 2010 bombing, and engage in criminality, including kidnapping and oil-bunkering. Nwozor (2010) states that grassroots community, civil society and vulnerable groups, such as women and children, that shunned violent struggle have also been inadvertently excluded from state largesse, while continuing to grapple with the adverse effects of oil activities, particularly environmental degradation and the loss of livelihoods.

Furthermore, the cost of executing the amnesty programme is substantial, and, due to volatile oil revenues, the government's commitment to maintaining cash payments and support to militants to abandon violence will be put under pressure. Aside from these economic concerns, other ethnic groups that are perceived to be excluded from the distribution of state largesse may turn to violence, in expectation of some form of monetary settlement. Omeje (2006) states that the commitment of the region's political elite to genuinely supporting the amnesty in the medium term can also be questioned, as political electioneering in the Niger Delta has been linked with violence, criminality and arms proliferation.

Above all, Omoweh (2005) states that, the continued use of military force in the Niger Delta undermines the avowed commitment of the Nigerian government to peace, and prevents a wider engagement with local communities on their grievances against the state and MOCs. There is ample evidence, as shown by Frynas (1998) that oil minorities initially channelled their grievances towards the state and MOCs through the legal system in spite of the state's approach towards militarization of the Niger Delta region. However, the failure to obtain fair, equitable settlement within the legal system facilitated the increasing use of violent means to confront the 'petro-military alliance'. The Nigerian military as stated by Eberlein (2006) has continued to maintain a significant presence in the region, although its mandate has recently been changed from suppressing a popular insurgency to 'providing security to oil installations, tackling oil bunkering, illegal oil refining, oil pipeline vandalism and sea piracy'. In 2012, the federal government announced changes to the composition and mandate of the Joint Task Force (JTF) which suggest that the amnesty programme has

reduced militant activities in the Niger Delta and that the role of the military should reflect the transition from conflict to peace-building in the region.

Conclusively, in order to be truly effective, and address the multiple, complex grievances that underlie the Niger Delta conflict, amnesty must be complemented by political, economic and structural reforms.

5.4. Establishment of Niger Delta Development Commission

The NDDC was created largely as a response to the demands of the population of the Niger Delta, a populous area inhabited by a diversity of minority ethnic groups. During the 1990s these ethnic groups, most notably the [Ijaw](#) and the [Ogoni](#) established organizations to confront the Nigerian government and multinational oil companies such as [Shell](#). The minorities of the Niger Delta have continued to agitate and articulate demands for greater autonomy and control of the area's petroleum resources. They justify their grievances by reference to the extensive environmental degradation and pollution from oil activities that have occurred in the region since the late 1950s. However, the minority communities of oil producing areas have received little or no currency from the oil industry and environmental remediation measures are limited and negligible. The region is highly underdeveloped and is poor even by Nigeria's standards for quality of life.

Sometimes violent confrontation with the state and oil companies, as well as with other communities has constrained oil production as disaffected youth or organisations deliberately disrupt oil operations in attempts to effect change. These disruptions have been extremely costly to the Nigerian oil industry, and both the multinationals and the federal government have vested interests in permitting uninterrupted extraction operations; the

NDDC is a result of these concerns and is an attempt to satisfy the demands of the delta's population.

Mandate and operations of NDDC

The NDDC Mandate

- Formulation of policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta area.

- Conception, planning and implementation, in accordance with set rules and regulations, of projects and programs for sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications.

- Surveying the Niger Delta in order to ascertain measures necessary to promote its physical and socio-economic development.

- Preparing master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger Delta region and the estimation of the member states of the Commission.

- Implementation of all the measures approved for the development of the Niger Delta region by the Federal Government and the states of the Commission.

- Identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger Delta region and assisting the member states in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the resources of the Niger Delta region.
- Assessing and reporting on any project being funded or carried out in the region by oil and gas companies and any other company, including non-governmental organizations, as well as ensuring that funds released for such projects are properly utilized.
- Tackling ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in the Niger Delta region and advising the Federal Government and the member states on the prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution.
- Liaising with the various oil mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on all matters of pollution, prevention and control.
- Executing such other works and performing such other functions, which in the option of the Commission are required for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta region and its people.

5.4.1. Challenges of NDDC Projects and the Niger Delta Region

A. Corruption

Corruption is one of the greatest problems of the Nigerian society and it also finds its ugly and devastating effects in all sectors of the polity including the Niger Delta Development Commission. The Governors of the Delta region has contributed negatively to the development of the region. Despite the federally allocated revenue to all the 36 states of

the federation, Akinola (2011) revealed that the states that make up the Niger Delta enjoys special allocation of 13% as specified in the revenue sharing formulae based on derivation as fixed by section 162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution. Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution grants state governors and their deputies' immunity against prosecution and these have protected the state governors and encouraged them to steal and syphon the state treasury. Babalola (2014) explained that the "former governors Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, James Ibori and Peter Odili of the Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states respectively were deeply involved in grand corruption that took place in these states were enough to render the states bankrupt. It was discovered that Mr. Alamieyeseigha, who was arrested in London in September 2005 and subsequently impeached in December 2005 for a host of corrupt practices, had allegedly stashed away £1m in his London home, in addition to the sums of £420,000 and £470,000 found in different accounts belonging to him, as well as assets worth £10m (Vanguard, 3 February 2006: 1; 15). Moreover, the ex-governor was also accused by Nigeria's Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) of approving several dubious contracts and payments totaling 1.7 billion naira in favour of eight fictitious companies', in addition to other contracts totaling 667,258 million naira awarded to fictitious companies, also EFCC discovered 100 billion naira was diverted into private bank accounts during Odili's administration".

The looting of the treasury was also mentioned in the London case against the former Delta State Governor Mr. James Ibori and huge sum of money were stolen including purchasing a house in Hampstead, North London, for £2.2m; a property in Shaftesbury, Dorset, for £311,000; a £3.2mmansion in Sandton, near Johannesburg, South Africa; a fleet of armoured Range Rovers valued at £600,000; a£120,000 Bentley; and a Mercedes Maybach for 407,000 euros that was shipped to his mansion in South Africa

(<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa17739388>).United Kingdom (UK) juryat the Southwark Crown Court, London, in June 2010, convicted Christine Ibori-Ibie, the sister of the former Governor of Delta state, James Ibori, on charges of money laundering and mortgage fraud. She helped her brother embezzle an estimated \$101.5 million from Nigeria'sDelta state into the governor's UK bank accounts. Nigeria's anti-graft agency, according to Agbibo(2012) EFCC, comments that Ibori stole as much as \$292 million while he was the governor in the oil-rich state in theNiger Delta. All these governors mentioned were Governors of the part of the Niger Delta Region and all others were involved in the looting of their state treasury. The corruption was enormous and these also transcend into the activities of NDDC and hence most of the funds for the contracts were corruptly embezzled and misappropriated hence the lots of cases of abandoned projects in the communities.

This corruption hence emerged as one of the major problems challenging the activities of the Commission in the region under study and the data and amount corruptly engulfed by the Commission's staff were shielded as such records were not made to the public . "One of the major problems of the Niger Delta area is corruption. Most of the political leadership in the region are corrupt and this has serious implications for development. Omotoso (2010) states that, the impact of the 13% special allocation to the Niger Delta area is not so felt by the people because of problems of corruption".In 2002 the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Nigeria, Alhaji Ghali Na'abba, according to Coventry (2009), told a conference that "The problems highlighted by the military taking over and replacing each military regime through coups d'état in 1966, 1975, 1983, and 1993 were never solved, rather, corruption became more pervasive, ethnicity more pronounced, and the economy ruined. To explain the level of corruption in the Niger Delta Region, the

Commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Restore Hope was removed because of accusation that he and his soldiers were involved in bunkering and illegal collection of money from the oil companies so as to protect them from the militants. Likewise communities were fighting each other in the Niger Delta on accusations of one community playing sharp practices against the other.

So the level of corruption engulfed all the sectors including government, parastatals, ministries, government officials and community leaders even the youth leaders and NDDC was not left out in the act. It was also estimated by EFCC according to Coventry (2009), that the sum of N3.3 trillion allocated to local government councils as part of an overall expenditure by federal, state and local governments of N16 trillion (US\$136.5 billion) in the period 1999 to 2007 was corruptly utilized leaving most of the local governments with no water, electricity, paved roads, no good schools nor health centers. A citizen of the Niger Delta from Ohaji/Egbema during the oral interview said. “the problem faced with the project is corruption and use of non-competent contractors”. The awards of contracts are highly politicized and this makes some communities aggrieved and tends to hate the staff of the commission. Another participant said “Most of the jobs are not well done because of the incompetency of some contractors. Giving borehole contract to a contractor who has no idea about water drilling or giving a road contract to a man that studied political science just because he is a friend to the commission members does not help matters”.Capitol (2010) states that President Olusegun Obasanjo in his inauguration speech in the year 2000 knew the problem of corruption in Nigerian society and he said in part “Let me reiterate here that NDDC will not be a honey pot to serve the personal greed of anyone. I will personally make sure of that and I have the Anti – Corruption Commission to support me”. Unfortunately, the

corruption is still hampering the achievements of the set goals of the NDDC and this is why most of their projects are either abandoned, or continue to manifest in their records as ongoing.

The report of Newsom (2011) explained that the Annual budgets in the four main oil producing states of Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, and Delta total \$7 billion, was roughly Ghana's Federal budget. However, though statistics are unreliable, there is consensus that around 51 percent of the Niger Delta's people still live on \$2 or less a day, only 49 percent have access to safe drinking water, there is one secondary school for every 14,679 children, and one child in five dies before his/her fifth birthday which is an indication of high infant mortality. Conflict in Niger Delta Region are based largely on resource issues, such as local control over a share of oil and gas income; corruption and institutionalized patronage that effectively block development gains; multiple political drivers, including the use of violence by political actors; the established political economy of violence as well as criminal economies, primarily crude oil theft; environmental damage from industry and oil spills; failure or neglect of local economies and infrastructure; a culture of impunity, particularly for political and militant actors; lack of representative and accountable government; and poor government service delivery. In 2004, clashes between militant leader Asari Dokubo and the Rivers State government or proxy militias spanned communities south of Port Harcourt. Groups of five to twenty people armed with AK-47s, dynamite, and small arms carried out the attacks, with spectacular effect on confidence in the region but limited effect on overall day-to-day production. Most attacks deferred less than 25,000 barrels a day of oil production. In 2005, assaults on oil pipelines intensified. The effect on production again was limited, but the shock factor added several dollars to the global price of oil. Oil companies scaled up

security and withdrew non-essential staff as the number of kidnappings grew. In 2007, post-election raids on Port Harcourt by competing militias were repelled by security forces using helicopter gunships inside the city. Regular oil production fell by 500,000 barrels per day or more. In 2008, fresh clashes across Delta, Rivers, and Bayelsa states slashed production to 1.2 million barrels per-day from an average of about 2.2 million barrels in the months before the conflict. According to UNDP report (2006), specifying the concerns of the residents on the major problems of the region “UN-commissioned survey asked residents what they most disliked about the region; poor leadership, poor governance, and corruption were the top answers”.

A participants from Oguta, an unemployed youth said “ NDDC, and the government are all the same, the NDDC learn from the government “their oga” on how to chop money, they just managed to do these little work for us on our roads, water and electricity, we thank them but they are chopping too much. We are not saying they should not chop my brother, make dem chop and remain for us as they know that we are suffering here and poverty is too much. Please tell them like that” this statement has some “pigin or broken” English as “the oga” means “the Boss” “chop” is a local way of saying eat or consume.

Poverty in the Niger Delta Region Poverty in the Niger delta region has persisted over the years because of the governmental and stake holders approach in tackling it and the stakeholders here includes the multinational oil companies, the various commissions and parastatals, the NGOs and the communities themselves. There has not been a well-articulated poverty alleviation programme that carried the communities along in its planning and implementation and even when there are better designed programmes, the corruption and implementation lapses make the programmes ineffective. There has not been provision of

alternative means of livelihood for the citizens of the region since the farms and waters for farming and fishing which is the main occupation of the communities has been destroyed by the activities of oil exploration. Hence in the Niger Delta there should be provision of social infrastructures to serve as alternative empowerment for the citizenry as that would encourage them into new productive activities so as to reduce poverty and increase growth and development. Even when the stakeholders especially the oil companies and government try to provide these social capitals, the politicization and non-equitable distribution of such facilities in terms of priority makes the provisions unjustifiable. There have been cases of over concentration of such infrastructures in a particular community just because they have a strong and influential politician or top government official, hence the provisions do not follow the ethical and equitable provisions based on urgent need. This is in line with the assertions of Idemudia (2008) as he emphasized that the provision of roads, electricity in the communities without good drinking water and habitat possess problems to the communities. What is the relevance of electricity and roads when there is no house to shelter the people? Efforts should be geared towards providing low income housing units for the poor farmers and fishermen than for them to live in slums and shanties. The need for social capital as a motivation and empowerment to the communities would in no small means reduce the poverty in the region. An organized and customized micro credit scheme or facility could be organized for the local dwellers so that they can borrow with little or no interest to start a new life outside the non-existing and profitable farming and fishing. As stated by Idemudia (2008), the danger in this is most of the local people are fearful of loans based on their little knowledge about it and the procedures.

There have been cases of people becoming poorer due to some mishaps in investments and non-proper utilizations of loans which may lead to their selling off all they have to pay off or go to jail in some cases. Therefore government should according to Joel (2008) fashion out an attractive micro finance scheme to encourage the local farmers getting out of poverty in the region. Poverty gap in Nigeria is widening, with a greater proportion of the nation's wealth being concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest 20 percent of the population and the elite in the society has not made enduring efforts to enhance the conversion of the socioeconomic and political situation in the Niger Delta Region to reduce poverty in the communities. Asikhia (2013) in their study tried to find out the relationship between poverty alleviation and income distribution and rural development and they discovered that "a direct relationship exists between poverty alleviation, income redistribution and rural development. When poverty is alleviated, individuals develop capacity to create wealth which redistributes income and facilitates development" though the level of relationship varies depending on countries and the variables.

A participant from Obowo said "poverty in this our country is too much and increases every day. Each day many people join the poverty number as many lose their jobs and nothing comes from government to support us. NDDC is part of the government in power. Government appoints the board members to compensate politicians and relations so they embezzle money and government does not care. It is all the same corruption everywhere and poverty everywhere. I have been teaching for over twenty five years and I cannot even have a good house nor buy a car. I only manage to train my children".

A community leader in her early fifty said : "we are very poor here and women are bearing the brunt of the bad government, we sell all we have to train our children hoping they

would get job and take care of us but the reverse is the case. They graduate to become more burdens to us. Government always go on air promising all and saying poverty alleviation programme and we don't see the alleviation. We are not getting support and projects here not done, we don't know whom to hold, NDDC and government are the same. See the roads they are now worst, they would have left it for us as it were before than coming here to spoil them more in the name of projects" tell them since your mouth can reach them that we are very angry on the abandoned projects here. It is increasing hardship, poverty and erosion will soon clear our village".

A high Chief from Ohaji/Egbema said "Corruption and stealing is killing this commission and government, they have good programmes but the people at the head are so bad that they steal the money, they don't use the money well and even, they give the contract to small school leavers who don't know anything about contract just because they are their relatives. How can they do good contract? That is why most contracts are poorly done and nobody talks, I told them that they are thieves and not helping the region, they came here that they want to check our destroyed economic crops for compensation, they moved around for few days and went and never came again and nobody was compensated. That is corruption on its own as they must have shared the budgeted money for compensation"

Militancy and Leadership Structure Militancy and leadership structure of the Niger Delta region has been a challenge to both NDDC projects and the region in general. The level of violence, kidnapping, hostage taking and other activities of the militants has delayed and in some cases hampered the smooth operations of the contracting staff as well as the stakeholder's participation in the implementation of projects in the region. It was explained by Paki (2011) that one of the major road construction companies in Nigeria Julius Berger

had to abandon some of their projects within the Niger Delta Region because of high rate of kidnapping of their staff. Okumagba (2012) states that, one of the biggest security challenges in contemporary Nigerian State is the activities of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta as this led to the deployment of military by the Federal Government to control and subdue the violence and the response by the federal government so as to secure the life of expatriate oil workers and safe guard the continued oil production so as to maintain the foreign revenue generation and this led to the increasing level of insecurity and violence rather than addressing the challenges of the region. In June 2008, Olusola (2013) states that, the militants were able to move into the deep-sea-operation area to attack Nigeria's largest offshore oil platform, the Bonga Oil Platform that produces 225,000 barrels of crude oil per day, which lies 120 kilometers off the coast of Nigeria and this action gave a very serious signal to the Government that if nothing serious was done the militants would cripple the economy by blocking all the oil locations, "report of the LedumMitee led Technical Committee on the Niger Delta estimated that Nigeria lost about 8.84 trillion naira or 61.6 billion dollars to oil theft and sabotage in the volatile Niger Delta region between 2006 and 2008". This militancy made Nigerian Government to lose millions of barrels of oil daily and the short fall affected the global oil supply and the prices went up. The Amnesty granted by the President Yar'Adua in June 2009 helped to reduce the activities of the militants and President Godluck Jonathan's administration continued on this amnesty and were able to bring reasonable peace in the Niger Delta.

This high insecurity affected a lot of economic and developmental activities in the region as the activities of militia groups were declared as criminal and therefore a threat to national security and accordingly the federal government declared war against the militants

and the communities where they are located. As a result, it became a big challenge to the leaders of such Niger Delta Region as Government now see the communities as collaborators in the conflict which now raised the issue of the roles of national, regional and communal leaders in these crises. The conflict in the region according to Osaghae (2007) can be grouped into three levels ; the conflict between government and communities where government is using force to suppress and subdue the communities and unions agitating for ownership and benefits from the oil, conflicts between the oil companies and communities as communities confront oil companies asking for adequate compensations for the environmental and economic problems caused by the oil drilling activities while the oil companies themselves deny causing any negative environmental issues and later claimed that since they pay royalties and taxes to government that they were no more under obligation to compensate the communities and conflict among the communities for control of benefits that accrue from having oil on one's land or territory.

The active participation of leaders in community activities and decision making in Nigeria is very important and researcher have mentioned the key roles they play in their various communities and the society at large Kuponiyi (2008), and the Niger Delta Region is not an exception in this regard .Also the qualities of good leadership as highlighted in the works of Sabran (2010) is of importance in consideration of the role of community leaders in the crisis resolution in the Niger Delta Region.

The environmental problems of the Niger Delta and women role in the struggle and protest against the challenges of socio economic and environmental problems of the Niger delta and NDDC projects have been mentioned in lots of literature (Ikelegbe 2005, Anugwom 2008, and Onyenechere2010). Women have formed organized groups to agitate

and make useful presentations to the authorities on how to face and reduce the challenges they are facing as a result of the Niger delta situations and the Niger Delta Development Commission's projects. Women in the region have not kept quiet in the face of the problems caused by oil exploration which have drastically affected their means of livelihood and also that of their families.

The women of the Niger Delta according to Jike(2010) summarized their problems during a protest and explained that the Oil pollution and gas flaring has killed all the fishes, farmers who farm the land cannot get anything from their land anymore because of gross environmental degradation, Oil spillages have destroyed their lands leading to much hunger in the land that used to be full of food, community members are suffering and the gas they are flaring is causing so many people to die pre-maturely due to suffocation and other hazardous effects. "We are all women here. We are angry and aggrieved that is why we have come together, we cannot rely on our husbands anymore for this fight because they are not giving us the desired result-my only occupation is fishing. But nowadays when I go to the riverine areas, there is no fish any more to kill. Oil pollution and gas flaring has killed all the fishes. Farmers who farm the land cannot get anything from their land anymore because of gross environmental degradation. Oil spillages have destroyed their lands. As a result of these, we are hungry. Our children are suffering".

Women in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta are known to be peaceful but it does not mean they are cowards as when they try peaceful settlement and it fails, they resolve to action and confront any person, group or government. The cases of Aba Women's riots in 1832 and Abeokuta's women's riot of 1948 where women protested against the Colonial masters, the imposition of taxes and their system of governance comes to mind. About 58

protests according to Olakunle (2010) have been organized by women in the region to fight neglect, isolation, hunger, poverty, unemployment, and mismanagement of oil- resources. Women in the region have engaged in strong unions and leadership that has affected the lives of the communities. Various towns have women organizations who elect their leaders and run their organizations and likewise the men folks. In the words of Olankunle (2010) in his article, he quoted “we have organized cooperative and thrift society to address poverty among women. We have also given out soft loans to women. Our organization has given alternative business opportunities to women in replacement of their sources of subsistence that have been destroyed by the exploration. Our organization has also provided scholarships and grants to young school girls in secondary and tertiary institutions. Vocational training has been organized for women. Women mind is flexible and soft. We cannot wage war, carry arms like men’ (Women Professional Organization, Rivers State)”.

Sustainability – Monitoring and Evaluation Sustaining the projects in the Niger Delta Region has been a challenge to NDDC and these has be traced to their non-having a properly articulated and coordinated monitoring and evaluation layout and team for the projects. Majority of the participants stated that the communities were not involved in the design and implementation of the projects hence, they knew a little about them but since they were developmental projects, they willingly released their lands and other required materials to the commission. Hassan (2013) viewed that, the importance of people’s participation, monitoring and evaluation in projects and programmes has a wider support from literatures.

A participant and community leader in Ohaji/Egbemaduring an interview in January 2015 said: “The projects are 100% funded by NDDC, One major problem outside corruption is the issue of monitoring, evaluation and sustainability that is out of place. Once they

manage to complete a project, that is the end of it and this is why some of the water and electricity projects here are not functioning. No monitoring and evaluation. They do not sustain the projects”. “Corruption in the commission and the society at large is a very big problem affecting the projects”. Also affecting the project is the climatic condition of the communities. The rainy season of July through November affects the speed of the projects; hence some of them are abandoned due to the heavy rain and swampy nature of the region but our annoyance is that they don’t resume work on some of them as soon as the dry season sets in. Most favourable time for construction work in the study area is the dry season which starts from November through June.

The third participant stated; “I am not sure they monitor their projects, see the poor jobs done by the contractors, see the narrow roads and poor drainages, if they have competent staff that monitor, they would have seen that these works were poorly done”. “They brought in some projects but they are not doing well with the projects. Like the school they gave contract here, the contractor, a small boy who has no knowledge of building was moulding a set of 9 inches blocks for the upstairs and moulding 45 blocks with one bag of cement, just a trap to kill our children as the building would collapse after a short period”.

A participant from Obowo Community in Imo State stated: “There is nothing like good people in the commission and there is much projects abandoned and even when finished, done badly and no monitoring and evaluation. This is a big problem and giving the commission bad image. Most often the Board members are changed because of corruption, still nobody is tried nor found guilty and new members follow the same trend of embezzlement and misappropriation of funds. No monitoring and if there is, then these projects would not be like these, erosion is about pulling down people’s houses along the

Umuekwele – Alike Umuosochie road and nothing is done. The communities now try to organize communal labour to redirect the flood. The abandoned umulogho-Okwuohia road is not passable because the contractor abandoned the bridge and the road, so where is the NDDC monitoring team”?

B. Environmental Factors

The nature and topography of the Niger delta possess serious problems to both the inhabitants and all developmental projects in the locations. The two seasons of Niger delta are of April to October for the rainy season and from November to March is the dry season. In the words of former president of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo according to Capitol (2010) the problems of the Niger delta includes the environmental situation “Another challenge is the serious problem of environmental degradation and pollution” Niger Delta Development Commission Publication (“The Capitol; 10 years of NDDC. The Niger Delta Region of Nigeria consists of freshwater swamp, mangrove swamp, beach ridges, sand bars, lagoons marshes and tidal channels. Nigeria according to Ayuba (2012), has a total land mass of 923,768sq/km; 918,768sq/km being terrestrial land and 13000 sq. /km being aquatic. In the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, according to Adelana (2011) some of the environmental problems associated with oil exploration and production include oil spills, gas flaring and venting, discharges of petroleum–derived chemical wastes, contamination of controlled water sources, contamination of soil and sediments, the destruction of the farmland and the marine environment, discharges from abandoned oil well that were not filled or properly covered and the discharges from illegally installed oil plugs done by oil bunkers.

More than three-quarters of the people living in Niger Delta areas, according to Iledare&Suberu (2010) lack access to potable or safe drinking water in spite of a vast network of natural freshwater and groundwater resources as these natural water have been polluted by the activities of the oil companies operating in the area, leading to pervasive water-borne diseases. Baghebo et al (2012), pollution from gas flaring is enormous especially the “Open pipe flare” which most companies adopt in Nigeria unlike the “ground open flare”. Scientists have observed that the open pipe type contains elements derived from the products of incomplete combustion, including soot and various sizes of carbon particles which are both hazardous. Also, Steiner (2010), UNDP (2006) and United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP 2011)), explained the environmental situation in the Niger Delta region in the report highlighting the enormous oil spills occurring in riverine areas in the Niger Delta Region have also done great damage to the aquatic ecosystem, particularly in the mangrove swamp forest zone. Steiner (2010) stated thus that in the Niger Delta, “drinking water is polluted, fishing and farming are significantly impacted and ecosystems are degraded”. This swampy nature and environmental problems affected the NDDC projects as most of the road construction works could not be done once rainy season starts and the swampy nature of the soil makes construction works there more difficult and expensive.

Inadequate Funding: The issue of inadequate funding as a challenge to NDDC projects and the Niger Delta Region has generated lots of argument and counter arguments. Most times the Commission has hinged their inadequate performance and lots of abandoned projects to lack of funds to execute these projects. On the other hand the communities and government has indicated that the level of corruption and misappropriation of funds annually budgeted and allocated to NDDC has caused their poor performance.

However, considering the expanse of projects and programmed associated with NDDC in their master plan, there is justification for continuous increase in their allocation but the danger and problem is that no adequate and satisfactory account has been given for the funds allocated and this has made many people in Nigeria see the commission as a settlement avenue for political supporters. That is why most committee reports probing on the Board of Directors has never left the office of the president nor the national assembly. The report of the various probe panels and committees ends up on the pages of newspapers. It then shows that the commission is just an extension of the corruption that goes on at the larger sector of the economy.

All of the participants contacted on telephone were of the view that corruption, mismanagement and award of contracts to incompetent contractors are some of the problems of the commission and the region. They also commented on the environmental problems of the region and said the commission and government are working but not enough to effectively transform the region and make it attractive and comfortable to live in. They were optimistic that once a good management is in place, the challenges of the region would receive admirable attention and the communities would be happier and the illegal activities would drastically drop to the barest minimum.

5.5. Establishment of Ministry of Niger Delta

The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs was created in September 10, 2008 by His Excellency, President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua to formulate and coordinate policies for the development and security of the Niger Delta Region comprising of the following states: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. Actual operation

commenced in February, 2009, after the appointment of two Honourable Ministers and the posting of a Permanent Secretary and a few Senior Staff. According to Juliana (2008), the minister will be incharge of development of Niger Delta area and a minister of State incharge of youth empowerment.

The establishment of a Ministry to handle the development of the Niger Delta Region is another attempt by the Government to solve the development issues and challenges, including the perceived sense of exclusion, environmental degradation, poverty, and unemployment in the Region.

Prior to the creation of the Ministry, Government had taken many intervention measures, such as the establishment of Niger Delta Development Board of 1960, the Presidential Task Force on 1.5% Derivation which was set up between 1979 and 1983, the Oil Minerals Areas Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC) of 1992 and the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) which was created in 2000 by an Act of Parliament. Unfortunately, these Agencies could not fully deliver the expected results, hence the establishment of the Ministry as a coordinating vehicle to drive the development process of the Region.

The mandate of the Ministry is to formulate and execute plans, programmes and other initiatives aimed at fast-tracking the development of the Niger Delta Region. In addition, the Ministry is coordinating the activities of Government Agencies, Communities in the Area, International Development Partners (through the National Planning Commission), Donor Agencies and other relevant stakeholders involved in the development of the Region.

Policy Focus

The functions of the Ministry are to oversee the implementation of Government policies on the development and security of the Niger Delta Region, Coordinate the formulation of the Development Plan for the Region, Formulate policies and programmes for youth mobilization and empowerment in the Niger Delta Region, Advise Government on security issues concerning the Region, Liaise with relevant Government, Non-Government and private organizations, Formulate and coordinate policies for environmental management in the Region, Liaise with host communities for the enhancement of the welfare of the people and the development of the Region, Facilitate private sector involvement in the development of the Region, Plan and supervise public education/ enlightenment programs, and Liaise with oil companies operating in the Region to ensure environmental protection and pollution control;

- Organize human capacity development as well as skills acquisition programs for youths and women; and
- Take adequate measures to ensure peace, stability and security with a view to enhancing the economic potentials of the Region.

5.5.1. Challenges Facing the Niger Delta Ministry

There is no disputing the fact that the challenges of developing the Niger Delta are enormous and perhaps intimidating. This gargantuan task, no doubt, requires the concerted efforts of all stake holders. The indications are that the Federal Government understands this, which explains why it adopted a multi-faceted strategy in tackling the challenges, realizing

that it is not an undertaking for only one or two development agencies. The justification, of course, is that undoing the damage wrought by decades of neglect and injustice would need team work.

Thus, the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs tallies with the reasoning that all hands must be on deck to fast-track the development of the region that produces the oil-wealth of the nation. The ministry was supposed to lead and coordinate the infrastructural and environmental development as well as the youth empowerment programs of the Federal Government in the region.

Despite this good intension, the ministry took off amidst controversies and apprehensions. Those who had reservations about the ministry feared that it would add another avoidable layer of bureaucracy to the effort at speeding up the development of the Niger Delta. However, those who supported its creation were hopeful that it would attract additional funds and expertise for the rapid development of the region.

A lot of premium was placed on the advantage of having two ministers who, as members of the Federal Executive Council would have a platform to articulate the development needs of the Niger Delta. Those who were still not convinced were told that the ministers would have easy access to Mr. President to ensure that he never loses sight of the Niger Delta question.

Today, however, the story appears to be different. The ministry which many had thought was coming to add value to the fortunes of the region is now confirming the worst

fears of critics who predicted that it would slow down rather than enhance the activities of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) that it was supposed to complement.

This is contrary to the general expectations that the ministry and the NDDC would team up to implement the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. This unpleasant turn of events is, to say the least, shocking. You can be sure that political and community leaders who had justified the creation of the ministry are not amused. Most people in the region had thought that a massive inflow of funds would follow the creation of the ministry to translate the lofty goals of the Master Plan into projects and programmes that would make significant impact on the lives of the people of the oil-bearing communities spread across the Niger Delta region. In fact, some people had suggested a Marshall Plan approach in addressing the developmental challenges in the region.

It is rather sad that this has not happened. To make matters worse, the ministry appears to be in a contest for superiority in its relationship with the NDDC. While other stake holders are looking up to them to play a leading role in coordinating the implementation of the widely applauded Master Plan, the ministry seems intent on bringing NDDC under its control. The power tussle is uncalled for and the ministry should know that it was not put in place to reinvent the wheel. Basically, it was created to add more impetus to the activities of other agencies of government that are already on ground and partnering with them for the benefit of the region.

Senator Ndoma-Egba, a strong voice in the Upper Legislative House of the National Assembly, according to Nosike (2008) puts it this way: “My understanding of the decision by the executive to create a ministry for the Niger-Delta was to empower it to help in the

infrastructural development of the area in addition to, not as a replacement for what the NDDC is doing.”

Another lawmaker, representing Warri Federal constituency in the House of Representatives, Hon. Daniel Reyenieju, noted that the commission was established by an Act of Parliament. “On no account should the commission be merged with the ministry because the Niger Delta Ministry was created by an executive fiat while the commission came to life via an Act of Parliament which is far stronger than that of the ministry,” he said. Again, the ministry should be conscious of the fact that up to this day, many people still believe that it is a superfluous political contraption. Only recently, for instance, the former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Mallam Nasir el-Rufia said “the creation of the Niger Delta Ministry is a political gesture and unnecessary bureaucracy that will fail to solve the problems facing the troubled region.”

Unfortunately, the ministry seems to be preoccupied with annexing more powers and extending its spheres of influence, especially over other statutory agencies. The Minister of Niger Delta Affairs, Elder Godsdan Orubebe, has never hidden his disdain for an autonomous NDDC. He has argued at every opportunity that the commission should be supervised by his ministry. Here is what he said in a recent interview published in a national newspaper: “There is no correlation between the NDDC and the Niger Delta Ministry. If you go and attend a meeting anywhere in the world, people are talking to you about the NDDC, people are talking to you about development and as a minister, you have little or no information about what the NDDC is doing; does that present any meaningful reasoning? A

minister of the Niger Delta should be able to tell development partners and whoever that is concerned what is being done by the NDDC. But today, there is no correlation.”

The minister is right in insisting on collaboration between his ministry and the NDDC. But who or what are the hindrances to this very necessary partnership? Before the ministry came on board, the NDDC had already set up a clearing house called the Partners for Sustainable Development (PSD) Forum. This important organ brings together representatives of federal and state governments of oil-bearing states, youth and women leaders, traditional rulers as well as the organized private sector, civil society, the mass media and international development agencies such as the UNDP and the World Bank. Its main function is to ensure that the developmental activities in the Niger Delta by all stakeholders are synchronized. This important organ is all that the ministry needs to key into the development programs of the region.

Indeed, it is surprising that the ministry has not adopted the Master Plan facilitated by the NDDC as its own road map, since the Federal Government gave its blessings for the production of the comprehensive plan. The 15-year period of the plan must not be allowed to run out without any significant impact on the Niger Delta. There is no need for this distractive schism in what should be a collective effort to rescue Niger Deltans from the pits of squalor and want. The Act setting up the NDDC clearly puts the supervision of the commission directly under the President. Note, not under the Presidency. This means that there are no obstructive go-between for the commission and the President to ensure expeditious implementation of decisions. The framers of the law were conscious of the fact that the interventionist agency must be freed of all the encumbrances of ministries which are usually

weighed down by bureaucratic red tape. Part II, Section 7 of the Niger Delta Development Commission (Establishment) Act 2000 states that: “The Commission shall be subject to the direction, control or supervision in the performance of its functions under this Act by the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” Royal fathers in the region, under the aegis of Association of Traditional Rulers of Oil Mineral Producing Communities of Nigeria, have given their wise counsel to President Goodluck Jonathan on this matter. Their warning: “Don’t contemplate merging the commission with the ministry. Such action will be detrimental to the entire people of the area.”

The urgent task now is to secure more funds for the full implementation of the Master Plan for the region. There is enough room for both the ministry and the NDDC to operate and collaborate for the benefit of Niger Deltans.

5.6. Government Use of Military Task Force in Niger Delta

The Joint Military Task Force (JMTF) also known as “Operation Restore Hope” comprises military personnel and combatant troops drawn from the Nigerian Army, the Navy, the Air force, the Police and the State Security Service (SSS) who were deployed to the Niger Delta in May, 2009. They were originally charged by the Nigerian government to protect oil installations and waterways in the Niger Delta Region following recurrent reports of vandalization of oil facilities in the region by ethnic youth activities.

However, military attacks carried out by the JMTF on the insurgents group were said to result in indiscriminate killing of the insurgents and civilians and destruction of property in the Niger Delta worth millions of Naira. One of the divisions of the JMTF was referred to as “Operation Flush Out”. The history of military occupation of the oil communities began in 1994, which according to Okonta and Dougla (2003) marked out the Niger Delta as the only part of Nigeria where a special military occupation force took over the lives of the people, killing, maiming and raping thousands. Ransome-Kuti (1999), in November, states that 1999 the federal government also moved some Army battalions from Warri in Delta State and Elele in Rivers State into Bayelsa State. Some day before, seven policemen had been killed in a clash with youths in the Odi area of Bayelsa State and as Ransome-Kuti (1999) pointed out, rather than send Security Operatives to investigate the incident, identify and arrest the perpetrators of the killings, the government sent troops and weapons. After two days of criminal bombardment of Odi, all male youths in the town and its environs were killed while buildings were set on fire. this action of the government use of military force in the Niger Delta Region to curb insurgency has not resulted to positive outcome rather it has led to increasing insurgency in the region. According to O Ekpeye (personal communication April 7th, 2018), the use of military force by the government to eradicate insurgency was a wrong and miscalculated approach. It spouses up more agitation than solving it. What would have been expected from the government and oil companies was to look into the reason for the agitation and proffer a more sincere and result oriented approach. The use of military force on them is a means of trying to intimidate them. It is wrong and unacceptable. The government and the oil companies should avoid military force and use a more peaceful approach.



Source:<http://dai,ypost.ng/2017/08/06/niger-delta-militants-split-nigeria-five-republics-see-names/>



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The above pictures shows the government use of military task force in Niger Delta Region

CHAPTER SIX

NON-VIOLENCE APPROACH TO NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY

6.1. The non-violent approach in curbing Insurgency in Nigeria

Sequel to the investigation into the various approaches utilized by the government to curb insurgency in Niger Delta Region which are mainly violent in nature, it has been discovered that violent approach has not done any good toward solving insurgency in Niger Delta rather it has increased the rate of killing innocent citizens and destroying properties worth Billions of Naira. In respect to this, it is obvious that a more better and result oriented approach is needed. To achieve this, Ghandhis ideology of applying non-violence is required. This is why Hayes (2003) contended that those who oppose Insurgency should endeavour to engage in a broader set of dispute resolution strategies to ascertain the one workable and thus use it.

Furthermore, Harik (2004) observed that there have been many occasions in which government and others engaged in conflict resolution strategies with terrorists including amnesties, treatment of arrested Insurgents, and negotiations during insurgency and campaigns. Gandhi in his own concept of nonviolence propounded the use of *ahimsa* and *Satyagraha* as a viable approach in curbing insurgency.

6.1.1. The Foundation of Mahatma Gandhi's Philosophy of Non-violence

The concept of non-violence has been in existence in the Religion of the Hindus even before Gandhi used it to propagate the independence of Indian and Indians in South Africa. This concept is embedded in the religious belief of the Indians in reincarnation. According to

Charles (2010), Reincarnation is the “religious concept that the soul or spirit, after biological death, begins a new life in a new body and this doctrine is a central tenet of the Indian religion” (p.640). The word reincarnation is derived from Latin word, which literally means “entering the flesh again”. The Greek equivalent “Metempsychosis” roughly corresponds to the common English Phrase “transmigration for the soul” and also animal, though emphasizing the continuity of soul not the flesh.

There is no word corresponding exactly to the English terms “Rebirth”, metempsychosis,” “transmigration” or “reincarnation” in the traditional language of *pali* and *Sanskrit*. Brodd(2003) maintains that the entire universal process that gives rise to the cycle of death and rebirth, governed by *Karma* is referred to as *Samsara*. Madu (2003) presents that as for rebirth – *Samsara*, Buddhism maintains that a being is a combination of physical and mental forces or energies. Death is nothing else but a total non-functioning of physical body but not the mental energies, which Buddhism accepts are always desirous to live again; manifesting itself in another form, producing re-existence which we call rebirths” (p.74).

The actual process of change from one life to the next is called “*pubarbhava*” literally “becoming again”, or more briefly, becoming and some English-speaking Buddhists prefer the term “rebirth” or rebecoming to render this term as they take “reincarnation” to imply a fixed entity that is reborn. Krishnan (1997) asserts that “the life as known now, after death therefore moves on to another form of life based on the merits and demerits it accumulated in its current life. The part to becoming a supreme soul is to practise non-violence and be truthful” (p.13). Mark (2006) in its own word viewed that “Janism which is part of Buddhism religion believes in the sacredness of all life and committing an act of violence against a human, animal, or even vegetable, generates negative Karma that in turn adversely affects

one's next life". (p.376). He went further to view that they believe that the only way to save their own souls is to protect the souls of everyone else and this strenghtens up their practice of Ahimsa which means non-violence" (p.376).

Christ teaching of active love also forms the foundation of Gandhi's non-violence philosophy. Christ and his teachings occupy a unique place in the history of the non-violence and pacifism. In His teachings, He condemned the use of physical force and preached the principle of love. His life was the story of intense suffering for the love of humanity. Moreover the entire teachings of Christ logically followed from his conception of the universal, loving fatherhood of God and brotherhood of human. According to Jesus, one should give up violence and convert enemies into friends through his technique of love. For him, non-violence being the expression of love is a universal virtue and not the peculiarity of any race, creed or country. Acknowledging this Gandhi said, "Love is a rare herb that makes a friend even of a sworn enemy and this herb grows out of nonviolence. What in a dormant state is nonviolence becomes love in the waking state. Love destroys ill will".

Jesus taught and practiced true *Ahimsa* and true love. His whole life was an example of love and sacrifice for others. A classical example of Christ's Ahimsa and love was shown at the Cross where he faced the evil courageously and nonviolently, with love and kindness for even those who were responsible for his death/crucifixion. The prayer of Jesus at the cross was an important example of meeting evil with love and nonviolence. He prayed "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do". Acknowledging such examples of Christ, Gandhi wrote to S.K. Rudra, "Jesus had the power to consume his enemies to ashes but he refrained and permitted himself to be killed for he so loved". For Gandhi, Christ

revolutionized the law of love transforming and raising it from the level of reciprocity to that of non-retaliation and creative purpose.

It is on the basis of the above belief of Buddhism religion on reincarnation and Christ teaching on Love that Gandhi expounded his concept of Non-violence which he used to liberate the Indians in South Africa, and the independence of the Indians from their colonial masters.

6.1.2. Gandhi's Concept of Non-violence

To Gandhi, the notion of non-violence attains a special status. He not only theorized on it, he adopted non-violence as a philosophy and an ideal way of life. He made us understand that the philosophy of nonviolence is not a weapon of the weak; it is a weapon, which can be tried by all. Nonviolence was not Gandhi's invention. He is however called the father of nonviolence action to a level never before achieved. According to Kripalani (1990) Gandhi was the first in Human history to extend the principle of non-violence from the individual to social and political plane. While scholars were talking about an idea without a name or a movement, Gandhi is the person who came up with the name and brought together different related ideas under one concept: *Satygraha*.

Gandhi saw violence pejoratively and also identified two forms of violence; passive and physical violence. The practice of passive violence is a daily affair; consciously and unconsciously, it is again the fuel that ignites the fire of physical violence. Gandhi understands violence from its Sanskrit root, *himsa*, meaning injury. In the midst of hyper violence, Gandhi teaches that the one who possesses nonviolence is blessed. Blessed is the man who can perceive the law of *ahimsa* (Non-violence) in the midst of the raging fire of

“himsa” all around him. To Gandhi (1970), “the more adverse the circumstances around him, the intenser he grows his longing for deliverance from the bondage of flesh which is a vehicle of “himsa” (p.69)”. Gandhi objects to violence because it perpetuates hatred. When it appears to do “good”, the good is only temporary and cannot do any good in the long run. A true nonviolence activist accepts violence on himself without inflicting it on another. This is heroism. When Gandhi says that in the course of fighting for human rights, one should accept violence and self-suffering, he does not applaud cowardice. Cowardice for Gandhi (1928) is “the greatest violence, certainly, far greater than bloodshed and the likes that generally go under the name of violence” (p.247). For Gandhi, perpetrators of violence (whom he referred to as criminals), are products of social disintegration. Gandhi feels that violence is not a natural tendency of humans. It is a learned experience. There is need for a perfect weapon to combat violence and this is nonviolence. Gandhi understood non-violence from its Sanskrit root *Ahimsa*. *Ahimsa* implies total non-violence, no physical violence, and no passive violence. Gandhi translates *Ahimsa* as love. For Gandhi, non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than any weapon of mass destruction. It is superior to brute force. Gandhi’s nonviolence is the search for truth. Truth is the most fundamental aspect in Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence. Truth and nonviolence are as old as the hills. For nonviolence to be strong and effective, it must begin with the mind, without which it will be nonviolence of the weak and cowardly. A coward is a person who lacks courage when facing a dangerous and unpleasant situation and tries to avoid it. True nonviolence is dissociated from fear. Gandhi feels that possession of arms is not cowardice but also lack of fearlessness or courage. According to Nimal (1948) Gandhi concluded that “I can imagine a fully armed man to be at heart, a coward possession of arms implies an element of fear, if not

cowardice but true nonviolence is impossibility without the possession of unadulterated fearlessness” (p.154). In the face of violence and injustice, Gandhi considers non-violence resistance preferable to cowardly submission. Gandhi viewed that there is no deliverance for any people on this earth or for all the people of this earth except through truth and nonviolence in every walk of life without any exceptions.

6.1.3. Ahimsa

Ahimsa according to Mayton and Burrows (2012) is a term meaning “to not injure; the word is derived from the Samkrit root “hims” which means to strike; himsa is to injure or harm and the opposite of this is cause no injury or do no harm” (p.713). To Bajpai (2011), it is referred to as “nonviolence, and it applies to all living beings including animals according to many Indian religious” (p.98). It is to John (1997) a “multidimensional concept, inspired by the premise that all living being have the spark of the divine spiritual energy, to hurt another being is to hurt oneself” (p.392). Also to John (1997), it is related to the notion that any violence has karmic consequences” (p.417). Kirkwood (1989) concludes that *Ahimsa* precept of “cause no injury” includes one’s deeds, words and thoughts” (p.213). It is to Gandhi as presented by William (1986) “to preclude not only the act of inflicting a physical injury, but also harsh words, dishonesty and lying, all of which he saw as manifestation of violence incompatible with Ahimsa” (p.11). It is an important tenet of the religions that originated in ancient India (Hinduism, Buddhism, and especially Jainism). Ahimsa is a rule of conduct that bars the killing or the cause of injury to living beings. However, in its comprehensive meaning, Ahimsa connotes entire abstinence from causing any pain; harm whatever to any living creature, by thought, word, or deed. It therefore, requires harmless mind, harmless mouth and harmless hands. Okoro (2008) asserts that it

does not only mean negative non-injury but also cosmic love. It is the development of mental attitude in which hatred is replaced by love. Ahimsa is true sacrifice, it is true forgiveness. Ahimsa is power. It is true strength.

The philosophy of life *Ahimsa* is not peculiar to Hinduism rather applicable in most of the world religions. However it is mostly fundamental to Jainism. Gandhi was influenced by this Jain Philosophy and practice at his early age. Commenting on the Sri Swami as Okoro (2005) noted, “Gandhi, living with a devout mother and surrounded by Jain influence at Guyarat, he learnt from an early age the tenet of non-injury to living beings, vegetarianism, fasting for self-purification and mutual tolerance between members of various creeds and sects” (p.8). While expounding the doctrine of Ahimsa, Gandhi in Bhargave (1968) says:

If you practice Ahimsa, you should put up with insults, rebukes and assault, you never retaliate nor wish to offend anybody even under extreme provocation. You should not entertain any evil thought against anybody. You should not curse. You should be prepared to lose joyfully even your life in the cause of truth (p.100).

Accordingly, the ultimate truth can only be attained through *Ahimsa*. Gandhi maintained that Ahimsa and by extension Satyagraha cannot be practiced by weak persons. It is not possible without fearfulness. In Gandhi’s own words as stated by Jack (1965):

When thought of revenge and hatreds arise in the mind, try to control the physical body, and speeches first; do not utter evil and harsh words. Do not curse. Do not injure others. If you succeed in this practice for some months,

the negative thoughts of revenge, having no scope for manifesting outside, will die by themselves (p.332).

Gandhi, in teaching this philosophy acknowledged the difficulty of practicing Ahimsa in a selfish society like Nigeria but he opines that true test of the validity and viability of such unpopular philosophy is in hostile societies like our contemporary Nigeria. For Gandhi, he who must practice *Ahimsa* must have a full control of his thoughts, body and speech.

Ahimsa is the practice of self-mortification, total destruction of mortal desires and self-aspirations. It is living selflessly in a selfish world. It is the submission of the left cheek when beaten on the right. *Ahimsa* is contrary to the laws of revenge which suggest “tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye” that is paying with the same coin. Martin Luther King Jr. in Odey (1995) emphasizing on the danger of revenge says: “If you use the law ‘an eye for an eye’ ‘a tooth for a tooth’ ‘then you will end up with everybody blind and toothless” (p.43). The practice of *Ahimsa* which is being calm and quiet while being oppressed will cause your furious opponent to be calm because you are silent while being oppressed. The opponent will get astonished and terrified at your moral strength. *Ahimsa* is a soul force. At its presence hate melts. There is no other power for social reforms that can equal that of Ahimsa.

6.1.4. Satyagraha

Satyagraha according to Uma (2005) is “loosely translated as “insistence on truth” or truth force” (p.138). “It is a particular philosophy and practice within the broader overall category, generally known as nonviolence or civil resistance”(p.138). Satyagraha is a philosophy or principle coined by Gandhi to describe the form of nonviolent techniques he used and practiced. It is a philosophy and practice of absolute nonviolent resistance of

injustice, oppression and dehumanization. This concept of Satyagraha was conceived, developed and used by Mahatma Gandhi alongside *Ahimsa* to fight for the liberation and reformation of Indian society. The plight of the Indian in South Africa was according to Gross (2014) “the factor that necessitated the concept and the development of Satyagraha” (p.15). It is a weapon for social change. Though the concept of Satyagraha was conceived and used initially at South Africa, its full or wholesome use was for the independence of India.

Satyagraha is derived according to Gross (2014) from “two Sanskrit words-*Satya* which means “truth” and “Agraha” which means to “grasp” or “holding fast””. (16). For Gandhi as presented by Gross (2014), “Satyagraha went far beyond mere “passive resistance” and become strength in practising non-violent methods” (p.17). In the struggle for India independence, Gandhi as affirms by Hardman (2003) described the concept thus:

Its root meaning is holding unto truth, hence ‘truth force’ or ‘soul-force’. In the application of Satyagraha, I discovered in the earliest stage that the pursuit of truth did not admit violence being inflicted on one’s opponents but patience and sympathy, for what appear to be truth to one may appear to be error to others. Here patience means self-suffering. Therefore, the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on oneself (p.206).

In describing the process of developing his concept, Gandhi underscores the fact that Satyagraha was developed in the heat of liberation struggle in South Africa. Here there was no clear name to describe the idea of this new liberation option; therefore, it was called

‘Passive Resistance’: but the name did not give a clear description of his idea. As the struggle advances, the idea of the method became clearer and as such “Passive Resistance” was dropped and then, ShriMayanlal Gandhi suggested a Sanskrit term ‘Satyagraha’ which means firmness in good cause. Though this new idea did not quite represent Gandhi’s idea, but it gave the insight through which Gandhi came up with his idea of Satyagraha. So with time, the Indian movement began to be called Satyagraha.

Satyagraha is a two-sided coin; the non-violent side and the non-cooperation side. Though most times, people emphasizes only the non-violent side to the dethronement of the non-cooperation aspect. But without the good working knowledge and application of the non-cooperation to the non-violent, the whole scheme will seem to be a mere escape route for the weak and fainthearted. It seeks to confront all dehumanizing forces, as well as to promote justice at all realms of human association. Satyagraha underscore the equality of all human persons, Okoro(2008) noted that the general aphorism among Satyagraha, it is better to die a free man than to live a slave finds its relevance in the contemporary political history. As have been noted above, the concept of Satyagraha was initiated and developed in South Africa, but was wholesomely used to achieve independence in India.

6.1.4.1. Satyagraha in India

Odey (1996) asserts thus:

The British were masters in somebody else’s house. Their very presence was a humiliation. Imperialism is government of other people by other people for other people. It is a perpetual insult; for it assumes that the outsider has the right to rule the insiders who cannot rule themselves. Even if the British had

converted India into a land flowing with honey... they would have been disliked. Subjection breeds a desire for liberation. Hence imperialism digs its own grave and there can be no good colonizers (p. 106).

For someone to come to a foreign land and begin to dominate is not only an insult, but alerting the people to the insult. It is just like proving to the people that they are incapable of leading themselves. In situation like this, no matter how good the imperial government may seem, the people must dislike it, and fight for their liberation and independence.

This was the situation of India, they were under the colony of England. The decisions affecting the Indians were not taken by fellow Indians who would have understood their people better, but were being taken by foreigners (English people) who were not interested in the peoples' welfare, but rather work for their own selfish interest. The people were in political bondage and thus continually searched for a change in their government. Yet, most of their efforts for change seemed abortive.

This unique concept (Satyagraha) was greatly used in India, especially in the fight for her political independence. Looking at the condition of some of the Indians who were being used as 'Raiyats' (farmers) and how they were being exploited by their English landlords, Gandhi used Satyagraha to help them. He made the poor farmers who were initially suffering in silence to stand up for their right. Though he made great enquiries and gathered testimonies from about eight thousand farmers, yet he did not receive a rupee from anyone, even while a friend of his offered him 15,000 rupees, he declined the offer. Due to his inquires, Gandhi was appointed as member of the Champaran agrarian enquiry committee, where he now used Satyagraha all the more for the wellbeing of the farmers.

Gandhi equally used Satyagraha to stop the Indian students in London from their plot to take advantage of the First World War against their exploiters. He used Satyagraha to convert some of the leading Indians who had opposed the recruitment of the men in assisting their English exploiters to win their battle. He converted them to his own way of thinking. When the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Bill No. 1 of 1919 and the Criminal Law Emergency Power Bill No. 2 of 1919 were issued, Gandhi and his followers used Satyagraha to disobey the demands of the bill without violence. The observance of this 'Hartal' (disobedience of the bill) was seen as "the most wonderful spectacle." As another civil disobedience, the Indians refused to pay the increased land revenue tax in Bardoli, and their disobedience, yet without violence (Satyagraha) led to the rescinding of the tax, Gandhi in Odey (1996) addresses the ill-conduct of the English people as he says:

Nothing but organized nonviolence can check the organized violence of the British government... this nonviolence will be expressed through civil disobedience... my ambition is no less than to convert the British people through nonviolence, and thus make them see the wrong they have done to India... I respectfully invite you to pave way for the immediate removal of these evils, and thus open a way for a real conference between equals (p. 140).

In a nutshell, the principle of nonviolence (Satyagraha) was effectively used, not only for the freedom or independence of Indian, but also to convict and convert the British government from their colour prejudice and the ill treatment of the Indians in particular.

6.1.4.2. Satyagraha in South Africa

Odey (1996) asserts thus:

If one is rejected because he is uneducated, he can at least be consoled by the fact that it may be possible for him to get an education. If one is rejected because he is low on the economic ladder, he can at least dream of the day that he will rise from his dungeon of economic deprivation. If one is rejected because he speaks with an accent, he can at least, if he desires, work to bring his speech in line with the dominant group. If, however, one is rejected because of his colour, he must face the anguishing fact that he is being rejected because of something in himself that cannot be changed. All prejudice is evil, but the prejudice that rejects a man because of the colour of his skin is the most despicable expression of man's inhumanity to man (p.57).

The condition of the Indians and the colour race in South Africa at this time was so disheartening and very painful. If this rejection is caused by what one can correct or what one is responsible for, it could have been bearable, but it was due to the fact that their skin colour is black which is natural. This rejection was being stressed to the point that the Blacks are considered as second-class human beings. Consequently, they were denied equal right of existence as other people. They were rejected and have separate schools, health centres, public vehicles, etc. They were not allowed to travel with first and second tickets. They were used as manual labourers in the British-owned sugar, tea and coffee plantations; this ugly situation lasted for a long time even before the birth of Gandhi. Before the coming of Gandhi to South Africa, the suffering Indians were uncomfortable with their colour prejudice and marginalization, but they know not how to help themselves. When Gandhi arrived India in 1893, having noted his horrid experience on his way, Gandhi who was initially interested in his personal affairs-career, finances, family, etc., was now compelled to think globally and

think about the plight of the poor and the oppressed in an oppressive society. It was this later mission that developed after series of efforts to what we now have as the concept of Satyagraha.

With the principle of Satyagraha, Gandhi opposed the Natal government's intention or bill of imposing an annual tax of twenty-five pound on the 'Indentured Indians. The indenture Indians were those Indians whose master paid a certain amount of money on their behalf to their owners or parents before transporting them to South Africa. They equally footed their traveling bill which they expect that these Indians will work to pay back, all this to exercise freedom as supposed. It was this same concept that generated "the cotton thread of love" which bounds Gandhi to the Indian community that even while he travels to India that he will come back to South Africa whenever his services are needed. In 1906, when the government of the Transvaal introduced the Asiatic Registration Bill, Gandhi used Satyagraha to oppose the bill which he said was "specifically anti-Indian" though it also affected the Chinese in South Africa. It was also used to fight against the Asiatic Bill which Gandhi and his followers stigmatized as the "Black Act". This was why they now formed the "Passive Resistance Association. "With the principle of Satyagraha alongside Ahimsa, Gandhi and his followers were able to bring about liberation to the suffering Indians in South Africa, hence, they were now seen as fellow human beings with equal human rights.

6.1.5 Some Satyagraha's Effort

The impact felt and the effect seen in nonviolence and truth-force principles cannot be over emphasized. Thus, Gandhi used this twin weapon-Ahimsa and Satyagraha for social reforms effectively on many occasions and aspects of his struggle and he secured resounding

victories. Therefore, we have some struggle and he secured resounding victories. Therefore, we have some Satyagraha's, efforts or Satyagraha attached to different liberation efforts. Satyagraha was used in the following ways: it was used to hit against the salt tax in 1929, which Gandhi and his fellow Satyagraha call the salt March. It was used to oppose victoriously against the Black Act 1907 under Rowlatt in South Africa, which was passed to enslave the Indians all the more. Satyagraha was used by Gandhi in the "Champaran agrarian enquiry committee to convict the landlords of their evil deeds, and thereby require them to refund the twenty five percent of the cash payment while the exploitative system of farming was abolished. It was also used to convert some Indians who were so much conscious of violence as their only weapon for Swaraj (self-rule). Also, to convict the British government and landlords of their colourprejudice and ill-treatment against the Blacks. Satyagraha was used to achieve freedom for Indians in South Africa and independence for the Indian nation.

In summary, the concept of Satyagraha (Nonviolence) has been tested and proved by world-class activists as a viable means of Socio-Political and Economic reform. Martin Luther King Jnr used it in his Black struggle in America. As Kelgley (2000) asserts I do hold, however, that non-violence is the only way to genuinely achieve progress.

6.2. Characteristics of Non-Violence

6.2.1. Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience is the refusal to obey unjust laws or decrees. The refusal takes the form of passive resistance. For Civil Disobedience to be valid, it must be nonviolent. Rawls (1977) defines Civil Disobedience as "A public, nonviolent, conscientious, yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law with policies of government" (p.81).

People practicing Civil Disobedience break a law because they consider the law unjust and want to call attention to its injustices, hoping to bring about its repeal or amendment. The people are also willing to accept any penalty such as imprisonment for breaking the law. It means the refusal to obey laws using nonviolent means to force concessions from government. It is mostly taken by large number of people against government principles.

Civil Disobedience has brought about important changes in Law and government policies and those who undertake this disobedience do not break the law simply for personal gain. Echekwube (1999) viewed that, they work with the conviction that “the society governs with laws and decrees promulgated by the ruling government. Some of these laws may disregard the rights of individuals who may feel aggrieved by such obnoxious laws”(p.302). Individuals who are so affected and moved by conscience have the common good in mind and work with the dictum that “*lex injustas non est lex*”- “An unjust law is not law.”

Civil disobedience makes a distinction between unjust laws, which only apply to a portion of the population, and a just law, which applies, to everyone. Thus Gandhi fought against laws in South Africa that only applied to Indians and Martin Luther King Jr. fought against racist laws that only applied to blacks. Despite this affirmation, we still affirm vehemently that a law can apply to all and still be unjust.

6.2.2. Noncooperation

Noncooperation is the most common form of nonviolent action and involves deliberate withdrawal of cooperation with the person, activity, institution or regime with which the activists have become engaged in conflict. Political noncooperation includes

acts of civil disobedience,- the deliberate, open and peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations and the like, which are believed to be illegitimate for some reasons. Those who undertake this are faced with this question; must the law be obeyed? These feel that law portrays a great deal of normative personalism, in other words, if a law is unjust, it should not be obeyed. Noncooperation is an effective, noble and valuable means to bring change. Kumar (2009) insists that “this has been used by great men to end atrocities, inhumanities and injustices. It has been used to fight against wrongdoers, tyrants, oppressors, exploiters and unjust persons” (p.11). One reads the following line from Kumar (2009): “some ancient times great men, leaders of societies, philosophers and reformers have taken the path of non-cooperation to remove obstacles from the way of mutual cooperation. For them, it has been a method of strengthening the process of cooperation”(p.11). These great men, before proposing it to the world, tried it themselves and discovered its strength in accordance to justice and freedom.

6.3. Tripartite Dialogue

Tripartite Dialogue is a vital instrument in curbing or alleviating insurgency. Iioanya and Nwangbo-Ben (2010), asserts that tripartite dialogue is a vital medium through which Insurgency in Niger Delta Region will be tackled. They pointed out that tripartite dialogue is one of the best ways of settling any problematic or topical issues like Insurgency. It is a method of conversation between three or more people. It is also the process through which matters are settled in a round table instead of through the barrel of the gun or Military action.

According to Iioanya and Nwangbo-Ben (2010), tripartite dialogue is not the same as dialectics. The difference is that in dialectics there are three steps namely: thesis, antithesis and synthesis, while in tripartite dialogue there are four steps which are: thesis, prosthesis,

enthesi and synthesis. Tripartite dialogue is equally not the same as discussion in the sense that in discussion people come to interact without making up their mind to go home with the real fact at the end of the day; rather, they come with debate tactics to convince others, when their own opinion is not what is held, at the end of interaction they tend to cause confusion and disharmony but in tripartite dialogue the reverse is the case. According to Iloanya and Nwanagbo-Ben (2010), when people come for interaction in tripartite dialogue, though they will come with their various ideas but there will be nothing like debate tactics as in the case of discussion, rather they are ready to hold on to what is improved on the ground which will favour all the parties involved whether their opinion is held at the end of the day or not. In dialogue, as in non-violence, truth is seen as a vital fact that enables the round table discussion to arrive at a conclusion at the end. This is why Gandhi as in Hardman (2003) states that;

the root meaning of Satygraha is holding unto truth, hence truth force or soul force. In applying it, at the earliest stage, the pursuit of truth may not admit violence being inflicted on one's opponent but patience and sympathy, for what appears to be truth to one may appear to be error to other. Here patience means self-suffering. Therefore the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on oneself through peaceful dialogue (p.206).

This solution to the insurgency in Niger Delta is very good as it is void of sentiments and selfish interests but rather holds of truth. However, the problem is that, the Insurgents groups in Niger Delta and Government both State and Federal including the oil companies finds it difficult to hearken to the voice of reason and condescend to the principles involved in dialogue. Thus the solutions to the Insurgency in Niger Delta ought to be multi-faceted and

not just a one way affair. All the parties involved in the Niger Delta insurgency must as a matter of necessity accept and apply the principle of tripartite dialogue with almost truth so as to arrive at a lasting solution to the insurgency. All parties should be ready to keep their own part or role of the conclusion of the dialogue to its fullness with sincerity and truthfulness which is through Satyagraha.

Sequel to the above, the solution to the Insurgency in Niger Delta must be surrounding around nation building, capacity building, good-governance and youth empowerment. Actions must be backed with theories on the part of the government in order to create a perfect peaceful atmosphere in Niger Delta Region and Nigeria in general. Both the Niger Delta people, government and the oil companies have to come to a round table and dialogue. Ererene, F (personal communication April 7th, 2018), agreed with the fact that insurgency in the region can be reduced to the nearest minimum but to achieve this, there must be a sincere dialogue between the parties involved and the outcome of the dialogue must be sincerely implemented without trying to favour a few individual or group rather for the general good of all. He cited some cases where dialogue was carried out previously to curb insurgency in the region but could not produce lasting solution owing to the fact that it was done insincerely. Individualism was more prominent than the common good of all.

6.4.Tackling of Corruption and Weak Institutions

The United States Vice President, Joe Biden (cited by Obinna, 2015), while assuring the Nigerian President Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of the United States support in fighting Insurgency in Nigeria, stated that the United States will assist in rebuilding the Nigerian

economy: However, he observed that corruption and weak institutions must be tackled, if Nigeria wants to benefit from such reforms.

Irrespective of the fact that the issue of corruption in Nigeria is a well-known stigma in the Nigerian civil service and basic institutions; fighting it is a different thing altogether. The war against corruption must start from the Nigerian leadership down to the last citizen. Witch hunting the immediate past administration in the “probe” guise, and military atavistic cum sole administrative form of administration and appointing of the Nations Cabinet members from only the Northern parts of the country will not lend credible hand in fighting corruption and the endemic insurgency in Nigeria, rather it will heighten it. Besides, with the current stride of the federal government towards the so called: “change” agenda; it will only weaken the institutions that were being suggested by the United State Vice President to be strengthened. The weak institutions in Nigeria should equally be outlined and clear cut faults or weakness therein pin pointed. The Insurgency infesting Niger Delta currently leaves no room for ambiguous suggestions and superfluous statement. The insurgency in Niger Delta needs total honesty both in the part of the insurgents, Government and the oil companies. Fighting Corruption must be wholly in all these parties involved. The insurgents group must be void of corruption in the sense that they must be fighting for the general good of all and not for selfish gain. Gandhi in his exposition of non-violence states that whoever will be applying non-violence must do it in a sincere heart and holding fast to truth as a major factor. On the part of the government and the oil companies, there is need for a sincere attitude; implementing policies to help the Region. Corruption has dealt so much with the government that notwithstanding they have proffer good and sustainable approach to curb insurgency but no good result have been seen due to corruption. This is why Achebe (1998) stated that:

as a great country, it is one of the most corrupt, insensitive, inefficient places under the sun. it is one of the most expensive countries and one of those that gives least value for money. It is also dirty, callous, noisy, ostentatious, dishonest, full of violence, inhuman treatment and vulgar; in short, it is among the most unpleasant place (p.11).

Most times though the policy may be good but in its application, corruption divert its goodness to self centeredness. The individuals or institutions involved finds it difficult to implement policies sincerely. This is why Achebe (1998) states that the violence in Nigeria is majorly as a result of inhuman treatment caused by corrupt leaders or individuals. He went further to state that “though hopeless as it may seem today, Nigeria is not absolutely beyond redemption. Critical, yes but not entirely hopeless”(p.10). Sibani (2012) avers that there is need to also fight corruption so as to implement justice to our environment. He went further to say that injustice to our environment is as a result of corruption. Therefore there is need to fight corruption sincerely and wholistically.

This implies that if corruption is sincerely tackled, the issue of insurgency in Niger Delta will be reducing to its nearest minimum. Ogini .S (personal communication April 8th, 2018), states that unless corruption is fought sincerely, insurgency will continue to grow in the Region. Corruption is a major factor hindering the fight against insurgency and the corrupt leaders and institutions have not really understood the level of effect corruption is playing against the fight of insurgency. The corrupt leaders and institutions should be fought with non-violence and by these let them see the ills they had caused. By way of fighting corruption, let recommendations come from traditional council and the church. Let

politicians be removed. In creating ministries, people from academic field, indigents from international organizations like common wealth, UN, Ecowas etc should be considered.

6.5. Respect for the Sanctity of Life

Life is a free gift from God and it must be respected. Iwe (1986) states that, the most fundamental of all human rights is the right to live. It is a right which springs directly and immediately from the very nature of man. It is a right which a man or human being enjoys in virtue of the fact that he is a human person. It is the first of the fundamental rights of man deriving strictly from and based immediately on the dispositions of the natural law.

Sequel to the above, both insurgents and government should understand that they are human beings and not just human doings or animals in respect of shedding human blood at will. They should value the lives of others as much as they value their own. If they can flee for the sake of their dear lives, they should reason that so does innocent souls they murder value theirs. Good enough, all popular religious faiths admonish one not to kill fellow human beings because life is precious, priceless and irreplaceable. After killing ones so called enemy, what next? The culprit may have a feeling of temporary triumph before a foreboding sense of regret, or in a worst case scenario live the miserable life of a haunted man.

Insurgents should understand the sanctity of human life; thereby stop their torment on human beings. Likewise the government should not resort to military approach because it is a forceful approach which ends up in destroying properties and killing of human life. When the insurgents started, they were not killing people but when the government employed military force, the insurgents responded by killing.

It is in view of the above that Gandhi advocates for Non-violence approach to both the government and the insurgents. He explained the sanctity of life when he propounded the principle of Ahimsa. According to Gandhi (2001), Ahimsa is a term meaning “to not injure”; the word is derived from the Sankrit root “hims” which means to strike; himsa is to injure or harm and the opposite of this is cause no injury or do no harm. It is according to oday (1997) to preclude not only the act of inflicting a physical injury, but also harsh words, dishonesty and lying, all of which he saw as manifestation of violence. In expounding the doctrine of Ahimsa, Gandhi (1968) says:

if you practice Ahimsa, you should put up with insult, rebukes, and assault; you never retaliate nor wish to offend anybody even under extreme provocation. You should not entertain any evil thought against anybody. You should not curse. You should be prepared to lose joyfully even your life in the cause of truth (p100).

In collaboration with the above, Odey (1995) advised on the danger of violence which affect or destroys human life. He viewed that “if you use the law ‘an eye for an eye’, ‘a tooth for a tooth’ then you will end up with everybody blind and toothless” (p.43). These implies that both the government, oil companies and the insurgents group should embark on nonviolence approach so that they will not end up killing all who will enjoy the wealth of the oil or destroying properties which are valued to enhance human living thereby causing more harm than solving the existing problems.

6.6. Imbibing the Culture of Peace

Peace in reality exists on its own and is actually independent of war, violence nor insurgency. Hence the great artisans of peace of modern times like Pope John Paul 11,

maintained that one can gain lasting peace when one receives peace in one's mind and spirit. Anyanwu (2011), assert that this can take time as peace is built progressively and perseveringly. Ibeanu (2006), in his peace process theory maintained that peace is a process and not just a condition. This follows then that peace is a process that involves activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within specific societies like Niger Delta Region and in the wider international community. With this in mind, peace then is a process which relates to existing social conditions, it is not a finished condition, but always a "work in progress"; and is never finished because human societies continue to aspire to higher levels of development and less conflict. Peace then should always be on the increase and thus, teachings and thoughts on peace should always be born at the heart of every average Niger Deltans.

Peace studies should be woven into the fabrics of the education curriculum from primary to higher education level. Teachers and lecturers should teach on peaceful co-existence to pupils and students in order to learn tolerance. Parents at homes should inculcate peaceful approaches to issues on the children at homes. The use of abusive words on each other should be greatly frowned at. Children at homes should be taught to report cases of misdeeds to them to their parents to resolve and not taking laws into their hands by fighting back or resorting to any acts of violence. Religious institutions or groups should be emphasizing on peace.

Evil acts emanates from a broken family where the parents are not there as caring mothers or protective fathers. Government must therefore, involve the traditional rulers and opinion leaders from the places of frequent insurgency, in robust and far-reaching dialogue to get to the root causes of crime and inculcate peace lectures. Parents should stop breeding

more children than they could adequately cater for and nurture in the life of peaceful ordering of affairs.

As some of the terrorist groups are incited by religious teachings, Gofwen (2004), suggested that religious leaders must make sure that their preaching engagements are persuasive and not inciting or insulting. They should as a matter of necessity, weigh seriously and critically their utterances and actions. They should promote basic moral teachings on good virtues always. Individual adherents of each religious group must equally understand the basic tenets of their religion, and know when they are being incited and used in order not to be ever manipulated by their religious leaders. They should learn to stand their ground and seek for peace and unity of the nation Nigeria whenever at the verge of being deceived to resort to violence.

Moral instructions in schools must always feature teachings on those virtues that will prepare pupils and students respectively to embrace Nigeria as their Nation without developing phobia for neither any religious group, ethnic group nor the government at large. Tolerance for one another in Nigeria should equally be inculcated within these moral instruction sessions in schools.

The government authorities of Nigeria should form peculiar surveillance groups that checkmate inciting and insulting religious teachings. This will help to control excesses and religious fundamentalism cum fanaticisms in Nigeria. Religious groups that are discovered to be disseminating violence in any mode should be out rightly disciplined by the government authorities of Nigeria. The understanding that there is freedom of worship and religion in Nigeria should be promoted always.

Every citizen of Niger Delta should be encouraged according to Emelu (2014), through the mass media, enlightenment campaigns, churches and so on to learn to make the proposals of *pacem in terris* on the four pillars of peace-namely, truth, justice, love and freedom – the cornerstone of their relationships both public or private. This will aid in re-engineering the concept of the rich African culture that makes one as one's brother's keeper.

Again, through imbibing the culture of peace, the new radical perspective will be employed by the military as Nnoli (2006), proposed in the rethinking of the militarial stance and tactics. In other words, in the performance of Peace mediation, the military then should be emphasizing on peace keeping functions. This according to Nnoli simply means building its skills, capacities, structures and doctrines around peace keeping. The objective is to be able to keep apart the Niger Deltans engaged in conflict until the causes of conflict are democratically resolved. This must mean that only in the very extreme cases would the military shoot at insurgents in Niger Delta. The only exception would be when the dismemberment of the country is clearly threatened and such threats should be beyond questions. Also the insurgents should avoid carrying of arms, but rather embark on peaceful approach.

Imbibing the culture of peace will help discipline the Nigerian security operatives which includes the secret security officers, the police, the military and so on; on employing principles that deemphasizes the use of lethal force. Such is a necessary stance for a prompt and durable peace building. Security achieved by the use of force or the readiness to use force against others more often than not generates unintended negative consequences. Dissuasion may turn into provocation, the defense of basic human rights into partiality and self-defense into brutality. All these may engender more insurgency. Besides, imbibing the

culture of peace via this means will equally discipline the Nigerian security operatives the more as this will reduce their criminal mode of shooting at civilians on several occasions under the guise of accidental discharges whereas these are mostly prompted by their indiscipline and inability to be on their guard and pull themselves together. Thus through this mode, the insurgency they perpetrate amongst the civilian populace especially at check points will be tackled permanently.

On the side of the insurgents, they should imbibe the culture of peace in their effort to achieve their goal owing to the fact that if they continue to use arms, the government will have no option than to employ military approach. Sequel to the fact that what they are fighting for is for a sustainable living condition, use of arms will only end up destroying the oil they are fighting for, destroy most of the already development or amenities already provided and killing of human life. These will end up reversing their communities into a more bad and uncondusive environment; more dangerous than it was. Leaders of Insurgent groups in Niger Delta should advocate for peaceful approach in order to achieve a more positive result in the region.

6.7.Gainful Employment

The Federal Government of Nigeria needs to put efforts in place towards rapid agricultural, industrial and technological development in order to enhance a self-reliant economy. Long before the discovering of oil in 1957 in Nigeria, agriculture was the main stay of Nigeria's economy. Nigerians should therefore re-embark on massive, mechanized agricultural production. The federal and state governments should as a matter of urgency

lunch into mechanized farming. This would ensure adequate food production for Nigerians and for exports.

This endeavour will settle the problem of unemployment and hunger which are one of the reasons for insurgency in Niger Delta. Again, it will reduce the tensions in the Niger Delta regions over their feeling of being used, marginalized and not benefitting from the oil being mined from their lands. Employment opportunity should be created in order to keep the youths of the region busy because staying idle leads to many evil thoughts as it is said: an idle mind is a devil workshop. Also, the youths in the Niger Delta should be available and ready to work because most of the insurgents are youths that are creative in nature but out of laziness most are not using their skills properly.

6.8 Principles of Non-violence

1. Nonviolence is a way of life for courageous people.

It is active nonviolent resistance to evil. It is assertive spiritually, mentally, and emotionally.

Non-violence is always persuading the opponent of the justice of your cause.

2. Nonviolence seeks to win friendship and understanding.

The end result of nonviolence is redemption and reconciliation. The purpose of nonviolence is the creation of the Beloved Community, peaceful atmosphere in a society and institutions.

3. Non-violence seeks to defeat injustice, not people.

Nonviolence holds that evildoers are also victims.

4. Nonviolence holds that voluntary suffering can educate and transform.

Nonviolence willingly accepts the consequences of its acts. Nonviolence accepts suffering without retaliation. Nonviolence accepts violence if necessary, but will never inflict

it. Unearned suffering is redemptive and has tremendous educational and transforming possibilities. Suffering can have the power to convert the enemy when reason fails.

5. Nonviolence chooses love instead of hate.

Nonviolence resists violence of the spirit as well as of the body. Nonviolent love gives willingly, knowing that the return might be hostility. Nonviolent love is active, not passive. Nonviolent love does not sink to the level of the hater. Love for the enemy is how we demonstrate love for ourselves. Love restores community and resists injustice. Nonviolence recognizes the fact that all life is interrelated.

6. Nonviolence believes that the universe is on the side of justice.

The nonviolent resister has deep faith that justice will eventually win. The mind set of every non-violent agent or proponent is to achieve justice

6.8.1. Steps of Non-violence

Step 1: Gather Information

Learn all you can about the problems you see in your community through the media, social and civic organizations, and by talking to the people involved.

Step 2: Educate Others

Armed with your new knowledge, it is your duty to help those around you, such as your neighbors, relatives, friends and co-workers, better understand the problems facing society. Build a team of people devoted to finding solutions. Be sure to include those who will be directly affected by your work.

Step 3: Remain Committed

Accept that you will face many obstacles and challenges as you and your team try to

Change society. Agree to encourage and inspire one another along the journey.

Step 4: Peacefully Negotiate

Talk with both sides. Go to the people in your community who are in trouble and who are deeply hurt by society's ills. Also go to those people who are contributing to the breakdown of a peaceful society. Use humor, intelligence and grace to lead to solutions that benefit the greater good.

Step 5: Take Action Peacefully

This step is often used when negotiation fails to produce results, or when people need to draw broader attention to a problem. It can include tactics such as peaceful demonstrations, letter-writing and petition campaigns.

Step 6: Reconcile

Keep all actions and negotiations peaceful and constructive. Agree to disagree with some people and with some groups as you work to improve society. Show that all is gained as benefits of changing, not what they will give up by changing.

6.9. Factors Favouring Non-violence

Organization and Coordination is integral to the success of non-violent action. In dealing with oppressive government and leaders, that are unwilling to change in their methods of governance, it is important that non-violent action is well organized and coordinated. It goes beyond just having grievances and voicing them through protests and other nonviolent

actions but it is about organizing actions in such a way as to bring about permanent and constructive change. Below are some of the factors:

1. **Leadership:** Leadership determines the success and failure of nonviolent action. In this sense, leadership must be strategic, visionary, and committed to the cause. Ken Saro Wiwa of the MOSOP in the Niger Delta could be identified as proving solid and strategic leadership in promoting the rights of the Ogoni tribe nonviolently. Leaders like Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah did promote the ideas of nonviolence. Leaders must strongly uphold and embrace the principles of nonviolence and charismatically guide the people in their response.
2. **Educated and well-sensitization:** Educated and well-sensitized members of a nonviolent movement must understand the strategies and methods that can contribute successfully to nonviolent action. Moreover, they must understand the nature of their grievances, the need for nonviolence, and the agenda of the oppressor, Training the public on the nature, impact, and value of nonviolence is also important in preparing them for nonviolent action. Members of nonviolent movements or individuals taking part in a specific nonviolent action must understand the issues and the reasons for which they are embarking on this struggle. Civil society, non-governmental organization, and academic institutions can contribute in training and educating members on strategic nonviolence.
3. **Communication:** Clear communication is necessary for successful nonviolent struggle. Communication becomes important not only between the leader and the supporters, but among supporters to avoid any division. Communication with the opponent is important because they must clearly understand the needs and grievances of nonviolent movements and the change that they desire. Groups using strategic nonviolent action must therefore

clearly understand the issues that they are fighting for and be able to clearly relate this to their opponents.

4. **Discipline:** Self and group discipline involves maintaining a nonviolent stance in spite of the dangers from the oppressor. In the use of nonviolence as a response, it is very likely that the opposition will use violence as a response to suppress any action against its rule. Thus violence as a tool for response, leads to the beating, injury, and death of nonviolent protestors. Furthermore, nonviolence requires self-discipline and a strong personal commitment to the cause even in the midst of imminent danger. Linked to this, nonviolent action is a long process and might not produce results immediately, thus self-discipline and commitment to the cause is important. In many cases nonviolent action might need to be carried out for months before any change or transformation is achieved. Thus, it requires ultimate belief in such a movement and what it is fighting for.
5. **Understanding of opponents:** it is important to have a solid understanding of opponents. This therefore requires a solid analysis of the context, including an understanding of the weakness of the government and how these can be capitalized on to enact change, requiring an understanding of the unique, cultural contexts of the society and the government in question. It is also important to understand the context in which the conflict is emerging.
6. **Support:** Having the support of various sectors in carrying out nonviolent action is important in broadening mass appeal and getting sufficient support, for a cause. Sectors that are of benefit to nonviolent movements include education, health, religion, security, and the private sector. For instance, in a case where a group will face violence in the midst of nonviolent action, having the support of individuals within the medical sector

and access to medical practitioners will be useful in catering to injured members. The private sector can also be relied upon to provide material and monetary support to those movements. Having the support of members of the military or armed forces might be useful in providing security and to help advance the cause of nonviolent movements.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

7.1. Summary

The situated background to the problem and challenges of the Niger Delta, it is obvious that insurgency is an act that has more negative effects than any other forms of violence. The importance of this research is contained in the first chapter and runs like a thread throughout of this dissertation. This dissertation is a seven chapter research work. Chapter two contains a systematic review of related and relevant literature which helps to establish that the subject of this study is original and viable. It also posits that there was a genuine gap which these scholars and research has filled. The review was considered under three principal headings; namely: Conceptual frame work, theoretical and empirical frame works. Conceptual exposed scholars' views or concept on insurgency and nonviolence.

Theoretical Frame work which explored several theories which are relevant to this study and they include: functionalism, conflict theories, internationalism and theory of Anomie. While Empirical Studies reviewed literature concerning insurgency and non-violence.

Also works on Nonviolence were also reviewed and they includes. This led to the next chapter where the Niger Delta Region was thoroughly discussed in perspectives. This includes, the geographical location of the Niger Deltans, the population, the colonialism in the Niger Delta Region, and different sections of Niger Delta Region. These includes; the Western Niger Delta, the Eastern Niger Delta and the South-South Niger Delta sections. This chapter also examined slave trade in the Niger Delta, together with settlement patterns, Economic activity, occupation, and indigenous food resources, of the Niger Delta People which includes fisheries and forestry production and industries.

The forth chapter did not delay from looking into the issues of insurgency in the Niger Delta Region. This was discussed under the following sub-headings; Insurgency in Niger Delta after military Rule, MEND Insurgency: The local-Global Dimension, the International Dimension to government's management of the Niger Delta Insurgency, History of Insurgency in Nigeria which includes: Declaration of Niger Delta Republic, The Nigeria civil war, the movement for the Actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and Related insurgencies, Oodua People's Congress, Northern Arewa Groups, *Jama'atu Ahlil Sunna Lida wati Jihad* (Boko Haram), and *Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Baladis Sudan (Ansaru)*. Furthermore, factors responsible for insurgency in Niger Delta Region was also discussed under the following points: Resource Control and the Ownership Question and its increasingly violent character, Environmental Degradation, lack of political participation and Democratic accountability,

infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment. The chapter also discussed the nature of insurgency, persistence of insurgency in Niger Delta and the challenges of Insurgency.

The fifth chapter quickly looked at previous approaches towards insurgency in Niger Delta. They include: Establishment of Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission, (OMPADEC) the Policy of Co-optation, Amnesty Initiative program, the Niger Delta Development Commission, the Establishment of the Ministry of Niger Delta and the use of military task force. The next chapter which is chapter six, looked at the Non-violent approach to curbing Insurgency in the Niger Delta Region. In expounding this, it looked at the foundation of Gandhi's philosophy of Non-violence, Gandhi's concept of Non-violence which includes *Ahimsa* and *Satyagraha*, and the characteristics of non-violence: Civil Disobedience and Non co-operation. It also looked at some other non-violent instruments like, dialogue, fighting corruption and weak institution, respect for sanctity of life, imbibing the culture of peace, gainful employment, and basic moral teachings. It also discussed the principles of non-violent, the steps of Non-violent, and the factors responsible for the success of non-violent. The last chapter handled the summary and conclusion of this dissertation. Recommendations are also in place, including contributions to knowledge and areas suggested for further research, which will be helpful to students of religion.

7.2. Conclusion

Solving the problem of insurgency in Niger Delta is an important issue, which needs an urgent, result oriented and sincere approach. The Niger Delta region is a land filled with the nation's black gold or rich treasure of crude oil and gas. This been exploited to a level

that its conspicuous nature cannot make its people who hate injustice, oppression, slavery, and marginalization and to be quiet over the above ugly situation.

This led to the people of the region embarking on a search for a better situation and solution to their ugly situation. In their quest for solution, they resolved to apply a violent approach, which is insurgency; kidnapping of expatriates, destroying of oil facilities and other violent actions. These actions affected the government income as the oil in the region is responsible for a high percentage of National Income.

It is obvious that the Niger Deltans have not been treated well. The government has failed in their responsibility to the Niger Deltans. This work has identified some of the ugly situation of the Niger Deltans which includes; unemployment, environmental degradation, etc. These problems as have been identified in the work have led the Niger Deltans into embarking on violence means in assuaging their situation.

Government on their own, in reacting to the violence tactic of the Niger Deltans, also resort to violence. Using of military force and so on. This response instead of solving the insurgency in Niger Delta region has ended up escalating the situation. Insurgency in the region is on the increase day by day and the revenue generated from the oil in the region is reducing daily.

It is sequel to the above situation, that this research work is advocating for a more successful and result oriented approach which is Non-violence. This non-violence is a means through which groups can actively oppose a system of injustice and violence without using violence and exacerbating an already volatile situation. Non-violence is not passive or weak but it requires action in transforming a situation. Discourses on nonviolence agree that

conflict is necessary and an inevitable part of the society. As long as there is a desire and competition among individuals and groups, conflict is bound to emerge. It is given then that if conflict is central to all human relationships, it becomes a challenge when it takes a violent turn and human lives are destroyed in the process. Niger Delta track record shows the high incidence of violent conflict and the destruction of lives and properties.

Based on this, it is vital that both the government and the Niger Deltans engage in non-violent actions in resolving the causes of insurgency than embarking on violent approaches. The argument for non-violence is that, violence is not always effective in transforming a situation and is guided by the fact that government cannot survive without the support of its citizens.

7.3. Recommendation

1. Oil and gas companies operating in the region should be encouraged and if necessary, compelled to comply with International best practices to ensure the protection of natural habitats through uncompromising implementation of demands of the doctrine of corporate social responsibility.
2. Both government, oil companies and the insurgents should adhere to the principle of non-violence in their entire endeavour, as it relates to the oil in Niger Delta Region.
3. The government and the insurgent groups should support and guarantee respect for human life.
4. The philosophy of Non-violence should be taught in schools from secondary Education to tertiary Education.

7.4. Suggestion for Further Research

Sequel to the fact that this research work is not an encyclopedia and have not touched all the various issues in Niger Delta Region, it vital to note that this dissertation will ignite researchers' zeal to carry out more research on:

1. The Culture of Insurgency in Niger Delta region of Nigeria.
2. The impacts of Niger Delta insurgency in Nigeria Economy
3. The role of the elites in curbing insurgency in Niger Delta Region
4. The place of education in curbing insurgency in Niger Delta Region

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Appendix I



**DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION & HUMAN RELATIONS
FACULTY OF ARTS**

**NNAMDI AZIKIWE UNIVERSITY, AWKA.
P.M.B. 5025, AWKA.
ANAMBRA STATE.**

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This letter is intended to introduce my Supervisee Abalogu, Divine Maduka, Ph.D research student with Registration Number 2015097001p from the Department of Religion and Human Relations, Faculty of Arts, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka. His research topic is entitled; **NON-VIOLENT APPROACH TO INSURGENCY IN NIGER DELTA REGION OF NIGERIA.**

The research is purely an academic exercise and your anonymity is guaranteed.

We solicity your sincere co-operation.

Remain blessed.

Dr. Uche, O.O.C

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Appendix II

1. In your own word explain the term Insurgency.
2. Is there really any crises in Niger Delta.
3. Under what can the crises in Niger Delta Region be classified?
4. Was there crises in Niger Delta from Creation?
5. When did the insurgency in Niger Delta Region start?
6. Before the advent of insurgency in Niger Delta Region, how relative were peace in the Region.
7. What is really the cause of insurgency in Niger Delta Region?
8. In your own word do you think the oil in the Niger Delta Region is a blessing or a curse?

9. What are the problems faced by the indigenes of Niger Delta Region as caused by Oil drilling
10. What other approaches has the Niger Deltans employed in fighting the problems of oil drilling
11. What has been the response of the government
12. Why did the Niger Deltans resort to Insurgency?
13. Since the inception of insurgency, what has been the effort or approach of government to solve the causes of insurgency?
14. To what extent do you think Insurgency will solve the problem?
15. Do you think government approaches to curbing insurgency has really result oriented.
16. Do you think Insurgency is the best option for the Niger Deltans? If No, what other best option do you proffer?
17. Have you heard of Non-violence approach to solving insurgency?
18. Having understood what non-violence approach is all about, do you think it is good and will work in Niger Delta? Support your stand with reasons.

Appendix III

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

S/NO	NAMES	AGE	DATE	PLACE	OCCUPATION
1	Monday Ogu	81years	7/4/2018	Eleme	Farmer
2	Franklin Nwabochi	55 years	7/4/2018	Eleme	Teacher
3	Pius Nwikili	67 years	9/4/2018	Gokana	Lecturer
4	Nwaeleta Joel	82 years	9/4/2018	Gokana	Farmer
5	Lukari Godwin	42 years	9/4/2018	Gokana	Artisan
6	Jonathan Ossai	70 years	9/4/2018	Gokana	Mechanic

7	Odomuloye Wisdom	82 years	9/4/2018	Aaada	Retired
8	Loveday Akari	61 years	9/4/2018	Aaada	Farmer
9	Omonoye Akari	77 years	9/4/2018	Aaada	Clergy
10	Ucheha Victory	88 years	9/4/2018	Aaada	Retired
11	Salvation Alok nuru	65 years	11/4/2018	Akure	Clergy
12	Duke Odinoha	47 years	11/4/2018	Akure	Teacher
13	Mathew Abraham	40 years	11/4/2018	Akure	Lawyer
14	Friday Mbeclilam	91 years	11/4/2018	Akure	Retired
15	Peter Osho	73 years	11/4/2018	Akure	Clergy
16	Asiekwu Godwin	50 years	12/4/2018	Warri	Politician
17	Elemokwu Gideon	30 years	12/4/2018	Asaba	Artisan
18	Mogkwu Wilson	78 years	12/4/2018	Asaba	Clergy
19	Helen Ugwulashi	83 years	12/4/2018	Asaba	Lawyer
20	Goodhead Onwuosa	51 years	18/4/2018	Uyo	Lawyer
21	Onyema Ogini	40 years	18/4/2018	Uyo	Business
22	Dennis Izume	59 years	18/4/2018	Uyo	Clergy
23	Oba Donatus	50 years	18/4/2018	Uyo	Teacher
24	Sunday Nwalom	41 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Teacher
25	Ngozi Nwachukwu	30 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Civil servant
26	Ikenna Anyaku	60 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Lawyer
27	Chidi Ogbowo	82 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Farmer
28	Onyemuluonweya Felix	71 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Retired
29	Ogwundu Oba	44 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Clergy
30	Innocent Oba	90 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Retired
31	Paul Osa	21 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Student
32	Emmanuel Ossai	35 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Business

33	Monday Nwabuochi	40 years	19/4/2018	Ph	Teacher
34	Godspower Oburu	60 years	20/4/2018	Obigbo	Politician
35	Gospel Eссор	67 years	20/4/2018	Obigbo	Lecturer
36	Loveday Uge	52 years	20/4/2018	Obigbo	Banker
37	Sunday Umesie	49 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Civil servant
38	Cyril Nwokoma	60 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Lawyer
39	Godwin Osiago	72 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Trader
40	Ekwueme Matinas	70 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Politician
41	Kenneth Nwabuochi	71 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Doctor
42	Nwivu Stephen	45 years	20/4/2018	Aba	Business
43	Okwukwu Jonathan	19 years	21/4/2018	Umuahia	Student
44	Charles Owho	27 years	21/4/2018	Okrika	Student
45	Ejue Bisong	76 years	21/4/2018	Ogoni	Doctor
46	Monday Ngwori	37 years	21/4/2018	Umuahia	Nurse
47	Nwokamma King	49 years	22/4/2018	Umuahia	Banker
48	Promise Ogboro	68 years	22/4/2018	Umuahia	Nurse
49	Richmon Udoeye	71 years	22/4/2018	Umuahia	Producer
50	Wisdom Ukammadu	44 years	22/4/2018	Umuahia	Doctor
51	Agustine Ohia	67 years	22/4/2018	Umuahia	Politician
52	Kingdom Nwokeoma	86 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Retired
53	Anayo Udokwu	90 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Retired
54	Otommadu Gidon	44 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Banker
55	Sule Igwela	64 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Lawyer
56	Nwoko Kinsley	55 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Clergy
57	Ekwere Eric	71 years	22/4/2018	Okigwe	Doctor
58	Victor Odua	42 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Politician

59	Godwin Ejimaji	48 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Doctor
60	Dimkpa Ahakwu	67 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Clergy
61	Kinsley Okwosahe	64 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Doctor
62	Laggard Nwoke	29 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Politician
63	Emeka Orike	66 years	23/4/2018	Benin	Politician
64		71 years	2/5/2018	Owerri	Lawyer
65		80 years	2/5/2018	Owerri	Politician
66	Nwobiri Goodluck	58 years	7/4/2018	Ahaoda	Clergy
67	Umukoro Friday	60 years	7/4/2018	Ahaoda	Civil servant
68	Gekpa Goodhead	67 years	8/4/2018		Farmer
69	Ekpeye Otornye	42 years	7/4/2018		Politician
70	Ogini Sunday	30 years	8/4/2018		Student
71	Ererene Friday	32 years	7/4/2018		Business

NB. Some of those interviewed pleaded anonymity