CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY

A historical incursion into the different epochs that have emerged in the African experience reveals that there is one profound aspect of the African social being that has remained in spite of all the changes. This profound aspect is the African family value system- "*ujamaa*" or brotherhood as Nyerere calls it. Scholars, mostly of Western orientation have argued that this is an old value with no relevance in a scientific and fast globalizing world and that it failed in Tanzania where it was implemented the first time ever by a government.

Further, scholars have also argued that this socio-political model of African socialism (as a generic name for the political ideologies of the early nationalists) is not in tandem with the reality of human nature which is ever transcending; in a perpetual struggle to outdo its present situation or condition.

In the light of the importance of this African family value system- "*ujamaa*", Nyerere explains that despite the said failure of the system and the resultant repudiation of the idea by most scholars, if approached differently, there is something positive about such a humanist socio-political philosophy at a time like this, when individualism has become the order of the day and the dignity that is due to the other is gradually eroding in the African socio-political life.

However, Fukuyama like a good number of his predecessors, explains that the competitive tendencies which is an attribute of capitalism or liberal democracy is in consonance with human nature. He rediscovered in man a certain desire for recognition. The theme of the *thymos*; this innate desire to be recognized, he explained is as old as Western political philosophy. It is for him the first major statement of Plato's political philosophy; the "spirited" aspect of the soul. Like Fukuyama saw it in Plato's philosophy, he also discovered it in different guises in the political thoughts of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Nietzsche and Alexandre Kojeve's reading of Hegel, amongst others.

Fukuyama saw in the *thymos*, the shoulder upon which the entirety of man's historical progress lies. According to Hegel, as quoted by Fukuyama, the desire to be recognized was what propelled man at the beginning of history into bloody battles to death for honour and pure prestige. It is this desire for recognition that initially drove two combatants to seek to make the other recognize their humanity by putting their lives at risk of death in a mortal battle. At the point when the natural fear of death leads one combatant to surrender, the relationship of master and slave is established. The end of these battles culminated into the division of the human society into a class of masters; those who were willing to risk their lives, and a class of slaves; who surrendered to their natural fear of death. This relationship of lordship and bondage which is aristocracy, however, did not satisfy the desire for recognition of either the masters or the slaves. The slave was not acknowledged as a human being and therefore was not accorded any kind of recognition. But also, the recognition which was enjoyed by the master was deficient, in that, he was not recognized by other masters, but by mere slaves whose humanity was not complete. Thus even the master longs for a more balanced society where he will be recognized by more 'equal'

people.[1] That is to say, the master longs for a universal and reciprocal recognition.

However, the slave recovers his humanity; lost on account of the fear of death, through work. This is for two reasons. In the first instance, his motive for work, which was fear of punishment, changed to sense of duty and self-discipline or work ethic. Secondly, through work, the slave begins to realize the power of transforming nature. He uses tools, can use tools to make other equipments, and thereby invents technology. Through the medium of science and technology, he discovers that he can change nature, not only the physical environment into which he is born, but his own nature as well.[2]

This dissatisfaction felt by both master and slave leads them from aristocracy to democracy, which establishes the principles of popular sovereignty and "rule of law". In democracy, the unequal recognition of master and slave is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition or *isothymia*; the desire to be recognized as equal to other people. This is in contrast to *megalothymia*; the desire to dominate and to be regarded as superior to others, a

characteristic of the master. Both *isothymia* and *megalothymia* are parts of the *thymos*.

Further, it is however, to curb *megalothymia* (the desire to dominate) that democracy articulated such principles as; constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, rule of law, separation of powers etc. otherwise, unbridled *megalothymia* will lead to tyranny (a free for all political terrain) like is the experience in most African states. It is in recognizing this possibility that Plato and Aristotle suggested that democracy could still give way to tyranny.[3] *Megalothymia* as a part of human nature lies at the base of ambition.

Megalothymia has been said to find certain outlets in both sports, science, the arts and religion. Yet, it is not all *megalothymic* men that will end up in sports or the inventive sciences. Some will find their way into politics, despite the provisions in principle, of checkmating it in liberal democracy.

This desire to dominate is in the nature of man and in politics, it translates to political absolutism. This political extremity characterized the early political systems of the first men like

monarchy, aristocracy, totalitarianism etc, but we have seen that the master soon becomes ashamed of this exhibition and society becomes overwhelmed against it, hence the advent of democracy.[4] However, *megalothymia* is not exterminated by the principles of democracy but seeks to manifest itself through other more subtle means; through the manipulation of the constitution and capitalizing on its weaknesses.

This ultimate inability by constitutionalism in practice to curb the desire to dominate renders it with certain internal contradictions which cannot stop the advent or continuous manifestations of *megalothymia*.

This abuse of the desire to be recognized as depicted in man's *megalothymic* tendencies is where liberal constitutionalism as articulated in democracy has been misconstrued and misapplied in Africa; where African political players have hinged their individualism and thus the African political and economic predicament.

It is based on this backdrop that we advocate a revisit and reimbibing of the spirit of brotherhood which *ujamaa* carries with it.

A socialism, which this time will adopt the positives of human nature-*isothymia* (as articulated in democratic liberalism) to subdue *megalothymia* which has reared its ugly head in the African political space; where individualism now thrives.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The problem of this thesis constitutes in the fact that democratic practice in most African state falls short of the principles of democracy. The social and democratic ideas of our present day politicians are wholly defective as they amount to an uncontrollable individualism and alienation of the masses. It is only right, in the interest of fair-play, justice and the common good of the people, to redefine the social ideas and refocus this tendency or desire for recognition in such a way that it will be for the ultimate benefit of humanity; as the human person is a social reality. Individualism as exemplified in *megalothymia* has a natural history and since that history has not and is not auguring well with Africa's social reality, and the idea of individualism can no longer help, as the modern day Africa is suffering a backwardness from its misapplication of Western ideals, there is a need for a more humanist approach to the

African peculiarity. The danger of this excessive desire to be recognized as superior to others with its resultant individualism, is that it makes people measure success in monetary terms and this in turn leads to 'looting' of public fund for one's selfish ends. How can we address this social anomaly? Like Nyerere's *ujamaa* attitude or spirit as proposed in his version of African socialism, this study proposes a new society in which the *megalothymic* tendencies in the African will be intertwined with the brotherhood spirit of *ujamaa*, only this time doing away with the untamed domination tendencies of the African and the utopic egalitarianism of the *ujamaa* society. In essence, this reconstruction of the African socio-political space recognizes the import of equality as exemplified in the *isothymia* of Fukuyama and the brotherhood of all humanity in Nyerere as the foundation for a new politics in Africa.

1.3 PURPOSE OF STUDY

This study examines Julius Nyerere's socio-political postulations as contained in his *Ujamaa* otherwise called African socialism. In doing so, this study draws some comparison from the concept of *megalothymia* as enunciated in Francis Fukuyama's *End of History*

and the Last Man. This study seeks to reconcile the *ujamaa* spirit of brotherhood and the *megalothymic* extremism with its resultant individualism in Africa's socio-political relations. The study posits that imbibing the former and a moderation in the latter will bring about a new Africa in terms of socio-political stability, devoid of the extreme egoism or individualism that presently bedevils it.

1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY

This study covers Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* as postulated in his version of African socialism. Beyond this, the scope also encapsulates Francis Fukuyama's concept of *megalothymia* (the desire to be recognized as superior to others or to dominate others), a brand of *thymos* (the desire for recognition), as articulated in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. Since Nyerere holds that *Ujamaa*- African socialism is most appropriate for arresting the reality of socio-political instability in Africa (yet it has been said to have failed where it was applied) and Fukuyama reechoes the reality of this part of the human person-*thymos*- as manifested in *megalothymia*, and yet the institutionalization of this tendency has failed to achieve the desired result as evident in Africa, a dialogue of

these paradigms is proposed for the emergence of a new and stable Africa.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The significance of this study lies on the fact that a proper understanding of what the true spirit of *ujamaa* holds for our socio-polity will engender a reconsideration of its application, not also ignoring the natural tendency in man to be seen as superior to the other. When these facts are recognised, it will go a long way in paving the way for the emergence of a new politics in Africa.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

This dissertation employs the philosophical method of Dialectics in considering the opposition between the two paradigms: *ujamaa*-African socialism (thesis) and megalothymia-the desire to dominate others; as typified by liberal democracy (antithesis), which would lead to the emergence of a new socio-political disposition in Africa, devoid of the utopia of certain understanding of *ujamaa* and the egoistic extremism of *megalothymia* (synthesis). The dialectics here is not quite "dialectical" materialism as articulated by Karl Marx.

Marx drew the concept of dialectics from Hegel. According to Hegel, "the real and the rational follow a threefold process of thesis (affirmation), antithesis (negation) and synthesis (negation of the negation or affirmation on a higher level)."[5] Hegel also said that the "concept (abstract idea) through nature (negation of concept), becomes the idea (the concrete Absolute)."[6] Torre explains that:

> Rather than nature being the negation of the concept, Marx believed that ideas by themselves cannot generate things; he therefore began the dialectical process with material nature which is negated by consciousness. Marx is then a materialist.[7]

Dialectics in the Marxist context means, among other things, that nature becomes the object of man's knowledge, not searching for a truth that is theoretical, but simply because man is in need of nature to support himself. In Marxist epistemology therefore, praxis is prior to theory.

Dialectics here, also does not quite mean a "historical" dialectics of the different stages of human socio-economic development, moving from one stage of conflict of opposing scenarios, to more advanced arrangements. We do not mean quite a dialectics of class struggles. Neither do we mean dialectics in the Engelsian ontological sense. To

prove that life and consciousness, even if superior in quality, can derive from inorganic matter, Engels,

> Assumed that abrupt changes in quality can result in qualitative changes. He mentioned the example of the barley seed which sprouts and becomes a plant (affirmation); the plant produces a multiplicity of seeds which die in the earth to give birth to new plants (negation); the plants bear new seeds and the original barley-seed is reproduced, not in its original quality, but tenfold, twentyfold or thirtyfold.[8]

By dialectics here, we mean a conceptual dialectics. We mean:

> An interpretative method in which some assertible proposition (thesis) is necessarily opposed by an equally assertible and apparently contradictory proposition (antithesis), the contradiction being reconciled on a higher level of truth by a third proposition (synthesis).[9]

We mean a three-phase process likened to Hegel's. Even though Hegel abstained from the terms "thesis, antithesis and synthesis", he followed according to Torre, "the three-phase reasoning so dear to the idealist authors".[10] Hegel called this process "dialectics" and understood it as a dynamic, almost creative endeavour. "Although reason cannot create reality, it alone can give meaning to reality:

The process of reasoning and that of becoming are, in this sense, identical".[11]

The first step of the process is affirmation (thesis), because "the truth is in the whole".[12] In the beginning of our search for truth, he explains that, we should not use piecemeal analysis, but we should rather try to grasp and affirm the whole, even in a still abstract and undifferentiated way.

The second step is negation (antithesis). Unsatisfied with the confused affirmation of the thesis, the human mind tries to clarify it yet again, through conceptual reflection and analysis. We then differentiate the elements of the whole by opposing the essential to the nonessential and the nonessential elements to each other.

The third step is conciliation on a higher level (synthesis). "The goal of philosophy is not only unity, but also concretion. The unity of the thesis was abstract and confused, conceptual reflection divides being".[13] The synthesis reconstructs the unity of being in a concrete manner. Eventually the synthesis becomes thesis, and the process continues until the whole field of philosophy and reality has been displayed. There exists:

> A chain of triads leading towards the Absolute. Their course is not one of continuous progress. Although each synthesis points at the Absolute, where such becomes a new thesis, it recedes one step and from there jumps forward again, advancing two or more steps towards a new synthesis.[14]

The import of this method to this research as it is a method that aligns with "any systematic reasoning, exposition, or argument that juxtaposes opposed or contradictory ideas and usually seeks to resolve their conflicts"[15], is that it brings out the attempt here of reconciling the opposing paradigms of *Ujamaa*- African socialism (thesis) and *Megalothymia*- the desire to dominate others (antithesis), leading to a new socio-political disposition that permits in more subtle terms the extremisms of the two opposing paradigms (synthesis).

This dissertation is thus divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction. Chapter two reviews the contributions of scholars on the subject matters of Nyerere's *Ujamaa* and *megalothymia* as articulated in Fukuyama. Chapter three does an appraisal of Nyerere's *Ujamaa* and the Tanzanian experience. The chapter four looks at *Thymos* in the history of Western political philosophy. Chapter five looks at *Megalothymia* in Francis

Fukuyama's "End of History". The sixth chapter attempts a dialectics of the two paradigms at play in Africa. Finally, the chapter seven is the evaluation and conclusion.

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Ujamaa

Ujamaa is a Swahili word derived from the root verb, "jama'a meaning together, to unite, to combine, to bring parts into a whole".[16] 'Ujamaa' can simply be translated as 'familyhood' or 'brotherhood'. It is an expression of the African sense of familyhood. It is this spirit of familyhood that gives rationality to African socialism.

Communalism

> Communalism is a social system in which a people or a community lives together as one family. It is based on the brotherhood of all in the community. It is a social system that perceives every person in the society as a member of one family with a duty and a right to contribute and share in the well-being of that society.[17]

Describing African Communalism, Ike Odimegwu explains that "African communalism is generally projected as the theory of African social existence in which the individuality of the person is founded on his communality".[18]

Thymos

Thymos or thumos is a word with ancient Greek roots which means "spiritedness"; it is that part of the human soul which seeks recognition of one's moral worth or dignity. It manifests as *isothymia* or *megalothymia.*

Megalothymia

Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior to others. Man, just like lower animals, desire food, sex, pleasure etc. Beyond these, there is another desire peculiar to man and that is recognition. However, in most cases, man does not just want to be recognized, he wants to be recognized above others. Fukuyama explains that though *megalothymia* is a healthy desire, it has both positive and negative sides. Thus:

> *Megalothymia* can be manifested both in the tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority (as in the case of Hitler), as well as in the concert pianist who wants to be

> recognized as a foremost interpreter of Beethoven.[19]

Isothymia

Isothymia is the need to be recognized as merely equal to others. It stands in opposite to megalothymia which is the excessive desire to be recognized more than the other.

Dialectic: Dialectic is the art of conversation or debate. It is most fundamentally "the process of reasoning to obtain truth and knowledge on any topic".[20] It is:

> An interpretative method, originally used to relate specific entities or events to the absolute idea, in which an assertable proposition (thesis) is necessarily opposed by its apparent contradiction (antithesis), and both reconciled on a higher level of truth by a third proposition (synthesis).[21]

It is also called the Hegelian triad. It refers to the "Hegelian process of change in which a concept or its realization passes over into and is preserved and fulfilled by its opposite".[22] It develops through the stages of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

ENDNOTES

1. F. C Aghamelu and E. I Ani, "Francis Fukuyama on Democracy and the End of History" in A.B.C. Chiegboka et al (eds), *The Humanities and Nigeria's Democratic Experience.* (Nigeria: Rex Charles and Patrick Ltd, 2009), p.93.
2. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p.194.
3. Plato, *The Republic*, Bkx. 621c. See also Aristotle, *Politics*
4. F. C Aghamelu and E. I Ani, p.93.
5. T. de la Torre, *Popular History of Philosophy*, (Houston Texas: Lumen Christi Press, 1988), p.339.
6. *Loc. cit.*
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. *Loc. cit.*
9. Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary, (K. Dictionaries Ltd Copyright 2005, Random House, Inc.), www.google.com (accessed 12/10/2015).
10. T. de la Torre, p.253.
11. *Loc. cit.*

12. J. Baillie (trans.), *The Phenomenology of Mind (2nd ed) Revised ed,* (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p.13.

13. T. de la Torre, p.254.

14. *Ibid*; p.355.

15. F.C Mish (ed), *Merrian Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 10th ed.,* (Springfield, Massachussetts: Merrian-Webster's Incorporated, 2001), p.319.

16. J.K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.3.

17. M.C. Anyaehie, "African Communalism and Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria" in Ike Odimegwu (ed.), *Perspectives on African Communalism,* (Victoria, B.C, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2007), p.346.

18. Ike Odimegwu, "African Communalism and the Search for African Personhood" in Ike Odimegwu (ed.), *Perspectives on African Communalism*, (Victoria, B.C, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2007), p.214.

19. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p.132.

20. Simon Blackburn (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 2nd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.99.

21. Ologies and – isms. Copyright 2008, The Gale Group. Inc. www.google.com (accessed 12/10/2015).

22. T. de la Torre, pp.318-319.

CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter attempts a summary of relevant literature on the subject matter of *Ujamaa* as articulated by Nyerere and the concept of *Megalothymia* as presented in Fukuyama's account of human nature.

J.O. Oguejiofor for one, stating that Nyerere is very well known for his theory of Ujamaa, explains that:

> Ujamaa means family or familyhood. In the essay, "Ujamaa, the Basis of African Socialism", Nyerere argues that the African society was socialist because it was based on the principles of Ujamaa, familyhood. Thus if we interpret Ujamaa in the sense of communalism, then it would mean that for Nyerere, socialism is synonymous with communalism.[1]

Further, Oguejiofor rightly observes that for Nyerere, socialism is basically an attitude of the mind, which is characterized by people caring for the welfare of one another. In this scenario, everyone was a worker. In the traditional African setting no one owned so much as to subjugate the rest of the community. The basic values which characterized the African past, where such attitudes as, self-

esteem, co-operation, and the non-tenacious holding onto of wealth as an instrument of domination, but rather as a means of banishing poverty in the community. These where the positive attitudes of the African past that Nyerere wanted to revamp. Oguejiofor concludes his breakdown of Nyerere's account by reiterating that:

> Nyerere concludes his essay by saying that modern African socialism can draw from traditional Africa the recognition of the society as "an extension of the basic family unit" – This spirit is captured in the first line of his party's creed: "I believe in Human Brotherhood and the unity of Africa.[2]

However, Oguejiofor observing that the traces of communalism still exist among Africans in spite of the societal changes, held that it was due to the long period of time in which societies where nurtured in this communalist spirit. He argues that:

> The numerous adulations of communalism among African writers often blur the sense in which the continent is communalistic. We have tried to show that Africans cannot claim to be essentially communalistic, given that communalism like most other human factors are qualities which are context-based, and which change with change of their context.[3]

Oguejiofor further opines by way of buttressing his point above, that the increase in individualism today in Africa due to changes and slight improvements in living conditions of the masses, is a proof of the context-laden nature of the said African communalism. He holds that "African communalism, in the degree in which it has survived today in the psyche of the African is not an unmitigated good".[4] He thinks that on the contrary, that "Communalist sentiment is at the foundation of many social ills in African societies, especially when it becomes a ploy for the hegemony of the holder of power and the cohorts of his kinsmen over the powerless".[5]

J.D. Okoh on his own part, after an attempt to explain the sense in which Nyerere is a philosopher, explains that:

> Julius Nyerere – the philosopher – deserves many compliments for trying to rejuvenate the African's traditional pride in himself and what he can do. Perhaps more than any other intellectual leader in the recent history of Africa, Nyerere has worked the hardest and most consistently, both at the theoretical and practical levels to restore the confidence of the colonized African in his own worth; in his African values and in his ability to solve his problems.[6]

Explaining this revolution in thought pattern in the African, held that it is exemplified in the principle or philosophy of *Ujamaa*. In his words:

> Ujamaa as a political philosophy seeks to disabuse the African of the imported bourgeois spirit with its accompanying capitalism, individualism, self-interest and the race for material wealth. It seeks to implant in their place, such values as: communalism, mutual help and cooperation, respect for the common man, social justice, equity and selfless service to the nation-state.[7]

Buttressing his point, he opines that:

> Ujamaa is a philosophy of social reform. Without joining issues over the debate on the role of philosophy vis-à-vis social reform, our assessment of Julius Nyerere as a social philosopher and social reformer is very positive and falls in line with the highly acceptable point of view of Dewey. Instead of aping Western models, let African political leaders and intellectuals critically study and reappraise Julius Nyerere's philosophy of Ujamaa.[8]

However, to take hook line and sinca what Okoh has posited would imply an ignorance of the implications of his postulations. Granted that the role of Nyerere as a social philosopher and the fact of the

need for a renewed interest and reappraisal of this philosophy of *Ujamaa* are not in contention. However, Okoh's position as regards the mission of *Ujamaa* philosophy, which he thinks is to implant in place of capitalism and individualism such values as communalism, mutual help and cooperation, respect for fellow men, social justice, equity and selfless service to the community, makes it look as if these values were not in existence in the African past, prior to the coming of his litany of social ills, chief of which is capitalism. These fundamental posited values were and are part of the nature of the African, what Ujamaa philosophy was to do, is to revamp these values which were gradually dwindling.

Also, Maduabuchi Dukor on his own part, explained that *Ujamaa* as a concept is a rejection of the colonial foray and mentality as well as a rebuttal of the numerous western ideologies making way into African nations at that time. He opined that like most of the liberation ideologies of his political ideological counterparts, Nyerere's "Ujamaa is the philosophy of African "familyhood" but which sought world recognition in an ideological and anticolonial manner, most poignantly in Tanzania.[9] Dukor in describing the

pivot role of the concept of familyhood across African cultures and the fact that it is gradually dwindling, explains that:

> 'Familyhood' is one single most important African concept and value. Among the Igbo, for instance, it is called "Umunna', very close to Nyerere or Swahili's Ujamaa in dialect and etymological meaning. Yoruba, Hausa, Akan, Ga, Titsu, Hutu, Zulu and all other troubled ethnic groups in Africa have this concept. Where is it now? It is in us but not with us.[10]

Dukor's observation of the gradual eroding of the concept of 'familyhood' or 'brotherhood' points to the problematic which J.O. Oguejiofor tried to pinpoint in describing the context-laden nature of the said "coevalness" of communalism or "familyhood" to Africa. Further, Dukor in examining this value of 'familyhood' which he observed, is in the African but no longer with the Africa, avers that:

> Nyerere calls it Ujamaa. The Igbo call it Umunna. The subsistence of the concept in various distances in space and time ensures it perhaps, as a necessary heritage of all Africans. Looking at the looting and pillaging of public treasury by the occupiers of the corridors of powers in Africa today, one is left in doubt that the liberalist and communist humanists principles of familyhood have collapsed into the drain.[11]

This observation notwithstanding, these humanist principles of the concept are with us. This is captured in Nyerere's principles or socialist ideology-*Ujamaa*. For Nyerere, for the Africans, socialism is an attitude of mind. Acquisitiveness for the purpose of gaining power and prestige over others is unsocialist. For Nyerere, in Africa, "both the 'rich' and the 'poor'"[12] were completely secure and free from the worries of individual acquisition or enrichment.

Western or European variant of socialism was an emanation of the Agrarian revolution and the industrial revolution which accompanied it. These revolutions created stratifications in society. However, as against this scenario of the nature of European socialism, to Nyerere, African socialism did not have the benefits of such revolutions. The basis of African socialism is the extended family. There is no class war or conflict in African society for a person to see one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies.[13] Dukor captures this better when in line with Nyerere he explains:

> All men are members of his extended family. The brotherhood of man in Africa is articulated in this proverb of cooperation: "A man cannot sit down alone to plan for prosperity". Hence African socialism or Ujamaa (familyhood) is

> opposed to capitalism which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man.[14]

The socialism, communalistic attitude and self-reliance based on the Ujamaa principle is a re-affirmation of the equality of all men, fundamental human rights to dignity and respect, freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and other universalist and liberal principles in today's charter of the united Nations.[24] However, this *Ujamaa* or Umunna spirit presupposes that a recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent to embrace the whole society of mankind.[15] The love for tribe, nation or continent, should translate to a love for the whole family of mankind.

Further, Dukor having articulated some of the basic tenets of *Ujamaa*, observed some of the fundamental theoretical and practical difficulty in its praxis of African freedom from neo-colonialism, imperialism and as a developmental strategy. Dukor contends that:

> Like Negritude, its relevance to African freedom can best be captured from the rightist

> but revolutionary perspective. The Ujamaa attitude to unfreedom would be rightist revolutionary approach which is mainly anti-colonialism not backed by Marxist Leninist philosophy. Yet the danger that lies in Ujamaa or related traditional political philosophy is that it could not and cannot offer the much needed economic and technical succor necessary before any revolution against the ideologies that had hitherto provided the modern necessities of life. Indeed the revolutionary praxis of Ujamaa is questionable in the sense that it could not provide answers to the challenging task of economic empowerment against the economic and technological superiority of the west.[16]

Dukor suggests that:

> Perhaps, Ujamaa or familyhood lacks the empirical and scientific lever or basis to meet the challenges of western science. Historically speaking, it is all obvious that Ujamaa or familyhood or African socialism as the case may be is not a sustainable political philosophy.[17]

For him, grounded on African metaphysics and epistemology, Ujamaa or African socialism require further orientation that is more scientific and technological to act a buffer against neo-colonialism and imperialism. Dukor thus opines, that:

> Today's Africa as a people without scientific Ujamaa or familyhood is into wars of each

> against all and each ethnic group against the rest. In his sermon titled, "Renewing the foundation"; published in the Guardian August 24, 1998, Rev. Ayo Ladipo re-echoed the wreckage of familyhood while arguing that the foundation had been destroyed and law and order broken down. Describing the family unit as the most important in human civilization, he explained that those who destroyed the foundation of African peace and unity went to the family to affectively perpetrate their unholy acts. Having been introduced to hard drugs, and occultism, the youths are now favourably disposed to terrorism, thuggery, obscene music, robbery and other social vices.[18]

In essence for Dukor, the failure of Ujamaa and familyhood in seeking African freedom is at the base of the destruction of the foundation of the leadership in Africa.

Despite the strength and direction of this argument, the fact remains that the failure of *Ujamaa* does not lie in its proposition, but rather in its implementation. The failure of *Ujamaa* to stand the test of time as a socio-political philosophy is the failure of African's, to see the good in an ideology that seeks to accord mutual recognition to all men beyond the boundaries of tribe and blood tie. There must be something good about seeing all men from

the lens of brotherhood, and as such relate with them in mutual recognition of their humanity.

George Ehusani in articulating Ujamaa ideology as a brand of socialism, like most of his contemporaries, upholds the extended family as the single most important factor in the African socio-cultural and political heritage. He suggests that Nyerere's Ujamaa stresses the fact that family should be the foundation of African socialism.[19] His position about *Ujamaa* suggest that for him, *Ujamaa* socialism subordinates industrial and technological advancement to familyhood. This is because according to Nyerere, he avers, the first principle of *Ujamaa* is related to the human person, and that what needs development is people and not things or objects. His interest is in building a society in which progress is measured in terms of human well being and not competitive prestige, buildings, cars or material acquisitiveness in general.

Ehusani further opines that Nyerere's *Ujamaa* is particularly averse to violence. And violence as it is, is inimical to the development of the human person. He writes thus:

> It is on the basis of this aversion for violence that Ujamaa reject the class struggle of doctrinaire socialism on the one hand, and exploitation of liberal capitalism on the other. Democracy for him cannot be built upon intolerance and violence.[20]

According to Omeregbe, *Ujamaa* philosophy of Nyerere is based on the communalism of traditional African society. He argues that:

> Nyerere agrees with Nkrumah and Senghor that capitalism and individualism are foreign to Africa and that traditional Africa is communalistic. Not only capitalism, but also the socialism based on class struggle, conflict and tension is just as foreign to African traditional society as capitalism and is equally to be rejected.[21]

Commenting on the liberation angle to the mission of Ujamaa, he suggests like Nyerere that:

> With the elimination of colonialism, exploitation and inequality from the society, the individuals feel liberated. For Nyerere liberation, is inseparable from development, in fact, he sees development as liberation and this is to be achieved in an egalitarian and communalistic society, based on familyhood.[22]

Like most other scholars who see the genuineness of the anthropocentricism of Nyerere's *Ujamaa*, Francis Njoku in his book

"Essay's in African Philosophy, Thought and Theology" see in it a humanism distinctively with human interest and a deep concern for mankind. A. M Mojola captures this best when he states that:

> Nyerere is bothered with the African colonial past, the long age of slavery, hunger, economic exploitation and social degradation were realities he contemplated most of the time. With this kind of impulse Nyerere ascended the post of Prime Minister of his country, adopting the social experimentation to wedge a war against colonialism and its effects.[23]

Njoku properly speaking, writes that according to Nyerere,

> Exploitation is making a living from the work of others, it is making money out of proportion from the rest of society, it is displaying a capitalist attitude of mind. A person with money making a profit from a person without money is an exploiter.[24]

In Nyerere's struggle against exploitation, he sees a political and philosophical ideology worth pursuing: he states as follows:

> Nyerere's fight against exploitation is articulated as a political and philosophical ideology that should be pursued while realizing the fact that there might be detractors at the international level who want to dislodge the move to fight exploitation in the African continent.[25]

Commenting further on Nyerere's African socialism, he is of the opinion that Nyerere thinks that certain way of doing things or being are alien and inimical to it and this informs his frowning at exploitation which is the hallmark of capitalism. He writes that *Ujamaa* is an expression of the African sense of family which is why Nyerere holds that *Ujamaa* is the basis of African socialism. This is what Njoku means when he argues and correctly too, that:

> Therefore familyhood gives rationalism to African socialism. It contrasts with western colonial capitalism that makes the individual acquire wealth at the expense of the other. Goods and property are shared in African socialism because people belong together, living and instilling the practice of mutual acceptance as persons endowed with equality. This is already the basis of democracy in African socialism.[26]

Also, Njoku commenting on the import of equality embodied in African democratic socialism, observes "that being does not depend on materiality of the mere redistribution of material resources. Democratic socialism is found on the value of acceptance, care and equality.[27]

This is why he posits that:

> On the moral plane, African socialism is expressed by an attitude of mind or a morality, where people bring out their best in each other through mutual cooperation. African socialism embodies encouragement for the young and the youth, support for the children, the infirm and the aged, and a relevant tribute for the living-dead that continue to be at the side of God and their people.[28]

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Ujamaa and the sometimes utopic applicability of its tenets, like the denial of private property which belongs to man, Njoku like a few other scholars, still acknowledges that "his, remains an ideal that has set the model to revolutionalize the African people from within".[29]

For O.G. Idjakpo and J.A. Aigbodioh in their article titled "The Philosophy of Ujamaa and The African Predicament", Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa was influenced greatly by the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, Albert Luthuli, John Kennedy and of course, Kwame Nkumah. They opine that Nyerere's Ujamaa philosophy is a formulation of a new social and political doctrine which reflects the communal structure of the African nation. Accordingly, they suggest that like:

> Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere was imbued with purpose and nationalistic feeling in writing the Ujamaa. However, no matter how laudable his intentions are, the doctrine is faced with lot of problems.[30]

Chief among the problems they hold, is that it is not stated anywhere in the text, in clear terms the meaning of the "brotherhood" so referred to. They regret that Nyerere simply assumes that the reader already knows the meaning of the concept. To have a basis for their understanding of the possible meaning of the term so as to situate the meaning which Nyerere means, they state that kinship relationship involves people with consiquinal affinity.[31] They rightly observe that unlike in western societies, kinship for the African, is not limited to the relationship which exists between "blood" brothers and sisters. In Africa, there is the extended family system which includes cousins, aunts, uncles, nephews and nieces. Thus, one will be correct to call an uncle, "brother" without loss in meaning in terms of family relationships.

Further, they explain that the concept of brotherhood may also refer to:

> A group of individuals with policies of social cooperation. The most important thing to note here is that, individuals may yet be knit together by a feeling of fraternity, deriving from their common concern for issues affecting their collective, even when blood relationships does not exist among them.[32]

With the example of the existence of the "Nation of Islam" this point was all the more made vivid. They explain that according to Adeigbo, this is a nation of most Black American Moslems that are currently led by Loius Farrakhan, which is dedicated to the promotion of the collective interact of Black Americans in the United States. Accordingly, they opine that one characteristic feature of this type of brotherhood is that the individuals are willing to subdue their liberties and pleasures so that the good of the "general will" can thrive. They must be disposed to personal sacrifices for the good of all.

They submit that the concept of African brotherhood can be used in a different sense to mean brotherhood of man qua man.[33] The African sees others as not limiting his possibilities but people who tend to enhance his liberty.

However, Idjakpo and Aigbodioh are suspicious of the motive behind an erudite intellectual and progressive statesman as Nyerere, to have propounded such an ideology that favours a return to our traditional communalistic tradition of social ordering before the coming of the western overlords. They believe that such an ideology represents a false consciousness to perpetrate people like Nyerere and his cohorts in power. They maintain that:

> His commitment and sincerity to the principles of *Ujamaa* are suspect as a rebuilt. This also means that the argument for the failure of western models of government for the adoption of *Ujamaa* as an indigenous system of government cannot be sustained.[33]

They conclude somewhat on the negation of the success of Nyerere's mission. Their argument run thus:

> *Ujamaa* has drawn our attention to the egalitarian and humanistic impulses which exists in traditional African societies which form the basis for the road map for social and political development of the continent. However, it appears that Nyerere has been unable to point out the real solution to the problem of governance. For example his work seem to have failed to address the issue of consensus which Kwasi Wiredu considers as an important aspect of the African heritage.[34]

For I.A. Kanu, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* represented a basis for hope for many in the 1960's, especially those who wished to carve out an independent socialist pathway that was in contrast not only from the acquisitiveness of western capitalism, but one also different from the totalitarian forms of communism in Russia and China. Rather than rapid industrialization, Nyerere aimed for a form of democratic socialism rooted in the village.[35] Nyerere envisioned a society made up of small village units, a country made up of *Ujamaa* villages, wherein there is;

> Mutual cooperation and collaboration. Such a nation would be basically family unit extended to embrace the whole society. The capitalist spirit of acquisition, individualism, the exploitation of man by man, class struggle and conflict, which widens the gap between the rich and the poor and creates an avenue for exploitative attitude, will be excluded from that society.[36]

Also, commenting further, Kanu observes that:

> At the heart of Nyerere's political values was an affirmation of the fundamental equality of all humankind and a commitment to the building of social, economic and political institutions which would reflect and ensure this equality.[37]

Kanu reflecting on the successes and woes of *Ujamaa* policy, states that:

> A cursory glance at the thoughts of Julius Nyerere reveals that his vision was bigger than his victories; his perception was deeper than his performance. In global terms, he was one of the giants of the 20th century. Like all giants, he had both great insights and great blind spots. His vision did not space his victories, and his profundity outweighed his performance.[38]

He opines that Nyerere's *Ujamaa* policy, amounted to a case of heroic failure. Its heroism lies in the fact that Tanzania was one of the few African countries that attempted to find its route to development, via the traditional ways, rather than borrowing the ideologies of the west. However, its failure, was as a result of lack of commitment towards forming a state based *Ujamaa* principles as well as refusal by individuals high and low alike, to imbibe these spirit of brotherhood that has been lost to colonialism. This was one of the major reasons, why *Ujamaa* was not sustained a national ideology.

In all, Kanu is of the opinion that:

> We can say that Nyerere had good plans for his people, he wanted to build something African,

> that which will embrace the African spirit which is communalism. He deserves applause for having a though of rediscovering the spiritual and humanistic principle of African personality, that is, his effort in bringing to Tanzania some kind of ideology that is based on the communalism of Africa in contrast to capitalism and individualism.[39]

Joseph McCarney on his own part, explains that the theme of the desire for recognition is, according to Fukuyama, as old as Western political philosophy. He explains that:

> Its first major statement is Plato's account of *thymos*, the 'spirited' aspect or part of the soul. Thereafter it emerges in various guises in the thought of, among others, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Hegel and Nietzsche. The immediate source of Fukuyama's use of it is, however, Alexandre Kojeve's reading of Hegel where it has a central role. The classic formulation of the theme, in Kojeve's view, is the master-slave dialectic of the *phenomenology of spirit,* an episode that is for him the key to Hegel's entire philosophy of history.[40]

McCarney explains that in Kojeve's version of that philosophy the substance of human history is constituted by this struggle for recognition of fighting masters and toiling slaves. He explains that:

> These struggles are necessarily unavailing, essentially because the slave, being a slave, can neither receive nor confer a humanly satisfying recognition. In the course of historical time, however, and specifically through the French Revolution and its aftermath, the contradiction of mastery and slavery are dialectically overcome. Both are transcended in equal Citizenship in what Kojeve calls the 'universal and homogeneous state' whose prototype is the Napolenic Empire.[41]

In this society, every individual receives 'universal' recognition as a citizen enjoying all political rights and as a 'juridical person' of the civil law. "The achievement of this fully satisfying form of recognition brings history to an end by, as it were, switching off the motor of its movement."[42]

Jacques Derrida in his book the *Specters of Marx*, explains that Fukuyama and the quick celebrity of his book is but one symptom of the anxiety to ensure the 'death of Marx'. He held thus:

> For it to be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history; never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity. Instead

> of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the 'end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipator discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic facts, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on earth.[43]

Even though researchers have found empirical evidence that democracies are better at reducing poverty as compared with non-democracies[44], Derrida goes on to analyze Fukuyama's book as taking part in the intellectual branch of current Western hegemony and the spreading of its "New Gospel"[45]. He explains that "this end of History is essentially a Christian eschatology. It is consonant with the current discourse of the Pope on European Community: destined to become a Christian State or Super-State, this community would still belong therefore to some Holy Alliance"[46]. He claims that the book uses a 'sleight-of-hand trick' of making use of empirical data whenever it seems to suit its message, while appealing to an ideal whenever the empirical data contradicts it.[47]

Mario Wenning in his article "The Return of Rage", explains that "Plato already argued that only a political system that could successfully balance the accumulating receptive, erotic, on the one hand, and the giving, explosive and he calls 'thymotic' dimensions of communal life, on the other hand, would provide for a just society."[48] He explains that Peter Sloterdijk's position, "proposes to reread the history of civilization as well as contemporary political developments as attempts to balance the vengeful and the caring dimensions of social interaction."[49] Wenning points out that his paper:

> Discusses Sloterdijk's proposal to introduce rage as a central psychopolitical category and at the same time pursues the systematic question whether this proposal can be extended into a political theory that is empirically plausible and normatively convincing. The guiding hypothesis is that a politics of caring for the worst-off without vengeful contours is empty, while rage without a vision of a better society is blind.[50]

A rehabilitation of rage as a political concept is all but an easy and, even less so, self-evident endeavour. It is almost truism that rage

destroys rather than creates environments in which human beings and communities could flourish.

Wenning explains that:

> Philosophical calls to a politics of rage, one would think, is the last thing we need at times in which we are only slowly recovering from a rampant war rhetoric that too easily distinguished friend from foe, those who are with from those who are against us. Nonetheless, there remains the question how we should relate to that force which the ancient Greeks referred to as "thymos".[51]

Further, Wenning in interpreting Sloterdijk's rereading of Plato and Hegel says that "Sloterdijk rereads Plato and Hegel through the lens of neoconservative thinkers Leo Strauss and Francis Fukuyama. Plato had argued in the fourth book of the *Republic* that the human soul consists of three parts: reason (*nous*), appetite (*epithymia)*, and what he refers to as "thymos""[52]. Thymos, which is usually translated as "spiritedness", is that part of the soul which houses pride, a need for recognition, and courage. He explains that "when claims to pride and recognition are not satisfied, the thymotic part of the soul reacts with spirited emotions ranging from shame to

rage"[53]. When hurt, "thymos triggers struggles for recocognition"[54]. Although this part of the soul is different from reason, "it is not reducible to the corruptive appetite of physical desires."[55] He explains that Plato in the fourth book of the *Republic* gives insight to how "in the soul, the spirited is the third part, by nature the helper of reason, if it has not been corrupted by bad upbringing".[56] The thymotic part of our soul responds to suffering from injustice, be it our own or that of others. However, it is not itself part of reason, because one can sometimes be angry without being guided by reason in acting on the anger.

Also, Andy Blunden in his article titled "Fukuyama on Trust and Recognition" disagrees with the basic tenets of Fukuyama's position as expressed in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*. He explains that Fukuyama's book is greatly misleading and does not deal with facts in reality. He holds that the book is:

> A thoroughly despicable triumphalist eulogy to liberal individualism written in the wake of the collapse of the USSR with more generalizations than the Reader digest of wisdom and more myths and legends than Cambridge companion to ancient Greek.[57]

For Blunden, Fukuyama's like Hegelian idea that *thymos* which strives for recognition is the driving force of history, is a fraud. Even though Fukuyama claims to have been influenced by Alexandre Koveje, a contemporary interpreter of Hegel, and not by Hegel himself, Blunden accuses him of doing "terrible violence with his sources". He explains thus:

> To say throughout the remaining 400 pages Hegel when you really mean Hegel as interpreted by Kojeve as interpreted by Fukuyama, is a fraud… Fukuyama is claiming an innate ahistorical drive for recognition built into human nature and there is no way he can claim Hegel as an ally let alone a source.[58]

For Blunden, Fukuyama does not give a logically acceptable interpretation of the Hegelian position. *Thymos* he explains, is not the propeller of human history but rather *Geist* (spirit), everything else he explains, unfolds according to its own internal logic. He states thus:

> A logic which requires the positing of no fictitious matter or force or organ or drive as its ground but can be understood by paying attention to the whole cultural historical process of which the thing is a part.[59]

What this means is that Blunden does not see any basis why Fukuyama should posit such fiction as *thymos,* as the propeller of human history.

John Gray on his own part agreed with Fukuyama, holding that the fall of communism has left the world with no other accepted alternative to liberal democracy and especially because "liberal democracy is the only system that can satisfy the universal human need for self recognition or Thymos: the Platonic virtue of spiritedness".[60]

Gray however, argues that *thymos* which expresses itself in irrational ways like Nationalism and fundamentalism is a militating factor against liberal democracy and its place at the end of history. For him therefore, history has not basically ended, but instead has resumed after decades of interruption. His view is that the Soviets in modern times have not totally dropped Marxism and adopted liberalism, instead they have returned to ethnic and cultural identities increasing in Nationalist Spirit. He states:

> The post communist people do not express their Thymos by inflaming to become producers and consumers in the global market

> of rights bearers in a universal liberal democracy, they expressed it by the demand for nationhood and by the reassertion of their traditional religious identities.[61]

Nationalism and fundamentalism which are irrational expressions of the Thymos, for Gray, will move history further hereby standing in opposition to Fukuyama's claim that history has ended. Thymos, Gray thinks, will still move history beyond this point.

Richard Bernstein in disagreeing with Fukuyama's conviction that history has ended with the triumph of the super power at the end of the Cold war, says that there are likely to be in the future new and unanticipated manifestations of the *thymos* inherent in irrational forms of recognition as Nationalism, religious fanaticism or fundamentalism or just plain human stupidity in order to keep history moving. What Bernstein attempts to posit is that for history to end, it means that human nature which is liable to change must also end. That is to say that history will end if only man ceases to be man or if man's nature were to change. He reiterates that:

> To believe in the end of history you must believe in the end of human nature, or at least its gift to evil or as Jean Francois Revel the

> French political analyst puts it "in politics, I don't much care about the long run, it is the short one that counts after all since all human life is short".[62]

If therefore *thymos* is part of human nature it would be inconsistent to state that this thymos would cease to manifest itself in its usual form. To Bernstein therefore, "... human nature must end for history to end. From this position, it would not be too off the mark to state that *thymos* will continue to move history as it always has"[63].

A thorough look at his argument, one would see that Bernstein seemed to have forgotten that these forms of recognition as nationalism, fanaticism, and fundamentalism (apart from humanism) are irrational forms of recognition because they are not universal. Although his argument would seem to hold water after the September 11 attacks on the United States of America, they do not hold much appeal to people outside these interest groups: (Islamist and nationalist groups).[64]

Stephen Holmes in rejecting Fukuyama's idea of the end of history hold that liberal democracy which claims to satisfy the feelings of

all the three parts of the soul especially *thymos* contradicts itself because of the nature of *thymos. Thymos* which contains two contradictory drives: *Isothymia:* the desire for equal recognition and *Megalothymia*: the desire for unequal recognition, leaves much difficulty at reconciling their meeting points. Holmes reiterates this when he states that:

> You have been released from community unhappiness into democratic meaninglessness. Welcome to the vacuum at the heart of liberal society where life is no longer worth living, you are no longer admirable prisoners, you are now contemptible last men emptied of all ambition.[65]

A liberal society instead of solving the problem of *thymos* only creates more problems for it. This thought is in line with Nietzsche's argument that democracy creates men without chests. However, what Holmes seems to posit is that liberal democracy destroys the *thymotic* part of man creating contemptible last men devoid of pride, ambition and dignity. His position however, points to the fact that Holmes is obviously ignorant of Fukuyama's argument on the role of *thymos* at the end of history and its expressions in the sustenance of liberal democracy. For Fukuyama, *Megalothymia* is

not completely destroyed in liberal democracy but is channeled onto subtler modes of expression as sports competitiveness, politics and entrepreneurship.

For William McNeill in consonance with Fukuyama, man is not merely an economic animal as posited by Hobbes and Locke, man is not just reason and desire; man is also made up of thymos a very crucial and un-ignorable part of man which is necessary for political participation and also for the progress of history. He opines that:

> This he calls *thymos*, a term borrowed from Plato that he translates as spiritedness or desire for recognition. Thymos is the principal motor of politics compelling some men, throughout history to assert personal mastery over others.[66]

Further, Aghamelu F.C and Ani E.I, in their article "Francis Fukuyama on Democracy and the End of History" held that *megalothymia* cannot be exterminated by liberal democracy but only seeks manifestations in more subtle forms through the intentional manipulation of the provisions of the constitution and capitalizing on its weaknesses. They explain that a dialectic develops and the

metahistorical movement begins with political absolutism through liberalism to democratic constitutionalism. "Political absolutism is the thesis and primordial expression and this conflict between these two extremes resolves into constitutionalism which attempts to accommodate both and transcend them"[67].

They explained that the inability of constitutionalism to curb *megalothymia* creates internal contradictions and thus there emerges a dialectical tri-logical movement of absolutism, liberalism and constitutionalism. "The constant struggle between *isothymia* and *megalothymia* shows that there cannot be a settled democracy and the notion of a complete democracy is an illusion"[68]. They posit therefore that *megalothymia* posses a great threat to democracy. They assert that:

> Megalothymia (the desire to dominate) cannot be ruled out of life of men and since this is so, political absolutism remains a perpetual possibility and a seasonal actuality in any political arrangement no matter how egalitarian, democracy might not after all signify the end of history.[69]

For Fukuyama, there are two kinds of desires: animal and human. All animals, man inclusive, desire those things that contribute to

the preservation of life. The object of animal desire is that which is conducive to attaining this end. For example, an animal desires food for sustenance. By taking the desired object into itself, the animal preserves its life.

However, Homo sapiens differ from animals of other species because it has the capacity to desire to be the object of desire. This, he argues, "… is the particularly human desire: the desire to be desired. Man is a self-conscious being that seeks recognition by another self-conscious being"[70].

Humans are therefore, the species that can have as the object of its desire the desire of another, rather than the mere natural desire for those things that sustain life. This desire is the desire to be recognized as human. Also, this desire does not end up in being just recognized, man wants most times to be recognized as superior to others. And it is this, which leads and motivates people to do extraordinary things; things sometimes inimical to the existence of the other. This tendency to appear superior to others is what is called *megalothymia*. Fukuyama holds that:

> There is no reason to think that all people will evaluate themselves as the equals of other people. Rather, they may seek to be recognized as superior to other people, possibly on the basis of true inner worth, but more likely out of an inflated and vain estimate of themselves. The desire to be recognized as superior to other people we will henceforth label… megalothymia. Megalothymia can be manifest both in the tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in a concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven.[71]

Nietzsche maintains that the democratic man was composed entirely of desire and reason and lacking in any *megalothymia.* And as a result, he believed that "… no true human excellence, greatness, or nobility was possible in democratic society"[72]. What this translates to is that, true creativity arises out of megalothymia, that is, the desire to be recognized as better than others. People, according to him, would never push themselves to their own limits if they simply wanted to be like everyone else.

For Fukuyama democracy does not aim at stifling *megalothymia*; in the sense that a democratic man is a man with desire and reason without megalothymia. What democracy actually does, for him, is that it aims at channeling the energy inherent in *megalothymia* into

positive areas. He sees megalothymia as having both positive and negative sides to it. The negative could manifest in domination, suppression and oppression. For him, democracy aims at controlling these excesses and sublimating them into positive expressions.

He explains further, that democracy needs *megalothymia*, and will not survive on the basis of unbridled equality. Based on this backdrop, he concludes that: "A civilization that indulges in unbridled *isothymia* that fanatically seeks to eliminate every manifestation of unequal recognition, will quickly run into limits imposed by nature itself."[73] Nature, on the other hand he explains, will conspire to preserve a substantial degree of *megalothymia* even in our egalitarian, democratic world. A civilization devoid of anyone who wanted to be recognized as better than others, and which did not affirm in some way the essential health and goodness of such desire, would have little art or literature or intellectual life. Such a society, "would not have much in the way of economic dynamism: its crafts and industries would be pedestrian and unchanging, its technology second-rate."[74]

Also, he held that any system that pursues unbridled equality will not be able to defend and compete with other systems that are infused with a greater spirit of *megalothymia*. This is why he is not surprised that: "A contemporary liberal democracy like United States permits considerable scope for those who desire to be recognized as greater than others"[75]. His conviction is that what equality does in democracy is not to put everybody on the same pedestal, in all the aspects of life, irrespective of our individual unequal differences. The universal equality of all men is the basis for checking the excesses of *megalothymia*. The excesses and negative could manifest in subjugation and domination in order to appear superior and, the positive could manifest in outwitting each other "... in scientific inventiveness, entrepreneurship and other forms of economic activity and qualitative service in governance"[76]. Fukuyama is convinced that:

> The striving to be recognized as superior has not disappeared from human life, but its manifestations and extent have changed. Rather than seeking recognition for having conquered foreign peoples and lands, *megalothymic* individuals try to conquer Annapuma, or AIDS, or the technology of X-ray lithography. In fact, virtually the only forms of

> megalothymia that are not permitted in contemporary democracies are those leading to political tyranny.[77]

From the foregoing, it is easy to notice that there are a good number of literatures on the subject matter of *ujamaa*- African socialism. However, none have been seen to observe the genuineness of Nyerere's articulations. They argue that where it was applied that it failed, that the genuineness of such a project was in doubt and that its tenets are not in tandem with modern socio-political reality.

Also the theme of "the desire for recognition" or domination is one as old as socio-political discourse, but none of the authors so reviewed considered it from the African perspective, where the idea of the "common good" has left the socio-political scene at the mercy of the whims and caprices of single individuals.

In a nutshell, the attempt here is to see how the excesses of *megalothymia* can be subdued (while healthy competition is encouraged) and the spirit of brotherhood which is peculiar to the African situation can be exploited, to herald a new Africa devoid of the extremisms inherent in the two paradigms; a perspective which

the scholars reviewed did not identify with. This dialogue of the two opposing paradigms is what the research hopes to contribute to scholarship.

ENDNOTES

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71. *Ibid;* p. 182.

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73. *Ibid;* p. 314.

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CHAPTER THREE: *UJAMAA* IN JULIUS NYERERE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

3.1 The Concept of Ujamaa

Julius Nyerere's works in political writings include among others, Essays on Socialism, Freedom and Unity, Freedom and Socialism and Ujamaa. Nyerere was greatly influenced by the teachings of such scholars as Gandhi, John Kennedy and most of all Kwame Nkrumah. *Ujamaa* as espoused by him is basically a new social and political doctrine that reflects the communal structure of the African nation. It is an ideology that derives from our grass-roots, and village solidarity that marked traditional African society.[1] *Ujamaa* is a Swahili word translated as "familyhood" or "brotherhood".

Familyhood for Nyerere, extends the basic family unit in Africa. It is a combination of nuclear and extended family. It also extends beyond the extended family. It extends to the tribe, the community and even the nation. It encompasses the whole of humanity. As Nwokolo describes Nyerere's idea: The basic foundation of the objective of African socialism is the extended family.[2]

His believe is that in the structure of the African traditional society. There exists the essential ingredients for the formulation of the doctrine. According to him, some of these essential ingredients which enrich *Ujamaa* as a philosophy of social and political development he describes thus:

> In traditional African society everybody was a worker. There was no other way of earning a living for the community. Even the elder who appeared to be enjoying himself 'without' doing any work and for whom everybody else appeared 'to be' working, had, in fact, worked hard all his 'younger' days. The wealth he now appeared to possess was not his personally; it was only 'his' as the Elder of the group which had produced it. He was its guardian. The wealth itself gave him neither power nor prestige. The respect paid him by the young was his because he was older than they, and had served his community longer; and the 'poor' Elder enjoyed as much respect in our society as the 'rich' Elder.[3]

Describing the other essential ingredients for the thriving of this Ujamaa doctrine, Idjakpo and Aigbodioh, argue as follows:

> That every member of the society enjoyed the security and hospitality provided by it, because such one contributed his quota in economic production, avoiding parasitism or exploitation. That the communal ownership of land was maintained; the individual has only the right to use land.[4]

For Sogolo, for effective formulation of the doctrine, what is required is the investment of the potential human and social resources of traditional African communalism.[5] In working and developing a template for economic and social development of African village and clan loyalties, communal and African humanism should be harnessed and taken into consideration. For Nyerere, the underlying aim of such template or road map is "to build a society where all members will be entitled equal rights and opportunities in which they will live in peace with their neighbours devoid of exploitation and suffering"[6].

Ujamaa can be contrasted with capitalism and doctrinaire scientific socialism. They are different as Nyerere differentiates:

> Ujamaa or family-hood describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man, and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conduit between man and man.[7]

Observable from the above citation, is the rejection of the popular orthodox Marxist form of social structuring, founded according to Nyerere, on the inherent contradictions which exist in capitalist

societies. To Nyerere, African socialism is not a product of such contradictions since there are no classes and class struggle in traditional African society. Thus *Ujamaa* is for him, an attitude of the mind in which Africans care for each others' well-being.

3.2 Basic Assumptions of Traditional *Ujamaa* Living

The traditional African family lived according to the basic principles of *Ujamaa*. Its members did this unconsciously and without any core understanding of what they were doing in political terms. This pattern of living was made possible because of three basic assumptions of traditional life. These assumptions were neither questioned nor contemplated upon. Even though they were not honoured by all, majority of the people, lived them uncritical of them.

The first of these assumptions or principles of life, Nyerere described as 'love'. However, based on the many false impression sometimes given to the word, He explains, that: "a better word is perhaps 'respect', for it was-and is – really a recognition of mutual affection deeper than that of familiarity"[8].

The second of the basic assumptions of the traditional living is that all the basic goods were held in common, and shared among all members of the unit. There was an acceptance that whatever one person had in the way of basic necessities they all had; no hoarding of food by one when others were hungry. However, ad mists this seeming scenario of "paradise", Nyerere notes that:

> There was not complete equality; some individuals within the family, and some families within the clan or tribe, could 'own' more than others. But in general, they acquired this through extra efforts of their own, and the social system was such that in time of need it was available to all.[9]

He explained that inequalities existed, but they were tempered by comparable family or social responsibilities, and they could never become gross and offensive to the social equality which is at the basis of the communal life.

The third and final of these basic assumptions or principles was the fact that everyone had an obligation to work. The work done by different people was different, but no one was excused. Every member of the family, and every guest who shared in the right to

eat and have shelter, took it for granted that he had to join in whatever work had to be done.[10]

3.3 Elements of Ujamaa

Of the many conceptions and misconceptions of what Nyerere's *Ujamaa* purports to represent, two basic elements stand out. The first has to do with its rejection of the colonial attitude of mind and the mission of recapturing of the traditional African "attitude of mind". This may be referred to as the dissociative element of Ujamaa.[11] The second of the elements, is the development aspect of *Ujamaa*, as spelt out in "The Arusha Declaration", which emphasized the philosophy of *Ujamaa* put into practice.

3.3.1 Ujamaa an Attitude of the Mind

Fundamental to Nyerere's philosophy of socialism, is his insistence that *Ujamaa* was an "attitude of mind". What exactly does this cultivation of *Ujamaa* "attitude of mind" mean? An attitude of mind is based on the individual's mental adaptation to his experiences. For Ramon J. Rhine, it is a more or less permanently enduring state of readiness of mental organization which predisposes an individual to react in a characteristic way to any object or situation with which he is related.[12] In stressing the dissociative element of Ujamaa,

Nyerere hoped to provide a new structure of value orientation which would predispose his people to effect a change in attitude at a philosophical and critical level. Hence, Nyerere's call for a recapturing of the traditional attitude of mind could be said to represent a value or a slogan capable of providing for the rationalization of action by encapsulating a positive attitude towards a beneficial state of affairs.[13]

Nyerere's basic aim was to unite the divergent social values among the Tanzanian people, into a group of attitude in other to effect a change in the structure of the present system, one opposed to the colonial value system that for him, alienated the African from his past.

Chief of the many positive attitude of the African past which he hoped to rejuvenate, are such attitudes as: Attitude of self-esteem, the attitude of cooperation and the attitude of regarding wealth as a means and not an end and seeing wealth not as an instrument of domination rather as a means of banishing poverty from among the people.

3.3.2 *Ujamaa as* Self-Esteem

The many decades of colonization of the Africans, created in them a spirit of "inferiority complex, coupled with a crisis of identity".[14] In Tanzania, as was true of all the former colonized nations of Africa, the African was in search of his identity. In the work of Robert Lane, "identity refers to; firstly, self image, the awareness of one's own ideas and desires; secondly, self-description, the individual's thought about his personal characteristics and thirdly, self-esteem, the approval of one's self and ideas".[15]

The colonial tactic eroded the very foundation of traditional African personality. The aim was to make sure that the African looked at himself only in terms of the whiteman and that he acted only by imitation, never from personal reflection. This tactic was exemplified in the modernization paradigm of development prevalent in British overseas colonies at the turn of the century. Emphasis was placed on the education of a small elitist group, which was supposed to be the system innovators. Thus, the colonial overlords and their hand-picked African collaborators usurped the roles of "the thinker and the innovator". All the thinking and all the changes were made for

the colonized African. In a situation such as we have just described, the African's self-image, his self-description and his self-esteem were laid to rest. His reflective and creative thinking habit was inhibited because of the shifting of the centre of political action and decision from the tribal environment, where the elders were accustomed to sit under the trees and talk until they agree, to the colonial metropolis and cities.

The colonial school system, based on a harsh socialization philosophy, taught the Africans who were privileged to have formal education to be submissive and content with their status in life. As Albert Memmi provokingly remarks, that all who pass through a colonial school system cannot but imbibe a depersonalizing colonial mentality. The first ambition of the colonized, notes Memmi, "is to become equal to that splendid model (colonizer) and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him"[16]. The African was "mis-educated" to think that the only way to human dignity and self-esteem was to barter all he is and all he had for the western way of life. Of all the crimes of colonialism, Nyerere observes that:

> There is none worse than the attempt to make us believe we had no indigenous culture of our own; or that what we did have was worthless-

> something of which we should be ashamed, instead of a source of pride… those of us who acquired a European type of education, set ourselves out to prove to our colonial rulers that we had become "civilized"; and by that we meant that we had abandoned everything connected with our own past and learnt to imitate only European ways. Our young men's ambition was not to become well educated Africans but to become Black Europeans! Indeed, at one time it was a compliment rather than an insult to call a man who had imitated the Europeans a 'Black European'.[17]

It was, no doubt, in the best interest of the colonial rulers to destroy the "identity" of the colonized, which is in consonance with Paulo Freire when he argues that:

> For the culture invasion to succeed, it is essential that those invaded become convinced of their intrinsic inferiority. The more invasion is accentuated and those invaded are alienated from the spirit of their own culture and from themselves, the more the latter want to be like the invaders, to walk like them, talk like them.[18]

Nyerere was convinced that a recapturing of the traditional African identity could help his people achieve psychological emancipation. By stressing the attitude of self-esteem, Nyerere hoped to arouse the critical consciousness of Africans and reawaken them to the

challenge posed by many years of colonialism, slavery and repression.

No one was more aware than Nyerere that a man's estimation of himself, as a person, is one of the dynamic sources of ideas. It was imperative to do something to destroy the colonial myth which made Africans to think very poorly of himself and his abilities, thus effectively shutting himself off from the world of ideas. The power to think and to give birth to ideas was to be the foundation stone of the new Tanzania which Nyerere hoped would emerge. In his speech to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in 1963, Nyerere maintains that:

> One of the basic purposes of the Independence struggle is to get the right to think for ourselves and apply the results of our thinking. We did not carry on…bitter fight for freedom in order that we may become jumping jackasses, which wait to see what a western or an eastern power will say about an idea before automatically doing likewise.[19]

Further, if it is true, as Crane Brinton has suggested, that, "no ideas, no revolution"[20], one could understand why Nyerere linked idea-systems unequivocally with the process of revolutionary change he wished to bring about in Tanzania. He saw the attitude

of approval of one's self and ideas as a necessary pre-requisite to the success of his social reforms. Such an attitude of mind would enable the young and old to reconstruct the traditional African process of reflective thinking and action which once gave meaning and value to life, long before the western intrusion.

3.3.3 *Ujamaa as* Cooperation

A socialist, in Nyerere's thought, is one who believes in human equality and the common historical destiny of mankind; one who has mutual respect and care for his fellow man; one who is keener on cooperation than on competition with his fellow man. And a socialist society is a society of men with the above attitude of mind. The *Ujamaa* attitude of cooperation, as espoused by Nyerere, had an ethical meaning which implied the political, economic and social well-being of every single member of the society. Once again, Nyerere drew on the lessons of the traditional institution of the extended family. The traditional African family life was based on the cooperative principle which virtually excluded the idea that one member of the extended family could kill another or steal from another. There was an attitude of mutual respect and reciprocity,

and every member of the extended family accepted the obligation to cooperate in all things for the common good. In this traditional setting, each individual had equal human dignity, each individual had freedom, no one was ever in want as everyone enjoyed cooperative experience and group living which made all members of the extended family happy, both individually and socially. According to Nyerere:

> Traditional African society was not called 'socialist'; it was just life. Yet, it was socialist in the principles upon which it was based. It involved human equality and it involved mutual responsibility, with every member of the community being concerned about the work and welfare of every other member.[21]

The spirit of individualism as it exists in the west was never a feature of traditional African community. In the tribal community in which Nyerere grew up, people were always conscious of their common destiny, and existence was defined in collective, not in individual terms. This is in tandem with the ideas of Nyerere when he observes and correctly too, that:

> Africa is essentially a country of community government. Collective life and social solidarity give its inhabitants a kind of humanism which many people might envy. It is also because of

> these human qualities that a human being in Africa cannot conceive the organization of his life outside that of the family, village or clan. The voice of the African peoples has no features, no name, no individual ring.[22]

Traditional tribal politics dealt with the affairs of the whole community; its objective was the common good of all. Nyerere believed that neither the individual nor the society can be conceived in total isolation of the other. The individual needs to learn to cooperate with the society in order to achieve his full potential; no man can live and act in complete isolation. On the other hand, society is not a self-sufficient entity; it is made for man and it consists of individuals in their manifold relations and interactions to each other.

Nyerere's emphasis on the attitude of cooperation springs from the traditional African communalism which engendered a solidarity or the bonds that hold individuals together in terms of shared and common emotions, about the same highly valued ideas and objects. On account of this solidarity, the individual could say, "I am because we are and since we are, therefore I am".[23] Nyerere argues that the African's, have no need of being converted to socialism.

This was because "socialism is rooted in our own past, and in the traditional society which produced us"[24] Nyerere saw a definite continuity of traditional communalism with *Ujamaa.* This is perhaps why he did not regard *Ujamaa* as a revolutionary creed in the Marxist-Leninist sense. For Nyerere, *Ujamaa* was at this stage primarily a revolution in thinking and a revolution in African attitudes towards their rich history and cultural heritage. All that was necessary to achieve *Ujamaa* from traditional communalism, in Nyerere's words, was "a revolution with a purpose". The purpose of such a reform or revolution consisted in re-educating the Africans to regain their former attitude of mind.

In the traditional African society, the individuals within the community took care of the community and the community took care of the individuals. The African has traditionally been "socialistic". For this reason, Nyerere stressed the fact that *Ujamaa* was hardly more than a restatement in contemporary idiom of the principles of cooperation, mutual respect, and so on, underlying traditional communalism. Modern African socialism, affirmed Nyerere, can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of society as an extension of the basic family unit. But it can no longer

confine the idea of a social family within the limits of the tribe, nor indeed, of the nation. Our recognition of the family to which we all belong continued Nyerere, must be extended to embrace the whole society of mankind. The *Ujamaa* attitude of cooperation, mutual respect concern and responsibility give an ethical ring to Nyerere's socialism. It makes sure that "the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contributions they make to the all-round growth of every member of the society".[25]

3.3.4 *Ujamaa* and Wealth

A very important aspect of the cultivation of the Ujamaa "attitude of mind" implies a radical change in the concept of wealth. Many critics doubt Nyerere's sincerity in audaciously declaring that "there are more important things in life than the amassing of riches, and that if the pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human dignity and social equality, then the latter will be given priority"[26]. How could a philosopher-president of one of the poorest countries in the world indulge in such wishful thinking? The skeptic asks. How does Nyerere hope to deal with the problem of incentives with such an

idealistic attitude towards wealth? The answer lies in Nyerere's understanding of the meaning and purpose of wealth.

To Nyerere, the only purpose of wealth is the banishment of poverty. He saw nothing wrong with a person wanting to be wealthy, but the converting of wealth for the purpose of exploitation was incompatible with *Ujamaa*. According to Nyerere:

> The moment wealth is divorced from its purpose, which is the banishment of poverty, there develops a ruthless competition between individuals, each person tries to get more wealth, simply so that he will have more power and more prestige than his fellows. Wealth becomes an instrument of domination, a means of humiliating other people. The very basis of socialism is the rejection of this use of wealth.[27]

Nyerere believed that a society that stresses material wealth and success at all costs puts a great deal of pressure on the individual who does not succeed, who starts out from a position of poverty or who finds opportunities blocked because of social inequality. Such a person may resort to anti- *Ujamaa* behaviour, not because he is poorly socialized, but because he is too well trained in the prevailing values of society. He accepts the capitalist values of the dominant

society. He nourishes dreams for economic success, dreams to acquire as much, wealth and power as possible. If he does not know how to handle such dreams and aspirations, he resorts to activities which betray the national interests and the common good for personal gain, to attain his goal.

Nyerere is opposed to capitalist values and refuses to accept the doctrinaire Western European glorification of capitalism as the father of socialism. However, Nyerere does not condemn capitalism *per se,* but some specific exploitative tendencies inherent in being a capitalist. Nyerere buttresses this point when he declares in no uncertain terms that:

> In the individual, as in the society, it is an attitude of mind which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. It has nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth. Destitute people can be potential capitalists – exploiters of their fellow human beings. A millionaire can equally well be a socialist; he may value his wealth only because it can be used in the service of his fellow men. But the man who uses wealth for the purpose of dominating any of his fellows is a capitalist. So is the man who would if he could.[28]

Nyerere's bitter indictment of the introduction of capitalism with its lust for economic competition and individual acquisitiveness into

Africa is obvious. This according to him, undermined the attitude of traditional family life and communalism where "nobody starved; whether of food or human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth; he could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he was a member"[29]. Instead of this communitarian attitude to wealth, capitalism introduced economic competition not to obtain the basic necessities of life, but a competition for wealth based on greed and the desire to get more power and more prestige for the purpose of dominating somebody else. Nyerere proposes a radical change in the attitude to wealth and material possessions. He is conscious of the obvious fact that on account of differences in abilities and talents, some people will always have more wealth than others. But he indignantly observes that "there must be something wrong in a society where one man, however hard-working or clever he may be, can acquire as great a 'reward' as a thousand of his fellows can acquire between them".[30]

3.4 Liberalism in *Ujamaa*

Nyerere's construction of *Ujamaa* can be seen, in part, as him, attempting to restore racial equality; restore respect for human rights, especially the human rights of the African people; restore freedom or independence, eradicate poverty, restore self confidence and community spirit, and restore the attitude of brotherhood and self-reliance, conditions which according to Nyerere's considerations were either exacerbated or caused by slave trade and colonialism.

However, the question is how did Nyerere think those conditions could be restored? That is to say, what does he think is the solution to the problems of human rights abuse, poverty, racial inequality, individualism and selfishness, and loss of freedom? The answer to these problems came from various sources in different ideological traditions. The most prominent of these, were the ideological tradition of Western liberalism, particularly Kantian liberalism and communitarian ethos of indigenous society. This is the point Victoria Stoger-Eising made when she held that "Nyerere tried to fuse European concepts deriving from Kantian liberalism with ethos derived from his more communitarian native society"[31].

Nyerere borrowed from Kantian liberalism, particularly the concept of equality and the concept of freedom. The concept of individualism, which according to Heywood is "the core principle of liberal ideology"[32]. In Nyerere's thought *Ujamaa* was based on the belief in community. It is on this backdrop of belief in community that *Ujamaa* was based, but it is also here that Nyerere found himself in stark opposition with liberalism which on the whole, had doubted if not totally rejected, community in its social, political and economic organization. However, the question as to whether having rejected individualism *Ujamaa* could genuinely be said to be rooted in liberalism is a complex one. Suffice it to state that Nyerere incorporated into *Ujamaa* certain elements and not all elements of Kantian liberalism.

However, to be able to understand Kant's influence on Nyerere, let us attempt an overview of Nyerere's understanding of equality in Kant.

3.4.1 The Concept of Equality

Equality is one of the European concepts derived from Kantian liberalism which was fused into *Ujamaa*. For Nyerere, the principle of equality in Kant is described in terms of rights and opportunities.

In the first part of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere identified a number of rights that he considered essential for *Ujamaa*. They include: the right to dignity and respect, the right to equal participation in government, the right to freedom of expression, movement, belief and association, the right to life and property, and the right to receive just wage etc. However, a look at some of these rights, will point to an extent, its Kantian roots before its use in Nyerere is presented.

3.4.1.1 Right to Dignity and Respect

Nyerere's basic assertions about rights to dignity and respect, though expressed differently, are taken from Kant. For example, Nyerere's assertion that "every individual has a right to dignity and respect"[33], is basically a summary of Kant's discourse on the concept of 'person'. Similarly, Nyerere claims that the status of a

person, permitting or giving a person the right to respect is "his basic humanity"[34], which is rationality and autonomy or freedom, is simply paraphrasing Kant, who in his *Metaphysics of Morals*, argues that in a person, a status that has to be taken for granted and which therefore, gives a person dignity, is his nature as a rational and morally autonomous being.

Further, Nyerere's instruction to party and government leaders that people should not be treated as 'things' or as 'objects' which have no purpose of their own and, therefore, decisions about development "must come from the people themselves and that they themselves must carry out the programmes they have decided upon"[35], and should not be forced into action as if they have no purpose of their own, is derived from Kant's second formulation of the 'categorical imperative' which directs a rational agent to "act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only".[36]

In his reading of Kant's moral philosophy, Nyerere understood that Kant linked right to dignity and respect with a specific understanding of person. He understood that in Kant's account, a

person is described as a rational agent and an autonomous being. Kant states that in the "kingdom of ends, everything has a dignity or value, whatever is above all value and therefore admits no equivalent has a dignity".[37] In Nyerere's reading, the agent who is above value, who has no equivalent and who therefore, has a dignity or intrinsic worth is a person. According to Kant, "persons are called persons because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, [which] is as something that must not be used merely as means".[38] The very nature of persons is understood to be rationality and autonomy and this led Nyerere to believe that for Kant, a person has a *dignity* or *intrinsic* worth because her nature as a rational agent and autonomous being points her out as end in himself. Another way of expressing this is to say that, for Kant, "that, which can be an end itself, has an intrinsic worth, [a] dignity"[39], and since man conceives his own existence as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, he has intrinsic worth or dignity.

Nyerere believed that in Kant, the notion of respect is also linked to the notion of person. For him, Kant believed that in his capacity as

a rational agent, a person unlike a thing has capacity to both enact laws for himself and to freely choose to abide by them. Nyerere believed that in Kant, "it is the capacity for a person to enact laws and then abide by them which makes persons deserve our *respect* as ends in themselves".[40] In addition, in his capacity as an autonomous being, a person unlike a thing, obeys no law which he has not enacted, and because he acts only on laws that he has himself enacted, Kant suggests that morally autonomous beings deserve our *respect* as ends in themselves and not as objects or means to an end only. Otteson has succinctly summarized Kant's arguments on the dignity and worth of a person by holding that:

> Individual human beings have a dignity because of their natures as beings of a certain kind (namely, rational and autonomous), and this fact about them entails that these individuals must be respected, both by themselves and by others.[41]

This brief account has been done to articulate Nyerere's understanding of Kant. The purpose is to see how Nyerere applied it in order to buttress the point of Nyerere's intellectual influence.

3.4.1.2 Dignity and Respect in *Ujamaa*

In Nyerere's construction of *Ujamaa*, the idea of right to dignity was interpreted in a variety of ways: firstly, the right to dignity was considered to imply private or individual rights. Nyerere admitted that the word 'equality' is very difficult to describe because "there is no absolute and simple rule which can be easily applied everywhere and to all aspects of life in relation to equality".[42] Consequently, Nyerere states that "we are forced back to the concept of human dignity".[43] How then is the right to dignity translated in *Ujamaa*? Explaining what human dignity means, Nyerere writes:

> Every member of society must have safeguarded by society his basic humanity and the sacredness of his life-force (and) He must both be regarded, and be able to regard himself, as the human equal of all other members in relation to the society.[44]

He suggests that in practice, the right to dignity imposes certain obligations on the individual as well as on the society to which the individual belongs. The first obligation is on the society; for it requires that the basic humanity, those elements that give worth to mankind namely, rationality and autonomy, of every of its member has to be protected. In other words, in a society there must not be

people who are considered to be rational and autonomous or free and others who are considered not to be rational and free. In Nyerere's view, these basic elements of humanity must be protected and respected by society. The second obligation is that society must protect the life of each of its members because as he says in the above quotation, life is sacred. And lastly, the right to dignity requires an individual to consider all persons, including one's own self, as equal members of society. That is to say, one should consider all persons in one's society as equal bearers of rights. The overall point, however, is that in Nyerere's thought, the right to dignity is translated to mean the right to personal or individual rights. Furthermore, according to Nyerere, in the course of realizing these individual rights, the state has *prima facie* duty to protect the rights of its citizens.

Secondly, having interpreted the word 'equality' to mean human 'dignity' and having described 'dignity' in terms of 'rights', Nyerere, goes on to argue that the dignity of a human being is also a matter of a person's well-being. Nyerere expresses the point when he argues that "there is no human dignity in extreme poverty or

debilitating disease- nor in the ignorance which buttresses these things".[45] This means that to Nyerere, there is no dignity in poverty, ignorance and diseases. To express this differently, it can be said that for Nyerere, extreme poverty, debilitating diseases and ignorance are indications of the absence of rights. Where the basic rights of a certain group of people are not respected as it was for instance the case with colonialism, Africans became poorer and ignorant. Those whose rights were respected were materially prosperous and literate. Dignity in Nyerere's view has therefore two aspects: the aspect of rights and the aspect of well-being, for the respect of one's rights leads inevitably to one's well-being.

In Nyerere's view, a person's well-being consists of goods that are necessary for a person to function. In addition to the basic human rights, Nyerere's list of goods also includes basic material goods such as food, shelter and clothing. He writes:

> To a socialist, the first priority of production must be the manufacture and distribution of such goods as will allow every member of the society to have sufficient food, clothing and shelter to sustain a decent life.[46]

Thus, in Nyerere, we discover that expression of the right to dignity requires the state not only to safeguard the basic rights and liberties of the citizens but also to ensure that the basic material needs of every individual in society are met. That is to say, society has a *prima facie* duty to create and sustain conditions that enable people to produce enough food, erect decent houses and dress satisfactorily.

Thirdly, in Nyerere's *Ujamaa,* "persons are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our acting but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted".[47]

As already buttressed earlier, the status of Africans during slave trade and colonialism contradicted this position entirely. Based on this backdrop, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* was formed as an attempt to restore the dignity, the worth and the respect of Africans. The provisions of *Ujamaa* included guidelines that challenged "arrogant, contemptuous and oppressive leaders in the workplace".[48] The guidelines also advised greater respect for the humanity of Africans in the work place, a move that resulted in increased freedom for

workers. In addition to the guidelines against exploitative and abusive employers, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* also opposed all forms and systems of slavery and colonialism. This included capitalism since Nyerere viewed it as a system with a propensity for using people, especially Africans as objects or means to an end.

3.4.1.3 The Right to Democracy

Nyerere's assertions about democracy have parallels to Kantian assertions about it. For instance, Nyerere's claim that "Tanzania shall remain a republic with an executive head of state",[49] is in conformity with Kant's assertion that "republicanism is the best form of government".[50] Similarly, Nyerere's emphasis on "the laws which govern the [people]",[51] which is the constitution, has parallel with Kant's assertion that "the republican constitution is the ultimate end of all public rights".[52] Finally, Nyerere's assertion about the "freedom of the people to choose their representatives",[53] and about the formation of government with the separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and the judiciary, are assertions taken from Kant, who in *Science of Rights* argued for a republican form of government with a separation of those powers.

Nyerere's study of Kant was in order to find out the best form of government that would replace the colonial government. In his reading of Kant, particularly, *Science of Rights*, Nyerere came across different types of ideologies such as autocratic, aristocratic and democratic governments as well as republicanism.[54] Nyerere understood that Kant drew a distinction between republicanism, in which the executive and the legislative powers are separated, and democracy, which Kant believed was destined to lead to despotism, when the executive powers begin to claim that they represent the popular will. Whatever the merits and disadvantages of each form of government, Nyerere believed that for Kant, the best form of government was republicanism because "the law is itself sovereign and is no longer attached to a particular person".[55] Since the constitution did not reflect the will of a particular person, Nyerere thought that for Kant, the republican constitution is "the ultimate end of all public rights".[56] Moreover, Nyerere understood that for Kant, the republican state represents "the state in which every citizen can have what is his own peremptorily assigned to him".[57] This is how Kant argues it:

> Every true republic is and can only be constituted by representative system of the people. Such a representative system is instituted in the name of the people, and is constituted by all the citizens being united together, in order, by means of their deputies, to protect and secure their rights.[58]

Based on this backdrop, Nyerere became convinced that for Kant a true civil state requires representative institutions, protection of individual rights, and the separation of the legislative and executive powers.

3.4.1.4 Democracy in Nyerere's *Ujamaa*

It is worthy of note that Tanzania was not a democratic country during the colonial era. Attempts to establish democracy in Tanzania were initiated by Nyerere. In the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere proclaimed that "every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national levels".[59] Describing the aim and purpose of the right to democracy, Barcalow insists that:

> It is intended to protect people from being excluded from government decisions that can have profound effects on their lives. It is directed against various forms of tyranny, and

> is intended to ensure that government is based on the freely given consent of the government [and] in its general form, it is the right to participate in political decision making[60].

Democracy as it was practiced in Tanzania had the hallmarks of democracy in Western liberal societies insofar as representative institutions were established. The first representative institution, created almost immediately after independence in 1961, was the promulgation of the republican constitution in 1962. The next was the parliament or legislature and the third was the establishment of the judiciary. The constitution identified the executive, the legislative and judicial powers and defined their respective roles in a way as Nyerere had noted in Kant. Nyerere understood that for Kant, the executive power belonged to the president who is the regent of the state and the appointer of magistrates. The president or governor is under the authority of the law, bound to it by the supreme control of legislators, the parliament. Both "the executives and legislators do not exercise judicial functions rather, they appoint judges as magistrates".[61] Thus, when he came to power in 1962, the state powers were constructed by Nyerere in a very similar arrangement with only minor departures. For example, the

executive power in Tanzania comprises the president, who is the regent of the state, the vice-president who is usually the president of Zanzibar, and the prime minister. Although over time, Nyerere abolished "multipartism" and Tanzania remained a *de facto* one party state- a move that tarnished the democratic outlook of the Nyerere project, - the representative institutions that he believed in were those spelt out by Kant, and they remained intact.

During the colonial era, people did not have any official say in the decision making process of the colonial government machinery nor were they called upon to elect their leaders. Using Zanaki, the place where Nyerere was born, as an example, Stoger-Eising points out that "chiefs were appointed by colonial administrators rather than the people".[62] It was Nyerere's government which initiated the first attempt to get the people involved in choosing their political leaders. After independence they used the right to "democracy principle", to mobilize people into the decision making process. In popular democracy, "the model promoted in Tanzania, the individual is considered an equal participant, and is usually placed at the centre of the social, political and economic activities".[63] The people have a

positive role insofar as they elect and direct their representatives and initiate policies. The representatives act on behalf of the people by taking their views to the high organ of decision making. Thus, "the ordinary citizen has a role in the government's decision making process and in self governance".[64] The programme of creating *Ujamaa* villages was to an extent, to enable "peasants to participate in the decision making on issues that affect their lives",[65] an idea which he borrowed from Kant.

3.4.1.5 The Right to a Just Wage

Like the other two rights discussed above, the right to a just wage is also rooted in Kant. Nyerere's assertion that "every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour",[66] is a conclusion that is derived from Kant's *Discourse on the State*. Since it is derived from there, we will look at some of the relevant sections of Kant from Nyerere's perspectives. Nyerere understood that for Kant, the question of a just wage was related to the question of the origin of the civil state and to Kant's formulation of the categorical imperatives. Kant describes the state as a "civil union of men… who on account of their mutual influence on one another, require a

juridical constitution uniting them under one will, in order that they may participate in what is right".[67]

Based on this backdrop, Nyerere came to appreciate that the only reason people come together in a state, that is, in a civil union, is their desire to participate in what is right. If people knew that in a civil state their rights, including their rights to a just wage would not be realized, they would have stayed in the state of nature, which according to Kant "is a state of society not yet regulated by right".[68] But people form the civil state precisely because it is regulated by right and in this state "everyone has his rights determined by law, what shall be recognized as his".[69] What belongs to a worker after laboring, that is their salary or wage, is already determined by law, the constitution. So the right to a just wage, to receive what they deserve after labour, is in a sense already contained in the original contract. Thus, in Nyerere's reading of Kant, a just wage is not only a right in virtue of the nature of the state, but it is also a right in virtue of the external law, the constitution under which the people forming a state subject themselves. Conversely, an unjust wage is a

violation of the original contract and as such it is a constitutive dimension of the state of nature and not a civil state.

With respect to the categorical imperative, Nyerere recognized that Kant identified two formulations: the first directs a rational agent to "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will it become a universal law".[70] Nyerere understood this maxim that paying a just wage does not involve a contradiction when universalized since the employer who pays an unjust wage would like to receive a just one as a labourer. With respect to the second formulation, Nyerere understood that it directs a rational agent to "act so as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only".[71] Nyerere interpreted this to mean that treating persons as an end in themselves involves having genuine and true regard for that person's autonomy and rationality and paying them a just wage, would seem to be consistent with a genuine regard for the person's freedom and rationality.

3.4.1.6 Just Wage in *Ujamaa*

Having seen how Nyerere understood the nature of the just wage in Kant, it is only proper too, to examine its use in Nyerere's *Ujamaa*. Before Nyerere's articulations on *Ujamaa,* the German colonial administration in Tanzania for instance, turned large numbers of people into slave labourers. During this colonial period, there were no systematic attempts by the colonial administrators to address the issue of unjust wage apart from the brutal repression of those who demanded a just wage. After independence, Nyerere's government initiated attempts to pay workers just wages because Nyerere believed that "every individual has the right to receive a just return for his labour".[72] Expressed in that way, the assertion sounds easy to understand until the question is asked: what constitutes a 'just' return? In Nyerere's thought the answer to that question stood between the status of the economy, the contribution of the worker to the society and need. A look at each of these three factors would further buttress Nyerere's point.

In his discussion on *Ujamaa*, Nyerere argued that a just wage is "contingent upon the level of the economy of a particular society".[73]

He maintained that Tanzania, as a poor country, "could not afford to pay its workers European or American salaries".[74] From a socialist perspective on the matter of a just wage, Nyerere writes: …"the true socialist will demand only that return for his skilled work which he knows to be a fair one in proportion to the wealth or poverty of the whole society which he belongs".[75]

Since Tanzania was a poor country, Nyerere stated that demands for just wages should be consistent with the poverty of the country. This translates into the belief that a just wage in a poor country is that which the country can afford to pay. This pragmatic approach acknowledges that society cannot pay what it does not have. It also makes it clear that just wage cannot be universalized because it depends on the economy of a particular country.

The second factor that influenced Nyerere's understanding of a just wage was the contribution an individual makes to society. In his discourse on development, Nyerere insisted that "every person [must] get a return commensurate with the contribution he makes to the society".[76] Nyerere goes on to explain that a society which prevents its citizens "from getting a fair share of the products of

their own sweat and toil needs putting right".[77] Thus, to Nyerere paying a just wage is a *prima facie* duty of society; it is something society must do as part of its obligation to the individual. In regards to the general framework within which Nyerere described society, paying a just wage is a prima facie duty of society. This is because it is the "basis on which society [could] hope to operate harmoniously in accordance with its purpose",[78] for unless citizens get just rewards for their toil, "there will always be an inherent, although sometimes concealed danger of a breakdown in society".[79] The reason to pay just wage was, therefore clear. However, what is questionable, is the maxim of 'each according to his contribution', that Nyerere defends as an approximation of equality. Ake states that the maxim is open to debate as a principle of justice because it does not establish the criteria for determining what constitutes a contribution to society.[80] In Ake's view, it is imperative to set out what constitutes a contribution and what does not. Nyerere's way around this conundrum was to argue that miners for example, contribute more since their products command such a high artificial value as opposed to farming products which have intrinsic value.[81] Hence, Nyerere asserted that workers in the mining sector

could claim higher pay. A just wage in *Ujamaa,* then, not only depended on the economy but also the contribution made to society.

The third factor that influenced Nyerere's stance on a just wage was *need*. The 'need' factor was employed because the application of the maxim that "every person [should] get a return commensurate with the contribution he makes to society"[82] resulted in greater inequality rather than the equality it sought to achieve. Workers in the mining sector, for instance, received more income than their counterparts in other sectors who consequently went on strike to demand equal pay. Nyerere's solution was to propose that workers whose jobs contribute more to society should not claim "a greater share of the profit of their own industry than they actually need; and if they insist… then that group is exploiting (or trying to exploit) its fellow human beings [and] it is displaying capitalist attitudes of mind".[83] In order to reflect a socialist attitude, employees in the mining sector were discouraged from demanding more than they actually needed, which in Nyerere's view were the bare essentials; food, shelter and clothing. Thus, a just wage for those who

contribute more equated to the amount required in securing these basic needs. Does this mean that there were different standards for those who contributed more, and those who contributed less? And if the criterion is need, and the basic needs are the same for everyone, why was it considered unjust to pay all workers the same wage? A circular argument arises here: it was considered unjust to pay all workers the same wage since some contributed more to society than others yet in order to avoid greater inequality those who contributed more were not paid more. This argument, was employed to Nyerere's undoing.

3.4.1.7 Equality in Terms of Opportunity

Having looked at the principle of equality in terms of rights, and its use in Nyerere's *Ujamaa*, it is only proper to turn to the principle of equality in terms of opportunity. In order to understand how Nyerere employed the idea of equal opportunity in *Ujamaa*, it will be helpful to describe some of the relevant sections of another thinker's (John Rawls) ideology. This is because the similarity between them is quite striking. For one, Nyerere's assertion that the "aim of TANU is to see that the government gives equal opportunity

to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status",[84] is a practical application of the second principle, the 'fair opportunity principle' of John Rawls which states that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both… attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity".[85]

In Nyerere's view, the purpose of making the arrangement open to all is to grant equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity seeks to provide individuals with equal chances to realize their unequal potentials. The practical implication of this for Nyerere was that, an individual should have the same chances to acquire the same qualifications regardless of the socio-economic situations into which the individuals are born. Through his familiarity with Social Democracy or Fabian Socialism that Rawls elaborates so well, Nyerere came to believe that people in society should not be entitled to goods simply because they happen to have the 'right' social status or simply because they happen to be from the 'right' race, gender, tribe or religion or ethnic group. Nyerere understood that Rawls rejected this system of share distribution because "it is so

arbitrary from a moral point of view".[86] He understood that people with the same natural talents and willingness to use them should have equal prospects of success, regardless of where they start in life. For individuals to have equal chances and qualifications, individuals should have equal access to educational opportunities and health care services, and equal employment opportunities. For instance, when an individual applies for a job, their case is considered entirely on the merits of their talent, skills and qualifications and not on social status. This brief account can help in understanding Nyerere's thought in which elements of Rawls' theories, which is also a derivative of Kant's, play an important part. It is simply an attempt to show Nyerere's reading of Rawls.

3.4.1.8 Equal Opportunity in *Ujamaa*

Having looked at the origin of the right to equal opportunity in welfare liberalism, let us examine how Nyerere constructed *Ujamaa* using his understanding of Rawls' theory or principle of equal opportunity. The situation of educational and employment opportunities during the colonial period has been portrayed elsewhere as one of inequality. It is enough at this juncture to say

that at the point of independence, race, religion and gender ceased to be criteria for educational and employment opportunities. Essentially, Nyerere employed the principle of equal opportunity to initiate two main programmes in the education sector: first, was the nationalization programme. Here, the government nationalized all private schools in view of creating more educational opportunities available for Africans who had been alienated from education during colonialism. Secondly, the programme of education for self-reliance which was also one of the main programme which intended to provide qualifications for all who wanted. The aim was not merely to create more educational opportunities for Tanzanians but also to create the kind of education that was needed in the society that was emerging. The criteria for employment opportunities was no longer race, but educational qualifications, skills and good character, a condition which translates into a socialist attitude of serving the nation and of caring for one another. Thus, the institutions established by Nyerere's government became open to everyone who possessed the necessary academic qualifications and the right mindset, that is, the socialist attitude.

3.5 The Principle of Freedom

Another principle of Western liberalism that was integrated into *Ujamaa* is the principle of freedom. In a social setting, freedom is simply "the absence of constraint or restraint".[87] A constraint or restraint can be construed as anything placed by one individual onto another so as to prevent them from doing what they otherwise could. Freedom, therefore, "is independence from coercion. Coercion implies a deliberate interference by another human being, within the area in which one could otherwise act".[88] For Muller, freedom "always enters consciousness as 'free, hurrah' ".[89] Keeping this general meaning in mind, Nyerere identified specific types of freedoms: "national freedom or independence, freedom from poverty, personal freedom for the individual (i.e. freedom of speech, and freedom from arbitrary arrest, to mention but a few) and political freedom or democracy".[90] Of the different types of freedom Nyerere enumerated, priority was given by him, to freedom from poverty and national freedom or national independence. However, the point here is that in Nyerere's articulation of the *Ujamaa*

concept, the concept of freedom was, like in Western liberalism, given a position of import.

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CHAPTER FOUR: *THYMOS* IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN SOCIO-POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The basis for the inclusion of this chapter is informed by the need to outline the prominent role *thymos* as *megalothymia* has played in the history of western political discourse. This will form a background for our eventual analysis and conclusion.

4.1 *Thymos* in Political History

Thymos also spelt as *thumos* is an ancient Greek word expressing the concept of spiritedness as in "spirited stallion". It should not be confused for another Greek word that means "anger", as they are both pronounced differently. "The word indicates a physical association with breath or blood. The word is also used to express human desire for recognition."[1] *Thymos* provides an "all powerful emotional support to the process of valuing and evaluating, and allows human beings to overcome their most natural instincts for what they believe to be right or just."[2] Like earlier mentioned, this word has made an in-road in the earliest times of socio-political thought, starting from the ancient Greek period of Homer and Hesiod, and Plato(Socrates), to modern/contemporary period of Nietzsche and Hegel. This *Thymos*, is the alleged feature of man

that has perhaps created the most controversy over time. In modern language it can be translated as *self-esteem* and *pride*, when using a positive language, or to *vanity* and *"amour-propre"* when highlighting the negative aspect.

4.1.1 *Thymos* in Ancient Greek Period

In Homers works *thumos(thymos)* was used to denote emotions, desire or an internal urge. *"Thymos* was a permanent possession of living man, to which his thinking and feelings belonged; when a Homeric hero is under emotional stress he may externalize his *thymo*s, conversing with it or scolding it."[3]

However, beyond the Homeric usage of the concept of *Thymos* in the ancient Greek period, the term *thymos* was first brought into prominence by Plato in *The Republic*, toeing the Socratic tradition, Plato famously envisaged a tripartite division of the soul: *nous* (intellect or reason*) thymos or thumos* (passion) and *Epithumia* (appetite).

> "In the *Pheadrus*, Plato depicts logos as a charioteer driving two horses *eros* and *thumo*s(love and spiritedness are to be guided by rationality); to its appetitive part are ascribed bodily desire, *thumos* or t*hymos* is the emotional element in virtue of which we feel anger, fear, etc. *Nous* is (or should be) the

> controlling part which subjugates the appetites with the help of *thumos*."[4]

Thymos emerges in the Republic as being somehow related to the "value one sets on oneself, what we today might call self esteem"[5]. It is the location of such feelings as pride, shame and indignation and the need for recognition for oneself and for others. Thymos exists alongside with our godlike reason and our base appetites. Appetites constitute our lowest side, embracing the desire to eat, sleep, reproduce, and live as the physically dependent mammals we are. Reason on the other hand, enables us to understand and master life's complexities. "*Thymos* although dependent on reason for guidance, can cause us to act in unreasonable ways out of our pride and to strive for ends inimical to our physical wellbeing"[6].

4.1.2 *Thymos in* Renaissance (Interlude)

Nicollo Machiavelli in his famous redefinition of virtue and morality in favour of the Princes who should aim to acquire and hold power at all costs (as the end justifies the means), also spoke of the desire for glory, although he did not directly call it *thymos*, he understood that it was *megalothymia* in the form of the desire for glory which

was the basic psychological drive behind the ambition of Princes and a legitimization of superiority claims of aristocracy. "Nations could go into war with their neighbors as a matter of necessity, in self defense or to build up population and resources for the future but apart from these, the desire for recognition stands above all; for him then the desire for glory is the universal characteristic of man which creates special problems by leading ambitious men into tyranny and the rest into slavery."[7] Aristocratic pride was later on attacked by most Enlightenment writers, such as David Hume and Montesquieu, and the early English liberals saw megalothymia in the form of passionate and stubborn pride of princes, or the otherworldly fanaticism of militant priests, as the chief cause of war. For the liberal movement the megalothymia of the aristocratic class was a main target. They argued that the aristocratic class in their fight for recognition destroyed rather than created wealth, that they lived on the efforts of others. Machiavelli's proposed solution to the curbing of megalothymia "was mixed republics where the thymotic ambitions of princes and the aristocratic few could be balanced against the thymotic desire for independence on the part of the people could ensure a degree of liberty."[8]

4.1.3 *Thymos* in Modern Period

Hobbes and Locke, who are seen as founders of the Anglo-Saxon liberal movement, tried to find a governance order that suppressed thymos as a driver of man and highlighted the two other building blocks, desire and reason.[9] Hobbes and Locke pitted the fulfilment of the desiring part of human nature against the aspirations of thymos, hoping through social engineering to master the latter. David Epstein has in an analysis of the Federalist Papers found that the importance of finding constructive and peaceful ways of meeting the need of man for recognition and prideful self-assertion was on the mind of several of the founding fathers. The Founding Father Madison saw popular government – the process of running for office, debating, voting – as a benign way to indulge man's natural pride and need for selfassertion.

The American Declaration of Independence has been perceived as the final victory of Lockean philosophy when it declares "the pursuit of happiness" as the main goal of society, generally interpreted as the fulfilment of material desires, especially the right to property. The objective of Locke-Hobbes to reduce the role of thymos in politics created several reactions. CS Lewis saw the liberal society to

be composed of *"men without chests"* driven only by reason and desire, lacking the proud self-assertiveness that was somehow at the core of man's humanity in earlier ages. It was chest that made man. He claimed that "by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal"[10].

4.1.4 *Thymos* in Contemporary Period

The most articulate critic of the liberal thinking was Friedrich Nietzsche who is known as the champion of *thymos* and called for its revival. For Nietzsche, the eradication of thymos would give rise to a nation or civilization of men without chests, a society of bourgeois who aspired to nothing more than their own comfortable self preservation. "The very essence of man is not his desire nor his reason but is *thymos*: man above all is a valuing creature, the "beast with red cheeks" who found life in his ability to pronounce the words good and evil"[11]. He explains that:

> Only man placed value in things to preserve himself ....therefore he calls himself man which means : the esteemer. To esteem is to create.... Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most esteemable treasure. Through esteeming alone is there value; and without esteeming the nut of existence would be hollow[12].

The act of valuing is the essence of man, of giving oneself worth and demanding recognition for it. "Nietzsche was particularly interested in *Megalothymia* as he believed it was what drove men to seek for excellence and recognition above others, and was the source of true freedom and creativity"[13]. He rejected *isothymia,* that is, the desire to be recognized the same as others as a "slave" doctrine.

To Hegel this third dimension of the human nature is very central. He calls it *the struggle for recognition*. And he takes it very far, claiming that no man can be seen as a full man, a "master", if he is not prepared to sacrifice his life to be recognized: "And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance…The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a person; but he has not attained the truth of his recognition as an independent self-consciousness"[14]. It was the struggle for recognition which led to the progress of history. It was this struggle for recognition that led to the creation of master and slave relationship which resulted from the primordial battle to the death for pure prestige and the revolutions (the French and

American revolutions). These revolutions led to the establishment of liberal societies across the world. In taking a closer look at the struggle for recognition, we discover that Plato's *thymos* is nothing other than the psychological seat of Hegel's desire for recognition: for the aristocratic master was moved to engage in the bloody battle for pure prestige by the desire that other people should evaluate him at his own sense of self worth. *Thymos* and the desire for recognition are a bit different in the sense that *thymos* is the part of the soul which creates this desire for recognition because it invests objects with value, "while the desire for recognition is the activity of *thymos* that demands that another consciousness shares the same valuation which it accords itself"[15].

Hegel saw, like Marx, a divided society. But while Marx saw the relations based on functions such as landlord and peasants, Hegel perceived them mainly as differences in the willingness to sacrifice one's life. Masters are prepared to die in order to be recognized, "servants" are not.

Fukuyama, was also critical of the idea of the purely rational man. He does not see the work of a tamed thymos, to use the language of Socrates and Plato, in modern societies. Men do compete and they

do seek recognition, but they have also accepted that the reward is in the form of fulfilment of their material desires, not in the enslaving of those that recognize them. Fukuyama agreed in the last chapter of his book called *"The Last Man"* with Aristotle that all systems are incomplete in some way and speculates whether, following Aristotle, "we might postulate that a society of last men composed entirely of desire and reason would give way to one of bestial first men seeking recognition alone, and vice versa, in an unending oscillation."[16]

ENDNOTES

1. "Thumos" http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/thumos? Was Redirected=true (5/5/2015)

2. Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And The Last Man. (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p.171.

3. *Loc. cit.*

4. Anthony Long, "Psychological Ideas in Antiquity" *Dictionary Of The History Of Ideas.* http://xtf.lib.virginia.edu (5/5/2015).

5. "Thumos"http://en.m. wikipedia.org/ wiki/thumos? Was Redirected=true (5/5/2015).

6. Plato, *The Republic*. Trans Benjamin Jowett© 1994-2009. http://classics.mit.deu/plato/republic.html (5/5/2015)

7. Thomas Dineen, "The future of Thymos" http://intellectualconservative.com/ atricle1034.html (7/5/2015).

8. F. Fukuyama, p.184.

9. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.35.

10. C.S Lewis

11. F. Fukuyama, p.185.

12. *Ibid;* p.188

13. Friedrich Nietzsche "On The Thousand And One Goals" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Book 1 in *The Portable Nietzsche*. (New York: Viking, 1954), p.170.

14. Hegel, 1967, trans J.B Baillie, p.233.

15. F. Fukuyama, p.304.

16. *Ibid*; p.335.

CHAPTER FIVE: *MEGALOTHYMIA* IN FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S "END OF HISTORY"

5.1 Battle to Death for Pure Prestige

In Fukuyama's reading of Hegel, he has it that it was the desire to be recognized that propelled man at the beginning of history into bloody battles to death for honour and pure prestige. Kojeve has it thus:

> All human, anthropogenetic desire- the desire that generates self-consciousness the human reality- is, finally, a function of the desire for "recognition". And the risk of life by which the human reality "comes to light" is a risk for the sake of such a desire. Therefore, to speak of the "origin" of self-consciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight to the death for recognition[1].

Hegel was for Fukuyama the first philosopher to answer Kant's call and wrote what remains in many ways the most serious Universal History. As interpreted by Kojeve, Hegel provides us with "an alternative mechanism by which to understand the historical process, one based on the struggle for recognition"[2]. Fukuyama further explains that:

> While we need not abandon our economic account of history 'recognition' allows us to recover a totally non-material historical dialectic that is much richer in its understanding of human motivation than the Marxist version, or than the sociological tradition stemming from Marx[3].

Apart from the first reason, Fukuyama gave other reasons for returning to the Hegelian account. According to him:

> The second reason for returning to Hegel is that the understanding of his as a "struggle for recognition" is actually a very useful and illuminating way of seeing the contemporary world. We inhabitants of liberal democratic countries are by now used to accounts of current events that reduce motivation to economic causes, so thoroughly bourgeois in our own perceptions, that we are frequently surprised to discover how totally non-economic most political life is. Indeed, we do not even have a common vocabulary for talking about the prideful and assertive side of human nature that is responsible for driving most wars and political conflicts.[4]

Fukuyama opines that the "struggle for recognition" is quite an old concept; one as old as political philosophy. It refers to a phenomenon that is conterminous with political life. He explains

that if it seems to us today a somewhat strange term, "it is only because of the successful "economization" of our thinking that has occurred in the past four hundred years".[5] Yet the "struggle for recognition" is for him evident everywhere around us and underlies contemporary clamours for liberal rights, be it in whatever part of the world.

To uncover the meaning of the "struggle for recognition", we need to understand the Hegelian concept of man, or of human nature. Unlike the Hobbesian, Lockean and Rousseaun "first man" in the "state of nature", the Hegelian concept denied a state of nature doctrine, as it also rejected the concept of human nature as "permanent and unchanging".[6] Man for Hegel, was free and un-determined, and therefore capable of creating his own nature in the course of history just as the existentialists philosopher like Sartre, Kierkegaard, Marcel, e.t.c, would want us to believe.

Hegel's "first man" shares certain basic natural desires with the animals, such as the desire for food, for sleep, for shelter and above all for the preservation of his own life. However, Hegel's "first man" is radically different from the animals in that he "desires not only

real "positive" objects- a steak, or fur jacket with which to keep warm, or a shelter in which to live- but also objects that are totally non-material. Above all he desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be recognized"[7]. Indeed, Fukuyama thinks that for Hegel, an individual could not become self-conscious, that is, become aware of himself as a separate human being, without the recognition by other human beings. Man in other words, was from the beginning, a social being; as his own sense of self-worth and identity is intimately connected with the value that other people bestow on him. He is basically, "other directed"[8]. It is only a man that can desire an object that may be described as "useless" from a biological point of view- as a medal, or the enemy's flag during a war. He desires such objects not for themselves, but because they are desired by other human beings.

Also, the Hegelian "first man" differs from the animals in another, but more fundamental way. This man wants not only to be recognized by other men, but to be recognized as a *man*. And the thing that constitutes man's identity as man; the most fundamental and uniquely human characteristic, is his ability to risk his own

life. Thus, for Hegel, the "first man's" encounter with others leads to a violent struggle in which each contestant seeks to make the other "recognize" him by risking his own life. Man is fundamentally other-directed and social animal, but his sociability leads him not into a peaceful civil society, but into a violent struggle to death for pure prestige. This "bloody battle" can have one of three scenarios playing out. For one, it can lead to the death of both combatants, in which case, life itself, human and natural ceases. It can lead to the death of one of the combatants, in which case the survivor remains unsatisfied as there would be no more human consciousness to recognize him. Or the battle can culminate in a relationship of lordship and bondage, in which one of the contestants decides to submit to a life of slavery rather than face the risk of violent death.

However, this relationship of lordship and bondage did not satisfy the desire for recognition of either the masters or the slaves. The slave was not acknowledged as a human being and therefore was not accorded any kind of recognition. Also, the recognition which was enjoyed by the master was deficient, in that he was not recognized by other masters, but by mere slaves whose humanity

was incomplete. Thus even the master longs for a more balanced society where he will be recognized by more 'equal' people. He longs for a universal reciprocal recognition.

The truth like Fukuyama rightly observes is that "much of this Hegelian account of early man will sound very strange to modern ears, particularly his identification of the willingness to risk one's life in a battle for pure prestige as the most basic human trait"[9]. For he asks: "isn't the willingness to risk one's life simply a primitive social custom that has long since been passed out of the world, along with dueling and revenge murder"[10].

The importance of the willingness to risk one's life in a battle for prestige can only be understood if we contemplate more deeply the Hegelian view of the meaning of human freedom. In common parlance, freedom is seen as something like the simple absence of restraint. For Hobbes for instance "Liberty or Freedom, signifies properly the absence of opposition- external impediments of motion- and may be applied no less to irrational inanimate creatures than to rational"[11]. By this, rocks in rolling down would be "free", but our experience is that it is determined by gravity and the slope of the

hill, just as the "behavior of the bear is determined through complex interaction of a variety of natural desires, instincts and needs"[12]. The inanimate rock and the bear have no choice but are simply responding to the laws of physics and needs respectively.

Hegel, by contrast, starts with a completely different account of man. For him, not only is man not determined by his physical or animal nature, but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal nature. His freedom is not just in Hobbes's formal sense of being physically unconstrained, but free in a metaphysical sense of being radically un-determined by nature.

But how do we know that man is free in this more profound sense? According to Fukuyama, "certainly, many instances of human choice are in fact merely calculations of self-interest that serve nothing more than the satisfaction of animal desires and passions"[13]. Hegel would not deny that man has an animal side or finite and determined nature: he must eat and sleep. But he is also demonstrably capable of acting in ways that totally "contravene his natural instincts, and contravene them not for the sake of satisfying a higher or more powerful instinct, but, in a way, purely for the

sake of the contravention"[14]. This is why the willingness to risk one's life in a battle for pure prestige plays such a pivotal role in Hegel's philosophy of history. For by risking his life, man proves that he can go contrary to his most powerful and basic instinct- the instinct of self-preservation.

Only man is capable of engaging in this bloody battle for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life, that he is something more than a mere complicated machine or a "slave to passions"[15]. That is, that he has a specifically human dignity because he is free.

5.2 The Thymotic Origins of Work

Work according to Hegel, is the *essence* of man: it is the working slave who creates human history by transforming the natural world into a world habitable by man. Apart from a few idle masters, "all human being work: and yet, there are tremendous differences in the manner and degree to which they work. These differences have traditionally been discussed under the rubric of the 'work ethic'".[16]

The slave earlier described, recovers his humanity lost on account of the fear of death through work. This is for two reasons. In the first instance, his motive for work which was fear of punishment, changed to sense of duty and self-discipline or work ethic. Secondly, through work, the slave begins to realize the power of transforming nature. He uses tools, can use tools to make other equipments, and thereby invents technology. Through the instrumentality of science and technology, he discovers that he can change nature; both the physical environment of his birth and his own nature.

Traditional liberal economic theories, beginning with Adam Smith, maintain that "*work* is essentially unpleasant activity, undertaken for the sake of the utility of the things created by work"[17]. That utility can primarily be enjoyed in leisure; the aim of human labour, in a certain sense, "is not to work but to enjoy leisure"[18]. Think about a man who works up to a point where the marginal disutility of labour- that is, the unpleasantness of having to stay late at the office, or working on a Saturday- exceeds the utility of the material benefits arising out of work. Men differ in the productivity of their

labour, but the degree to which they will work is essentially the result of a rational calculation in which they weigh the unpleasantness of work against the pleasurability of its results. Harder work is stimulated by higher material benefits to the individual work: a person is more likely to stay late in the office if his or her employer offers to pay double for overtime. For the traditional liberal economic theories, desire and reason, are therefore adequate to give an account of differing propensities to work.

Work ethic implies that differences in the manner and degree to which people work are determined by culture and custom, and are therefore related in some way to *thymos*. There is a difficulty in projecting a theory of individual or a people with a strong work ethic in the strictly utilitarian terms as in traditional liberal economics.

The argument could be also, that such overtime worker, is working on behalf of their families or of future generations, and this could sometimes be a motive, "but most "workaholics" almost never see their children and are so driven by their careers that their family lives all too often suffer"[19]. The reason such people work as hard as

they do, is only partially related to what monetary compensation they will get: they most times derive satisfaction from the work itself, or from the status and recognition that comes with it. Work, in other words, is undertaken to satisfy their *thymos* than the other desires.

5.3 The Rise and Fall of *Thymos*

The thymotic tendency in man; that sense of self-worth and the resultant demand that it be recognized has been all the while, presented as the source of such noble virtues as "courage, generousity and public spiritedness, as the seat of resistance to tyranny, and as a reason for the choice of liberal democracy"[20]. However, there exists a "dark side to the desire for recognition as well as, a dark side that has led many philosophers to believe that *thymos* is the fundamental source of human evil"[21].

Thymos was initially presented as an evaluation of one's own worth. This sense of worth is frequently related to the feeling that one is "more than" his natural desires, that one is a moral agent capable of free choices. This is what in modern language can be called, "self-esteem"; a human value, possessed at a greater or lesser degree by

all men. It is, "what enables us say "no" to other people without self-reproach"[22]. That there is a moral dimension to the human personality which constantly evaluates both the self and others, does not, however, mean that there is a generally accepted moral content. Fukuyama means this when he argues that:

> In a world of thymotic moral selves, they will be constantly disagreeing and arguing and growing angry with one another over a host of questions, large and small. Hence *thymos* is, even in its most humble manifestations, the starting point for human conflict[23].

Besides, who can guarantee that a human being's evaluation of his own worth will remain within the bounds of this "moral" self. There is the argument in some quarters, that there is a germ of moral judgment- a sense of rightness in all men: accepting a generalization of this nature, "we would have to admit that it is much less developed in some people than in others. One can demand recognition not only for one's moral worth, but also for one's wealth or power, or physical beauty as well"[24].

Also, there is no reason to think that all people will evaluate themselves as the *equals* of other people. Rather they have most

times, sought to be recognized as *superior* to other people, possibly "on the basis of true inner worth, but more likely out of an inflated and vain estimate of themselves"[25]. This desire to be recognized as superior to other people "we will henceforth label with a new word with ancient Greek roots, *megalothymia*"[26]. As Fukuyama would have it:

> Megalothymia can manifest both in a tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in the concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven[27].

The opposite of *megalothymia* is *isothymia,* the desire to be recognized as the equal of the other people. Megalothymia and Isothymia together constitute the dual manifestations of the desire for recognition, around which for Fukuyama, the historical transition to modernity can be understood.

5.4 Manifestations of *Thymos*

The insight that human nature is complex and has many dimensions is old. How to understand human nature has been at the heart of philosophy ever since Homer, Socrates and Plato. These

philosophers have discussed issues such as the body, mind and soul and dwelled on different, often conflicting features. Man's role in nature and to which extent his rights and values are related to an alleged Supreme Being or Deities have been other aspects that have captured the interest of generation of philosophers. It is not until the former century that the perception that there is a 'hidden variable', an intrinsic rationality, which is underpinning everything we do, resurged.

The desire for recognition as one's sense of self worth has been presented as the source of the noble virtues like courage, generosity and public spiritedness, as the seat of resistance to tyranny and as a reason for the choice of liberal democracy; but there is also another side to the desire for recognition. It is this fact which has led many philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke to believe that *thymos* is the fundamental source of human evil. This desire for recognition is found in all men but it is found in varying degrees, although it is believed to be present in a modest amount in everybody as it is important to their ability to function in the world and in the satisfaction which they get from their lives as individuals. The existence of a moral dimension of the human

personality that constantly evaluates both the self and others does not mean that there will be a uniform content of morality in all men. In a world made up of many men each with their own sense of moral worth or value, there are bound to be differences of interests which will create conflicts. Fukuyama states that *thymos* "is even in its most humble manifestations, the starting point of human conflicts"[28]. These differences in worth or valuation all arise out of *thymos* and its different manifestation. *Thymos* according to the review manifests itself in two forms; namely: *Isothymia* and *Megalothymia.*

5.4.1 *Isothymia*

Isothymia is the more subtle manifestation of the *thymos*. It is the desire to be recognized as equal to other people. *isothymia* does not lead men to seek to assert themselves over others but rather leads men to the desire of being seen as equals of other men and all men as equal. *Isothymia* then is the characteristic of a liberal democratic state which offers equal recognition to all its citizens. It was the thymotic tendency in man manifesting itself as *isothymia* which led to the French and American revolutions and consequently led to the

establishment of liberal democracy and the eradication of the master and slave relationship created by *megalothymia* created by the aristocratic superiority. This manifestation of *thymos* was wholly rejected by Hegel as it is for him a "slave" doctrine.

5.4.2 *Megalothymia*

Megalothymia is the radical form of *thymos*. It is the desire to be recognized as superior to others. It leads men to try to assert themselves over others. *Megalothymia* is the opposite of *isothymia.* Instead of men striving to be recognized as equal to others, they seek to be recognized as superior to others. Megalothymia can be manifested both in seeking to enslave others and in seeking to excel above others in any endeavor. Fukuyama asserts:

> It is clear that *megalothymia* is a highly problematic passion for all political life, for if recognition of one's superiority by another person is satisfying, it stands to reason that recognition by all people will be more satisfying still[29].

Thymos which is the desire for one's dignity and worth to be recognized can also manifest itself in the desire to dominate, oppress and enslave others. It was *megalothymia* which led to the

first bloody battle for pure prestige as stated by Hegel. It was this desire to have oneself recognized that led the two combatants to engage in the battle for recognition which created the master and slave relationship where the slave had to recognize the master out of fear of a violent death. Megalothymia has been resounded in the history of philosophy by political philosophers like Machiavelli who called it the desire for glory, by Nietzsche who called it the beast with red cheeks.

Megalothymia can be seen as the root of imperialism and tyranny and the driving force of many tyrants in history such as Caesar, Adolf Hitler, Stalin and a good number of world renowned dictators of African extraction and thus the deplorable socio-political scenario in the African continent.

ENDNOTES

1. A. Kojeve, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel* (New York: Macmilian, 1947), p.14.
2. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: A Penguin Book, 1992), p.144.
3. *Loc. cit*
4. *Ibid;* p.145.
5. *Loc. cit.*
6. *Ibid;* p.146.
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. D. Reisman, *The Lonely Crowd*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p.
9. F. Fukuyama. p.148.
10. J. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p.9.
11. T. Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. 170.
12. F. Fukuyama, p.149.
13. *Ibid*; p. 150.

14. *Loc. cit.*

15. J. J. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 365.

16. F. Fukuyama, p.224.

17. *Ibid*; p.225.

18. *Loc. cit.*

19. *Ibid;* p.226.

20. *Ibid;* p.180.

21. *Loc. cit.*

22. J. Didion, "On Self-Respect" in Didion. *Slouching Towards Bethlehem,* (New York: Dell, 1968), p.142.

23. F. Fukuyama, p. 182.

24. *Loc. cit.*

25. *Loc. cit.*

26. *Loc. cit.*

27. *Loc. cit.*

28. *Ibid;* p. 164.

29. *Ibid;* p.182.

CHAPTER SIX: THE DIALECTICS OF NYERERE'S *UJAMAA* AND FUKUYAMA'S *MEGALOTHYMIA* IN AFRICA

6.1 The Role of *Thymos* in Colonial, Pre-independent and Independent Africa

Our aim here is to examine the role of the thymotic nature of man in African liberation process or struggle for recognition. As depicted in Fukuyama, "the 'struggle for recognition' is a concept as old as political philosophy, and refers to a phenomenon coterminous with political life itself"[1]. Fukuyama's contention is that many people have believed that the thymotic nature of man is the basic source of evil in society. This explains why he says that:

> Man's sense of self-worth and the demand that it be recognised has, up till now, been presented as the source of the noble virtues like courage, generosity, and public spiritedness, as the seat of resistance to tyranny, and as a reason for the choice of liberal democracy. But there is a dark side to the desire for recognition as well, a dark side that has led many philosophers to believe that thymos is the fundamental source of human evil[2].

The danger posited by overestimation of thymos in the political sphere by individual like Hitler, Stalin, and Europe in their colonisation of Africa and other continents explains why many philosophers see it as a basic factor for human evil. This entails that these people wanted to be recognised as superior to others. "The desire to be recognised as superior to other people we will henceforth label with a new word with ancient Greek roots, Megalothymia"[3]. It is this megalothymia that is responsible for slavery and slave trade in Africa and European colonisation of Africa. This is in consonance with the observation of Fukuyama when he argues that:

> It is clear that megalothemia is a highly problematic passion for political life. For if recognition of one's superiority by another person is satisfying, it stands to reason that recognition by all people will be more satisfying still. Thymos, which first came to light as a humble kind of self-respect; can thus also manifest itself as the desire to dominate. This later, dark side of thymos was of course present right from the outset in Hegel's description of the bloody battle, since the desire for recognition provoked the primordial battle and ultimately led to the domination by the master of the slave. This logic of recognition ultimately led to the desire to be universally recognised, that is, to imperialism[4].

Fukuyama explains that this is a desire for vain glory. This was exactly the scenario in Africa. The European colonisation of Africa was domination of Africa in every aspect of life. We can only say with this, that the dark side of thymos was the driving force for this sojourn in the African continent.

However, the colonialists' introduction of their western type education in Africa was a point of self destruction. The first educated Africans in seeing the dominant nature of colonisation sought the liberation of Africa from its sranglehold. Like the slave in Hegel's account of history, the Africans sought to be liberated only through education as the slave in Hegel sought to be liberated through work and mastery of nature. "Today nobody studies the thymos systematically as part of their education, and the struggle for recognition is not part of our contemporary political vocabulary"[5]. But in effect, it expresses itself in everything we do in political life.

The African struggle for political independence was a struggle for recognition. This struggle for recognition among Africa nations was

not in the form of *Megalothymia* but rather expressed itself in its opposite -i.e. isothymia. "The second thing that remains in place of Megalothymia is an all pervasive isothymia, that is, the desire to be recognised as the equal of other people"[6].

In the African struggle for liberation, one can say that the thymotic nature of man was at play. This thymotic nature in the African liberation struggle was not that of domination but that of equality. The African Nationalists saw that the time had come for them to be masters of their own destiny. It was this human urge for freedom that led African nations to be liberated.

6.2 *Thymos* in Contemporary African Socio-Polity

There is a common notion that politics is a universal phenomenon. It means that politics exists everywhere and can influence people's lives irrespective of the nature of their involvement in the political process. This must have informed Aristotle's position that man is a political animal; "*zoon politikon*"[7].

However, although politics is a universal phenomenon, there are various manners and ways individuals and societies play it. The

environmental factor, based on the cultural antecedence of the people in question cannot simply be overlooked in considering their political behavior.

Politics as a means of achieving order in society, has been so bastardized in Africa, that *order* is far from what we have as the status quo in the present Africa, where individualism or selfish ambition and pretense are prevalent in our political culture. The *thymotic* tendency has been one of negativism than anything that has to do with the selflessness that underscores the *thymos*- that embodiment of public-spiritedness that has according to Fukuyama, driven history to its present "end".

The present African politics needs a return to the "traditional hospitality, sense of humanism and universal brotherhood inherent in African society"[8]. The question of the type of political organization or government in practice among most African countries is fundamentally not the problem with Africa. The present Africa's socio-political predicament lies more at the *attitudinal* level.

The present attitude is one of a high level of *megalothymic* "myselfism" than "communionism". That is a prevalence of extreme individualism than community spirit. From the Tunisian Ben Ali, to

the Egyptian Mubarak, from the Libyan Gadafi, to Senegalese Wade, from the Nigerian Obasanjo, to the ethnic cleansing of the Hutus by the Tutsi's of Rwanda among others, all point to the attitude of self-political interest that has held sway over the spirit of brotherhood that is perculiar to the African. However, the scenario seems to be changing. But the change has so far come by the "guns" and not by a fundamental change in the attitude of its leaders and followers. As it is true that man can live above his selfish animal instinct, then the African, should as well, now more than ever return to the altruistic socialism that once held sway in the African social life. Hegel confirms this possibility of man living an altruistic life when he thought that "not only is man not determined by his physical or animal nature, but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal nature"[9].

6.3 *Megalothymia, Isothymia* and the African Predicament

For Fukuyama as well as Hegel and Nietsche, *Megalothymia* and *isothymia* together constitute the "two manifestations of the desire for recognition around which the historical transition to modernity can be understood."[10] It is these two manifestations of *thymos*

which led to the progress made by man in social, political and economic aspects of life. Historical progress of mankind from earliest stages of social, political and economic existence to more complex contemporary societies is hinged on *thymos* which manifests itself in both *megalothymia* and *isothymia*. From the discovery of metal which was used in the creation of simple farm tools as well as crude weapons of war like spears and arrows in earlier societies to the creation of nuclear and space technology, *thymos* can be seen as the mechanism which has driven man to move history forward.

However, unlike the direction of the Western account of human nature and the socio-political history of human society, the African experience has rather been a leadership tradition that points more to excessive *megalothymia* than its subtle version.

Over the years, it was quite fashionable to blame colonial rule for the problems of Africa. Unquestionably, it is still logically correct to blame colonialism for what Africa is going through today. This position thrives because scholars have refused to see the problems of Africa beyond colonialism and refused to think outside the box. This view that the problem with Africa was colonialism was what led

in the first place to the articulation of elaborate socio-political philosophies to eliminate it. While the rest of the world was prescribing philosophies for development, Africa was hell-bent on articulating schemes to prescribe philosophies for decolonization.

At independence, most African States adopted Socialism of different kinds and variants, "as it was the only reasonable alternative to capitalism"[11]. Since colonialism was rejected, it only followed that capitalism be rejected too.

Beyond this, the rapid development of the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which was attributed to the adoption of Socialism by the Soviet Union was also a contributory factor. The argument was that "if the Soviet Union was able to catch up with the rest of Europe within a period of just thirty years after adopting Socialism, then Africa could also do the same after independence"[12].

Some political philosophers have argued that the tragedy of the current African condition can be attributed to the kind of political philosophy adopted at independence. They explain that the early nationalists were too much in a hurry to do away with the traces of colonialism. As true as this may be, it is true that human nature is

one, even if it manifests in different ways based on the context, and thus the various accounts by philosophers about the "evil" or "good" nature of man, his rationality or otherwise and the prescriptions on guarding against excesses. The present African predicament is more attitudinal than what obtains as our political philosophy.

Bertrand Russell posited two groups of desires: primary and secondary. Under the primary desires, Russell lists food, shelter and clothing, while the secondary desires are acquisitiveness, love of power, vanity, excitement, fear, hate and rivalry. The point of Russell's argument is that the quest to fulfill primary desires is normal and natural and would ordinarily not lead to destruction of civil life or retard the development of any society. But unfortunately, human beings are never contented with the fulfillment of primary desires. We pursue secondary desires too. Secondary desires in most cases create so much conflict and tension in civil society. The African predicament lies on the fact that its leadership, has placed too much premium on the secondary desires, "especially the love of power and desire to acquire wealth for the sake of it"[13]. Africa is

where it is today because of love of power, the acquisitive nature of its leadership which has its root in unbridled individualism.

All human beings have the tendency to be swayed towards the destructive secondary desires. Human nature is such that the desires have to be controlled before man can partake in productive activities that will be of benefit to the larger community. Some societies have succeeded in the process of reducing the lust after the desires that are destructive to the commonwealth and to the individuals concerned. Checkmating this negative desire for dominance is not yet the case in Africa. This scenario explains the deplorable condition of the African continent at the socio-political level, and thus a need to ask an old question anew. Do our problems lie in political theories or in our attitude? The problem is not in our stars but in ourselves.

6.4 Between Capitalism, Democracy and African Socialism

The End of History and the Last Man of Francis Fukuyama is the book of its historical moment, of Western triumph, just as the *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* of Paul Kennedy's was of a slightly earlier phase of American self-doubt. Its thesis, that capitalist

democracy is the final stopping place of historical evolution, is of compelling interest, and one that it would be evasive to ignore. Whatever the quality of Fukuyama's arguments, he does at least present socialists with the challenge of a coherent historical narrative, antithetical to that of their own tradition, and provokes them to question whether in the light of recent events they still have a tenable narrative of their own.

Democracy for Fukuyama is now without serious ideological competitors in the modern world, and we may confidently expect its further spread. Two main kinds of explanation are given for this hegemony. The first is a functionalist argument, which claims that democracy is the set of political arrangements best adapted to the development of capitalism. The second is an argument from human nature: it is the fundamental desire of human beings for mutual recognition that makes democracy so much more attractive than those forms of rule (feudalism, oligarchy, plutocracy, autocracy e.t.c), which define some citizens as inherently less worthy of respect than others. It is because democracy treats human beings as inherently equal that it has become a universal aspiration of all

societies. Even the former functionalist argument, from the needs of capitalism, rests on motivational presuppositions. Capitalism is propelled, in Fukuyama's view, by the fact that it is able to satisfy material needs more than other economic systems do. It is the application of reason, especially in the forms of science and technology to meet human desires that explains why capitalism has outstripped and is defeating, for the moment, all competing systems.

Fukuyama presents in this theory a liberal version of historical materialism, explaining the triumph of a superior system of economic organization by its capacity to bring reason to bear on the problems of meeting human desires. Unlike Marx, however, Fukuyama sees no inherent contradictions, imagines no further stage of economic and social development, than that of the present. Like Ernest Gellner, who put forward a not dissimilar kind of historicist liberal view in his *Thought and Change*, Fukuyama sees democratic capitalism, combining as it does, the satisfaction of material desires with a measure of self-rule, as all that social and economic arrangements need to provide.

The vulnerability of this argument as Fukuyama more than once hints that he recognizes in his discussion of possibly successful authoritarian forms of capitalism lies in the necessity or otherwise of the relationship between capitalism and democracy. Fukuyama's basic theoretical strategy is to privilege a universalized individualist motivation as the main explanatory principle underlying both these institutions. On this basis the ultimate conjunction of capitalism and democracy is made to seem plausible. The element of human nature committed to the satisfaction of biological and material desires will naturally seem to prefer the most effective form of economic organization. The thymotic element postulated by Fukuyama, the desire for recognition and respect, will on the other hand naturally opt for political systems based on equal rights of citizenship. Thus democracy and capitalism each in their way satisfy fundamental (though different) needs of the individual subject, and are essentially complementary.

There are two critical points to make about this argument. The first is that the entitlements fundamental to capitalism are rights of ownership of property, in its many forms, which were neither equally distributed at any notional outset of market competition,

nor necessarily become more equally distributed as this competition proceeds. Capitalism can obtain many benefits from democratic systems, including, as Fukuyama points out, the unfettered exchange of information (increasingly important in the era of the tertiary economy and the primacy of information production) and the means of peaceful regulation of conflicts. But it is also potentially threatened by claims made within democratic systems for equal economic entitlements, or for defence of particular citizens against the destructive (to them) effects of competition. Capitalist democracies typically operate within limits which protect them against the enforcement of such claims. As Adam Przeworski has pointed out, "social-democratic parties in government find themselves obliged to maintain the cooperation of the major holders of power in the market. If they fail to do so, they damage the economic interests of their supporters and find themselves driven from office"[14]. If, on the other hand, they accept the need for this collusion, they find they can do little about the inequalities they were voted in to redress.

Capitalism and democracy operate in tandem, but only whilst political claims against the holders of wealth are kept within strict

limits. Fukuyama, by categorizing capitalism as a 'middle-class society', chooses to ignore the fact that capitalism too has a ruling class of property-holders; or, to put this another way, that there are vast inequalities between those with large holdings of property, and the powers that derive from them, and the majority of the people with little wealth or none. It can of course be argued that there is a symbiosis of interest between capitalist property and the material well-being of the majority, especially where democratic states function as regulators and redistributors of wealth and power. Fukuyama clearly holds this view. Nevertheless, there are two analytically distinct and different institutions capitalism and democracy to be considered in their various possible relations, and not a single ideal institution of 'capitalist democracy'.

The second major argument of *The End of History and the Last Man* arises from a distinction between two kinds of individualism, each held to be vital elements of the spirit of modernity. The first of these, which Fukuyama derives from the tradition of Hobbes and Locke, is the individualism of the satisfaction of desires, the mundane 'bourgeois' spirit that seeks self-preservation and material

comfort as its primary goal. The second, which Fukuyama associates with the spirit of aristocracy, and whose foremost modern advocate is Nietzsche, is the desire for recognition, glory and respect the competitive and conflictful assertion of the self in the face of others. Fukuyama categorizes this aspect of human nature as the thymotic, from the Greek *thymos* or 'spiritedness'. In a rather brief and unconvincing way, he derives this from one of the three elements of the self set out by Plato in *The Republic.* This is the mentality associated with the guardian class, whose *thymos* or courage and public spiritedness is necessary in the defence of the city. "Thus, for Socrates, *thymos* is an innately political virtue necessary for the survival of any political community, because it is the basis on which private man is drawn out of the selfish life of desire and made to look towards the common good"[15]. Fukuyama goes on, via St Augustine and Machiavelli, to define *thymos* more clearly as the desire for glory, until he arrives at the liberal attempt to displace aristocratic pride altogether. What is a little surprising about Fukuyama's argument here is his interpretation of Plato's view, who after all postulated in *The Republic* a class of warriors charged with functions of defence who were distinct and differently

motivated from the philosopher kings or guardians who were actually to rule the city. This is one of several examples of Fukuyama's book where virtues of aristocratic and warlike pride are extended beyond their proper scope. In all this Fukuyama is describing and to a degree affirming the legacy of aristocratic cultures essentially warrior cultures holding up 'honour' as their prime virtue suggesting that these embody an indispensable universal potential of human nature which modern societies also need to fulfill. Fukuyama argues that this aristocratic principle has been assimilated into liberal political thought by Hegel, especially in his demonstration of the dialectic of master and slave, of the primordial desire for recognition as the foundation of human society. The problem posed by Fukuyama in his last chapters indicates the extent liberal democracy (he prefers this term to 'capitalist democracy' for the most part) can fulfill the human need for recognition, and how far it can therefore become a permanent and stable system; the end- stage of history, in fact.

Fukuyama examines both left and right-wing critiques of liberal, each assimilated to the problem of according recognition in society.

These critiques are identified both as theoretical arguments against liberal democracy, which have been identified with Marx and Nietzsche respectively and as right and left-wing pressures internal to liberal democracy which impel it in opposite directions. The critique from the Left expresses itself internally as *isothymia*; the desire for equal respect for everything and the denial of difference. Fukuyama evokes de Tocqueville's critique of American democracy as "a society in danger of being tyrannized by the spirit of leveling equality. In this he echoes much contemporary American anxiety, expressed in the panic about American education, and in the backlash against 'PC' and radical influence in universities"[16]. This threat to 'difference' arises not from commercialism and the pressures of the market (the main problem for earlier left-wing critics of mass society) but from radical political mobilizations against inequality and discrimination.

The contradictions facing liberal democracy both from Left and Right are explored by Fukuyama using variations on his central concept of *thymos,* or the desire for recognition. The egalitarian impulse in democracy is categorized as *isothymia*; the idea of equal

respect and recognition for all. It competes, however, with its opposite extreme, the innate impulse to *megalothymia*; the self-aggrandizing impulse, the willingness to risk the self for an intrinsic value, or indeed simply for the sake of respect and honour as values in themselves. This, Fukuyama is at pains to stress, is a necessary component of the social order. "Nature, on the other hand, will conspire to preserve a substantial degree of megalothymia even in our egalitarian, democratic world"[17]. For he believes that Nietzsche was absolutely correct in his belief that some degree of megalothymia is a necessary precondition for life itself. Fukuyama argues that both the value and stability of liberal democracy depend on its leaving space for this spirit of aggrandizement. 'Indeed, democracy's long-run health and stability can be seen to rest on the quality and number of outlets for megalothymia that are available to its citizens. These outlets do not only tap the energy latent in *thymos* and turn it to productive uses, but also serve as grounding wires that bleed off excess energy that would otherwise tear the community apart. Among these outlets are democratic politics and entrepreneurship. The importance of the dominant form of American power is thus given its due in Fukuyama's observation

that “capitalism does not just permit, but positively requires, a form of regulated and sublimated megalothymia in the striving of businesses to be better than their rivals”[18].

The attempt here is to attempt a philosophical legitimation of the conflicting moralities of capitalist democracy in a country like America. The ideology of contemporary American capitalism is well summarized as an oscillation between two competing forms of individualism, an egalitarian/altruistic and a libertarian/ competitive variety. Like some Marxists, Fukuyama views such motivational principles as the driving forces of historical change, but he gives little attention to the problems of moving from explanations at the level of individual motive and action, to macro-historical change. One such link can be made via the concept of ideology, in which what is historically influential is not a potential human need or want as such (there may be an infinity of these), but a persuasive social definition or construction of such a want, which gives it a collective force and makes it into a social fact with causal weight. The concepts of honour and respect, which Fukuyama roots in aristocratic societies, and of legitimate self-interest and desire,

which he locates in the origins of bourgeois society, were both effective as forms of ideological power, not as universal psychological principles[19]. In this way we should see the different versions of individualism which contend with one another in modern society as effects of a dominant capitalist order, as well as causes and legitimations of its hegemony.

Fukuyama's excessive insistence that there is no alternative to individualisms of different kinds invites one to look for what may be hidden between this ideological representation of individualism and its substantive basis. We have already suggested that the role of capitalism in this process, as a system of power with imperatives that may only contingently coincide with those of democracy or the rights of the individual, is one other reality to be taken into consideration in mapping possible futures. But one might also question the emphasis given to the defining role of individuals in Fukuyama's account of the end of history. After all, reproduction of the human species only takes place at all because females are capable of nearly complete identification of their interests with those of their children for a considerable length of time. The crucial

unit of early life is not the individual at all, but the dyadic couple, and the unit necessary to sustain that in existence is usually a larger family. From this account of species origins one might, with psychoanalysis, derive a view of human nature as essentially social, not individual, and of the need for relationship with others based on affections and sympathies as a primary one. Fukuyama's view of the springs of prideful action is an exceedingly male- centred one, and a more feminized perspective would generate a very different philosophical anthropology than this. And whilst modern democracy may be founded on the idea that it confers equal recognition on all citizens, one doubts that the democratic process in its "everyday" reality offers all that much tangible recognition to each citizen through activities of deliberation and choice. It seems unlikely that Fukuyama's experience of modern American politics, with its participation rate of less than fifty per cent of voters in presidential elections, offers much reason to celebrate democratic principle. It seems that at the very moment when the ideological affirmation of the individual and the democratic process is at its height, it is under the greatest pressure from institutional forces with other priorities.

It is nevertheless a point of agreement between the liberal and socialist traditions of the Enlightenment that material improvement is to the benefit of mankind. From Fukuyama's generally positive view of capitalism's power of economic transformation one would not altogether dissent, though how and whether this will be realized is a serious issue. What is also in question is what one might expect from such prospective abundance, as different possible futures or histories-to- be. Here it is vital to separate the different explanatory components of Fukuyama's analysis, since it is their false unity which gives his account its life-threatening sense of closure. Capitalism as a system valorizing motives of individual gain and self-realization, and democratic citizenship as a source of social choice rooted in moral norms, point in different directions. There is therefore no reason to expect the hegemony of the first over the second to be a feature of all time.

Fukuyama is right about the role of motive, to the degree that it is the desire for material sufficiency which gives capitalism its great power. Once, and where, this power is satisfied one might expect to see a wider range of values and social preferences contending with

one another, as they have in many actual societies. The philosophical traditions from which Fukuyama has drawn so selectively disclose many different priorities of value which societies might adopt, given freedom to do so. Michael Walzer has shown in his book *Spheres of Justice* how such different domains of value are instantiated in modern societies, and how the problem is to give these their appropriate due, against the one-dimensional dictatorships of capital or state. Perhaps the very precariousness of the current triumph of capitalism is revealed in Fukuyama's will to demonstrate that there is no other future; that the historical narrative ends here. Hegel knew that the relationship between human understanding and its objects was more complicated and paradoxical than this.

In spite of the theoretical and practical problems of democracy, in true practice, it remains the best value of governance. Democracy recognizes the worth of individual, while also accommodating the will of the majority. In countries where democracy is grounded on the pristine notions of freedom, equality, justice, periodic elections and choice, "development has been the result"[20]. The idea that

democracy breeds incompetence and enlarges differences holds true at places where the pristine notions of democracy have been sacrificed at the altar of different kinds of chauvinism. In practice, the shortfall of democracy in Africa lies in the capitalist economic system that stands side by side to it; which has become the power and wealth monger's leverage to perpetuate himself.

Most accurately, the concept African socialism emerged in African thoughts in the 1950's at a time when many of the African countries were getting ready for independence. Then the problem confronted by the first crop of political elites or leaders in their various territories was how to mobilize the values and the energies of their people, for the development of the territories after independence. It was "within this atmosphere that African socialism emerged as a body of ideas"[21]. Some of these African leaders and proponents of African socialism are Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, L. S. Senghor of Senegal, kwameh Nkurumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria and Sekor Toure of Guinea.

According to Friedland and Rosberg, "the common principles of the various versions of African socialism were: economic development

guided by a large public sector, incorporating the African identity and what it means to be African, and the avoidance of the development of social classes within society"[22]. Senghor claimed that "Africa's social background of tribal community life not only makes socialism natural to Africa but excludes the validity of the theory of class struggle,"[23] thus making African socialism, in all of its variations, different from Marxism and European socialist theory.

When we talk of African socialism, the originators and proponents are of different temperament and have not often spoken with one voice. This makes it difficult to give a univocal meaning of the concept. However for the purpose of making progress than we have done earlier, we may say that it is a search for an altogether different type of social system with its root in African soil. It was in this vein that Mboya conceives of African socialism as:

> A political philosophy which stands to restore national values, communal social practice and above all to restore the traditional values in the African socialist mentality and outlook, and to create more values in the changing world of money economy to build an economy which reflects the thinking of the great majority of people.[24]

Mboya's list of basic values and social practices of traditional African consist of the communal spirit, hospitality, hard-work, generosity, acceptance and practice of equalitarianism, communal ownership of land, equality of opportunities for all, tribal loyalty and so on. Nyerere also views African socialism or "Ujamaa Socialism" as he terms it, as more than a political system, it is a philosophy, a world view as well as a gateway to African selfhood. Nyerere asserts that African socialism is:

> Essentially an attitude of the mind which involves a change in personal attitude and a reconciliation of individuals but goes beyond these to effect structural change consistent with the socialist outlook, creating a pattern of justice in which creativity and justice in which equality and freedom of all will be assured[25].

Julius Nyerere is one of the most original political thinkers to emerge from Africa. He led his country Tanzania to independence through the party he founded in 1952- the Tangayika African National Union (TANU). At independence in 1961, Nyerere was elected president of Tanzania. On 7th February, 1969, he made the famous Arusha declaration, which laid down new social ways of pursuing development in Africa. His Ujamaa philosophy

emphasized breaking Tanzania into small sizeable villages and pursue intensive grass root human and material development. The concept Ujamaa comes from the Swahili for extended family or familyhood, which is distinquished by several key characteristics such that "a person becomes a person through the people or community"[26]. In spite of the difficulties Nyerere faced in the pursuit of his Ujamaa, he is recognised all over the world as one of the few African leaders with integrity. His death in 1991 was mourned by many statesmen all over the world.

Leopold S. Senghor sees African socialism as a form of socialism that is peculiarly African by saying that "our socialism is not that of Europe. It is neither atheistic communism nor quite the democratic socialism of the second international. We have modestly called it the African mode of socialism"[27]. Senghor believes that two elements are central to African socialisms, namely "economic democracy" and "spiritual freedom".

Likewise, Nkurumah explains African socialism through the communal life practiced by traditional African, he says; "anyone who seeks the socio-political ancestors of socialism, the one must go to communalism. Socialism has characteristics in common with

communalism, just as capitalism is linked with feudalism and slavery"[28]. Nkurumah avers further that "the traditional African has an attitude towards man which can be described as being socialistic. This he believes arises from the fact that man is regarded in Africa as primarily a spiritual being, a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value"[29]. Nkurumah believes that the idea of the original value of man imposes duties of a socialist kind upon him.

From the works of the different proponents of African socialism emerge the following issues or elements as articulated by Agbaye; "the nature of man, the nature and role of the family and kinship ties, the society, the nature of government and the state, and the peculiar nature of African socialism"[30].

Man according to the proponents of African socialism, is quite different from the individualistic picture inherent in literature from the west, for them, man is intrinsically a communal animal. He depends on and is part of the community not only for economic and social reasons alone, but also for spiritual succour. African Socialism thus focuses on the needs of man, the individual as a member of the community, a community in which he is not in

conflict either with himself or others. Therefore, man is conceived by the African socialist as being in a symbiotic relationship with the community, they then believe that the encouragement of the past model in the present African world, will generate bonds of brotherhood, unity and conflicts free solidarity.

The proponents of African socialism view the family and kinship ties as very crucial social structures in bringing about community of relationships, which will work against the development of explicatory relationship and are therefore conducive to the building of the "communocracy" they envisaged. This sort of argument is pushed forward in Julius Nyerere's "ujamaa socialism".

African socialism portrays traditional African societies as being free of conflict due to their being egalitarian. For proponents of African socialism, traditional society of the past was one in which social wealth was used for the benefit of all and there existed no oppression and no diversity of society into opposing and hostile camps. Thus the modern day proponents tend to discourage all forms of opposition (social, economic, and political) which might generate social conflict.

As earlier stated, African socialism at its inauguration was a tool for the mobilization of the resources of the new African nations for political, economic as well as social development. As a result of this, African socialists tend to see the government and the state as communocratic, a means of mobilizing natural resources for development. Hence, dissent is discouraged because it could distract the overriding goal of unity and purpose in the search of development. African socialism therefore encourages the development of one party regime.

Proponents of African socialism argue that it is not a form of Marxist socialism based on the proletariates, who wield power and dictate to the bourgeoisie nor is it a form of Chinese collectivism, whose basic unit is the commune, established on the basis of an oath of mutual aid among the participants or communism based on the holding of property in common, since the state would have withered away. The form of socialism campaigned for by these first crop of African leaders is not new to Africa. The traditional Africa that they knew was socialist in his mental outlook, and his life was governed by indigenous socialist rules, customs and institution.

To be sure, African socialism as an ideological orientation presents to the modern Africa (individual and the society), messages from the past which it can learn a lot from concerning the traditional past. This explains why Onuoha avers that, "it has a beauty of its own. It was highly integrated in a peculiar way and embodied those traits by which Africans are to be distinguished as a people"[31]. Therefore, African socialism calls the modern man back to the land and culture as the source of authentic social progress and self-hood for there seem to be regretful awareness by the present day African, that being exposed to European education, culture, values and capitalist exploitative tendency has eroded from the African his true self and has alienated him from his development, hence the need to pursue progress from the roots of the African culture. Another suggestion for this retracing to the roots, is that it is possible to "recapture the traditional values and worldviews of his race and adapt them to the modern needs for scientific progress and international co-operation"[32].

ENDNOTES

1. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man,* (New York: A Penguin Book, 1992), p.145.

2. *Ibid;* p.181.

3. *Ibid;* p.182.

4. *Loc. cit.*

5. *Ibid*; pp.189-190.

6. *Ibid;* p.180.

7. T. A Sinclair, *Aristotle, The Politics*, (Great Britain Chaucer Press Limited, 1962), p.287.

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9. W. G. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans J. B Baillie (New York: Harper Row, 1967), p.233.

23. Fukuyama, p. 164.

11. O. A Falaiye, "A Philosopher Interrogates African Polis: How Can We Get It Right?" in *An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Lagos* (Lagos: Unilag Press, 2012), p.15.

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13. A.O Falaiye, p.29.

14. A. Przworski, *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 280.

15. Fukuyama, p. 163.

16. *Ibid; p.*164.

17. F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* trans Walter Kaufman, (New York: Vintage, 1996), p.45.

18. Fukuyama, p.166.

19. *Loc. cit.*

20. A.O Falaiye, p.40.

21. A, Agbaye, *African Political Thought* (Ibadan: Department of Adult Education U.I., 1991), p. 12.

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23. L. S Senghor, “Negritude and African Socialism” in P.H. Coetze and A.P.J. Roux (eds), *The African philosophy Reader,* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 16.

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25. J. K Nyerere, “Ujamaa-The basis of African socialism” in G.M. Mutisco and S.W. Rohio (eds) *Readings in Africa Political Thought,* (London: Heineman, 1975), p.34.

26. F. Brockway, *African Socialism*, (London: The Bodley Head, 1963), p. 47.

27. Senghor, p. 17.

28. J. K. Nkrumah, “Conscientism” in G.M Mutisco and S.W Rohio, *Readings in African Political Thoughts,* (London: Heineman, 1975), p.99.

29. *Ibid;* p.101.

30. Agbaye, p.7.

31. B. Onuoha, *Elements of African Socialism,* (New York: Friendship Press, 1971), p.56.

32. O. Oladipo, “Reason, Identity and the African Quest: The Problem of Self-definition in African Philosophy” in *African Today*, 1995, vol.42, No. 3

CHAPTER SEVEN: EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

7. 1 EVALUATION

We have to applaud the first crop of African leaders for reacting to the capitalist exploitative hegemony of the west under the influence of colonialism and its last stage of neo-colonialism which is imperialism, at a point in African history by propagating an African traditional ideological orientation; African socialism, and stating emphatically that it is peculiarly African. Their efforts notwithstanding, there have been enormous critical interrogation of these assumption about the past and its suggestion for the present, especially those connected with the society and the individual.

Firstly, Nyerere's presentation of the African past society as one that is conflict free is problematic. Because from history we know that this was not the case, there were cases of intra/inter-tribal wars, as exposed in many literatures on African history.

Also, there were criminals and exploiters in the traditional societies of Africa, as we have in the present capitalist states. Oguejiofor pictured this when he said that:

> Communalist sentiments is at the foundation of many social ills in African societies, especially when it becomes a ploy for the hegemony of the holder of power and the cohorts of his kinsmen over the powerless[1].

Secondly, the communal co-existence suggested by Nyerere and his proponents of African socialism for the present African socialism is not attainable in an over populated geographical area as the African states and with the present day high level of acculturation and globalization.

When Francis Fukuyama wrote the *End Of History and The Last Man* in which he expanded his ideas which were formerly published in an article "End of History?" in the *National Interest*, he based his arguments for the role of the *thymos* in history on the Hegelian understanding of history as interpreted by Alexandre Kojeve, a contemporary interpreter of Hegel. His is to be sure a reawakening to scholarship, a dimension to human nature that has almost been neglected. The density of his work has been appreciated:

> One must also admire Fukuyama's intellectual ambition, there are a few subjects in the intellectual history acomplicated as

> relationship of Hegel in particular and German philosophy in general, to the Anglo- America philosophical tradition that runs from people like Locke and Hobbes to Adam Smith and James Madison. In fact Karl Marx once said that life work was to reconcile English political economy within German philosophy[2].

Despite this, Fukuyama's ideas have come under a lot of criticism because he made a lot of bold statements about historical progress, and the end of history.

Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history with the fall of communism and the adoption of liberal democracy by some nations formerly under military and communist rule, and stated that liberal democracy would mark the final or end point of mankind's ideological evolution. Admittedly, therefore, there will be no further progress in the area of political ideology since mankind has found the best form of government. Man will not seek to change this for any other system because, it has satisfied man's deepest fundamental longing which is the desire for recognition.

This thesis affirms the belief in historical progress stressing that history is directional but does not agree to the concept of an end of history. This is based on the primacy of thymos which has

advanced history. The equal recognition granted all men by liberal democracy will no longer satisfy man in the long run as many will no longer seek to be seen as equal and the same with other men. This is the reason why people go to any lengths to assert themselves over others. This is seen in the increase in terrorism around the world. "This seemingly small number of persons are enough to set in motion, a wheel of change which will reshape liberal democracy in the future. This is already seen in many nations reframing their national policies to address new challenges such as terrorism"[3] and the excessive individualism that bedevils humanity at present.

Fukuyama takes for granted the different experiences of different nations by proposing liberal democracy as the ideal to which other nations should aspire.

Proposing an end to history suggests a state of stagnation, human history has been marked by change and in line with Heraclitus, change is the only thing that is constant in human life. Human nature is insatiable and the only time that man stops seeking change or improvement will be when his nature changes or when he

dies. Therefore proposing an end to end history is proposing an end to human nature.

Liberal democracy though popular as a more suitable system of government compared to other forms of government but to say that it will mark the end of man's ideological evolution would be to limit the powers of the human mind. Men will in the future seek to try out new things, liberal democracy may be restructured to a more humanistic variant or completely dumped for a more suitable system. This is because human beings will always make judgments with regard to the situation in which they find themselves. With the fast pace of economic, technological and social change and degradation witnessed in this era, men might be forced to make choices which may change preexisting systems and ideologies. William McNeill identified this when he states that:

> In the future, people may become confused about what is possible for them to enjoy then it would seem that the chief threat to liberal democracy would be our comparison about what is really at stake[4].

The choice of political systems in the future will not lie in the ideal but what men find to be more suitable for them at that point in

their history (as desperately needed in African politics, where the excuse to true democracy is capitalist tendency).

Even though *thymos* is the only force which will determine how men will act in the nearest or distant future and it will all depend on the situation in which men find themselves and this will influence their choices, Fukuyama's thesis that *megalothymia* is curbed in liberal democracy is unsatisfactory. *Megalothymia* is naturally a constituent of men, it can be placated or channeled to other so called productive avenues but it cannot be completely overcome.

Today, people too seek other means of recognition of their uniqueness by becoming members of certain groups such as nationalist groups, terrorist groups and spiritually inclined movements because they still seek some avenues to regard themselves as unique and see these avenues as means of expression of *megalothymia*. It is clear that as it is, *Megalothymia* will cause changes within liberal democracy that will lead to its change or reconstruction.

7.2 CONCLUSION

Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* deserves compliments for trying to rejuvenate the African's traditional pride in himself, with its proposal of seeking to disabuse the African mind of such attitudes of individualism, self- interest and the race for material wealth. It seeks to implant in their place such values as; communalism, mutual help and cooperation, respect for common man, social justice, equality and selfless service to the community. To be sure, these values are what every human socio-political system seeks to achieve. But the question is to what extent is it able to do this, considering its fundamental tenets and the commitment of its adherents? However, Nkrumah warns that:

> The nostalgia of African traditional past should not be fetish or a facile simplification. The way out is not to regurgitate Islamic and European influences in a futile attempt to recreate a past that cannot be reconstructed. Senghor also favours some kind of return to African communalism that will accommodate the positive contributing of colonial rule[5].

The demarcation created between capitalism and socialism; be it as a work in progress or at its communitarian end, is a hasty one as the two systems ultimately seeks to order society and better the

lives of the populace. The success of any system is dependent to a very large extent on the sincerity of purpose of the adherents. It is "true" African socialism has "failed" but there is yet to be that human social system that has "delivered" man entirely from his present social, economic and political quagmire.

To be sure, without joining issues to the debate as to how capitalism has fared in the African continent, it is our position that the *thymotic* tendency in man in its manifestation as *megalothymia*, has remained the basis for the unbridled individualism that has surfaced in the African continent.

In the final analysis, when the excesses of *megalothymia* can be checkmated in Africa (while healthy competition is encouraged) and the spirit of brotherhood which is peculiar to the African situation is exploited, it will herald a new Africa devoid of the extremisms of the two paradigms. A re-orientation of the citizenry through education at the family level, in the secondary schools and tertiary institutions will instill this spirit of "brotherhood". When we speak of "brotherhood Spirit", we mean a more humane psychological disposition towards the "other". There must be something good

about a philosophy that seeks to grant to all a universal humanism beyond the borders of tribe, clan, race or political interest.

Wherever politics is grounded on the pristine notions of freedom, equality, justice and "brotherhood" (oneness of all), a new humanism will emerge and thus a new African *polis*.

ENDNOTES

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