

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY

The quest for knowledge has been the concern of Philosophers in all ages. Consequently, philosophy right from its Greek origin is noted for its critical, rational and coherent way of viewing things.

This period of philosophy witnessed a lot of trust in the authority of scholars of previous centuries with special attention to Aristotle. During that time, it was believed that the ancients were geniuses whose insight could provide all knowledge and therefore solve all problems.

However, instead of arguing about alternative theories of nature, philosophers now addressed themselves to the problems of knowledge. They asked questions whether it was possible for the human mind to discover any universal truth.

According to the Socratic injunction ‘‘man know thyself’’, man in his intellectual activities tries to know himself and his immediate environment. This search for knowledge and certainty has made philosophers to go deep in the search for true knowledge. This true knowledge can be acquired through reasoning or experience. When philosophy studies realities it is called the objects of existence. When philosophy studies the subjects, it is called subjects of existence. Philosophy can therefore start from the subject/subjectivity or from object/objectivity. With this venture philosophers in all ages have tried to ask the following questions: ‘‘what do I know’’, ‘‘How do you know’’, ‘‘what are things really like’’? etc. This kind of questions leads us to a branch of philosophy called epistemology which is the science of knowledge and a deeper science of knowledge of the abstract which is Metaphysics.

In this work, epistemology and metaphysics were defined separately in details for the better understanding of the concepts.

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with the nature and scope of knowledge. It is also referred to as theory of knowledge. It questions what knowledge is and how it can be acquired and the extent to which any given subject or entity can be known. Epistemology deals with our concept of knowledge, how we can learn and what

we can know. Therefore the problem of epistemology is the problem of knowledge because epistemology's main concern is the definition of knowledge, the source of knowledge and limits of knowledge.¹

Etymologically, epistemology is a word that is derived from two Greek words "episteme" and "logos" meaning knowledge and discourse, word, study or theory.

Knowledge is the ability to "know" or to acquire information about the existence of reality. This quest to know was what led to the existence of philosophy by the Ionian or Milesian thinkers in their quest to know how things are really like and ways by which we can explain the process of change in things.

This quest to know more about reality brought about different periods in philosophy namely:

1. *The Ancient Period* (shaping of the philosophic mind).

This is the period that philosophy started at Athens. The Ancient Ionian philosophers which began with Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides among others were interested in the "stuff" of existence that is what the reality or world or the universe is made up of.

2. *The Mediaeval Period*: (the confluence of Philosophy and Theology).

This is a period where philosophical and theological views merged together. The Philosophers in this period were mainly theologians. They were interested in the source of human knowledge, problem of evil, proofs for the existence of God, etc. Some of the philosophers here include St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas.

3. *The Modern Period*: (confluence of Philosophy and Science).

This is a period where philosophy met with the unfolding world of science. This is a time when philosophy turned away from the traditional method of relying knowledge on the authority of scholasticism and made a u-turn to the methods of science. The philosophers in this modern period were interested in clear and distinct knowledge that can be empirically or scientifically verified. Some of the philosophers are Bacon and Hobbes, the Rationalists: Rene Descartes (known as the father of modern philosophy) Baruch Spinoza, Gotfried Leibniz, and the Empiricists, John Locke, George Berkely and David Hume.

It was at this period that Immanuel Kant came in to become a mediator between rationalism and empiricism.

Epistemology considers that knowledge can be obtained through experience and reason but there is still a knowledge which is totally and entirely devoid of any empirical attachment. This knowledge that cannot be empirically or scientifically verified can be acquired metaphysically.²

Therefore Metaphysics which is another source of knowledge is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of Being and the world.

Although the term is not easily defined traditionally metaphysics attempts to answer the basic question, ‘‘what is there?’’³

The term metaphysics is derived from two Greek words ‘‘meta’’ and ‘‘ta phusika’’.

‘‘Meta’’ means after, beyond, transcending while ‘‘ta phusika’’ means physics, matter and body. Metaphysics therefore means that which concerns itself with which is beyond the physical.

Early use of the term ‘‘metaphysics’’ simply referred to the topics covered by the works placed after (hence meta) the physics in the traditional editing and commentary of Aristotle’s works made by the Greek peripatetic philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes.⁴

Aristotle held the view that metaphysics is the first philosophy that studies Being, or as it is written in Greek *Ons qua Ons or Ens qua Ens*. According to him ‘‘there is a science which studies being *qua* being and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature.’’⁵

According to Festus Okafor

Metaphysics is that branch of philosophy that among other things deals with the following

- (1) That which does not appear to the senses*
- (2) Abstract concepts such as essence, existence, goodness etc.*
- (3) Explanation of the nature of being or reality per se as distinct from the study of any particular material being.*
- (4) Explanation of the origin of the world or cosmos.*⁶

However, metaphysics is not concerned with examining the physical properties of things that exist but instead, the study of the underlying principles that give rise to the unified natural world. As such the statement that ‘‘evil does not exist’’ deals with the object ‘‘evil’’ as

opposed to ‘‘good’’ which is a metaphysical subject. Whereas the statement that ‘‘all things are composed of atoms which are in turn composed of electron, proton and neutron’’ is definitely not metaphysics but rather a concern of physical sciences.

The contrast between rationalism and science raised for Kant the question whether metaphysics can increase our knowledge the way science obviously can.

This thesis therefore has as its main objective, the vision of explicating and clarifying the issues that have beclouded the role of metaphysics in contemporary philosophical studies and research with a view of establishing foundationalism and conceivability on firm, logical and indubitable ground by comparing the solid foundations of African metaphysics with the salient postulations of metaphysics in Kant’s critical philosophy. Issues to be addressed, therefore are substantive questions in *Igbo* African philosophy or epistemology, metaphysics as they compare with similar ones in Kant’s epistemology such as understanding, cognition, the existence of soul, ethics and God.

This work is of the view that foundationalism and conceivability are relevant. Foundationalism is the idea that ‘‘our knowledge is a structure whose foundation is the content of consciousness and whose upper regions are in place in so far as they are justified’’⁷ and conceivability which says that ‘‘there could be a creature physically like us and yet for which there is nothing it is like to this creature or for whom sensory states are very different from what they are like to us.’’⁸

It postulates an explanatory of mental and the physical. Much as these are the major planks of contemporary African philosophy.

There is the need to find out the extent to which these concepts in epistemology generally agree with, or differ from Kantian critical philosophy and transcendental idealism. The author attempts to show through *Igbo* that African culture has all the substantive frame works of philosophy like in western philosophy and that transcendental knowledge which Kant denied is possible in *Igbo* metaphysics.

Secondly the vistas of African Philosophy need to be explored as a substantive philosophy with the objective of discovering its common grounds with other philosophies. This is because African philosophy has been established as substantive discipline, with its scope, nature and method well articulated. It is defined as ‘‘the particular way or ways of an African experiences, conceives and interprets nature, society, religion, man, God, human conduct and so on’’⁹ while African metaphysics is defined as, ‘‘the nature of ultimate reality for the

African, the nature of forces or being in African universe, the relationship between the seen and unseen etc are topics in African metaphysics or science of reality. ¹⁰

1.2. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he postulates the nature of what he calls transcendental illusion or the limits of human knowledge beyond experience. In the *Transcendental Dialectics* of Kant enforces a limitation in human reason in the form of antinomies which the human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. But more importantly the limited constitution of pure reason necessitates the emergence not only of practical reason for moral pursuits but also of judgement for aesthetic experience. Kant denied metaphysics while he was engaged in metaphysics. Kant rejected metaphysics because he believes that reason has a limit because it cannot penetrate *noumena* or thing – in – itself.

This is because Kant argues that reason falls into error when it wants to think about God, freedom and immortality of soul. This error according to him is natural and unavoidable and cannot be limited by any objective investigation into the nature of things. While *Igbo* African philosophy proves the existence of metaphysics through its metaphysical theories in God, immortality of soul, causality, reality, etc.

Issues to be discussed therefore are substantive questions in African philosophy or epistemology and metaphysics as they compare with similar ones in Kant's epistemology and implied metaphysics. Such theories like understanding, transcendental cognition, perception, sensibility, intuition, empirical cognition, the existence of soul, world and God were examined.

Moreover, there is a need to find out the extent to which these concepts in epistemology and metaphysics generally agree with or differ from *Igbo* African philosophy and Kantian critical philosophy.

However, in most significant cases in the study of African Philosophy, its metaphysics more often conflates with its epistemology which is the study of contemporary African method of acquiring knowledge either empirical or transcendental.

Moreover, the following questions emanates in the study of this work.

The research questions include the following:

1. How is knowledge attainable both in Kant's philosophy and African Philosophy?
2. How is metaphysical knowledge verified?
3. What is the limit of human reason in acquiring knowledge?

4. Can knowledge be acquired through reason alone?
5. Is Kant's antinomy sufficient for the denial of metaphysics?
6. Is metaphysics possible in African world views?
7. What are the consequences for denying metaphysical knowledge in Kant's transcendental dialectics?

1.3 PURPOSE OF STUDY

This work tries to bring to limelight that metaphysics is possible in *Igbo* philosophy contrary to Kant's position on the impossibility of metaphysics. Kant believes that metaphysical knowledge is impossible and this generated many implications while African philosophy upholds the existence or affirmation and acceptance of metaphysics in all ratifications. The purpose of this thesis is to know why Kant rejected metaphysics in the transcendental dialectics and to reveal some of the implications that arose out of this rejection. Also, the philosophies of the contemporary African philosophers on the existence of metaphysics in the African world views are brought to knowledge.

This work tries to ensure that Kant does not confuse mankind by rejecting metaphysics while his works are purely metaphysical and to bring to our knowledge the authentic existence of metaphysics in *Igbo* African philosophy which can mostly be seen in the people's way of life, communal life, tradition, customs, folklores, poetry, arts, music and their relationship with their God or gods as the case may be.

1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY

The knowledge of Kant's three Critiques, *Critique of Pure Reason* (with a special reference to the Transcendental Dialectics) *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Critique of Judgement* inclusive of *Prolegomena to Any future Metaphysics* are very important if justice must be done to the scope of this work. However, some references are made from some books in contemporary African philosopher's view on the existence and possibility of metaphysics which is essential for the actualization of this work. Burning questions in epistemology and metaphysics are addressed here in reference to Kant and African philosophy. These questions hinge mostly on why Kant rejects metaphysics while African philosophy affirms it. Therefore there is a need for comparative analysis of Kant's rejection of metaphysics and African philosophy's acceptance of it.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

It is important to note that Kant's three critiques illustrate three instances of the theory of limit of human reason, knowledge and implications of metaphysics.

Our thesis is to argue that while Kant's transcendental approach to human cognitive capabilities culminates into "theory of limits", the contemporary African transcendental approach to human cognitive capabilities culminates into a theory of metaphysics and knowledge. Again what Habermas and others have felt the need to "de-transcendentalize" Kant, our thesis will show that *Igbo* African metaphysics is transcendental without Kantian limits.

However, the important of this work is that it will present in details analysis of Kant's rejection of metaphysics and African philosophy's acceptance of it.

Moreover, because metaphysics was extensively treated in respect with other issues in Kant and African philosophy, most of these related issues will be discussed; Efforts are made in this work to examine and clarify all important issues bordering in metaphysics.

More so, this work will be important because it will expose the extremeness of Kant's rejection of metaphysics and its implications.

Furthermore, this work will be a source of reference to a research of similar topics. In order words, it is only when a thorough analysis and evaluation of this topic must have been treated that people will adequately understand every bit of this concept.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this work is philosophical method of analysis which chiefly contributed to the realization of this work. Philosophical discussions and debates related to the topic were gotten from such valuable materials like textbooks, journals, magazines and internet sources were utilized in making this work a reality. This work is critical and analytical due to the use of these philosophical methods in analyzing different concepts in metaphysics especially in that of Kant and *Igbo* African philosophy.

This work is systematically written and organized in such a way that every form of obscurity is eliminated and issues clarified for better understanding of the study. The work is divided into six chapters. Chapter one which is the introductory aspect with definition of terms was done as to enable the reader to understand the trend of the work. Chapter two relates others author's views in metaphysics which is the topic in question. Chapter three deals with Kantian epistemology. Chapter four talked about the existence, knowledge and possibility of

metaphysics in contemporary *Igbo* African Metaphysics. Chapter five is an in depth comparative analysis of Kant and African metaphysics while chapter six which is the last chapter dwelt on the critical evaluation and conclusion.

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

For the purpose of clarification it is necessary that terms which are indispensable to this study should be defined. This is more so, given to the fact that certain terms are multi-referential, this is to say that a particular term can mean so many different things; here the meaning of a term is drawn from the understanding of its relevance to our discourse.

Analytic or Analysis

Analytic means ‘‘using or involving analysis’’. ¹¹ In the view of Analytic philosophers, analysis consists in re-writing sentence of natural language in such a way that these sentences will exhibit their proper logical form. According to them, ‘‘when they are put into their logical form, their meaning will become clear and philosophical perplexity will be eliminated’’. ¹²

Analytic is distinction made famous by Kant according to which an affirmative subject-predicate statement (proposition judgement) is called analytic of the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept and synthetic otherwise. The statement ‘‘All red roses are red’’, is analytic since the concept ‘‘red’’ is contained in the concept ‘‘red roses’’.

In the *Dictionary of Philosophy*, A.C. Ewing defines transcendental analytic in Kant as a section of *Critique of Pure Reason* which deals with the concepts and principles of understanding. Its main purpose is the proof of the categories with the realm of the *phenomena*.¹³

In Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, the transcendental analytic is that part of the transcendental logic section which investigates the *a priori* principle which determine the scope and validity of the operations of the mind.

African Metaphysics

It is simply a study of the African world and world view. Such investigations as the nature of ultimate reality for the African, the nature of forces, or beings in the African universe, the relationship between the seen and unseen etc are topics in African metaphysics or science of reality. ¹⁴

A Posteriori

A prominent term in theory of knowledge since the seventeenth century, a posterior signifies a kind of knowledge or justification that depends on evident or warrant from sensory experience.

A *posterior* concepts are concepts that cannot be understood independently of reference to sensory experience.

A *posterior* knowledge contrasts with *a priori* knowledge which is knowledge that does not require evidence from sensory experience.

A *posterior* knowledge is empirical experience – based knowledge where as *a priori* knowledge is non – empirical knowledge. ¹⁵

A Priori

An important term in epistemology since the seventeenth century. *A priori* typically connotes a kind of knowledge or justification that does not depend on evident or warrant from sensory experience.

Talk of *a priori* truth is ordinary shorthand for talk of truth knowledgeable or justifiable independently of evidence from sensory experience.

Talk of concepts that can be understood independently of reference to sensory experience.

A priori knowledge, is knowledge requiring evidence from sensory experience.

Broadly characterized, *a posterior* knowledge is empirical, experience based knowledge and *a priori* knowledge is non empirical knowledge standard examples of *a priori* truths are the truths of mathematics, where as standard examples of *a posterior* truths are the truths of natural sciences. ¹⁶

Dialectics

From the Greek word ‘*dialektik*’, dialectic means the art of debating. It is also ‘‘the art of discovering and testing truths by discussion and logical argument.’’ ¹⁷

Kant uses dialectics as the name of that part of *Critique of Pure Reason* which deals critically with the special difficulties (antinomies, paralogisms and ideas arising out of the futile attempt (transcendental illusion) to apply to the categories of the understanding beyond the only realm to which they can apply, namely the realm of objects in space and time (*phenomena*).

Also according to the *Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, Thomas Mautner(ed) defines dialectics thus:

In the terminology introduced by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, transcendental dialectics is the heading he gives to the discussion of the illusions to which human reason is prey. The dialectic is a process of fallacious reasoning by which reason arrives at untenable knowledge-claims concerning the self, the world as a whole and God.¹⁸

Epistemology

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. Its central questions include the origin of knowledge and the place of reason in doing so.

According to the *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, Paul .K. Moser defines Epistemology as

“The study of the nature of knowledge and justification, specifically, the study of (a) defining features (b) the substantive auditions and (c) the limit of knowledge and justification”¹⁹

Idealism

Idealism can be defined as “any system or doctrine whose fundamental interpretative principle is ideal. Broadly any theoretical or practical view emphasising mind (Soul, Spirit, and Life) or what is characteristically of Pre-eminent value or significance to it.”²⁰

Also, idealism in its philosophical sense is the view that mind and spiritual values are fundamental in the world as a whole. Thus idealism is opposed to naturalism that is the view that mind and spiritual values have emerged from or are reducible to material things and processes.²¹

Metaphysics

In *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Roger Hancock explains that metaphysics refers generally to the field of philosophy dealing with questions about the kinds of things that are their modes of being. Its subject matter includes the concepts of existence, event, the distinction between particulars and universal, individuals and classes, the nature of relation, change, causation and the nature of mind, matter, space and time.²²

In addition, from *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Metaphysics is the philosophical study whose object is to determine the real nature of things. To determine the meaning, structure and principles of whatever is in so far as it is.

Although this study is popularly conceived as referring to anything excessively subtle and highly theoretical and although it has been subjected to many criticism. It is presented by

metaphysicians as the most fundamental and most comprehensive of inquiries, in as much as it is concerned with reality as a whole.

Characteristics of Metaphysics

1. An inquiry into what exists or what really exists.
2. The science of reality as opposed to appearance.
3. The study of the world as a whole.
4. A theory of first principles.

Problems of Metaphysics

- The existence of forms, categories and particulars.
- The existence of God.
- The soul, mind body relationships.
- Natural and external world.
- Space and time.
- The concept of spirit.²³

Noumena

Noumena is an object of reason chiefly used by Kant. In Kant's Critical Philosophy, 'the noumenon is contrasted with the phenomenon that is the object of empirical knowledge. A noumenon is an object of awareness not produced by sensory experience.'²⁴

Reason

The epistemological function of reason according to Kant can be seen from two distinct stand points. The first is that sensibility offers a manifold that is unified by the concepts of the understanding that in their turn are unified into a system by the idea of reason while the other the spontaneity of reason makes visible objects, determines the rules of the understanding which are then applied to objects in space and time.'²⁵

Synthetic *a priori* Judgement

Synthetic *a priori* judgement is a special form of knowledge the possibility of which forms the basic question of Kant's transcendental philosophy. The account of such judgement is

prepared in the *Critique of Pure Reason* by a distinction between analytical and synthetic judgements.²⁶

Transcendental

According to *Dictionary of Philosophy* by Thomas Mauntner, transcendental is a word used by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* which pertains to the necessary, *a priori* conditions of knowledge. Transcendental philosophy is for Kant an inquiry into the necessary presuppositions of knowledge and the result of the scope and objective validity of human knowledge.²⁷

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholars since antiquity have made several attempts in written works to explain what metaphysics is all about. In the course of their deliberations different meanings, problems and scopes of metaphysics were evolved.

While some philosophers affirmed the existence of this branch of philosophy called ‘‘Metaphysics,’’ others consider it as a non-sense and non-existent course.

In this chapter, we are to peruse into the views of some prominent and non-prominent scholars who affirmed the existence of metaphysics and metaphysical knowledge.

Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries were reviewed. Some scholarly books and articles on metaphysics, Kant and some African philosophies were also reviewed.

Finally, the work of David Hume was also reviewed because he followed the trend of Kant by rejecting metaphysics.

Plato was born in Athens in 428/27 B.C. when Socrates was about forty-two (42) years old. Plato was a philosopher in classical Greece. He was also a mathematician, student of Socrates, writer of philosophical dialogues and founder of the Academy in Athens.

Along with his mentor Socrates and his student Aristotle, Plato helped to lay the foundation of the western philosophy and science. Plato’s sophistication as a writer is evident in his Socratic dialogues.

There are three (3) periods of Plato’s writings namely:-

1. Early or Socratic period: This is a period where Socrates is the chief inter-locutor, the thoughts present the doctrine of Socrates himself. They include; Apology, Chamides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphros Gorgias, Hippias Major, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus and Protagoras.
2. Middle period: these dialogues are thought to present the views of plato, though Socrates remains the speaker. They are: Cratylis, Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium and Theatetus.
3. The late period: these are Parmenides, Critias, Law, Philosophy, Politicus, Timaeus and sophist.

Phaedo, was one of Plato's dialogues that his metaphysics was explicit in-and it is the one reviewed here. In the *Phaedo* Socrates was the main character and the interlocutor. The *Phaedo* recounts the last hours of Socrates on his cell before he died by drinking hemlock poison. Plato was not present at the last hours of Socrates on earth so he tried to know how that happened by asking Cebes to tell him what happened. Cebes narrated through the dialogues the topics he discussed with Socrates. The most outstanding feature of Plato's metaphysics is the doctrine of Forms and immortality of the soul which is seen in this dialogue of *Phaedo*. This theory of Form is seen in Book X of the *Republic*, discussed in the *Phaedo* taken apart in *Parmenides* and revisited in *Timaeus* and *Law*.

The *Phaedo* is Plato's eulogy to his teacher Socrates. It recounts Socrates last hours. Plato used series of arguments to prove the immortality of the soul. These three arguments are crucial and important in understanding Plato's metaphysics and epistemology, they include:

1. The Argument from Recollection:- Here the forms are seen as perfect and what particulars strive to be like but fall short of.
2. The Affinity Argument says that forms are simple or in composite of one form, where as particulars are complex divisible and of many forms.
3. The final argument presents the hypothesis of forms to explain becoming and destruction in general or changes.

Plato's theory of forms is a rational reconstruction of his doctrines where scholars tried to determine a set of principles when taken together allow us to show why Plato says what he does about forms, souls and other metaphysical item. In the argument in *Phaedo*, Plato asserts that "the soul seeks freedom from the body so as to grasp truth because the body hinders and distracts it. The soul seeks to be separated from the body, itself by itself".¹

Philosophers agreed that the passage in the *Phaedo* that introduced the forms is as follows:

What about these things? Do we say that justice itself is something? of course. And the fair and the good? Surely. Then have you ever seen any of these sort of things with your eyes? In no way. But then have you grasped them with other sense through the body. I am talking about (all of them) for instance about size, health, strength in a word about the essence of all body then that what is most true of these things is contemplated or does it hold thus.²

The forms which is sometimes translated as idea from the Greek word ‘*Eidos*’ are timeless essences or entries. Forms are transcendental because they depend on the assertion that there is a plane of being outside our ordinary existence transcendental because they depend on the assertion that is a plane of being outside our ordinary existence. In the beginning of this dialogue, we see how Socrates tried to convince his pupils especially Simmias the joy of dying a good death in which he is readily prepared to accept the hemlock poison as ‘to die and join the wise and good gods’.³

Plato tries to praise philosophy as a moral discipline that helps an individual to live a good life. In that sense a philosopher must know where he is going to when he faces death or is about to die. In this regard, Plato asserts that “a man who devoted his life to philosophy should be cheerfully in the face of death and confident of finding the greatest blessing in the world when his life is finished”.⁴

Plato believes that when the soul is within the body it cannot attain the truth but by “the course of reflection, if at all the soul gets a clear view of fact”.⁵ Plato was somehow funny when he asserts that “the philosopher’s occupation consists precisely in the freeing and separation of soul from the body”.⁶ One can now ask “how can a philosopher who is still alive separate his soul from his body? Does Plato want to tell us that one can take his life at a free will? Socrates in the dialogue sometimes suggests that the forms are only true objects of study that can provide us with the genuine knowledge.

However, Plato tries to show us in the theory of re-collection through the speech by Cebes that our souls pre-exist their incarceration in the body when he said that:

Knowledge is simply recollection of true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollects. But this would be impossible unless our soul has been in some place before existing in the form of man, here then is another proof of the soul’s immortality”.⁷

Recollection means for example recognizing a thing you have forgotten, seeing a thing that belongs to a loved one you try to remember it that is recollection.⁸ There is a form for every object or quality as in reality. For example forms of human beings, dogs, mountain, colour, courage, love, and goodness. Form answers the question “what is that? For example, there are countless tables in the worlds but the Form of tableness is at the core, it is the essence of all of them.

Socrates in the dialogue tries to convince Cebes and Simmias about theory of forms when he gave them so many examples among which is that “fire must either or cease to exist at the approach of cold. It will never have the courage to admit cold and still remain fire just as it was only with the addition of cold”⁹

So from the above example, Plato infers that: the name of the form is eternally applicable not only to the form itself but also to something else which is not the form but invariably possesses its distinguishing characteristic.¹⁰

Plato argues that our soul has been in existence on its own before coming to be in a man’s body when through Socrates he said that “our souls existed formerly apart from our bodies and possessed intelligence before they came into man’s shape”

Moreover, in talking about the soul, Plato talked about characteristics of soul as thus: “divine, immortal, intelligible, the uniform, the indissoluble and the unchangeable”¹¹

While characteristics of the body is the human, the mortal and unintelligible, the multiform, the dissoluble and the changeable”¹²

In addition, Plato believes that a good soul goes to a glorious, pure and invisible place which is rightly called the unseen world and dwell with the good and wise God. Like *Ndi igbo* of South Eastern Nigeria, Plato also believes that defiled and impure soul (that is an evil soul) have no rest. They wander in places as punishment for the wicked lives they have lived. He also said that those who have chosen injustice, tyranny and robbery enter the bodies of wolves, hawks and kites. In trying to explain more about form in relation to opposites, Plato spoke through Socrates that:

Not only does an opposite not admit its opposite, but if anything is accompanied by a form which has an opposite and meets that opposite, then the thing which accompanied never admits the opposite of the Form by which it is accompanied...five will not admit the Form of odd. Double has an opposite of its own, but at the same time it will not admit the form of odd. Nor will one and a half or other fractions such as one half or three quarters and so on, admit the Form of whole.¹³

With the above passage, Socrates was able to convince Cebes and Simmias who were Pythagoreans that do not believe in life after death to believe in his doctrine of the immortality of the soul which they reject from the beginning of the dialogue until now. Plato describes the world of form as “a pristine region of the physical universe located above the

surface of the earth”¹⁴ True knowledge according to Plato in the *Thaetetus* is the ‘‘ability to grasp the world of form with one’s mind’’.

The properties of form in www.Anselm.edu/PlatoForm.Htm, are as follows:

1. Transcendent: The form is not located in space–time for example there is no particular place or time at which redness exists.
2. Pure: The forms only exemplify one property. Material objects are impure, they combine a number of properties such as blackness, circularity and hardness into one object. A form such as circularity only exemplifies one property.
3. Archetypes: The forms are archetypes that is they are perfect examples of the property that they exemplify. The forms are the perfect models upon which all material object are based. The form of redness for example is red and all red objects are simply imperfect, impure copies of this perfect form of redness.
4. Ultimately real: the forms are the ultimately real entities not material objects. All material objects are copies or images of some collection of forms, their reality comes only from the forms.
5. Causes: the forms are the causes of all things
 - a. They provide the explanation of why anything is the way it is and
 - b. They are the source or origin of the being of things.
6. Systematically interconnected: The forms comprise a system leading down from the form of the good moving from more general to more particular from more objectives to more subjective. This systematic structure is reflected in the structure of the dialectic process by which we came to knowledge of the forms.¹⁵

Some of the criticism of Plato’s form is from Plato himself in his dialogue titled *Parmenides*. *Parmenides* is one of Plato’s later dialogue. It recalls a meeting that Socrates, Parmennides and Zeno had in Athens. Socrates was a youth while Parmenides was old according to the dialogue.

Plato also argues in the *Phaedo* that forms exist as essences in a transcendental or supra inner world. They are apprehensible rather than sensible and constitute the objects of our knowledge. While in the *Parmenides*, Parmenides says that the chief problem is figuring out the exact relationship between the form and the particular. How does a particular partake in the form? How is the form incarnated in the particular?¹⁶

It is important to recall that Plato sees a form as the ideal essence of something, a transcendent entity evident that is perfect, immutable, and indivisible. The things of our everyday world are imperfect copies of the forms. They are multiples but the form themselves are one. For example: there are different kinds of cats, some have blue furs, others grey, others oranges. Something that all cats have is catness. Plato calls all the different cats in the world by one name because they have that form in common.

The excerpts from the *Parmenides* are as follows:

Parmenides says ‘‘how can the form of cat be infused to each individual cat while remaining invisible and one’’?

How does the perfect deal intermingle with its perfect copy? Another problem is one of limits of how many particular things in the world can be said there is a form?

Socrates would say that there is a form for beauty, for truth, virtue and justice and for any number of other things (fire water, cats, dogs).¹⁷

But Parmenides asked if there is also a form for hair, mind and dirt.¹⁸

Socrates concedes ‘‘I have often been troubled by a doubt Parmenides whether or should say that what is true in one case, may not be true in all.’’¹⁹

At one point, Socrates suggests that these forms were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are made in their image and likeness, and this participation they came to the form is nothing but their being made in their image.

However, they continued:

Well Parmenides says ‘‘if a thing is made in the image of the form, can that form fail to be like image of that form, can that form fail to be like it, in so far the image was made in its likeness?’’

If a thing is like, must it not be like something this is like?

It must says Socrates.

Will not Parmenides says that in which the like things share so as to be alike, be just the form itself that you spoke of.

Certainly Socrates replied.

If so Parmenides concludes nothing can be like the form nor can the form be like anything. Otherwise a second form will always make its appearance over and above the first form and

if that second form is like anything, yet a third. And there will be no end to this emergence of fresh forms if the form is to be like the thing that partakes of it.²⁰

Aristotle in his book *Metaphysics* criticized Plato's form. It is important to note that Aristotle uses the word forms and Ideas interchangeably.

The extracts are from Book 1 chapter 8. Some of the critiques are as follows:

Of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is follows and from some arise Forms even of things of which we think there are no Forms. For according to the argument from the existence of the sciences, there will be forms of all things of which there are sciences and according to the one over in any argument there will be Forms even of negations and according to the argument that there is an object for thought even when the things has perished, there will be Forms of perishable things, for we have an image of these.²¹

In addition, he says that:

Further, according to the assumption on which our brief in the ideas rest, there will be Forms, not only of substances but also many other things (for the concept is single not only in the case of substances but also in the other cases and there are sciences not only of substance but also of other things and a thousand other such difficulties confront them).²²

Furthermore, he adds that:

But further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'Form'. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the ideas. And anything can either be or become like another without being copied from it, so that whether Socrates exist or not, a man like Socrates might come to eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing and therefore several Forms, e.g. animal and two footed and also man himself will be Forms of man²³.

Aristotle continued to criticize the Forms thus:

Again it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart, how therefore could the ideas being the

substances of things exist apart? In the *Phaedo*, the case is stated this way ...that the Forms are causes of both being and of becoming yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement and many other things came into being (e.g. a house or a ring) of which say there are no Forms. Clearly therefore even the other things can both be and come into being only to such causes and produce the things just mentioned.²⁴

Bertrand Russell, in his book *The History of Western Philosophy* criticizes Plato's form or ideas. Russell argues that Plato's doctrine of idea (forms) contains a number of obvious errors. But in spite of these, it marks a very important advance in philosophy, since it is the first theory to emphasize the problems of universal which in varying forms has persisted to the present day. Furthermore, Russell believes that Plato has no understanding of philosophical syntax. He gave an example like this: Socrates is human; Plato is human and so on. In all these statements, it may be assumed that the word "human" has exactly the same meaning. But what does it mean? It means something which is not the same kind as Socrates, Plato and rest of the individuals who compose the human race.

Human is an adjective, it would be nonsense to say that human is human. Plato thinks that beauty is beautiful. He also thinks that the universal man is the name of a pattern created by God of whom actual men are imperfect and somewhat unreal copies. Plato falls altogether to realize how great is the gap between universal and particulars.²⁵

Plato was of the view that what many things have in common or share is a universal or in Plato's term a "form". From the above quotation, one can easily ask, how can an individual know the universal features as to differentiate a milk colour from a white colour or roundness from oval?

There are particulars and universals but one need to know the particulars first before knowing the universals. Plato said that the forms are only true objects of study that can provide us with genuine knowledge. I disagree with Plato on this in the sense that knowledge is acquired through both reason and experience. Neither of them can take superiority not to talk of forms. In discussing that "there is a form for both object and quality as human beings, dog, love, courage, etc. Plato tries to place human beings in the

same hierarchy with animals and quality. This is not possible because human beings need to be studied as “being *qua* being” and not in relation to animals or quality.

In discussing about immortality of soul, I agree with Plato when he said that our soul will leave our body and go to a better place to be with the good and wise God if we live a good life but will suffer if we live an evil life. But I disagree with him when he said that “our souls existed somewhere before coming into the body to live without telling us where the soul was “hanging” or “sleeping” though he had re-incarnation in mind when he said that but he did not explain or elaborate on it.

Plato’s form is an abstract entity; Plato tries to define physical things with an unseen, non-concrete spiritual entity which does not integrate well with what is being defined. “How can a physical thing give meaning to a spiritual thing”.

Rather, it is only symbols that signify what it symbolizes. Plato believes that these forms exist outside the object. Now the question arises “if there are forms of everything existing outside the object, where is the abode of these forms? Plato’s form is abstract and does not show any sign of existence in reality that is it does not sound “real”.

Aristotle was born in Stagira in 384/3 B.C. He studied in Plato’s Academy for two decades. He later set up the Lyceum which is a rival of the Academy.

Aristotle did much of his teaching walking up and down the colonnades with advanced students. As a result, his school and philosophy came to be qualified by the Greek word for walking around “*peripatetikos*” from which we got the word “peripatetic”. Aristotle’s work *Metaphysics* will be reviewed here. Aristotle’s treatise that has come to be known by the title *Metaphysics* is the first major work in the history of philosophy to bear that name. Aristotle himself did not use that title or even describe his field as one. Scholars opined that the title was coined when a compilation of Aristotle’s smaller works were being carried out. The works were intended to be studied after a study dealing with nature called “*physis*” has been studied. Hence, the title *Metaphysics* which literally means after the *physis* shows the place the discussed topic is intended to occupy in philosophical scheme of study.²⁶

Aristotle himself describes his subject matter in different ways. He called it “first philosophy” the study of being *qua* being, “wisdom” or “theology. We deem it important to summarize some ideas raised in Aristotle’s fourteen books before criticizing some of them.

In Book 1, Aristotle started by telling us that: “All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses, for even apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves and all other the sense of sight.”²⁷

The above quotation means that as human beings there is a passion or zeal within us to acquire knowledge more and more. This is a joy we derive from the sense of sight. Aristotle opined that ‘animals live by appearance or memories while human beings live by art and reasoning.’²⁸

This means for him that science and art come to man through experience. This is advancement from sensation through memory, experience and art to theoretical knowledge.

In addition, the book also tells us how the ancient Greek philosophers like Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras etc recognizes the material, efficient and final causes.

In Book 11, Aristotle talks about truth as ‘a proverbial door which no one can fail to hit.’²⁹ He also said that ‘philosophy should be called knowledge is truth’. Moreover, Aristotle argues that there is infinite series or infinite variety of kinds of causes. This means that causes has no limit. In regard to this he opined that: neither can one thing proceed from another as from matter, and *infinitum* (e.g. flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire and so on without stopping).³⁰

In Book 111, Aristotle discusses the main problems of philosophy. He asked if one science can treat all the four causes³¹. In addition, Aristotle argues that being is merely ambiguous. He explains that various sense of being had a *prohen* ambiguity. They are all related to a single central issue. For example, consider the term healthy and medical. Neither of them has a single definition that applies to uniformity in all cases. Not every healthy or medical things is healthy or medical in the sense of healthy or medical. There is a range of things that can be called healthy namely, people, diet, exercise, complexion among others. These various senses have something in common because they refer to one central thing namely health.

Aristotle asserts that what happened to the word ‘health’ is the same with the term ‘being’. Being has a primary sense as well as related sense in which it applies to other things because they are appropriately related to things that are called beings in the primary sense. The beings in the primary sense are substances. The beings in the other senses are the qualities, quantities and so on that belongs to substances³². Aristotle listed out four possible

candidates for being the substance of something namely: essence, universe, genus and subject. Some questions that emanate in Book I, are

1. Can one science treat all the substances?
2. Is there anything apart from individual things?
3. Are being and unity substances or attributes?
4. Are the objects of mathematics substances? etc.

In Book IV, Aristotle argues about a science that investigates being as being while others investigate its part. This being must be studied through substance, unity and plurality and from substance the philosopher grasps the principles and causes.

He also talks about the unmoved mover who moves things that are in motion but cannot be itself moved. Aristotle also held the view that we must study the primary axioms especially the law of contradiction and he also defended the law of excluded middle.

In Book V, Aristotle discusses about four causes. A cause is:

1. That from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being e.g the bronze of the statue
2. The form or pattern that is the formula of the essence
3. That form which the change or freedom from change first begins e.g the man who has deliberated a cause, the maker of cause of thing
4. The end that is for the sake of which a thing is e.g health is the cause of walking.

These causes can be simply illustrated like the following

Causes	Example 1	Example 2
Formal cause	Statue of Jesus	Chair
Material cause	Marble	wood
Efficient cause	Sculptor	Carpenter
Final cause	For praying	For sitting

However, Aristotle also argues about an element, nature of things, what is necessary, what are substances, same opposite, contraries, prior and posterior, capacity, quality, quantity and things which are relative.

He went further and discusses what is called complete, limit, virtue of thing, disposition, having, affecting, privation, a part, a whole, what is said to be mutilated, a kind, what is called false and finally what is an accident in this thirty (30) topics of Book V.

In Book VI, Aristotle postulates that everything inclusive of sciences have principles and causes. He also made a distinction amongst theology, the science of being from the science of mathematics and physics. He also mentioned the qualities of being as accidental, true, non being and being, the false.

Aristotle did a detailed study of being in Book VI. One can hold that Aristotle refined some of the things he said about beings in Book III which is that the primary sense of being is the sense in which substances are beings. He links the secondary sense of being to non-substance categories here. The primacy of substances made him to say that ‘‘what is being? Is just the same thing as ‘‘what is substance?

In this Book VI, Aristotle answered the question of what is substance by saying that substance is essence. He went further to say that ‘‘a substance is a principle and a cause of being.’’³¹

In Book VII, Aristotle opined that ‘‘there are several senses in which a thing may be said to be’’. The study of being for Aristotle is the study of substance.

He also said that there are four things which are commonly held as to be substantial namely the essence, the universal, the genus and the substratum. Essence is primarily substance and a thing is as its essence and that makes it a substance.

In Book VIII, Aristotle continues to talk about sensible substance. He believes that its matter itself is substance. In addition, Aristotle tries to explain definitions of matter, form and concrete individual. He later drew conclusion about causes, principles and elements of substance and that the recognized substances are fire, earth, water and air.

In Book IX, Aristotle gives details of being as potency and actuality. Potency is defined on terms of potency of motion, active or passive.

Aristotle mentions that ‘‘actuality in the strict sense is identified in the movement’’. Actuality which is prior to potency in definition, time and substantiality, nothing eternal or necessary is a mere potency.

In Book X, Aristotle outlined different meanings of the word ‘‘One’’ and its application and usage in our everyday life. He explains one in terms of four kinds of unit, that is what is

called “One” can be summarized in four ways. The essence of a unit is to be a measure of quantity or quality, or various types of measure.

In Book XI, Aristotle started by saying that “wisdom is a science of first principles. This can be seen from the introductory chapters in which Aristotle has raised objections to the statements of other disciplines about first principles. Aristotle asks if it is the duty of one science to examine the first principles and does wisdom investigate all substances or not? Here, Aristotle tries to differentiate wisdom from the science of physics and mathematics.

In addition, he explains that the study of being *qua* being in the science of the philosophy should be studied universally because if studied in respect of part, it follows that being does not fall under one science. The last chapters of this book dwelt extensively on the science of physics.

In Book XII, Aristotle states that substance is the primary subject of inquiry. He lists three kinds of substances namely: Perishable (sensible), eternal (sensible) and unmovable (non-sensible). The former two kinds of substances are the subject of physics (for they imply movement) but the third kind belongs to another science if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.

Aristotle went further to say that sensible substance is changeable therefore change implies not only form and privation but matter. Whatever comes into being comes from a substance of the same kind. Aristotle also talks again about actuality and potency as principles common to all things, though they apply differently in different cases. Aristotle argues that movement is eternal and once it is eternal there must be an eternal mover whose essence is actuality. The eternal mover originates motion by being the primary of desire; being actual it cannot move or change. It is a living being perfect, separate from sensible things and without parts.

In Book XIII, Aristotle discusses about immaterial substance. Two kinds of immaterial substances are in mathematical objects and ideas. Mathematical objects cannot exist as distinct substances either in or apart from sensible things. They can be separated only in thought. There were arguments about belief in ideas and these ideas would not explain the change in the sensible world.³²

In Book XIV, Aristotle explains in details the nature of unity and plurality. He tries to show difficulties in various theories of number and concluded by saying that the causal agency ascribed to numbers is purely fanciful.

We must really commend Aristotle on his wonderful work on *Metaphysics* though scholars have opined that it is better to read Aristotle's *Categories* first before one can understand his *Metaphysics*. Aristotle wrote his book in a simple language that is easy to understand though sometimes obscure. Aristotle's approach conflates philosophy with science. This means that his metaphysics and physics mutually reinforce one another. Though Aristotle's physics has been super ceded by modern science now.

Aristotle's approach to philosophical questions is considerably more analytical than Plato's. Aristotle takes comparatively minor problems and examines them carefully one by one and tries to repeat them in other chapters of other books thereby maintaining consistency somehow in his work. Aristotle opined that animals live by appearances or memories while human beings live by art and reasoning. But he did not give a detailed account of how animals have memories (except dogs that wag their tails to their owners).

Also, he did not explain how human beings live by art and reasoning alone in the sense that there are many factors that affect a man's life. These factors can be spiritually, physically, emotionally, socially, mentally, financially, politically and psychologically motivated.

Aristotle said that "truth is like a proverbial door which no one fails to hit. He also opined that we cannot miss truth about reality entirely although it is hard to find the truth at any given point. This means that he upholds truth in its totality. We need to be in moments of truth all the days of our lives for peaceful minds and our salvation. Aristotle also talks about being in primary sense as substances while being in other senses are qualities, quantities and so on that belong to substances. Aristotle in trying to differentiate between primary being and other being did not mention the name of the "other being" in question. He suppose to bring out a definite word in contrast to substance so that when one talks about substance one can equally talk about its opposite.

Aristotle is also of the view that there is a need for a science that studies things, if indeed there is any that is eternal not subject to change and independent of matter. Such a science is theology and this is the first and highest science. This means that Aristotle identifies theology with the study of being *qua* being while we knew that theology is all about "faith in God" though he had metaphysics in mind.

I will conclude by saying that Aristotle might not have had the idea of the word "Metaphysics" when he was writing because "Metaphysics" from what we read was how

his books were shelved after the work ‘‘Physics’’ and most of his theories are consistent and universal theories in metaphysics. That is some of his ideas are foundations for metaphysics.

Descartes’ metaphysics can be seen in his six Meditations titled *Meditations on First Philosophy*. In this meditation Descartes showed us through his methodic doubt about the existence of God, self, world (which he later denied) and the relationship between mind and body.

Descartes started the First meditation by saying that:

Several years have now passed since realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true and thus how youthful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus I realized that once in my life I had to erase everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations if I wanted to establish anything in the sciences.³³

From the above quotation, Descartes laid a good foundation to modern philosophy and that was why he was regarded as the ‘‘father of modern philosophy’’. Descartes did not want to hold on to the scholastic or Aristotelian philosophy any longer and that was why he sought for a clear, distinct and indubitable knowledge.

Furthermore, in this first meditation, Descartes entertains a number of possibilities that suggests we might be mistaken about results that seem perfectly evident to us. Descartes denied some parts of his body in a sleepy or dreamy stage and later he affirmed them when he woke up and felt their presence. In his doubt, he thought that God will not allow him to doubt but rather an evil genius deceived him when he opined that: ‘‘Accordingly, I will suppose not a supremely good God the source of truth but rather an evil genius supremely powerful and clever who has directed his effort at deceiving me’’³⁴.

In the Second Meditation, Descartes came out with his famous dictum which he is known for. Before he came to that in the beginning of this meditation, he said that: ‘‘I will stay in this course until I know some things certain or if nothing else until I at least know for certain that nothing is certain.’’³⁵

Descartes tried to know who he really was. Whether he existed or not. This made him to say: But what then am I? A thing that thinks what is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, will, refuses and that also imagines and sense³⁶.

Descartes doubted everything he knew about external world, God and his own existence. But in the process of doubting everything, he discovered that he was thinking and that was why he said that “from the very fact that I doubted the truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed”³⁷.

With the above conviction that he thinks and exists, Descartes came out with his popular dictum *Cogito ergo sum* meaning I think therefore I exist which he used to establish the existence of the self.

However, in the Third Meditation, Descartes was certain that he is a thinking thing and that whatever he perceives clearly and distinctly must be true.

He believes that he did not perceive things themselves but only the ideas or thought of those things which appeared before his mind.

Descartes said that the most common error in judgement is to judge that the ideas in one’s mind conform to or resemble things outside the mind.

Descartes also argues that a person who thinks that it is possible that there is no such being as God is confused. This assertion made him to go deeper as to know the nature of God.

In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes asserts that the most certain knowledge that God exists comes from the intellect and not from the senses or imagination. Descartes also said that the source of his errors came from the intellect (the faculty of knowledge) and the will (the faculty of choice or freedom of the will). Descartes later concluded that error results not from imperfections in either of these faculties but from the fact that the will has a far wider scope than the understanding.

This meditation gave distinction between the intellect and the will. The intellect is the faculty that not only understands and thinks, but also senses and imagines. The will is responsible for affirming and denying and it is in the will that value and possibility for error manifest themselves.

In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes drew attention to material objects. He said that he can distinctly imagine extension, shape, position and local motion which is associated with duration. Descartes argues that there are geometrical objects that do not exist in the world. For example there were no triangles in the world only their being exists.

Descartes considered the existence of God again when he said that God exists as an idea in his mind.

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes opined that material objects exist since they are subject matter of pure mathematics, the truths of which he perceives clearly and distinctly. Descartes is of the view that he is in essence only a thinking thing when he said that "I Judge that obviously nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing."³⁸ Descartes made a distinction between mind and body. He held the view that mind and body are ontological independent substances and their distinctness consists in their ability to continue to exist even after death separates them.

Descartes is also of the view that the mind can function without the body and that is why he said that "I am really distinct from my mind and my body can exist without it"

Descartes accepts the mind-body dualism when he said that the mind and body interacts in the pineal gland of the brain; According to him "my mind is not immediately affected by parts of the body but only by the brain or perhaps one small part of the brain."³⁹

Descartes in his bid to know how the body and mind interacts became confused that made him to think and say that the mind and body interacts at the pineal gland. He forgot that mind is a spiritual or abstract entity that is not concretized. Descartes also distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are heart, colour and taste while secondary qualities are size, shape and texture.

In conclusion, Descartes is of the view that he thinks before he can be able to exist without knowing that existence precedes essence. Descartes argues that he does not have a body since thinking itself does not involve a body without him knowing that the mouth which he used to speak with is a part of the body and out of the abundance of the heart, the mouth speaks.

Leibniz's work *Discourse on Metaphysics* has up to thirty seven (37) sections. Leibniz created a universe that belongs to God alone and non-composite, immaterial soul like entities called monads

Leibniz proposes solutions to some several philosophical problems like problem of free will, problem of evil and nature of space and time. This book, *Discourse on Metaphysics* is a short treatise in which Leibniz developed a philosophy concerning God's role on the universe, physical substance, motion and resistance of bodies. The author started by saying that: "God is an absolute... "God is an absolute perfect being. There are different ways of being perfect and that God has all of them each in the highest degree. A property is not a perfection unless there is a highest degree of it."⁴⁰

Leibniz also argues that we must try to recognize the goodness of a thing even if we do not know the author. Leibniz argues that God is simple and His activities can be ordinary and extra ordinary. God's actions are also different from that of created things. Leibniz praises Plato's form because he believes that Metaphysics should accept the knowledge of it (forms) because without it we could not properly grasp the first principles of metaphysics.

However, Leibniz held the view that substantial Forms are not in need for explanation and that substances are not identified with their extension (size, figure and motion) or bodies. Again Leibniz said that we should not blame God when we sin in the sense that God is not the cause of evil because evil is as a result of an original limitations in the nature of beings.

Leibniz claims that God's omnipotence was not in any way impugned by the thought of evil but was rather solidified. He endorsed the view that God chose the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz's work would have been captioned Discourse on God (which is a special metaphysics) and not metaphysics because it did not discuss other concepts studied in metaphysics except God. He dwelt so much on God's perfection. He exalted God a lot. He also tried to tell us how ought to behave in the sense of moral values for man which is ethics.

David Hume is one of the most important empiricist among the renaissance and modern philosophers. He was a stick empiricist and indeed empirical scepticism emanated from his thoughts. We are however more concerned with his opposition against metaphysics and metaphysical knowledge in his book; *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* where he caricatured metaphysics as following:

If we take in our hands any volumes; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. does it contain any experimental reasoning mater or fact and existence? No. commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.⁴¹

This means that metaphysical propositions are epistemologically empty and cannot yield any knowledge. Hume's idea is that of a strict empiricist which he is and this leads to the conclusion that only empiricist knowledge is possible, yet with some sceptical commutations. He developed an epistemology based on impressions. According to him "all knowledge comes from impressions and ideas while impressions are formed due to sensations, passions and motions, ideas are the faint copies of impression."⁴² Therefore the material of our

knowledge is composed of impressions and ideas which are connected with one another by the law of association such as similarity, contiguity and causality. As a consistent empiricist Hume says that only particular facts of experience are epistemologically significant and therefore we could not step beyond sensations to reality. This summarizes his lack of confidence in metaphysics and metaphysical knowledge.

Kant began his wonderful book *Critique of Pure Reason* by letting us know that intuition is a way by which man relates to objects. "That capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled sensibility;"⁴³

In the *Transcendental Aesthetics*, Kant tries to define space and time which he names sensibility.

Kant is of the view that space is not what we know out of experience rather it is "a necessary *a priori* representation which under lies all outer intuition".⁴⁴

Kant goes on to say that "space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuitions is possible for us".⁴⁵

Like space, time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. According to Kant "time has only one dimension, different times are not simultaneously but successive just as different spaces are not successive but simultaneous".⁴⁶ Time is not something which exists of itself but rather "the form of inner sense that is of intuition of ourselves and of our inner state".⁴⁷

Kant went further to say that "time and space are two sources of knowledge from which bodies of *a priori* synthetic knowledge can be derived. "⁴⁸

In the *Transcendental Logic*, Kant tries to define how we ought to know, that is the source of our knowledge when he opined that:

Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity {in the production} of Concepts.⁴⁹

Furthermore, Kant explains that there are pure concepts of understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition. These concepts are called categories which Kant himself said that he borrowed from Aristotle.

TABLES OF CATEGORIES

	I	
	Of Quantity	
	Unity	
	Plurality	
	Totality	
II		III
Of Quality		Of Relation
Reality		Of inheritance and subsistence
Negation		(<i>Substantia et accidens</i>)
Limitation		cause and Dependence
		(Cause and effect)
		Community
		(Reciprocity between agent and patient)
	IV	
	Of Modality	
	Possibility – Impossibility	
	Existence – Non – existence	
	Necessity - Contingency	

This then is the list of all original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself *a priori*.⁵⁰

In the Transcendental Analytic Book II, Kant talks about general logic which coincides with the division of higher faculties of knowledge namely; understanding, judgement and reason.

Here Kant differentiated these faculties of knowledge from general logic and transcendental logic.

In the transcendental Doctrine of Judgement Kant defines a kind of representation of objects as transcendental schema. He said that conditions of sensibility constitute the universal condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concept of understanding is restricted is called *schema*. While the procedure of pure understanding in these *schemata* is called schematism of pure understanding.

Moreover, Kant is of the view that indeed it is *schemata*, not images of objects which underlie our pure sensible concepts for example, no image could ever be adequate to the concept of

a triangle in general. It would never attain that universality of the concept which renders it valid of all triangles whether right angled, obtuse- angled, or acute angle: it would always be limited to a part only of this sphere- the schema of the triangle can exist nowhere but in thought.

Kant also differentiated between *phenomena* and *noumena*.

Phenomena is objects of appearance known as sensible entities while *noumena* are objects thought merely through the understanding known as intelligible entities. *Noumena* is known as ‘‘Thing-in- themselves’’.⁵¹

In the Transcendental Illusion, Kant explains that truth or illusion is not in the object but in the judgement in which it is thought. He therefore says that ‘‘it is correct to say that the sense do not err-not because they always judge right but because they do not judge at all’’.⁵² Truth, error and also illusion as leading to error are only to be found in the judgement that is only in the relation of the object to our understanding.

However, Kant defines a logical paralogism as a syllogism which is fallacious in form, be its content while a transcendental paralogism is one in which there is a transcendental ground, constraining us to draw a formally invalid conclusion.

In addition, Kant explains that the transcendental antithetic is an enquiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and outcome. This means the problems we get when the categories are applied transcendently. With these, Kant came out with four antinomies which he named the conflict of the transcendental ideas. They are;

Thesis	Antithesis
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The world has a beginning in time and is also limited as regard space 2. Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts, and nothing any where exists save the simple or what is composed of simple. 3. Causality in accordance with Laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom 4. There belongs to the world, either as its part or as cause a being that is absolutely necessary. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The world has no beginning, and no limit in space it is infinite as regards both time and space. 2. No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple 3. There is no freedom, everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature. 4. An absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.

Kant argues that there are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason. They are

1. The impossibility of an Ontological proof of the existence of God.

This is where Kant argued from mere concepts *a priori* that a highest cause exists.

2. The impossibility of a Cosmological proof of the existence of God. This proof goes from the empirical experience to the idea of a God.
3. The impossibility of Physico-theological proof, which goes from determinate existence by means of causality to the highest cause.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* came out of his acceptance of David Hume's skeptic conclusions about cause and effect.

We must commend Kant in this thrilling work on metaphysics. This work is purely theoretical analysis of metaphysical concepts and theories. Kant did a wonderful job in his efforts to explain and differentiate some concepts like the distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*, *a priori* knowledge and *a posteriori* knowledge and so many of them. Kant asserts that there is absolutely no knowledge of an object unless there is thought which employs abstract concepts. For him, perception is not knowledge because it is not thought. In general Kant claimed that perceptions are not mere sensation.

Kant is also of the view that metaphysics is knowledge *a priori* or before experience. This made him to conclude that the source of metaphysics must understand inner and outer experience in order to know the whole and not empty forms. Kant did not prove that material for knowing the world is outside of the experience of the world.

Kant's Dialectics offered a criticism of metaphysics, transcendent and metaphysical speculation which made him to claim that knowledge has to be limited to possible experience.

Further more in the Transcendental Dialectics, Kant enforced a limitation on human reason in the form of antinomies which the reason can neither comprehend nor reject. Realization of this fact is the ground for the self-critique of reason itself. The self reflects upon the conditions of its own employment. But more importantly the limit of pure reason necessitates the emergence of practical reason for Kant.

Prolegomena to Any future Metaphysics can be seen as an introduction or summary of *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this work, Kant shows how pure mathematical knowledge, pure science, special metaphysics and general metaphysics were possible.

The rationalist and the empiricist believe that there are two kinds of truths namely analytical *a priori* and synthetic *a posteriori* propositions.

From the above proposition, Kant opines that there is also an *a priori* synthetic judgement which can be seen in mathematics, natural science and metaphysics.

How is a synthetic *a priori* proposition possible in mathematics?

Mathematics especially geometry can be *a priori* synthetic knowledge because it does not describe things as they are in themselves but only things as they appear to us.

Is a synthetic *a priori* proposition possible in the field of speculative metaphysics?

Metaphysics is not an established science that was why Kant used the word ‘‘whether’’ it is possible and not ‘‘how’’ it is possible.

Kant found out that metaphysics in the ordinary sense is not *a priori* synthetic knowledge because metaphysical speculation either involves the logical fallacy of paralogism⁵³, gives rise to unavoidable antinomies⁵⁴ or falls into some other errors.⁵⁵

In speculative metaphysics, understanding does not restrict itself to experience but tries to know ‘‘mere beings of thought’’ (*noumena*) as the unconditioned grounds of all our experience and of nature itself.⁵⁶

Kant believes that metaphysical judgements are seen under the categories. These categories are used beyond the bounds of sense experience. When the mind makes the use of these categories, Kant called it reason and the categories in their transcendental use he called ideas.

However, Kant also emphasizes that these ideas do not give rise to any metaphysical knowledge, rather he showed how they led to illusions on his explanation about the ideas namely; the physiological idea (soul), The cosmological idea (world) (where he formulated the antinomies as in critique) and the theological idea (God).

Kant renounced metaphysics because he believes that reason cannot penetrate the *noumena* that is he is of the opinion that reason has a limit. Moreover, another reason could be seen in the discovery of antinomies where contradictory propositions each of which can be proved to be true of reality if we suppose our intellectual concepts apply to reality at all.

Kant rejected metaphysical knowledge and yet acknowledged that we cannot do without it because if we give up metaphysical knowledge then we should give up breathing and this made him to opine thus:

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, to be expected as that we breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world, nay, everyone, especially every reflective man, will have it and, for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern.⁵⁷

Fichte in his book *Science of knowledge* argues that our representations, ideas or mental images are merely the production of our ego, or knowing subject. For him, there is no external thing-in-itself that produces ideas.

Fichte argues that Kant's pure intelligence and pure object cannot be balanced together. He said this because we are driven to choose one of two alternative views as to emphasize the knower and ignore the known as a thing-in-itself or to ignore the known in order to focus on the reality of the known.

According to Fichte, the idealistic reality began with the transcendental ego, the elusive self but purely active noumenal self, identifiable only in an indefinitely repeated reflection upon primary experience. This conscious being expands itself infinitely to comprehend everything limited in its scope only by the logical categories and the regulative principles.

Hence for Fichte, objects exist only as the objects of consciousness, believes by some individual ego in its restlessly active pursuit of knowledge. The ego expands infinitely to do everything and yet is consistently limited by its own legislation of moral law.

Fichte's style was a challenging exaggeration of Kant's already difficult writings. Also Fichte claims that his truth were apparent to intellectual, non-perceptual intuition. That is truth can be immediately seen by the use of reason. By eliminating all references to material objects as even potential things – in – themselves, Fichte left room for nothing but minds in the noumenal realm. Though Fichte regards himself as a loyal follower of Kant, he significantly modified his master's thought by regarding it as inescapably committed to transcendental idealism.

In existentialist metaphysics, the existentialists are interested in the epistemological aspects that deal with man's knowledge of himself, the overall reality and totality. For the existentialists, it is the human conditions, problems of life, suffering and death that lead to the main function of its philosophy which is to remove all illusions of man. There is no ultimate validity of both material world and the supernatural because both are equally illusory.⁵⁸ This is where the African world view is different because it affirms both material and the supernatural world. One common feature of all the existentialists is the belief that, 'existence precedes essence'⁵⁹ that is, men make their essence as they go along, and do not live out a predetermined essence or blue-print.

The theist among the existentialists are Soren Keirkegard, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel etc. While the atheists are Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger etc. We shall review the thoughts of Karl Jaspers and Sartre as representatives of existentialist philosophy because they share some common features not with Kant only but also with the *Igbo* African metaphysics.

For Jaspers the question of truth leads to philosophical problems and scientific knowledge cannot solve the problem. For him man is everything and by understanding him we understand the truth. He says that the world is a mystery and is the cipher of God. What he means by man, himself, as encompassing means that man himself is always more than what we can know him to be, that is 'in principle he is never exhaustible by any conceptual to scientific knowledge the intrinsic capacity of reason to understand and know propositional and objective knowledge, beyond the ambience subjectively'.⁶⁰ For him man has the inner act of transcending. Hence reason can transcend itself if it remains honest and clear because

It is as if we stood in a small pool of light within the encompassing darkness. We can see into the encompassing darkness by turning a torch towards it. But we can be aware of this darkness as the units of light. The eyes cannot see darkness as such. But we must be aware of that darkness if we are not to forget what light means.⁶¹

The belief about reason or the capacity of man's mind to penetrate the darkness could be synonymous with the African belief that reason can penetrate the *noumena* or thing-in-itself, but contrary to Kantian limitation of reason.

On the other hand, Sartre is an atheist who admonished that men must learn to live with the trust in God forever unsatisfied. He believes strongly that man makes himself and as such must accept responsibility; otherwise it is a denial of freedom and authenticity. For him, in the book, *Existentialism and Humanism* there is no universe except the human universe, the universe of human subjective. This relation of transcendence is seen as “constitutive of man with subjectivity ‘’.⁶² One important metaphysical and epistemological point in Sartre’s existentialism is his attempt to avoid realism and dualism on the one hand and idealism or subjectivism on the other hand. This is why he talks of being as phenomenon. A conscious being human reality or thinking person has being-for-itself. It is impersonal and unreflective. Sartre calls it nothingness.⁶³ For Sartre, the Being has no essence or consciousness while realism asserts being-in-itself as an object in the external world. Immanuel Kant is both an idealist and a realist; also the *Igbo* African is both an idealist and a realist. But Sartre talks of idealism and realism as being faced with nothingness.

Being-in-itself will become conscious of plenitude of object and nothingness of ourselves. Being-for-itself intimates being-in-itself in order to create a world of phenomenal objects. Man has no essence or determinate character.⁶⁴

All these presuppose that Sartre has no intention of metaphysical knowledge or truth as an area where human reason or intellect can penetrate into, one can therefore, say that his metaphysics is nothingness.

Bertrand Russell has a very critical commentary on metaphysical knowledge in his book, *The Problem of Philosophy*. He is in the soundest sense, a skeptic, a common sense philosopher and a realist, who believes much in the sense-data than whatever it represents or not. In other words, he subscribes to appearance instead of dabbling into the controversial question of reality and matter. Yet sense-data must represent something according to him. He asked: “Granted that we are certain of our own sense data have we any reason for regarding them as signs of the existence of the something else, which we can call the physical objects?”⁶⁵ He believes that the function of philosophy is to criticize and investigate amidst galaxies of mistaken beliefs. This made him to enunciate that

The modest function we have spoken of can certainly be performed by philosophy, and certainly suffices for those who have once began to doubt the adequacy of common sense, to justify the arduous and different labours that philosophical problems involves.⁶⁶

Accordingly he criticized George Berkeley and idealism generally on the question that every object and idea is mental. "The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehend is in any sense mental?".⁶⁷ He accuses Berkeley of committing tautology when he says things exist in mind. "We are uttering a mere tautology if by in the mind is the same as by before the mind ".⁶⁸ This his criticism led him to postulate knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.

Bertrand Russell however shared some propositions with the idealists and metaphysicians. Like the idealists he believes in *a priori* and *a posteriori* general principles. For him intuition is part of self-evident or *a priori* principles which are mostly found in mathematics while the empirical or *a posterior* principles are found in physical sciences. He comes close again to the metaphysicians because of his beliefs in self-evident principles. On the limits of metaphysical knowledge, he said that it is difficult to prove by "*a priori* metaphysical reasoning such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusionary of matter, the unreality of all evil and so on".⁶⁹ Paradoxically, he also says that the proposed proofs that, in virtue of the laws of logic such and such things must exist and such and such others cannot, are not capable of surviving criticism. He is therefore a skeptic who will not give a listening ear to metaphysical reality we want to prove in *Igbo* African philosophy.

In Kant's first antinomy: a critical appraisal from classical Indian Perspective, S.S. Antarkar critically revisited the page of the first antinomy of Immanuel Kant. According to him,

The central thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason, developed from the beginning of transcendental aesthetic to the end of transcendental analytic is the distinction between 'thing in itself and thing as it appears to our outer and inner senses through the two *a priori* forms of intuition-spaces and time and the categories of understanding.⁷⁰

According to Kant therefore, the world or cosmos and all objects of possible experience are nothing but appearances and have no existence independent of our faculties of knowing. That which exists in itself apart from its relation to our senses and possible experience is unknowledgeable. This is the doctrine of transcendental idealism. Kant is an empirical realist and transcendental idealism. The main presuppositions of Kant about space, time and the world are “ (a) space and time are the *a priori* forms (b) The spatio-temporal world, therefore is an appearance. What the world-in-itself is cannot be known. Therefore is an unbridgeable gap between ‘what can be known’ (*phenomena*) and ‘what exist in itself (*noumena*) (c) there is no higher, supra-sensous, supra-intellectual way of knowing what is real, (d) the solution of this antinomy has practical relevance for morality and religion’”.⁷¹

According to S.S. Antarkar, in classical Indian tradition, the distinctions between *a priori* form and empirical content, formal validity and material truth, deductive and inductive arguments, analytics empirical sciences like astronomy, logically necessary and contingent, are absent or at least do not seem to have been explicitly recognized. Similarly, in African metaphysics, the distinctions between *a priori* and *a posterior* statements, formal material truth, deductive and inductive arguments, analytic and synthetic judgements, logically necessary and contingent statements are absent or at least do not seem to have been explicitly formulated.

In the article, Nature and Source of Transcendental Illusion, Sabhajeet Mishra says that the *a priori* principles which Kant argues to be the necessary conditions of all objective knowledge are the presuppositions of Newtonian science and of common sense objective experience. But he argues “that these metaphysical presuppositions of mathematics or natural science or of common sense experience must be carefully distinguished from the absolute metaphysical presupposition.”⁷² On our own part, we are interested in establishing the indubitability of absolute metaphysical presuppositions on *Igbo* African metaphysics. The absolute metaphysical presuppositions are not the necessary conditions of the objective character of a non metaphysical theory, but apparently constitute the body of an autonomous science. They are not about the possibility of objective experience, but about some peculiar subject matter of her own’”.⁷³

But for Kant, metaphysics is reason’s occupation with merely itself which leads to transcendental illusion, empirical illusion and logical illusion. Kant has been criticized for relying on traditional logic and Euclidean geometry in deriving the concepts of

understanding, the ideas of reason and space and time as forms of intuition. But Kant is interested in critically exposing the transcendental ground of all possible experience and at the same time show the limits of reason with regard to its transcendental use in giving us knowledge of metaphysical objects. Yet in *Igbo* metaphysics reason's role in identifying metaphysical reality goes far beyond its limits unlike in Kantian epistemology or metaphysics.

In Kant's Critique of Metaphysics M.E Kulkarni, described Kant as a philosopher who provided a new sound foundations for metaphysics after decisively dismissing the delusions of transcendental metaphysics. Kant's critique of the noumenal order is an integral part of his critical philosophy. He is explicit that there can be no knowledge of *noumena* but only of *phenomena*. Absolute metaphysics is an attempt to gain *a priori* knowledge of *nuomena* or things as they are in themselves by using ideas of reason.⁷⁴ By reasons of them it seeks to extend and complete our knowledge to reach the summit of it as it were.

In *Igbo* African philosophy, absolute metaphysics is possible as reason can penetrate and operate in absolute continuum and submit to the world of forms of Plato. But for Kant the proper use of the ideas of reason is regulative, that is to provide valuable guidelines to the investigation of *phenomena*. Kant rejected transcendental metaphysics, but some of his central ideas have bearing on metaphysics.

For Kant all knowledge arises from the interaction of two distinct faculties: intuition (sensibility) and thought or judgement. Intuition or sense-manifold is the awareness of data or presentation. But the "task of ordering and organizing the sense-manifold carried out in accordance with certain *a priori* concepts and principles which are innate experience but are applied to it by the human mind. Without such ordering objective cognition or knowledge is not possible".⁷⁵

Space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition which are not abstracted from experience but are presupposed by it, that is, time of inner sense and space of outer sense. According to Kant, the forms of intuition and *a priori* principles of the understanding have application only to *phenomena*. If we try to extend them beyond the limits of possible experience, and determine the nature of objectively existing reality by means of them, the result is intellectual disaster or transcendental illusion which further leads to three antinomies; rational psychology, rational cosmology and speculative metaphysics.

Hence Kant recognizes that if the improper use of reason generates antinomies and brings us to a standstill, reason is under an obligation to resolve these antinomies and clear the path for subsequent proper use of reason that is pure practical reason which can self-reflectively arrive at the autonomous free will in the maxims of universality, end-in-itself and kingdom of ends.

Tempels in *Bantu Philosophy* shows the philosophy of the sub Saharan African. That is Tempels argues that the *Bantu* speaking people of African have a special and unique philosophy that is peculiar to them.

According to Tempels

Primitive people have a concrete conception of being and of universe, this ‘ontology’ of theirs will give a special character a local colour to their beliefs and religious practices, to their morals, to their languages to their intuitions and customs, to their psychological reactions and finally their whole behaviour.⁷⁶

Tempels shows that the *Bantu* people were not only capable of thinking but also had a distinct and coherent philosophy of their own. Tempels is of the view that the primary metaphysical category in the thought of *Bantu* speaking societies is force. This Force can be likened to the western Being.

Relationship between Being and Force are Being is distinct from force, Being is Force, Force is Being. With the postulation of ‘Force vitale’ as *Bantu*’s understanding of Being, Tempels explains the metaphysics of the sub Saharan Africans. This means that force has taken the place of the notion of Being in western philosophy and not an attribute of philosophy.

Tempels argues that as a result of fundamental differences in categories, the African life of the mind is structured around understanding and defining force which contrasts sharply with the western enterprise of understanding and defining Being.

Tempels who was a missionary at Africa was biased in his mind with the postulation of his Force. Being a part of the community of the *Bantu*’s he wants to give them a special attention and being a missionary wanted something unique and tangible he will do for them by postulating the word Force for them in replace of western being.

Tempels was a philosopher, so no one will be surprised by the way he changed being into Force. There is no difference between Force and Being. They are the same thing in meaning.

Tempels shows that Force is the African notion of Being. He tries by showing interest in the life of the community he found himself in by giving them a metaphysics of their own but it cannot be used to generalise the whole African in the sense that each tribe has its own unique metaphysics. But most scholars in African philosophy has accepted Force as a universal concept and that is very rewarding in African metaphysics.

Iroegbu in his book *Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy* explained that

Metaphysics in the real sense is not occultism but rather Metaphysics gives the deep meaning to all reality. It is thus an indispensable aspect of the human enterprise. It sets out to provide a fundamentally needed rational and existential explanation of reality as it affects us especially in its totality and ultimacy.⁷⁷

He affirmed that metaphysics ask questions like why man at all? Why reality itself? Why being including matter?

However, Iroegbu is of the view that the African's existence is a rational existence and this is witnessed in the African man's word, traditions and life in community.

The African *phenomena* starts from the opposite end that is external where other person's existence is felt, lived and communicated because I live and work and commune with them, I discover my own presence.

In propounding *Uwa* ontology, Iroegbu began with the following introduction

Uwa gini ka o bu?

Gini di n'ime ya?

Kedu mbido ya, kedu ngwucha ya?

Uwa – m ; isi ya o bu gini?

World what is it, what is it?

Its origin, its end, my world (life)

What sense (meaning) has it.

Iroegbu opined that the questions above summarises any question pertaining to African human being. He holds that *uwa* defines being which englobes all being. *Uwa* is reality and reality is *uwa*.

In defining *Uwa*, Iroegbu mentioned and explained fifteen connotations of *Uwa* that includes: life, cosmos, field of action, time, conditions, fate etc.

Furthermore, Iroegbu classified *Uwa* into six zones. These six zones of *uwa* was his personal ideology in reference to his experience or what he has heard. There can be other different types of *uwa* as when we talk about the planets that surround the sun, the life beneath the oceans, rivers seas and so forth.

In his explanation of these six zones of *uwa* in relation to divine world where *Chukwu* or the great God dwells, the word divine is not generally known as abode of God. Rather, when you talk about divine, it relates to attributes of God that is divine attributes of God. We know that God stays above in Heaven and He is everywhere inclusive of our hearts (as our religion taught us).

Iroegbu argues that when a child is born, he is born into a community which gives him a name according to the circumstances surrounding his birth. This community determines the world, life and success of an individual living in it. This community based action can be fully seen in communalism where *umunna* the kindred plays an active role in the life of an individual.

From this communalism, Iroegbu developed his philosophy of belongingness which according to him is

The arrangement of the fundamental structure of society (laws, duties, privilege, positions, jobs, office, advantages and incumbent of community), such that it incarnates and manifests the commonness of origin, of history and of general destiny of all the members of the community. Belongingness is *umunna* concretized. It makes all belong and none is marginalized both contributively (duties and responsibilities) and distributively (sharing of communal cake).⁷⁸

Iroegbu concludes in his theory of belongingness that it is an ontological term that specifies that a thing is because it belongs. It is the *kpim of uwa*.

Iroegbu made an effort to dwell into *Igbo* metaphysics. His efforts must also be commended because in it he propounded his theories of *uwa* ontology and belongingness.

Belongingness in the theoretical aspect was very interesting but cannot be actualized. This is not a time of communal life in the sense that the world is now being globalized, civilized and modernized. Though communalism has worked in the past for some people but it does not encourage individualism.

Ohia in *‘Causality in David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Igbo Metaphysics* examines what he understood as *Igbo* metaphysics with special reference to the theory of knowledge and causality. He also compares this *Igbo* theory of knowledge and causality with that of David Hume and Immanuel Kant.

Ohia was of the view that *Igbo* concept of knowledge is primarily based on *Igbo* man’s experience of causality which is behind every reality.

This means that everything that happens do not happen by chance, it must be caused or tagged to something. That is why *Igbo* people believe that anything that happens must be traced to God, the world or from spirit world as the case may be and this made Ohia to acknowledge that *Igbo* people acquire knowledge by experience of causality and their personal relationship with the soul of the world, God and spirit’’.⁷⁹

In addition, Ohia argues that once African philosophy exists, *Igbo* concept of knowledge and metaphysics exist too.

In discussing *Igbo* concept of knowledge, Ohia mentioned *Igbo* epistemic concepts namely: *Ako* (wisdom or moral knowledge) *Amamihe* (dispositional knowledge or intelligence) and *Uche* (thoughts or thinking). He concludes that *Ako na uche* is known as knowledge.⁸⁰

Moreover, Ohia quoted Onuoha and agreed with him that our ancestors went into metaphysics and posited a spiritual substance called ‘*Chi*’ to which everything was ultimately reducible.

This made Ohia to say that ‘*Chi*’ is the source of all being and supported it with Iwuagwu’s opinion which states that ‘*Chi* is the essence of being because all things were made through *Chi* and without *chi* was made nothing that was made’

Everything therefore comes from God and participates in limited measures through *Chi* in the being of God.

Ohia also concurred with Iwuagwu on his argument about the existence of categories in *Igbo* metaphysics when he quoted Iwuagwu who enunciated thus:

Our ancestors established seven metaphysical categories under which all that there is in the universe must be comprehended. Where God (chukwu) is the principle of unity, these categories are the principles of multiplicity, differentiation and number in the Cosmos. Seven is the symbol of totality not the sum of four and three. The names of the seven categories should be chanted not read. They are Igwe, Ala, Anyanwu, Imomiri, Ahiajoku, Ekwuruochie and Agwu-Nsi. Of all creation, these are the first born of God.⁸¹

Furthermore, Ohia had the notion that *Igbo* people see reality as material and non material reality while Kant sees reality as *phenomena* and *noumena*.

In addition, Ohia argues that the concept of *Igbo* causality serves as a response to western scepticism like David Hume and the neo-positivists on the critique of causality.

In *Igbo* metaphysics, everything is linked together by an underlying causality. The totality of the visible or invisible universe is a continuous process towards the efficient causality – that is the Supreme being – *Oseburuwa*.

This is why reality in *Igbo* African world view is dynamic, it continues to move on and is not static like the western reality.

In traditional metaphysics, the issue of cause was taken as a principle because everything that exists must have a cause. But western scepticism rejects this traditional idea regarding the knowledge of causality. In this work, a new dimension was taken to the idea of a cause because Ohia examined causality from the aspects of *Igbo* culture. This means that philosophical problems can be examined differently from various cultural perspectives.

I agree with Ohia and Onuoha on the postulation that our ancestors went into metaphysics and posited a spiritual substance called ‘*Chi*’. This is because it means that there is an existence of metaphysics in the *Igbo* African world view for the past centuries. One could now ask ‘how does our ancestors who do not know what philosophy is all about (this is in terms of philosophy as an acquired knowledge) knew about its branch called metaphysics? This means that once a tribe exists, its philosophy including its metaphysics is already there with them because metaphysics is all about reality and abstract entities and people believe in such. This belief in reality, causality and abstract entities are passed on from generation to generation. It is unique and peculiar to that particular people in question. That these beliefs in realities are not written or universally accepted does not mean that it is not authentic.

Ohia must be commended for his attempt to awaken us to know what causality and knowledge are all about in *Igbo* metaphysics.

In this his work, he tried to place God like Leibniz in every aspect of an *Igbo* man's life which he taught is what *Igbo* people believed in.

This is true because every *Igbo* man believes that God must come first in everything he does before every other thing.

In *Towards an Igbo Metaphysics*, Edeh examines the historical background of *Igbo* people with regards to their culture, language, beliefs, customs and traditions which is very important in understanding the people in question.

Edeh argues that language plays a vital role through *Igbo* proverbs and folklores as a channel for the metaphysics of the *Igbo* people when he said that:

Proverbs are not only the criterion of linguistics authority in *Igbo* rural communities, but are over and above all the verbal expressions of the metaphysical content of *Igbo* thought. They are a kind of metaphysical channel insofar as they open the *Igbo* to an awareness of being.⁸²

Edeh went further to explain and analyze the concepts of two worlds in *Igbo* world view. *Igbo* people believe in *uwa* (world) visible world and *Ani mmuo* (land of the unseen). The duality of the world can also be seen in the idea of re-incarnation and concept of death.

However, Edeh through his interviews believes that *Igbo* race have the notion of being through ‘‘*Onye*’’ and ‘‘*Ife*’’ hypothesis.

After analyzing the two hypothesis, Edeh agrees, with the ‘‘*Ife*’’ hypothesis.

In trying to define this ‘‘*Ife*’’ hypothesis, Edeh brought out a review of his questionnaire but I disagree with him.

Question: *Gini bu Ife di*, what is being?

Answer: *Ife di bu ife di*, Being is being.

Edeh's translation does not follow in the real sense of *Igbo* language. I agree with him that ‘‘*Ife*’’ can mean material or immaterial things, happening, event, occurrence, etc.

When one is asked *Gini bu Ife di?* (what do you have?) this is a question a customer normally asks a waiter/cook at a restaurant or food vendors. It does not give any meaning to the western being whatsoever. I believe the right way to put the ‘‘*Ife*’’ hypothesis could have been seen in the questions below:

Kedu ihe o bu/Gini bu ihe ahu?

Meaning ‘‘what is it’’?

When somebody is asked the question above, the following answers and many more will emanate from it for example

1. What is it?

My friend is knocking at the door (human being)

2. What is it?

The dog is barking (non-human)

3. What is it?

There was a road accident at the major road (event)

We must commend Edeh for coming out and taking the pains to research on *Igbo* metaphysics which I believe has been an open bench for debates, discussions and researches in ‘‘*Igbo* Metaphysics’’.

In chapter one of this book, Edeh used what he called empirical method which can only be used in the sciences alone. This chapter one is his sampled questionnaires with answers, which could have gone for another topic.

Edeh tries to prove the existence of God through mythology way by analyzing the interview of his correspondents. I thought he could have done so from his own personal ideas as a philosopher and an *Igbo* man.

Edeh’s work *Towards an Igbo Metaphysics* could have been named ‘‘Towards an *Igbo* Metaphysics: A case study of the Nkanu people of Enugu State’’ (then Anambra State).

This is because the outcome of this research is peculiar only to the people of Nkanu. There are many dialects, customs, traditions and beliefs of *Igbo* speaking people of the south eastern Nigeria.

Dukor in *African Faculty of Knowing and Kant’s Epistemology*, explains the similarities and differences between African epistemology, metaphysics and that of Kant.

Dukor begins by letting us know that some of Kant’s metaphysical results in terms of how various kinds of knowledge came to be possible have already been accounted for by African metaphysical world-views.

According to Dukor, African epistemology can be defined as ‘‘A synthetic of affective and cognitive aspects in the process of knowing reality which is esoteric or beyond the operation of the five senses and rational logic of Kant and Western science’’.⁸³

Dukor is of the opinion that symbol is significant in African epistemology. The brain as the seat of intelligence and consciousness has all the functions and categories allocated to the mind in mediating experience.

Dukor argues that Kant's mind and the African mind generates simultaneously the *a priori* process and synthetic process for understanding the relation of cause and effect.

For Kant, sense perceptions enlarge the concept we frame of an object of intuition by new predicates which intuition presents synthetically in experience. But the African can intuit concept without any object for example concepts of cause.

The *phenomena* is African physical reality while the *nuomena* is African spiritual reality. There is a view that space and time are actual qualities inherent in things in themselves. But Kant seems to disagree with this.

Dukor also argues that in African metaphysical science, the soul (rational psychology), the universe as a whole (rational cosmology) and God and His attributes (transcendental theology) are decipherable by pure reason.

Going through this work is like going through some passages from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Like other authors who researched on "Igbo metaphysics" Dukor must be recommended and praised for going a step further in *Igbo* metaphysics and epistemology by comparing it with difficult Kant. The work was written in simple English with analysis that brought out the real mind of the author on the topic because where the Africans did not have full comparison in regards with Kant's opinion he mentioned it without being biased as an African.

Dukor in his another article titled 'Modal Symbols and Categories in Igbo Metaphysics' tries to show case the role of symbols and categories in Igbo Metaphysics. He opined that;

To do justice to an epistemology of African philosophy we must use the basic modal concepts of necessity, contingency, possibility and impossibility in understanding somewhat quasi-modal symbols or categories such as God, gods, life and death, palm tree, offor, ogiriisi, kola nut.⁸⁴

In propounding "Theistic panpsychism" Dukor said that "animism can be applied to *Igbo* philosophy and religion and African at large not because they worship or reverse empty

objects but because they believe that in every being or object there is a vital power or soul. He calls this vital power “spiritual essence”.

Dukor is of the view that *Igbo* people have a religious ontology that defines all their philosophical symbols.

However Dukor explains the modal symbols in details as for one to assimilate them very well. *Igbo* people believe in the existence of God who is the highest in the hierarchy of beings.

Dukor also came out with the picture of theistic pan psychic animistic universe which made his thoughts to be understood in a simpler way through this diagrams. This work is wonderful. It gives an indebted awareness of *Igbo* metaphysics in the traditional sense of what the people believes in and lived with now, today and forever.

Ozumba in his work *African Traditional Metaphysics* was of the opinion that African metaphysics includes and transcends the western explanatory indices in the sense that “while the West limit their enquiry to experience and reason, the African go beyond that to employ extra empirical and extra-ratiocination means often called extra-sensory perception (ESP)”.

However, Ozumba defined African metaphysics as

The African way of perceiving, interpreting and making meaning out of interactions among beings and reality in general. It is the totality of the African’s perception of reality. African metaphysics will therefore include the systematization of the African man’s perspective as it relates to being and existence. This will embrace the holistic conception of reality with its appurtenances of relations, qualities characterization, Being and its subtleties, universals, particulars, ideas, minds, culture.⁸⁵

Furthermore, he goes on to say that because African metaphysics was not written down, it does not make it rigorous because “every view is properly examined and seen to rationally explain a puzzle before it is accepted”.

Ozumba shows how empiricism merged with rationalism through some concepts namely personality, being, substance, causality, immortality of the soul and witchcraft.

Ozumba explains each concept metaphysically in *Igbo* African world view.

PERSONALITY

The western concept of a person being a rational, moral, free, linguistic and social entity is taken for granted in African metaphysics.

In the western conception of personality, a person is said to be made of spirit, soul and body.

But in the African conception of personality, the initial problem is that of reaching a consensual view as to the constituent parts of the human person.

In *Igbo* metaphysics, there are three components of the human person namely *Ahu* (body), *Mkpuru Obi* (soul) and *Mmuo* (spirit).

For the *Igbo*, a man is simultaneously a physical, psychological and spiritual entity.

Ozumba was also of the view that in *Igbo* metaphysics of personality a man's essence is his *Mmuo* (spirit) which continues to exist even after physical death.

A man's *Chi* (destiny) can change through spiritual fortification and intervention but his spirit (*Mmuo*) cannot be changed. It continues as an identical being throughout existence.

2. BEING

The Africans have a hierarchy of beings with God at the apex followed by the ancestors, then lesser gods or divinities then totems, emblems of hereditary.

God being at the apex oversees and regulates the activities of the world.

God's supreme position is seen in the African names of God.

For example,

In *Igbo* ontology, God is known as *Okaka Amasi-Amasi* meaning one who is not fully known. *Chukwuokike*-creator of the universe.

3. SUBSTANCE

In African context, the concept of substance is closely related to the concept of being and personality.

The western conception of substance is seen as a substratum that sustains fleeting appearances or seen as the sum of all qualities.

While the Africans conceive substance as the quality of beingness which could be seen or divined through oracular means.

This means that what makes a substance in African world view is an evidence that a thing exists whether seen or unseen by the physical eyes.

For example, the Africans do not see spirits but they believe that they exist knowing their qualities to be immaterial.

4. CAUSALITY

The African life is permeated by the understanding that nothing happens without a cause. Why must a particular event happen to a particular person at a particular place in a given time?

This means that the concept of chance does not have a place in African metaphysics.

The Africans see cause and effect from the point of imaginable range of possibilities or they resort to oracles for the final verdict.

5. IMMORTALITY OF SOUL

The soul of man is immortal. It continues to exist after the dissolution of the body. Its abode is determined by how well it lived here.

If a soul lived well, it will live in a special place of peace but if it lived badly, it may be barred from having a resting place, it may continue to roam the earth.

However, all spirits are said to have direct contact with the physical earth. This is why ancestral spirits are sacrificed to in the understanding that they come to eat of the sacrifice.

This shows that Christian concept of eternal separation between the living and the dead is not agreeable to the African worldview.

Ozumba is also of the view that the concept of immortality is closely linked with re-incarnation in the African worldview.

Both good and bad spirits are re-incarnated. The good ones are welcomed while the bad spirits are called *ogbanje* are either exorcised or rejected.

The Africans through divination or other esoteric means claim to be able to detect which spirit has returned.

Ozumba's work will serve as an "eye opener" or a stepping stone to the question of the existence of metaphysics in the African world view. He acknowledged it in his conclusion when he said that "...it only intends to ignite more discussions on the idea of African metaphysics and metaphysics in general". This work was written in a simple English with analysis that will make an individual know and understand the line of thoughts of the author very well.

Ozumba shows us what the Africans (with case study of *Ndi Igbo*) believes in mind and body relation together with life after death. God Almighty was placed in the apex in his hierarchy of beings. With this one can see that Africans cannot do without their religion in all their endeavours. African beliefs conflate with their philosophy.

With Ozumba's article, one could now see that *Igbo* African metaphysics really exists.

Asouzu in: *Relevance of Mythological Metaphysics and Formulation of Metaphysical Questions* defines this mythological metaphysics as "a fundamental issues of ethics and such has been instrumental to questions of cohesion, control, law and order within African societies".⁸⁶

The author is of the view that Africans live in harmony as a community because their world is "rooted in a metaphysics that sees this as a necessary off shoot of man's relationship with the forces that control these spheres of reality."

Asouzu's article can be likened to Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics* because he places God as the ultimate metaphysics. The author tries to explain in details what mythological metaphysics is all about. He tries to show the importance of communalism through which an African interacts with metaphysical forces and above all God.

The author who took a different way defining metaphysics need to be praised in the sense that he views metaphysics in such a way an uneducated African man sees the way of life without being biased by "westernization".

"UBUNTU" as an African Metaphysics in Economics: Towards an economic cultural synergy in Humanising our economic system'' by Mufunisel wa J. Bhengus argues that the Africans were forced by colonization to embrace western capitalism which later resulted today as African economic system. Bhengu believed that Africans will come out of the westernized economic system only when we embrace *ubuntu* which is an African system that

teaches us one moral universe which makes us to realize our duty to others. *Ubuntu* is known worldwide as ‘*ngabantu*’ in *Zulu* language meaning ‘I am because you are, you are because we are’.⁸⁷

Bhengu propounds a theory that ‘profits should be shared between owners of economy and their workers’. This theory propounded by Bhengu is good and will help the poor workers a lot in the sense that there is equal share of profit between the employer and employee. It will alleviate the sufferings of labourers with hard labour but we know that this theory is unrealistic because there is no way an employer who owns the cost of production will share his/her profit with a mere worker he /she employed. Rather the employer will ask ‘where was he (the employer) when I was suffering, now that I had made it he came out from nowhere to enjoy and reap where he did not sow, *tufiakwa, alu*-(abomination)’.

Moreover, this theory from time immemorial has not been propounded. What need to be done in the economic sector is that workers should not be treated like slaves because they have fundamental human rights. Their salary should be paid on time and compensated in times of overtime work. Again they should be taken good care of by providing enabling working environment and facilities like good toilet and pipe borne water. Also they should be taken to a good and well equipped hospital in time of sickness and occupational hazards.

Idjakpor in *The Meaning of African and Western Metaphysics: a Conceptual Analysis* examines metaphysical concepts in African and western philosophy.

Idjakpor begins this work by explaining the general meaning of metaphysics after which he mentions that Kant believes that the subject matter of metaphysics is super sensible reality whose method is non empirical. This means that ultimate reality cannot be known through sense experience.

Idjakpor is of the view that the African philosophical mind reflects on what goes in the world and beyond. He tries to look for solutions to some fundamental questions about reality. In trying to know these answers, the African mind goes beyond the world as to know the cause and nature of reality.

Idjakpor defines African metaphysics as “the summation or totality of solutions found to the problem of reality or it may be regarded as the African’s questions about reality and the answers which he gives to the questions”.⁸⁸

Idjakpor mentions the problems of African metaphysics as the following:-

1. Ontological problem.

2. Cosmological problem.
3. The science of the soul.

1. **Ontological Problem.**

The author argues that ontology is the first problem encountered by both Western world and the African world. This problem is relationship between reality and human being, soul, proofs for the existence of God etc.

However, Idjakpor explains that western metaphysics is static. This implies the conception of reality which takes actualities to possibilities. This means that an aspect of reality is mistaken for the whole of reality e.g. God.

Western asks the question: why is there something instead of nothing? Being is and being is not and what exists?

In contradiction, African metaphysics is dynamic because it takes reality as an ongoing process. Reality is taken to be the manifestation of Being and its relationship with all existent beings, objects and subjects. The African asks: What is that simple unifying element that permeates every nature?

This is why the African tries to identify the ultimate Cosmic principle by which things come into existence.

With these beliefs by the Africans, Idjakpor agrees with Bantu ontology that Being is force, force is spirit which means the permeation of the force or spirit in all things that is responsible for what is.

2. **Cosmological Problem.**

Idjakpor is of the view that cosmological problem deals with the following questions: Does material things exist? Who created the world? What are the grounds for its creation? Is it created by God, universal mind or by somebody else? Is the world eternal or not?

He went further to say that the Africans believe there are material things which are created by God. They also believe in the existence of Supreme Being and space-time.

3. **Problem of the science of the soul.**

The author is of the view that the Africans believe in the nature of the mind, the purpose of human life, the problem of moral freedom, the place of self in the reality and destination of the soul.

The African did not separate the body from the mind because he believes that they are one integral entity.

Idjakpor also mentions that metaphysics in the west represents the study of the science of reality as whole or the study of being as being while in Africa, metaphysics represents the views on reality and how an African grapples with them.

He concludes this work by explaining Kant's division of metaphysics into rational theology, rational cosmology and rational psychology.

Idjakpor made an attempt to explain the problems of African metaphysics through ontology, cosmology and science of the soul which he contrasted with western metaphysics. He only outlined the concepts without giving us the meaning, explanations and beliefs of the Africans concerning these metaphysical concepts.

This work is a reminder for us to know that African metaphysics exists. This should make us to wake up from our "dogmatic slumber" and research more on the existence of African metaphysics. This is because we have passed the age of whether there is an African metaphysics but we are in the age of what is African metaphysics, what is reality in African metaphysics, what is space time in African metaphysics etc.

Aja in his *Metaphysics: An introduction* devoted a chapter on African metaphysics where he explains African cosmology, African (*Igbo*) notion of Being, Categories of African ontology and African theory of causality.

Aja is of the view that "by the word African, we imply that there exists a metaphysics that is quite distinct from either western or oriental metaphysics".

He goes further to say that the subject matter of metaphysics is peculiar to the African because each culture's understanding of what being or reality is all about is reality to that culture.

Aja admits that it is reasonable to talk of African metaphysics in terms of its ontology, cosmology etc.

He also argues that *Igbo* conception of the universe, reality etc are corporate beliefs and acts which can have no unanimity. This means that different cultures have different ways of ordering the world. Each culture's lens enables it to see only a certain part of the world, one which gives meaning to its existence.

Ohia and Onuoha was in support of seven categories while Aja postulates that *Igbo* cosmology is conceptualized into three categories namely *Eluigwe* – the sky, *Ala mmadu* – the earth and *Ala mmuo* the land of ancestors or spirits.

Moreover, Aja argues that there is no word that adequately translates the English term "Being" in African (*Igbo*) context but believes that the word nearest in meaning is 'Ife' or

“*Ihe*”. Aja goes further and agrees with Tempels that everything is force but in *Igbo* world, there is double concept of being which he calls “*Ife na ike ife bu otu*” meaning that being is that which is force.⁸⁹

Four categories of African ontology according to Aja are human beings, things, place and time, modality.

He borrowed from Kagame’s mother tongue and said that categories are *Mantu*, *Kintu*, *Hantu* and *Kuntu*. In African thought everything must belong to one of these four categories and must be conceived as forces.

Aja like Edeh postulates that “*Ife*” or “*Ihe*” is the word nearest in meaning to being. He mentions the questions he asked his correspondents without telling us where he did the interview so that we can know if it the same people Edeh interviewed years back. If it is not the same people then we know that the people they interviewed have the same or common ideology.

This Aja’s work on African metaphysics is analyzed in such a way that is easily understood. He also gave some illustrations through diagrams so that his reader should read his mind as well.

Moreover, this piece of work is something we should reckon with in African metaphysics because no contribution is a waste. This means that no matter how small what an author writes should not be discarded but should be welcomed so that in the future we shall come out with some generally accepted (universal) theories or terms in African metaphysics.

Uzukwu argues in *Igbo World and Ultimate Reality and Meaning* that life is at the centre of the *Igbo* man’s experience of ultimate reality and meaning. Life stands out for the *Igbo* as a value in which they find their meaning. This can be seen in *Igbo* phrases like *Ndubuisi* (life is first) and *Ndukaku* (life is greater than wealth)

The prefixes “*di*” or “*du*” in the phrases is like *Bantu*’s “*ntu*” (being).

Uzukwu in his explanation of life as the ultimate principle and value in *Igbo* man’s existence elucidated thus:

In their apprehension of ultimate reality and meaning, the *Igbo* place human life at the centre of their universe. Realities are perceived as ultimate and are consequently hierachized insofar as to the degree that they impinge on the life of the *Igbo*.⁹⁰

From the above quotation, we see that *Igbo* man places life first in everything he does. This means that in man's existence to be is to exist. Without life man is nothing. Without life man works for nothing. Man is being and being is existence.

However reality in African metaphysics is dynamic, unfolding, it moves on because it is an ongoing process and that is why we have divergent views from different authors.

Moreover, like other authors, Uzukwu came out with his own principle that life is the ultimate reality. We should commend him as well for his contribution to the science of African metaphysics which shows that Africans really have value for their lives.

This is why when an *Igbo* African man is very sick and is struggling with the tides of the economy, he is advised to leave the stress alone and cater for his life first because *Ndu bu isi aku* (only a living person enjoys wealth and not vice versa) and *Aghara ndu kpaaku onye ilo erie* (if a man did not take care of himself while sick and eventually dies, his enemy takes control of his wealth whether he likes it or not). In addition the *Igbo* African people see life as supreme and sacred that is why they have respect and great values for life.

This great value and respect for life makes an *Igbo* African to frown at suicide and murder. It is also important to know that some families seek spiritual means to know the causes of sickness, accidents, misfortunes or even death that might have befallen their beloved ones. This means that *Igbo* African man believes a lot in vitalism which is the understanding of life. With this life is understood with regard to its past, present and future.

Obi in Senses of Being in *Igbo* Metaphysics propounded that the notion of being means different things to an *Igbo* African man. This means that being is perceived in different ways at a particular space-time.

The author explains being in the following ways:-

1. Being as Action or Function
2. Being as Non-interference
3. Being as Becoming
4. Being as Negation
5. Being as Self – consciousness
6. Being as Transcendence
7. Being as Questioning.⁹¹

1. Being as Action or Function

Obi was of the view that Being as action or function can be best described as *Idi ike or idi ile*. *Idi ike* is more acceptable because *ike* is the power by which a thing can perform any action. A thing becomes truly itself through being as action or function. This can easily be seen in the relationship between traditional *Igbo* and their gods. Any god that becomes powerless is being discarded that is why we say that *Ikenga adiro (adighi) ike awa ya nku* meaning if the god *Ikenga* did not prove itself powerful it merely becomes a wooden piece.

2. Being as Non – interference.

This means that the referent is neither sitting on something else nor is it acted upon by an external agent. That is an object is allowed to reveal itself without any pressure from anywhere. This can be represented in the *Igbo* vocabulary ‘*Ino nkiti*’ and ‘*Inolu onwe onye*’

3. Being as Becoming

This means that being is not static and not found as such but always in its aspects. That is being manifests itself now in one aspect and then in another. This can be seen in the *Igbo* term ‘*ino ghali*’.

4. Being as Negation

The author is of the view that being as negation and the rejection of absolutes belong together in *Igbo* traditional thought. The major philosophical implication of the rejection of absolutes is the affirmation of being as negation. This can be seen in *Igbo* as ‘*Ikwudebe* or *Inodebe* (to determine or to validate)

5. Being as Self – Consciousness

Obi argues that the word ‘self – consciousness is not found in *Igbo* vocabulary and he therefore chose the word. ‘*Isochinazu*’ (to have your *chi* in view) as the word nearest in meaning. The word means to be present to one-self which is philosophically a way of being.

6. Being as Transcendence

Being as transcendence is the ability of being to go beyond. This can be seen in the *Igbo* term ‘*Ito felu oke*’. This means being as transcendence has the capacity to go beyond the boundaries of being.

7. Being as Questioning

Obi explains that Being has always been presented as a question without much yielded result. He makes it clear that rather than question being, let being be the questioning. This means that being as the ground of all things makes a fundamental demand on them to reveal themselves.

The proverb ‘‘*onye ajuju adighi efu uzo*’’ can be interpreted in our context to mean that the adoption or awareness of being as questioning proves to be the individual’s sure path to critical and productive thoughts. Also *chinasa okwu* implies that everything is responding to the basic questioning which is being.

However, the author concludes this work by accepting that there are shortfalls in *Igbo* vocabulary that will aid research and subsequent development of philosophy.

We must also commend Obi for his arguments on the existent of different meanings of being to an *Igbo* African man. He tries as much as possible to define these different aspects of being and as well find an *Igbo* vocabulary that defines them too.

However, in as much as the author tries to give some *Igbo* terms that translate what he meant, I quite disagree with him on his explanation on being as self-consciousness as *Isochinazu* which literally means to follow your *Chi* behind or according to the author ‘‘to be present to yourself’’.

The word *Chi* can be referred to as the creator of the universe *Chineke*, Supreme Being – *Chukwu* or ‘‘*Chi*’’ as a person’s guardian angel that controls ones destiny (*akalaka*).

I believe the word self- consciousness means to be aware of one’s existence. I am because I know that I exist. This means that I have reached self realization, I am conscious of myself anywhere, anytime. I know where I am.

Moreover, despite the shortfalls in vocabulary, the work is a great achievement of *Igbo* metaphysics to African metaphysics in general. Being understood in these different ways shows the dynamism of the notion of being in African metaphysics.

However, it is very pertinent to note that being in the western world is static because it has a strong and solid foundation that is rigid and firm. That is why it has been explained and given meaning which is universally accepted.

While being in African metaphysics is dynamic because it is an ongoing process, and given meaning by different people and this explanation still goes on. It’s being explained and will still be explained in the future.

Being is the ultimate in existence that is why being is existence and existence is being. That is whatever is, is a being. Being defines the existence or presence of reality in the sense that whatever exists, whatever is felt, whatever is perceived, whatever that is known, is a being.

African metaphysics is always seen as a practical science which is tied more with life and not merely metaphysics of being as in the western world. The world of man and the understanding about it is what being is all about.

This means that man is being, man is existence. Existence of metaphysics in the western world has a solid foundation and generally accepted principles. This is why Immanuel Kant in his contribution to metaphysics aroused a transcendental dialectical problem in the sense that he gives detailed analysis of the space – time, soul, world and God and yet denied their very existence which he argued extensively and affirmed the existence.

This means that Kant who was influenced by Hume's agnosticism restored confidence in metaphysics as a science of *phenomena* (apparent) experience where he showed how categories employed in interpreting experience are necessary forms of intuition or concepts of understanding supplied by the mind. Kant continued to be agnostic also about the nature of real things that is *noumena* or things-in-themselves.

In addition, African metaphysics is still moving from one stage to another. This is because there are no yet universally accepted principles in it. This is why it is important for we African philosophers especially *Igbo* African philosophers to rise up and organize research centres, seminars symposiums, workshops etc that will help us get information, facts, ideas and opinions which will be analysed and provided as generally accepted principles in African metaphysics.

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CHAPTER THREE

BIOGRAPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804)

Immanuel Kant, a German Philosopher was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia April 22nd, 1724. His family were among the Pietists, a protestant sect somewhat like the Quakers and early Methodists. After attending the University of Konigsberg, and serving as a tutor in several aristocratic families, Kant became an instructor at the university. He held this position for fifteen years, lecturing and writing in metaphysics, logic, ethics and natural science. In March 1770, he was appointed Professor of logic and Metaphysics in Konigsberg. The Salient trait in Kant was probably his moral earnestness and his devotion to the idea of duty, a devotion which found theoretical expressions in his ethical writings. Kant was a sociable man, kindly and benevolent one. He was never rich, always systematically careful in money matters but he regularly assisted a number of poor persons. Kant died on February 12th, 1804.

Some of Kant's works include:

- ❖ The Critique of Pure Reason (1781).
- ❖ Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783).
- ❖ Idea for a Universal History (1784).
- ❖ Fundamental Principle of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
- ❖ Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science (1788).
- ❖ Second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787).
- ❖ Critique of Judgement (1790).
- ❖ Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793).
- ❖ Metaphysics of Morals (1797).

3.0 KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Human existence and human nature have been encompassed by many complexities some of which have led to the distortion of the understanding of the reality of human nature. Many attempts to proffer possible solution to most of these complexities have resulted to untold difficulties. This is true with the problem of man's desire to know and the sources of human knowledge.

This quest for knowledge has brought about the recognition of different sources of human knowledge namely: rationalism, empiricism, scepticism, pragmatism, absolutism etc.

The rationalists and the empiricists argued that there are two kinds of truths namely analytical *a priori* and synthetical *a posteriori* propositions respectively. From these propositions Kant came out with *a priori* synthetic judgement which can be seen in mathematics, natural sciences and metaphysics.

This can be evidently seen when Kant asked the question: “how are synthetic *a priori* knowledge or judgements possible?”

Kant answered this question in three different ways.

Firstly, how are synthetic *a priori* propositions of mathematics possible?

Kant asked this question in the transcendental Aesthetics and the doctrine of the transcendental idealism of space and time.

Secondly, how are synthetic *a priori* propositions of natural sciences possible?

Kant answered this question in the transcendental Analytic where he seeks to demonstrate the essential role of the categories in grounding the possibilities of knowledge and experience.

Finally, Kant asked “whether synthetic *a priori* propositions of metaphysics are possible?”

Kant answered this question in the transcendental Dialectics where he concluded that metaphysics is inherently dialectical through his doctrines of antinomies, hypostatization, paralogisms and subreption.

Moreover we can see that in mathematics and natural sciences, Kant began the questions with “how” while in that of metaphysics he began the question with “whether”.

This in my opinion is because Kant has had real knowledge of what metaphysics is all about and knew that “whether” will be more appropriate than “how”. This can be seen when he asked the question “whether” synthetic *a priori* proposition about *noumena* (things in themselves) are possible?

However, burning questions on epistemology and metaphysics are addressed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. This *Critique of Pure Reason* is a consequence of the epistemological turn western philosophy took during the age of enlightenment.

In Kant's *Critique of Reason* he postulated the nature of what he calls transcendental illusion or the limit of human knowledge beyond experience. He divides the *Critiques of Pure Reason* into two parts namely: transcendental doctrine of method. The former is further divided into two parts (I) Transcendental Aesthetic (II) Transcendental Logic.

In the Transcendental aesthetics, he analyses the nature of human sensibility and postulated that space and time are its *a priori* forms through which intuitions that constitute the materials of human knowledge are given.

In the transcendental Logic, he distinguishes between transcendental analytics and transcendental dialectic.

In the transcendental analytic, he concerns himself with delineating the *a priori* forms and the principle of pure understanding which are responsible for synthetic *a priori* judgements in natural sciences.

Both transcendental aesthetic and transcendental analytic account for Kant's theory of knowledge. This means that synthetic *a priori* judgements in mathematics and natural sciences have their foundation in the *a priori* forms of understanding.

In the transcendental dialectic, Kant enforces limitation on human reason in the form of antinomies which the human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. But more importantly, the limited constitution of pure reason necessitates the emergence not only of practical reason for moral pursuits but also of judgement for aesthetic experience.

Kant's critical philosophy is known as transcendental idealism which supports the view that all human knowledge is restricted to things given in space and time as appearances and not as they are; apart from their being related to our mind as they are in themselves. This was why Kant said that:

The transcendental idealism did not concern the existence of things for it has never entered my mind to doubt this, but only the sensible representation of things, to which space and time first and foremost belong and of these as in general of all appearances, I have only shown that they are not things.¹


In this chapter therefore, we will carry out the expose of Kant's transcendental philosophy.

3.1 SPACE AND TIME (SENSIBILITY) IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY


Kant explains his concept of sensibility in the transcendental aesthetics. Kant was of the opinion that "the capacity for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility".²

With this sensibility objects can be given to us which yield to intuition. This intuition is thought through understanding and from the understanding arise concepts.

This sensibility can be illustrated like the diagram below:



OR



(Signs and illustrations are mine)

This means that without sensibility no objects would be given to us and without understanding no object would be thought of. Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

Sensibility by itself does not make judging objects possible. It takes also understanding which provides the concepts, rules for determining what is common or universal in different representations.

Kant meant that in order to think about some objects, it takes understanding which assigns concepts based on the object sensation to identify what is common and general about it.

Kant argues that in order to think about the input from sensibility, sensations must conform to the conceptual structure that the mind has available to it. By applying concepts, the understanding takes the particular that are given in sensation and identifies what is common and general about them. A concept of "shelter" for instance, allows me to identify what is common in particular representations of a house, a tent and cave.³

According to Kant, the science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility is called transcendental aesthetics. Two pure forms of sensible intuition that serve as principles of *a priori* knowledge are named space and time.

3.1.1 SPACE

Kant explained what space is all about from the metaphysical and transcendental dimensions. The metaphysical contains that which exhibits the concepts as a given *a priori* while the transcendental is all about mathematics or geometry which could give us synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

Kant gave the metaphysical definitions of space as the following:-

1. Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experience. The representations of space cannot therefore be empirically obtained from the relations of outer experience. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible through the representations.

2. Space is a necessary *a priori* representation which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an *a priori* representation which necessarily under lies outer appearances.

3. Space is not a discursive or general concept of relations of things in general but a pure intuition. For in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly these parts cannot precede the one all embracing space as being, as it were constituents out of which it can be composed, on the contrary they can be thought only as in space is essentially one, the manifold in it, and therefore the concept of space depends solely on limitations. Hence it follows that an *a priori* and not an empirical intuition underlies all concepts of space.

4. Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Space as a concept cannot be thought as containing an infinite number of representations within itself. All parts of space co-exist *ad infinitum*. Consequently the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition not a concept. ⁴

Bertrand Russell gave the interpretation of the above definitions as follows:

The First Metaphysical Argument

For in order that certain sensation may be referred to something outside me (that is to something in a different position in a space from that in which I find my-self) and further in order that I may be able to perceive them as outside and beside each other and this is not merely different but in different places, the presentation of space must already give the foundation. Different external experience is only possible through the presentation of space.

The phrase ‘‘outside me’’ (that is in a different place from that in which I find myself) is a difficult one. As a thing-in-itself, I am not anywhere, and nothing is spatially outside me, it is only my body as a phenomenon that can be meant. What induces me to arrange objects of perception as I do rather than otherwise?

For example, why do I always see people’s eyes above their mouths and not below them?

According to Kant, the eyes and the mouth exist as things-in-themselves and cause my separate percepts, but nothing in them corresponds to the spatial arrangement that exists in my perception.

The Second Metaphysical Argument maintain that it is possible to imagine nothing in space but impossible to imagine no space. It seems to me that no serious argument can be based upon what we can or cannot imagine.

You can imagine looking at the sky on a dark cloudy night, but then you yourself are in space and you imagine the clouds that you cannot see. Kant's space is absolute, like Newton's and not merely a system of relations.

The Third Argument

The nature of this Argument is the denial of plurality in space itself. What we call "spaces" are neither instances of a general concept "a space" nor parts of an aggregate. I do not know quite what according to Kant their logical status is but in any case they are logical subsequent to space.

The fourth Argument is chiefly concerned to prove that space is an intuition, not a concept.

It's premise "space is imagined (or presented) as an infinite given magnitude". This is the view of a person living in a flat country like that of Konigsberg. I do not see how an inhabitant for an Alpine valley could adopt it. It is difficult to see how anything infinite can be "given". I should have thought it obvious that the part of space that is given is that which is peopled by objects of perception and that for other parts we have only a feeling of possibility of motion.⁵

However, according to Kant "transcendental exposition is the explanation of a concept as a principle from which the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic knowledge can be understood".⁶

With the above explanation, Kant explains the transcendental meaning of space.

The Transcendental Meaning of Space

Sensibility imposes the intuition of space and objects around us. By making synthetic judgements on that space, we form the concepts of geometry. Geometry is a science which

determines the properties of space synthetically and yet *a priori*. This means that pure geometry must exist and must consist of *a priori* synthetic truths. How is this possible?

Kant's answer is that

Space in its origin must be intuition, for from a mere concept no propositions can be obtained which go beyond the concept as it happens in geometry. This intuition must be *a priori* that is it must be found in us *a priori* to any perception of an object and must therefore be pure not empirical Intuition.⁷

Kant's answer means that Euclidean geometry reflects the requirements of our own mental powers. If we are to represent things as objective in relation to us that is as existing and surviving independently of our experience, we must situate them in space. Space enables us, so to speak to turn our back on them to situate them in a place where we might have observed but which we do not observe. In experiencing something as objectives, therefore we represent it as spatial. In Kant's words "space is the form of outer sense. Outer sense being the capacity to perceive what is outside me, what is objective in relation to me, what is not part of my inner realm".

Synthetic *a priori* judgements are possible in geometry because space is an *a priori* form of sensibility. This means that we can know the claims of geometry with *a priori* certainty only if experiencing object in space is the necessary mode of our experience.

From both the metaphysical and the transcendental explanations of space, Kant concluded the following:-

- a. Space does not represent any property of things in themselves nor does it represent them in their relation to one another. That is to say space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves and which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective condition of intuition.
- b. Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us.⁸

However, we do not experience space, but we experience objects that are spatially structured in a particular way.

Kant calls space the form of outer sense because it structures the experience of objects external to us. This means that we apprehend spatially only what affects our sense-organs.

It is impossible to grasp an object as an object unless we delineate the region of space it occupies. Without spatial representations, our sensations are undifferentiated and cannot ascribe properties to particular objects.

Space conditions every experience we have. Space includes nothing such as here and there, high and low, large and small, near and far, up and down, around, proximately and so forth.⁹

The fact that every actual experience we have ever had has been conditioned by space is a human construct, something our minds add to experience in order for it even to register with us.

But even more importantly, our minds are simply incapable of even imagining what a spaceless experience would be like. The fact that we cannot even imagine a non space conditioned perception ought to make us even more suspicious that space is a condition our minds add to perceptions.

This made Kant to say that ‘‘the fact that all our actual and all our possible experience is conditioned by space is an indication that space is one of the minds necessary categories of perception’’.

3.1.2 TIME

Like space, Kant gave the metaphysical and transcendental meanings of time.

The metaphysical definitions are as follows:-

1. Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. It is only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively).
2. Time is necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. In respect of appearances, we cannot remove time itself though we can quite well think time as void of appearances.

Time is therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is actuality of appearances possible at all. Appearances may one and all vanish but time (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot itself be removed.

3. The possibility of apodeictic principles concerning the relations of time or of axioms of time in general is also grounded upon or of axioms of time in general is also grounded upon this *a priori* necessity.

Time has only one dimension, different times are not simultaneous but successively (just as different spaces are not successive but simultaneous). Kant argued that these principles cannot be derived from experience for experience would give neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty.

4. Time is not a discursive or general concept but a pure form of sensible intuition.

Different times are nothing but part of one and the same time. The proposition that different times can be simultaneous is not to be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic and cannot have its origin in concepts alone. It is immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time.

5. The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every magnitude of time is possible through limitations of one single time that underlies it. The original representation of time must therefore be given as unlimited.¹⁰

However, in the transcendental explanation of time, Kant explains what is alteration. In defining alteration, Kant merged it with motion and defined both of them as concepts of alteration of place which is possible only through time and in representation of time.

Kant is of the opinion that this representation must be an *a priori* (inner) intuition, if not no concept no matter what it might be could render comprehensible the possibility of an alteration.

This means that combination of contradictory opposed predicates in one and the same object known as one after the other.¹¹

Thus our concept of time explains the possibility of that body of *a priori* synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion and which by no means is unfruitful.¹²

Kant made the following conclusions about metaphysical and transcendental explanations of time.

- a. Time is not something which exists of itself or which inheres in things as an objective determination and it does not remain when abstraction is made of all subjective conditions of its intuition.
- b. Time is nothing but the form of inner sense that is of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. It can be determination of outer appearances; it has to do neither with shape nor position but with the relation of representations in our inner state.
- c. Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space as the pure form of all intuition is so far limited, it serve as the *a priori* condition only of outer appearances. But since all representation whether they have for their objects outer things or nor belong in themselves as determinations of the mind, to our inner state and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition and so belongs to time.

Time is an *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever.¹³

Moreover, time like space is not a thing existing in itself out there in the universe. Instead it is a form in which objects appear to us.

Kant calls time the form of inner sense because mental states necessarily occur to us in a temporal succession. Kant is of the view that time is one of the primary categories that shapes our perception.

Time shapes our perception because our minds are simply incapable of having any perceptions except those that are conditioned by time.

Categories of time include now and then, earlier and later, before and after, fast and slow, durations etc.

Kant says that we have all experienced time as seeming to slow down or speed up but none of it has ever had an experience that is not conditioned by time.

Every experience we had has occurred in time. That's why our mind must add time to our experiences in order for the experience to register with us.

For example, memorable days and dates like birthdays, weddings, survival from accidents, illnesses are not easily forgotten or when we lose a dear one, robbery attacks etc. are not easily forgotten too. These events are remembered in years to come and are told later as history in remembrance dates.

Time is something in us rather than out in the world because our actual experiences occur in time.

It will be difficult for our minds to imagine time-less experience. The fact that we cannot imagine a non-time conditioned perception ought to make us believe that time is a condition our minds add to perceptions. That's why Kant says that:

“The fact that all our actual and all our possible experience is conditioned by time is an indication that time is one of the minds necessary categories of perception”.¹⁴

This means that it is impossible for us to have any experience of objects that are not in time. However we have seen that space-time are *a priori* intuitions. They are forms of our sensible intuitions. They are perceiving subjects (that's why they are known as forms of sense perceptions too) rather than being out there in the world existing independent of us. This means that they are necessary features of our experience rather than qualities found in the things-in-themselves. This is Kant's conception of sensibility that is the capacity of the mind to receive representations through the presence of objects. It would be impossible for us to have experience of objects which are not placed in space-time.

These conditions of sensibility are due to our ‘consciousness which must apprehend objects as occupying a region of space and persisting for some duration of time.’¹⁵

This means that we perceive objects as they are located in space and time. This condition of experience is that whatsoever events that occur shall take place in a spatial and temporal character. That is the world as it appears to us (the phenomenal world) must have this spatial and temporal characters.

Thilly explained it in simpler terms when he elucidated thus:

Sensation must be referred to space and time. It must be perceived as something outside by the side of other things. Our sensations are arranged in a spatial and temporal order. Sensations constitute the raw materials (colours, sound, and weight) which are arranged by sensibility into the frame work or form of space and time and so become percepts. The soul not only receives sensation, but by virtue of its faculty of intuition perceives them, it sees the colours, hears the sound outside of itself in space and in a time order.¹⁶

Finally, we will conclude the space time by asking the question. In what sense is it plausible to claim that space, time and causality are universally valid and necessary forms?

Skirbekk and Gilje answered the question in reference to Kant and gave their own illustrations about it thus:

Kant answered that our knowledge of things must always be marked by space and time (forms of cognition or forms of sense experience) and causality (one of the twelve categories). Illustration of space, time, causality. A constable reported of a collision. He was asked where it happened, he said no particular place, when did it happen he said no particular time, what caused it he said nothing. One can see that there is something wrong with the constable.¹⁷

In other words, space, time and causality are necessary and universally valid forms because our knowledge must be marked by time, space and causality in order to be comprehensible that is in order to be a complete form of knowledge. Space, time and causality are therefore conditions for possibility of knowledge.

3.2 THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT

Judgement is the mediate knowledge of an object that is the representation of a representation.¹⁸

This means that in every judgement, there is a concept which holds of many representations and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object.

For example

All bodies are divisible.¹⁹

From the above example we can see that the concept of ‘divisible’ applies in particular to the concept of the body and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects are represented immediately through the concept of divisibility.

Kant is of the view that the function of thought in judgement can be brought under four headings each which contains three moments.

They include:-

I. Quantity of Judgements

- Universal.
- Particular.
- Singular.

II. Quality.

- Affirmative.
- Negative.
- Infinite.

III. Relation.

- Categorical.
- Hypothetical.
- Disjunctive.

IV. Modality.

- Problematic.
- Assertoric.
- Apoideictic.²⁰

EXPLANATIONS

1. In the employment of judgements in syllogism singular judgements can be treated like those that are universal in respect of quantity, the singular stand to universal as unity to infinite and is different from universal.

2. Transcendental logic and general logic consider what may be the worth or content of a logical affirmation that is thus made by a means of a merely negative predicate and what is thereby achieved in the way of addition to our knowledge.

For example,

If I should say “the soul is not mortal” by this, I have warden off error by this negative judgement. Now, by the proposition “the soul is non mortal” means making an affirmation. Since the mortal constitutes one part of the whole extension of possible beings and the non mental the other. Nothing more is said by my proposition than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remains over when I take away all that is mortal.

3. All relations of thought in judgements are
 - a. Of the predicate to the subject.
 - b. Of the ground to its consequence.
 - c. Of the divided knowledge and of the members of the division taken together to each other.

In the first kind of judgements, we consider only two concepts, in the second two judgements, in the third several judgements in their relation to each other, a relation not of logical opposition and that of community.

4. The modality of judgements contributes nothing to the content of their judgement (for besides quantity, quality and relation). There is nothing that constitutes the content of a judgement but only the value of the copula in relation to thought in general.

Problematic judgements are those in which affirmation or negative is taken as merely possible (optional). In assertoric judgements affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true) and in apoideictic judgments as necessary.

Thus the two judgements the relation of which constitutes hypothetical judgement and like the judgements, the reciprocal relation of which forms the disjunctive judgement (members of the division) are one and all problematic only. ²¹


There is a relationship between understanding and judgement. This is why Kant was of the opinion that ‘all acts of understanding can be reduced to judgement which may be represented as faculty of judgement’.²²

3.3 THE THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING

The mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. The faculty which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.²³

Kant is of the opinion that besides intuition that there is no other mode of knowledge except by means of concepts. It could be noted that no concept is ever related to an object immediately but to some representations of it.

Understanding is a faculty of thought while thought is knowledge by means of concepts. We could remember that this understanding has been reduced and was known as faculty of judgement as earlier discussed in the theory of Kant's judgement. From the ongoing, we can now infer that there is a relationship between concept, understanding and judgement. All of them are twined together and they are dependent of each other. None can stand on its own alone. This relationship can be seen like a three sided triangle that must have support of each other as to stand.



(The diagram /illustration is mine)

Kant says that for us to have a complete account of knowledge we must realize that

There are two stems of human knowledge, namely sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common unknown root to us. Through the former

objects are given to us, through the latter they are thought.²⁴

This was why Thilly explained it in his own words thus:

Knowledge or judgement would be impossible without a synthetic thinking mind, that is without understanding or intelligence. Intuition is perceptual, understanding conceptual, it thinks in concepts. The understanding by itself cannot intuit or perceive anything; the sense by themselves cannot think anything. Knowledge is possible only in the union of the two.²⁵

This means that the minds *a priori* conceptual contribution to experience can be enumerated or explained by a special set of concepts (the categories) that make all other empirical concepts and judgements possible.

The understanding actively organizes experience by means of pure concepts or categories of the understanding. They are called pure concepts because they are *a priori* and are not derived from experience.

3.4 PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING (CATEGORIES)

Kant held the view that concepts by means of analytical unity produced judgement which introduces a transcendental content into its representations. Kant called these representations pure concepts of understanding and these concepts he named categories which according to him he borrowed from Aristotle.

The tables (types) of categories are list of original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains within itself *a priori*. Indeed it is because it contains these concepts that it is called pure understanding, for by them alone can it understand anything in the manifold of intuition that is think an object of intuition.

In Kant's words, intuitions are brought under concepts. Without concepts experience would be meaningless. This made him to buttress that

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore, necessary to make our

concepts sensible, that is to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible that is, to bring them under concepts.²⁶

This means that the minds *a priori* conceptual contribution to experience can be enumerated or explained by a special set of concepts (the categories) that makes all other empirical concepts and judgements possible. These concepts cannot be experienced directly; they are only manifested as the form which particular judgements of objects take.

TABLE OF CATEGORIES

	I	
	Of Quantity	
	Unity	
	Plurality	
	Totality	
II		III
Of Quality		of Relation
Reality		of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation		(<i>Substantia et accidens</i>)
Limitation		of Causality and Dependence
		(Cause and effect)
		of Community
		(Reciprocity between agent and patient)
	IV	
	Of Modality	
	Possibility – Impossibility	
	Existence – Non – existence	
	Necessity – Contingency. ²⁷	

EXPLANATION OF THE CATEGORIES

The first of the considerations suggested by the table is that while it contains four classes of the concepts of understanding, it may first be divided into groups.

The categories in the first group is being concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical while those in the second group is with the existence of their objects in their relation either to each other or to the understanding.

The categories in the first group Kant entitled mathematical, those in the second group the dynamical.

The former have no correlates, these are to be met with only in the second group.

Secondly, in view of the fact that all *a priori* division of concepts must be by dichotomy, it is significant that in each class the number of the categories is always the same.

It may be observed that the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first.

Thus totality is just plurality considered as unity. Limitation is simply reality combined with negation. Community is the causality of substances reciprocally determining one another.

Lastly, necessity is just the existence which is given through possibility itself. For the combination of the first and second concepts in order that the third may be produced required a special act of the understanding.

Thirdly in the case of one category namely that of community which is found in the third group, its accordance is in the form of a disjunctive judgement. The form which corresponds to it in the table of logical function is not as evident as the case of others.²⁸

However, Kant called the manner in which concepts can relate *a priori* to the objects transcendental deductions.

Transcendental deduction of all *a priori* concept has a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely that they must be recognized as *a priori* conditions of the possibility of the experience whether of the intuition which is to be met within it or of the thought.

This made Kant to say that

Once I am in possession of pure concepts of understanding, I can think objects which may be impossible or which through perhaps in themselves possible cannot be given in any experience.²⁹

3.5 PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA

According to Kant

Certain objects as appearances, sensible entities are known as *phenomena*. The other possible things which are not objects of our senses but are thought as object merely through the understanding in opposition to the *phenomena* we call intelligible entities (*noumena*).³⁰

Phenomena are the things which we can perceive. The *phenomena* world is the world as it appears to us. It is contrasted with *noumenal* world, the world as it really exists behind appearances.

Noumena is things-in-themselves, the inaccessible reality which lies behind appearances.

Phenomena can be listed as an *a posteriori* knowledge while *noumena* can be listed as an *a priori* knowledge.

A posteriori knowing is knowing based on experience that is knowledge that is logically posterior to (and grounded in) experience. It is empirical knowledge derived from our experience.

A posteriori gives knowledge of only appearances that are only phenomenal aspect of things.

A priori knowledge is not based on experience that is it is logically priori to experience. If we are to have knowledge of the *noumenal*, it have to come from some form of *a priori* knowledge.

Kant explained what it means to have *noumenon* in the positive and negative senses (that is types of *noumenon*)

Noumenon in the positive sense is when we understood *noumenon* as object of a non-sensible intuition, we there by presuppose a special mode of intuition namely the intellectual, which is not that which we possess and not by which we cannot comprehend even the possibility.

Noumenon in the negative sense is when we understand *noumenon* by a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it.

The doctrine of sensibility is doctrine of the *noumenon* in the negative sense that is of things which the understanding must think without this reference to our mode of intuition, therefore not merely as appearances but as things in themselves.

Therefore, if we should attempt to apply the categories to objects which are viewed as being appearances, we should have to postulate an intuition other than the sensible and the objects would thus be a *noumenon* in the positive sense.³¹

The concept of *noumenon* is that of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the sense but as a thing-in-itself. The concept of a *noumenon* is thus a merely limiting concept.³²

From the above definitions of *phenomena* and *noumena* we can infer that:

The only world that can ever make any sense to us is the world of objects that appear within experience. These things as they appear to us Kant called the *phenomena*.

In a practical sense, the *phenomenal* world is the real world and the notion of such a world corresponding to anything outside of it is unintelligible.

These things in themselves that are not structured by the mind's categories are what Kant calls *noumena*.

We cannot assign any positive content to the concept of the *noumena*.

The concept is merely a limiting concept or a way of pointing to what lies beyond any possible experience.

Thilly gave a simpler definition for a lay man as thus:

The concept of the thing-in-itself or noumenon as something not knowable by the sensible (but the possibility of knowing which in intellectual intuition is thinkable) is therefore a limiting concept. It says to the sense here is your limit, you can go no further, here is where your jurisdiction ceases. You can know only phenomena, the non-phenomenal, the noumenal, the intelligible is beyond you.³³

By supposing that *noumena* exist behind the veil of appearance, Kant was unwittingly indulging in the sort of speculative metaphysics which he makes clear that he abhors in transcendental dialectics.

3.6 KANT'S CONCEPT OF PURE REASON

In the introduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant made it clear that

Reason gives knowledge in a realm beyond the world of senses where experience can yield neither guidance nor correction that our reason carries on those enquires which owing to the importance we consider to be far more excellent, and in their purpose far more lofty than all that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances. These unavoidable problems set by pure reason itself are God, freedom and immortality. The science which with all its preparations is in its final intention directed solely to their solution is metaphysics.³⁴

We have no knowledge antecedent to experience and with experience all our knowledge begins. But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.

We should also note that all our knowledge starts with the senses from where it proceeds to understanding and ends with reason. Kant is also of the same view that reason is the opposite of experience when he said thus:

If we see the words ‘‘concept of reason’’ we should note that we are dealing with something which does not allow of being confined within experience since it concerns a knowledge of which any empirical knowledge is only a part.³⁵

Just as Kant re-named pure concepts of understanding as categories, like wise he re-named concept of pure reason as ‘‘transcendental ideas’’.

These transcendental ideas according to Kant are concepts of pure reason in the sense that they view all knowledge gained in experience as being determined through an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented because they are composed by the very nature of reason itself and therefore stand in necessary relation to the whole employment of understanding.

In addition, they are transcendent in the sense that they overstep the limits of all experience. No object adequate to the transcendental ideas can ever been found in the experience.

Kant also held the view that in every statement he tries thinking on reason very well as to know the meaning of it and what to infer and conclude when he opined that

In every syllogism, I first think a rule (the major premise). Secondly condition of the rule by means of judgement (the minor premise). Finally what is thereby known I determine through the predicate of the rule and so a priori through reason (the conclusion).³⁶

In trying to explain the function of reason, Kant asked this question: “Does reason in itself (that is pure reason) contain *a priori* synthetic principles and rules and in what may these principles consist?

Kant gave two answers to the above question.

First, reason in the syllogism does not concern itself with intuitions, with a view to bring them under rules (as understanding does with its categories) but with concepts and judgements.

Even if pure reason does concern itself with objects, it has no immediate relation to these and the understanding of them, but only to the understanding and its judgements which deals at first hand with the senses and their intuition for the purpose of determining the object. That everything which happens has a cause is not a principle known and prescribed by reason.³⁷

Secondly, reason in its logical employment seeks to discover the universal condition of its judgement (the conclusion) and the syllogism is itself nothing but a judgement made by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the major premise). This rule itself is subject to the condition must therefore be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) whenever practicable. The principle peculiar to reason in general is to find the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding, the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.³⁸

However, Kant argued that reason can have another function apart from the two functions mentioned above when he elucidated thus:

The function of reason in its inferences consists in the universality of knowledge (which it yields) according to concepts, the syllogism being itself a judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its conditions. The proposition Caius is Mortal could indeed derive from experience by means of understanding alone. But I am in a pursuit of a concept (man) that contains the condition under which the predicate of this judgement is given, and after i have subsumed the predicate i proceed to determine the knowledge of my object.³⁹

In concluding the function of reason in establishing the grounds for attaining knowledge without the sense or void of experience, Kant asserts thus:

So long as reason in its concepts has in view simply the conditions in the sensible world, and in considering what satisfaction in this regard it can obtain for them, our ideas are at once transcendental and cosmological.⁴⁰

3.6.1 TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION OF REASON

Kant was of the view that sense do not err not because they do not judge rightly but because they do not judge at all.

In any knowledge which completely accords with the laws of understanding there is no error. In a representation of the senses as containing no judgement whatsoever there is also no error.

Kant identifies reason as the seat of a unique kind of error, one that is essentially linked up with metaphysical propensities and which he refers to as ‘transcendental illusion’.

Kant says although metaphysics may consist of transcendental illusions, they are irresistible illusion.⁴¹

This made him to opine that:

We are concerned only with transcendental illusion which exerts its influence on principles that in no wise intended for use in experience in which case should at least have had a criterion of their correctness.⁴²

Kant's claim is that it is a peculiar quality of reason that unavoidable takes its own subjective interests and principles to hold objectively.

It is this transcendental illusion according to Kant that paves the way for metaphysics. Reason plays this role by generating principles and interests that incites one to defy the limitations of knowledge already detailed in the transcendental analytic.

This means that the doctrines of traditional metaphysics are illusions arising from the attempts to use the categories of understanding to gain information about objects beyond the horizon of our forms of intuitions.

However, Kant confuses himself by stating repeatedly that the illusion that grounds metaphysics roughly that the unconditioned is already given is unavoidable.

3.6.2 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS OF PURE REASON

Kant arranged all transcendental ideas into three classes.

The first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject.

The second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance.

The third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thoughts in general.

The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum total of all appearances (the world), is the object of cosmology and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of theology.⁴³

The advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world and by means of this to the original being is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premise to conclusion.

3.6.2.1 RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (THE SOUL OR THE SELF)

“The soul is a substance which is simple and incorruptible, numerically identical throughout the experience of any person and necessary distinct from any external objects”.⁴⁴

Kant refers to the self as transcendental ego or transcendental unity of apperception which underlies all experience and can never be known as an object of introspection or scientific

knowledge. This was why it is a part of the unknowable noumena and Kant refers to it as X, an indefinable variable.

It is necessary to say that there can be no knowledge without a subject, self or knower. Because of this, Kant said that the self is one of the necessary conditions for experience to exist at all.

Rational psychology draws conclusion not warranted by the premises, it uses terms self, subject and soul in different sense. This made it to be guilty of a fallacy which Kant calls a paralogism.

Thilly tries to give us the function of Kant's psychology when he asserted thus:

Although rational psychology does not add anything to our knowledge, it prevents us from adapting either a souless materialism or a groundless spiritualism. Reason here gives us a hint to turn from fruitless speculations and to put our self knowledge to moral use. The moral law teaches men to esteem the mere consciousness of righteousness more than anything else in the world and to render himself fit to become the citizen of a better world which exists in his idea only.⁴⁵

3.6.2.2 RATIONAL COSMOLOGY (THE WORLD)

Cosmology which is the second transcendental idea of pure reason is the assumption that we can reason about the cosmos or the world in which we live.

Russell explains what Kant's cosmology is for him when he opined thus "in this cosmology it seeks for an absolute beginning of things in time, for an absolute limit to them in space and for an absolute limit to their divisibility".⁴⁶

In this rational cosmology, reason tries to reduce the objective condition of all our *phenomena* to an ultimate and supreme condition or an unconditioned.

However, to think the idea of nature as a whole, the idea of a universe, and either conceive this as the principle on which all *phenomena* depend or we seek the unconditioned arriving the *phenomena* themselves we have to form cosmological ideas.

According to Kant, this would require jumping outside the bounds of our human ways of conceptualizing experiences.

Kant also attempts to show that reason falls into a triangle of inconsistencies when it goes beyond its proper limits. These inconsistencies lead to four pairs of opposing viewpoints (anti-thesis) which Kant calls antinomies.

It is necessary for us to know that all we had knowledge of is the finite collection of objects we have actually experienced. It is also important to note we have to think of the world as it were composed of objects including those we have not experienced because the future (time) still lies ahead of us.

3.6.2.3 RATIONAL THEOLOGY (THE CONCEPT OF GOD)

This third and last transcendental idea of pure reason is a theory that propounds the existence of a Supreme Being. This idea Kant calls the idea of a transcendental theology.

The idea of the Most Real Being however is a mere idea for Kant. First we make the object of it, that is a phenomenal object, then we make an entity of it and we personify it.

Thilly was of the same view, that rational theology is something based on our idea when he elucidated thus:

We form the idea of an empirical whole, of a whole of experience and we can conceive this system of objects, this universe of things or phenomena as something existing apart from us. We forget that it is our idea and so make an entity of it. We represent it as an individual thing containing in itself all reality as the most real thing as the highest reality, all sufficient eternal and simple.⁴⁷

Kant explained this transcendental idea of God very well and affirmed His very existence when he opined thus:

Reason in this case does not as with psychological and the cosmological ideas begin from experience and err by exaggerating its grounds in striving to attain, if possible the absolute completeness of their senses. Rather it totally breaks with experience and form mere concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a theory in general

and thus by means of the idea of a most primal Being, it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality of all other things.⁴⁸

The notion of God enables us to think of the world as if it were a systematic unity with a single intelligent and purposeful cause. This will motivate reason to continually try to make our picture of the world coherent.

We experience the self or the soul within us. We know that it exists within ourselves. This was why Descartes said that “I think therefore I exist”.

With this existence of the soul, we believe in the existence of the immortality of the soul which means that our soul will never die. When our bodies die at death, our souls depart or leave the body and transist to heaven for the good souls while the bad souls go to hell, or wander in the evil forests, and not be re-incarnated according to *Igbo* metaphysics.

In addition, we have the knowledge of the world because we live in it. We interact and acquire knowledge in this our physical world through experience. We know what we have experienced.

Furthermore, we experience and know God because of our belief in the maker, author and finisher of our lives who is also the creator of the universe. We believe in God because of His awesomeness as we read in our Bible and believe according to our faith as Christians.

Lastly all these transcendental ideas were the goals or ideals of reason and not its objects. These ideas are transcendent and beyond experience because they have no empirical value or use. This means that there is no physical entity or object that corresponds to these ideas but we believe that we have their experiences.

3.7 KANT’S ANTINOMIES OF PURE REASON

Kant was of the view that reason which involves abstract speculation easily becomes aware of its errors through the antinomy. Reason is hereby awakened to its errors through the antimony. Reason is hereby awakened to conscious of the factors in the determination of its principle.

This means that Kant attempts to show that reason falls into a tangle of inconsistencies when it goes beyond its proper limits. To demonstrate this he came out with four pairs of opposing viewpoints that he calls the antinomies of reasons.

Kant divided the antinomies into thesis and ant-thesis. The antithetic treats only of the doctrine of reason with one another and the causes of this conflict.

This transcendental antithetic is an enquiry into the antinomy of pure reason, its cause and outcome.

This antinomy according to Kant is not arbitrarily invented but founded in the nature of human reason. They are:-

1

Thesis: The world is, as to time and space, a beginning (limit).

Anti-thesis: Everything in the world is, as to time and space, infinite

2

Thesis: Everything in the world consists of (elements that are) simple.

Anti-thesis: There is nothing simple, but everything is composite.

3

Thesis: There are in the world causes through freedom.

Anti-thesis: There is no freedom but all is nature.

4

Thesis: In the series of the world-cause there is some necessary being.

Anti-thesis: There is nothing necessary in the world but in this series all is contingent.⁴⁹

There arises an unexpected conflict which can never be removed in the common dogmatic way because the thesis as well as the antithesis can be shown by equally clear, evident and irresistible proofs.

However, Kant divided the antinomies into mathematical and dynamical antinomies.

The first two antinomies are known as mathematical because they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogenous founded in such a contradictory concept. But the thesis and antithesis of two are false.

Kant was of the view that when he speaks of objects in time and space, it is of experience as the way of knowing things.

He went further to say that what he thinks in time and space exists in time and space but in this case he contradicts himself because space and time together with the appearances in them are nothing existing in themselves and outside his representations but are only modes of representation. It is contradictory to say that a mere mode of representation exists without our representation.

The thesis and antithesis of these mathematical antinomies reflect reason's search for the unconditioned but in two different forms. In the thesis, reason postulates an ultimate termination of a series, and in the antithesis an unconditional extension of the series.

Kant argues that neither side is true in these mathematical antinomies because reason is attempting to apply its demand for something unconditioned to space and time which are always indefinite in extent because they are finite yet always extendible products of our cognitive activity.

Our sense-perceived spatio temporal world has no first beginning in time and no extreme limit in space.

But there may be non spatial world which absolutely simple beings exist a world of spiritual entities. It does not follow that because a limit is impossible in the one world, it is also impossible in the other.

For all we know, the true world may have had a beginning, have been located by God and be limited.

Still, we have no right to search for spiritual beings in space and for spatial things in the super sensible realm.

Moreover, in the dynamical antinomies, the theses again result from reason's desire for closure and the antithesis infinite extension.

The these here do not necessarily refer solely to spatio-temporal entities. The claims that there must be a non-natural causality of freedom and a necessary being can apply to things-

in-themselves while the claims that are only contingent existents linked by laws of nature apply to appearances.

In this case both thesis and antithesis may be true.

That these antinomies may be true is crucial to Kant because it means that although theoretical reason cannot prove that neither freedom nor God exist, neither can it disprove them.

Existence of freedom and God can gain credibility in some other way.

Furthermore, in the mathematical class of antinomies, the falsehood of the pre-supposition consists in representing in one concept something self-contradictory as if it were compatible (that is an appearance as a thing in-itself)

But to dynamical class of antinomies, the falsehood of the presupposition consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible so that while in the former case, the opposed assertions were both false. In this case on the hand where they are opposed to one another by mere understanding they may both be true.

Kant solved the difficulties involved in the antinomies by pointing out that the thesis holds for the noumenal world and characterizes the stance of dogmatic rationalism.

The antithesis on its own side holds for the phenomenal world and characterizes the stance of dogmatic empiricism.

3.8 KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Kant explained that in the quest for the reason to arrive at a knowledge which is not to be in any way objects of experience, we must derive the knowledge of that which is in itself necessary, which makes us to begin an enquiry into an absolutely necessary being.

Kant went further to say that

If we admit something as existing no matter what this something may be, we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For the contingent exists only under the condition of some other contingent, existence as its cause and from this again we must infer yet

another cause until we are brought to cause which is not contingent and which is therefore unconditionally necessary bases its advance to the primordial being.⁵⁰

Kant named this unconditioned necessary being ‘*ens realissimum*’ when he said that ‘the concept of an *ens realissimum* is therefore of all concepts of possible things that which best squares with the concept of an unconditionally necessary being’.

Ens Realissimum means The Most Real Being.

In the footnote of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant outlined the processes which this *ens realissimum* undergoes when he opined thus:

This ideal of the *ens realissimum* although it is indeed a mere representation, is first realized, that is made into an object then hypostatized and finally by the natural progress of reason towards the completion of unity is personified.⁵¹

The proofs of arguments for the existence of God are namely:

- a. The Ontological argument
- b. The Cosmological argument
- c. The Physico-Theological argument

3.8.1 THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Ontological proof reasoned from the highest reality to necessity of existence. Its entire trust is in pure *a priori* argument that begins with the concept of a perfect being. The concept of an absolutely necessary being is a concept of pure reason. These concepts are something the non-existence of which is possible.

Kant made it clear that the concept of *ens realissimum* possesses all reality and it is a possible being.

Kant went further to say that all reality includes existence, and existence is therefore contained in the concept of a thing that is possible.

From this argument, it is inferred that; it is possible that there is a perfect being whose none existence is impossible.

But it makes no sense to say that there could be something whose none existence is possible. Therefore a perfect being must necessarily exist.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Kant was of the view that there are so many obstacles in inferring from a given existence in general to some absolute necessary being.

Verbal definition of an absolutely necessary being does not give rise to existence of the being, that is something the non existence of which is impossible.

Kant was also certain that when the concept of an absolutely necessary being is rejected and the subject is retained, that a contradiction results.

This is why he asserts thus:

To post a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is self contradictory but there is no contradictory in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of concept of an absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected we reject the thing itself with all its predicate and no question of contradiction can arise.⁵²

However, the problem in this argument is that we were not told whether triangles actually exist. If I deny there are triangles then I do not need to affirm that there are three angled figures. Similarly we may state 'if there is a God, then there is a being that necessarily exists. However if I deny there is a God, then I may also reject the claim that there is a necessary being. In this way Kant seeks to block the move from concepts to existence.⁵³

Kant also said that the concept of a Supreme Being is a mere idea which is unable by itself capable of enlarging our knowledge in regard to what exists. It is even competent to enlighten us to the possibility of any existence beyond that which is known in and through experience.

Kant concluded his Critique of this ontological argument by saying that

The attempt to establish the existence of a supreme being by means of the famous ontological argument of Descartes is therefore merely so much labour and effort lost, we can no more extend our stock of (theoretical) insight by mere ideas, than a merchant can better his position by adding a few noughts (zero) to his cash account.⁵⁴

Kant in trying to be against this ontology argument defends it as well in the sense that he believed that ‘the concept of a Supreme Being is in many respects a very useful idea’.

3.8.2 THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The proof begins with experience and is not *a priori* or ontological. For this reason and because the object of all possible experience is called the world, it is entitled the cosmological proof.

This proof is ‘if anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I at least exist, therefore an absolutely necessary being exists’.

The proof went further to say that ‘the necessary being must be completely determined through its own concept’.

Now, there is only one possible concept which determines a thing completely *a priori* namely the concept of *ens realissimum*. The concept of *ens realissimum* is therefore the only concept through which a necessary being exists.⁵⁵

This proof takes its stand in experience and thereby makes profession of being distinct from the ontological proof which puts its entire trust in pure *a priori* concepts.

This proof retains the connection of absolute necessity with the highest reality but instead of reasoning like the former proof from the highest reality to necessity of existence, it reasons from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some being to the unlimited reality of the being.

KANT’S CRITIQUE OF THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Kant believes that in this argument, there are so many combined pseudo-rational principles that speculative reason seems in this case to have brought to bear all the resources of its dialectical skill to produce the greatest possible transcendental illusion.

Kant said that this argument uses experience in concluding the existence of a necessary being but did not tell us the properties this being may have.

From this argument, Kant came out with dialectical assumptions which the summary is as follows:

1. The transcendental principle whereby from contingent we infer a cause which is only applicable in the sensible world.

2. The inference of first cause from the impossibility of an infinite series of causes to a given one after each other in the sensible world. The principle of the employment of reason does not justify this conclusion even within the world of experience.
3. The unjustified self satisfaction of reason in respect of the completion of this argument.
4. The confusion between the logical possibility of a concept of all reality invited into one (without much contradiction) and the transcendental possibility of such a reality. In the case of the latter, there is needed a principle to establish the practicability of such a synthesis, a principle which itself however, can apply only to the field of possible experiences etc.⁵⁶

However, the cosmological proof uses experience only for a single step in the argument to conclude the existence of a necessary being. This made reason to abandon experience from mere endeavours to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have (that contains in itself the conditions essential) to absolute necessity.

These are nowhere to be found except in the concept of an *ens realissimum* and the conclusion is therefore drawn that the *ens realissimum* is the absolutely necessary being.

In addition, as Kant has previously explained on this argument that every event has a cause, this principle only applies to things within the world of experience. We cannot apply it to the cosmos as a whole that is beyond experience.

Lastly, because the cosmological argument uses the notion of a necessary being it rests in the ontological argument which Kant has already dismissed.

3.8.3 THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Kant asserts that if neither the concept of things in general nor the experience of any existence in general can supply what is required then it remains only to try whether a determinate experience can do it.

This proof which can be proved through the determinate experience is known as Physico-theological proof.

Kant went further to say that if this proof fails then it must follow that no satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea can be possible by pure speculative reason.⁵⁷

Kant has a great deal of respect for this proof when he says that ‘this proof always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind.’⁵⁸

Moreover, this argument infers the existence of a Supreme Being from the nature and arrangement of the present world. It tells us that the manifoldness order and beauty of the world leads us to infer a cause of its origin and continuance. Such a cause must possess a higher degree of performance than any possible experience of ours. This proof suggests ends and purposes in nature where our observation would not itself have detected them.

SUMMARY OF THE CHIEF POINTS OF THE ARGUMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS

1. There is order in the world with a determinate purpose carried out with great wisdom and this is a universe which is indescribably varied in content and unlimited in extent.
2. The order is alien to the things of the world and only belongs to them contingently.
3. There exists therefore a sublime and wise cause which must be the cause of the world through freedom.
4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relations existing among the parts of the world, as members of an artfully arranged structure.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF THE PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Kant was of the opinion that physico-theological proof can never by itself establish the existence of a Supreme Being but must always fall back upon the ontological argument to make good its deficiency. It only serves as an introduction to the ontological argument.

Kant said that we cannot know a cause by an analogy with purposive productions of which alone the cause and mode of action are fully known to us.

Kant was also of the view that to prove this argument, we should require other grounds of proof than those which are derived from the analogy with human art.

Kant went further to say that what the argument can prove is an architect of the world who is always very much hampered by the adaptability of the material in which he works, not a creator of the world to whom's idea everything is subject.

Kant concluded by saying that the physico-theological argument indeed leads us to the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, power etc. of the Author of the world but can take us no further.

By Kant's last statement, he has implicated himself by accepting the existence of God while he thought he was rejecting it. This was so because when an individual admires the greatness, wisdom, and power of God who is the Author of the world, the person has already accepted the existence of that Author of the world in His Majesty which is God Himself.

However, in the final analysis, Kant thinks that this argument also fails. It could only prove that the form of the world had an architect that imposed order on matter that already existed.

This was why he asserts that ‘attempts to demonstrate Gods existence are altogether fruitless and by their nature null and void’.⁵⁹

3.9 THE QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS IN KANT

Kant in his quest to know if knowledge can be acquired metaphysically asked whether synthetic *a priori* judgements could be used in the study of metaphysics.

This question which Kant dealt extensively in the transcendental dialectics led to his most influential contribution to metaphysics which is the abandonment of the quest to try to know thing-in-itself (*noumena*) independently of our sense experience.

In the longest part of the transcendental dialectics, Kant argues that most of the doctrines of the traditional metaphysics are fallaciously denied by attempting to use concepts of the understanding without corresponding evidence from sensibility.

Since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience the understanding can never transcend those limits of sensibility within which alone objects can be given to us. Its principle are merely rules for the exposition of appearance and the proud name of an ontology that presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things in general (for instance the principle of causality) must therefore give place to the modest title of a mere analytic of pure understanding.⁶⁰

This means that the doctrines of traditional metaphysics are illusions arising from the attempts to use the categories of understanding to acquire knowledge about objects beyond the horizon of our forms of intuition. What makes such illusion inevitable is the tendency of human reason to seek the unconditioned that is to carry a chain of ideas to its assumed conclusion even when it lies beyond the bounds of sense experience.

However, Kant was of the view that the human mind cannot arrive by pure thoughts alone the truth about entities which by very nature can never be objects of experience. Such objects are God, human freedom, immortality of soul etc. Kant therefore concluded that the mind has no such power and it made such metaphysics not to be real.

This means that metaphysics does not concern itself in sense experience and from attempting to go beyond it reason fails to attain it. This is why Kant asserts that metaphysics uses the concept of the unconditioned.

Reason seeks for the unconditioned or absolutes in three distinct spheres namely:-

- a. Rational Psychology which is the idea of the Soul.
- b. Rational Cosmology which is the idea of the World.
- c. Rational Theology which is the idea of God.

These objects of special metaphysics are transcendent and can be thought but they lack objective reality. This means that there is no object that corresponds to each of them that can be given in intuition. That is why Kant referred to them as ‘mere thought entities, fictions of the brains or pseudo objects’.

Moreover, this Kant’s rejection of special metaphysics is grounded in his earlier claim that any attempt to apply the concepts and principles of the understanding independently of the conditions of sensibility (that is any transcendental use of the understanding) is illicit.

This was why Kant enunciated that, “the transcendental employment of the understanding which aims towards knowledge of things independently of experience (and thus knowledge of *noumena*) is illicit”.⁶¹

Kant was also of the view that metaphysics seeks to deduce *a priori* synthetic knowledge simply from the unschematized concepts of the understanding, “the effort to acquire metaphysical knowledge through concepts alone is doomed to fail because according to Kant ‘concepts without intuition are empty’”.

Kant was also in acceptance of metaphysics that he made very clear that he rejected. He argued that abstract thoughts, intuitions or problems of pure reason can only be seen and discussed in metaphysics when he opined that “these unavoidable problem set by pure reason itself are God, freedom and immortality. The science which with all its preparations is its final intention directed is metaphysics”.⁶²

In addition, Kant attaches a great importance to these problems arising out of the transcendence use of the concepts of reason that he goes on to say that the inquiry concerning the possibility of pure science and pure mathematics is only a means to the inquiry regarding

metaphysics. He argued that “this part of metaphysics however precisely what constitute its essential end to which the rest is only a means and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake.”⁶³ Kant claims that traditional metaphysics makes way for the possibility of freedom. This made him to say that “we require the principle of causality...in accord with all the laws of empirical causality.”⁶⁴

He therefore concludes that we can consistently conceive of events that fit into the seamless web of natural causality. Also the products of the free will of the rational agency of natural agents can be considered as they are in themselves.

Even though Kant criticized dogmatic metaphysics, he did not agree with Hume that we should burn all books on theology or metaphysics because he did not think the era of metaphysics is over. Although metaphysics may consist of transcendental illusions, he says these are “irresistible illusions”.

Kant thought that these metaphysical questions are unavoidable. Asking these questions is part of human nature although we can never arrive at a scientific answer. Kant was a philosopher who provided new and sound foundations for metaphysics even though he decisively rejected the delusion of transcendental metaphysics.

Kant was explicit that there can be no knowledge of *noumena* but only of *phenomena*. Absolute metaphysics is an attempt to acquire *a priori* knowledge of *noumena* or things as they are in themselves by using things as of reason. By means of them it seeks to extend and complete our knowledge. The proper use of the ideas of reason is regulative as to provide valuable guidelines to the investigation of *phenomena*.

Kant also held the opinion that metaphysics is a dark ocean without coast and light houses and yet he thought that metaphysical concerns were unavoidable which expresses something deep and significant in the human spirit. He opined thus.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether, there will always be metaphysics in the world, everyone especially every reflective man will have it and for, want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern.⁶⁵

Kant's rejection of transcendental metaphysics is inextricably connected with the system of critical philosophy which he founded with great patience and highly intellectual mental reasoning. His arguments were impressive and unequivocal.

However, for Kant all knowledge arises from the interaction of intuition (sensibility) and thought or judgement. The former cannot be reduced to the latter as Leibniz did when he regarded sense perceptions as confused thinking. Nor can the latter be reduced to the former as Hume seems to have done when he regarded thinking as the occurrence or arising of combinations and permutations of impressions and ideas.

Both the forms of intuitions and the categories of understanding are essentially principles of organization which give us *a priori* knowledge in mathematics and physics. But if they are to give rise to knowledge, there must be presentation of the sense manifold, which arise in the human mind as a result of the action of things-in-themselves.

In addition, in Kant's speculative metaphysics, he rejected the soul and world through the four antinomies. In each of them we are confronted with a choice between a thesis and an anti-thesis which are related to each other as contradictories. We must accept one of them and reject the other and yet both can be proved or disproved indirectly through the refutation of the opposed statement. He also disproved the existence of God through the already existing proofs for the existence of God.

Finally, it was Kant's principal contribution in philosophy to show that senses and reason give rise to acquisition of knowledge when he reconciled rationalism and empiricism through his synthetic *a priori*. This made him to uphold that the only conceivable metaphysics that could commend itself to a reasonable being must be both empiricist and rationalist simultaneously.

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CHAPTER FOUR

EXISTENCE OF IGBO AFRICAN METAPHYSICS

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Igbo African metaphysics was borne out of *Igbo* man's curiosity for the search of the ultimate reality. This means that he was in an awe and wondered the mystery behind everything that is, where they come from and where they go to.

Igbo people from time immemorial hold the view that there is an ultimate, necessary and efficient (final) cause that is responsible for all these wonders of the universe. These knowledge of the universe is clear, distinct, indubitable and concrete because they are acquired through the senses (experience) and reason (intuition).

With this, Ruch and Anyanwu enunciated thus:

An African sees, feels, imagines, reasons or thinks and intuits all at the same time. Only through this method does he claim to have the knowledge of the other. So the method through which the African arrives at the trustworthy knowledge of reality is intuitive and personal experience.

Our fore fathers had this firm, final and concrete conviction that there is a "Mystery Being". This "Mystery Being" is the Highest Supreme Being who is incomprehensible, who created things out of nothing and who is the owner of their lives

Ichie Akunne made it very clear that

We believed in Chi-ukwu. He made all gods. We make sacrifices to the little gods but when they fail and there is nowhere else to turn to we go to Chi-ukwu. It is right to do so. We approach a great man through his servants but when they fail to help, we then go the last source of hope. We appear to pay greater attention to the little gods but that is not so. We worry them because we are afraid to worry their master.²

From the quotation above, we know why the *Igbo* man seeks *Chi ukwu* through the other gods. When these other gods fail them, the gods become useless as in the saying ‘*Ikenga adighi ire awaa ya nku*’. (If the god *ikenga* does not perform its duty or if it is no longer useful it will be used for firewood). When these gods become useless they remember God who is the ultimate.

However, *Igbo* people believe that there is interaction between the great *Chi* (God), lesser *chi* (gods) and man. These beings though they are different cannot be without each other. This is why when an *Igbo* man encounters a problem, he goes to ‘*dibia afa*’ (diviner) for consultations, that is to ask questions (*I ga-na – ajuju*) as to know the causes of his problems and the answers (solutions) to them.

Metaphysics is part of man’s existence and reality irrespective of the tribe, race or continent. On this note, Ruch and Anyanwu opined that

No rational being can live for long without some at least implicit form of metaphysics that is without somehow situating himself with regard to the world that surrounds him with regard to his fellow men and with regard to some ultimate reality which accounts for everything that is. Without such a metaphysical dimensions a rational being would be a stranger in a world of which he could not make any sense while his intellect would be clamouring for sense and explanation. ³

This means that no rational human being will exist without the elements of metaphysics because to be is metaphysics and metaphysics is to be. This implies that man has to encounter and experience both the physical (fellow men and world) and the Spiritual (God and the spiritualized agents). Without this man will be a stranger in the world in which he lives and this is not unthinkable, attainable, applicable and acceptable.

With all these assertions and postulations I will say that *Igbo* Metaphysics is a process (a process because it still goes on) whereby God, man and the world interact with each other in the universe. These interactions are among the physical, spiritual, mental and symbolic (abstract) aspects of existence. From these interactions, man who is at the middle of the hierarchy of beings defines himself (both physical and spiritual aspects of himself), existence and the world in which he lives as to reach self-realization.

Moreover, in confirming the existence of *Igbo* philosophy with its branch *Igbo* metaphysics, Akogu et al opined thus:

Igbo philosophy dates as far back as their history. From time immemorial, they have seriously wondered at nature and its surroundings and have offered to their posterity a collective of national as well as popular explanations of the things of the universe. Such a rationalistic analysis has made them develop a philosophy of their own. It has been in their tradition to give a materialistic explanation to these elements as far as is humanly possible.⁴

They noted further:

from the other of things around them, they have deduced that there is a super human intelligence responsible for it. This Being is omniscient and omnipotent. This is God. Religion is natural to them. Apart from God they also express belief in deities which they believe are less powerful than God and act as his agents e.g. the earth goddess ‘Ala’ being agent responsible for fertility and production while the sun god ‘anyanwu’ is the agent responsible for impregnating all materials creation with its warmth. Their belief in these spirits have directly or indirectly moulded all their activities. It is from this source that all their customs, traditions, folklores and morals depend on.⁵

However, acceptance of metaphysics as a source of human knowledge is anchored on the belief systems of the people.

Igbo people, who are predominantly Christians believe in some areas which are more prevalent in African traditional religion.

Some of these belief systems are

1. Belief in a Supreme Being.

Igbo people believe that there is one God known as *Chukwu* or *Chineke*. All things come from *Chineke* because He is the creator of the universe. *Chukwu* has some messengers known as deities that He gives different tasks to perform.

2. Belief in Spiritual Forces

Spiritual forces are for blessing or destruction depending on circumstances. They punish social offenders. The spiritual forces taken charge by the priests, diviners, medicine men and women.

3. Belief in Spirit being

Igbo people believe in the activities of the spirit beings who govern all spiritual physical and social phenomena. The spirit world can be either the land of the spirits (non human) or the land of the spirits of the dead.

4. Belief in Ancestors.

Igbo people believe in the existence of ancestors. They are referred to as the living dead. There is a strong *Igbo* belief that the spirits of our ancestors guide us. The living interact with the dead especially during prayers and breaking of kola nuts.

They believe that sacrifices to ancestors or spirits will protect them from harm. The ancestors who lived well and given the correct burial rites come back in the form of re-incarnation.

5. Believe in Reincarnation

Igbo people believe a lot in re-incarnation. There is a belief that people will be re-born or come back again to this world in the form of any person but the traits of the ancestor that came back will be there. Sometimes, *Diabia afa* is consulted as to know the ancestor that came back.

6. Belief in Traditional healers

Ndi Igbo also have the belief that traditional healers should be consulted when an individual is sick. This is normally done in the case of a protracted illness or illness with strong signs beyond human or scientific recognition.

Diabia Ogwu goes into divination-*Igba afa* as to find out the causes of the sickness and the remedy for it.

4.1 BEINGS IN IGBO METAPHYSICS

Being has no definite or concrete word that is equivalent to it in *Igbo* worldview. The *Igbo* metaphysicist (metaphysicist sounds more academic than metaphysician that sounds like a

magician that's why I prefer to use the former instead of the later) believes that being is anything that exists. This means that whatever is, is in so far that it is.

For Edeh and Ajah being is ' *Ife di* ' (*Ihe di*) meaning whatever exists.

However, according to Obi there is what he calls Senses of Being in *Igbo* metaphysics namely:-

1. Being as action /function.
2. Being as non – interference.
3. Being as becoming.
4. Being as self consciousness.
5. Being as transcendence.
6. Being as questioning. ⁶

1. Being as action/function

This is best described as *Idi ike* which is the power by which anything can perform any action at all but most importantly that proper function that makes it part of a kind as different from other species.

This means that each being has a spectacular function that is unique which he performs. Using the ability of *Idi ike*, the being stand strong, firm and rigid while discharging his duties.

2. Being as non-interference

Here being is neither acting on something else nor is it acted upon by an external agent. The entity is left on its own and known as *Ino nkiti* or *inolu onwe onye*.

This means that a being is not performing anything. A being is idle and busy doing nothing. This idea of sense of being does not really need to be because a being must cause a being to perform. There is nothing like chance in *Igbo* metaphysics. There is integration among the beings that one being cannot stay without the other. May be Obi was thinking of resting time but do not know how to define it.

The deities and spirits, cannot even be without their manifestations in men.

Man on his own part interacts with his fellow men in the community through communalism. He also interacts with God and other lesser gods.

3. Being as becoming

Even though being is not static, it does not become any other than itself therefore being as becoming is meant to demonstrate that being is not found as such but always in its aspects. That is being manifest itself now in one aspect and then in another.

The *Igbo* term ‘*inoghali*’ or ‘*ebe onye no, ebe ona noro a na-agu ya*. Which means that man is not satisfied with his current position in life and wants to go to the other side without checking if it worths it.

This means that when being changes position that it does not change itself. It remains the same with interference.

4. Being as self- consciousness

Means *Isochinazu*. *Chi* which is the substantial from matter is the essence of existence, animate and inanimate but in man it is the highest and has the most intelligence. *Isochinazu* therefore means to be present to one.

5. Being as transcendence

This is capacity of being to go beyond the boundaries of beings. With this, metaphysics and epistemology find a common ground in *Igbo* traditional perspective for the ability to cross the boundaries of beings is apparently the attempt to know or define them.

The word for being or transcendence is *ito felu oke*.

6. Being as questioning

Being has always been ‘the question’ but no universal answer has been within the globe. Rather than question being, being is understood here as the questioning. This means that being as the ground of all things makes a fundamental demand on them to reveal themselves. The adoption or the awareness of being as question proves to be individual’s sure path to critical and productive thought as in *Onye ajuju adighi efu uzo*.

Also *Chinasaokwu* implies that everything is responding to the basic questioning which is being.

4.1.1 HIERARCHY OF BEINGS.

Hierarchy of Beings according to Ikenga Metuh are

1. *Chi-Uk wu* (Supreme Being).
2. *Mmuo* (deities).
3. *Alusi* (spirit force).
4. *Ndi Muo* (disembodied spirits).
5. *Uwa* (the visible world).⁷

CHI

Chi in *Igbo* cosmology can be understood as God and a spark of God that is *Chi* functioning as a man's destiny or guardian angel. Let's examine *chi* as a spark before *chi* as the Supreme which is broader.

A. *CHI* as a personal spirit –guardian can be seen in *Igbo* words like

i. *Ebe onye dara ka chi ya kwaturu ya*

Meaning where a person falls is where his personal spirit – guardian pushed him down.

ii. *Oka mmadu ka chi ya* means if you are stronger than a person, you are also stronger than his personal spirit guardian.

iii. *Ofunne na amu ma ofu chi adighi eke* means that siblings have different traits due to different personal spirit guardians.

iv. *Chi mu anya* means my personal spirit guardian is awake. This is an exclamation always made by people when they escape from danger or become aware of impending danger or survive a fatal calamity.

B. *CHI* as a destiny can be seen in the following *Igbo* proverbs.

i. *Chi jiere onye chi ojoo anaghi abo abo*

This means that day never break for a person with bad *chi*.

ii. *Onye ajo chi kpatara nku ewu taa ya*

This means that the fire wood fetched by a person with bad *chi* was eaten by a goat.

C. *CHI-UKWU* as the Supreme Being.

Chukwu bu mmuo.

Okasi – okasi.

Onye ji aka ya diri na onye ya.

Na – enweghi isi mbido.

Na – enweghi isi njedebe.

Buruzia onye okike.

Osebuluwa nke ihe nile.

Catholic Catechism (*Igbo* version).

The quotation above which ushered us to the concept of *Chi-ukwu* means that God is the Supreme Spirit, the greatest of all or mightier than all who alone exists of Himself and infinite in all perfections. He is the creator and upholder of the universe.

God is at the apex (highest rank) of everything and knows everything even before it happens. He created the world out of nothing.

God in *Igbo* metaphysics has so many names in which He is known for. They are:-

Chi-ukwu – the great God, Supreme Being.

Chukwu – *onye* – *Okike*, God who creates.

Chineke - God the creator.

Amama – *amasi amasi* – the incomprehensible God.

Olisa eburuwa – God the upholder of the universe.

Igbo acceptance and possibility of the existence of *Chi-ukwu* was buttressed by Basden when he asserted thus:

Among the Ibo people there is a distinct recognition of a supreme being beneficent in character; who is above every spirit good or evil. He is believed to control all in heaven and earth and dispenses rewards and punishments according to merit. Anything that occurs for which no visible explanation is forthcoming, is attributed either to Him or His eternal enemy Ekwensu that is the devil. But *Chukwu* (as He is called) is supreme and His services are many ministering spirits whose sole business it is to fulfil His commands. This Supreme Being is designated by different rites, chief of which are *chukwu* (*chi – ukwu*) that is the Great God, *Olisa bulu uwa* is God who fashions the

world, in the southern district Chineke (God the creator) is the prevailing name. Certain actions such as murder, theft, and adultery are esteemed offences against God as well as against man.⁸

However, *Ndi Igbo* believe in the existence of this Supreme Natural Being called God. They do so not by facts or mythology but by things surrounding them and their circumstances with regards to causes and effects.

From personal experience, I think that *Ndigbo* have this firm belief from the following arguments:-

- a. Nominal Ontology.
- b. Manifestation/ Discovery.
- c. Supreme values.

a. Nominal Ontology.

This refers to names which *Ndi Igbo* give to their children. These names portray or show that they believe in a Super Natural Being. This Being has so many names but there is a particular prefix for this Being called *Chi* meaning God which appears either as a prefix or suffix to the names which *Ndi Igbo* give to their children. These names are given to their children based on circumstances before, during or after their births. Some of these names include:

- | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. | <i>Chi – zi – tere</i> | God sent. |
| 2. | <i>Chi – di – ebube</i> | God is miraculous/ marvellous. |
| 3. | <i>Chukwu-emeka/Nna-emeka</i> | God has done it. |
| 4. | <i>Chi – na – edu</i> | God leads. |
| 5. | <i>Ngozi – Chukwu</i> | God’s blessings. |
| 6. | <i>Okwu – dili – chukwu</i> | Words belong to God. |
| 7. | <i>Ike – chukwu/ Ike – Nna</i> | God’s power. |
| 8. | <i>Chi – de-raa</i> | Once God has written, He has written. |
| 9. | <i>Chi – di – ebele</i> | God is merciful. |
| 10. | <i>Chi – nye – re</i> | God gives. |
| 11. | <i>Chukwu – di</i> | God exists. |
| 12. | <i>Uche – Chukwu</i> | God’s mind/thought. |
| 13. | <i>Chukwu– ma</i> | God knows. |

- | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| 14. | <i>Chi – oma-</i> | Good God. |
| 15. | <i>Chukwu – bu – ikem</i> | God is my strength. |
| 16. | <i>Chukwu – ebuka</i> | God is great. |
| 17. | <i>Chi – na – echerem</i> | God thinks for me. |
| 18. | <i>Chi – emerie</i> | God is victorious. |
| 19. | <i>Chi – goziri – mu</i> | God has blessed me. |
| 20. | <i>Ka – osi – so – chukwu</i> | As God wishes. |

b. Manifestation/ Discovery.

Igbo worldview is dynamic. The universe is a large system consisting of God the Supreme power that is *Chukwu – Onye Okike* who created it, spirit powers who rule over every aspect of this creation and at the centre man. Everything below man was created for man and the inanimate things also serve him.

The whole system is alive because it is energized by a spiritual force emanated from the Supreme Being that is *Chukwu – kelu uwa*. This force flows from the Supreme Being to man and from man to all things lower on the state of life.

Moreover, *Igbo* man thinks about this Supreme Being, the spirit forces and the world in which he lives. During reflections, he asks himself the following questions

- i. I came to this world and saw it, who made this world, who made me and left me behind this world?
- ii. What was the purpose of my creation and when I die where hence forth do I go?

After asking these questions and answering them, he attributed the creator to a Supreme Being that lives above that is *Chi – Ukwu*.

Again *Igbo* man wants explanation of mysteries and he imposed it on the Super Natural Being. When he accepts the existence of a Super Natural Being as the source of his life that is his provider, sustainer and creator he tries to reciprocate by saying ‘‘I thank you God’’. *Ndi Igbo* thank God through prayers, offerings, thanksgivings etc.

c. Supreme Values

This refers to one's search for what is good or what is truth. *Igbo* man believes that there is a need to search for what is the truth. He believes that there is a Being that is immortal whom is responsible for this truthfulness or goodness because man being mortal cannot attain truthfulness or goodness unless with the intervention of the Supreme Being.

MMUO (SPIRITS).

Mmuo are non human spirits. They are created by God who is the greatest spirit of all because He is a spirit. Spirits are spirits *qua* spirits. They are spirits in so far they are spirits.

Mmuo includes God the creator, *alusi* and all other spirits.

Ozumba explains what spirits meant to the African people which by implication is applicable to *Igbo* African when he asserted thus:

The Africans do not see spirits but they believe they exist, knowing their qualities to be immaterial. There is ample evidence that the activities of these spirits affect them favourably or adversely. However, there is the belief that everybody has its distinctive qualities whether perceived or not.⁹

Abanuka was also of the view that God sent some spirits to interact with men on earth when he opined that

It was through interaction with men that names of the four spirits God had sent as messengers to earth were discovered. These spirits Eke, Orié, Afor, Nkwo showed their appreciation for human ingenuity and determination by establishing the four market days which bear their names.¹⁰

This means that after the spirit's sojourn on earth, they wanted to make an impact by creating the market days so that men will appreciate them and live with their memories.

Meanwhile, there are some people who answer the names of the four market days in *Igbo*.

They include:

Nweke/Okeke-son of *Eke*.

Mgbeke-daughter of *Eke*.

Nworie/Nwoye/Okoye-son of *Orie/Oye*.

Mgborie /Mgboye-daughter of *Orie/Oye*.

Nwafor/Okafor-son of *Afor*.

Mgbafor- daughter of *Afor*.

Nwankwo/Okonkwo-son of *Nkwo*.

Mgbankwo-daughter of *Nkwo*.

It is important to note that most of these names are fading away as first names but very prevalent, common and famous as surnames of most *Igbo* people.

ALUSI (SPIRIT – FORCES)

Alusi are known as spirit forces, metaphysical forces or even being forces. *Alusi* can be in form of an object, a river, a piece of land, a tree or even forests. An *alusi* can possess either all or any of the forms.

Alusi becomes an *alusi* when any of these forms are charged and there is a manifestation of spirit or invisible supernatural forces emanating from them.

Alusi can be inherited or imported. It is either owned by a person, a family, a clan, or even a community. My research has shown that most of these *alusi* came into existence during war times. They were either individuals who sacrificed themselves so that their village will live or they are imported from other communities.

For example the *aro alusi* of Abagana was a woman who sacrificed herself that her people might live during the time of war when the town was originally answering Mbagana. This shows that *Aro* is a female *alusi*.

However, a remarkable thing about this *Aro* is that anybody who wants to talk about her shed tears because of her sacrifice. There was a time a contemporary preacher Rev. Fr. Ejike

Mbaka visited Abagana, while in the crusade he asked the congregation the name of their *alusi* and people shouted *Aro*. The priest then shouted “Holy Ghost” as to destroy the *Aro alusi* but nobody replied “fire” and the priest was amazed and asked them ‘*Unu a choro imebi alusi unu*’? Meaning don’t you people want to destroy your deity? An elderly man came out and told Fr. Mbaka that ‘*Aro adighi acho okwu, o nne ka o bu*. This means that *Aro* does not look for trouble, she is a mother.

Moreover, in towns like Aguleri, Anaku and Nando, some *alusi* were imported there from Igala land. Sometimes when a ‘client’s’ demand cannot be met there they are referred to *Igala* land where the head of the *alusi* is.

There is a relationship between one *alusi* and another. This is a situation where one *alusi* will tell another *alusi* to perform a function for a client and after they will share the ‘gifts’ from the client.

One striking scene I have noticed is that people write their problems in a white paper and it is dropped in front of the deity and answers to their problems are revealed. Imagine a spiritual force being educated by reading what is written with a pen and paper. This is a mystery we will unravel in our future metaphysical research.

Sometimes *alusi* act wickedly or according to Metuh ‘*alusi* act irrationally and this distinguishes them from the deities’. They can also act honestly and to me this depends on the ‘chief priest’ who is either honest or callous (mostly greedy ones).

My research has shown that most honest “chief priests” are those who were ordained even before their births (destined or proclaimed chief priests). This is because if they go contrary to the *alusi* and its functions, they will lose their “third eyes” or ‘*Anya ndi mmuo ha ji afu uzo*’. The wicked ones are mostly those who learnt it as a trade as to acquire wealth.

There is a case of a ‘client’ who wanted to kill his debtor but after consultations, the chief priest noticed that it was his ‘client’ who actually is the real debtor. The chief priest then told his ‘client’ that ‘*alusi mu adighi egbu onye aka ya di ocha*’ meaning my *alusi* does not kill innocent people. So the ‘client’ left and the chief priest told me that he made a ‘wall’ against that client’s creditor whom he did not know so that another wicked chief priest will not kill him and I encouraged him to do more of that as to have sanctity in the whole metaphysical propensities.

There is always a day set aside for the celebration of an *alusi* in its host community. For example *Aro Abagana* is celebrated on the last *afor* market day of December. It is a day known as ‘Ede *aro*’ and her worshippers are expected to cook and eat only cocoyam that day. It is a very big symbolic ceremony where most of the participants are Christians.

NDI MMUO (DISEMBODIED SPIRITS)

Ndi mmuo is an army of the disembodied spirits of the dead. The spirits of good men who have reached *Ala mmuo* the spirit land are called *Ndiichie*, ancestors. The spirits of evil men roam restlessly in *Ama ndi mmuo na mmadu* that is an intermediate state between the spirit land and the visible world of men.

UWA MMADU (the visible world).

This is the world of man’s daily experience. Man lives out most of his cycle of life in the visible world. The presence of the spirits are also felt here by man. The visible world also contains inanimate things like trees and minerals of natural resources.

4.1.2 INTERACTION OF BEINGS.

There is a continuous interaction between visible beings and invisible beings. That is there is a movement of entities from one world to another. This means that beings from one world interact with beings from another world. Interaction of beings in *Igbo* world view is similar to that of Bantu’s own.

According to Tempels

Africans conceive beings as living forces. Being is always active, dynamic not static. Beings are linked with one another by a network of relationship like a spider’s web and the action of one affects the whole. Since being is a living force, interaction between beings may lead either to the reinforcement of the power of being or its diminution.

11

This means that although existent beings are individual forces, there is interaction of these beings with one another. These beings have a bond that binds them together. There is a solid and firm string that holds them together which make it impossible for them to crumble. But once a being is shaken, the whole being falls.

Ogugua was very clear in explaining the dependency of forces when he opined thus:

There is interaction of forces, one flows into another and vice versa or else what does it mean to say that African world view is essentially holistic? The Igbo people say ‘Ife kwulu ife akwudebe ya’, – when a thing stand something else stands close by or by its sides. Forces have an intimate ontological relationship with each other.¹²

Moreover, in Igbo metaphysics, no explanation is complete without reference to all these beings in their hierarchical order in the universe because they all interact with one another. There is nothing like being as non-interference that is *ino nkiti* or *inolu onwe onye*.

4.2 IGBO METAPHYSICAL DEITIES.

Deities are those spiritual entities that help man in the acquisition of mystical knowledge. They see the ‘unseen’. The common characteristic of these deities is that they have spiritual forces, they are spirit themselves. There are hundreds of deities in *Igbo Land*.

The Deities according to Ikenga Metuh are as follows:-

1. *Anyanwu* (sun).
2. *Igwe, Amadioha or Kamalu*.
3. *Ala* (Earth Deity).
4. *Ifejioku*.
5. *Agwu*.

1. ANYANWU (SUN)

The sun, the lord, God creator seems to refer to a single personality. In Awka a favourite name for God is *Anyanwu*. *Anyanwu* is emanation of God. It is a deity bringing wealth and good fortune.

2. IGWE, AMADIOHA OR KAMALU

Just as husband fertilizes his wife, so *igwe* in the form of rain fertilizes *Ala* the Earth Deity. *Igwe* is regarded as the agent of *Chineke* against undected criminals. He exposes his power and anger in thunder bolts and lightening. In serious disputes involving false and malicious accusations, *Chukwu* is sometimes called upon to arbitrate through *Amadioha*.

3. ALA (EARTH DEITY)

Just as *Chukwu* presides over the sky deities, so (Earth Deity) is believed to preside over the deities below. *Ala* is regarded as the owner of man, alive or dead. *Ala* is the giver of fertility to men, animals and crops. Men are born in the earth, they feed on the products of the earth and when they die, they are buried in the earth.

Ala is the source and custodian of *Omenani* – customs and traditions and public morality.

Accordingly she exercises the main ritual sanctions in disputes and offenses. Crimes such as adultery, incest, homicide, unnatural birth e.g birth of twins etc are all offences against *Ala*, the Earth deity. They are therefore called *Nso Ala*, taboos of the earth deity. Sanctions for such crimes include propitiatory sacrifices to *Ala*.

4. IFEJIOKU

Ifejioku is the deity protector of the yam, the main food of *Igbo people*. Even though *Ifejioku* is subordinate to *ala*, the Earth deity and collaborates with her, it is not an *Arusi*. In some places it is called *Njoku* or *Ajoku*. Sacrifices are made to *Ifejioku* before the planting season and soon after the harvesting of new yams.

5. AGWU

Agwu is the patron spirit of divination and diviners. It is called *mmuo nkpassa* that is spirit of confusion. *Agwu* chooses its worshippers, endows them with the gift of divination and the knowledge of medicinal herbs. *Agwu* afflicts its victims with psychological disturbances which sometimes takes the forms of restlessness, wastefulness or even madness – *Ara Agwu*. Hence if you ask somebody *Agwu ona-akpa gi?* Are you seized by *Agwu*? It is just like saying Are you mad? The rite of *Ilu Agwu* or *Ikpu Agwu*; tying up or covering up *agwu* should not only bring the victim back to normality but also harness the power of *Agwu* in him for the practice of divination and healing with herbs.¹³

These deities are natural entities because they are endowed by *Chi-ukwu* who is the creator of all things that are. These deities get energy from *Chi-ukwu* who is the source of their life energy. *Igbo* deities have been with us since the existence of the *Igbo* world and we need to explain them more as to come out with more accepted universal theories of them.

4.3 CATEGORIES IN IGBO WORLD VIEW.

A category tends to classify a reality, it is that in which a reality is known for its existence that is *Ife eji wee malu ife*. A category can be spiritual (unseen) or physical (seen).

Igbo people have categories in which they know the existence of realities.

Ogugua postulated that every reality would be subsumed under the following categories:

<i>Muo</i>	-	Spirit
<i>Mmadu</i>	-	Human being
<i>Anu</i>	-	Animal (tame and wild)
<i>Ife</i>	-	Things
<i>Ebe</i>	-	Place
<i>Oge</i>	-	Time
<i>Uzo</i>	-	Modality (manner or style) ¹⁴

***Muo* (Spirit)**

Muo in *Igbo* ontology means spirit. Spirit can be in a form of human, animal, plant, land, river or wind. The presence of a spirit is always felt by the physical human being. Spirit can be either good or bad hence *ezigbo muo na ajo muo*. *Ezigo muo* (good spirit) is believed to come from *Chi-Ukwu* the Great God. It is “*Onatalu Chi*” that which comes from *Chi*. *Ezigbo muo* helps people to behave in good manners for the betterment of the society.

Ajo muo is believed to come from evil spirit or *ekwensu* (devil). It is the destructive spirit that destroys an individual who in turn destroys the society.

Both spirits can be seen in a man during the time of its manifestations in one’s character.

Mbaegbu defined *muo* as thus:

Muo falls into three sub categories namely *Chi-ukwu* (the Greatest spirit), *muo* (non-human spirit) and *Ndi muo* (human spirits). These are spirits strictly speaking whether human or non-human, they may have a shadowy bodily form, yet they assume different shapes such as human, animal, plant etc but without any bodily forms permanently attached to them.¹⁵

***Mmadu* (Human being)**

Mmadu (human being) is a being, living and rational creature that is created by *Chi-Ukwu* the Great God. Human being has a soul, a spirit, a body and a mind. The mind is what makes a human being to be rational in the sense that the human mind helps man to think feel, and to be conscious of his environment.

Human being lives in the physical world known as earth-*uwa*. Human beings include men, women, boys and girls. Every other thing like animals and plants are under human being.

Human beings use the resources within their reach to manufacture or produce things for their consumption and survival. In hierarchy of beings, human being is at the middle.

***Anu* (animals tame and wild)**

Animals – *anu* are lower than man in hierarchy. *N'ala Igbo e nwere anu ulo nke gunyere okuko, ewu, aturu, nkita, ezi. Anu ohia gunyekwara mbe, agwo, agu, odum, osa, nchi were diri gaba zia.*

The above sentences translates that in *Igbo* land, there are tamed animals such as fowl, goat sheep, dog and pig. Wild animals are tortoise, snake, tiger, lion, squirrel, grass cutter etc.

There are animals which are revered in some parts of *Igbo* land. For example *eke*-a python is seen as sacred or a god. Whenever a person mistakenly kills it in that revered places, he will buy a coffin, put it inside it and mourn it like a human being. It sounds awful but it is their belief. In Awka town they respect monkeys a lot, they will never kill nor eat it. This is because monkeys warn the Chief Priests of *Imo* Awka (river goddess) whenever the enemies are coming to invade the town during war times.

However, animals play an important role in symbolic ritual expressions. For example, a chick can be killed as to save a human soul. Sometimes, fetish and wicked people use tortoise which walks slowly to slow down peoples' successes though this can happen to only those who are not strong in prayers.

Ugo bird is a sign of good luck because *a dighi ahu, ugo mgbe ncha* is, it is a rare bird that is hardly seen.

***Ife/Ihe* (Things)**

Ihe means things in *Igbo* world. Things means non animate entities. They are mostly non-living things. *Ihe na-adighi ndu, na-adighi eku ime.* Things do not have soul or spirit.

For example, minerals which include gold, copper, iron-ore, limestone, etc or objects like table, chair, cup etc.

The thing of a thing is the uniqueness of that thing to be known as a thing. This means that a thing must be categorized as a thing as to become a thing.

Things are inactive and can only be acted upon by man or spirits.

Things can be discussed as an aspect of *the nile* that is, everything. This everything means both seen and unseen things. Therefore things are seen as entities or objects.

Ebe (Place)

Ebe means a place. A place is where an event occurred or where something happened. This means that in *Igbo* world view, a place is a name of a space within a geographical area.

A cause must happen (take place) in a place before its effect is seen or reflected in that place or another place as the case may be.

In *Igbo* ontology, nothing happens in an unknown place. It must be a known place whether in a spiritual realm or physical sphere.

Oge (Time)

Oge is time. *Oge* as one of *Igbo* categories means when a thing happened or when a cause took an effect. Every event must happen at a stipulated time.

The time can be *ututu* (morning), *ehihie* (afternoon), *mgbede* (evening) or *abali* (night). It can even be on *eke, orie, afor, nkwo* market days. It can also be during rainy season, dry season or harmattan, before the world war, during Biafra/Nigeria war, during the regime of Abacha or after the death of Abacha, during the time of Goodluck first tenure as president etc.

This means that in *Igbo* world view, events or history is use to calculate time. During the day a man's shadow is used to calculate time and not the westerner's chronometer though civilization has made most people to use the "clock" to know the time.

However, past time is as long as the mind can remember past events and the future is as long as the mind can imagine. This can be seen in the *Igbo* proverbs, *echi di ime* – tomorrow is pregnant, *nku one kpara na okochi ka o na – agha na udumiri* – firewood a man fetched during dry season is what he uses during raining season.

Igbo people believe in *Oge-chi ka mma* which means God's time is the best. This is used to describe a long awaited event that finally occur. This is easily seen in progress or success of an enterprise or a long awaited child.

Uzo – Modality (manner or style)

Uzo simply means the way. That is a way by which a thing is done. It can simply be seen as a process of doing something.

In *Igbo* world view, whatever happens or whatever exists, must have a way or manner or style of existing. It means that the thing that is existing must define itself in its peculiar way.

Uzo is a gradual process, it is not static. It changes from one stage to another. That is why it is a style or manner which can change depending the circumstances that surround it.

However, the categories according to Alexis Kagame are *Muntu*, *Kintu*, *Hantu* and *Kuntu*

Kagame argues that these categories are infrastructure of African philosophy. All beings, all essences in whatever form they are conceived can be subsumed under one of these categories. Nothing can be conceived outside item.

He went further to say that everything that exist must necessarily belong to these four categories as a force and not as a substance.

However, forces are related to one another. The relationship of these forces is expressed by the stem “*NTU*” which is ever present in each of the categories.

If the determinatives *Mu*, *Ki*, *Ha* and *Ku* are removed, what is left in each of the categories is the stem “*NTU*”.

This according to kagame explains the inter-relationship and interactions of forces in Bantu world-view.

EXPLANATION OF THE CATEGORIES

Muntu is force endowed intelligence it includes the living and the dead.

kuntu encompasses all the forces that cannot act for themselves but can become active only on the command of a *Muntu*. Objects of customary usage, animals, minerals, tools, plants etc. belong to this category.

Hantu is the force which localizes spatially and temporally every event and every motion because since all beings are force, everything is constantly in motion.

In some cases a question of place can be answered in terms of time. In other cases a question can be answered by an allocation of place. In Bantu thought therefore, there is an indissoluble rapport between space - time. This is also evident in *Igbo* metaphysics where space-time is dependent concept where space and time intermingle and intermarry each other in terms of causes and events.

Kuntu is the last category. All the modalities belong to it and it covers such concepts like beauty, laughter etc.

4.4 REALITIES IN IGBO WORLD VIEW

Igbo hold the view that the spirit and physical are inseparable aspects of realities. Although they may look different the two elements are dependent of each other, they cannot be without each other. There are so many forces in the universe and these forces intermingle with each other.

Ogugua buttressed thus:

Experience of our reality is characterized by communication and exchange. In African world view, forces intermingle and inter penetrate each other, the spiritual world and the physical world are in marriage hence the essentially holistic vision of reality, resolution of conflicts and contradictory and upholding of harmonic order in creation of worlds. The *Igbo* man does not think only of this physical world, he rather thinks more of the non-material, spiritual world, although conscious that he encounters only one world but in different aspects.¹⁶

This intimacy between these two realities is very possible because in the physical, a person feels the spiritual element while being in the spiritual, a person feels the physical elements.

Anyanwu enunciated thus:

Unless one realises that the spirit-world is vivid in the material world and that both are inseparable, one would not come near to understanding the *Igbo* concept of ultimate reality, it is in assumption that the spirit dwells in matter that forms the basis of *Igbo* religion, philosophy, ethics, and politics etc.¹⁷

However, *Igbo* reality is dynamic because it is an ongoing process because there are more of them to be unravelled in the future. Reality is a manifestation of being because it has special relation with all existent beings, objects, or subjects.

Though the physical world is occupied by man, animal and plants the invisible spiritual world is the world of spirits ranging from ancestors to *Chi-ukwu* they are not separate entities because they intermingle, they relate with each other.

Echekwube noted thus “the multifarious nature of the universe is conceptually one in Igbo world view that there is no clear distinction between the spiritual and the physical. Reality is homogenous in Igbo cosmogenic view”.¹⁸

There is utmost belief in *Igbo* reality that whatever exists or happens must do so in the world of opposites. There are contrary powers, events, and forces both in the physical and spiritual spheres of existence.

Nwigwe elucidated thus:

The Igbo conception of reality is ambivalent in the sense that everything co-exists with its opposite. In fact body and spirit are coextensive with each other, so do suffering- joy, pain-pleasure, life- death, good- evil etc. They all constitute part of the existential issue that belong to life itself. This is why very stringent initiation rites accompany the advent of manhood and womanhood to prepare the initiates for the unavoidable odds of life.¹⁹

Reality in the *Igbo* understanding is universal with the African conception of reality. This means that reality in African is one, unique, universal and generally accepted.

Commenting on African reality, Balogun enunciated thus:

African thought abhors the type of dualism found in western philosophy. For the African there is just a single order of nature. The world of the physical and the spiritual are so closely linked such that life in the former is seen as a mere replication of life in the later. Furthermore, life forms in the material world are said to be modelled after those in the supernatural world of spiritual existence. From plant life to animal life down to man and the ancestors, there is a constant interaction and the interplay of roles and functions. The distinction between natural and supernatural is blurred in African world view.²⁰

However, everything that happens in the physical world has a root in the spiritual world. This means that there is an inner most thought or intuition in the spiritual world that tries to manifest its replica in the physical world. That is there is a manifestation of what has happened in the spiritual world to the physical world.

This can be seen in the sayings like *o nweghi ihe na-eme chi mu amaghi* – there is nothing that happens that my *chi* (personal guardian) does not know.

This is more evident on the death of a young person. The people will say ‘*Ebugo ya n’ime mmuo ka mgbe tupu o puta ihe*. Meaning the person has been killed in the spirit for a long time before it manifested physically.

4.5 THE IMMORTALITY OF SOUL

The human personality in the *Igbo* world is part of the human reality. The *Igbo* human person possesses the aspects that are holistic or one in nature. There is no sharp distinction between aspects of human person. They are like the doctrine of Trinity in one God where God the father, God the son and God the Holy Spirit are one God but in three different manifestations or persons.

This is why Ogugua made it clear that “although the *Igbo* offer a dualistic explanation of reality, they do not make any radical distinction between the body and the soul (mind) as evident in western understanding of reality”.²¹

The aspects of the human person in *Igbo* are as follows

Ahu - body

Mmuo - Spirit

Mkpuruobi - soul

Uche - mind

However, *Igbo* person did not separate these entities but they function harmoniously as to give value or existence to the human person. This makes a man a physical, a psychological and a spiritual being. Unah made it clear when he noted that “Reality is an inseparable

mixture of mind and matter. Mind and matter, the spiritual and the physical have never been apart. They have never really been separated so that we cannot talk of synthesizing them.”²²

Ahu is the human body that houses the *mmuo*, *mkpuruobi* and *uche*. The human mind on its own aspect need the human body as to perform its functions. Some of the functions of the mind are consciousness, volition, thinking, willing, etc. If the human mind fails to perform its duty, it can result to madness and can be seen in the saying *Isi adighi ya mma*.

After death the spirit which is the essence of man and the soul transits to another state of change. The spirit according to *Igbo* stays in the land of “living dead” where they interfere with the people in the physical world. The good spirit become ancestors and can re-incarnate while the bad spirits roam around evil forests. The classification of good and bad spirit depends on how a person lived his life in the physical world.

Asouzu buttressed thus:

Survival of human person after death is imaginable only as a totality. The spirit (*mmuo*) is not only immaterial but a reflection of the totality of the human person as it survives after death such that this spiritualized body must have its faculties and the capacity to perform its operations fully intact. This is why this spirit (*mmuo*) goes to the land of the living dead or land of spirits (*ala mmuo*) and can be omnipresent at the same time as situations require.²³

This means that the soul survives after the death of the body. The soul is immortal because it is the spark of *Chi-ukwu* which is spiritual and immortal.

According to Ozumba

The soul of man is immortal. It continues to exist after the dissolution of the body. Its abode is determined by how well it lived here, it will live in a special place of peace but if it lived badly, it may be barred from having a resting place, it may continue to roam the earth. However, all spirits are said to have direct contact with the physical earth. This is why ancestral spirits are sacrificed to in the understanding that they come to eat of

the sacrifices. This shows that Christian's concept of eternal separation between the living and the dead is not agreeable to the African worldview. The concept of heaven and hell is not well delineated in the African conception.²⁴

From the above quotation it is very clear that immortality of soul exists concretely in the *Igbo* African world view. As the saying goes whatever a man sows that he reaps. *I mee njo, njo esobe gi ma ime mma, mma eso be gi.*

This means that man receives his blessings or punishments after death depending on the way he lived his life in the physical world.

As we said earlier, if a man lived a good life, he becomes revered and an ancestor, sometimes some of the good ones come back to life *via* re-incarnation.

4.5.1 RE-INCARNATION

Re-incarnation in *Igbo* world view is a situation whereby a dead person comes back or returns to the world in the form of a new born baby.

This is a strong belief among *Igbo* people. When a new child is born, he or she may show some physical signs of a departed soul that will make people to know that he/she is a re-incarnated soul. Sometimes, when a child is born, the parents or any member of the community goes for consultations as to know who ‘returned’.

For example in Umuokwara village, Orlu town whenever a child is born, the elderly people go into consultation as to know who returned. When that is done, they come back to call the child by the name the ancestor was bearing while alive. That is in that area, you see little children answering surnames (as a nickname) that does not belong to his/her immediate family.

There is a case of a little girl of two (2) years Chinemerem whose mother refused to call her by the name of the ancestor that came back. Because of that, she became ‘mysteriously’ sick that the hospital could not find any bacteria or virus responsible and yet the child is dying. On hearing that, an elderly man in the community went for consultations, came back

came and called her the name of the ancestor that returned. To the amazement of everybody, she laughed and nodded and that was the end of the sickness till today.

Moreover, a re-incarnated child shows mostly the same traits of the ancestor that returned. Sometimes he/she remembers what has happened before his or her birth like in the case of the author who always remembers incidents and events and becomes confused when such things re-occur.

4.6 SPATIO – TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN IGBO WORLD VIEW

Space – time in *Igbo* cosmology is like the nature of reality, soul and body which are not distinct or wholly separate or different from each other.

Space- time is one and holistic in nature. They intermingle and are dependent on each other. Space – *Mbara* cannot exist without time – *Oge* and vice versa. This is because anything that happens must happen in space-time.

Time is not static but cyclical, that is it moves on around space and within a space without waiting for anybody. Motion, events and occurrences happen in space within a period of time.

Everybody is occupied with space – time and cannot do without them. Iroegbu made it clear that ‘time is eternal it continues forever, time is long because it is part of the reality of belongingness.’²⁵

However, some *Igbo* researchers have made it clear that the *Igbo* idea of space consists of three cyclical (because it moves round and round in circle) dimensions namely *Igwe* – sky, *Ala*- earth and *Ala- mmuo* – land of living dead.

Nwoga supported this view when he opined thus:

Space is a field of action, a plane of action, not just a location made up of discrete physical distances and separate physical spaces. *Alammuo* (spirit world) and *ala mmadu* (human world) are then planes of spirit action and of human action and these need not be physically separated. It is this non - separation in physical terms that makes interaction between the various worlds possible so that spirits and their activities impinge in the realities in the human and physical.

²⁶

Ndi *Igbo* do not use chronometer to measure time but it is inherent and imbedded in them to know that it is time to do this or that within a space of time.

Oge – time is a part of nature or an event to live with. The *Igbo* people actually know the time to do everything within space because there is time for everything. They do not use chronometer. They know the time to wake up by the crow of the cock, time to eat, time to go to farm or work and time to go to sleep by checking one's shadow in the light or under the moon. The rainy season is time to farm, dry season to harvest and harmatan to clear the field for the next planting season.

Space – time is experienced more concretely in the rising and setting of the sun, in the emergence and resting of the moon etc.

Chimakonam was of the view that

Time helps us to characterize space, space helps us to define time and thus the *Igbo* conceive them in a continuum. The four dimensional space in *Igbo* thought namely *Eke – ukwu*, *Oye – ukwu*, *Afor – ukwu*, *Nkwo ukwu* correspond to four spaces in *Igbo*, *ala/uwa*, *Ala ndi ichie* and *Ala mmuo*.²⁷

Chimakonam buttressed his idea further by quoting Animalu thus:

Because the *Igbo* conceived motion as cyclic changes of space and time, they used the same names – *Eke*, *Oye*, *Afo*, *Nkwo* to designate both locations in space such as *Eke – Otolu*, *Afo – Oba*, *Nkwo – Nnewi*; *Oye – Ojoto* and locations in time of the four *Igbo* market week (*izu*).²⁸

There is a relationship between the space – time we experience in the physical world and space – time in the spiritual world.

This idea was made clear by Asouzu who enunciated thus:

The flow of consciousness in space and time is a part of the totality of the world. The *Igbo* philosopher fused the idea of a transcendent space and time in a manner that renders speculations about absolute space and time superfluous. The reason is that space and time form one continuum and aspects of the totality that joins the material and the immaterial, the living and the dead in a way that is existentially relevant.²⁹

He went further to say that

This is to say, this traditional African philosopher was able to transpose the idea of physical space of everyday experience into a transcendent space that extended beyond the physical into the realm of the supernatural. This idea of space and time formed the framework for the transcendent unity of consciousness in a way that unifies the real world with the ideal supernatural world in a complementary harmonious manner. This form of arrangement while imbuing special characteristics to the medium of communication between the physical and the transcendent, between the spiritual and the material helps to rein-force the unity between the phenomenon and the noumenon.³⁰


This means that space – time makes an *Igbo* man to articulate the complementary unity of consciousness in a way to know the distinction between the real and the ideal, the material and immaterial, the spiritual and the physical. For example, when the rain starts earlier than expected, *Igbo* African people know that it is not yet time to start farming but a clear indication that there will be much rain for the time to come.

They also know that there is a particular time at noon that *ndi mmuo* (spirits) visit the market, they all make space within that time as for the spirits to occupy.

Again, they know at a time at dusk the spirits come out and visit the villages, they do not come out. Even if there is a knock at the door it will not be opened because the spirits are knocking.

This researcher has had that experience in this contemporary time. I woke up and decided to wash my children's clothes by two in the morning (2am) at the balcony of my house. But to my greatest surprise my mum came out and warned me to go inside (while I am in a story building) that this is the time the spirits move around. I argued with her to the logical conclusion that I do this always that my *Chi* is with me therefore nothing will happen to me but she refused and rebuked me.

The point – cyclical space – time continuum in *Igbo* thought. This is a diagram by Chimakonam



The outer circle represents various stages of time just as the inner circle represents various compartments of space, thus the outer circle equals to the inner circle. *Abani* is a stage in the 12 hourly cycle of night as well as in angle space *Eke – ukwu* as it rolls over to *ngabi – abani*. *Eke Ukwu* inevitably rolls over to *Oye ukwu* .

Also as *ngabi – abani* rolls over to *ime abani* and then to *isi – ututu*, *Oye ukwu* rolls over to *Afo ukwu* and then to *Nkwo ukwu*. The difference here is that while time has a 24 hourly cycle of night and day, space is composed of ever cyclic stages that keeps touch with time whether night or day. This ensures that when *isi-ututu* rolls over to *ututu* and then to *ngabi – ubochi*, *ehihie* and finally to *mgbede* to complete the plane and night cycle of time the plane angle spaces keep touch with time.³¹

However, *Igbo* man makes appropriate use of his time until the western introduction of the chronometer. This chronometer made *Igbo* Africans to forget their root and knowledge about the importance of time to them. They now become slaves to the tick – tack of the clock hence the slogan ‘‘African time’’.

African time in this context is not real but the reverse is the case. This is when an *Igbo* African goes late to a ceremony after the tic-tack has left the number where it supposes to be on his arrival.

The past of time is nothing than the human mind as it recollects or remembers events *phenomena* or occurrences that have taken place. This is why *Igbo* talk about *Mgbe ochie, oge – ochie, mgbe elu bu ala osa, oge oso* Abiola, *tupu agha Biafra ebido, ka – agha – bilu were diri gaba zia.*

These are words that represent past (time) and some of them mean during the olden days, during Abiola election crises, before the Biafra war, after the war etc.

The future is simply the human mind as it imagines. It has no objective existent outside the mind which remembers. The future is simply the human mind as it considers thinks and reflects both the past, the present and what will still happen (future).

This can be seen in *Igbo* words like *echi di ime, echi eteka, echi, oge na – abia, oge na – eteghi aka.* The words meant tomorrow is pregnant, tomorrow is still far, tomorrow, time to come, recent time to come.

This shows that *Igbo* African man thinks for the future and makes plans for it so that the rain will not beat him unprepared. This is unlike Mbiti's idea that Africans do not have future but *Ndi Igbo* do have.

Space – time is a continuous process that happens within the mind of the perceiver therefore it is a mental phenomenon.

4.7 THE CONCEPT OF CAUSE- EFFECT IN IGBO METAPHYSICS

Causality means that every cause has an effect and every effect must have a cause. This idea establishes the relationship between cause and effect.

In *Igbo* cosmology, man knows things or events in their causes. This can be seen in the sentences: *ihe kwuru, ihe akwu do be ya, ihe mere ede jiri bee nwii.* These sentences means that causality is the essence of life and order in *Igbo* world view. There is an orderly universe in which all events are caused. This means that whatever exist must have reasons why it is so. This cause which is the efficient and final cause points to *Chi-ukwu* – God who is at the apex of the hierarchy of beings. The idea made *Chi-ukwu* to be at the centre of causality. *Ihe chi-*

ukwu amaghi adighi eme – there is nothing that happens without the knowledge of God. This is rooted on the centrality of *Chi* as the *Igbo* causality.

Explaining this idea of *chi* as the cause of causality, Asouzu opined thus:

The traditional African philosopher was committed to the idea of ultimate principles and causes that are responsible for effects existing in the world. Likewise effects of all causes can always be countered by other causes and that a thing can be the effect of diverse causes. This is the idea with the case of *Chi* which serves as the determining principles for the lives of human beings. *Chi* acts as a cause but its reality does not negate in any way the constitutive role which the mother plays as a necessary co-causal factor in the generation of children.³²

This means that *Chi-ukwu* participates in every event in the life of an *Igbo* man. Every event in a man's life be it success or failure is known as *Onatalu-chi* which means a gift from God.

Moreover, this idea of causality in *Igbo* upholds that nothing happens by chance. There is no event whose cause is not known because every event must have a cause that caused it. This means that an *Igbo* man is free to choose between alternatives. Causality is seen behind every reality in *Igbo* world view. This means that with the knowledge of causality a person can penetrate *noumena* which is the core of metaphysics which Kant denied and said that reason cannot penetrate.

Ohia enunciated thus: “Apart from the fact of observation, man has ability to acquire the knowledge of the inner most secrets of nature by causes, which is by every standard beyond the empirical desiderata by means of his intellectual powers”.³³

However, in the case of unexpected events – *Odachi* (especially premature deaths, suicide) or accident – *ihe mberede* or strange and incurable diseases, *Igbo* man resorts to the *alusi* (deity) or *I ga na* – *ajuju ka dibia afa gbaa afa* (going for divination for the diviner to see beyond the ordinary).

Dukor elucidated thus:

In an attempt to understand the principle of causation, one needs to understand some basic elements of Igbo metaphysics of cause and effect. It is assumed that where disease strikes, that there is a harmony of elements in the body and this has an underlying cause. It just did not happen. The belief that this could have been caused by some personal agent is not rejected, neither is the idea that it is caused by a germ thrown away. The cure will definitely depend on discovering or identifying the agent involved, the reason for the incursion and the extent of the damage and what should be the remedy with proper procedure so as to count the adverse influence already recovered. The problem already recorded. The problem is usually identified in the traditional society by means of divination.³⁴

It is pertinent to note that *Chi-ukwu* – God is the cause of all events. He is the final and efficient cause from which everything emanates from.

4.8 SYMBOLS IN IGBO METAPHYSICS.

Symbols are overt expressions of what are behind the veil of direct perceptions. Symbols are always for something else because it cannot define or be for itself.³⁵ This means that a symbol signifies what it symbolises and symbolises what it signifies. It signifies ordinarily what it is not.

Ogugua noted thus:

A symbol is something, a reality we can apprehend with the aid of our consciousness and with which we can connect meaning. It is an overt expression of the reality behind the cloud of any direct act of perception and apprehension which really possesses scientific connotation outside its norm.³⁶

Symbols point out to something beyond themselves because it is a concrete indication of abstract values.

A symbolic expression can encapsulate many things that is it can represent many different things in different levels of understanding. Symbols are physical objects while symbolism is a relationship. Symbolism derives its power from the fact that it speaks not only to reflective intelligence but to the entire human psyche. It arouses deep emotional experience, releases hidden energies in the soul, gives meaning and stability to the personality, establishes strong

loyalties and disposes a man for consistent and committed actions. A symbol can either be material or non material.

A symbol is material when it designates an object or a consciousness. It is non material when it has intentional reference to the objects or the consciousness.

Kinds of symbols

1. Arbitrary symbols

They are not found by nature but are established by decree *for example igba afa – divination*

2. Association symbol

Here, the symbol and its meaning are joined in virtue of an implicit middle term with which they are connected either naturally or because of historical event. For example *ofa* stands for truth.

3. Evocative symbols

These symbols suggest their meaning by engendering certain attitudes and feelings rather than by direct statement. For example *Ala* (earth deity) stands for fertility etc.³⁷

Dukor introduced modal symbols and categories in *Igbo* metaphysics as the following:-

- a. Theodicy.
- b. Anthropomorphism and immanenism.
- c. The Earth Goddess.
- d. Mind and Body.
- e. Palm tree.
- f. *Ofor* (symbol of truth).
- g. *Ogirisi* (Newboulda) tree.
- h. Kola nut (*oji*).³⁸

Some places or events where symbols are used in *Igbo* system of thought are as follows:-

1. *Afa* – Divination
2. *Igba-ndu* - The covenant
3. *I go oji ututu* - The morning kola /ritual
4. The notion of self (Re – incarnation)

5. *Mgbe na oge* - Chronology
6. *Mmanwu* - Masquerade
7. *Ichi ozo* – Title taking ceremony
8. *Ezigbo I gu aha* - Authentic child naming ceremony
9. *Ime ego nwanyi* – Bride price ceremony
10. *Igba nkwu nwanyi* –Traditional marriage ceremony.

Objects that show symbolic expressions in an *ozo* titled man of *Agbalanze* society of Onitsha Ado are

<u>Symbols</u>	<u>Symbolism</u>
1. Shining ring with rounded white and blue ribbon.	A full member of the <i>Agbalanze</i> society.
2. <i>Ofo/ Osisi</i> - staff	Justice, truth and holiness.
3. Hand fan with one's name written on it.	Identity.
4. White wrapper, shirt and shoes.	Purity and traditional priesthood.
5. Aka beads.	A titled man.
6. Red kneatted beads cap.	A full grown titled man with dignity.

Also items in the morning prayers or rituals in *Igbo* cosmology can be symbolised too as the following expressions

<u>Symbols</u>	<u>Symbolism</u>
1. <i>Oji</i> – kolanut.	Unity, love and welcome.
2. <i>Nzu</i> – white chalk.	Purity and peace.
3. <i>Ose oji</i> – alligator pepper.	a seasoner, vibrator.
4. <i>Mmiri e ji akwo aka</i> . Water in the bowl.	life, cleanliness, a purifier.
5. <i>Ofo</i> – staff.	truth, justice or staff of authority.
6. <i>Mmanya ocha</i> – palm wine.	Joy, spice in life.

The items are objects or symbols which have their respective symbolism.

The symbolic expressions of morning rituals are:

- Otu) *Owetalu oji wetalu ndu.*
Oji ruo ulo okwue ebe osi bia.
- Abuo) *Ose oji a di eje ogu ifele.*
A taa oji taa ose obi adaa juo.
- Ato) *Nzu bu obi ocha.*
- Ano) *Ife luo unyi a saa ya mmiri*
Mmiri atana ma azu anwuna.
- Ise) *Ofo na ogu bu ike*
Oji ofo ga- ana.
Ofo ka ejula ji aga n-ogu.
- Isii) *Mmanyanya bu ogwu/uto ndu.*
Mmanyanya hu onye o maara, o bee ukwu.

However, what was previously regarded as primitive practice in the ancient world especially in *Igbo* Africa is now being revisited for the sake of appreciating the theoretical and scientific functions of symbolism as a form of knowledge. Such practice in *Igbo* is *Igba afa* that is divination.

Symbols are forces which can be seen highly in the place of this *igba afa*.

Divination – *igba afa* is getting knowledge beyond human understanding through the diviners- *dibia* – *afa* about sickness, puzzles of stolen items or foretelling the future of the person that visited the diviner. A diviner can be likened to a soothsayer who tells you what is ‘hidden’ that cannot be known or verified.

According to Dukor

In *Igbo* African world, the *dibia afa* – a diviner through the *igba afa* – a divination process by entering into the mystical zero, the circle of internal differential reality discover not the cause of the problem but also the solution as well. The principle of causality is expressed in the ‘*dibia*’ acting as diagnostician and prescriber of remedies which might include sacrifices and taking of herbs or performing other functions so as to restore balance both in the spiritual world and physical world and equally in the patient’s body.³⁹

Igba – *afa* is a great mystery that we need to embrace as to solve our daily problems. *Igba* – *afa* was very useful in the cure of a sickness I witnessed. My relative was very sick and the

signs were very strange, shouting, vomiting and fainting. When he was rushed to the hospital nothing was found. We tendered the laboratory results from an American hospital where he was treated before but the current doctor said that if that laboratory result of the mechanism of both brain, heart, everything in the body except the “soul” belonged to him then there is no need for any test again.

However, on hearing the case an elderly exclaimed ‘*Oria a gbaro aka*’ meaning this sickness is caused by unseen forces. The elders sent somebody to Aguleri to see *dibia afa* who divined with my relative’s name, saw the cause of the sickness and the herbs to use. My relative was given the herbs and he was on his feet again. Nobody believed it. “Born again” Christians criticized going to *afa* but I thank God that my relative was alive through the knowledge of *dibia afa* by *igba afa* and the herbs created by God Himself.

Prof. Rich Umeh, former deputy Vice Chancellor of University of Nigeria Enugu campus said that *afa* is a computer. This means that *igba afa* tells you all that is hidden that you want to know.

Umeogu analyzed the *Afa ugili* as a system of *igba afa* with *ugili* seed shells communed with the noisy and expository wisdom of the tortoise. He defined *afa* itself thus:

Afa is the science of all things in the Igbo African world of being, motion and time. It is a system of traditional institution and analysis that in its dimensions of symbols and meanings, language and logic and communications and controls, gives a coherent and necessary system of the combinations of general and relative ideas in terms of which every items of experience can be interpreted.⁴⁰

This means that the whole effort and search for information by humans in the domain of the sacred is in the province of divination.`

Through the medium of diviners, the puzzles of life surrounding human condition and society itself are revealed. The diviner is a human agent who receives pieces of information and signs in the spirit world and interprets them to his “client”. The diviner reconnects the past, foretell the future and marry both on earth and spirit world.

Afa is owned and manipulated by *agwu*.

Agwu or *agwu nsi* is the spirit of divination. It gives *dibia afa* the knowledge he is seeking for by opening his “third eye”.

Metuh enunciated thus:

Agwu is the patron spirit of divination and diviners. It is called mmuo – nkpassa – spirit of confusion. Agwu chooses its worshippers and endows them with the gift of divination and the knowledge of medicine herbs. Agwu afflicts its victims with psychological disturbance which sometimes takes the form of restlessness, wastefulness or even madness – Ara agwu. Hence if you ask somebody agwu o na – akpa gi? Are you seized by Agwu? It is just like saying Are you mad? The rite of ilu Agwu or ikpu Agwu, tying up or covering up Agwu, should not only bring the victim back to normality but also harness the power of Agwu in him for the practice of divination and healing with herbs.⁴¹

This means that *agwu* is the real essence of *afa*. Without *agwu* there is no *afa*. *Agwu* sometimes select who will replace the current *dibia afa* even before the child is born. *Agwu* is re-incarnated from generation to generation and that is why some Catholic priests who have *agwu, ndi agwu malu-* those possessed by *agwu* spirits are very prophetic priests.

Finally, the supreme function of a symbol is the designation of an idea, or group of ideas that does not yield easily to analysis.

A symbol is therefore a mode of expression that often takes the place of analysis.

Whether a symbol is a single object or a synthesis of objects, it is inevitably based upon a relationship, a correspondence existing between a natural order of reality and a spiritual order.

4.9 VALUES IN IGBO METAPHYSICS.

Value is what an individual or groups of people hold at the highest esteem. It is what people have regard and respect for. That is *ihe di mkpa n'ala Igbo*. This means what is important more than others, what is on top of scale of preference or what is placed higher above other things.

A value like a symbol is the inner most or abstract content of what is upheld but the difference is that value does not have object that signifies it, rather it is a mental process. While symbol signifies, value justifies.

Ogugua opined thus:

Value is conceptually real, a metaphysically reality. Value is real because it exists and it has a role to play in relation to its inescapable determination as a gap filler within the house of reality. The value of a thing is an intrinsic quality of that thing and equally basically constitutive of what the thing operationally becomes...When we talk about value, we operate on the meta – ethical level because we are talking of things belonging to the spirit and soul of the African culture.⁴²

This means that value as a metaphysical reality has a function to perform. It has an obligation or duty to fulfil as to bring out its concrete existence in defining man on whose existence value is dependent on.

Njoku was of the view that “value is an elusive concept; it encompasses being itself and retains anything that is good. Value in the *Igbo* understanding is embracive, it includes man, God, children, land, property, utensils etc”.³⁵

Ogugua enumerated seven values in *Igbo* metaphysics as follows

1. Life
2. Offspring
3. Truth
4. Justice
5. Wealth
6. Love
7. Peace.⁴⁴

1. Life.

Life – *Ndu* is a gift from God. It is revered so much in *Igbo* world view that they celebrate a lot when a person dies at an elderly old age with the belief that he is lucky to live that long. *Ndi Igbo* also frown at suicide or murder because they believe that it is an abomination against the giver of life, life itself and existence.

Life is the ultimate reality which every *Igbo* man prays for every day that it should be given to him. Without life man is nothing and nowhere to be seen in the physical world. This is why

Ndi Igbo answer such names like *Ndubuisi* – life first, *Ndukaku* – life is greater than wealth, *Ndu bu isi aku* – life is the owner of wealth. They also believe in the adage *a hara ndu kpaa aku, onye iro erie ya* meaning that if you do not take care of yourself while alive, when you die, your enemies will take possession of your wealth.

2. Offspring (children).

Offspring –*umu*. Like life, children are precious gift from God. Whenever two people come together as husband and wife, the first thing they ask God is ‘*Olisa nye mu nwa*’ – God give me a child. They pray for the first child and when the baby comes, they now pray for more children.

Children are highly valued in *Igbo* cosmology especially the male child because it is a belief that when one dies, he will have child/children to cry for him at the grave and as well a son to replace him as an heir in the family.

The absence of a child can be felt by a lamentation of a childless woman whom does not have regard amidst her women folk who normally mock childless women. There are names *Igbo* people give their children as to show the value of a child. They are *Nwakaego* – a child is of great value than money, *Nwamaka* – a child is beautiful, *Uba mmadu ka uba ego (Ubaka)* - plenty children is better than plenty money, *Afam efuna* – let my name not be lost. *Afamefuna* is a name normally given to a male child who did not arrive earlier than expected or the only son of his parents.

3. Truth.

Truth – *ezi okwu* (literally means good words). In *Igbo* cosmology *ofo* is a staff of authority and truthfulness. Any *Igbo* man that holds *ofo* does not tell lie (then not now) or else he will face the consequences of *ala*- the earth goddess/deity.

Truth means saying exactly what it is, what happened, how it happened, when and where. Truth is and will forever be.

Truth in *Igbo* understanding can be expressed as the following:-

- i. *Eziokwu bu ndu* – truth is life.
- ii. *Kwuo eziokwu ka ihere mee ekwensu*.

Say the truth and shame the devil

- iii. *Ezi okwu na – adi njo na nti ma ya bia buru ndu* – truth is bad to the ear but it is life.
- iv. *Eziokwu na enu inu* – truth is bitter.
- v. *Okwu ezi okwu a dighi agbaghe ya agbaghe* – truthful words are never doubted.

From the above expressions we can infer that Christ is an *Igbo* metaphysicist because He said in the Holy Bible ‘I am the way, the truth and life..., and you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.

4. Justice

Justice is *nke luru onye*. This literally means giving a person a share that is due for him. It can also be named *oke onye*. Justice in *Igbo* cosmology is one of the values that is highly respected. This is because injustice means oppression, wickedness and evil in the sight of *Chi-ukwu*. This is why *Ndi Igbo* have the metaphysical knowledge of the deity-*alusi* and *afa* that unravel truthfulness on the cases of perpetuated justice.

In *Igbo* metaphysics, whenever a person whose share or due is not given, *Ala* the earth deity comes to the rescue of that person. This can be evident in the case of calamities that the people witness. These calamities make them to consult either the deity or diviner for messages from the gods as to know the causes of such events.

5. Wealth

Wealth – *aku na uba, ihe aku, ihe enwe enwe* (possessions) means a lot to the *Igbo* man. *Igbo* man strives to define himself as an existential being by possessing wealth. Wealth means a lot of things to the *Igbo* man. To the primitive *Igbo* man, wealth means many wives, many children, largest portions of farmlands, biggest barn of yams, numerous live stocks and finally being a titled man. To the contemporary youthful man, one wife, few children, hundreds of houses (mansions), hundreds of exotic cars, hundreds of lands, millions of dollars and being the president of America.

However, it is quite clear that the contemporary *Igbo* man is in a haste to acquire money which is known as ‘*ego oku*’ quick money, blood money, ill gotten money. Notwithstanding there are other people who value good name rather than money as in the saying *ezi afa ka ego*. This is a principle, this a value which my father inculcated in us even as little children.

He use to tell us that no matter the suffering, no matter the hardship, we should be contented with what we have, we should remember where we came from (that is the family name) and we should remember that *ezi afa ka ego*. Meaning good name is better than money.

6. Love

Love – *Ihunanya* means feelings, expressions, respect, regard for one self, home, community, society, state and country at large.

In *Igbo* setting, someone who loves tolerates and sacrifices a lot. Tolerance and sacrifice in the sense that there should be a harmonious co-existence among people which will lead to a peaceful society. Without love we can do nothing because it is endurable. Also in *Igbo* community a man that loves himself does not commit suicide neither does a man who killed his neighbour has love for his neighbour. Love is an abstract entity that can be seen or reflected towards oneself, fellow men and the society at large.

7. Peace

Peace is *udo*. Like love, peace is an abstract entity that reveals itself from a man to fellow men or the society.

Peaces emanates from the mind. Whenever a man is at peace with himself, everything around him becomes peaceful. He lives harmoniously with his fellow men and avoids trouble at all times.

In *Igbo* cosmology, a man that does not embrace peace is always known as *onye nsogbu*, *Ocho okwu* which means a trouble maker.

However, a peaceful community needs proper means of communication. It is always encouraged to say one's mind and be vocal when you believe that you were offended. This will go a long way to make the community peaceful for a peaceful co – existence.

These values are very important to human kind. When all these values are inculcated to the human race, present and future, I believe the world will be a better, peaceful and safer place to be. This is because when a man is in harmony with all beings (both physical and spiritual) he will be able to define his existence in the world in which he lives.

Igbo metaphysics has been in existence since the race came into being. This is evident in *Igbo* man's search for the cause of the beginning of all things, the why of all realities.

This is why *Ndi Igbo* was very curious in the search to know how everything came to be. This made them to believe in a Being that is mysterious, Incomprehensible, Infinite, mightier than all, and above all the Cause of all causes. This Being they posited that is higher than their gods is what they call *Chi-Ukwu*, *Chineke*, *Olisaeburuwa*, *Ama ama amasi amasi* as the cause of all things. They believe that their *chi* (gods) are messengers to *Chi-ukwu*. *Chi-ukwu* is therefore the necessary, universal, final and efficient cause.

Chi – ukwu has a spark in which the *Igbo* call *chi* which means spiritual guardian or one's destiny. *Chi* guides an individual and is very unique and peculiar to a particular person. This means that no two persons can have the same *chi*.

Moreover, *Igbo* metaphysics started from the empirical *mmadu* (man), to the mental *ala*, (earth deity/goddess), *afa* (divination), *agwu* (divination spiritual force) and finally to the immaterial super-sensible *Chi-ukwu* (God).

The existence of deities in *Igbo* metaphysics help to reveal or unravel unknown knowledge of things from the past, current and future. It does it in a way that is highly metaphysical and beyond human comprehension.

Ala which is the earth deity/goddess is responsible for the principles or laws of morality. Any sin against *ala* is regarded as an abomination (*Nso ala*) against it. *Ala* is sacred to the *Ndi Igbo* and need not to be defiled because she is a mother hence-mother earth.

Ndi Igbo believe in immortality of soul where *ahu*-body, *mmuo*-spirit and *mkpuruobi*- soul are not very distinct in difference. They are dependent of each other until death takes physical body *ahu* away from spirit and soul. Re-incarnation is also a truth in *Igbo* cosmology.

Symbols are very dynamic in *Igbo* cosmology for example *Oji Igbo – Igbo* kolanut is a symbol of love and welcome. It is used in *afa* divination. It is used to settle disputes especially when the culprit is telling lies. This is demonstrated when the elderly man among them removes his shoes and becomes bare footed, he prays with it and anybody who eats that kolanut must say the truth or else *ala* will deal with that person.

We should know that *Oji a naghi anu bekee* meaning that kola nut does not hear English language except *Igbo*. During prayers with kolanut, it is prayed that anybody who brings kola nut brings life therefore kolanut is a symbol of life.

A kolanut can be either male or female. This is seen when the kolanut has been broken. A kolanut can have two or more lobes. In Onitsha when a man brings kolanut with five lobes, a cow is killed for the man because the kolanut meant abundant life and wealth. Kolanut is presented in even numbers and not in odd numbers.

In addition *Ndi Igbo* regard life as a sacred virtue. This means that they abhor shedding of human blood because it is an abomination against the physical and spiritual elements of the land. Life is the ultimate reality and value in *Igbo* land.

From all indications *Igbo* metaphysics has penetrated *noumena*. *Igbo* metaphysics is able to provide solutions in the manner that is widely acceptable, which has enormous implications for diverse areas of knowledge. This means that we have to embrace *Igbo* metaphysical knowledge of *afa* which will help to unravel man's puzzles, perplexities, uncertainties, and truth in the case of strange illnesses, thefts, deaths or other calamities that may befall man. The Christian faith should marry *afa* divination which is using physical objects to see visions as to bring out effective results better than 'biased prophets/ prophetesses' as to solve man's unending problems.

However, when we review our *Igbo* metaphysics, there might be some imperfections or non universality with other African metaphysical theories because philosophy is continually adaptive and *Igbo* metaphysics is dynamic, unfolding while retaining its fundamental principles.

We need an *Igbo* metaphysics that is modernized and useful to man, science, technology, society and the world at large. *Igbo* metaphysics need to be developed, diversified and universalized.

Mason in his article "Towards an Agenda for Philosophers in Africa today" made it clear that

For participants at the second congress of Black African Writers and Artists held at Rome in 1959, philosophy is expected to identify the elements of a genuine African wisdom and safeguard the unitary vision of cosmic reality which characterizes the wise men of Africa. For others it is to develop a personal reflection on reality through the glasses of some African culture.⁴⁵

This is why we need to establish ‘‘The Academic Metaphysical Society of *Igbo* Philosophers’’ where *Igbo* Philosophers should form a school of *Igbo* metaphysics. This school of *Igbo* metaphysics should also accommodate other philosophers and academics who are interested in *Igbo* metaphysics.

They are to assemble, and organize researches, seminars, workshops, symposiums, ideas, opinions, interviews. All these are to be reviewed and documented as to arrive at generally accepted principles. The researches should be on going processes.

I will conclude by saying that

Ndi Igbo no na mbido uwa
Ndi Igbo no kwa ya
Ndi Igbo ga- anogide
Onye si na – anyi
enweghi ihe eji
mara anyi na mgbe ochie
taa na echi?
Anyi nwere ihe anyi ji biri
Anyi na-efe Chi-ukwu
Olisa bi n’ igwe.
Anyi mara akwukwo
Any nwere uche
Anyi no ebe niile n’ uwa
Anyi nwere ihe
niile mmadu jiri biri
Ma nke a na – ahu
anya, ma nke anaghi ahu anya.
Anyi kwere na ha niile.
- **Alike Mirian**

Translation

Igbo race has been in existence since the
beginning of the world; *Igbo* are,
Igbo race will be forever.
Who said that we have
nothing we are known for

From the past, today and
Tomorrow? We have our
Identity. We believe in
God – *Chi – Ukwu* who lives
Above. We are intelligent.
We are wise
We are all over the world
We have all that are
necessary for man's existence,
both the physical (seen) and
Spiritual (unseen).
We believe in all of them.
- **Alike Mirian**

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CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICAN AND KANTIAN METAPHYSICS COMPARED

Idealism is the metaphysical argument that is based on the belief that reality is of the nature of the mind as against materialism which holds reality to be characterized by matter and motion. Thus idealism and materialism oppose each other. The mind and its idea constitute reality. Instead of accepting the view that the universe is rooted in matter, the idealist emphasizes the importance of mind as the basis of the universe.

According to the idealist theory mind is prior to the matter. The world of nature cannot be properly explained in terms of motion, mechanical causes and laws. It is only with reference to reason, values, ideals and purposes that we can interpret the vast nature surrounding us. Matter and physical force are external to mind and they are ultimately real.¹ African philosophy is idealistic in nature in the sense that it is metaphysically founded world view with some interferences of material admiration of the physical universe around man.

Moreover, in nature and experience, idealism grants primacy to spiritual representations. Apart from the self or mind, there can be no world of objects. That is an object which is not object of some consciousness is not comprehensible. Epistemologically, African metaphysics and idealism are the foundations of knowledge while Kantian philosophy disagrees by identifying knowledge as a function of experience and the faculties of mind.

But African philosophy regards the world as spiritual and rational with significance. The magnificent unity and harmony that we observe in nature implies internal relations between things. Man is essentially a self, spiritual being. African philosophy emphasizes human freedom, self determination and moral responsibility.

Kant's analysis of metaphysics is both positive and negative. His negative consideration consists of his rejection of the metaphysical. Kant is of the opinion that metaphysical propositions lie beyond proof or disproof. He further contented that even if metaphysical judgments are meaningful, they are still quite different from the way in which the judgment of science are meaningful.

Though Kant's negative criticism of metaphysics prepared the ground for the anti-metaphysical school of the recent past, yet it is of more than historical interest because what Kant is providing is on metaphysics. Even by supposing that *noumena* exist behind the veil of

appearance, Kant was unwittingly indulging in the sort of speculative metaphysics which he makes clear that he abhors in the transcendental dialectics

The African is a metaphysical being and therefore in need of metaphysics, although this metaphysics itself is in need of logical judgment.

Anyanwu argued against Kant's Skepticism in that

Every human being is in need of metaphysics but the metaphysics of a collective people is not logical or reasoned knowledge but religion. People need an account of the origin of the world, of man, of existence and of their destin.²

He consistently argues from this point of view that an African has a feeling of dependence because the self, as we saw earlier, depends on the world and the world on the self. The African metaphysical consciousness of the world teaches him that the world also has its own consciousness.

This was why Anyanwu buttressed thus:

For the African, to experience any reality, a person must put himself in a proper metaphysical situation as analytical and sympathetic understanding are different in their assumptions, stand-points, logic and meaning while in the western theory of knowledge based on a dualistic view of reality, subjective and objective experience are so much riddled with contradictions that the former leads to morbid religious views and the latter to hyper intellectualism. In the end, the western culture is satisfied by none of its dualistic forms of experience.³

These contradictions in Western theory of knowledge is what formed Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* leading to paralogisms and antinomies which human reason can neither understand nor reject. Kant tried to mechanize the world of consciousness in his transcendental deduction yet he could not reach any acceptable views on the reality of the supersensible world which the African affirms.

Kant's metaphysical propositions as synthetic and universal are like the propositions of the natural sciences. He says that they are unique and distinct because they are not generalization from experience. He draws two conclusion from his conception of metaphysical proposition.

Firstly, he says that our intuitions and the understanding always represent objects given through sensibility as spatially, temporally or logically dependent upon others. Therefore

given metaphysical proposition cannot be verified by an appeal to perception because, they are about unconditioned objects. Therefore they cannot be proved or disproved in the same way that non-metaphysical propositions can.

Secondly, on the criterion of intelligibility, metaphysical propositions are incomprehensible and unintelligible, because the category of the unconditioned is not one of the twelve categories of the understanding.

The distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal is the basis for Kant's criticism⁴. According to him, *phenomena* refer to the world as known by us and *noumena* refer to a transcending reality that cannot be known by us.

Commenting on this, Stumpf enunciated thus:

We cannot know anything about the thing-in-itself because the categories of the mind apply only to the phenomenal world and not to the thing-in-itself. Since knowledge is possible according to Kant, only when the categories of the mind are imposed upon the objects we experience through our senses, and since we do not sense the thing-in-itself, we cannot have any knowledge about it. Finally since ultimate reality was for Kant the thing-in-itself to say that we cannot have knowledge about it meant that we cannot have knowledge about the reality.⁵

In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says that there is no metaphysics for the empirical understanding. For the African man is of dual nature, that is the metaphysical and the empirical, but for Kant man is a product of nature governed by the natural laws of cause and effect like other physical objects. But here is another aspect which consists of the faculty of the will. It represents rational faculty and the rational attitude of doing things before taking up the moral law, the categorical imperative for explanation.

Kant elaborates the concept of will and its special status. Man is determined to the extent that he acts on the basis of his senses and intellect. In Kant's ethics, he emphasized the importance of the will and its autonomy. The will in man gives him distinction.

In Kant's *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, he makes it clear at the onset that

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world even out of it which can be called good without qualification except goodwill. All other things in the world including intelligence, courage, judgment, resolution etc, are good. This may become bad if the will which is to make use of them is not good.⁶

Goodwill is subjected to any condition. Kant went to the extent of saying that: “if with its greatest effort, the good will should yet achieve nothing and there should remain only the goodwill like jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself.”⁷

Kant made the second proposition of duty after explaining the meaning of goodwill. The two concepts are inseparably related because an action done out of goodwill have no other motive but the performance of duty. A man who acts as a rational being cannot be guided by any motive except duty.

Kant opined thus:

In action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which is determined and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action but hereby on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.⁸

Thus, we are taken to the third proposition of the moral law or the categorical imperative.

The moral law is unconditional. “It is categorical since it holds absolutely and without qualification, it is imperative since it is a command that ought to be obeyed. The categorical imperative is rational, since it is approached intuitively by the reason and is logically consistent; it is *a priori*, since it can be known in advance to apply to every possible problem that may arise in experience. The circumstance to one’s duty is a categorical imperative. That is rational and *a priori*, one ought to do one’s duty under all circumstances whatsoever this is intuitively evident to reason, it is known to be true in advance to a specific situation that may ever come up”.⁹

In African philosophy, moral law is grounded on the metaphysical and the spiritual. It is also cultural.

However, Kant gave the formulation of categorical imperative in the form of “the idea of will of every rational being as a universally legislative will”.¹⁰ The will of everyman is the supreme legislative authority and therefore he is bound by his own law and nothing else.

For Kant, the principle of moral conduct is morally binding on me if and only if I can regard it as a law which I impose on myself. Moral law is not something imposed from outside. It is a production of our own reason. In African philosophy, moral law is the law of God. Kant did not postulate the existence of God because it is a metaphysical entity.

However, it is very pertinent to note that Kant who rejected the existence of God in the critique, affirmed that very existence in the *Opus Postumum* when he argued that

A being who is originally universally law-giving for nature and freedom, is God. Not only the highest being, but also the highest understanding – good (with respect to holiness). Ens summum, summa intelligentia, summum bonum. The mere idea of Him is likewise proof of His existence.¹¹

Moreover, in African philosophy, there are proofs for the existence of God. For the African there is continuous revelation of God in the spirit of man. God is imminent in the world yet He is not subject to ordinary limitations which characterize the phenomenal world. To a theist, God in His operations is continuously present in nature. God transcends the world of things and selves as He is not identical with them either individually or collectively.

While things depend on Him and He acts on them. He is not dependent on things. The spatial and temporal world is a manifestation of the Divine will. God is infinite as He is complete and self-sufficient. He is Himself sufficient cause on ground of all finite exercises. God is also associated with attributes of omnipotence meaning that nothing is impossible for God. God is all powerful, independent and self-sufficient ground for the being in the world. Religious consciousness is satisfied that God is Omnipresent that is God is everywhere.

In addition, in African philosophy, the question of the existence of God is a question in metaphysics. For the African, ontologically, God is a being of which a greater cannot be conceived, but an idea which in reason as well as intellect, therefore God must be thought as necessarily existing. Since God is the most perfect Being He must necessarily exist as not to exist would be an imperfection. Therefore, God’s perfection implies His existence.

The idea that a God, creator of existence and sustainer of the universe is not Himself in need of existence is strange in African metaphysical conception of an omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotent God. It is also un-African to argue that “God is not in need of existence because with Him existence is inexhaustible”.¹²

This is because God is already existing and will continue to exist. The African conception of God is a loving God, a caring God who is in need of existence for the world He created.

This made Echekwube to enunciate thus:

By way of transcendence, we understand how God is outside His creation and by immanence we comprehend how He is without the same creation. By this explanation, we avoid the pitfall of pantheism or the exclusivist view that God is a *Deus Otiosus*, a distant God who abandoned His creation immediately after creative act.¹³

Cosmologically, the existence of God is inferred from the world as it is given probably with the cosmological argument in mind. The contingency of the fact within the world leads up to something which is posited as a necessary being and a ground for the contingent. This proof gave emphasis on the law of causation because God is seen as the first cause of all the different series of causes.

Teleologically, there is order in the world and this order is taken to be token of design and God is thought as the source of that design. This design and purpose has been imposed on the world and God can be as that only agency which can impose such order and purpose.

Unlike the negative aspect of Kantian metaphysics, *Igbo* African metaphysics is in the positive sense which allows the interpretation of the world in the dualistic sense of day and night, good and evil, universal and particular, God and Satan etc.

This made Edeh to opine that:

Significantly for the *Igbo*, the invisible nature as well as the visible are metaphysically real, a fact evidenced in their language ... *Ife na ife ya na ya yi*, that is a thing and that which it is. It strongly implies that the unseen part of a material object is metaphysically real and different from the visible.¹⁴

This means that in African Metaphysics there is matter and its form because a thing which is visibly seen has an inner nature which is invisible and that is its form, being its essence.

Unlike Immanuel Kant, Pantaleon Iroegbu correctly averred that

Metaphysics is a straight science that investigates reality in its various forms and manifestations as reality. Metaphysics must at all levels be clear on the issue of stake, the definition, role, object and value at metaphysics. It is wisdom, philosophical science, inquiry and understanding of being. It is thus a systematic investigation of the totality of reality in its basic principles and operations.¹⁵

Also in *Igbo* Ontology, it is believed that the mind and the brain are being controlled by the soul and the spirit. This is because the soul and the spirit are the “power houses” in the sense that they help the mind and the brain in the cognition processes. This action is similar to schemata in Kant’s transcendental philosophy.

Dukor made some comparisons between Kant and African Philosophy when he buttressed thus:

Kant is of the view that each different *a priori* concept is correlated with and correspond to a different fundamental type of innate unconscious synthetic process whereby the human mind generate out of crude sensation the experience of ostensibly preserving a world of independent persistent, extended and unidentifiable interacting things. Similarly the African mind generates simultaneously the *a priori* process and synthetic process for understanding the relation of cause and effect.¹⁶

He went further to say that

Kant says that by sensuous intuition we can intuit things apriori by which we can know objects as they appear to us. This is very necessary to grant synthetic proposition a priori status. When placed side by side with African mind, Kant seems to be technically paraphrasing African epistemic methodology which is pansychic. To the African everything that is empirically given has a spiritual basis. The ultimate reality is spiritual. The African mind periscopes both the empirical and the *a priori* otherwise known as the spiritual reality.¹⁷

Moreover, Kant argued that the transcendental ego is the transcendental unity of apperception. He contrasts the transcendental ego to the empirical ego which is the active individual self that is subject to immediate introspection. It is the empirical ego that distinguishes one person from another providing each with a definite character.

Similarly, this empirical ego is known as *Chi* (destiny) in *Igbo* African world view. It distinguishes a person from another person even if they are from the same parents hence *Otu nne na amu ma o buro otu chi na eke*.

Kant made some achievements which made some of his ideas consistent with African philosophy. One of them is the theory of space-time. African metaphysics agrees with Kant that space-time are forms of intuition which is known a *priori* though they are regarded as independent realities in *Igbo* African ontology.

Kant also agrees with the African that the reality is spiritual with regard to the concepts of God, freedom and immortality. These concepts led to the question of metaphysics. Kant later inquired whether metaphysics could co-exist with physics and these concepts.

African metaphysics is also in consonance with Kant's transcendental analytic with regard to the function of the human mind in making objects of experience intelligible to understanding. This is possible because of the modality of the ability to know.

Lastly, Kant differs from African Metaphysics in his transcendental dialectics. After elaborating the functions of reason (which is metaphysics) he argued against it because he believes that reason falls into natural error known as transcendental illusions and antinomies (fallacies). These arguments about reason could have been the basis of his metaphysics if he did not reject them.

But to the *Igbo* African, reason penetrates *noumena*, soul, world and God.

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CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Burning questions on epistemology and metaphysics are addressed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. His *Critique of Pure Reason* is a consequence of the epistemological turn western philosophy took during the age of enlightenment. During this period, rationalism and empiricism were at dagger drawn and therefore posed a great problem to epistemologists and theorists. For rationalists, knowledge of fundamental features of the world is acquired through the reason alone.

Rene Descartes opines that the basic principles of physics are derivable from geometric principles. For Spinoza and Leibniz, details of the world would be deducible from an ideal mind. Hence rationalism generally would indeed give a foundation for knowledge, but could not give an acquired picture of how knowledge about the world of nature can be acquired. For empiricism, experience is the grounding of knowledge of the world. Therefore, our knowledge of natural facts are inductive, hence the casual laws that from experience we observe one event succeeding *a priori* the other as the effect.

Kant inherited many problems of the rationalist and empiricist traditions and then asked the question:

How can there be the possibility of having the knowledge of the sort obtainable in the sciences? He is also concerned with the three different kinds of object of knowledge namely:

(a) That based on tautologies (b)

Empirical observation, and (c) General principles of nature, law and causation. He is also concerned with how he can integrate three forms of knowledge namely: (a) knowledge that is not dependent on truth of definition (b) One that is universally valid and (c) Knowledge that goes beyond the testimonies of the senses. Because David Hume did not see the possibility for such knowledge, he ended up in skepticism. But Kant attempted and succeeded in his Copernican revolution.

Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* therefore resulted in part, from the fact that he took David Hume's conclusions about such basic principles as cause and effect seriously. Hume's position stems from extending the deductions made from the rising science of the period, especially the physics of Isaac Newton. During this period science was making itself a universal discipline whose premises were certain and the method is disputable only by an

adoption of the stance of philosophical skepticism. Therefore the growing influence of science made metaphysics a discipline of no consequence.

The repute of metaphysics as a domain of knowledge became greatly questioned; its very position on philosophy was thrown into doubt, and this very doubt was only exacerbated by Hume's radical skepticism, a skepticism which according to Kant, aroused him from his dogmatic slumber. For Hume all knowledge concern either relation of ideas or matters of fact. This is, more or less Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic truth. Hume held further that knowledge of the relations of ideas could be attained *a priori*. The disagreement started when Hume claimed that all knowledge of matters of fact comes from experience which Kant on the other hand calls synthetic *a posteriori* of knowledge. Hume stated that there are two ways by which we arrive at knowledge by experience; one is by observation and the other by experimental interference.

From observation man makes inference about what must cause or explain them. Most of our synthetic knowledge comes from experimental inference according to Hume, but the dogmatic theory that woke Kant up was Leibniz's doctrines. Kant addressed Leibniz's doctrine of living force against Cartesians, his attack on absolute space and time against the Newtonians, his immaterial atomism or Monadology, his theodicy and his various principles and laws like the identity of indiscernible continuity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason. Kant's quarrel with the doctrine of rationalism is that it posits knowledge of the kind that it has no foundation to talk about or to possibly establish. This task then becomes the bridging of the gap between rationalism and empiricism.

In bridging the gap between empiricism and rationalism, Kant postulated the synthetic *a priori* knowledge which is based on experience and innate ideas or otherwise called a synthesis of *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge. This most single instance of Kant's acknowledgment of the validity of knowledge derived from innate idea, a tacit acceptance of epistemological foundationalism and African conception of metaphysical reality. Although Kant subscribed to *a priori* knowledge mediated by reason, he failed to discern the intrinsic ability of the mind or reason, especially the contemporary African or *Igbo* mind, to penetrate the reality or the *noumena*, that is, things -in- themselves. This why this thesis argued on the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge in Kant and the possibility of metaphysical, indubitable and certain proposition in contemporary *Igbo* African metaphysics.

It is important to note that Kant's three critiques illustrate three instances of the theory of limit of human reason and knowledge and by implication metaphysics. The first critique shows how pure reason can self-reflexively come to grasp the possibility, validity and limit of synthetic *a priori* judgments. The second critique shows how the practical reason can self-reflexively arrive at the antinomies of free will in the maxims of universality end-in-itself and the kingdom of ends. The third critique shows how the judgment of taste can discern what is beautified and sublime.

The Kantian notion that the sublime is an occasion for the disclosure or rediscovery of our moral freedom and we are there by able to regard as small or of no significance those things which otherwise we attach most importance to, our worldly goods, health and our life itself, implies that the experience of the sublime leads us to the ordering or re-ordering of our priorities, and brings into action, the tension between the force of the soul and the force of the flesh.

Hence the three critiques of Kant inaugurated a full-fledged discourse in metaphysics (transcendentalism) moral philosophy (ethics of obligation) and aesthetics (reflective judgments as autonomous). The post-modern thinking in its various forms takes Kant more seriously than perhaps, any other philosopher of modernity. This is partly due to the peculiar conception of human reason and human rationality that Kant proposed. The post-modernist reading of Kant's conception of reason and human rationality is in terms of '*a-priorism*' or transcendentalism. This post-metaphysical and post-modern reading of Kant is evident in the works of Hegel, Heidegger, Habermas, Andorno, Foucault and Derrida.

Our thesis however, argued that while Kant's transcendental approach to human cognitive capabilities culminates into "a theory of limits," the contemporary African or *Igbo* transcendental approach to human cognitive capabilities culminates into a theory of metaphysical knowledge. Again while Habermas and others have felt the need to "de-transcendentalize Kant, our thesis argued that African metaphysics is transcendental without Kantian limits.

Kant's critical philosophy led to the acknowledgement of the limits (but not limitations) of reason. This is primarily the task of epistemology, the fulfillment of which justifies philosophy as a critical enterprise. But Kant, at the same time, highlights the moral dimension of the so called value – neutral epistemology by further problematizing the attempt which leads to transgress the limits of reason and enter the domain of faith.

However, any such attempt leads to what Kant calls transcendental illusion. A perceptual illusion is a case of misapplication of the rule of logic. But the transcendental illusion is due to the very tendency of human reason to try to transgress its own limit. In this sense, transcendental illusion is natural and inevitable. Therefore, it cannot be correct in the sense in which the perceptual or the logical illusion can be corrected.¹

In African philosophy or metaphysics, there are perceptual illusion, transcendental illusion and some element of logical illusion. Perceptual illusion as in western philosophy is the inability to comprehend the objective world like the case of mistaken identity. Transcendental illusion is the inability of mind or reason to penetrate the vistas of *noumena* especially when it is possible for an African metaphysicist or conceptual world. In Africa, logical illusion is as a result of the failure of human reason.

According to Kant (a) space and time are the *a priori* forms of intuition (b) the spatio-temporal world is therefore an appearance, (c) there is no higher, supra sensuous, supra-intellectual way of knowing what is real, (d) the solution of this (i.e. first) antinomy has practical relevance for morality and religion.²

But more importantly, for Kant time and space are forms of cognition of the *phenomena* that is things as they appear and not things as they are-in-themselves that is *noumena*. But for African philosophy spatio-temporal world is an appearance not because space and time are forms of cognition but since they are limiting adjunction to Kant, therefore, African philosophical system hold that the real is knowable.

Similarly, almost all classical African philosophical systems accept the possibility of supra-sensible experience through which non-empirical can be known. Apart from these differences in conceptualizing the nature of the world, the nature of perception etc, the point to be noted is that the classical African philosophical systems cannot be classified in terms of “rationalism” and “empiricism” since these two nomenclatures have definite meaning in the context of western philosophy.

Thus, according to Kant, who is a critical rationalist, belief in God, soul and creation are necessary foundations of morality and religion. Kant’s explanation of antinomy as to the conflict between theoretical and practical interests of reason does not hold solid ground *vis-a-vis* the classical African philosophical systems.

Classical African philosophers formulate the problem (that is whether the world is finite or infinite with respect to time and space) and offer its solution in the ways radically different from the three main strands within the western tradition of Christian cosmology, science (as in the form of such theories as the Big-Bang theory) and Kant's own views. In the context of these three views, the classical African thought in general accepts space as infinite and the cosmological time as cyclic.

Moreover, for *Igbo* in Africa, the thinking mind which is rational is an activity of the soul. It is also a divine spark and a mirror into the transcendental or metaphysical reality. It is simply the existence of man as a soul and spirit that leads to the belief in the existence of a Superior Being whose activities are ontologically and cosmologically visible.

Among the Swahili of Kenya, Kaunda, Kaypya and Laye speak of soul in different ways. For Kaypya, the soul is "the faculty which enables human beings to appreciate values that go beyond themselves".³ Kaunda says it is "the intuition of the unknowable".⁴ which is known as an activity of the soul while Laye describes the soul activity "as the recognition that the inexplicable is supreme".⁵

Placide Tempels in his *Bantu Philosophy* defined the soul as a vital force and this does not detract much from the above ideas or opinions about the soul and that of the *Igbo* of Nigeria's conception which is both an epistemological initiative entity and a force in the sense of the creative powers inherited from the Supreme Being.

While Tempels argues that force can be increased or diminished by acquiring more being or being reduced to a less being, K.C. Anyanwu argues that "the African believes that God created him. From this theory of life force, man is not passive but active individual force".⁶ The concept of spirit, soul and force in Africa philosophy, therefore offer an insight beyond the spacio-temporal world, into the unknown.

The cyclic cosmos enables the African philosophers to treat Big-Bang theory as a beginning of a new cycle and as an end of the prior cycle. The Big-Bang theory is not the first state of the beginning of the world. Classical African philosophers would argue with Kant that any state arrived at empirically is not to be taken as the final unconditioned state. This then becomes the problem of method. Kant is of course averse to the vulgar speculative method which consist of going from one gross material to another gross material. This method of experience is not empirical (that is Kantian).

Time is an inner intuition, a form to which the succession of inner state is subjected. Kant also holds that the outer experience (in space) is determined by time only as mediated, time does not allow the determination “I think” to directly bear “I am”. This Kantian denial of Cartesian drawing of “I am” from “I think” is based on making states of mind in locus of passing time. In other words, Kant is successful in introducing a gap between thought and being.

“I encounter myself only as determined within time, as phenomenal being and not as I am, the “I” is assigned to me as it from outside. The consequence of the gap between thought and being is interiorized and represented as the passive self. Time thus becomes the form of the passive self. Time here is the internal rupture or the torison within the order of representation; hence time does not yield to direct representation”.⁷

As against the Kantian restriction on time, that is time cannot be represented directly and given the dictum on time without affection, the problem Sanil (an Indian author) is raising becomes explicit. “How can we entertain ourselves and let time pass while preventing the form of affection from affecting us? It is against this that we need to evaluate Cinema’s claim to represent time directly and to offer us entertainment without affection.”⁸

Kant and Cinema (an Indian author) confront each other on the issue of the passivity of self that is whereas Kant denies us any direct access to the sources of this passive self, Cinema explores into this passivity.

The limit-riddled constitution of human reason and its Kantian resolution remains an issue for the post-Kantian philosophers. Two points concerning this issue, namely the dualism of *noumenon* and *phenomenon*. For the African, there is limit in African reason, yet its limitation is its relation to the intelligence, Being or the creator who knows all man’s reason to know depending on its development.

The concept of limit is one of the fertile concepts in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant uses it in two separate but related contexts. On the one hand, knowledge vis-à-vis faith has to be restricted and on the other hand, give the peculiar distinction that Kant makes between *noumenon* and *phenomenon* (that is sensible intuition) from being extended to *noumenon* (that is thing-in-itself).

R.P. Singh in his *Transcendental Philosophy as a Theory of Limit* brings to our notice the Kantian employment of the concept of limit. He argues that the basis for it is Kant’s *a-*

priorism. Apart from the general statements where Kant uses the term limit, the specific employment of it is in Kant's transcendental deduction of concepts where Kant is discussing the infinite judgment under the quality table of judgment. Infinite judgments in contradistinction to affirmative and negative judgments are those in whose case the concepts of "reality" and "negation" cannot be applied.⁹

This is illustrated in terms of such judgments like "hydrogen gas is not green" which means (i) hydrogen gas has a colour other than green or (ii) it has no colour at all.¹⁰ Another type of judgment which exemplifies the notion of limit is disjunctive judgment like "the earth exists either through the inner necessity or through-external cause or through a blind chance".¹¹

These disjunctions mutually exclude each other but jointly they somehow give us complete knowledge. The modern logicians who reject many presuppositions of the traditional Aristotelian logic will have great problems into Kant's table of judgment. But the point R.P. Singh is making is more general. Singh argues that to understand the Kantian conception of "limit", one needs to examine Kant's separation between *noumenon* and *phenomenon* on the basis of a threefold distinction between "reason", "understanding", and "sensibility". As understanding unifies perceptions with the categories, it requires higher unity, the unity that is of reason to form a connected system. This unity is supplied by the ideas of reason, namely, freedom of will, immortality of soul, and the existence of God. For Kant the ideas of reason are regulative than constitutive.

However, the concept of knowledge as a synthetic *a priori* has a limit, that is, it is limited to the phenomenal world and cannot penetrate into the noumenal world. In the ideas of reason, the conception of limit as an epistemic category serves to maintain the distinction, as rigorously as possible, between the realism, that is the noumenal and the phenomenal. Kant's theory is a theory of limit in this sense.

In the Transcendental Dialectics therefore, Kant enforces a "limitation" on human reason in the form of antinomies which the human reason can neither comprehend nor reject. Realization of this fact is the ground for the self-critique of reason itself. The self-reflectivity of reason reflects upon the conditions of its own employment. But more importantly, the limit riddled constitution of pure reason necessitates the emergence not only of practical reason for moral pursuits but also of judgment for aesthetic experience.

Fichte argued against Kant's thing-in-itself that it is not possible that something exists but we cannot know nothing about it. This means that we already know something when we say that it exists. To say that something is unknowable is contradictory because such a statement implies that we already know that something is and to the extent is knowable.

Also for Kant to say that thing-in-itself exists is to go beyond the limits he had set for knowledge because existence is a category of the mind, a concept which applies only to objects that we experience through our senses.

CONCLUSION

Kant is the most influential founder of European modernity and the enlightenment rationality. Kant had contributed in areas like phenomenology, philosophy of science, analytic philosophy, etc. Kant influenced some philosophers like Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx, Engels etc.

Fichte, Hegel and Schelling transformed Kant's critical philosophy into a metaphysical idealism but each of them approached it in his own different way.

Kant is a philosopher who provided a new and solid foundations of metaphysics after decisively rejecting the elusions of the transcendental metaphysics. Therefore, Kant's critical philosophy is not a negation of metaphysics but rather a preparation for it.

Kant uses his synthetic *a priori* judgments to form the foundation of three areas of sciences namely mathematics, natural science and metaphysics. He argued that if these judgments create difficulties in metaphysics, they also create for mathematics and physics.

Moreover, Kant introduces a new method of doing philosophy particularly metaphysics which radically influenced all subsequent philosophies. Kant was of the view that only through an account of the *a priori* principles of the mind can knowledge be validated and objective. This process leads to metaphysics as science, that is as an accepted body of knowledge.

Kant goes on to say that the inquiry concerning the possibility of pure science and pure mathematics is only a means to the inquiry regarding metaphysics when he says that "this

part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end to which the rest is only a means and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake.”¹²

Also, I agree with Copleston in his submission that Kant’s metaphysics is possible as a science when he enunciated thus:

Some certain general conclusion about metaphysics follow directly and transcendental analytic take together. First, to some extent that transcendental criticism can itself be called metaphysics, the metaphysics that is to say, of objective experience; metaphysics is possible and possible as a science. Secondly, if the entire system of synthetic a priori propositions relating to pure natural science well worked out, we should have a developed metaphysics of nature or of natural science.¹³

Kant set out to prove the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge in his investigations about pure reason but ended up denying metaphysics by doing metaphysics. I think that Kant who was influenced by Wolff’s and Baumgarten’s metaphysics wanted to make a different path for himself by denying what his predecessors and himself has affirmed.

Kant’s denial of metaphysics is like a friend who knows everything about his best friend. He elaborated on their relationship in a public ceremony, their differences and similarities in character. After saying all that he knew, he concluded that he does not know his best friend. With this conclusion, we can see that his audience will say that something is wrong somewhere.

It is also important to note that in another arena (Prolegomena), Kant said that he cannot stop thinking about his friend (metaphysics) because if he does, then that means he has stopped breathing air.

In Kant’s words:

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore always be metaphysics in the world, nay, everyone, especially every reflective man, will have it and, for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own standard.¹⁴

However, *Igbo* metaphysics came out of *Igbo* man's curiosity, awe and wonder for the search of the ultimate reality; the necessary and universal cause. *Kedu ihe kpatara ihe niile ji were di? Ebee ka ihe ndi a niile si were bia? Onye kere ihe niile di n'uwa', na-elu, na-ala ma na mmiri? Onye ahu kere ya, ebee ka o si were bia?*

These questions are translated as, why are things existing? Where do they come from? Who created everything in the universe, up above the sky, below the earth and rivers? Where did the creator come from?

All these are the troubling questions that made *Igbo* African to conceive of a higher *Chi*, (*Chi-ukwu*) more than their gods. He is the owner and maker of all that is.

In African philosophy, there is existence of *Igbo* metaphysics. Reality in *Igbo* metaphysics is based on the physical, spiritual and the mental. Within these realities, there is existence and hierarchy of beings (forces). These forces interact with each other. Their presence is acknowledged by man who is at the middle. This is why *Igbo* ontology is an arena for the interaction of beings more than the western world.

Igbo metaphysics is imbedded in *Igbo man's* culture, customs, traditions, folklores, music, idioms, beliefs folklores, education etc. it is different from other metaphysics because it deals with realities, ideas and knowledge that are unique and peculiar to *Igbo* people. Though it is not codified as a system like scholasticism, socialism etc, but we hope to be there one day with our efforts on course to make it a universal accepted mode of philosophy or knowledge.

Man's thought must begin with the world of experiences that is phenomenal world and then correspond it with innate ideas of the reason. But metaphysics on its own part, moves from the innate ideas to the inner most intuition which Kant said that *noumena* cannot penetrate into. From this gradual process of moving from phenomenal to the noumenal world and finally to the inner most intuition, a sound and comprehensible metaphysics is established.

Metaphysical propensities or theories are innate within us. It is a natural thing for us to think about God, freedom, world and immortality of soul because we knew there must be a cause responsible for their effects or existence. We have our different inclinations about these metaphysical entities due to culture, customs and academic background.

Metaphysics stands out as a table and it is the side which any man sees, that he explains, defines or describes. Therefore, we should wake up, for a clarion call as to come out with substantive methodology both western and African as to make metaphysics a science because Kant has set the pace for us. Also metaphysics which is already existing in *Igbo* African philosophy should be provided with universal theories so that we can depend on its findings to solve our problems.

Conclusively, I think that metaphysics is a science, a theory of abstract knowledge, universal and necessary and this is because the intellect sees the principles of identity, non-contradiction, and causality.

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