

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

Ever since the emergence of the post-colonial state in 1960, Nigeria has been saddled with the task of socio-economic transformation. The effort to achieve this task over the years has continually increased the pressure being mounted on the government as it widens the spheres of responsibility even amidst dwindling economic resources. In addressing these problems, foreign aid was adopted by the government as a veritable option for stimulating growth and supplementing the meagre domestic sources of finance of the country. In order to provide the required socio-economic infrastructure, the government partners with some donor agencies that have the capacity to mobilize foreign aid needed to achieve development and reduce poverty. Interestingly, countries such as China and South Korea have benefited from foreign aid at one time or the other and have developed their economies. But countries such as Nigeria which have continued to benefit from various kinds of foreign assistance, yet the pace of socio-economic development remains slow.

Anambra is a state in south-eastern Nigeria. It was created on 27th August, 1991 following its bifurcation from the old Anambra State into Enugu and Anambra. The name derived from the Anambra River (*Omambala*) which is a tributary of the River Niger.¹ The state shares boundaries with Delta State in the west, Imo State and Rivers State in the south, Enugu State in the east and Kogi State in the north.² The indigenous ethnic group in the state are the Igbo and a small population of Igala in Anambra West Local Government Area. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the population of the state was estimated at 5,527,809 by 2016 based on the 2006 national population census.³ The state occupies a landmass of 4,416 square kilometers.⁴ Igbo is the language of identity, even though English is the official language. The State capital and seat of government is Awka; Nnewi is the industrial Center and Onitsha, the commercial town with the largest market based on geographical size and volume of goods in the West African sub-region.⁵ The 21 local government areas of the state are: Aguata, Awka North, Awka South, Anambra East, Anambra West, Anaocha, Ayamelum, Dunukofia, Ekwusigo, Idemili North, Idemili South, Ihiala, Njikoka, Nnewi North, Nnewi South, Ogbaru, Onitsha North, Onitsha South, Orumba North, Orumba South and Oyi.⁶

Even though most Anambra population is rural, the state is experiencing rapid urbanization even with its relatively small land mass. According to National Bureau of Statistics, Anambra State is the 2nd most urbanized state in the country with 62% of its total population living in urban areas, ...it has one of the highest population densities in Africa with 947 persons living within every square kilometer.⁷ There are 179 communities in the state.⁸ The mainstay of the state economy is commerce and most of the citizens of Anambra (*ndi Anambra*) are known to be very industrious. The former National Coordinator of National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP), Dr. Magnus Kpakol, has rated Anambra state high as the state with the lowest poverty rate among all the states in the country.⁹ He further noted that the level of private enterprise in Anambra put the state on the top echelon of the efforts by states to eradicate poverty.¹⁰ Also, Governor Obiano during the Inaugural Anambra Development Partners Summit (IADPS) in 2017, stated that Anambra State is the fourth largest economy in Nigeria after Lagos, Abuja and Rivers state with the lowest poverty rate in Nigeria.¹¹ In spite of these, the state still has numerous development challenges.

Similar to the economic situation in Nigeria, Anambra State government aspired to develop its economy but could not generate sufficient income to drive its vision. According to Professor Stella Okunna in 2013, Anambra State was relatively poor considering the fact that she occupied about the 26th position in terms of Federal Allocation, getting about only three billion naira (₦3bn) every month, which made every development partner very important.¹² The State is faced with numerous developmental challenges such as: low internally generated revenue, high recurrent expenditure, over dependence on the federation account for funding of development initiatives, weak infrastructural base, epileptic power supply, high unemployment rate, high level of poverty and natural disasters/ environmental degradation.¹³

One of the strategies the State adopted to confront these developmental challenges is strategic partnership with development partners or donor agencies. Donor agencies are known for donating, lending, borrowing and partnering with benefiting countries. Foreign aid which is brought by donor agencies can be defined as both grants and concessional loans that have at least a 25% grant component.¹⁴ According to the World Bank, foreign aid is usually associated with Official Development Assistance and normally targeted at poor countries in the world.¹⁵ Foreign aid, refers to that assistance or support, in this case from a foreign body, accorded to a country which need it to facilitate the pace of its development and socio-economic stability. The Development Assistance

Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) asserts that, (foreign) aid (or the equivalent term, foreign assistance) is financial flows, technical assistance, and commodities that are: (i) designed to promote economic development and welfare as their main objective (thus excluding aid for military or other non-development purposes); and (ii) provided as either grants or subsidized loans.¹⁶ Foreign aid are largely international transfer of capital, goods, or services for the benefits of other nations. Some donor agencies are part of their government's foreign ministries, so they can relate with recipient governments as in line with their own government's foreign policy priorities. There are different forms of aids. The main ones are: bilateral, multilateral, tied, project, military, and voluntary aids. It may be necessary to state that not all aids are charitable; most times, they go with stringent conditionality. For instance, the import of the Tied Aid is that whatever support or aid given to a country in need must be spent on goods or services produced in the giver-country.

Since 1991, over forty donor agencies have partnered with the state at different times to implement development programs. Some of these agencies include: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank, European Union (EU), Department for International Development (DFID), International Federation for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Parenthood Federation of Nigeria (PPFN) funded by Global Funds and the Cater Center.

The state government has signed several Program Implementation Agreements (PIAs) with different donor agencies to tackle diverse areas of interest including Emergency Preparedness Response, Survival and Early Child Care, Health and Nutrition, Basic Education, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Child Protection and Participation, Social Policy, Advocacy and Communication. These programs have tried to improve the health, education, governance and agricultural sectors of the state amongst others. They have also provided basic social infrastructure such as drilling of boreholes, hand dug wells, distribution of mosquito nets, construction of classroom blocks, installation of streetlights, among others. All these programs are coordinated by the state Ministry of Economic Planning, Budget and Development which is also charges to oversee the execution of other donor projects implementation in all the state ministries.


In assisting to develop the Anambra health sector, donor projects such as the Health and Nutrition Program has been carried out to give attention to the revitalization of the health systems, support to routine immunization, as well as infant and young child feeding. The program launched by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) provided the state with cash and supplied assistance worth thirty-eight million, one hundred and forty -five thousand naira (N38,145,000) in 2013.¹⁷ Remarkably, Anambra State, today, is polio free and also won the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation award as best performing state in immunization. In the same year, the Basic Education Program attracted thirty-nine million, one hundred and fourteen thousand, seven hundred and ninety-six naira (N39,114,796.00) as cash and supply assistance from UNICEF to the state.¹⁸ The program tried to increase access to basic education and equity, quality standards in basic education and school community systems. The intervention of EU/UNICEF on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) project with their cash and supply assistance worth sixty-nine million, nine hundred and eighty thousand, four hundred and seventy- five naira (N69, 980,475.00)¹⁹ tried to improve the participatory capacity of the benefiting communities on development projects. It also helped to boost good community project ownership attitude and project sustainability as well as contributed to poverty reduction and community development in the State.

The state government overtime has remarkably attracted a growing number of donor agencies with increasing eagerness to site development projects. Anambra is considered by donor agencies such as UNDP, World Bank, European Union as the foremost state committed to reforms and development. Numerous development programs have been executed over the years with about thirty donors actively implementing different projects at the same time.²⁰ Professor Stella Okunna, during her tenure as the Honorable Commissioner for Economic Planning, cited an example where two boreholes were sited in a school by two agencies (MDG and UNICEF through RUWASSA).²¹ This however raised the need for proper donor coordination to better streamline activities and help ensure that efforts are not duplicated. Governor Obiano has however remarked that, his government had centralized its resources in terms of dealing with Partners in one single office to make for easy coordination, adding that henceforth, the State will be fully involved in the final evaluation processes to ensure that the funds it releases are effectively deployed.²²

However, in view of donor projects implemented in the state over the years, one would expect a more socially and economically developed Anambra. In line with this, Governor Obiano in 2017, noted

during an interview, that most of the projects done by some development partners in the state in the past especially in the areas of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene are no longer not functional.²³ Perhaps there is wisdom in the opinion that, “any country or state desirous of progress and development, should not depend on the activities of donor agencies, since they are only aid groups... but at the same time, states should court them to get some of their aids, which are sometimes big enough to make impact on the lives of the people.”²⁴ Based on this background, this study investigated the impact of donor agencies on the socio-economic development of Anambra state.

Figure1.1 Map of Anambra State Showing the 21 Local Government Areas



Source: Convafresh Team ²⁵

Statement of Problem

While some of the activities of donor agencies is commendable, it is sad to note that after decades of donating various resources, the socio-economic development of Anambra state is not commensurate with the resources expended for the purpose. It is worrisome that donor resources meant for development do not fully achieve intended purposes. Some of the social programs and infrastructure installed by donors such as, boreholes, are hardly maintained at the expiration of the program implementation span. This trend in socio-economic performance of the state in the midst of avalanche of donor resources suggests that some of these development programs are not sustainable. In spite of these problems, Anambra continues to experience an increased number of partnerships with donor agencies and resources. Even more worrisome, is that if the obstacles that prevent maximum effectiveness of these programs are not addressed, then the development interventions of these agencies may continue to not meet its target.

Activities of donors have captured the attention of scholars all over the world. Indeed, journalists, academics, governments, donors and beneficiaries have written on various aspects on the subject matter in various parts of the world. However, despite the long years of activities of donor agencies in Anambra State, there has not been a well-articulated, comprehensive historical research on their activities. While fragments of the study may have been carried out on the activities of a few donors for a period of time, available literature does not capture holistically, all the donor activities in the state. Sadly, this lacuna has made it a challenge to assess the real impact of these donor agencies and more importantly, denied stakeholders the opportunity to learn from their experience. It is in the light of this gap that this study attempted to assess the impact of donor-agencies in promoting socio-economic development in Anambra state from 1991 to 2017.

Purpose of the Study

This research is designed to undertake the following purposes:

1. To assess the impact of donor agencies on the socio-economic development of Anambra State.
2. To examine the various development programs and activities of donor agencies in the state since 1991.
3. To discuss some of the impediments to the development objectives of these agencies in the state.

4. To make recommendations that may help to ensure that project development objectives are achieved in the state.

Significance of the Study

This study is an evaluation of the activities of donor agencies in the socio-economic development of Anambra state, thus findings from this study have both theoretical and practical significance.

Theoretically, it contributes to the academic discussion on the subject matter and serves as a source material to students, the general public, donor agencies, donors and to the government. It could also assist in recommending effective and efficient strategies to ensure that aid resources infused into the state economy has maximum impact. In view of the paucity of resources on this subject matter, it serves as a compendium of the various programs of donor agencies since the inception of the state.

It would also provide the government especially the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development Partners- as the coordinating ministry with up to date data on the level of implementation of the various programs, successes recorded and pitfalls. The study will further complement the measurement tools for assessing project implementation and performance of donors' interventions. This study would be useful to the state government and the twenty-one local government areas, as well as the general public as a reference material and an independent assessment of the activities of donor agencies in the state.

Scope of the Study

This study raises some fundamental issues on the development activities of donor agencies in Anambra with a view to critically assessing their impact on the socio-economic development in the twenty-one (21) local government areas of the State. It will however, cover the period between 1991 and 2017. 1991 marks the creation of the state and the study terminates in 2017. The year 2017 marks a further leap in the activities of donor agencies because specifically in April 2017, the UN through the WHO and UNESCO successfully conducted household census for target population 0-5years within the state. The import of this was to know the extent to which its health interventions have reached the target population and to enable UNESCO develop effective operational plans in the state subsequently.

Methodology and Sources of Data

This study adopts the qualitative method of research. It uses primary and secondary sources. Primary sources such as oral interviews with Anambra State Government officials, program implementors/officials and members of benefitting communities; Anambra State government reports/documents, letters and memos; annual reports from donor agencies and physical visitation of sites of program implementation to ascertain a first-hand account on the sustainability of these projects. Other sources of data for this study are secondary sources of data which include, journals, articles, newspapers, magazines, unpublished works, student project materials, internet materials, textbooks, pamphlets, and other related documents.

Definition of Terms

For proper understanding of this study, certain terms adopted in this work will be clarified. Conceptual clarification is adopted to not just highlight new terms but to explain such terms and connect them to the subject matter.

Foreign aid refers to the international transfer of capital, goods, or services from a country or international organization for the benefit of the recipient country or its population. Aid can be economic, military, or emergency humanitarian (e.g., aid given following natural disasters).²⁶ It is the resources that one country voluntarily transfers to another, which can take the form of a gift, a grant or a loan to be given to assist in the socio-economic development of another country. Foreign aid is distributed by donor agencies to recipient countries such as Nigeria and likewise, Anambra State.

Donor Agencies are international development organizations that provide funds and technical support to different sectors especially to developing states at all levels. Examples of donor agencies include the European Union (EU), United Nation Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and United Nations Development Program UNDP. Donor Agencies have specific areas of intervention and particular intervention modalities. Most of the funds available to finance or carry out projects in African countries are programmed and administered under Official Development Assistance (ODA).

According to the International Civil Aviation Organization, **Official Development Assistance** is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.²⁷ Whether disbursed bilaterally or through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank, ODA in the form of grants, “soft” loans with a substantial grant component, or technical assistance play a key role in eradicating poverty and forming the foundation for sustainable growth.²⁸

To the International Institute for Sustainable Development, **Sustainable Development** is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.²⁹ Sustainable development is critical in socio-economic development of any society and sadly appears to be lacking in the activities of donor agencies in Anambra State.

Socio-Economic Development refers to the relationship between economic activity and social life. According to the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) Declaration,

*socio-economic development is the continuous improvement in the wellbeing and in the standard of living of the people. The socio-economic thematic area aims to ensure that Africans meet their basic needs that are essential to live a life of dignity. This includes access to quality education, better healthcare, decent housing, safe drinking water and good sanitation, as well as equitable distribution of a nation's wealth. Socio economic development is measured with indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment. The impacts of socio-economic development are seen in changes in laws, changes in the physical environment and ecological changes.*³⁰

The need to accelerate socio-economic development is thus vital and it is the primary target of the Anambra State Government.

Theoretical Framework

The two theories adopted in this study are the “basic needs theory” and the “sustainable development theory”. These two theories shall be used to buttress the subject matter of this research discourse.

Basic needs theory harps on the need to deliberately set some minimum economic benchmark aimed at giving the ordinary people minimum welfare opportunity for survival. It is essentially geared towards eliminating acute, chronic or absolute poverty among the ordinary people – done as a precursor for development in a country. To this end, the basic physiological needs of food, shelter, clothing (and job) will first be met, and when these have been met, the people will then naturally be willing to commit themselves to the requirements of higher development. This theory which came to the limelight in 1976 has as its major proponent the International Labor Organization (ILO)³¹.

It became a focus for some developmental work within the World Bank. This reflected growing concern that the benefits of economic growth in developing countries had not trickled down to the poor in the way that liberal economic theory had predicted. It was a response to the evidence that structural adjustment policies in countries with severe economic crises were having a devastating impact on the poor. UNICEF's approach of 'adjustment with a human face' encouraged the targeting of scarce state support to the poor and vulnerable and shifting public spending towards basic needs provision. Around 1985, basic needs were being forced off the agenda by growing neo-liberal perspectives that saw efficient markets as the key mechanisms for satisfying needs. However, basic needs thinking about well-being remains very influential and has experienced something of a comeback. The World Summit on Social Development at Copenhagen in 1995 and the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable Development Goals both make extensive use of basic needs thinking about well-being and this is reflected in the latter's focus on survival, health, hunger, safe water and basic education.

According to Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, Basic needs theory (BNT) is an offshoot of the self-determination theory (SDT), which investigates the connection between human developmental tendencies and innate psychological needs that drive motivation and personality.³² More specifically, the theory suggests that “humans function and develop effectively as a consequence of the social environment and its potential for basic need satisfaction.³³ In alignment with the SDT, the BNT proposes that humans have three basic innate psychological needs, which are:

1. Autonomy – The need of an individual to make his/her own decisions and choices.

2. Competence – The need of an individual to feel a sense of mastery and/or success while interacting with his/her environment.
3. Relatedness – The need of an individual to feel connected to, and respected by, significant others.³⁴ To Deci and Ryan, these basic needs are energizing when they are fulfilled, they result in a sense of well-being and when these basic needs are not satisfied, they result in illness and a sense of ill-being.³⁵ In relation to the three basic needs identified above, research suggests that conditions supportive of autonomy and competence facilitated growth and development, while conditions that sought to control behavior undermined motivation.

Basic needs approaches to well-being are concerned with outcomes. A focus on basic needs looks instead at well-being outcomes, such as whether people are healthy, well nourished, and well educated, and how shortfalls in these well-being outcomes are distributed within society. Basic needs approaches focus on key indicators that are seen as objective assessments of well-being such as longevity, infant survival, body mass index, educational attainment, and so on. They arose out of recognition that economic approaches to development that focused on incomes and growth were problematic. A narrow economic understanding sees increasing incomes and faster growth as proxies for improved well-being. However, basic needs proponents argue that this depends, firstly, on whether income is spent on satisfying basic needs where there are shortfalls or on luxuries that may ultimately have a detrimental impact on well-being and, secondly, on how income and the positive welfare benefits of increased income are distributed between and within different social groups.

The idea of basic human needs that must be satisfied for development to occur has been enormously influential in development thinking. This approach to enhancing well-being is focused on 'ends' as opposed to 'means'. A concern with ends translates into a policy concern with making up the shortfalls that the poor experience with respect to their basic needs. It is compatible with a targeted approach aimed at establishing safety nets for those who are most vulnerable with the aim of realizing a universal minimum standard of well-being outcomes.

Whilst there is some measure of agreement on what basic needs are essential for survival (such as food, water, shelter, health care and education), there is much less agreement about what basic needs must be fulfilled for well-being to be said to exist. The theory no doubt benefited a lot from Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory of 1968 but they are not synonymous. Maslow's theory denotes that individuals are motivated by unsatisfied needs and his infamous hierarchical five needs are-physiological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualization needs.

On the other hand, the sustainable development theory upholds the need to procure and secure development for both the future and the present. The theory sees sustainable development as that which, meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs³⁶. In the above light it is important to state that the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 released the report *Our Common Future* also called the Brundtland Report. That report in trying to give a broad definition of the concept says:

*sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It adds that, it contains within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular, the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future need*³⁷

The concept and theory of sustainable development has undertaken various developmental phases since its introduction. Its historical development saw participation of various organizations and institutions, which nowadays work intensely on the implementation of its principles and objectives. It has also experienced different critiques and interpretations over the time while being accepted in different areas of human activity, and the definition of sustainable development has become one of the most cited definitions in the literature. In its development, the concept has been adapting to the contemporary requirements of a complex global environment, but the underlying principles and goals, as well as the problems of their implementation, remained almost unchanged. Still, some goals have been updated, and the new goals were set. These goals are united in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals 2015 which outline the challenges that humanity has to fight not only to achieve sustainable development but to survive on earth as well.³⁸

The theory and concept of sustainable development is based on the concept of development (socio-economic development in line with ecological constraints), the concept of needs (redistribution of resources to ensure the quality of life for all) and the concept of future generations (the possibility of long-term usage of resources to ensure the necessary quality of life for future generations).³⁹ The essence of the concept of sustainable development derives from the Triple bottom line concept, which

implies the balance between three pillars of sustainability – environmental sustainability focused on maintaining the quality of the environment which is necessary for conducting the economic activities and quality of life of people, social sustainability which strives to ensure human rights and equality, preservation of cultural identity, respect for cultural diversity, race and religion, and economic sustainability necessary to maintain the natural, social and human capital required for income and living standards.⁴⁰ Complete sustainable development is achieved through a balance between all these pillars, however, the required condition is not easy to achieve, because in the process of achieving its goals each pillar of sustainability must respect the interests of other pillars not to bring them into imbalance. So, while a certain pillar of sustainable development becomes sustainable, others can become unsustainable, especially when it comes to ecological sustainability, on which the overall capacity of development depends.

One of the first uses of the term sustainable in the contemporary sense was by the Club of Rome in 1972 in its classic report on the *Limits of Growth*, written by a group of scientists led by Dennis and Donella Meadows of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Describing the desirable state of global equilibrium’ the authors wrote, we are searching for a model output that represents a world system that is sustainable without sudden and uncontrolled collapse and capable of satisfying the basic material requirements of all of its people.⁴¹ The thought of this theory is part of what led in 2015 to the non-extension or termination of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and its replacement with what is now called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It was operationalized to last from the year 2016 and terminate in 2030. Some Sustainable Development theorists are: Arthur Pigou, Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, Dennis and Donella Meadows, and of course the Brundtland Report.

The applicability of these two theories (basic needs and sustainable development) to this study steamed from the fact that the various foreign donor assistance or aids that Anambra State has received and continues to receive are all oriented towards engendering modicums of development in mainly meeting the basic necessities for general survival – medicare, basic and gender-balanced education, environmental sanitation, effective waste management, clean water provision, mitigating incidents of ecocide, poverty reduction, and social cohesion. Likewise, this work is concerned by how sustainable these aids being received by Anambra state for decades could affect its socio-economic development in generations to come. These theories would therefore structure this paper in its attempt to access the impact of the activities of donor agencies in the state since 1991.

Literature Review

Undertaking a review of existing literature in an academic research serves to provide a basis for understanding the opinions of others on the subject matter. The activities of donor agencies and foreign aid have garnered attention from historians, economics, government, donors, researchers and journalists. Some of the literature available especially on the effectiveness of donor aid will be reviewed here.

The effectiveness of donor agencies is a subject of much debate in development economics. Do aid and donor agencies promote growth and development of the underdeveloped countries? If they do, then why is it that most of these countries after long experiments with foreign aid and receiving huge amounts of it, are still to achieve a robust to high growth rate? Or is it a foreign policy tool of donor countries to promote their national interests? In development theory, there has been a clear polarization of pro-aid and anti-aid arguments.

It may be necessary to note from the onset that there has hardly been a monolithic scholarship or orientation regarding the place donor agencies or foreign aids play in the developmental agenda or desiderata of third world countries (TWCs). While some assessors view their place as facilitating development, others see it as inhibiting, or at any rate, terminating it; a third group however believes that the task of development is not to be left in the hands of external bodies or foreign donors but should be the sole responsibility of the state. This third view believes that any attempt to blame the *inhibiting* tendencies of the donor agencies is actually an attempt to shift the burden of development to the wrong actors or bodies; it notes that this attitude or practice will only help to perpetuate the unruly dispositions of leaders in the TWCs to behave irresponsibly and ill-responsively⁴².

This view therefore posits that any developmental good, no matter how diminutive or short-lived, gotten through the intervention of any donor agency or foreign development partner, should be appreciated. The basis of this orientation is that most times the goodwill or gestures or aids donated by external development partners are often obstructed, obfuscated and adumbrated by internal colluding and contradictory forces (public officers) who by so doing squander, misapply, loot or mal-utilise them with a brazen sense of negligence⁴³.

Be that as it may, Craig Burnside and David Dollar Aid, in their study titled, Policies, and Growth:

Revisiting the Evidence, found a link between foreign aid and economic growth. The study revisited the relationship between aid and growth using a new data-set focusing on the 1990s on the overall measure of institutions and policies popular in the empirical growth literature. The interaction of aid and institutional quality revealed a robust positive relationship with growth that is strongest in instrumental variable regressions. It emphasized that in the 1990s the allocation of aid to low-income countries favored those with better institutional quality. Their cross-country evidence on aid effectiveness is supported by other types of information as well: case studies, project-level evidence, and opinion polls.⁴⁴ This information supports the view that corrupt institutions and weak policies limit the impact of financial assistance for development. Indeed, aid accelerates growth in developing countries with sound institutions and policies, but has less or no effect in countries in which institutions and policies are poor. A corrupt, incompetent government would not apply aid accordingly and foreign donors are not going to be able to force such government to change its habits overnight or if ever. This further re-emphasizes their opinion that, because of corruption, foreign assistance to developing countries is mostly wasted.⁴⁵

It is important to state that Burnside and Dollar's work has received heavy criticism, however, most development economists agree that underlying economic institutions and policies are the main determinants of long-term growth. In Anambra state, the existence of weak institution for thorough monitoring and accountability contributes to the reason why the decades-long activities of donor agencies have not resulted to a sustainable socio-economically developed state. While donor aid is not solely required to engender development, however, if these donor aids are applied as planned, more economic development would be visible in the state.

Alex Yaw Adom's, *Analysis of the Role of Foreign Donor Aid in Ghana's Economic Development and Poverty Alleviation*, extols the role of donor assistance in promoting economic development and poverty alleviation especially among rural folks in Ghana. Respondents in his research indicated that the majority (56%) of donors and non-governmental organizations suggested that foreign donor aid contributed very significantly to the development of the economy of Ghana and a further thirty-one percent (31%) expressed that the role of foreign aid is significant.⁴⁶ His research posits that the role of donor assistance in promoting economic development and poverty alleviation especially among rural folks in Ghana cannot be understated. However, in spite of Ghana being one of the world's highest recipients of donor assistance, not much has been achieved with the foreign assistance in terms of

economic development and poverty alleviation. In over five decades of receiving donor assistance, the economy of Ghana has not been drastically transformed as there still remains high levels of poverty, high mortality rate, high levels of unemployment and a dilapidated infrastructure.⁴⁷ This research work is not about Ghana but about Anambra state. Here, the activities of donor agencies were examined against the backdrop of developmental strides in Anambra State to ascertain if the Ghana experience was necessitated by the Ghana people or leaders or because of the inherent defects in aids. Overall, it appeared that both the State and the country Ghana share similar results from receiving donor aids after decades.

Ashok Kumar Pankaj in his study titled, *Revisiting Foreign Aid Theories*, argues that foreign aid may prove helpful in pushing the growth rate of under developed and developing countries. This is because donor aid can provide capital, foreign exchange and technical knowledge which are major deficits of growth and development of these countries. He further affirms that such aid can also strengthen their internal economic structures especially in the initial stage.⁴⁸ However, Pankaj's argument has an idealist concern and even views foreign aid as promoter of international peace and prosperity through developing cordial relations between the donor and recipient countries. It is certain that Pankaj is essentially over-optimistic about aids. This is because the idealistic character he painted concerning the gloriousness of aids has not completely been felt or materialised in Anambra State. Yes, aids have had some significant effects as discussed in the body of the study, yet the idea that it is a sure vehicle for the promotion of peace and prosperity is an exaggeration driven too far.

Chinyere Ogbuagu in her Bachelor of Arts project on, *Impact of Donor's Agencies in Developing Nigeria Economy: A Case Study of The Anambra State Education Program Investment Project (ANSEPIP)* appears pro-aid. Her paper concludes that the intervention of World Bank via the project in the state has gradually been achieving the project development objectives since the set targets have not only been achieved but exceeded. The basis of her conclusion was from the data collected from the project office and through oral interview with teachers and School-Based Management Committees.⁴⁹ While Chinyere's work may have basis for her conclusion, the work however was focused only one World Bank project in only the education sector. It also dealt with only the period between year 2014-2016. Hence, her position appears to be subjective and limited. The current study is multi-sectoral and covers a broader scope, from 1991 to 2017.

Joseph Chukwuma Ezeobi in his Bachelor of Arts project on, *The Contributions of Development Partners on Community Development in Anambra State in the New Millennium: A Study of EU/UNICEF activities in Nnewi North and Idemili South Local Government Areas*, also affirms that donor agencies have impacted positively in Anambra State. The study reviewed community development with respect to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) projects which practically indicated to be multi-institutional activities geared towards improving the living conditions of the communities. The study hypothesizes that, the intervention of EU/UNICEF on WASH projects has improved the participatory capacity of the benefitting communities on development project. It equally changed them from passive recipient of development projects and services to active participants on development issues and could help ensure project sustainability. The study emphasizes that the water supply, sanitation and hygiene education programs have contributed to poverty reduction and community development in Anambra state.⁵⁰

The WASH project may have been beneficial to the socio-economic development of the state and especially the benefitting communities, but today, some of the boreholes installed have broken down and are no longer functioning. This has returned rural dwellers to the dismal *status quo* before the installation of the infrastructure. Again, this study's scope is limited compared to the one at hand. The current study looks at a collectivity of sectors so as to have a comprehensive understanding of how the donor agencies have been faring in these areas, and not in just one area.

Tolulope F. Adetayo et al in their journal article, *Foreign Aid Intervention and National Development in Nigeria: A Study of Akure South Local Government Area of Ondo State*, reveals that foreign aid is an essential ingredient to the process of development in their locality. The work states that, since the projects were completed, things have changed...they had more barbers, welders, many shops and retail outlets, increasing population... poor economic and social status of our community has changed for the better.... In fact, the community has witnessed socioeconomic development.⁵¹

Findings from the research reveals that, foreign aid intervention has contributed to the development of benefitting communities especially in the areas of essential infrastructure. The study among other recommendations, strongly advocates that foreign aid intervention should be carried out more in rural communities especially in the area of critical infrastructures. The study also avows that a more inclusive community participation in programs and projects as well as proper identification of ownership of aid

proceeds (especially when it's a project) may help overcome cases of use of sub-standard materials, incompleteness of projects before abandonment, poor maintenance, among others. With these in place, some of the challenges facing development aid may be overcome.⁵² The position of this study appears flawed as only a total number of eleven people were interviewed, making such conclusion based on information of only a few number of persons is not enough to provide a balanced view on the effectiveness of donor agencies activities in the area.

Abidemi I. Odusanya et al, in their journal article on, Foreign Aid, Public Expenditure and Economic Growth: The Nigerian Case, opines that foreign aid and government expenditure have contributed to the growth of Nigeria's economy. The study submits that foreign aid represents an important source of finance in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), including Nigeria, where it supplements low savings, narrow export earnings and thin tax bases. It further notes that the impact has not been qualitative on the welfare of the people. Their study recommends that foreign aid and government expenditure should be channeled towards provision of critical and vital socio-economic infrastructure such as adequate power, roads etcetera that are essential to engineer economic growth and development in Nigeria.⁵³ The problem with this study is that it confused economic growth and development. It failed to show the differences. It did not clearly show that aids that elicit economic growth and the one that elicited development cannot be said to have performed the same way.

Adegbemi B.O Onakoya and Ismail Olaleke Fasanya's article, Does Foreign Aid Accelerate Economic Growth? An Empirical Analysis for Nigeria, examines the impact of foreign aid on economic growth. The model developed in their paper provided evidence supporting the contention that foreign aid positively impacts economic growth in Nigeria. However, they warned that policy variables may reverse the positive effect of aid, even making it detrimental to economic growth in some cases and that donor governments should be aware of the political situations in recipient countries, and work with relevant bodies to ensure as much stability as possible. They agree with dependency theorists that without good institutions, aid is likely to have a detrimental impact on the quality of governance in a recipient developing country.⁵⁴ In view of long standing weak economic institutions in the country, perhaps donor aid is not as effective as the study posited. However, the study was correct to advocate that efforts should be dedicated to improving the quality of governance in the country. Hence, this study improved on Fasanya and Onakoya's study by specifically looking at Anambra State.

In spite of the above literature proclaiming the goodness of donor aid, many scholars and economists argue that aid does not significantly increase economic growth rates nor improve Human Development Indicators. Chinweizu, in his book, *The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slavers and African Elite*, questioned the practical benefit of aid to the recipient countries. He posits that donor aids are not given in good spirit by the donor countries, given the fact that the end product of such aids amounts to putting the recipient country in relatively worse economic condition. In the view of Chinweizu, the trouble with foreign aid is not that it is given, but rather, that its givers use it to stimulate a perverse kind of development.⁵⁵

Chinweizu strongly view aid as unnecessary especially as it involves the developed countries as donors and the developing countries as recipients. This becomes worrisome because such relationship is never on mutual benefit, but always on master-servant basis.⁵⁶ His book totally disregarded any positive impact donor aids may have contributed. His criticism appears harsh and subjective since the study was undertaken in 1984. It did not take into account any good which aid may have done in recent times.

According to George Soros in his book, *George Soros on Globalization*, the efficacy of foreign aids is strongly dependent on the channel through which the aids are delivered, and the sincerity of the regime in power in the recipient country. To him, if a regime is corrupt, foreign aid is bound to be misused. This implies that liberal regimes justly and judiciously apply such aids for the welfare of the citizenry, unlike the repressive regimes which usually use such aids to satisfy selfish ends.⁵⁷

George maintains that poverty reduction strategies fail as a result of the fact that donor bodies such as the World Bank are often obliged by the standard rules to carry out their activities through the governmental channels. Unfortunately, this bureaucratic strategy exposes such aids to corruption that emanate from government officials who usually divert such aids to their private pockets. George Soros is of the belief that such foreign aids, if to be given, ought not to go through the repressive regimes, but preferably through non-governmental channels.⁵⁸ His belief however is faulty as no foreign donor body can operate without the consent of the host government.

Daniel Offiong, in his book, *Imperialism and Dependency* states that foreign aid (through the international donor agencies) tends to be counter-productive. This is because of the fact that such donor agencies indirectly serve and represent the interest of the developed countries rather than serving the interest of the developing countries. His position reflects in the former president of the United States,

John Kennedy's definition of foreign aid as "a method by which the United States maintained a position of influence and control around the world, and sustains a good many countries ..."⁵⁹ This imperialist statement reinforced his opinion that foreign aids serve as the instrument of campaign for alliances, rather than promoting development in the recipient countries. Aid is viewed as coming from the corridors of political projections rather than economic projections.

Offiong further underscores many areas of difference and discontent between the developed countries (donor countries) and the developing countries (recipient countries). This includes that aid albeit insufficient is usually secured after a prolonged and frustrating bargaining and that aids often, back-fires hereby worsening the economies of the recipient countries and forcing them into more foreign debts.⁶⁰ It is necessary to state that the obvious of this perception is that it looks at aids through the prism of dependency theory which blame the West for virtually all the evils of underdevelopment in Africa, without looking at areas where the continent's leaders have misled the African states.

According to Simeon Djankov et al, in their paper, *The Curse of Aid*, foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the curse of natural resources literature. In their paper, they discussed this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960 to 1999, they found that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy.⁶¹ For comparison, they also measured the effect of oil rents on political institutions. They concluded that foreign aid is a bigger curse than oil. The results described in his paper suggest that more money will likely generate little growth. Instead, stronger incentives for rent seeking may reduce the quality of democratic institutions and the checks and balances in the governments of recipient countries. Using data on over one hundred countries and for over forty years, this study quantifies the effects of aid on democracy.

Being dependent on foreign aid seems to result in worsening democratic institutions. The comparison is instructive as it highlights how little is known about the delivery of foreign aid, despite an estimated \$2.3 trillion spent on aid in the second half of the 20th century.⁶² The specific mechanism why foreign aid has a negative effect on political institutions needs to be further investigated. However, their conclusion may be faulty as they did not focus on a specific country. The need for specific country case study is imperative in order to ascertain all necessary facts. The results of the cross-section studies such as this, usually depend on variables on multiple countries and periods of study chosen. The study also

has numerous problems of measurement and interpretation and ignored the stylized structural features of individual countries.

Joseph Adeyeye in his article, *Stolen Aid Slays Development*, notes that Nigeria's development indicators have not improved and has unfortunately taken the downward trend despite four decades of continuous aid with nearly two-thirds of the population living on less than a dollar a day. Adeyeye laments that theft and misappropriation of development aid are a subset of Nigeria's ubiquitous corruption. Sadly, the government has not shown serious interest in prosecuting those who steal aid because of its tolerance for corruption generally. Government officials who steal from their country's budget should not be expected to treat foreign grants or aid differently. His study further states that another major challenge confronting the aid administration in Nigeria stems from misplacement of priorities in the disbursement of foreign aid. Foreign aids are often not channeled to critical areas where the majority of Nigerians would benefit. Adeyeye, cited the instance of a recent study by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a British watchdog, that criticized a six-year primary education program for its insignificant impact on the community and advised the United Kingdom to cancel its funding.⁶³ In all his study is correct in stating that corruption and the poor prioritization of aid are part of the reason for the little impact that donor funds are having on Nigeria's socio-economic development.

Segun Oshewolo, in his journal article, *Poverty Reduction and the Attainment of the MDGS in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects*, observes that aid often comes with a price of its own for developing nations like Nigeria. To him, aid is often wasted on conditions that the recipient must use overpriced goods and services from donor countries. Also, most aid do not actually go to the poorest who would need it the most.⁶⁴ This view describes one of the major ways donor agencies constitute a major problem to the attainment of foreign aid objectives. He posits that on the part of recipient countries (Nigeria in this case), the scourge of corruption that has turned out to be an epidemic that has plagued every sector of the Nigerian society. Oshewolo further states that aid may fail to help the vulnerable, as aid money can often be embezzled. To corroborate his position, he shared a shocking revelation made by Nuhu Ribadu, the former chairman of Nigeria's anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2006 that corrupt government officials and others steal most of these funds. Quoting Ribadu: My pet example is the £220 billion [\$405 billion] of development assistance that has been stolen from this country since independence to date by past leaders.⁶⁵

Evidence from literature and in reality, shows that donor aid has never been immune to severe criticism. Emmanuel Okokondem Okon, in his study on, *Five Decades of Development Aid to Nigeria: The Impact on Human Development*, discovers that most foreign aid had no significant impact on basic development measures such as infant mortality or primary schooling ratios, although some particular programs (immunization and research, for instance) could be effective. His results imply that most foreign aid is consumed rather than invested, and that aid receipts increase the size of government without influencing health indicators. He also finds that the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal, democratic or highly repressive.⁶⁶ However, empirical literature on the impact on foreign aid and government expenditure in his paper is also inconclusive. These discouraging findings constitute, some evidence of government failure, whose incentives to improve Human Development Indicators are insufficient, aid inflows notwithstanding.

Gaps however exist in the review of most of literature reviewed here as most of the analysis were not specifically on Anambra state. As a result of this, the impact of the all donor activities in Anambra state as stipulated in the various Program Implementation Agreement (PIA) documents have not been examined. An in-depth sector-by-sector basis has not been fully ascertained; hence this study would try to fill this gap. From the reviewed literatures so far, it is also observed that no attention was directed towards re-strategizing donor agencies towards better performance. Recommending new strategies to enhance the performance of donor agencies, could effectively help in reducing the poverty level in developing countries, thereby improving their economies; if adopted by relevant authorities.

Those who oppose foreign aid and donor agencies do a good job of giving evidences as to why aids fail to meet the intended goals. But what most of these researchers have in common is that they fail to come up or derive a practical and effective alternative to aid. It would be of economic interest if researchers and scholars were to come up with studies that give a sustainable solution to poverty levels in these developing countries. It may be disastrous to abruptly stop donating to developing countries without having an alternative solution. If researchers were to come out with a good alternative, then it would be easier for aid recipient nations such as Nigeria to make better decisions that could lead to proper resource allocations and sustainable development.

Organization of Study

This study was organized into six chapters. Chapter one deals with the background to the study. It also presented other information such as the statement of the problem, purpose of the study and literature review. Chapter two recounted the background to the political structure and economy of Anambra state. It gave an overview on the economy of the state before and after 1991. Chapter three reviewed the categories and operational framework of donor agencies in the state while chapter four critically assessed the development activities of donor agencies in different sectors of the economy of the state. Chapter five discussed the challenges facing donor agencies and their development efforts in the State, while chapter six focuses on summary, conclusion and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND THE ECONOMY OF ANAMBRA STATE

From Old to New Anambra State (1976 To 1991)

Old Anambra State was created in 1976 from part of the East Central State. The current Enugu State and part of Ebonyi State, together with the current Anambra made up the old Anambra State, from 1976 to 1991. By 1991, the new Anambra State of the current geographical area was created out of the old one, while the remaining part was re-named Enugu State. The Old Anambra State had its administrative capital at Enugu metropolis. Onitsha was the commercial nerve-center of the state while Nnewi remained its industrial hub¹.

The new Anambra State has its state capital in Awka. The state shares boundaries with Kogi State to the north, Enugu State to the east, Imo, Abia and Rivers states to the south, and Delta and Edo States to the west.² The people of Anambra State mainly Igbo with a small population of Igala in Anambra West Local Government. The state has a total land area of 4,416 sq. km... and is made up of 21 Local Government Areas (LGAs).³

Apart from Awka, the state capital, some other major towns are Onitsha, Nnewi, Obosi, Ihiala, Aguata, Oko, Uli, Ojoto, Abagana, Nkpor, Ogidi, Okija, Awkuzu, Umuleri and Aguleri.⁴ Anambra State falls within the south-east geopolitical zone of Nigeria. According to the 2006 population census, the population of the state is four million, one hundred and eighty-two thousand and thirty-two (4,182,032).⁵ Old Anambra state was created barely six years after the Nigerian Civil War from the region which was devastated by the war. Consequently, most of its administrative structure and economy was weak.

Overview of the Economy of Anambra State Before 1991

It may be necessary to examine the economic history of Nigeria before the discussion on the economy of Anambra State before 1991. This is because the dynamics of the national economy directly affected the state especially regarding the state's need to partner with donor agencies for development.

Overview of the Nigerian Economy

Nigeria is regarded as one of the largest economies in Africa. However, the country is largely a mono-economy, especially since the discovery of crude petroleum, first in Olobiri, a community located in the present day Bayelsa State, in January 15, 1956 by shell Darcy and the subsequent exploration of the resource in commercial quantities.⁶ Before oil took the center stage of the Nigerian economy, the country had depended on agricultural production for its major exports. By 1958, agriculture contributed 68% of gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. However, agricultural productivity consistently declined since 1970.⁷

Generally, the popular agricultural export produce from Nigeria, especially before independence, were palm produce, groundnuts and cotton.⁸ Nonetheless, there were a plethora of agricultural produce that had appreciable export value apart from those mentioned above. Each region of the country is known to specialize in specific products, basically because of the climatic conditions inherent which allows for such production. In the north, peasant farmers produced cereals, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, cotton, millet and some wheat. On its own side, the south is known to have specialized in root and tree crops like yam, cassava, citrus fruits, palm produce, kolanuts, cocoa and rubber.⁹ According to A.A. Lawal, despite their reliance on traditional methods of shifting cultivation and the use of traditional implements, peasant farmers produced 70% of Nigeria's exports and 95% of food requirements.¹⁰ Considering the statement credited to Lawal, Nigeria had overtly relied on crude farming methods, which involved the use of non-mechanized tools and implements. This situation may have discouraged the agrarian economy and served as a foundation for its abandonment at the wake of petroleum oil exploration.

The agricultural production in Nigeria was negatively affected by the rise in oil price from 1973. The event of the rise in oil price precipitated high revenue for the country through petroleum oil exportation. The country became so wealthy that General Yakubu Gowon, who was Nigeria's military head of states in the early 1970s, reportedly declared that Nigeria had so much money that it did not know how to spend.¹¹ The statement credited to Gowon may have explained why his government failed to adequately invest in agriculture nor implement effective agro programs during his regime despite the huge oil revenue accruable to the coffers of the country. Instead of looking inwards to diversify the economy through mechanization of agriculture, the Nigerian government at the time took up the stance of "father Christmas" for her West African neighbors. Even the Gowon's Second National Development Plan

appeared to have neglected agriculture because it was not found as one of the main objectives of the Plan.¹² The long-term effect of this neglect was the establishment of an economy that depended on petroleum products and aids from donor actors in the international system. Ofcourse, there were efforts by subsequent governments to reawaken the agricultural sector of the economy but these efforts could not ameliorate the dependency culture of the country on crude oil earnings.

The Nigerian practice of near mono-economy did not only affect the agricultural sector but also rubbed off negatively on the industrial sector of the nation's economy. A passive observation of Nigerian economy may indicate a total dearth and neglect of the industrial sector by the government. Even though successive governments appear to have been prioritizing industrialization in their economic policy objectives, their implementations have left much to be desired.

However, the neglect of industry or the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy did not have a historical antecedent beyond the colonial times. Before and during colonialism, different areas of Nigeria evolved elaborate indigenous manufacturing sector as could be allowed and supported by their prevailing environmental exigencies. The environment as a factor in the nature of industry that flourished in a given part of the country before the contemporary times. Olufemi Ekundare opined that,

natural and geographical factors dictated the location of industries in Nigeria... The canoe industry developed along the coastal areas and the river banks...cotton had been grown and manufactured into cloth for many centuries past... Long before the nineteenth century, the people of Nigeria had been mining iron, tin, gold, salt and other minerals. Ironworks existed in many areas, including Ijebu-Ode, Ilorin, Bida and Awka.¹³

Apart from explicating the environmental factor in manufacturing, Ekundare provided an insight on the industrial sector of the pre-colonial and pre-independence Nigerian economy. Unfortunately, the elaborate industrial foundation laid over the years, which depicts the independent ingenuity of the Nigerian indigenous manufacturers, was laid for sacrifice on the altar of crude petroleum. Of course, many scholars believe that the neglect in the post-independence industrial sector was precipitated by the colonial deliberate efforts to ensure the de-industrialization of the country. In as much as this assertion remained valid, the country obviously had the opportunity to effect sustainable industrialization with the revenue from petroleum during the days of oil boom. But the investment on

industrialization by the successive governments appeared to have yielded minimal results and the attitude of governmental officials shows a people who were overwhelmed by the oil revenue that other aspects of the country's industry remained neglected. The situation further provided the foundation for the dependency on aid and international donors.

Of course, as inferred in the previous paragraph, there were visible attempts made by successive governments to achieve industrialization in Nigeria. Evidence showed that revenue from petroleum exports had over the years been channeled towards industrial development but, as would be shown in this section, obvious cases of corruption, ineptitude, incompetence, nepotism and gross mismanagement, among other maladies, affected the productivity of the efforts towards industrialization. The attention given to industrialization in the post-colonial Nigeria could be gleaned through the words of Onwuka Njoku that, "the immediate post-colonial government's dream of industrializing the economy was supported with a package of facilitative measures and incentives designed to create a favorable investment climate in the country...including... legislative enactments, institutional reforms and infrastructural improvements."¹⁴

Also, the industrialization of the economy became one of the key objectives of the First National Development Plan, 1962-1968. In that development plan, government planned investment on manufacturing was 13.4 percent of total spending.¹⁵ The Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974 also attempted to promote industrialization by rectifying the lopsided distribution and location of industries. Furthermore, A.A. Lawal noted that the consistent support of government for further industrialization in the Third National Development Plan between the 1970s and 1980s stimulated rapid growth and investment in output, employment and a number of industrial plants which concentrated on production of light consumer goods like cotton, textile, beer, cement and paints.¹⁶

There were also some other immediate gains which accrued from the industrial or manufacturing sector with the implementation of some of the measures that were adopted to boost the sector. Contributions of the sector to the growth of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced steady growth, especially up to 1983. According to statistics, the sector contributed 4 percent of the country's GDP in 1958-1959; 6 percent in 1963-1964; 9 percent in 1969-1969; 16 percent in 1982; 18.2 percent in 1983; 7.4 percent in 1993; and 6.9 percent in 1994 and the percentage kept dwindling up to the close of the 20th century.¹⁷ It is significant to note that the contributions of the industrial sector began to nosedive

by 1993, and the year falls within the scope of this study. Events showed that the period marked the peak of political instability in the country, precipitated by military coup d'état and the concomitant truncation of existing economic programs.

The above sentence underscored another force that bedevils the Nigerian economy. That force is overt dependence on foreign investment, which is considered by dependency theorists as a factor of neo-colonialism. Foreign investment is a basic ingredient of economic growth in the world of free trade. However, Nigeria appears to lack the bargaining power to influence the terms of trade to its favor.

The failure to develop the manufacturing or industrial sector of the Nigerian economy is exemplified in the gloom that befell the attempt to establish a sustainable steel industry in the country. This situation was succinctly captured by Njoku in the following words, "The story of the Ajaokuta Steel Company exemplifies most of the indices of Nigeria's industrial calamity..."¹⁸ The Ajaokuta steel complex has turned out to be a monument reminding the nation of its failure in the industrial sector. Of course, the government had a juicy plan towards the project, considering the place of steel in industrial development.

The developments in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the Nigerian economy had a direct influence on the trade or commercial sector, especially on exports. This is because a country can only trade with other countries that which it has comparative advantage of producing agriculturally or industrially. However, different parts of the country evolved different trade patterns in the pre-colonial times and many of them were involved in significant exports or what was termed long distant trade mostly across the Sahara. North Africa is known as the sub-region to establish the first regular contact with Nigeria. This was made possible by the trans-Saharan trade. Ekundare threw light on the historical significance of the trans-Saharan trade on Nigeria and the West African sub-region when he states thus, "by the use of camels, caravan trade routes were developed across the Sahara between West and North Africa, and for a long period these routes were the only ways to and from West Africa and the outside world."¹⁹

However, colonialism redirected Nigeria's foreign trade from across the Sahara to Europe. The primary motive of the British in Nigeria was to establish the colony as a base for industrial primary products and also as a market for British manufactured goods. This objective directed the British colonial economic policies in the country. The British intensified the exportation of raw materials from Nigeria

and export figures soared high especially in the southern part of the country. The years between 1908 and 1910 experienced rapid growth in Nigeria's external trade in the southern parts. A similar phenomenal growth was experienced in northern Nigeria from 1910 onwards. The increase in exports was made possible by the colonial infrastructural policy. There was the impressive network of railways across the country, and the northern contributions on trade were effectively made possible by the extension of the railway from Minna to Kano in 1911. These contributions could be seen in the statistics of groundnut exports from the region. Whereas groundnut exports from the north was about 1,179 tons in 1910, it reached 19,288 in 1911.²⁰

By the time Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it started experiencing trade deficits. This could be attributed to the deliberate colonial effort to de-industrialize the country. Therefore, at independence, instead of Nigeria depending on local production for export, it engaged in large scale importation of machinery and equipments.²¹ Nonetheless, the country soon started experiencing trade surpluses as a result of massive exports of crude oil. However, the positive outcome of the export of crude only reinforced the country's dependence on foreign capital goods and industrial raw materials,²² thereby precipitating long-term negative impact. Trade deficits returned beginning in 1975. Since then Nigeria's balance of trade has alternated between periods of deficits and of surpluses, driven by fluctuations in the global oil market and government decisions on how to spend its money. A trade surplus in 1980, for example, allowed work to continue on the new federal capital designate of Abuja, but by 1982 the surplus had become a deficit, and grew worse by the end of 1983. At the beginning of the 21st century, exports were greater than imports, but the interest on the country's external debt was so high that a truly favorable balance of trade (as opposed to one that existed on paper only) hinged at least partly on the effectiveness of debt relief.²³ These conditions also perpetuated the country's subsequent dependence on international donors.

There has always been an effective and elaborate internal trading system in Nigeria over the years. The direction of domestic trade in staple foods was largely north-south between different ecological zones but also between major urban Centers in the southeast and southwest. The southern states supplied plantains, cassava, kola nuts, and fruit to the northern states, which in turn supply beans, onions, and livestock to the southern states. Yams from the central region were traded in the southern and the far northern cities. Women played a dominant role in marketing foodstuffs and manufactured goods in the southern states. Most of the food items and manufactured goods are sold in open market stalls, in small

neighborhood shops, and on the streets.²⁴ Normally, the internal trading system could have helped to ensure sustainable markets for domestically produced goods hence contributing enormously to economic development through equitable distribution of income per capita. Unfortunately, such factors as inflation and unhealthy competition with imported goods have kept on undermining local production and trading.

A critical look at the service sector of the Nigerian economy showed that the sector is largely untapped. Two major components of the service sector, which are science and technology, are conspicuously inadequate in the country's economic environment. Another highly rewarding component of the service sector, which is tourism, is nearly comatose in the country. Ironically, Nigeria has lots of tourism prospects because the country has many attractions of interest to tourists. There are miles of coastal beaches, wildlife reserves, a variety of cultures, and many museums that house artistic treasures.²⁵

Nigerian economy between 1991-1999 was characterized by a conspicuous romance with foreign donors. This basically came in form of concerted attempts to ameliorate the long ailing economy. However, some other unfortunate developments in the country strained the economic relations between Nigeria and many western donor actors, thereby affecting the activities of the donor agencies in Nigeria until the turn of the 21st century. Such unfortunate developments were the ugly human rights situation precipitated by military dictatorships in the country. The General Sani Abacha's military junta particularly witnessed sanctions from international state and non-state actors, including prospective donor agencies, because of records of blatant human rights violations attributed to the regime.

The Nigerian story with international donor agencies from 1984 up till 1994 could be told within the context of the country's relations with the Bretton Woods institutions. According to A. C. Agajelu, N. J. Obiakor and Leo Nnoli, "by the late 1970s and the turn of the 1980s, the global oil price experienced a drastic fall which resulted to the oil glut... Nigeria started experiencing excruciating balance of payments deficits due to sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings... The Bretton Woods Institutions seemed to be the only light at the end of the tunnel especially as credit facilities was no longer flowing in from international commercial banks."²⁶

Of course, the Nigerian economy experienced a major hiccup as the country's foreign exchange earnings could not take care of its import bills. During the oil boom, Nigeria was known to have engaged in heavy importation of both capital and consumer goods. This reliance on importations made

the governments of the country scamp for donorship since the income of the country could no longer balance with its expenditure. However, at this point it is pertinent to show with statistics the period when the external sector of the country's economy enjoyed a favorable balance of payment. This period is regarded as the period of growth of Nigeria's merchandise trade. The positive trend is explicated in table 2.1:

Table 2.1: The Growth of Nigeria's Merchandise Trade, 1946-1974

Year	Exports (Naira 000)	Import (Naira 000)
1946	49,292	40,918
1950	180,446	123,736
1955	265,067	272,238
1960	339,427	431,782
1965	536,538	550,788
1970	885,365	756,419
1971	1,293,338	1,078,907
1972	1,434,212	990,064
1973	2,278,415	1,224,786
1974	5,794,837	1,737,324

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, *Trade Report, Annual Abstract of Statistics and Economic Indicators*; Quoted in F.O. Fajana et al, *Structure of Nigerian Economy*²⁷

Even though naira was not in use in the earlier period before 1970, as presented in the table 2.1, the value of imports and exports are given in naira to achieve uniformity. The table showed the advantage exports had over imports and the positive trend of balance of payment accruable. Imports only edged over exports in 1960, which was the independence year and 1965, which was a year that marked the height of instability that characterized Nigeria's first republic. After these periods, the index became positive again. Of course, we know these years to be the years Nigeria achieved its best economic results. The table 2.2 below justifies this assertion.

The economic realities that led to the country's reliance on external donors are explicated in the table and explanations below:

Table 2.2: Selected Indicators of Economic Growth Performance, 1975- 1984

Indicators	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Aggregate Output GDP Growth Rate (%)	10.7	10.4	6.6	-5.6	5.9	0.5	-5.2	-5.3	-6.7	-0.6
Domestic Production Index of Agricultural Production (1975=100)	100.0	93.9	88.7	88.5	87.2	89.4	92.4	91.9	87.9	91.4
Index of Manufacturing Production (1975=100)	100.0	123.8	131.1	148.6	221.6	233.1	245.9	322.3	307.4	251.4
External Sector Index of Agricultural Export Earnings (1975=100)	100.0	118.6	162.8	178.8	202.6	147.2	48.9	86.1	186.6	125.1
Index of Oil Export Earnings (1975=100)	100.0	138.5	155.0	118.4	222.7	296.4	234.1	175.1	157.8	193.8

Source: T.A. Oyejide, A.Soyode and M.O. Kayode, *Nigeria and the IMF*, Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria Limited, 1985.²⁸

The table 2.2 above presented data on the indicators which capture the essential elements of Nigeria's economic growth performance during the 1975-1984 decade. Three types of growth indicators are displayed in the table. The indicator of aggregate output performance is the average annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to the trend shown by this indicator, the rapid inducing impact of the 1973-1974 sharp increases in crude oil prices carried through the first three years of the 1975-1984 periods. Positive and impressive GDP growth rates were thus recorded up to 1977; although the rate fell steadily during the three years from 10 percent in 1975 and 1976 down to under 7 percent in 1977. Then, there was a sharp drop to a negative growth rate of -5.6 percent in 1978. Another sharp reversal occurred in 1979, this time in the desirable upward direction. Unfortunately, this rally turned out to be short-lived; the growth rate took a nosedive shortly thereafter and it remained in the negative range through 1984. Thus, the GDP has fallen consistently through the first half of the

1980s; and in practical terms, Nigerians have had to endure four consecutive years of generally declining standard of living.²⁹

The other two types of indicators as shown in the table 2.1 reflected the proximate causes of general decline in Nigeria's living standard. Two indicators attempted to track the performance of domestic production for the local market. These are the indices of agricultural production and manufacturing output. The trend of agricultural output represented a clear disaster case. Over the 10year period, agricultural output remained more or less stagnant at a level which was well below (by roughly 10 percent) the 1975 performance. Given Nigeria's rapidly growing population, the consequences of a stagnant agriculture are obvious grim. The trend of manufacturing output, according to the table, is more reassuring. Steady, though not dramatic, increases in output are recorded throughout the 1975-1984 period, except in the last year when a fairly sharp drop is shown as the index declined from 307.4 to 251.4 between 1983 and 1984, as shown in the table. This decrease of about 21 percent in manufacturing output was the ultimate reflection of the drastic shortage of industrial raw material inputs following tight control on imports which was progressively imposed from 1982 as a means of dealing with the increasingly acute shortage of foreign exchange.³⁰

However, as indicated earlier in this section of the chapter, the proximate cause of the economic crises, which pushed Nigeria to be donor-dependent economy, are to be found in the external sector. Just as the oil (export) boom of the 1973-1975 period created the growth-inducing resources which enhanced GDP growth rate up to 1977, the impact of subsequent events in the external sector is reflected in the GDP growth trend between 1978 and 1984. The external sector, as inferred earlier, has been dominated by oil export earnings. Foreign exchange earnings from the agricultural sector exhibited a mild upward trend until 1979, after which a marked decline occurred. This sector thus contributed somewhat to the economic crisis of the 1980s. But the real culprit clearly appears to be the oil sector. As indicated in table 2.1, particular declines in the index of oil export earnings were faithfully reflected by corresponding decreases in the GDP growth rate. For instance, as the index dropped from 155.0 to 118.4 between 1977 and 1978, the GDP growth rate fell from 6.6 percent to -5.6 percent. The consecutive year to year decreases of the index between 1980 and 1983 were mirrored by similar declining GDP growth rates over the period. As the index regained an upward trend between 1983 and 1984, the GDP growth rate also improved.³¹

From the explications above, it has been shown that the policy-makers of Nigeria during the 1970s were either unknowledgeable of the linkage effect of international price of oil on the country's GDP and in furtherance on the county's economic growth and development, or they were simply ignorant of it. In all, the economic realities plunged the country down the dangerous lane of balance of payments deficits and its resultant economic recession. The situation made the country to look in the direction of major donors which were the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) for bailout loans.

From 1979 -1983, the Second Republic government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari battled to revive a seriously ailing economy. Unfortunately, while efforts were made by the government to keep the country on the path of economic growth and development, other events in the international economic arena, especially the global economic recession, effectively weighed the country's economy down. The recession worsened an already bad situation of decreased oil exports and precipitated a rapid decline in commodity prices on the world market. To meet external financial commitments Nigeria was increasingly forced to borrow money from international capital market.³² General mismanagement of available funds made the country to suffer mounting budget deficits which, according to T. Falola *et al*, rose from N3,295.6 million in 1980 to N4,882.6 million in 1981 and N5,373.1 million in 1982. Total government deficits increased from 16.6 percent in 1980 to 31.9 percent in 1982. The budgetary deficits were financed by borrowings and by 1983 Nigeria had already developed a scary debt profile.³³

In addition to going to the Bretton Woods Institutions, the Shagari's government also made some indigenous efforts to salvage the country's economy. In order to battle the downward sliding economy, the government promulgated the Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provision) Act of 1982. This Act was promulgated primarily to reduce government expenditures and curtail imports. The president justified the Act by stating that "since government depended on oil revenue for 82% of its expenditure; the decline of the oil sector has had various impacts on our domestic finance."³⁴ In order to check importations the government went on to impose import duties where hitherto non-existent, increased the existing import duties, and import licenses already issued to various categories of business persons were recalled for review. In addition, business travel allowances were reduced and compulsory advanced deposits imposed on importers of certain commodities including food, building materials, raw materials for use in industry, spare parts and so on. Furthermore, external borrowing by states was restricted. These economic measures became known as the austerity measures. While the

aforementioned internal austerity measures were being adopted, negotiations were started with the IMF for a loan.³⁵ The negotiations with the IMF for a loan could not be completed by the Shagari administration as it was forcefully replaced by the military junta led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari.

The Buhari's military government began renegotiation of loan agreements between the country and the IMF.³⁶ Nonetheless, the government appeared to be indecisive on whether to accept the IMF conditionality and go for the loan or whether to reject the loan because of what was regarded as the IMF draconian conditionality. This indecision is seen as one of the economic short-comings of the Gen. Buhari military administration. According to Falola *et al*, Perhaps the most serious weakness of the economic program of the Buhari administration was its failure to evolve any overall strategy for dealing with Nigeria's external indebtedness which at the time peaked at 20 billion dollars.³⁷

The military junta of Buhari was toppled in 1985 to be replaced by another junta led by Gen. Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, popularly known as IBB. The IBB administration immediately made known its commitment to tackle the economic difficulties which faced the country and therefore, did not hesitate to open up for loan negotiations with the IMF. Agajelu, Obiakor and Nnoli describe the changes the IBB government introduced to the Nigerian economy in the following words:

*However, the coming to power of General Ibrahim Babangida marked a turning in the annals of economic restructuring in Nigeria. In its efforts to break the icy relationship between Nigeria and the IMF, the regime instituted a national debate on the desirability of Nigeria obtaining a 2.5 billion U.S dollar loan with the accompanying conditionality. It was reported that though the delegates rejected the loan during the national debate, Babangida went ahead and implemented the Structural Adjustment Program which was the conditionality for procurement of the IMF loan.*³⁸

Even though there was what appeared to be unpopular response to the IBB's desire to accept the IMF loan under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), the government went ahead to adopt and launch SAP in June 1986.³⁹ The adoption of SAP and the obvious hardship that came with the program strengthened the voice of proponents of dependency theory. The conditionality of SAP was described as draconian and was deeply criticized both within and outside Nigeria. In the context of the IMF, conditionality refers to the policies a member is expected to follow in order to secure access to the

Fund. These policies were intended to help ensure that the member country will overcome its external payments problem and thus, be in a position to repay the Fund in a timely manner.⁴⁰ The policies towards economic reforms as contained in SAP as at the 1980s included:

- Import substitution
- Privatization and commercialization
- Trade liberalization
- Withdrawal of subsidies
- Currency devaluation⁴¹

The IBB's administration proposed certain objectives for the implementation of SAP. These objectives are documented by Falola et al as thus:

- *to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports;*
- *to achieve fiscal balance of payments viability, that is to say, reduction and, possibly total elimination of budget deficits;*
- *to lay the grounds for a sustainable non-inflationary or minimal inflationary growth;*
- *to lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the public sector, and improve the sector's efficiency as well as intensify the growth potential of the private sector; and*
- *to reduce the strangulating regime of administrative controls in the economic sector of national life.⁴²*

The effect of SAP on the Nigerian economy was a subject of intensive debate among both economists and lay people. However, its direct impact on the citizenry, which came in the form of low living conditions attributed to the devaluation of the Naira, inflation, removal of subsidies, among others, made the program a subject of intense criticism.

By 1991, the economy of Nigeria was characterized by the effects of the Structural Adjustments. The government claimed that deregulation would boost domestic productivity thereby diversifying the economy. It was particularly expected that agricultural production would experience a boost. However, there are indications that the agricultural sector generally remained sluggish even though official

statistics suggested an absolute increase in the output of commodities like cotton and cocoa.⁴³ Devaluation of the naira meant increased cost for farming communities, both of farming inputs and consumer goods. More significantly, the removal of subsidy on fertilizers, seeds, farm equipment and pesticides added to the increased costs suffered by farmers in the 1990s. Furthermore, the middlemen took advantage of the removal of the marketing boards to impose their will on the countryside to the detriment of the peasantry.⁴⁴

The industrial sector was particularly hit hard by the structural adjustment, especially by 1991. There was diminished industrial capacity utilization due to the devaluation of the Naira and the resultant inflation. Akin Fadahunsi *et al* reported that the industrial sector was so badly affected by the adjustment program to the point that capacity utilization in several cases fell below their pre-adjustment levels.⁴⁵ The situation was exacerbated by trade liberalization which made Nigeria a dumping ground for foreign producers. Furthermore, the collapse of consumer purchasing power meant an increase in unsold stocks in manufacturers' warehouses. The effect of this was large-scale factory closures across Nigeria in the 1990s.⁴⁶

Some argued that the boom in the banking and financial sector witnessed since 1986 was a positive effect of SAP due to deregulation. However, Fadahunsi *et al* argued that this boom only heightened speculative activities, especially with regard to Naira exchange rate.⁴⁷ They went further to state that in the period up to 5 March 1992, bankers, especially merchant bankers, were able to earn a rent of up to N8 on the dollar by trading dollars (and other hard currencies) which they bought from the Central Bank of Nigeria at about N10 to the dollar for between N15-N18 to the dollar⁴⁸. The bureaux de change which they set up also prospered on such huge rents. The decision of the CBN to devalue in 1992 and become an active trader in the foreign exchange market failed significantly to put a decisive end to this kind of rent-seeking. Indeed, a new gap opened almost immediately between commercial/Central Bank Naira exchange rate and the parallel market bureau de change rates. By the end of December 1993, whereas the Central Bank rate for one US dollar was N21.9, the parallel market/bureau de change rate was N47 and in 1995, while the CBN rate stood at N22 to the dollar, the parallel market rate rose as high as N82 to one dollar.⁴⁹ This trend marked the instability which hit the banking and financial sector of the economy in the 1990s as a result of the SAP. In all, SAP failed to be an agent of the highly needed economic diversification. Instead it perpetuated the country's dependency on foreign donors and the rot in the economy continued ever since.

The events of June 12, 1993 also had huge negative implications on the economy. On that day, Nigerians went to the polls to elect a President for the Third Republic. It was the first election held after the military coup that toppled the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari in 1983. The election was lauded as generally free, fair, peaceful, credible, transparent and unique, as it was the first time the Option A4 voting pattern was deployed unlike other elections. It was also regarded as the first election in Nigeria that was devoid of religious and tribal sentiments. Elections results clearly revealed, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola, also known as MKO Abiola, of the social Democratic Party as the winner to the pleasure of many Nigerians. Consequently, the annulment of the election by the military government of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, was perceived by most Nigerians as a rude shock, leaving pro-democracy activists and supporters reeling in chagrin and dismay. According to the military government, the annulment was to stave-off credible security reports of a threat to the enthronement of a democratic government at the time and to avoid a likely military coup d'état. This event triggered nationwide protests by the press, patriotic Nigerians and civil society amidst the threat of torture and murder. The resultant unrest further destabilized the Nigerian economy.

The return to civilian government promised some new dimensions in solving the Nigerian economic problems. While the military dictatorships were characterized by authoritarianism which manifested in draconian decrees, the civilian government had the promise of incorporating experts and technocrats to help solve the country's economic malady. By the time Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's administration emerged in 1999, there appeared to be a light at the end of the long dark tunnel. Taking cognizance of the deplorable living conditions of the majority of Nigerians and the negative effects of SAP on the industrial sector of the economy, Obasanjo stated the following as top of his economic policy objectives:

- emphasis on developing manufacturing industries as opposed to agriculture,
- movement of labor from rural to urban industrial areas,
- less reliance on imported goods in preference to home produced goods,
- revision or abolition of the outdated land tenure system that hindered the acquisition of land for industrial projects, and
- establishment of a stable political system.⁵⁰

In as much as Obasanjo's efforts achieved varied results, the mono-economy trend, which continually hindered Nigeria's bargaining power in a free trade international economic system, persisted. Subsequent governments of Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'dua, Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari (who was Nigeria's president in 2017) attempted to adopt different measures to make a difference in the Nigerian economy and ensure positive balance of payments. However, the fall in the global oil price in 2015 and the concomitant economic recession that hit Nigerian economy showed that much progress had not been made in the area of economic diversification.

Certain factors that undermined Nigerian economy have been identified, such as the unhealthy mono-economy system, political instability, inflation, heavy importation of capital and non-capital goods, amongst others. The question now becomes: what are the trends in the Nigerian environment that precipitated these factors? Empirical observation showed that the unhealthy trends that keep the country economically crippled include, corruption, maladministration, misplaced priorities, nepotism, despotism, disintegration, and unpatriotic overtures. From the first republic, each administration in Nigeria had been characterized by the above mentioned anti-nation building traits. This made Chinua Achebe to write thus:

*The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership.*⁵¹

Anambra State Economy Before 1991

Now, in relation to Anambra State, the people have always been known for developing some peculiar economy patterns which complemented their social organizations. The mainstay of the economy of most pre-colonial Igbo societies east of the Niger was agriculture. The other sectors of the economy, which include trade, manufacturing and services, were only secondarily engaged in when farming activities must have been concluded. There are some evidences to back this assertion. To underscore the importance of farming in the Igbo pre-colonial economy, A.E. Afigbo quoted Uchendu as asserting thus:

To remind an Igbo that he is ori mgbe ahia loro, 'one who eats only when the market holds' is to humiliate him. This does not imply that traders are not respected: all it means is that the Igbo see farming as their chief occupation and trading as subsidiary not a substitute for it.⁵²

The place of farming as the principal agricultural activity in the pre-colonial Igboland led to many myths, legends, folklore and traditions, which tried to explain its origin and mystery. Popular among such myths is the one presented by Afigbo, which attributed the evolution of agriculture in Igboland to a divine intervention of the Supreme Being on the progenitors of Igbo at their time of dire need. According to the myth:

When Eri died his food supply (from heaven) ceased and Ndri at Aguleri complained to Chukwu that there was no food...and Chukwu told him he was to kill and sacrifice his eldest son and daughter.... This killing of eldest son and daughter was carried out and the bodies buried in separate graves. Three native weeks later shoots appeared out of the graves of these children. From the grave of his son Ndri dug up a yam.... The next day Ndri dug up Koko yam from his daughter's grave...for this reason the yam is called the son of Ndri and koko yam the daughter of Ndri.⁵³

Agricultural practices in Anambra State area was determined by climatic, soil and vegetation composition of the area in the pre-colonial times. Being a forest belt, the climate of Anambra State is characterized by heavy rainfall. Heavy rainfall supported root crop and tree crop agriculture. Crops such as yam, cocoyam, oil palm, cassava, banana, plantain, sweet potatoes among others, were the basic crops the people of Anambra area were known to have mainly cultivated. Among these crops, there were some which were chiefly for men and others chiefly for women. While the men exclusively cultivated the yam, the women cultivated the cocoyam. The reason for this gender arrangement could be deducted from the myth above as quoted from Afigbo. However, cassava could be cultivated by any of the gender. This also goes for the harvesting of the crops.

The agricultural productivity of each community in Anambra State and its contributions to the community's pre-colonial economy was also effectively determined by the soil. While some communities had impressively rich agricultural soil, others were not so lucky. For example,

communities close to the bank of the River Niger in the state had better soil composition, which was basically enhanced by the annual flooding of the river. The annual flooding of the Niger was said to make it possible for planting season to commence in December and ended in September of the following year.⁵⁴ This factor made the Niger communities a destination for itinerant farmers since the pre-colonial times. There is evidence that there were itinerant farmers from Ozubulu and Ihiala (hinterland Anambra communities) who came to settle in the Ogbaru (River Niger community) area. Also settler farmers were said to have come from more distant communities like Mbano, which is in today's Imo State.⁵⁵

On the other hand, many hinterland communities of Anambra State did not enjoy such rich or arable soil as the Niger communities. Communities in the present day Aguata, Anaocha, and Orumba areas are known to have soil of relatively poor quality, which hardly supported the growth of economic crops.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the soil composition of many of these communities made them susceptible to erosion menace that discouraged large-scale farming and limited the communities to subsistence farming, especially prior to the European incursion.

The prevailing land tenure system in different communities of the Anambra area also dictated agricultural productivity and its contributions to the pre-colonial economy. Evidence showed that most of the Anambra communities, both the Niger coast and hinterland communities, practiced communal ownership of land. In the Ogbaru area as well as the Awka-Anaocha-Aguata area, land ownership was based on kindred system. In these communities, the distribution of farmlands was the function of the village and kindred elders. The lands allocated for farming were normally outside the homestead.⁵⁷ This precipitated the division of most Anambra communities into two zones; the *Agu* (Farmlands) and the *Obuno* (homestead).⁵⁸ Some communities had larger area of farmland than others, and this also dictated the volume of agricultural productivity.

Livestock rearing in the pre-colonial Anambra society was not elaborately developed. Livestock were not known to be herded in large numbers or in ranches. Livestock ownership was generally regarded as part of domestic acquisitions. Therefore, the activities surrounding the rearing of livestock were incorporated in the domestic chores normally assigned to children. Fishery was basically an elaborate economic activity which was ultimately domiciled among the River Niger communities of Anambra State. This was because most of the hinterland communities were landlocked to make fishery a major

economic activity. In the riverside communities of Ogbaru in the eastern Anambra State, Onitsha in the west and Otuocha in the north, fishing was a vocation that every indigenous person was expected to either fully or partly engage in. In fact, many people believe that during the pre-colonial times up till the 1960, nearly every indigenous person of these areas were active fishermen.⁵⁹

Though not regarded as important as agriculture, trade in Igboland was equally of great importance. Trade in the pre-colonial Anambra area was closely linked with agriculture. Most Anambra people were subsistence farmers, especially those in the hinterlands, who only traded the surpluses from their farms. The trading system before European incursion was the barter system. However, with the coming of Europeans such mediums of exchange as cowries, manilas, cloths, wire and iron bars were introduced. These mediums of exchange were first made popular in the River Niger communities because of their earlier contacts with the Europeans and their coastal agents.

In the pre-colonial Anambra communities, there was normally a relatively big market which each community was known for. In that market, the agricultural or manufactured commodity which the community has the comparative advantage of producing, were popularly displayed. For example, the Eke Awgbu and Nkwo Ichida were known as palm wine markets. This was because both communities were known to harbour professional palm wine tappers.⁶⁰ While Eke Awka was known for metal products, Eke Amawbia (which later became known as Eke Oyibo) was known for wood works.⁶¹ The riverside communities of the Niger were popularly known to have sold food items from the hinterlands to long-distant merchants that came from across or along the river. One of such popular market that sold food items was Afor Atani.⁶² This pattern of trading enhanced inter-group relations among the peoples in the pre-colonial times.

Trading was not exclusively reserved for any particular gender in the pre-colonial Anambra area. However, the female folk were mostly engaged in them, especially the short-distant trade. It was a common sight to see women carrying *ukpa* (baskets specially designed for the market) with their commodities in them to the market on the period market days. The women also returned in the evening with the *ukpa* on their heads, only to this time contain their purchases, which they compulsorily made after their sales. A market day in Anambra communities was, therefore, an important day of buying and selling.

Manufacturing in pre-colonial Anambra State was also an important economic activity that demanded brief attention in this section. Each Anambra communities was known for a particular craft atleast. However, manufacturing was mostly done as a side activity after the agricultural activities were done. When the planting season was over, craftsmen would settle down to engage in pottery, carving, blacksmithing, textile weaving, basket making, mat making among others. A few communities had a guild of craftsmen, who hardly engaged in any other economic activity. Popular among such Anambra communities is Awka. Apart from the guilds, certain crafts tended to run in individual families.

Awka was a famed blacksmithing community in Igboland and beyond. They were known to have mastered the craft of smelting of iron from iron ore and making of steel. They had the knowledge of mixing of metals and they were said to have worked on iron, brass, bronze and copper. Among the popular iron items that made Awka blacksmiths popular in the pre-colonial times were machetes, swords, diggers and above all, the ubiquitous *Alo* the spear, used for throwing, thrusting and stabling. When it was used for throwing it was called *ube*, javelin.⁶³ The influence of Awka blacksmith on the Igbo and their neighbors is shown by Afigbo in the following words, “The Awka dominated the industry in Northern and Western Igboland, and were active among the Isoko of the West Niger area, as among the Igala and Idoma of the Middle Belt zone.”⁶⁴

Carving and woodwork was another industry in pre-colonial Anambra that inspired the formation of a special guild for it in some communities. In fact, the whole community of Umudioka of Awka specialized as carvers and organized a guild for the craft. They were known to have engaged in special carvings of ritual objects and insignia. Among the popular crafts were ceremonial stools, doors and panels used by titled men.⁶⁵ The Amawbia community was also known for elaborate woodworks in the pre-colonial times. They were known to have supplied Awka blacksmiths with wooden handles for iron tools, weapons and other implements.⁶⁶

Colonialism precipitated change and continuity in the nature and patterns of the economy of the Anambra area. A conspicuous area of change made possible by colonialism was in agricultural production. Not long after the colonizing authorities had settled in, the people started receiving the signal that the foreigners would prefer for trade, certain groups of crops, which later became known as cash or economic crops. Top among the economic crops obtained from the Anambra area was the oil palm. This led to an added importance attached to the product. Even though the oil palm had

traditionally been an important economic tree in the traditional Anambra society, extra importance was attached to it as a result of its increased demand for export. The value of a piece of land appreciated significantly if it has palm trees on them. In fact, in such communities as Agulu and Aguluzigbo, when a land was rented or sold, the oil palm trees on the land were not part of the transaction. What this meant was that the seller retains the ownership of the tree or opens a separate transaction for its sale with the buyer.⁶⁷

In order to ensure the effective acquisition of the important agricultural raw materials which were mostly available in the Igbo hinterlands, the colonial government adopted the policy defined by Ralph Moore in 1899 as one of “supervision and control.” This policy created the general conditions of peace and improved communication which would enable the people to harvest their natural resources for sale to European mercantile companies.⁶⁸ In essence, the colonial government was not eager to introduce radical economic measures, rather they preferred creating a peaceful atmosphere that would encourage rural productivity for their exports. The policy also provided for the control of the conditions under which the resources from these areas were collected and marketed.⁶⁹

The policy as enacted by the colonial government encouraged larger agricultural output in the Anambra area, and then there became a need to put in place the transport infrastructure that would ensure the movement of the products from the hinterlands to the coasts. However, there is a belief that the transport revolution that came with colonialism in Igboland was largely due to the colonial administrative needs instead of economic needs. According to Afigbo, “the transport and communication revolution in Igbo land, that is the displacement of the old and tortuous bush-paths by modern roads and railways, originated largely as a political and administrative event.”⁷⁰ Be that as it may, the roads served multiple purposes and helped ensure increased agricultural outputs.

The introduction of the roads also opened up a new economic activity across Igboland, including the Anambra area. Youths were mobilized locally for the construction of the roads, and even though the labor was not initially paid for, payment for labor was later introduced. More importantly, with the discovery of coal at Enugu and the need to evacuate the product through the ports, the railway line that transverse Igboland was initiated. The construction of the railway line came with enormous wage-earning opportunities that people from the Anambra area migrated to construction towns such as Enugu,

Aba, Umuahia, Uzuakoli and even Port Harcourt, to join the construction process and earn wages.⁷¹ This trend precipitated the rural-urban migration and helped to circulate the newly introduced currency among the people.

The coming of the Europeans widened the trade on the Niger and Anambra Rivers, and made the communities of the riverside important trading towns. Trade on the rivers indeed had more impact on the people of the Anambra area during the colonial times than the newly established trading ports along the railway lines. This was because of proximity. Big markets developed in the Niger communities of Anambra State because they became trading posts for colonial produce that came from the hinterlands, especially palm produce. Popular among such markets are Otu Onitsha, Otu Ocha and Afor Atani. In like manner, the Niger communities of Anambra State facilitated the east-west trade during the colonial times. The colonial government established the Ogbaru area of western Anambra State as a channel through which the palm oil extraction and exportation was made. The Ogbaru people became middlemen for the lucrative trade. This development is succinctly captured by Ojiakor in the following words:

By 1884, the N.A.C. (National African Company) had signed treaties of trade with some Ogbaru communities, Atani, Akili, Osomala and Umunankwo. At the same time factories were established at Atani, Umunankwo, and Osomala. The Ogbaru people then became middle men between the hinterland Igbo oil producers and the European merchants.⁷²

With this, agricultural production was increasingly geared towards export crops as against food crops, and this proved to be a major discontinuity in the patterns of agriculture and trade precipitated by colonialism in Anambra State. In other words, plantation farming became fashionable as against subsistence farming.

There were no much changes in the manufacturing sector of the Anambra economy during the colonial times. This was basically because of the colonialists deemphasized on industrializing the entire colony and perpetually designing them as primary produce Centers and markets for European finished manufactured goods. However, the introduction of European weapons and tools had a conspicuous impact on the Awka blacksmith industry. The Awka blacksmiths took samples from the European guns and replicated them. There are also claims that the Europeans affected Awka blacksmith industry

negatively by copying their patterns and started a mass production of the metal works which the Awka were known for. According to N.C. Neaher,

*...in 1925 Awka smiths were taken to England, in an exhibition at Wembley, England. They showed the British how Awka smiths worked, and what they made. Afterwards, the British imitated them and flooded the African market with cheaper machine-made goods. Awka blacksmithing fell, and has never risen again.*⁷³

This claim may not be entirely true to explain the decline of Awka blacksmithing, but it also underscored the effects of colonialism on industry in the Anambra area.

The colonial authorities in Nigeria established an export economy, which was mainly based on cash crops. The trend did not change by independence as the newly indigenous government continued to encourage agricultural production for exports through agricultural policies and programs. Therefore, in the Anambra area, plantation farming continued to be popular as profitable economic activity. Furthermore, the expanding internal market in Nigeria by independence and the growing food needs encouraged a plantation system that did not only focus on cash crops. With the popularity of rice as staple food in Anambra area, the riverside communities of the Niger and Anambra rivers emerged as known rice farming communities. Migrant farmers from Anambra hinterlands also came to the riverside communities to settle and cultivate rice professionally. This was due to the favorable soil condition in some of the riverside communities, which supported rice cultivation.

With the growing need to diversify plantation farming and modernize agriculture in the immediate post-colonial Nigeria, and also to encourage large-scale farming instead of the prevalent peasant farming, the government adopted a number of agricultural policies to boost the productivity of the sector. Most of these policies reflected in the Anambra area of the then Eastern Region, especially those communities with vast arable land. Popular among the government agricultural policies were the Government Plantations, the Farm Settlements, the Poultry Expansion Scheme (PES) and the Small-holder Tree Crop Scheme (STCS).⁷⁴ The Government Plantations program was adopted in the 1962-1968 Development Plan and it enabled the government of Eastern Region to establish a number of large oil palm, cocoa and rubber plantations.⁷⁵ Even though the major government plantations were not cited in the Anambra area, the program encouraged the individual farmers of the area to continually invest in palm plantation, which was the tree crop mostly supported by the climatic conditions of the area. The

Farm Settlements program had a direct impact on the Anambra area as Igbariam, which is one of the communities within its domain, was chosen as a farm settlement. The Poultry Expansion Scheme was implemented alongside the plantation and farm settlement programs and this had an obvious effect of popularizing poultry farming in the present day Anambra State. However, these programs had their pitfalls, which were basically due to lack of feasibility studies, impaired orientation, faulty implementation, the political crises of the First Republic and the concomitant Nigeria Civil War.⁷⁶

After the war in 1970, the General Yakubu Gowon government conceived the National Accelerated Food Production Program (NAFPP) under the Third National Development Plan, in 1972. The Agricultural Development Program (ADP) was subsequently introduced in 1974, and implemented mostly in northern Nigeria locations, but was later extended to Anambra State in 1986. Under the Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo regime in 1978, the Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) was introduced. The OFN particularly engaged the state governments to make their contributions to agricultural development. At the inception of the Second Republic, the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari immediately made known its commitment to introduce the “Green Revolution” to Nigerian agriculture.⁷⁷ To manifest this commitment, the government went ahead to conceive the Green Revolution program in 1980. The setting up of a nitrogenous fertilizer plant at Onne near Port Harcourt in 1983 under the Green Revolution⁷⁸ made the source of fertilizer closer to Anambra farmers, thereby resulted to less expenditure and improved agricultural productivity.⁷⁹

There are different roles played by the Local Government Councils in Anambra State within the agricultural development programs over the years.

The yields of the role of the LGCs could be seen in the establishment of demonstration plots, provision of slaughter houses and slabs, establishment of market gardens, provision of health Centers and clinics, mobilization of farmers for cooperatives organizations and formation, procurement and distribution of fertilizers, improved seeds, improved seedlings, tractors and implements and awareness creation through exhibition of agricultural products and agricultural shows among others.⁸⁰

Some of the agricultural programs in the pre-1991 years in Nigeria were designed to incorporate the uplifting of the social life of the rural dwellers in different states of the country. In 1986, the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida introduced the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) through a federal government decree. DFRRI was one of the agricultural and rural development programs that broadly empowered the states to carry out the execution of its objectives. It is claimed that in Anambra State, by March 1987 about 2000 kilometers of feeder roads have been constructed. This was said to have been made possible by the fact that the state set up a task force on road construction.⁸¹ It is instructive to note that most of the government agricultural and social rehabilitation programs were conceived during the days of the Old Anambra State. Therefore, some of the implementations of these programs were done in locations found in the present-day Enugu State.

With the neglect of the industrial sector of the Nigerian economy by the colonial administration, there was no viable foundation upon which sustainable industrial growth and development could be built. The only notable industry set up by the colonial government that was located in the present-day Anambra State was the iron nails factory at Onitsha.⁸² The colonial neglect notwithstanding, as we have already deduced earlier, post-colonial Nigerian governments failed to support the industrialization of the nation's economy. States were handicapped to enact industrialization policies for their different domains. In Anambra State particularly, industrial development became mostly a private sector activity.

In the immediate post-independences years, the ownership of industries in Nigeria was mainly in the hands of foreign Multi-national Corporations (MNCs). By the end of the Nigeria Civil war the Enterprise Promotion Decree was promulgated by the federal government to ensure that Nigerians had majority of the shareholding in companies. However, this policy was not favorable to the people of the present-day Anambra State and the Igbo states at large due to the circumstances of the time. The Igboland being the theatre of warfare, the people were still recuperating from the effects of the war and individual investors from the region were not adequately empowered to acquire shares from the newly indigenous manufacturing companies. The result of this was the industrialization of Anambra State based on private entrepreneurial efforts instead of based on governmental policies.

The post-colonial industrial development of Nnewi, a community that is regarded as the industrial hub of Anambra State, has its root traceable to the immediate post-World War II years in Nigeria. According

to C.C. Anagbogu, “It is also recorded that World War II gave the motor parts business a boost in Nnewi. At the time, second-hand motors and military vehicle were purchased and cannibalized.”⁸³ From cannibalizing and selling the motor parts, some industrialists in Nnewi started fabricating and producing the parts. The trend has obviously developed to the point of manufacturing complete vehicles, as could be seen in the Innoson Vehicle Manufacturing (IVM) Company, which is located in Nnewi.

Of course, certain developments after the Nigeria-Civil war of 1967-1970 spurred private sector-based economic activities in the present-day Anambra State. Many industrialists of Anambra origin lost their properties and businesses located elsewhere in the country during the war. An appalling event that perpetrated such loss was the “abandoned properties” saga in Rivers State. Many Anambra people lost their businesses in Rivers State because the state government confiscated them on the bases that the original owners abandoned them and therefore should forfeit them. Since after the war, more industries owned by Anambra people were established within the boundaries of the state. Furthermore, the cluster of industries in a particular location in the state was discouraged due to the fallout of the war where they were easy targets of air strikes. On this, Agajelu wrote:

*...the Igbo were spurred to invest in the areas within their geographical domain with more unfortunate events that had preceded the civil war. The loss of properties outside Igboland, especially in Port Harcourt where the notorious “abandoned property” saga conspicuously played out and the community ties strengthened by the need for security in the aftermath of northern massacres before and during the war made the relocation of at least some part of business activities paramount. This also made the post-civil war industrialization of Anambra State less restricted to major urban Centers like Onitsha and Nnewi. To avoid clustering industries on definite target areas industries were located at Abagana, Awka, Ihiala, Ogidi, Oko, Ozubulu and other Anambra communities which are increasingly urbanizing today.*⁸⁴

The establishment of Onitsha as an important trading post during the colonial era helped the Otu Onitsha market to grow and expand into a West African sub-regional market. Just like the case of the manufacturing sector, the trade economy of Anambra State was not really encouraged by known government trade policies, but partly by the self-help attitude of the people especially after the Nigeria-Civil War. Another factor that encouraged elaborate trading economy in Anambra State was the apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship in this context, is a process whereby one is bound by indenture

to serve another for a prescribed period with a view to learning an art or trade.⁸⁵ After the agreed period of apprenticeship has passed, the master often gives some capital or goods to the apprentice to enable him/her establish or start up their own business. This trend is prevalent in Anambra State, especially since after the war and it went on to solidify the trade sector of the state's economy. On the value of apprenticeship and its contributions to the state's economy, Agajelu posited:

During the period of apprenticeship, the apprentice gets to learn the intricacies of the business he is involved in. By so doing, he develops professionalism in that area and goes on to be an entrepreneur at the end of his apprenticeship. This process has led to the birth of notable entrepreneurs of international repute from the state and it has virtually made entrepreneurship a culture in the state.⁸⁶

The influence of Onitsha main market could be said to have spread through other markets across Anambra State, as other big markets of the neighboring Anambra communities to Onitsha emerged. This, in great measure, contributed to urbanization of many Anambra communities, including Ekwulobia, Nnewi, Awka and their markets and also a reduction in poverty rate in the state.

Unfortunately, the efforts of the entrepreneurs of Anambra State did not receive adequate government support. The pre-1991 days being mostly the era of military regime (except the short period of the Second Republic) the military administrators of the Old Anambra State largely followed the perverted developmental decrees from the Center, and little was done to enact programs that could encourage sustainable economic development in the state. The unfortunate situation invariably contributed to the need for the state to seek assistance from donor agencies by the turn of the Fourth Republic.

Donor Agencies in Anambra State, Before 1991

The genesis of foreign aid can be traced to the 18th century when Prussia subsidized some of her allies to strengthen their military support and effectiveness.⁸⁷ This was followed in the nineteenth century when the United States of America provided aid relief to the citizens of Venezuela under the 1812 Act for the Relief of the Citizens of Venezuela. In 1896, America Department of Agriculture provided food aid to needy countries in an attempt to develop commercial and political affiliations abroad. The British followed suit by providing grants for infrastructure projects in her less developed colonies under the Colonial Development Act of 1929.⁸⁸ However, full blown foreign aid scheme started after World War

II when secretary of State, George Marshall proposed a plan to aid European states devastated by the war. The World War II plunged Western Europe into chaos. Factories were closed, and unemployment and poverty rose to alarming proportions. This state of economic performance in Europe was aggravated by a severe winter which damaged crops between 1946 and 1947, cut off water transportation and caused huge food shortages. In an attempt to salvage these countries in distress in Western Europe, the Marshall Plan injected \$13 billion into 14 countries over a period of five years - 1947 to 1952 – to rebuild the war devastated region. Britain, France, Germany and Italy were the major beneficiaries of the plan while Greece, Austria and the Netherlands became the least beneficiaries.⁸⁹

The Marshall Plan was a success in rebuilding Western Europe and today, the plan is credited as showcase of successful US aid abroad. The success of the plan in Europe has given hope to the Western world that the same or similar policies could help develop the southern hemisphere and assist in bringing problems such as famine, diseases, poverty and human suffering confronting Less Development Countries to an end through the transfer of resources such as finance, technology and technocrats from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere.⁹⁰ Subsequently, Nigeria and Anambra state become aid beneficiaries and host to various donor agencies. Some of the donor activities recorded in the area of study before 1991, would be highlighted below:

World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1965-1978

As early as from March 1, 1965 - June 30, 1976 the East Central State (from which Old Anambra State was created from in 1976), was one of the beneficiaries of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) donor Credit to Nigeria worth twenty million dollars (US\$20.0 million); mapped out for the First Education Project.⁹¹ From April 18, 1972 – December 31, 1975 the East Central State also benefitted from the IBRD loan for the Second Education Project worth seventeen million, three hundred thousand dollars (US\$17.3 million)...Likewise, the region also profited for the Third Education Project sponsored by a loan from IBRD worth fifty-four million dollars (US\$54.0 million); which lasted from August 16, 1973 - December 31, 1978.⁹²

The three education projects together provided for construction, equipping, and rehabilitation of schools and for teacher training in all the twelve states of the Federation including the East Central State. The First Education Project (tagged 72-UNI by IBRD) had a late start in implementation, particularly in the

three eastern states which were affected by the civil strife between 1967 and 1970. However, execution of project in schools in these areas later progressed satisfactorily. The implementation of the Second Education Project (814-UNI) also began twelve months behind schedule while the Third Education Project (929-UNI) became effective on January 14, 1975.⁹³ Eventually the proposed design of buildings, procurement of furniture and equipment was implemented in the Second Education Project. Overall, some development progress was made to the education sector of the East Central State in Third Education Project and the first two projects particularly in the post-civil war period when it was direly needed and in the view of implementation of universal primary education in Nigeria.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1967-1970

UNICEF played a remarkable role in the East Central State during the Nigerian Civil War which lasted between 1967-1970. The thirty-month long war brought untold hardship to the nation and the citizens of the East Central State especially to women and children. The result was malnutrition, starvation and death due to extreme food shortages and other essential materials. In June 1968, it was feared that about forty thousand people would die in six weeks if external supply of food was not ensured.⁹⁴ The UNICEF faced an uphill task but persevered in its bid to alleviate the suffering of children during the war by providing food, medication, parental assistance, clean water, accommodation, education, safety, among others. The then UNICEF regional director Vedast Kyaruzi was a Tanzanian; which was one of the few African countries that recognized Biafra. Due to this, some of Kyaruzi's efforts were hampered by the Federal Authorities who regarded him as a sympathizer. Flow of relief materials and operations was also affected due to the disposition of both the Federal Government and the Biafran Republic as neither wanted to risk showing signs of weakness. Eventually when the issue was resolved due to the already weakened Biafran, relief operations began from Calabar to the war affected areas.⁹⁵ UNICEF adopted the Basic Services Approach (BSA) in 1976 based upon the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975...the BSA featured a multi-intervention package including water supply, sanitation, child nutrition, education, healthcare activities to improve the situation of the people.⁹⁶ In an interview with Mr Charles Anyikwa, he recalled that many relief materials were provided by UNICEF during the war and that they helped in saving lives of many in the East Central State.⁹⁷

World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975 - 1983

IBRD activities in Nigeria from 1970 focused mainly on agricultural assistance as aligned with the Federal Government's development objectives to invest oil revenues to promote rural development for the benefit of the bulk of the population.

In 1975, the IBRD proposed a donor loan for the equivalent of nineteen million dollars (US\$19.0 million) to help finance a nucleus estate/smallholder oil palm project in the East-Central State...the loan would be on lent by the Borrower (the federal government) to the State government under a subsidiary loan agreement acceptable to the Bank...credits to smallholders would be channeled through cooperatives, for a term of 13 years including a seven-year grace period, at an interest rate of 9-7/2 percent.⁹⁸

The project area covered some land situated in the former Owerri and Umuahia provinces and was estimated to involve about 8,000 smallholders.⁹⁹ The program also aimed to establish a Smallholder Management Unit (SMU) within the Ministry of Agricultural Extension (MAE) to implement the planting program; replant 16,000 ha of smallholder wild palm groves; and improve about 571 km of earth roads to facilitate all-weather collection of fresh fruit bunches from smallholders.¹⁰⁰ However, before the commencement of the program, the Old Anambra state was created in 1976.

Interestingly, this donor loan was proposed to Nigeria at the time when its economic progress was rapid and sustained. The period from 1970/1 to 1974/5 recorded increase in Gross Domestic Product, the Naira appreciated steadily vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, and the already rapid momentum of growth was proposed to be accelerated further within the framework of the Third National Development Plan. In 1973, Nigeria became a donor as well as a recipient of external aid. In 1974, it increased its subscription to the African Development Bank and announced that it will no longer seek to borrow from that institution; donated \$800,000 to the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, thus becoming the first developing country to become a donor; contributed \$120 million to the DIF Oil Facility, purchased \$240 million of World Bank bonds and increased its holdings of two-year Central Bank bonds by \$30 million.¹⁰¹ The Government also indicated its intention of using some of its foreign exchange surplus to assist other developing countries, particularly in Africa. At that time, it had already

made direct grants to several African countries suffering from the effects of the drought. Likewise, it intended to intensify its aid efforts to African countries in the field of technical assistance, scholarship awards, supply of skilled personnel and relief assistance in cases of national disaster such as earthquakes, droughts and floods during the Third Plan Period.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 1981-1991

In 1981, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), took a loan worth sixty-seven million dollars (US\$67.0 million) from IBRD to implement the Anambra Water Supply And Sanitation Project in Anambra State.¹⁰² “The Federal Government eventually lent the full amount of the loan to Anambra State, which in turn lent fifty-five million, two hundred thousand dollars (US\$55.2 million) to the Anambra State Water Corporation (ASWC) and three million dollars (US\$3.0 million) to the Onitsha Local Government, on the same terms as the Bank loan...the loan was payable over 20 years, including 5 years of grace at an interest rate of 9.6 percent per annum.”¹⁰³

The project tried to provide residents of Onitsha with reliable supplies of safe water and strengthened the available water supply organization as more persons especially low-income earners had access to pipe-borne water for the first time. The sanitation component of the program brought some relief to most of Onitsha's urban population through regularized refuse and night soil collection, particularly in low income areas. The health education program increased popular awareness of the relationship between safe water and waste disposal collection and personal health. In addition, the squatter-settlement of Okpoko was provided with key access roads and drainage to allow for the settlement's orderly expansion. The project was designed to provide acceptable standards of service at the lowest possible cost and was expected to meet water supply demand until 1990 at which time additional investments would have to be made to cope with future demand. The program also tried to improve ASWC's and Onitsha Local Government's operational and financial capabilities in order to improve service and planning for future development.

Anambra State had an estimated 1980 population of five million, of whom one million were estimated to be urban dwellers; an approximately 40 percent had no access to piped water supply while 60 percent who had access through house connections or standpipes, had only intermittent service.¹⁰⁴

Prior to the program, there were no waterborne sewerage services in the State. Most of its urban population relied on buckets and latrines for night-soil disposal. Solid refuse collection was totally inadequate, and the urban population simply dumped its refuse into the streets and drainage canals. The Onitsha Local Government contracted private firms to collect nightsoil, but the latter had no special vehicles, and dumped on uncontrolled sites. In Onitsha, storm drainage consisted of open canals that were subject to blockage from refuse which caused considerable flooding, with water regularly backing up into the streets during the rainy season. Refuse dumped on the streets was more prevalent in Onitsha than in other cities in the State because of market activities. Traffic congestion impeded any organized collection system, and the amount of accumulated nonbiodegradable material posed significant health hazards. The implementing agency ASWC, was created in 1976 to replace the former East Central State Water Board. The Ministry of Health was one of the implementing agencies that were responsible for planning and construction in the sanitation sector complemented by the local government which was responsible for the operation and maintenance of drainage, sewerage, and refuse disposal systems. On one hand, the project succeeded in improving water supply, drainage and sanitation services in Onitsha and both the ASWC and the ASES (Anambra State Environmental Sanitation Authority) improved their internal efficiency with technical assistance. The scope of policy and institutional objectives was expanded during project implementation as commercialization of water and sanitation services was undertaken in Anambra State as a whole, rather than in Onitsha only, as originally intended. On the other hand, the project had too many components each of which was reduced in scope during implementation. The project only achieved part of its physical objectives due, in a large part to design and procurement deficiencies. Also the implementing agency's financial situation was very poor. Accordingly, the project outcome is rated as unsatisfactory and the sustainability of institutional improvements and other benefits achieved under the project (e.g. improved water supply and solid waste collection services) is rated as unlikely in view of the project objectives.

International Bank for Rural Development/ International Fund for Agricultural Development/World Bank/ Federal Government of Nigeria/ Anambra State Government, 1986-1995

In 1986, a loan agreement worth one hundred and sixty-two million dollars (US \$162 million) was signed by the International Bank for Rural Development, International Fund for Agricultural

Development, World Bank, Federal Government of Nigeria and Anambra State Government to finance the Multi-State Agricultural Development Project (MSADP) in Anambra state.¹⁰⁵ The Federal Government lent the sum of twenty-two million, four hundred thousand dollars (US\$22.4) to the old Anambra State, payable over 20 years, including five years of grace, with the state carrying the foreign exchange risks.¹⁰⁶ Other beneficiaries of the MSADP was the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Bendel, Benue, Cross River, Imo, Ogun and Plateau States. Earlier in 1985, the Anambra State Agricultural Development Program (ASADEP) popularly called ADP was inaugurated to implement the program. Following the creation of Anambra state in 1991, Old Anambra State divided into Anambra and Enugu states. To restructure and continue with the program implementation in both states, funds were provided by the World Bank for the construction of a headquarters in the present Anambra state and by 1995 the ministry staff moved into the completed office complex located at kilometer 41, along Enugu-Onitsha expressway, Awka.¹⁰⁷

The broad objective of the MSADP was to improve standard of living and welfare by the rural small-holder farmers throughout the state, by raising their productivity and farm income via integrated rural development. The MSADP was a massive program with many sub programs made up of component which dominated and developed the agro-economy of the state for several years. There were four major sub programs: Extension Services, Adaptive Research (Technical), Rural Infrastructural Development (Engineering) Services and Support Services. The impact of this programs would be discussed in chapter 3 under the Agricultural sector.

Political Economy of Anambra State, Since 1991

In 1991, the present Anambra State was created. Before the creation of the state, developmental efforts covered the area of the Old Anambra State and considering the trend of general neglect of the rural areas in development efforts, whatever strides made by the state at that time was seen mostly in the Enugu metropolis. At that time, most areas of the present Anambra State constituted the rural area of the old state. This made it necessary for the governments of the newly created state to design developmental strategies that would put the economy of the state on the part of development. Below is the comprehensive list of leaders (administrator and governors) of Anambra State from 1991 till 2017.

Table 2.3 List of Administrators/Governors of Anambra state, 1991-2017

S/N	Name	Type of Leader/Political party	Period of rule
1	Joseph Abulu	Military Administrator	27 Aug, 1991 - Jan. 1992
2	Pius Chukwuemeka Ezeife	Governor	2 Jan 1992 - Nov. 17, 1993
3	Dabo Aliyu	Military Administrator (acting)	Nov 1993 - Dec 1993
4	Mike E. Attah	Military Administrator	9 Dec 1993 - 21 Aug 1996
5	Rufai Garba	Military Administrator	21 Aug 1996 - 6 Aug 1998
6	Emmanuel Ukaegbu	Military Administrator	6 Aug 1998 - 29 May 1999
7	Chinwoke Mbadinuju	Governor- PDP	29 May 1999 - 29 May 2003
8	Chris Ngige	Governor- PDP	29 May 2003 - 17 Mar 2006
9	Peter Obi	Governor-APGA (1st time)	17 Mar 2006 - 3 Nov 2006
10	Dame Virginia Etiaba	Governor-APGA	3 Nov 2006 - 9 Feb 2007
11	Peter Obi	Governor-APGA (2nd time)	9 Feb 2007 - 29 May 2007
12	Andy Uba	Governor-PDP	29 May 2007 - 14 Jun 2007
14	Peter Obi	Governor-APGA (3rd time)	14 Jun 2007 - 17 Mar 2014
15	Willie M. Obiano	Governor-APGA	17 Mar 2014-present

Source: Adapted from https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria_federal_states.htm¹⁰⁸

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the military administrators of Anambra State did little as regards the designation and implementation of economic developmental programs. While the civilian regimes attempted to design and float some economic development programs aimed at poverty reduction and sustainable development, their efforts turned out to be mostly rhetoric. In fact, it is believed in many quarters that the nascent state lay socio-economically comatose from 1991 to 2003. In that view, Uche Nworah stated:

From 1991-2003 (12 years), the system, leadership and followership which constitute major components of socio-economic development got so twisted that Government(sic) virtually collapsed in the State(sic). Anambra State was lagging behind most States(sic) of the Federation(sic) which were created at the same time with it, in the performance indices of development and good governance. At a point, many thought the State(sic) was jinxed to remain chaotic and underdeveloped, notwithstanding the enormous resources at its disposal.¹⁰⁹

This assertion was obviously made due to the lack of physical evidence of government efforts to bring about sustainable development after a dozen years of the state's existence. And also in the inadequacy of basic infrastructure, especial in the state capital territory, Awka since its creation. Some of the developmental programs initiated by the civilian regimes since 1991 are discussed in this section.

The “Think Home” Philosophy of Development: The first civilian regime in the newly created Anambra State under Dr. Chukwuemeka Ezeife initiated the “Think Home” philosophy of development in 1992 to foster sustainable economic development in the state. The program had as its main objective the motivation of economic investments in the state through conscientizing its enterprising indigenes in the diaspora to come home and invest. The strategic thinking underlying the developmental philosophy was the envisaged patriotic and unrestricted entrepreneurial activities which the “home” sentiment would trigger in the prospective indigenous diaspora investors in the state. With high investment of capital in the state, such developmental problems like unemployment, poverty and high crime rate would be reduced in no distant time.¹¹⁰

The “Think Home” philosophy failed to achieve its objectives in the state in spite of its novelty. Empirical observation shows that the Ezeife's government that initiated the philosophy may have had a good blueprint that could ensure its fruition. Unfortunately, the government did not last long enough to live its dreams. Furthermore, the blueprint of the developmental philosophy may have been enormously undermined by the prevailing business climate in the state at the time. There was general high rate of crime, especially in the commercial city of Onitsha. There was also a conspicuous dearth of infrastructure across the state. Such prevailing conditions may have scared away prospective investors, irrespective of the fact that they were indigenes of the state.

The Joint Action on Development (JAD): With the dawn of a new era of democratic dispensation in Nigeria, the relatively nascent Anambra State was lit up with exciting expectations. The sustainable development of the state appeared to be within reach as it was expected that the people would be accorded the opportunity to determine and influence their political and economic fortune. The emerging government of Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju was received with spontaneous goodwill in 1999. The following year, the government quickly went ahead to initiate a developmental strategy that it envisaged would ensure an all-encompassing socio-economic development in the state. The developmental strategy was named the Joint Action on Development (JAD). The major objective of JAD was to

achieve a joint cooperation between the communities in the state and the state government to ensure developmental efforts which would contribute to poverty reduction.¹¹¹ The rationale behind the quest for joint cooperation was the evident lack of fund and resources by the state to design and execute developmental programs that would among other things ensure rural poverty alleviation. With the JAD strategy, the state government planned that any community that wanted the government to embark on poverty reduction and sustainable development program in its locality should contribute a certain quota or percentage of the cost of the project.

Despite the publicity and popularity it enjoyed, JAD as a developmental strategy proved ineffective. This was principally because most communities in the state questioned the rationale behind joining efforts with a state government that appeared to have failed to live up to its primary responsibility of providing the basic needs of the communities. Also, the government did not show commitment to the cause of the program. According to Uchenna Emodi, the government appeared to have been constantly distracted and occupied by other things to show true commitment to developmental programs.¹¹²

The One Point Agenda: The Dr. Chris Ngige administration succeeded that of Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju in 2003. Amidst the controversy surrounding his election, the initial unpopularity of the government and the internal party crisis rocking the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), Ngige's government went on to initiate the One Point Agenda for poverty reduction and sustainable development. The One Point Agenda program was introduced in 2004 and its main objective was to select a particular aspect of development which was direly needed in the state. The selected aspect of development was to receive maximum governmental attention. The philosophy that informed the program was that if different areas of the people's needs in the state were taken care of one after another, in a short period of time the whole aspects of the state's socio-economic problems would have been solved, and poverty drastically reduced or eliminated.

The One Point Agenda commenced with the construction of roads across Anambra State. The priority given to road construction was because of the dilapidated state of the roads in the state. Hitherto neglected roads across the state received commendable attention and roads with appreciable quality were constructed or rehabilitated. It was claimed that the governor himself supervised the works going on at some sites during the road construction. The result of the program was the appearance of solid roads as had not been previously witnessed in the state, before his administration.

The success of the One Point Agenda on road construction notwithstanding, the program may not be regarded as entirely successful as it was obviously not holistic. The program failed to give attention to any other aspect of development except road construction. This made vital areas of development such as education, healthcare, agriculture, environment, power, trade and commerce and so on, to suffer obvious neglect.¹¹³

Anambra State Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS): The ANIDS developmental plan was introduced by the government of Mr. Peter Obi, who emerged as the governor of the state in 2006 when his 2003 mandate was restored by the court. The government made ANIDS its cardinal plan to ensure the simultaneous sustainable development of the state. According to Stella Okunna, “ANIDS is basically a planning and budgeting strategy, enabling the state to plan carefully and budget meticulously, to achieve verifiable results in all sectors simultaneously, particularly in the road sector.”¹¹⁴ The ANIDS initiative was actually a multi-sectoral model predicated on the internationally-acclaimed Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs aimed at eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, gender equality and women empowerment, reduction of child mortality, boost of maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, environmental sustainability and global partnership in development.¹¹⁵

ANIDS was widely acclaimed even by some of the critics of the government that initiated it. Initially, the critics were sceptic of the program, questioning how it intended to achieve simultaneous development of all sectors of the state’s economy with limited resources and amidst unfriendly political atmosphere.¹¹⁶

Under ANIDS the state was able to witness multi-sectoral improvements in infrastructure, healthcare, education, trade and commerce, environment, governance and agriculture among others. Among the peculiar areas of achievements of ANIDS were the constructions of a multi-billion naira stock-exchange complex in Onitsha, the construction of the state secretariat as well as local government secretariats, construction of appreciable road network across the state, refurbishing and equipping of hospitals across the state, among others.¹¹⁷ In fact, ANIDS proved to be the most veritable developmental initiative that worked closely with international donor agencies for socio-economic development.

The obvious laudable achievements of ANIDS notwithstanding, the initiative had its areas of shortcomings. The program did not do much to ensure the supply of portable water in the state. Private boreholes remained the main source of water for the people. Furthermore, some people view some of the projects of ANIDS as not having a direct impact on the people's lives. Such project was the stock exchange complex and the secretariat complexes. What is more, ANIDS appeared to have lacked legislative backing. This affected the sustainability of the initiative with the exit of the founder, Governor Peter Obi.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, and as could be seen above, several developmental efforts in Anambra State since its creation did not achieve the desired results. As a result, the state suffered socio-economic quagmire of high magnitude. When it became obvious that the successive state governments could not adequately fund developmental plans and programs they sought to incorporate the aid of donor agencies.

Socio-economic Quagmire and the Need for Donor Assistance

The area where the socio-economic backwardness of the state showed enormously was in infrastructure. As adduced earlier, most of the infrastructural development embarked on by the government in the defunct Anambra State were concentrated on Enugu metropolis, thereby neglecting the current Anambra area. The nascent democratic government that mounted the mantle of leadership could not do much to solve the infrastructure problem. To make matters worse, the military returned to power at the state levels and stultified infrastructural development in the state. The result of the foregoing was a very conspicuous infrastructural decay across the state. In the words of Uche Nworah, "successive governments had governed the State (sic) before now but still infrastructural facilities were grossly inadequate and where available, were in almost total decay."¹¹⁹ The road infrastructure was particularly bad. There was virtually absence of elaborate network of constructed roads across the state before ANIDS. Even though the ANIDS program endeavored to establish an admirable road network across the state, some of them were already dilapidating by 2017.

There was also the problem of environmental degradation, which proved to be a menace to the state and had contributed to its socio-economic quagmire. Soil erosion is particularly common in the state and successive government programs that came before ANIDS appeared to have lacked the initiative to adequately check the menace. On the conspicuous and destructive presence of soil erosion across the state, N.I. Obi and C.J Okekeogbo write, "the highest concentration of severe gully erosions in Nigeria

is found in five Eastern states of Anambra, Enugu, Abia, Imo, and Akwa Ibom. Anambra is famous with its Agulu-Nanka-Okoko-Ekwulobia gullies. Gullies of about 120m depth and 2km width have been recorded in this area.¹²⁰ Obi and Okekeogbo further provide an insight to the environmental situation in the state in the following words, in Anambra State, Erosion(sic) is a peculiar environmental problem. Almost all communities in the state are affected by one form of erosion or the other. According to media reports, “over 70 percent of the land of the state is ravaged by or threatened by erosion at various levels.”¹²¹ There were claims that the presence of about 500 gully erosions spread across the rural communities.

Notable areas include Aguata/Orumba local government areas with about 78 gullies, Nnewi 60 gullies, Njikoka/Anaocha 50 gullies, Idemili 46 gullies, Ihiala 40 gullies, Awka 30 gullies, Onitsha 22 gullies, and Anambra/Oyi 16 gullies. Other notable sites are the ones in Nimo community, between Umuchiana and Ekwulobia communities, Nnewi-Okigwe highway gullies, Omagba community, Inyaba Umudim Nnewi community, Mbanabo-Nnewi-Ichi Nnewi gullies, Utuh/Osumenyi gullies, Umuchu-Uga-Igboukwu highway gullies, Umueze-Uga gullies, Nwafijah community, Obieze community, Ifitedunu community and Ndiagu-Ogidi community. However, the Nanka erosion site is so terrifying that it has been declared a national disaster.¹²²

Considering this insight of the erosion menace in Anambra State, the situation called for broad-based state governmental efforts in partnership with relevant donor agencies to check the environmental problem. However, as could be deduced from the successive state government’s development plans, none except the ANIDS under Governor Peter Obi prioritized environmental protection and sustainability. The result of this was overt environmental neglect which had a linkage effect with infrastructural decay and social maladies.

Attitude to work and governance in Anambra State also remained poor for a long period of time. Reacting on attitude towards work and governance before the emergence of Peter Obi’s administration, Nworah comments thus, “morale of the workforce was at its lowest ebb... there was no clear vision, no development plan, personnel audit or proper planning.”¹²³ The result of the glaring bad governance was

the crisis of confidence by the people on the government. People lost interest in the governmental activities, majorly because disparity existed between what the reality on ground was and what the people were meant to believe. The issue of taking ownership of developmental policies and programs became strange to them. This was because they were completely alienated from the scheme of things in governance. All these were made possible because of the monstrous corruption that bedeviled governmental affairs at the time. What is more, government workers were owed many months of salaries and allowances. This grossly affected capacity utilization and productivity in civil service.

A hydra-headed monster that appeared to have been the root of the socio-economic quagmire in the state, especially since the democratic dispensation, was the phenomenon of godfatherism. The issue of godfatherism basically marred the administration of Dr. Mbadinuju. The governor was sponsored into office by some affluent individuals in the state and events that unfolded showed that these individuals held the government in debt and tried to continually squeeze the state's resources out of it. According to Basil C. Ejidike:

Not long after his election and swearing in which took place at Alex Ekwueme Square, Awka, Dr. C.C. Mbadinuju fell out with some financiers of his election, obviously over the godfathers' demands...Mbadinuju expended more energy and time struggling to free the resources of the State from his predatory godfathers, and the struggle was too much that critical issues of governance were ignored. This debacle obviously robbed the people of the state the government attention needed and also the dividends of democratic government.¹²⁴

The issue of godfatherism lingered and even extended to the subsequent government of Dr. Ngige. The result of this was economic stagnation and poor social conditions.

A glaring evidence of deplorable social conditions in the state was the increased poverty rate. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) the poverty rate in Anambra State increased by 20.11 percent in 2004.¹²⁵ Even though successive governments made efforts to ameliorate the social conditions and reduce the poverty rates, little progress was made and poverty remains a major developmental issue in the state, hence the need for even more support from donor agencies.

Table 2.4 Poverty Incidence in the Local Government Areas of Anambra State (2004-2006)

S/N	LGA	Poverty Incidence based on 50 th Percentile	Poverty Incidence based on 50 th Percentile
		Non-Poor	Poor
1.	Aguata	38.7%	61.3%
2.	Anambra East	38.6%	61.4%
3.	Anambra West	15.7%	84.3%
4.	Awka North	15.6%	84.4%
5.	Awka South	61.8%	38.2%
6.	Ayamelum	34.6%	65.4%
7.	Dunukofia	55.9%	44.1%
8.	Idemili South	62.3%	37.7%
9.	Nnewi	64.5%	35.5%
10.	Ogbaru	60.1%	39.9%
11.	Orumba North	30.5%	69.5%
12.	Orumba South	35.8%	64.2%
	Total	42.3%	57.7%

Source: *National Bureau of Statistics*¹²⁶

The above table showed that as of the time when the state was struggling with trial and error as regards developmental approaches, poor households across the state were more than those which were not. Poverty, by extension attracted ugly social maladies such as insecurity, ill-health, high mortality rate, child abuse, prostitution among others. It also reflected on the level of literacy and all these pointed to the inevitable need for the support of donor agencies in the state.

Another aspect of underdevelopment of the state that may have contributed to the increased need for donor aid was the state's debt profile. The state was virtually unable to meet its financial responsibilities and obligations since 1999. Nonetheless, there are indications that the debt management of the state improved from 2003. The government of Ngige established the Debt Management Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Budget. The unit, in collaboration with the State Accountant General's office

determined the exact nature and volume of public debt profile of the state. However, external debts posed a great challenge to the socio-economic activities of the state. The debt management office, Abuja in a 2005 report stated the Anambra State debt profile as thus:

1. Multilateral	\$15,433,427.04
2. Non Paris Club	NIL
3. London Club	\$3,072,441.90
4. Paris Club	\$50,027,062.26
Total	\$68,532,931.20

Naira conversion at N128.00 per Dollar = N8,772,215,193.60 ¹²⁷

As at December 31, 2017, Anambra state was indebted to the tune of two trillion, six hundred and twelve billion, four hundred and thirty- one million, five hundred and 3 thousand, eighty-nine kobo (N2,612,431,503.89).¹²⁸ Of course the debt situation remained gloomy and that indicated urgent need for resolution by the state government. Partly, the high debt rate was due to decades of high interest rate from borrowing over many years from donors and other external bodies. This raised stiff concerns as regarding sustainable development in the state. While this debt situation plagued the state, the state government yet remained undeterred in its partnerships with donors for additional funding to meet development needs. This situation yet presented a veritable platform for multilateral relationship with donor agencies for socio-economic management for the government and of course the donors.

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CHAPTER THREE

CATEGORIES AND OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF DONOR AGENCIES IN ANAMBRA STATE

The deductions made in the previous chapter shows that Anambra State is a society in obvious need of developmental approach that would involve integrated efforts of partnering stakeholders. Salient issues of poverty reduction, accessible and affordable healthcare, education, agricultural productivity, commerce and industry, infrastructural development among others, have been the priorities of successive governments in the state. Especially the Peter Obi administration which attempted a simultaneous development of all sectors under the ANIDS (Anambra Integrated Development Strategy) initiative and adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as its focal point. As we shall see in this chapter, these approaches to development could not entirely amount to much without the partnership of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. The present chapter goes on to examine in details the categories of donor agencies in Anambra State since 1991 and their operational framework.

The United Nations Specialized Agencies / Funds and Programs in Anambra State

The United Nations Organization (UNO/UN) has within it, specialized agencies and their activities are coordinated by the UN through negotiated agreements.¹ These specialized agencies are legally independent of the UN and have separate budgets, members, rules, and personnel. The bulk of their funding comes from voluntary contributions from governments, institutions, and individuals. The specialized agencies we are concerned with here are briefly discussed below:

- **International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD):** The IFAD, since its creation in 1977, focused exclusively on rural poverty reduction, working with poor rural populations in developing countries to eliminate poverty, hunger and malnutrition; raise their productivity and incomes; and improve the quality of their lives.
- **International Monetary Fund (IMF):** The proposed objective of the IMF is to foster economic growth and employment by providing temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment and technical assistance.
- **United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO):** The UNESCO focus on several issues from teacher training to helping improve education worldwide to protecting important historical and cultural sites around the world. UNESCO added 28 new

World Heritage Sites in 2018 to the list of irreplaceable treasures that will be protected for “today's travelers and future generations.”²

- World Health Organization (WHO): The WHO is the directing and coordinating authority on international health within the United Nations system. The objective of WHO is the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health. Health, as defined in the WHO Constitution, is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.
- World Bank: The World Bank focus on poverty reduction and the improvement of living standards worldwide by providing low-interest loans, interest-free credit, and grants to developing countries for education, health, infrastructure, and communications, among other things. The World Bank work in over 100 countries.³

However, the UN Funds and Programs are distinctly different from specialized agencies. In general, the Funds and Programs are established by a resolution of the UN General Assembly and have a focused mandate. They are funded either mainly or entirely through voluntary rather than assessed contributions and have a governing body that reviews their activities.⁴ The Fund and Programs included:

- United Nations Development Program (UNDP): The UNDP work in nearly 170 countries and territories, and help to eradicate poverty, reduce inequalities and build resilience so countries can sustain progress. As the UN's development agency, UNDP plays a critical role in helping countries achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.
- United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF): The UNICEF work in 190 countries and territories to save children's lives, to defend their rights, and to help them fulfil their potential, from early childhood through adolescence.
- World Food Program (WFP): The WFP aim to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. It is the world's largest humanitarian agency. Every year, the program feeds almost 80 million people in about 75 countries.⁵

It may be necessary to state that since the turn of the 21st century, in the year 2000, the UN activities in Nigeria had basically channeled towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The thrust of the UN system support to Nigeria has been focused on the following issues:

- *Policy dialogue on critical development issues*
- *Capacity building and strengthening of institutions*
- *Advocacy and policy advice on the ratification and implementation of international conventions, declarations and programs of action of UN Global Conferences*
- *Support to data collection, processing and analysis*
- *Eradication and control of infectious diseases*
- *Support to poverty eradication and job creation*
- *Support to building of partnerships and promotion of private sector participation in the development process*
- *Support to empowerment of vulnerable groups/communities, enabling them to cope with their development needs*
- *Gender mainstream in policies and programs*
- *Sharing of best practices/success stories using the UN Worldwide network*
- *Protection and realization of human rights*
- *Support to good governance and participatory democracy*
- *Support to sustainable environmental management*
- *Support to HIV/AIDS reduction programs*
- *Water and Environmental Sanitation Programs*
- *Support to development of coherent long and medium term policies, strategies and plans.*⁶

Considering the areas of challenge in the socio-economic conditions in Anambra State, a glance at the above stated thrust of UN support to Nigeria would suggest that the global body was likely to have an effective presence in the state. In essence, the UN specialized agencies/funds and programs operational in Nigeria are expected to be one of the principal donors to the state. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the developmental challenges identified in Anambra State, as shown in the previous chapter, is not peculiar to the state, rather all states of the Nigerian federation are afflicted with these maladies at different rates.

The presence of the UN in Nigeria is felt through the activities of the agencies mentioned above. The agencies operations in the country are also dictated by their established operational frameworks. Their operational frameworks are further designed along the set objectives of the agency, which in recent times are majorly focused on the achievement of the MDGs and Millennium Sustainable Goals

(MSGs). It would be difficult to ascertain the UN agency that is most effectively operational in any state in Nigeria or the country at large. However, considering the prevalent maladies afflicting the nation and its component units, which include poverty, lack of access to adequate healthcare facilities, population-related problems, illiteracy, fiscal challenges among similar others, certain UN agencies activities are conspicuously seen and felt across the country. Such agencies include the UNDP, the WHO, the World Bank, the UNICEF and others.

The UN is basically interested in the human development index of a state, especially those in developing countries. At this point, it is necessary to examine the Anambra State public expenditure on human development using the UN yardstick. Comparative analysis, where necessary, would also be made. Certain levels and patterns of public expenditure have been recommended as critical for governments to do well in human development. The 1991 UN Human Development Report suggested that the human expenditure ratio should be at least 5 percent.⁷ A study of the statistics presented by a World Bank report of the performance of Anambra State in relation with eight other selected states for study in Nigeria in the period between 2001 to 2008 showed that the state at the time did not perform credibly in the area of human development and in fact, did not meet the UN benchmark ratio of at least 5 percent. According to the same report, using the UN's Education For All Fast-Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) threshold for education expenditure as a measuring stick, Anambra State also recorded low expenditure on education within the same period. Furthermore, the report showed that the per capital education expenditure of the state in the same period under review was also low. There are other measuring stick for expenditure on other social sectors which were provided by other non-UN donor agencies in Anambra State.

Over the years, Anambra State has established its own specialized agencies that were designed to address specific salient areas of socio-economic development of the state and ensure effective implementation of developmental programs. Some of such agencies were formed independently or in affiliation with the federal government or foreign donor agencies. To effectively achieve their objectives, the state agencies normally seek affiliation or go into partnership with foreign donors. The UN Special Agencies and the Funds and Program organizations feature prominently among the foreign donors that were in ready partnership with the state government's specialized agencies. In most cases, the formation of the state agencies for implementation of developmental programs were part of the conditionalities of the UN agencies, therefore, forming part of their operational framework. For example, within the UNDP's 4th and 5th program cycles, such implementation structures as the State Program Coordinating Committee (SPCC), Stakeholders Boards (SHB), and the appointments of state program accountants were established at state levels in Nigeria including Anambra State.⁹

United Nations Development Program (UNDP): The UNDP commenced in operation in Nigeria since the country's independence in 1960. However, a partnership agreement, which included a memorandum of understanding (MoU) and the program support document (PSD), was formally reached and signed between both actors on 12 April 1988. The signing of the partnership agreement accorded a stronger enhancement to the operations of the UNDP in Nigeria. This enabled the UN agency to extend its operational scope to the component units of the Nigerian federation. The agency offers policy advice, advocates for change and mobilizes resources to facilitate sustainable human development and good governance in Nigeria.

In response to Nigeria's development priorities, the UN reform commenced in 1997 adopting the Delivering as One (DaO) approach. The UN system sought conformity under DaO with the four pillars of one program, office, fund and leader to improve UN coherence, relevance and impact in Nigeria. With the 4th and 5th program cycle that was operational within the time scope of four years (1999-2003), the program activities of the UNDP were channeled mainly on capacity building and institutional strengthening. With the creation of the SPCC, SHB, and the appointments of state program accountants, a consultative meeting of all the stakeholders was convened. The meeting's objective was to x-ray the state development environment, dialogue and identify the priority needs of the people, as well as agree on operational modalities and implementation structures.¹⁰

The 6th program cycle of the UNDP (2003-2008) in Nigeria witnessed a shift from mere capacity building and institutional strengthening¹¹. UNDP provided capacity building and policy development support to the Federal Government and 21 states drawn from the six geo-political zones in four program areas: Governance & Human Rights; Poverty Reduction; HIV & AIDS; and Energy & Environment. Initially, the ownership of the UNDP-championed development process did not reside with the nationals; rather it was domiciled with the officials of the program. Therefore, in the 6th program cycle it was envisaged that appropriate capacities are required at all levels of government so as to transfer the ownership of development process to nationals. For this purpose, the UNDP made extensive use of government technical ministries as implementing agents and this offered civil servants the opportunity to be trained on management and coordination of development programs.¹² In 2007, the UNDP commenced the implementation of the Human Development Fund program in Anambra State.¹³ This underscored the nature of partnership between UN agencies and state governments within the operational framework of the donor agencies.

In November 2008, the Federal Government of Nigeria and UNDP agreed and signed a new 7th Country Program that ran from 2009 – 2013 under the UN Development Assistance Framework,

UNDAF II.¹³ Under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, UNDAF II 2009-2013, six states including Anambra were selected as pilot states for the implementation of DAO approach. The midyear report on UNDAF II concluded that it was limited in reach, substance and not fully functional, but should inform a far more ambitious drive of DaO in the next cycle.

The Anambra State UNDP Partnership Manager, Mrs. Michelle Onugbolu stated that 2013 was the last year of the 7th Country Program of the UNDP. She noted that the core objective of the program is based on the mandate of the UNDP which was human development through capacity building.¹⁴ The Partnership Manager listed the four core programs of UNDP in the State:

- Economic Governance Program EGP (which dealt with prioritizing resources for development)
- Capacity for Governance Program CGP (dealt with government accountability and public oversight in resource management through participation)
- Private Sector Development Program PSDP (dealt with growing the non-oil resource base and promoting inclusive markets)
- Sustainability and Risk Management Program (SRMP) (dealt with protection of the resource base).¹⁵

Mitchelle Onugbolu, represented Anambra State in January 2014, to kick-start implementation of UNDP Country Program for 2014-2017, in a three-day work-planning workshop held in Abuja. The planning process was intensively consultative and inclusive. There was consensus around the need to craft development programs that focused on those areas where partners' finite resources can make the most impact. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF III) for 2014-2017, which was a medium-term (3-5 years) results framework that described the collective vision and response of the UN system to national development priorities and results was implemented fully under Mr Mark Okoye, the young Anambra State Commissioner for Economic Planning, Budget and Development Partners strategic. UNDAF III tried to include strategic national development priorities for better impact. Its four-core focus area were: good governance, social capital development, sustainable and equitable economic growth and human security and risk management. The 2014-2017 activities of UNDP in Anambra would be assessed in the next chapter.

United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund: UNICEF¹⁶ in Nigeria establishes different kinds of partnership to address issues concerning children. Most times their responsibility also include women welfare. One of the principal strategic partners of the UNICEF in Nigeria is the Anambra State Government. In the State, the UNICEF has partnered with the government to address such problems as the effects of communal clashes on vulnerable children and women, eradication of polio and other child-related diseases, gender inequality especially as regards the education of the girl-child among others¹⁷. From 1991 to 2007 the UNICEF supported the following social welfare programs in Anambra State:

- Primary Healthcare
- Advocacy and Social Mobilization
- Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME)
- Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES)
- Nutrition
- Children in Need of Special Protection Measures (CNSPM)
- Urban Basic Services (UBS)
- Basic and Non-formal (Adult) Education¹⁸

From 2007 the UNICEF was in partnership with the Anambra State government to engage in the following:

- Program monitoring and evaluation
- Water, Environment and Sanitation
- National Program on Immunisation
- Basic Education
- Non-Formal Education
- Health Education
- Nutrition
- Safe Motherhood
- Bamako Initiative
- Social Mobilization and Technical Committee
- Early Child Care

- Gender and Development
- Child's Right¹⁹

The UNICEF operate through its country office (CO) in Nigeria to achieve its set objectives. Furthermore, its operational framework in Anambra State was designed to organize a strategic moment of reflection around key issues such as: translating policies into actions to deliver results for children, making development equitable, broadening opportunities for social change, and making coherence work for children.²⁰ The UNICEF also partnered with other governmental bodies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) to achieve its mandate in Anambra State. These partners include Nigeria Community Radio Coalition, civil society organizations (CSOs), Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), the government of Japan and health partners. In partnership with the Nigeria Community Radio Coalition UNICEF ensured the revision of the national communication and radio policies and in a system to grant community radio licenses at the state and local government levels. In partnership with state governments and civil society organizations UNICEF saw to the establishment of Child Protection Networks in ten states of the federation including Anambra State, with UNICEF's technical support to develop referral paths and tools. A UNICEF partnership with DFID resulted in a positive evaluation of Girls' Education Project with good prospects of extension for four years in girls' education, likely additional support for water sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) areas as well as advanced discussions to support nutrition programming. A UNICEF partnership with European Union on WASH resulted in the allotment of a new tranche of US\$ 11.8 million which Anambra State benefitted from. Also, a UNICEF partnership with the government of Japan resulted in the grant of an additional US\$ 10 million for Health and US\$ 9 million for Emergency interventions both at state and national levels.²¹

The UNICEF especially partnered with the Anambra State government in the area of child health. The support of immunization exercise was an integral part of the operational framework of the UN agency in the state since 1991 when the state was created. To depict a typical and comprehensive UNICEF work /operational plan, a table of the nature and trajectories of the partnership between the UNICEF, Anambra State government and other stakeholders towards child health in the state in recent times is presented below.

Table 3.1 UNICEF Work Plan/State Operational Plan

Name of Program: Child Health Intervention

Output	Planned Activities	Results 2017			Planned Budget 2017 (in Naira)		Names of Partners	
		Expected results by mid 2017	Expected results by end 2017	MoV	UNICEF Contribution	Govt. Contribution	Implementing Partner	Other Partners
Output 2.2.3	Enhanced outreach service for 7 low performing LGAs	95% of unimmunized children reached	100% of unimmunized children reached	Report	5M	10.7M	ANSPHCDA	NPHCDA
	Conduct one round of TT campaign for women of child bearing age (15-45yrs) (MNTE)	100% coverage	100% coverage	Report	20.5M	25.8M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA, WHO
	Organize refresher courses for 500 health workers on minimum health packages for PHC services	500 health care workers trained for better practice	500 health care workers trained for better practice	Report	2M	3.8M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA
Output 2.2.4	Support implementation of 2 round IPDs in 21 LGAs	Sustenance of polio-free status for Anambra State	Sustenance of polio-free status for Anambra State	Report	45M	30.6M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA, CDC N-STOP
	3-day training of 2,000 PHC health workers on RI data management and reporting tools.	Better data management	Efficient data management	Report	4M	5.8M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA, EUSIGN, CDC N-STOP
	Conduct one round of Local Immunization Days (LIDs) in 10 high risk LGAs of the state for under 5 children.	Polio free state	Polio free state	Report	20M	10M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA
	Refresher training for 2500 HW on REW approach at state and LGA levels	Reaching every child with high impact child survival interventions	Healthy children for Anambra state	Report	2.3M	3M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA
	conduct yellow fever campaign	100% coverage and yellow fever free state	100% coverage and yellow fever free state	Report	35M	40M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA
	Support implementation of measles campaign in the state	100% coverage and measles free state	100% coverage and measles free state	Report	30M	20M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA

Output	Planned Activities	Results 2017			Planned Budget 2017 (in Naira)		Names of Partners	
		Expected results by mid 2017	Expected results by end 2017	MoV	UNICEF Contribution	Govt. Contribution	Implementing Partner	Other Partners
	Training of 2,000 health workers on basic guide for routine immunization.	100% coverage in routine immunization services	100% coverage in routine immunization services	Report	7M	9M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA, EU-SIGN
	Support introduction of new vaccine-ROTA MEN-A, HPV [training of health workers & logistics]	Healthy children for Anambra state	Healthy children for Anambra state	Report	8M	1.2M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA
	Two-day training of LIOs and DSNOs on AEFI & AFP surveillance and reporting	Good data management.	Good data management.	Report	500,000	700,000	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA
	Conduct Technical monthly meeting of LIOs, M&E & CCOs for improved performance and data management	Better data management	Efficient data management	Report and attendance	400,000	500,000	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA
	Provision of computers to the 21 LGA CCOs and training on software for data management	Better data management	Efficient data management	Report and attendance	2M	3.6M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA, CDC N-STOP
	Monthly integrated supportive supervision in all HFs. In 21 LGAs by 10 state team members	Healthy mothers & children for Anambra state	Healthy mothers & children for Anambra state	Report	4M	5.3M	ANSPHCA	WHO, NPHCDA
	Support ASPHCDA to conduct bi-monthly coordination meetings	Healthy mothers & children for Anambra state	Healthy mothers & children for Anambra state	Report & attendance	1.2M	3.5M	ANSPHCA	NPHCDA

Source: Florence Anene, State Immunization Officer.²²

A study of the funding of child health in Anambra State in 2017, as depicted in the table above, showed that UNICEF was a major donor in the state's healthcare sector. Among non-governmental partners the UN agency contributed greater percentage of the funding. This may have contributed to the enormous results achieved in curbing infant mortality rate and the almost eradication of polio in the state.

The UNICEF also played a conspicuous role in the water project in Anambra State under Anambra Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (ANA-RUWASA). The ANA-RUWASA was formed by the Edict of July 9, 1996 which came into effect on April 22, 1996.²³ The agency was responsible for

the development and management of rural water supply. The functions of the agency encompassed the provision of potable water to rural communities within the state; improving the hygiene behavior of the citizenry and ensuring improved sanitation coverage in rural communities; assisting local governments; took inventory of existing water supply infrastructure, their state of repair, use and maintenance; establishing and maintaining capacity for drilling works in rural communities; organizing the training of persons at the community level for maintenance of hand pumps. Furthermore, the agency trained local government staff in the maintenance of hand-dug wells, and the operation of manual rigs. It also trained sanitation artisans, community-based hygiene officers, and carried out sanitation and hygiene education programs. The agency assisted local governments to construct low cost latrines such as samplat, ventilated improved pit latrines in strategic places.²⁴

Considering the salient responsibility of ANA-RUWASA and its ability to have a direct impact on the condition of living of the people, it is not surprising that the UNICEF and European Union (EU) agreed to establish a partnership with the state agency in order to effectively fulfill its mandate. Both the UNICEF and the EU funded, set up the structures and management of RUWASA, Local Government WASH units and Water Consumer Associations (WCAs) in Anambra state. The foreign donor agencies engaged in capacity building of the officials of the state agencies to be able to manage and maintain the water facilities in their communities.²⁵

The UNICEF equally supported the Anambra State Agency for Adult and Non-Formal Education.²⁶ The state agency focused on achieving EFA/MDGs targets especially goals 2 and 3 with emphasis on goal 4. The following under listed were the areas of intervention:

- *Eradication of illiteracy among adults and youths, as well as create opportunities for (access and equity) adults and those that drop out of formal education.*
- *Provide functional Literacy and continuing education for adults and youths who have never had the advantage of formal education. These include, nomads, prison-inmates, migrant families, the disabled and other groups, especially the disadvantaged gender.*
- *Provide functional and remedial education for people who did not complete secondary education.*
- *Provide education for completers of the formal education system in order to improve their basic knowledge and skills.*
- *Provide in-service, on-the-job, vocational and professional training for different categories of workers especially the NFE facilitators to their skills.*

- *Procurement of vocational and instructional materials for the non-formal education learning Centers.*
- *Establishment of market schools/Centers especially in urban/commercial sections of the state to encourage traders, business men and women, commercial trafficking children to gain access to basic education alongside their enterprises.*
- *Empowerment of unemployed youths on various skills through skill acquisition training and empowerment.*
- *Training and empowerment of women on micro-enterprises and micro-credit facilities.*
- *Institutionalizing 'AFLATOUN' in the NFE Centers which recognizes child's rights, personal responsibility, thereby teaching them financial and social education for self-reliance, improvement on retention in learning Centers and access to continuing education.*
- *Conduct Post Literacy, Adult and Non-formal Certificate Examination (PLANCE). This Certificate is nationally recognized.²⁷*

The UNICEF also worked with the Anambra State Universal Basic Education Board (ASUBEB) for educational intervention programs. Their interventions included donations of instructional materials and school buildings.²⁸

UN-Habitat: The UN-Habitat was another UN agency that its presence was effectively felt in Anambra State. Within its operational framework was ascribed the mandate to ensure urban cities without slums; cities where women felt safer; inclusive cities with power, water and sanitation, and affordable transport; better planned cities, and cleaner, greener cities. Generally, the UN-Habitat operates in partnership with the European Commission and the Brussels-based Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group to support sustainable urban development.²⁹ Writing on the aim for the partnership and the adopted mandate, the Executive Director of UN-Habitat, Joan Clos stated:

The Participatory Slum Upgrading Program is based on the policy dialogue between UN-Habitat, the ACP Secretariat and the European Commission which dates back to the year 2002. When the three parties met at UN-Habitat headquarters in June 2009, more than 200 delegates from over 50 countries approved a resounding call on the international community to pay greater attention to these urbanization matters, and to extend the slum upgrading program to all countries in the ACP Group.³⁰

Onitsha, the commercial nerve Center of Anambra was a beneficiary of the UN-Habitat mandate in Africa. The enhancement of the living condition in Onitsha was captured within a program designed by the UN-Habitat named Participatory Slum Upgrading Program (PSUP). PSUP was an accelerated and action-oriented urban assessment of needs and capacity-building gaps at the city level. The PSUP operations were framed within three phases: (1) a rapid participatory urban profiling at national and local levels, focusing on Governance, Local Economic Development, Land, Gender, Environment, Slums and Shelter, Basic Urban Services, and Waste Management, and proposed interventions; (2) detailed priority proposals; and (3) project implementation. Before engaging in the urban enhancement of Onitsha, the UN-Habitat conducted an examination of the living situation in the city under the following themes: governance, slum and shelter, gender, environment, local economic development, basic urban services, heritage, and transportation. From the findings deduced, the agency set out areas that needed immediate attention and prioritized them.³¹

United Nations Population Fund: The activities of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) was also visible in Anambra State. The UN agency supported such programs in the state as the Community Reproductive Health, Population, Family Life and HIV/AIDS Education, Population Planning and Development Strategies and Gender and Advocacy.³² The UNFPA was the world's largest source of population assistance - \$309m in 1996.³³ The fund began operation in 1969, spurred by concern, the “population concern” and the attendant misery and hardship felt particularly by the poorer countries. Their objective was to assist developing countries at their request, in providing reproductive health care (including family planning, sexual health and adolescent health) on the basis on individual choice and formulating population strategies in support of sustainable development.

UNFPA assisted Nigeria in these areas since 1978 and provided three, Five Year Programs of Assistance within that period. Anambra was added later to the program and commenced/ completed her pre-project activities in August 1998. The UNFPA 4th County Program commenced in January 1997.³⁴ The program revolved to include suggestions (sub programs) by Anambra government officials based on indigenous needs. The UNFPA/Anambra State Program Development Mission visited and worked exhaustively in the state for two weeks in June 1997. Recommendations made by the team included the addition of ten local government areas to the sub programs- which made Anambra the state with the largest number of participating LGA.³⁵

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): On its own part, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) lent its support to the state's efforts towards agricultural development over the years. The UN agency partnered with the state government under the

Agricultural Development Program (ADP) to provide basic facilities for farmers settled in locations within the state.³³ By 2007, the IFAD initiated an active support of the cultivation of roots crops in Anambra State under the Roots and Tuber Expansion Program.³⁴

World Bank: The World Bank has had direct and indirect influence on the socio-economic milieu of Anambra State over the years. Of course, the entire country had a whiff of the shadow of the World Bank in the SAP years. The international financial body remains a major donor to the country in the more contemporary times. The World Bank International Development Association (IDA) played a leading role in drawing up “Nigeria Country Partnership Strategy” (CPS II), which described the following three themes of the assistance to Nigeria during the period from 2010 to 2013: improving governance; maintaining non-oil sector growth; and promotion of human development. The assistance along this partnership strategy accounted for 80% of the total assistance to Nigeria.³⁵ Until September 2010, the total lending by the World Bank amounted more than 10.5 billion dollars. More recent assistance projects include Second National Fadama Development Project (Fadama II) and Financial Sector and Public Financial Management Development Policy Credit (DPC).³⁶

At the state level, the federal government of Nigeria received a technical assistance loan from the World Bank to support the State and Local Governance Reform (SLOGOR) project operating in states of Anambra, Osun, Cross River, Kano, Jigawa and Yobe. The project development objective was to improve transparency, accountability and quality in public finance management, with a view to strengthening governance in the participating states. The project was consistent with the development objectives of the then administration’s Vision 20-2020, State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS) and other state development strategies. The program which spanned up to five year, was achieved through four components;

Component A: Public Financial Management Reforms

Component B: Support to local governance

Component C: Project Coordination

Component D: Supervision of Trust Fund activities.³⁷

The project was proposed to comply with the World Bank Safeguard Policies and applicable Federal, State and local laws of Nigeria.

The World Bank Safeguard Policies are as follows:

- Environmental Assessment (OP4.01)
- Natural Habitats (OP 4.04)
- Forests (OP 4.36)

- Pest Management (OP 4.09)
- Physical Cultural Resources (OP 4.11)
- Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)
- Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12)
- Safety of Dams (OP 4.37)
- Projects on International Waters (OP 7.50)
- Projects in Disputed Areas (OP 7.60)
- Public Disclosure (BP 17.50)³⁸

Significantly, the World Bank recognized that stakeholder consultation was necessary for the workability of the SLOGOR and this was in compliance with the already stated World Bank Safeguard Policies. A consultative meeting was held with the Anambra State government in Awka on May 2, 2013 and subsequent communication ensued via telephone and email. The State Project Coordinating Unit (SPCU) in Anambra State raised concern on the need for renovations and rehabilitation of SLOGOR office section within the civil service secretariat as well as upgrade of office equipment. These involve minor civil works. Project officers noted that project activities/execution had no discernable environmental and social impact therefore, there were no likely challenges concerning environmental management of project operations.³⁹

The international financial body performed other direct donorship role in different sectors of Anambra State socio-economic milieu. The World Bank assisted the HIV/AIDS Program Development Project and the Health System Fund (HSF) program in the state. The HSF program addressed issues such as capacity building for the efficient functioning of both the primary and secondary health systems in the state.⁴⁰ The environmental sector in Anambra State also witnessed the inputs of the World Bank. Anambra State was plagued by soil erosion menace. As C.C. Soludo puts it, "an enduring challenge for the state is the ravaging erosion (with over 500 erosion gullies already identified in the state)."⁴¹ The Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP), initiated by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and funded by the World Bank (WB) and International Development Fund (IDF), implemented in Anambra State to help reduce soil erosion vulnerability in the state and to develop the state's watersheds. With each passing year, uncontrolled storm water flow threatened lives and properties as the existing gullies become widened and more menacing. The Anambra State NEWMAP targeted to remedy and rehabilitate the existing gully and reduce the impacts through the NEWMAP opportunity.⁴²

Over the years, the government and donor agencies continued to intermediate in the agricultural sector in a bid to increase output performance through cooperatives as a strategy to promote collective action to strengthen small-holders' livelihoods by linking them to national and international market.⁴³

The Anambra State government in partnership with donor agencies also worked to ensure ample agricultural productivity in the state. It was the view of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) that the cooperative institution in view of its nature and antecedents could play a significant role in ensuring food security in developing countries.⁴⁴ In line with this view, the FAO encouraged cooperative farmers in the state through monitored subventions for established agricultural cooperative institutions.⁴⁵

Non-UN Donor Agencies

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries constituted a major chunk of the non-UN donors in Nigeria during the period. The top OECD donors to Nigeria include the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries partnered with the federal and state governments in Nigeria to extend aids and supports. It is important at this point to peruse their respective operational frameworks in Nigeria.

The United Kingdom: In the United Kingdom, Department of International Development (DFID) act as the Center of support for Nigeria. The DFID lead the UK's global efforts to end extreme poverty, deliver the Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDGs) and tackle a wide range of global development challenges. The UK's focus and international leadership on economic development is a vital part of Global Britain – harnessing the potential of new trade relationships, creating jobs and channel investments to the world's poorest countries. The DFID asserted that throughout history, sustained, job-creating growth has played the greatest role in lifting huge numbers of people out of grinding poverty. The international donor agency believe that this is what the developing countries want and is what the international system need to help deliver. According to the DFID Nigeria, “whilst there is an urgent need for traditional aid in many parts of the world, ultimately economic development is how we will achieve the Global Goals and help countries move beyond the need for aid.”⁴⁶ In essence, the DFID has it as its objective to aid poorer countries to achieve sustainable socio-economic development. It is equally interesting to note from the foregoing that the DFID and UN have a common objective of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

One may ask the question: why was DFID investing so much in Nigeria? A document that provided an insight into the operational framework of the DFID in Nigeria appears to have an answer to the above question in the following words:

*Nigeria is Africa's biggest country by population and its second largest economy. It has the world's 10th largest proven oil reserves and the 9th largest natural gas reserves. The UK-Nigeria trade relationship was worth £4 billion in 2015 and has the potential to grow significantly in future. Nigeria is therefore a significant trade and investment partner. However, Nigeria faces a number of challenges to its future growth and development. Conflict continues to affect its oil-rich delta region and there is a violent Islamist insurgency in the north-east, which has caused a humanitarian crisis. Despite significant natural resources, around a third of Nigerians (60 million) live below the national poverty line with around another third just above; many of them are highly vulnerable and at risk of being trafficked to the UK. The government of Nigeria is taking the lead to tackle these issues, but struggles with corruption as well as the capacity and resources necessary. The UK is focused on helping Nigeria overcome these challenges.*⁴⁷

Nigeria is one of DFID's top five bilateral programs and the second largest in Africa behind Ethiopia. DFID work across the country with federal and state governments and its program implementers to assist with development in Nigeria. DFID provides no financial aid to the government of Nigeria because of fiduciary risk and to avoid substituting Nigerian resources. Aid represents less than 1 percent of the country's GDP compared to a sub-Saharan African average of 10 percent. Rather, DFID describes the purpose of its program in Nigeria as ensuring Nigeria is able to deploy its own resources effectively towards the delivery of services.⁴⁸

There were 57 DFID projects in progress in Nigeria as at March, 2011. DFID aimed to build institutions and facilities, with which the Nigerian federal government, state governments and local authorities could cope with the people's needs in transparent ways. Since 2005, in cooperation with the World Bank, the UK implemented the Joint Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), to which the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) participated in 2013. Of the total amount of ODA disbursement by DFID, approximately 75 percent was used for technical assistance, 20 percent for the MDGs related projects, and 5 percent was used for civic society organizations. 60 percent of total amount of ODA to Nigeria was devoted to the state-level policy support, because each state government had strong power for policy implementation. DFID implemented an intensive strategy to concentrate investment in several states, and hoped to maintain this strategy in the future. Looking at the program level, DFID was in the lead position for gender education, showing the commitment to promote that issue at donor coordination level.⁴⁹

In 2015 and 2016, one hundred and ten DFID Nigeria staff across four offices, situated in Abuja, Enugu, Kano and Lagos, helped to deliver a program valued at nearly two hundred and twenty million

pounds (£220m).⁵⁰ However, in as much as states with relatively low situation of humanitarian crisis such as Anambra State still needed the donor activities of the DFID, the UK donor agency expended more focus and efforts on the crisis-prone northern states. In fact, the DFID currently focuses its efforts in eight out of thirty-six states and Nigeria and spends more than 60% of its allocation funds in six northern states.⁵¹

The three main pillars of the Operational Plan for DFID Nigeria for 2011-2016 are:

- promoting better governance at local, state and federal levels, and helping to improve management of Nigeria's own resources to benefit its citizens;
- improving the business environment to create jobs and incomes for poor people; and
- helping Nigeria to deliver basic services more effectively and efficiently.⁵²

In April 2012, the DFID agreed to work in partnership with the state government of Anambra. The State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) was one of the programs designed to provide technical assistance for governance reform. Shedrack Nkoro, the Technical Coordination Manager, Anambra DFID-SPARC noted that the main goal of DFID-SPARC was to use Nigeria's resources efficiently and effectively to achieve the MDGs through enhanced use of public resources. According to him, the agency intended to achieve this, by assisting selected state governments to build and strengthen systems for the following:

- making effective policy and strategy for development, with monitoring and evaluation framework (P&S/M&E) in partnership with Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget;
- managing state public financial resources (PFM) in partnership with Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Ministry of Finance, Office of the Accountant-General, Office of the State Auditor-General, BIR, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and so on;
- improving service delivery through state public service performance in partnership with the Office of the Head of Service. The state government provided SPARC with an office in the government house complex and a high level meeting between the program and government officials in late 2012 agreed on an intervention approach.⁵³

Since August 2012, Anambra's government and SPARC worked together to improve the budget process – the heart of government performance. In less than a year a guidance manual was produced, with an improved budget calendar and call circular developed and used, and better timed consultations with the public to shift budgeting from a supply to a demand perspective.⁵⁴

United States: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was established on November 3, 1961, following enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) which formally established and authorized the assistance programs that USAID implements. Since then, USAID has been the leading international humanitarian and development arm of the U.S. government. In financial year 2015, the agency was responsible for more than \$20 billion in appropriations, representing more than half of all traditional foreign aid appropriations and more than two-thirds of total U.S. humanitarian and development funding in that year. USAID is the workhorse of the U.S. foreign assistance program.⁵⁵

Of the multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. government that engaged in some form of international humanitarian and development work during this period, USAID differed from the others in a variety of ways:

- **Leading U.S. Development Agency.** USAID was the largest provider of U.S. development aid. It employed thousands of development professionals with specializations in a wide range of sectors and geographic regions. It was the representative of the U.S. government on development issues throughout the world.
- **Worked in Numerous Countries.** USAID funded activities in 125 countries (based on financial year 2013 obligations) and maintained an extensive field presence, with more than 60 standing bilateral country missions and regional offices that served countries without mission representation. This physical presence allowed the agency to formulate development strategies based on familiarity with local conditions, consult regularly with the local government and civil society, and closely monitored project progress.
- **Worked in Multiple Sectors.** USAID worked on a broad and varied range of humanitarian and development concerns, including microenterprise, health, agriculture, biodiversity, education, democracy and governance, economic infrastructure, energy, financial markets, trade capacity, trafficking in persons, women, disaster relief, and water. Activities in these fields were often supported by specific legislative authorities, and many of them were mandated annually by Congress in appropriations funding language.
- **Worked in the Poorest Countries.** In order to meet the objectives of mitigating humanitarian disasters and addressing poverty, USAID worked with the poorest of the poor countries. In financial year 2013, USAID had programs in 31 of the 34 lowest-income countries, accounting for 44% of total country assistance. With corrupt and weak political and economic institutions, these countries were often challenging development partners.

- **Worked in Conflict Countries.** USAID was obligated to work in conflict or post-conflict countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia. USAID programs in such locations often focused as much on establishing stability and delivering basic services as on long-term development. In the past decade, Department of Defense secretaries under administrations of both parties have argued the importance of USAID development programs in combating national security threats.
- **Served Political/Strategic and U.S. Commercial Purposes.** In addition to humanitarian and development objectives, USAID supported the political and strategic foreign policy goals of the State Department by providing assistance to strategically important countries—for example, eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the fall of communism and Afghanistan in recent times. USAID assisted U.S. commercial interests by furthering the economic growth of developing countries and building these countries’ capacity to participate in world trade. In most years, it was the largest provider of trade capacity building assistance among U.S. aid agencies.
- **Led the World in Humanitarian Aid.** While most refugee aid was provided by the State Department through contributions to international organizations, USAID was the U.S. government’s prime channel for disaster and food assistance and the most visible face of any U.S. humanitarian response.
- **Worked Directly with Civil Society/Private Sector as Well as Governments.** In addition to providing funding and technical expertise to governments, USAID directly funded international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as other private sector entities. It also participated with U.S. businesses in hundreds of public-private partnerships.
- **Largest and Leading Bilateral Donor.** USAID was the world’s largest provider of bilateral donor grant assistance. It alone represented about 14% of all Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all international donors in 2013. Historically, USAID led other donors in offering innovative ways to address challenges in the health, agriculture, microcredit, democracy promotion, environment, and private sector development fields.⁵⁶

The United States supported Nigeria through USAID. The country published “USAID / Nigeria Strategy 2010-2013”, and planed its support program based on it. They had four central support pillars: governing justly and democracy; investing in people, particularly through health and education; enhancing economic growth and trade; and improving peace and security. In addition, policies of energy security, regional stability, and Muslim outreach were priorities. These were

reflected in strategy addressing five key issue areas: youth, conflict, anticorruption, gender and local institutional capacity. At the same time, “USAID / Nigeria Public Private Partnership Strategy and Workplan 2010-2013”, published in 2010, acknowledged that they would actively utilize public private partnership in terms of the scale, expansion of effect, and sustainability of the projects, as well as achieving objectives mentioned in the above strategy. Application of the selection process of assistance target areas resulted in the choice of Bauchi and Sokoto states for health, education and governance interventions. Assistance in these states involved: “Leadership, Empowerment, Advocacy and Development” (LEAD), which aimed to improve governance through strengthening civil society and private sector entities; “Northern Education Initiative” (NEI) to improve the school enrollment rate in the northern region; and “Targeted States High Impact Project” (TSHIP) to improve health-related nutritional status.⁵⁷

In its 2015-2017 Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), the U.S. Government Mission in Nigeria identified four priority goals which included improving governance, furthering economic development, enhancing stability, and expanding opportunity. In support of that vision, the USAID mission has established its Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) goal as reduced extreme poverty in a more stable, democratic Nigeria.

The United States donor agency set out to pursue the goal through three Development Objectives (DOs):

- DO 1: Broadened and inclusive growth
- DO 2: A healthier, more educated population in targeted states
- DO 3: Strengthened good governance⁵⁸

The CDCS goal and development objectives were shaped by the following considerations:

- Nigeria is relatively wealthy yet suffers from high levels of poverty. Nigeria has enjoyed robust economic growth over the past five years however this economic growth has not fostered significant reductions in poverty or income equality.
- Regional inequalities are evident across Nigeria. The overall picture of Nigeria reveals a northern region that is much poorer than the rest of the country and under-developed, and a relatively wealthier, resource-rich south, with higher literacy rates, and better health indicators, yet a higher prevalence of HIV and higher levels of gender-based violence.
- Increasing the beneficiaries of economic growth is essential. Resolving bottlenecks to inclusive growth have prevented most Nigerians from benefitting from the country’s robust

economic growth. Working with the private sector and the Nigerian government under the Feed the Future and Power Africa initiatives is central to this element of the strategy.

- Government provision of social services will contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction. The health and education portfolios will focus on strengthening service delivery, systems oversight, and leadership to encourage adequate resource allocation to meet health needs and save lives and to increase access to basic educational services and the necessary skills to be productive members of society.
- Strengthening democratic processes and governance and conflict mitigation will complement all aspects of the strategy. Since the significant policy and budgetary decisions made at the state and local levels of government most directly affect the lives of all citizens, the Mission will strive to strengthen these institutions' capacity to administer elections, respond to citizen needs, and help mitigate conflict by increasing transparency and accountability of government and by fostering civic engagement.
- Humanitarian and transitional activities will continue in the northeast. These activities will be complemented by long-term development activities in northeastern Nigeria as conditions permit.
- Activities under this strategy will be focused and selective. The Mission's interventions, except in certain cases, will not be nationwide. Additionally, the Mission will partner with reform-minded leaders at the state and local levels.
- Improved monitoring and evaluation will help improve outcomes. The Mission is committed to the Agency's focus on monitoring, evaluation, and learning as demonstrated through its collaborating, learning and adapting agenda. This agenda focused primarily on internal and external capacity building in order to exert a multiplier effect on the Mission's development investments.⁵⁹

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in partnership with the Anambra State government also sponsored the Anambra State Operational Plan for the Elimination of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV. The UNICEF and the United Nations Joint Program on AIDS (UNAIDS) are also part of the partnership. FHI 360, UNICEF and UNAIDS provided technical assistance to the Anambra State Government during development of the plan. Financial assistance was provided by USAID under the terms of the Cooperative Agreement AID-620-A-00002, of the Strengthening Integrated Delivery of HIV/AIDS Services Project.⁶⁰

The European Union: To ensure the understanding of the operational framework of the EU in Nigeria, it is pertinent to have a peek at the donor profile of the international organization. With

contributions worth more than fifty billion pounds (€50 billion) a year as at 2012, the European Union (EU) and its member states were considered jointly the first donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world.⁶¹ In the EU, public development assistance is channeled through either national programs of the Member States or common programs under the EU budget. The main instrument of the European Union (EU) assistance is the European Development Fund (EDF).⁶²

First established in 1958 and launched the following year, the EDF has a geographic focus on a number of overseas territories and third world countries such as former colonies, which have special historical ties with some member states of the EU. Third world countries that received EDF funding are part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and are signatories to the Cotonou Agreement, a comprehensive international agreement setting out the wider framework of their relations with the EU and its member states until February 2020.⁶³

Over the past decade, EU-Nigeria cooperation is believed to have steadily expanded. This cooperation is grounded in the “EU-Nigeria Joint Way Forward” agreed between the EU and Nigeria in 2009.⁶⁴ The agreement outlined the priorities for bilateral EU-Nigeria cooperation. Most EU development cooperation activities in Nigeria are funded primarily through the allocation of EUR 689 million from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) to the EU/Nigeria National Indicative Program (NIP) and a EUR 562 million allocation from 11th EDF.⁶⁵ The 10th EDF Country Strategy Paper set out the priorities for EU funding to the country from 2008 to 2013.⁶⁶ The three priority areas for program and project funding were:

- peace and security,
- governance and human rights,
- trade and regional integration.⁶⁷

The three priority sectors for the current 11th EDF development assistance to Nigeria were:

- In the social sector, improved access to quality primary healthcare, the fight against malnutrition and measures to strengthen resilience and promote social protection. Included here are support for routine and polio immunization campaigns, activities to improve access to clean water and sanitation, and reinforce livelihoods and revenue generation in rural populations through food and nutrition security;
- In the economic sector, increased access to sustainable electricity, supporting efforts to improve conditions for economic growth with a focus on improving competitiveness and diversification, development of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures and

strengthening public finance systems at state and federal levels, to create a stable environment for trade and investment activities;

- In the governance sector, continued support to strengthen democracy in Nigeria, the fight against corruption, the fight against trafficking of human beings, drugs and small arms, the reform of the justice system, measures to manage migration more efficiently and effectively, and capacity building for civil society organizations.⁶⁸

While the UN donor agencies majorly operated within the framework of the MDGs in Anambra State, other donors either partnered with the state government to achieve the MDGs or to support other developmental initiatives, major among them was the State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (SEEDS). The EU conspicuously supported SEEDS in Anambra State. SEEDS in Anambra State attracted the intervention of the EU for the execution of Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Program and the Support for Reforming of Institutions Program (SRIP).⁶⁹

Since July 2006 the EU funded a governance reform program in Anambra State known as the Support to Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP). One of the assessments conducted by this program was a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment (in 2008). In 2011 the Anambra State government was the first in the country to subject itself to the State Peer Review Mechanism (SPRM) run by the Nigeria Governors' Forum – this was a process that assessed the performance of government against over 200 best practice indicators. As indicated earlier, the EU also partners with the ANA-RUWASA and other water, sanitation and hygiene agencies to ensure a healthy population in the state.

African Regional Donor Agencies

A well-known regional development partner to Nigeria is the African Union which implemented its developmental programs through various agencies such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The AfDB is arguably the single most influential regional financial institution in Africa. It is a major financial institution in a continent with weak economic performance.

African Development Bank: The AfDB was founded in 1964 and has its headquarters in Abidjan. It was established by thirty-three (33) African countries, many of which had achieved independence around that time. The founding members wanted to establish an institution that could specialize in African problems and that would be under African control. They were particularly concerned to create

an institution that could overcome the economic constraints that result from the small size of many African economies. An important arm of the AfDB is the African Development Fund (AfDF). The AfDF was established in 1973 to provide finance on concessional terms to member states.⁷⁰

The operational framework of the AfDB in Nigeria could be gleaned through programs formulated to make funds accessible to member countries to encourage sustainable development and good governance. In line with the foregoing, the AfDB formulated the Economic Governance, Diversification and Competitiveness Support Program (EGDCSP).⁷¹ The key outputs of the Program in Nigeria are:

- Improved Non-Oil Revenue Mobilization through tax administration & tax policy reform;
- Enhanced Expenditure Control & Rationalization;
- Mitigated Fiscal Risks;
- Enhanced Transparency and accountability in Government Own Enterprises (GOEs) and other Government operations;
- Ensured Value for money through more efficient public procurement;
- Enhanced Energy market competitiveness and diversification through energy sector governance, financial viability, and generation capacity adequacy;
- Improved agriculture sector policy and institutional environment;
- Fostering Social Inclusion.⁷²

The operation of the program is aligned with three of the operational priorities of the AfDB's Ten-Year Strategy (2013-2022), namely infrastructure, private sector development, and governance and accountability, which are reiterated in four of the High-5s: emphasizing scaling up investments in key areas of TYS -Light Up and Power Africa; Feed Africa; Industrialize Africa; and Improve Quality of Life of People of Africa. Both energy and agribusiness (value chain investments) will promote industrialization. The program is also linked to the three strategic pillars of the Governance Framework and Action Plan, 2014-2018 (GAP II), emphasizing sound public sector economic management, sector good governance, and investment and business climate enhancement. The operation is also consistent with the Private Sector Development Strategy, 2013-2017. The program was closely linked to the two pillars of the Nigeria Country Strategy Paper – (i) Promoting the development of a sound policy environment; and (ii) Investing in critical infrastructure to develop the real sector of the economy.⁷³ The AfDB also went into partnership with the EU, USAID and DFID to initiate the Nigeria Country Strategy Paper and national Indicative Program between 2008 and 2013.⁷⁴

The AfDB partnered with the Anambra State government in areas of infrastructural development and private sector support. Within 2008-2013 the AfDB provided funds to the state government to support Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMEs) through the Bank of Industry (BoI). Through these measures the AfDB intended to effectively partner with the Anambra State government to achieve the aspect of the MDGs that is aimed at poverty alleviation through empowerment.⁷⁵ The AfDB is also known to have operated within the framework of promoting good governance and accountability in Anambra State.⁷⁶

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vision and a strategic framework for Africa's renewal and sustainable development. NEPAD was conceived and developed by African leaders and designed to address the current challenges facing the continent. It evolved from three initiatives from these African leaders, designed to address the complex challenges to growth faced by African states: the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki; the Omega Plan, developed by the former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade; and the New African Initiative (NAI), which combined the first two initiatives. In 2001, these were reworked and expanded to provide a framework for all African states. NEPAD was adopted in 2001 by the OAU 37th Summit and ratified by the AU in 2002 at its first summit.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the pan-African strategic framework for the socio-economic development of the continent. NEPAD was officially adopted by the AU in 2002 as the primary mechanism to coordinate the pace and impact of Africa's development in the 21st century. Its primary objective was to provide a new mechanism, spearheaded by African leaders, to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process, accelerate the empowerment of women, fully integrate Africa into the global economy and eradicate poverty.

It equally subscribed and focused on the systematic attainment of the UN MDGs/SDGs. NEPAD's long-term objectives are the eradication of poverty in Africa and placing African countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalization process, and promoting the role of women in all activities. NEPAD also subscribed to the millennium development targets concerning under-five mortality, maternal mortality, school enrolment for children and the eradication of poverty.⁷⁷

Prioritizing the human development sector, NEPAD had been into partnership with the Anambra State government to promote poverty reduction programs initiated in the state, encourage women development programs and girl-child support, utilize a variety of approaches to bridge the education gap in order to facilitate development, adopting a variety of strategies to reverse brain drain thereby facilitating brain gain, and in pursuance of improvements in the development of healthcare systems and services.⁷⁸ The NEPAD initiative was however regarded by critics as new wine in old skin, and largely ineffective.

International Charity Foundations

International charity organizations equally play important role in aid delivery and donorship in developing countries. Charity foundations are a kind of business or organization that is part of non-profit (NPO) category. It is a kind of organization that is normally focused social activities that are philanthropic in nature. They can be public or private foundations.⁷⁹

Some charity foundations in Nigeria operate as private foundations that obtain their principal funding and finance through a corporation, family, individual or other single financial source that does not seek or request public funding. Private foundations usually use endowment funds to provide grants to outside or affiliated organizations that support the foundation objectives.⁸⁰

On the other hand, public charity foundations operating in Nigeria usually receive grants from the government, private foundations and individuals. They are managed by government agencies. Activities of charity organizations in Nigeria include:

- Offering relief for the poor, distressed or underserved
- Religious enhancement
- Educational funding
- Creation and management of monuments, public buildings or works
- Offering social services
- Lessening government burden
- Combating community deterioration
- The defense of public safety, children, civil rights, and elimination of prejudice and discrimination⁸¹

The Nigerian Foundation: The Nigerian foundation is a popular United States based charity foundation that operated effectively in Anambra State. The foundation is the umbrella organization

of Nigerians in the greater Houston area of Texas United States. It was formed as a nonprofit, advocacy group in 1982.⁸² Its initial objective was working for and representing the people of Nigeria in the greater Houston area. With time, the foundation expanded to become an international foundation engaged in donor and aids for Nigeria. The mission of the foundation is to empower Nigerians, give Nigerians a voice, and strengthen Nigerian community in the greater Houston and equally extend a helping hand to certain areas within the country in need of food, educational and healthcare services.⁸³ The Nigerian foundation has partnered with the Anambra State in several occasions to alleviate the sufferings of the communities that were plagued by natural disaster. They donate essential supplies to the communities through the state agencies.

Marie Stopes Nigeria (MSN): The Marie Stopes Nigeria (MSN) is a new member of Marie Stopes International (MSI) network, which came into Nigeria at the instance of Federal Ministry of Health in 2009 with the vision of having a world in which every birth is wanted and ‘Children by Choice not Chance.’ The organization offered access to high quality pre-natal, post-natal and parenting counseling and services. It was effectively funded by DFID and has also launched the BlueStar social franchise in Nigeria.⁸⁴ MSN operations are framed within the private sector. In other words, the charity foundation entered into partnership with private enterprises in Anambra State in order to effectively carry out their mandate. However, the foundation stipulates conditions for partnership with any private enterprise. The coordinator of MSN in Anambra State, Emmanuel Ajah explained that the only conditions for partnering with the private sector is firstly, when the partnership can be sustained; secondly the private sector must have attained some level of efforts such as availability of infrastructure, health care providers and presence of sound management practice. Ajah also explained that MSN works mainly with private clinic because they are a serious play in many developing countries’ health systems, large in number and geographical coverage, and under-utilized for reproductive health services.⁸⁵ MSN offers training support, supplies facilities, marketing and improvement in facility infrastructure if below a certain standard.⁸⁶

German Leprosy and TB Relief Association: German Leprosy and TB Relief Association, which is known in German as *Deutsche Lepra-und Tuberkulosehilfe e.V.* (DAHV) was founded in Germany in 1957. The charity foundation adopted the following task:

- to initiate and support leprosy and tuberculosis control activities;
- to initiate and support Buruli ulcer control activities;
- to foster medical and social rehabilitation;
- to support community-based rehabilitation program;

- to support research in leprosy and tuberculosis;
- to support training activities in leprosy and tuberculosis;
- to support control activities of neglected tropical diseases;
- medical and social support for people affected by neglected tropical diseases;
- to promote health education and information and;
- to support public awareness campaigns.⁸⁷

DAHW is networking with national and international bodies that are involved in political, medical, and social co-operation with developing countries.⁸⁸

DAHW came to Nigeria to form the German Leprosy and TB Relief Association (GLRA). The GLRA initiates programs to effectively carry out their objective of leprosy and tuberculosis relief in hard-to-reach areas of the country. One of such GLRA programs is the TB REACH project which was designed to increase the uptake of TB services in a number of urban slums in different states of Nigeria.⁸⁹

The GLRA Nigeria supported the Tuberculosis, Leprosy and Buruli Ulcer Control Unit in the Anambra State Ministry of Health. The foundation partnered with the Anambra State Government through the aforementioned unit of the ministry of health in the following:

- Quarterly review meeting of LGA TBLs meeting with the State Control Team.
- Capacity building – Training of general health workers in TB, HIV & leprosy control.
- Training involving PPM collaboration in TB/HIV control activities.
- Sponsored the Training of TBL Supervisors at Zaria.
- Training of TB microscopists in the state and sponsors quarterly quality assurance review meeting of AFB microscopists.
- Provision of leprosy reaction control drugs of prednisolone.
- Provision of foot wears for leprosy patients with insensitive feet – and other POD materials.
- Provides social economic and rehabilitation support to persons affected by leprosy and their families.
- Supported the State to commemorate world TB & Leprosy day.
- Supported to maintain and fuel the project vehicle provided by the Global fund for TB control.
- Maintained motorbike for the 21 TBLs in the State.⁹⁰

There were various challenges and achievements that were associated with the partnership. These are discussed in subsequent chapters of this study.

International Non-Governmental Organizations

Any discussion of the provision of aid through civil society organizations (CSOs) needs to take into account the particular case of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). They are a powerful force in the delivery of aid, and important actors within the international development architecture. They provided more aid to developing countries than ever before, and the budgets of particularly large INGOs have surpassed those of some Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donor countries.⁹¹ Eight INGOs (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International, Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International and Action Aid International) had combined revenue of more than US\$11.7 billion in 2011, up to 40 percent since 2005.⁹² INGOs represent a major presence in many developing countries (including Nigeria), receive substantial sums from donors to carry out humanitarian assistance and development work, and are an increasingly influential actor in policy processes and in the global governance of aid.

The size and scope of INGOs is one of their defining characteristics and a key reason why they occupy an important position within international development cooperation. World Vision International, the world's largest INGO, had an annual budget of US\$2.8 billion (in 2011), which is greater than the budget of all UN agencies combined other than the World Food Program (WFP), and more than the gross national income (GNI) of smaller African and European countries.⁹³ World Vision International's global revenue in 2011 was larger than the aid budgets of 12 out of the 23 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors.⁹⁴

INGOs' scale and scope are the result of dramatic increases in their budgets over the last 15 years. They have channeled more aid to developing countries than ever before.⁹⁵ The eight largest INGOs by revenue in 2005 (World Vision International, Oxfam International, Save the Children International, Plan International and Médecins Sans Frontières, CARE International, CARITAS International, and Action Aid International) earned a total of US\$11.7 billion in 2011, a 40 percent increase in these years.⁹⁶ The flow of money through INGOs for humanitarian assistance has also grown significantly: in 2007, INGOs supplied US\$4.9 billion of the US\$15 billion in humanitarian assistance provided by all aid actors.⁹⁷

INGOs have varied roles in development cooperation, and have varied approaches based on different models of development practice. However, there are strong similarities in the objectives they aim to achieve, and in their overall mandates. Key objectives for INGOs typically include the reduction of

poverty and inequality, the realization of rights, then promotion of gender equality and social justice, protection of the environment and strengthening of civil society and democratic governance. For example, three of the globally acclaimed largest INGOs have primary objectives based on poverty reduction:

- CARE International “shares a common vision to fight against worldwide poverty and to protect and enhance human dignity.”⁹⁸
- Oxfam International is a “global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty.”⁹⁹
- World Vision is “dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.”¹⁰⁰

INGOs work with a wide range of target groups and sectors to achieve their development objectives. While some have a special focus, many work in similar areas. In Nigeria, Save The Children and Plan International, as their names suggest, had a specific focus on children and undertook programs in health, nutrition, education, protection and child rights. In the country, the Action Aid worked on food rights, women’s rights, democratic governance, education, climate change and HIV/AIDS.¹⁰¹ Many INGOs, such as World Vision International or Oxfam International, were involved in humanitarian assistance as well as long-term development programs in different states of the country. One of the world’s largest INGOs, Médecins sans Frontières worked only on humanitarian assistance, delivering emergency aid “to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, healthcare exclusion and natural or man-made disasters”. This organization was mostly visible in the northern part of the country.¹⁰²

Most INGOs in Nigeria were directly involved in planning, implementing and managing development programs and humanitarian assistance. Their approaches can range from the operational implementation of programs, to working wholly through state governments, where they have no direct role in program implementation. Most INGOs in the country undertake a mix of approaches, often informed by practice models and theoretical frameworks, and by performance and quality standards.¹⁰³

INGOs played a major role in Anambra State, and sometimes constituted the main international presence in some parts of the state, in particular those that are more remote, affected by conflict or less important economically or politically, for example the conflict-ridden Umueri and Aguleri communities of the northern part of the state.¹⁰⁴ This meant that some communities experienced the

aid system (including its programs and institutions) primarily through INGOs. In these cases, there was a heavy onus of responsibility on INGOs: to operate ethically, to work collaboratively and productively with communities, to ensure positive outcomes of their interventions, and to be accountable for their actions. INGO presence in communities can be highly visible, and long-term: World Vision, for instance, established a 15-year presence in communities through its Area Development Plans and offices and its teams that support these plans.¹⁰⁵

In the final analysis, the INGOs make up a bulky part of donorship in developing countries and their operations are mostly guided by moral ethics and sense of responsibility. Their efforts are known to have yielded varied results in Anambra State, especially in the cases of environmental disaster and communal crisis. The impact of the activities of the INGOs will be appraised in the next chapter of this study.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF DONOR AGENCIES IN ANAMBRA STATE

In this chapter, some of the various activities of some donor agencies would be highlighted and assessed. Several attempts were made in the past to assess the activities of these donors. While some assessors view their place as facilitating development, others saw it as inhibiting while a third group however believe that the task of development is not to be left in the hands of external bodies or foreign donors but should be the sole responsibility of the state. This third view believe that any attempt to blame the inhibiting tendencies of the donor agencies is actually an attempt to shift the burden of development to the wrong actors or bodies; they noted that this attitude or practice will only help to perpetuate the unruly dispositions of leaders in the third world countries (TWCs) to behave irresponsibly and ill-responsively¹.

This view therefore posited that any developmental good, no matter how diminutive or short-lived, gotten through the intervention of any donor agency or foreign development partner, should be appreciated. The basis of this orientation is that most times the goodwill or gestures or aids donated by external development partners were often obstructed, obfuscated and adumbrated by internal colluding and contradictory forces (public officers) who by so doing squander, misapply, loot or mal-utilize them with a brazen sense of negligence².

It is this third view that this chapter's assessment of the activities of donor agencies in Anambra State is woven around. It is necessary to state that the research had limitation of data for some of the years within the timeframe of this study. However, from the oral interviews conducted, it was deduced that some of the donor agencies that are operating in the state now are the same bodies that have been operating before the state was created in 1991. The activities of donor agencies in the state from 1991 -2017 will be assessed below in five sectors of the state-health, education, government reforms, agriculture and environment.

Health Sector

The health sector was one of the sectors that received greater attention from international development partners and donor agencies, across Nigeria and in Anambra State in particular. Over the years the state received donor interventions in the areas of manpower development in the health sector; building and equipping of health facilities; sensitization and awareness campaigns, and

outright funding of certain health-related schemes, programs and initiatives of the state government. Development partners such as the World Bank, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) were on the frontline, working with relevant state agencies to manage and mitigate infant and maternal mortality; morbidity or rate of disease dispersal especially HIV and AIDS, and other water-diseases³.

The UNICEF in particular has had nearly an unbroken partnership with successive governments of Anambra State. Its intervention related but not limited to the promotion of primary healthcare and health education, advocacy and social mobilization, planning, monitoring and evaluation (PME), water, environment and sanitation, nutrition, Children in Need of Special Protection Measures (CNSPM), urban basic services, safe motherhood, early child care, immunization and reproductive health, among others⁴.

Another partner that was immensely active in this area was the Family health International (FHI 360) which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This agency's mandate covered, but were not limited to the following areas: HIV Testing Services (HTS); Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT); Early Infant Diagnosis (EID); Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART) for both Adults and Infants; Care and Support to Persons Living with HIV; Support for Orphans & Vulnerable Children (OVC); Laboratory Services including Viral Load & CD4 monitoring; Pharmaceutical services and Post Exposure Prophylaxis for HCWs and victims of Gender Based Violence⁵.

Despite the paucity of data experienced during this research, attempt would be made to chronologically trace and assess the activities of donors from 1991- 2017 in the health sector.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 1991-1993

As far back as 1990 in the Old Anambra state, statistics revealed that Anambra State recorded high prevalence and growth chances of HIV/AIDS in the state at 18% growth rate second only to Lagos State at 20%.⁶ The alarming statistics further projected that within the next five years, HIV/AIDS would grow in Anambra locations such as Awka, Onitsha, Ogbolafor, hotels and other recreational sites.⁷ Based on this negative health report; at a time when most people were ignorant of the severity of HIV/AIDS and on how to manage it, the government and collaborating health practitioners, hastened to develop a plan and requested for funding from the UNICEF to carry out advocacy to the citizens of Anambra in order to curtail the spread of the virus/disease. In 1991, the sum of about one hundred and twenty thousand Naira (N120,000) was released by UNICEF to the government and the

project implementers to carry out intervention activities amongst the populace.⁸ However, the project kicked off fully in 1993 due to internal administrative delays. Some of the earliest activities carried out in the area of HIV/AIDS prevention supported by UNICEF were:

- i. Training of police officers on HIV/AIDS prevention at Amawbia.*
- ii. Production and distribution of about three thousand (3000) calendars featuring HIV/AIDS preventive measures.*
- iii. Her Excellency, Njideka Ezeife the then first lady and wife of the state governor also assisted to bring together about three hundred women (300) representative of women from across Anambra state to Government Technical College, Awka for an enlightenment campaign, lecture and film show on the HIV/AIDS prevention.*
- iv. The state government further assisted to provide accommodation for the participants*
- v. While the film was prepared and shown by the collaborating agency- Community Health Education and Development in Africa (CoHEDA).⁹*

This early attempt to curb the spread of HIV/AIDs in the state was most remarkable as it helped to communicate preventive measure to the people on the deadly virus. Communicating these measures to a large crowd of women was also brilliant as the audience would have transferred their knowledge back to their various homes and communities across the state at large.

Capacity Building Courses, 1994- 1996

On May 12th -20th 1994, AFRICARE organized a capacity building workshop on prevention and management of HIV/AIDS/STI for healthcare practitioners in Anambra.¹⁰ The training equipped the attendees with valuable and communicable skills required in the control, management and prevention of HIV/AIDS/STI in the state.

In 1996, the Family Health International (FHI) conducted a capacity building workshop on the Syndromic Management of STDs at Calabar. Healthcare practitioners in Anambra were invited and in attendance for this vital training.¹¹ Dr. Clifford who was in attendance with his colleagues at both capacity building courses commended the intervention effort of the sponsoring donors and especially at valuable skills which was learnt there and was subsequently used to educate other health care practitioners in the state.¹² The training equally equipped him and his team to effectively continue an ongoing project on the mobilization and awareness creation on AIDS/HIV in the sixteen (16) Local

Government Areas of Anambra state sponsored by UNICEF which commenced in January 1996 and terminated in May 1996.

The importance of capacity building trainings such as these cannot be overemphasized as was necessary to regularly equip workers with the skills needed to carry out their activities in line with best practices. They also contributed to the growth of better health care management practices especially at those times when certain skills were neither known nor practiced.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 1997

In 1997, the UNDP in collaboration with the Anambra State government carried out a 14 days training for forty-two (42) Traditional Birth Attendants (TBA) in Orumba South Local Government Area of the state. The training was the first of its kind for the beneficiaries and it focused on:

- i. Promotion of safe motherhood*
- ii. Child survival strategies*
- iii. Prevention of harmful traditional practices*
- iv. Prevention of HIV in the rural community*
- v. Environmental protection and hygiene.¹³*

Prior to these trainings, these benefitting TBAs, engaged in some ignorant and harmful practices such as birthing in unclean environment and the use of unsterilized/crude knives during birthing. Due to these, there were random cases of maternal and infant mortality, HIV risks and pelvic infections. The training which was held from December 3-16th 1997 issued certificates to the TBAs, introduced them to all health Centers in Orumba South Local Government Area so that their patients could be admitted in such facilities on referrals, gave them daily training stipend of N300 each as well as one delivery kit to each trainee.¹⁴ Most especially, they were taught when to stop administering care to patients and refer them to hospitals, drug dosages administration and were monitored for one year thereafter until 1998 for compliance.

Ngozi Eze one of the beneficiaries was recorded to be so grateful that she shed tears of joy.¹⁵ This act of training TBAs is indeed laudable as it would no doubt have helped to save lives and improve the health of women/patients of these TBAs especially since this was the first time the beneficiaries received such vital training.

UNDP/Anambra State Government, 1999-2000

In 1999, the UNDP partnered with the state government in the following areas:

- A. Prevention and control of Schistosomiasis (Bilharzia) in Orumba South Local Government Area. As a result, twenty-one (21) headmasters/headmistress were trained as opinion leaders for onward training of teachers and pupils on the prevention and control of schistosomiasis.¹⁶
- B. Training of fifty-six (56) headmasters and headmistresses on the prevention and control of schistosomiasis for subsequent training of pupils and teachers in Orumba North Local Government Area.¹⁷
- C. A survey research carried out on the prevalence and morbidity pattern of schistosomiasis among school children in thirty-two (32) communities in Orumba North and South Local Government Areas of the state.¹⁸
- D. Establishment of effective public enlightenment on the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS/STD (Sexually Transmitted Diseases) particularly among high risk groups in the state.

At this time-1999, public understanding and appreciation of the threat of HIV/AIDS remained minimal. About 4.3% of Nigerians estimated to have acquired HIV infection had died, about 27% high incidence rate was inherent amongst commercial health workers, some interviewed students regarded AIDS as “American Intervention to Discourage Sex” while others called it white man disease. The enlightenment targeted young people aged 16-48 years through media. Specifically, the Anambra Broadcasting Service Radio and CoHEDA held a symposia with film shows on the “dawn of reality-AIDS in Nigeria” as shown to some of the students of Nnamdi Azikiwe University. Galand shows were also held at Amawbia Motor Park on September 7, 1999, Nkwo Nnewi Market on September 14, 1999 and Afor Nnobi Market on the same day. These enabled an audience of over twenty-eight thousand of all ages and sex to learn about the dangers of HIV/AIDS and STDs.¹⁹

It is without doubt that the manner adopted to enlighten the public on the dangers of these diseases were apt and impactful especially in the year 1999 when the strength of such advocacy was low.

Family Health International (FHI), 2000

Family Health International (FHI) Nigeria, conducted a rapid assessment in the state as part of the process of redesigning its ongoing IMPACT (Implementing AIDS Prevention and Care) project funded by United State Agency for International Development (USAID). The overall goal of the redesign was the development of a comprehensive program in key risk areas for both prevention and care. The assessment was conducted in three LGAs-Onitsha North, Onitsha South and Awka South from November 8-11, 2000.²⁰ Its objective was to identify risk settings and behaviors, risk population, potential implementing partners, health and social welfare systems/structures and assess the political environment for programming. It was carried out by Olufemi Oke, Ekon Emah and four other FHI staff.²¹ The exercise revealed that:

- i. The state presented a massive risk setting for HIV/AIDS/STI programming. Onitsha due to high trade activities, resulted in a boom of both trucking and sex activities.*
- ii. HIV testing was available but with limited counselling services.*
- iii. The state government had made no funds available for HIV/AIDS/STI programming in the last five years.*
- iv. There was a dire need for a comprehensive prevention and care program in the state.²²*

The results of this assessment facilitated better intervention project by USAID, FHI and the state government in preceding years. Sadly, it was observed that no Anambra indigene was involved with the assessment team during the course of this assignment. Therefore, the insight and knowledge that would have been provided by such an indigene was not reflected in the report especially as regarding the core needs of the people.

FHI/ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2001-2004

As part of IMPACT project for which an assessment was made in the previous year 2000 by the FHI, the HIV/AIDS/STI Intervention Project was launched for youths in tertiary institutions in Anambra State between June 2001 to June 2004 and was implemented by CoHEDA. The focus institutions were Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Federal Polytechnic Oko, Nwafor Orizu College of Education Nsugbe and Federal College of Education (Technical) Umuze.

Throughout the life of the project the following was achieved amongst others:

- i. *Set up of an 8-man project management team responsible for the day to day running of the project and a 10-man project advisory committee*
- ii. *Conducted thirty-five (35) advocacy/sensitization visits to stakeholders*
- iii. *Collaborated and formed linkages with various NGOs for program implementation*
- iv. *Procured office equipment including computer, printer metal cabinet, fans, television amongst others*
- v. *Conducted training workshops for trainers and training for peer educators. These peer educators were recorded to have over 94,500 cumulative reach by 2004.*
- vi. *Established health clubs in institutions*
- vii. *Procured and distributed behavior change communication materials*
- viii. *Held symposia on HIV/AIDS/STI with over four thousand nine hundred and one (4,901) students reach*
- ix. *Established recreational Centers in 3 resource Centers: Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka, Federal Polytechnic Oko and College of Education, Nsugbe.²³*

In an interview with Mary Nkechi Okadigwe, a theatre Arts students trained on September 26-30, 2002 as a peer educator during this project, she recalled that the training was quite impactful and inculcated her with the knowledge to become a HIV/AIDS facilitator.²⁴ It also made her feel useful and impactful to the society even then as an inexperienced student.

Overall, the project objective seemed impactful and contributed to the awareness among students who were part of the high risk group to practice safe sex, healthy and wholesome living.

Figure 4.1 Peer Educators trained in Nnamdi Azikiwe University in 2002.



Trained Peer Educators in their uniforms with their Certificates

Source: Adapted from the Final Report for 2001-2004, HIV.AIDS/STI Intervention Among Youths in Tertiary Institutions in Anambra State²⁵

Figure 4.2 Commissioning of UNIZIK resource Center by Prof. Ilochi Okafor in 2004



Club members conducting a public awareness program in Fed. Poly. Oko

Source: Adapted from the Final Report for 2001-2004, HIV.AIDS/STI Intervention Among Youths in Tertiary Institutions in Anambra State²⁶

Figure 4.3 Health club members on a public awareness program in Fed, Poly. Oko 2003



Commissioning of the recreational center in Awka (V.C. NAU Prof. Ilochi Okafor (SAN) about to cut the tape)

Source: Adapted from the Report Final Report for 2001-2004, HIV/AIDS/STI Intervention Among Youths in Tertiary Institutions in Anambra State²⁷

FHI/ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2005-2006

Following the success of the HIV/AIDS/STI Intervention project launched for youths in tertiary institutions in Anambra State between June 2001 to June 2004 and the need to sustain the momentum of the project, a similar project was sponsored by FHI/USAID from 2005-2006 and was implemented by CoHEDA. The benefiting institutions however shifted to Anambra state University of Science and Technology (ASUTECH), Uli, College of Health Technology, Obosi and College of Agriculture, Igbariam.

Some of their laudable achievement included:

- i. Selection and interview of students in the three institutions*
- ii. Training of fifteen (15) Train the Trainer peer educators*

- iii. *World AIDS Day Campaign activities in two institutions-ASUTECH Uli and College of Health Obosi and establishment of health clubs.*
- iv. *Peer education activities in progress in all three institutions.*
- v. *Production and distribution of advocacy materials*²⁸

As at March 2006, the total project sum of three million, nine hundred and sixty-four thousand, seven hundred naira (N3,964,700.00) was duly received and expended for the project.²⁹

The project appeared to be successful as more youths in the state gained knowledge on the prevention and management of HIV/AIDS/STIs. A detailed assessment of the project report which also showed pictures of procured materials, training sessions and signed documents revealed that the project was carried out effectively in these institutions.

Society for Family Health (SFH), 2011

Between February 10-26, 2011, the Society for Family Health (SFH) with its implementing partners, Center for Sustained Coordination Against AIDS/STDS (CSCAASTD), CoHEDA and Mother Esther Educational Foundation (MEEF) International launched a simultaneous program on Roll Back Malaria in the state.³⁰ The three benefiting local governments were Orumba South, Dunukofia, Awka North/Ekwusigo. The program sought to educate citizens of the state on causes of malaria, preventive and treatment measures, symptoms and myths about malaria.

Some activities carried out included:

- i. *Production and distribution of over two thousand (6000) copies of behavior change leaflets to educate the masses.*
- ii. *Motorized caravan talk show to public places such as Ukpo town, Umunze market, Nawfija town, Mgbakwu market, Amunuke and Eke market Ozubulu among others to disseminate malaria prevention messages*
- iii. *Interpersonal communication and shop to shop visit to have one on one talk*
- iv. *Sensitization visits to schools such as Community Primary School and Ifitedunu Primary School Isulo.*³¹

The visitations to these public places was indeed an effective means adopted to disseminate such information. As the audience especially mothers would be more susceptible to imbibe lessons/habits that would help keep their families healthy.

The financial contributions of donor agencies in the state presented below for the year 2014 shows the amount of donor funds that have gone in the development of the state. It also shows the level of financial commitments of the donor agencies to the general wellbeing of citizens of Anambra state. The financial estimates covered not only the health sector but other sectors. In consideration of the fact that the external donor agencies should be supportive bodies to government activities, the weight of their commitment was evident.

Table 4.1 Summary of Financial Investments by Partners (2014)

S/N	Name of Partner/Project	Monetary Contribution (N)
1	FGN/IfAD Assisted Rural Finance Institution Building Program	61,248,000
2	MDG Conditional Grants Scheme	459,495,771.20
3	NEWMAP- Erosion And Watershade Management Project	63,957,177
4	USAID -Family Health International 360 (Fhi 360)	104,610,921
5	The Cater Center	1,932,738,894
6	UNICEF : The United Nations Children's Fund	290,609,773
7	SPARC: State Partnership For Accountability Responsiveness And Capability	13,108,283,232
8	EU: European Union	10,021,725
9	SEPIP: State Education Program Investment Project	2,034,000,000
10	UNDP: United Nations Development Program	192,650,000
11	PPFN: Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria <i>(this does not include cost of anti-retroviral drugs, equipment and other non-monetary services)</i>	2,760,000
12	State and Local Government Reform Project (SLOGOR)	Not yet credit effective
13	ADP: Agricultural Development Project	No funding
14	SEMA: The State Emergency Management Agency	No funding
15	FADAMA III PLUS	Not yet credit effective
16	German leprosy & tb relief association	25,687,113
17	ANSACA: Anambra State Action Committee On Aids	No funding
18	SAVI: State Accountability & Voice Initiative	Not available
19	Christian Aid	Absent and no report
	Total	18,286,062,606

Source: Anambra state government. *Summary of the Financial Investments by Partners, 2014*³²

As a result of these financial commitments the following achievements was recorded in the year 2014:

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 2014

- i. *Purchase and supply of all vaccines for the prevention of the childhood killer diseases.*
- ii. *Data for assessing the status of the human development at the national and sub national levels are available in the following reports: Multi Indicator Cluster Survey 2011, Selected Indicators for Monitoring Millennium development Goals In the 21 LGAs of Anambra State, Survey of Poverty Distribution and Access to Social Services in the 21 LGAs of the state.*
- iii. *Development and customization of the Anambra State DevInfo database.*
- iv. *Funding of immunization services, child health weeks/measles campaign in the State facilitated high immunization coverage and Anambra State has consequently remained polio free.*
- v. *High Immunization coverage ,Promotion of exclusive breastfeeding, promotion of the use of insecticide treated mosquito nets, Promotion of antenatal attendance, Promotion of delivery by trained personnel ,Vitamin A and iron supplementation, Control of Iodine deficiency disorder related illness , Training of care givers on dietary diversification and, Training of mothers/ care givers on complementary feeding options all combined to significantly increase child survival so much so that the issue of Ogbanje in Igbo land has reduced.*
- vi. *High reduction of measles cases.*

Other interventions that tended to prevent, discourage and reduce pregnancy related deaths were employed and promoted. Some of these interventions include but were not limited to:

- vii. *Supply and use of anti-shock garments.*
- viii. *Preventive treatment of malaria in pregnancy.*
- ix. *Administration of tetanus toxoid for pregnant women.*

- x. *Due to prudent management of GCCC, more than 226 persons made up of women groups, unemployed youths and Orphan and Vulnerable Children (OVC) care givers were empowered with various income generating activities including bead making, soap production, fish farming, snail rearing, tailoring, weaving, food processing/preservation and vulcanizing.*³³

The above showed the active and effective presence of donor agencies in the state. However, better results would have been achieved if all stakeholders committed fully to the process and shunned certain corrupt practices such as the diversion of these donor interventionist materials.

Family Health International (FHI) 360, 2014

In 2014, it was determined that the FHI intervention activities recorded the following successes in the overall state's health sector:

- i. *By the end of the first quarter of 2014, four hundred and forty-three (443) health workers were trained*
- ii. *One hundred and ninety-five thousand, six hundred and ninety-five (195,695) persons were tested for HIV/AIDS and counseled*
- iii. *Two thousand, eight hundred and fifteen (2,815) pregnant women were placed on prophylaxes*
- iv. *One hundred and fifty-four (154) Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission sites were activated*
- v. *In the second quarter, a total of two hundred and sixty-one thousand, eight hundred and three and five (261,835) persons were tested and counseled*
- vi. *Two thousand, eight hundred and fifty-four (2,854) pregnant women were placed on prophylaxes.*
- vii. *In the third quarter, seventy-six (76) health care workers were trained and eighteen thousand, two hundred and eighty patients (18,280) were already on prophylaxes treatment. During this quarter, nine (9) Anti-Retroviral Therapy sites were activated*
- viii. *In the fourth quarter a total of fifty thousand, five hundred and sixty-three (50,563) clients were enrolled into FHI's care.*³⁴

Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria (PPFN), 2014

- i. *A total of twenty thousand, four hundred and sixty-three (20, 463) persons aged fifteen (15) years and above were tested and counseled for HIV and AIDS and out of this number, (nine hundred and sixty (960) tested positive.*
- ii. *Ten thousand and two (10,002) pregnant women were tested for HIV and one hundred and twenty-one (121) of them tested positive. However, two hundred and fifty-eight (258) of them received antiretroviral drugs to reduce the risk of mother to child transmission.*
- iii. *Eighty-one (81) HIV positive mothers gave birth during the period and fifty-two (52) of their new born babies who received HIV test/Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test within two (2) months of birth were not infected.*
- iv. *Two thousand, nine hundred and three (2,903) persons received antiretroviral therapy during the period January to October, 2014. Of this number, three hundred and eighty-two (382) were newly initiated cases. However, fifty-two (52) of the two thousand, nine hundred and three patients (2,903) died during the period of report.*
- v. *It was earlier proved that HIV/AIDS patients are susceptible to tuberculosis (TB) infections. It has therefore become imperative to test HIV/AIDS patients for tuberculosis. To this effect two thousand, one hundred and sixty-three (2,163) antiretroviral clients were screened for TB and 17 of this number were suspected to have TB.*
- vi. *Twelve (12) out of the seventeen (17) suspected TB cases tested positive for TB and consequently are receiving treatment for both TB and HIV/AIDS. ³⁵*

TB and HIV/AIDS interventions helped to reduce the number of children that could have died from HIV infection and TB illnesses which were originally considered by some people as punishment from God or the gods, has since been seen as mere human disease that is treatable. What this implied was that the donor interventions in these areas demystified the existing wrong perceptions that the diseases were judgmental based on the sins of one man or entire family, or even the entire community. Thereby engendering mindset change amongst the citizens of the state especially rural dwellers.

Table 4.2 Summary of Financial Investments by Partners (2015)

S/N	Name of Partner/Project	Financial commitment
1	EU: European Union WSSSRP II (urban and Small Towns)	N7,924,000
2	SEPIP: State Education Project Investment Program	USD 9.338
3	UNDP: United Nations Development Program	USD 605,000
4	PPFN: Planned Parenthood Federation Of Nigeria	N 13,271,000
5	SLOGOR	NO Financial report
6	Islamic Development Bank	N134,207,000
7	FADAMA iii Plus	No Report
8	FGN IFAD-Assisted Rural Finance Institution Building Program	N64,900,000
9	EU-UNICEF (WSSSRP II Rural Component)	252,705,954
10	Newmap Erosion And Watershhade Management Project	No financial report
11	FHI 360	N 76,891.783.29
12	The Cater Center (neglected tropical diseases)	No report
13	UNICEF, The United Nations Children's Fund	N108,891,570
14	SPARC	£157,790
15	German Leprosy & Tb Relief Association	No report
16	ANSACA: Anambra State Aids Control Agency	No report
17	SAVI	No report
18	Christian Aid	No report

Source: *Anambra state government. Summary of the Financial Investments by Partners, 2015*³⁶

Total Financial contribution

NGN 658, 781, 000

Pound 157,790

USD 9,943,000

Total NGN 2,686,828,500

Conversion: 1USD= N200; £1=N250

World Health Organization, (WHO), 2015

Major Areas of Intervention by WHO included:

- Advocacy and social mobilization
- Polio Eradication Initiative
- Non-Polio SIAs
- Disease Surveillance and Disease Control and Outbreak of diseases responses
- Routine Immunization.
- Capacity building on Ri and Diseases Surveillance and Disease Control
- Malaria, Tuberculosis and Leprosy Control

Part of the activities and achievements of WHO in 2015 included:

- i. 8 private Health Facilities signed MOU with State Ministry of Health for collaboration in immunization services*
- ii. 134% and 137% coverage achieved for the first and second rounds of the National Immunizations Plus Days*
- iii. 120 AFP cases identified, verified and all classified as inadequate*
- iv. 116 disease surveillance focal sites maintained and submit weekly reports and 420 others reporting monthly on disease data*
- v. 324 Measles cases detected and investigated*
- vi. Capacity of 306 health facility officers enhance and 1,324 community informants oriented.³⁷*

UNICEF, 2015

Immunization was one of the components of primary health care. The main objective was to protect the vulnerable groups [children and pregnant women] against vaccine preventable diseases by administration of Antigens to boost their immunities. This was done routinely and during campaigns.

Their achievements included:

- i. The wild polio virus was interrupted*
- ii. The coverage for the March and April National Immunization Plus days were 134% and 137% respectively*
- iii. New polio vaccine was introduced and 1,470 Health Workers trained*

- iv. *June-July Maternal Newborn Child Health Week achieved 97% [Vit.A] 66% [Deworming] and 88% [Iron folate]*
- v. *Vit A=115.9% Deworming= 25% Iron folate=6.5% for the Nov and Dec., 2015³⁸*

HIV and AIDS: Four agencies, namely Anambra State AIDS Control Agency (ANSACA), Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria (PPFN) and Family Health International 360 (FHI 360) and the Ministry of Health worked in this sector. Whereas ANSACA played the role of a coordinator, FHI 360 and PPFN and the Ministry of Health delivered services to the populace which covered:

- i. HIV Counseling and Testing (HCT)
- ii. Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT)
- iii. Anti-retroviral Therapy (ART)
- iv. SRH/HIV
- v. TB/HIV

As at 15th Dec 2015, 22,555 patients received Anti-Retroviral Treatment, (ART), 18,916 from FHI 360 and 3,639 from PPFN; 69 were on TB treatment and new infections among new-born were prevented through PMTCT services.³⁹

Table 4.3 Summary of Financial Investments by Partners (2016)

S/n	Name of partner/project	Financial commitment
1	EU/UNICEF: Water Supply Sanitation Sector Reform (WSSSRP II)	N178,634,929.00
2	Canadian Government: Water Supply Sanitation Sector Reform (WSSSRP II)	N8,076,145.00
3	SEPIP: State Education Project Investment Program	USD 216,678.96
4	UNDP: United Nations Development Program	USD 500,000.00
5	PPFN: Planned Parenthood Federation Of Nigeria	N 12,364,000.00
6	SLOGOR	£2,092,609.83
7	World Health Organization (WHO)	No financial report
8	FADAMA III Plus	N406,943,987.81
9	Anambra State Value Chain Development Program (ANSVCDP)	N269,388,579.30

10	FGN IFAD-Assisted Rural Finance Institution Building Program	N53,000,000.00
11	NEWMAP Erosion And Water Shade Management Project	N92,088,867.50
12	FHI 360	N 82,000,000.00
13	EU-SIGN	N2,060,000.00
14	The Cater Center (Neglected Tropical Diseases)	No Financial report
15	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	27,671,000
16	German Leprosy & Tb Relief Association (GLRA): State Tuberculosis, Buruli Ulcer And Leprosy Control Program	N4,867,000.00
17	Global Fund (GF): State Tuberculosis, Buruli Ulcer And Leprosy Control Program:	N38,544,982.00
18	ANSACA: Anambra State Aids Control Agency	No Financial report
19	WEWE	N64,000,000.00
20	Christian Aid	No report
21	SAVI	No report

Source: Anambra state government. *Summary of the Financial Investments by Partners, 2016*⁴⁰

Total Financial contribution

NGN 1,239,639,491.00

Euro 2,092,609.83

USD 716,678.96

In 2016, two donor agencies intervened in HIV/AIDS and they were Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria (PPFN), Family Health International 360 (FHI 360) and the Ministry of Health. ANSACA played the role of a coordinator while FHI 360, PPFN and the Ministry of Health delivered services to the populace which covered:

HIV Counseling and Testing (HCT)

Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT)

Anti-Retroviral Therapy (ART)

SRH/HIV

TB/HIV

Early Infant Diagnosis (EID)

As at 30th Nov. 2016, 31,121 patients received anti-retroviral Treatment, (ART) in the State; 26,824 from FHI 360 and 4,297 from PPFN; 230 were on TB treatment and 776 number of clinically undernourished PLHIV received therapeutic or supplementary food. FHI 360 supported 78 Health Facilities in the State, 50 out of the 78 are provide Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTCT) services.⁴¹

WHO, 2016

Major Areas of Intervention

- i. Advocacy and social mobilization
- ii. Polio Eradication Initiative
- iii. Non-Polio SIAs
- iv. Disease Surveillance and Disease Control and Outbreak of diseases responses
- v. Routine Immunization.
- vi. Capacity building on Ri and Diseases Surveillance and Disease Control
- vii. Malaria, Tuberculosis and Leprosy Control

Outcomes

- i. *Supported successful switch from tOPV to bOPV*
- ii. *Supportive supervision of DSNOs and environmental surveillance officers, using MDD_ ISS at LGA and HFs levels.*
- iii. *Conducted Timely AFP case verification and 60 days follow ups.*
- iv. *Supported RSA conducted in 5 priority HFs in 3 LGAs of Awka South, Ogbaru and Nnewi North LGAs (Initiated by zone).*
- v. *Support IDSR for accelerated diseases control.*
- vi. *Donated a complete set for 1 year data capture for AFP surveillance, training guidelines to State LG A and HFS levels.*
- vii. *Donated IEC posters on Diseases Case Definition to cover all LGAs, HFs and Communities for ease of reporting.*
- viii. *Donated 2340 arch files to State LGAs and HFs for data archiving and retrieval.*
- ix. *Implemented Measles vaccine campaign in the State_ January 2016.*
- x. *Implemented Two rounds of NIPDs conducted in 21 LGAs.*
- xi. *IBR conducted in 8 selected LGAs to close polio vulnerability gaps.⁴²*

UNICEF, 2016

The immunization intervention of UNICEF recorded some of the following successes:

- i. 1,345,503 children (147%) were immunized during the measles vaccine campaign done from 28th Jan-1st Feb. 2016.
- ii. During MNCHW done from 8th -12th Aug. 2016, 1,152,299 children (116%) got Vitamin A; 142,034 children (17%) were de-wormed and 6,804 pregnant women (3%) got Iron folate.
- iii. 477, 476 children (112%) were immunized during Local Immunization days from 9th -12th April, 2016 in 7 high risk LGAs and
- iv. 3297 children (82%) were immunized during the outreach immunization in 11 hard-to-reach areas/poorly performing LGAs in July 2016.
- v. Training of 338 officers' in-charge (health workers) on production of complementary foods from locally available food.
- vi. Periodic salt testing with iodine test kit supplied by UNICEF especially during MNCHW.⁴³

European Union (EU-SIGN), 2016

European Union-Support for Immunization Governance in Nigeria (EU-SIGN) Project was a continuation of EU support to the health sector in Nigeria - EU-PRIME, SRIK etc. Anambra State was among the 23 states plus Abuja which benefitted from the EU-SIGN Project. The total package of the support (grant) which lasted from 2011 to 2018 was 55 million Euros. 20 million Euros was channelled through the WHO for polio eradication while 35 million Euros was for routine immunization.⁴⁴ The global objective of the EU-SIGN project was "to contribute to the reduction of childhood morbidity and mortality in Nigeria due to vaccine preventable diseases."

Program/Project Outcomes

- i. Distributed and installed 78 Direct Drive Solar Refrigerators (DDSRs) at the 21 LGA cold stores and 57 Health Facilities.
- ii. Conducted Needs Assessment in 10 LGAs to ascertain broken down solar refrigerators and cost of their repairs.
- iii. Trained 50 State and LGA Immunization and M&E Officers on DQUSS (Data Quality Use Supportive Supervision).
- iv. Constructed New NPI Cold store at Ayamelum LGA.
- v. Renovated Nkpologwu PHC and handed over to Aguata LGA/Community.
- vi. Built data base of NGOs and CSOs working in health-related field and 5 registered/reputable CSOs engaged for the purpose of partnering with the Project.⁴⁵

In assessing the 2016 donor intervention in the health sector, findings revealed that most of the activities in the work plan were not carried out due to lack of funding. Most of the UNICEF supported activities did not receive any funding from UNICEF. While some of the reported achievements could

not be evidenced. And sadly, UNICEF intervention in the State dwindled to just Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Health sectors.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) /World Health Organization (WHO), 2017

The activities of the United Nations through UNICEF and the WHO for 2017 resulted in:

- i. *Two rounds of Immunization Plus Days (IPDs) conducted during which a total of one million, three hundred and twenty-seven thousand, five hundred and twenty-nine (1,327,529) children aged zero to fifty nine (0-59) months were immunized and protected against polio disease in the first round in March with one hundred and seventeen percent (117%) coverage and one million, six hundred and thirty thousand, six hundred and seven (1,630,607) children also immunized in May 2017 with a coverage of one hundred and twenty-three percent (123%) against a target population of one million, three hundred and twenty one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-one (1,321,791). The good news was that the various local government area survey showed that quality of supplemented Immunization activity remained high.*
- ii. *State and LGA teams were trained on DHIS2 data tool on February 2017 by CDC-NSTOP after which twenty-one (21) LGA LIOs were supplied with laptop computers for data management.*
- iii. *Household enumeration for target population zero to five (0-5years) was done on April 2017. Results yielded one million, three hundred and twenty-one thousand, seven hundred and ninety-one (1,321,791) but year 2017 projected target from year 2006 census is one million, one hundred and thirty-three thousand, two hundred and ninety-one (1,133,291).*
- iv. *AFP surveillance for polio eradication remained on course with no wild polio virus recorded. Non-polio AFP rate moved from 8.3% in 2015 to 9.7% in 2016. Stool adequacy is ninety-eight percent (98%) as against eighty percent (80%) which is national average.*
- v. *Twenty-one (21) LGAs achieved the two (2) core AFP surveillance indicators in 2015 till 2017.*

- vi. *Immunization management standards was strengthened through the instituted monthly routine Immunization review meetings with peer review of LGA Immunization officers and this helped facilitate the review in progress of implementation of immunization activities.*
- vii. *Data Quality Survey for rural immunization was conducted in three (3) LGAs which showed an improvement in data quality as evidenced in decreased number of unimmunized children.*
- viii. *Tracking quality and assurance through surveillance a total of 21 LGA DSNOs and their Assistants have been trained on surveillance with evidence of improved data management on data returns. This is in addition to the capacity upgrade of one hundred and twenty (120) focal points that has also improved the quality of weekly reporting of DS data, and two thousand, one hundred and twenty-three (2,123) community informants for expansion of disease surveillance activities. Again a total of eighty-four (84) clinicians have been sensitized on active surveillance to increase the surveillance network.*
- ix. *For the period under review, joint integrated supportive supervision was conducted in the 21 LGAs and this helped facilitate resolution of bottlenecks in implementation of RI services in the state. There is no polio case seen in Anambra state since 2009 to date.⁴⁶*

Indeed, the state benefited from the intervention of UNICEF in immunization. The state performed so well that it ranked highly nationally in regards to immunization response in the nations. This position was lauded by Gabriel Okeke, a desk officer in the state Ministry of Health. He proudly posited that Anambra was envied by other states nationally, the people participate willingly and donors were willing to continue to work with the state following sustained good performance during immunization exercises.⁴⁷

FHI, 2017

On its part, some of the major achievements of the FHI as at October 2017, include the following:

- i. *One hundred and thirty-one thousand, seven hundred and seventy (131,770) individuals received testing, counselling and test result as against one hundred and thirty-two thousand, four hundred and four (132,404) number targeted;*

- ii. *Twenty-five thousand, six hundred and fifty-seven (25,657) Pregnant women were tested for HIV and received result as against the targeted number of fifty- one thousand, five hundred and eighty-eight (51,588);*
- iii. *One thousand, two hundred and eight-five (1,285) HIV Positive pregnant women received antiretroviral to reduce the risk of mother to child transmission as against two thousand, three hundred and seventy-nine (2,379) targeted number;*
- iv. *One thousand, one hundred and thirty-five (1,135) Infants were tested for early infant diagnosis (EID) as against two thousand and fifty-two (2,052) targeted;*
- v. *Three thousand, eight hundred and seven (3807) Adults and children enrolled on Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) as against three thousand, one hundred and eighty-eight (3188);*
- vi. *Twenty-three thousand, four hundred and forty (23,440) Adults and children received antiretroviral therapy (ART) as against twenty-two thousand, one hundred and ten (22,110) targeted number;*
- vii. *Eight hundred and seventy-five (875) registered TB cases with documented HIV Positive status who were on ART during the reporting period as targeted one thousand and forty (1,040);*
- viii. *Nine thousand and forty (9,040) individuals targeted for OVC_SERV (N,DSD) while seven thousand nine hundred and thirty nine (7,939) individual were served; and*
- ix. *Nineteen thousand, eight hundred and ninety-nine (19,899) TX_PVLS (N,DSD) TARGET: twelve (12) Months viral load and six thousand, five hundred and eleven (6,511) number was achieved.⁴⁸*

As a result of the efforts of these donor agencies, by the end of 2017, HIV transmission reduced in all key populations (particularly women, children and young people), MTCT was eliminated, condition of people living with HIV improved through the implementation of effective innovative HIV prevention and mitigation policies, strategies, strong multi-sectoral partnerships and coordination; and active involvement of stakeholders at all levels.⁴⁹

It is noteworthy to point out that for agencies whose role was essentially interventionist and humanitarian, to say the least, to have done this much in the health sector, perhaps such effort has contributed to why Anambra state did not, during the period under review, declare an emergency in the health sector.

Figure 4.4: His Excellency, Chief Willie Obiano Administering Vit A To Children At 2017 July Immunization Flag-Off



Source: Adapted from the 2017 Interagency Report⁵⁰

Education Sector

Following the Nigerian Civil War years, Anambra State educational system was in dire crisis. The inherent challenges included underfunding, insufficient number of teachers, schools and poor curriculum definition. This situation was further worsened with the introduction in 1970 of the East Central State Public Education Edict No 4 of 1970.⁵¹ By this edict, the state forcefully took over the ownership, management and control of all schools which hitherto was managed by voluntary agencies, private individuals (voluntary agencies and private individual received grants-in-aid from the government and charged fees to supplement) communities, local governments and other government bodies. Under military rule in Nigeria, the educational system suffered a severe reverse. Inevitably, Anambra State inherited the educational deficits prevalent in Nigeria. The educational system was in dire straits and rudderless. Even, since Nigeria's return to democratic governance in 1999, its developmental progress was halted at all governance levels; perhaps, most keenly felt in falling standards of education.

Between 1991-1999, the education sector of the state experienced severe neglect, characterized by dilapidation and devastation. The standard of education further declined under the administration of Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju (1999-2003) when the already insufficient primary and secondary schools were closed for one calendar year due to non-payment of basic salaries to teachers. The table below shows the number of primary and secondary schools in the state from 1999-2005.

Table 4.4 - No of Public Primary and Secondary schools in Anambra State, 1999-2005

Statistics	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
No of Primary Schools in Anambra	1,039	1,039	1,039	924	1,501	1,260	1,260
No of secondary Schools in Anambra	227	227	227	250	476	333	333
Number of Classrooms in Secondary Schools	3,631	7,308	3,864	4,644	5,203	3,622	3,622

Source: Adapted from Federal Ministry of Education, *Statistics of Education in Nigeria, 1991-2005*⁵²

Below are the intervention activities in government owned primary and secondary schools in the state from 1999-2017.

Africare/UNICEF, 1995-1998

From 1995, UNICEF and Africare were some of the donors active in the education sector of the state. Their intervention activities included capacity building of teachers through workshops and trainings. Dr Laz Okafor, a staff in the state Ministry of Education in an interview disclosed that donors were visible in the state even in the military era as he participated both as a resource person and a participant

in some of the workshops and surveys sponsored by the donors.⁵³ He further stated that those workshops were very impactful as it helped to boost work productivity of teachers and staff of the state ministry of education especially at that time in the state when the education sector was neglected by the government.⁵⁴ Some of such trainings supported by Africare and UNICEF included:

- i. *Africare: Literacy for Health Curriculum Development Workshop by Africare/ Nigeria, Anambra state held at Tracy Hotel, Awka, September 10-15, 1995*
- ii. *Africare: One Day Training Workshop for Adult Literacy Instructors on the use of Africare/ Nigeria Anambra State Literacy for Health and Income Generating Activities Curriculum at Orumba North Headquarters, Ajalli on March 5, 1996.*
- iii. *NTI/UNICEF: Nigeria Training Institute/UNICEF Lead Trainers Workshop on Better School Management, July 15-17, 1997 at Dannic Hotels Ltd Enugu*
- iv. *UNICEF: Five Day Training Workshop for Head Teachers on Better School Management in Anambra State organized by State Primary School Education Board (SPEB) and UNICEF on March 30-April 3, 1998 at St. Faith Pro-Cathedral Hall, Awka*
- v. *UNICEF: One Day Evaluation Workshop for Education Officers on Effective Supervision of Schools in Anambra State by SPEB and UNICEF on August 7, 1998 at St. Pro Cathedral Awka.*⁵⁵

UNICEF, 2000-2005

UNICEF sponsored the Early Child Care, Survival, Growth and Development (ECC/SGD) project implemented by the Ministry of Education from 2000-2005. ECC was a low cost, community based and non-formal child care arrangement that emphasized the holistic development of the child between birth and up to six years old. ECC provided the link between pre-primary and primary school thus enriching the two sub-sectors. The project emphasized learning through play using the mother tongue. Within the state, ECC project focused on the establishment of viable childcare facilities that were home and community based with women groups and churches as the primary target. Other areas of intervention of UNICEF in the state were in: basic education, out-of-school children and out-of-school Youths.

In 2001 (when project activities fully kicked off), some of the actions under the ECC include:

- a. Statewide advocacy meeting held on July 16, 2001 and the attendees were town union leaders, religious leaders, education secretaries, education officers, traditional rulers and inspectors of education.⁵⁶ The meeting succeeded in stressing community initiative, organization and participation towards ECC project. A resolution was made on the need for all communities to embrace the project. The UNICEF released the sum of seventy-two thousand, three hundred naira (N72,300) while the state contributed one hundred and eighty-five thousand naira (185,000) to facilitate the meeting.⁵⁷ Outcome from the advocacy meeting included that three communities established ECC facilities vis: Emmanuel ECC Center Nkpologwu, Aguata local government area (LGA), Standard ECC Center Eziowelle, Idemili North LGA and Ideal ECC Center, Umunnachi, Dunukofia LGA.
- b. Community mobilization exercises held in three communities: Nkpologwu, Umunnachi and Eziowelle and over 1,500 community members mainly women, union leaders and traditional leaders was reached.⁵⁸ The exercises yielded a greater number of the awareness of community members on the importance of ECC. Parents and other community members accepted their responsibility in establishing and maintaining ECC facilities. UNICEF released the sum of one hundred and fifty-four thousand, five hundred naira (N154,500) and the state contributed ninety-one thousand, five hundred naira for the exercise.⁵⁹
- c. Needs assessments were carried out in Nkpologwu, Eziowelle and Umunnachi. About 900 children and women were sampled, facilitated by the sum of one hundred thousand, seven hundred naira (N100,700) from UNICEF and eighty-two thousand, five hundred naira (N82,500) by the state government.⁶⁰ Outcome of the exercise was the collection of data on nutritional status and care practices of children and mothers while children in ECC facilities received de-worming tablets, Vitamin A and folic acid supplements.
- d. Supply, allocation and distribution of materials for ECC Centers to three ECC facilities at Nkpologwu, Eziowelle and Umunnachi. Distributed items included: six spring mattress, eighteen different flipcharts, forty-four assorted fold outs, twelve teaching freezes and three first aid kits...to be used for the over 243 pupils in the Centers.⁶¹ The benefitting communities were very appreciative of the support, encouragement and assistance being offered to them and the ECC facilities management renewed their commitment.
- e. Training of over 900 caregivers and parents were also carried out in the three communities.⁶² The trainees acquired knowledge and skills on the concepts and philosophy of the ECC, management of the Centers and construction of toys and other instructional materials. UNICEF contributed four hundred and eleven thousand, eight hundred naira (N411,800), state government contributed one hundred and twenty-nine thousand naira (N129,000) while the

benefitting communities contributed forty-four thousand, eight hundred and fifty naira (N44,850) to the actualization of the training.⁶³

- f. Training on sara communication was carried out for students/pupils on child rights, teachers, LGA focal persons, coordinators and desk officers with over 45 participants pupils and their teachers from Ogidiani (Idemili North and Isingwu primary school Oraifite on October 23-25, 2001.⁶⁴ The lessons inherent in the sara storylines were crucial for the promotion of the child's rights in school and community as they were targeted at adolescent boys and girls as well as parents and other community members. UNICEF released the sum of five hundred and forty-four thousand, four hundred and eighty naira (N544,480) while the state contributed thirty-three thousand, seven hundred and fifty naira (N33,750).⁶⁵ Subsequently, educational materials such as sony tv sets, video players and video books on sara communication was distributed to two pilot schools at Ogidi and Oraifite.
- g. Several workshops and meetings were sponsored by UNICEF and attended by the desk officer and assistant desk officer. Knowledge, skills and experiences were acquired on project implementation, managements, proposal writing and appraisals.

In 2002, UNICEF sponsored some projects including:

- a. Supply and distribution of ECC materials including three child friendly chalkboards, instructional accessories and three giant abacuses at the Nkpologwu, Eziowelle and Umannachi Centers. These helped to boost the morale and effort of the caregiver/parents.
- b. Needs assessment were carried out at Oraifite for children and women of child bearing age. Over 300 households were visited during the survey which eventually held on January 13-18, 2003 and the assessment facilitated the opening of three ECC facilities at Unodu quarters, Ibolo Oraifite owned by the women group of St Luke's Anglican Church, Oraifite.⁶⁶ Data on nutritional status and key household practices of mothers were also collected in the community.
- c. Workshops and meetings on project proposal writing, implementation and management.

In 2003, the zonal workshop on community based ECC was held. UNICEF desk officers in 10 states, 50 parents/caregivers from Oraifite Nursery/Primary school and three Centers in Ibollo, Oraifite were in attendance from August 5th -9th, 2003.⁶⁷ Participants were trained in ECC concepts, philosophy, management of daily schedules in ECC Centers, soft toys and outdoor play materials produced/constructed for ECC Centers in Oraifite. UNICEF approved the sum of one

million, three hundred and ninety-eight thousand, four hundred and eighty naira only while the state the sum of fifty-two thousand, three hundred naira only.⁶⁸

In 2004, a new UNICEF project cycle (2002-2007) merged the community based Early Child Care with Nutrition under Survival and Early Childcare (SECC). This new project shifted ECC from ministry of Education to Health. Consequently, all ECC activities began to be coordinated by the Desk Officer (nutrition) in the Ministry of Health.

World Bank, 2002-2005

The Universal Basic Education Program (UBE) launched in September, 1999, by the Federal Government of Nigeria was majorly triggered by the World Conference on Education for All held in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990⁶⁹ The Universal Basic Education Act provided for compulsory universal basic education for all children in Nigeria and stipulated penalties for parents who failed to comply with the provision. The World Bank through the UBE commenced the UBE Self-Help projects (community school initiatives) in 2002 in the state supported by World Bank. Each community could choose projects to be implemented for them according to their basic need but was expected to provide 20% of support fund as proof of commitment.

The project was executed in three phases and eventually covered up to 30 schools in 21 LGAs. Phase I was in 2002, Phase II in 2003 and Phase III, 2004/2005. The phase II was the continuation of the Community/School Project Initiative which eventually contributed to the development of not just schools but to the socio-economic development of the state. Over all, World Bank support fund for the 228 projects implemented was sixty-two million naira (N62M), counterpart fund from communities was twenty -five million, seven hundred and sixty-one naira, one hundred and thirty-nine kobo (N25,761,139); totaling eighty-seven million, seven hundred and sixty-one thousand, one hundred and thirty-nine kobo (N87,761,139).⁷⁰

All UBE projects in the state were awarded at the federal level and over 903-UBE Classroom Blocks with Headmasters' offices, stores and toilets was recoded to be executed across the state.⁷¹ Projects implemented under the UBE self-help included renovation/rehabilitation of school buildings, completion of abandoned Parent-Teachers Associations projects, construction of toilet facilities, science and home economics laboratories, provision of furniture for pupils and teachers, HIV/AIDs awareness campaign and library projects. Among the many beneficiaries, Premier Primary School Otuocha received furniture, Model Primary School Isuofia had a school block completed, Nwannebo Primary School Ekwulobia gained the renovation of its school,

Primary School Oko was fenced and Development Primary School Awkuzu school library was construction.⁷² During a monitoring visit by the Commissioner of Education and the World Bank team to some schools in 2005, they expressed satisfaction over the pace and effectiveness of the project.

Each of the 30 focal schools received 38 library boxes from the world bank while 20 out 30 schools received various items of furniture worth eight hundred and thirty-two thousand, five hundred naira (N832,500.00) for each school including tables, chairs, file steel cabinet.⁷³ The Project Implementation Committee was made up of a Chairman, treasurer, secretary and two members from the school community. Monitoring and evaluation of projects was placed under the world bank desk officer at the ministry who was expected to visit each project on a monthly basis.

UNESCO, 2005

United Nations Education and Scientific Organization tried to implement four major projects in the state within this period: Technical Science Education Project (TSE), National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Library, Youth Empowerment and Nomadic /Migrant Farmer/Fishermen Education (MFE). Overall, UNESCO sponsored the training of over 100 teachers across the state under the Technical Teachers Training Program in the bid to strengthen technical education in the state. Six UNESCO assisted Skill Acquisition Centers were established in three senatorial zones of the state and the UNESCO Library Project at Umunze was duly completed, commissioned and connected to the UNESCO Library worldwide to serve the needs of scholars. Under the TSE project, the Ministry of Education keyed in accordingly; trained and monitored the application of mathematics and science kits earlier distributed to teachers in both public and private schools.

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 2003-2005

Population and Family Life Education (FLHE) project was sponsored by UNFPA from 2003-2005 in the state. It was an educational process which provided for an articulated and practical study of the population situation in the family, community, nation and the world with the aim of developing in an individual a more rational attitude and behavior towards improving the quality of their life now and in the future. FLHE preached eight core messages acronymized 'POPLFLE': family size and family welfare, delayed marriages, responsible parenthood, population change and resource development, population-related beliefs and values, gender issues, sexually

transmitted infections/HIV/AIDS/Drugs and Primary health concepts.⁷⁴ POPLFLE was integrated into the school curriculum spread across both junior and senior secondary schools. The rationale for the introduction was the long-standing acceptance of education as an effective tool for positive behavioral change in a society. The project metamorphosed into the new Family Life and HIV/AIDS Education with the focus now on adolescent sexuality. Its main objectives amongst students was to develop a positive and factual view of sexuality, acquire the information and skills they need to take care of their sexual health, including prevention of HIV/AIDS, respect and value themselves and others and to acquire the skills needed to make health decisions about their sexual health and behaviors. The Ministry of Education through UNFPA assisted FLHE project carried out sexual education especially prevention of HIV/AIDS in schools. Teachers were trained for onward training of students and peer education was carried out on over one hundred and forty schools.⁷⁵

UNICEF/DFID/UNDP/UNESCO, 2007-2013

Between 2007-2013, UNICEF, DFID, UNDP AND EU all participated in executing intervention projects under Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the state. In 2000, the United Nations launched a good governance template, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with eight measurable targets. In the same 2000, the Education For All (EFA) project was launched by the federal government of Nigeria to run from 2000-2015. Both projects aligned and complemented each other for implementation in Nigeria and in all the state governments including Anambra.

To reiterate, the MDGs' goals 2, 3 and 4 have the following areas of intervention:

- *Eradication of illiteracy among adults and youths, as well as create opportunities for (access and equity) adults and those that drop out of formal education.*
- *Provide functional Literacy and continuing education for adults and youths who have never had the advantage of formal education. These include, nomads, prison-inmates, migrant families, the disabled and other groups, especially the disadvantaged gender.*
- *Provide functional and remedial education for people who did not complete secondary education.*
- *Provide education for completers of the formal education system in order to improve their basic knowledge and skills.*
- *Provide in-service, on-the-job, vocational and professional training for different categories of workers especially the Non-Formal Education facilitators to their skills.*

- *Procurement of vocational and instructional materials for the non-formal education learning Centers.*
- *Establishment of market schools/Centers especially in urban/commercial sections of the state to encourage traders, business men and women, commercial trafficking children to gain access to basic education alongside their enterprises.*
- *Empowerment of unemployed youths on various skills through skill acquisition training and empowerment.*
- *Training and empowerment of women on micro-enterprises and micro-credit facilities.*
- *Institutionalizing 'AFLATOUN' in the NFE Centers which recognizes child's rights, personal responsibility, thereby teaching them financial and social education for self-reliance, improvement on retention in learning Centers and access to continuing education.*
- *Conduct Post Literacy, Adult and Non-formal Certificate Examination (PLANCE). This Certificate is nationally recognized ⁷⁶.*

Governor Peter Obi, was sworn into office on 17 March 2006, and he made education one of the cardinal pillars of his administration. By the next year, 2007 until 2013, MDG became fully operational in the state.

Chiagozie Udeh, Izuchukwu J. Okoye and Oseloka H. Obaze, described the education sector before Peter Obi thus:

Before Governor Obi's administration, the education sector was in a terrible situation. School buildings were dilapidated and pupils studied under squalid conditions...not one single public secondary school in the State had a properly equipped functional science laboratory. In this age of information technology, computers were virtually unheard of in public schools. No single public primary school classroom block that was not leaking; none without cracked walls, so much so that many of them constituted death traps to school children and teacher alike. Believing that pursuing the MDG goals would guarantee Anambra State a basis for an encompassing development and reviving the education sector, Gov. Obi decided to domesticate the MDGs, via a homegrown mechanism. The strategy for achieving this was christened Anambra Integrated Development Strategy (ANIDS), which was a process of planning,

*budgeting, and implementation of all sectors of the Millennium Development Goals simultaneously.*⁷⁷

Part of Obi's success in reviving the education sector of the state was attributed to vibrant collaboration with donor agencies. The period from 2007 is acclaimed by many as the most impactful and best years of the education sector in the state due to the unprecedented attention and interventions in schools. The state eventually achieved high ranking in national high school examinations as the state scores in the National Examination Council (NECO) and West African Examination Council (WAEC) moved most discernibly from the 26th position nationally to 3rd and eventually, 1st in both categories by 2013.⁷⁸ Anambra alongside Ekiti and Bauchi States was picked on merit and record of accountability, as the pilot states for implementing the World Bank's State Education Program Investment Project (SEPIP), which supported need-based teacher deployment; measurement of student learning in participating States; and school level management and accountability. In tribute to such seamless collaboration between Anambra State and its development partners, Gov. Obi declared that, "no state in Nigeria can talk about international partnership better than Anambra State."⁷⁹

Based on the robust relationship and assistance of donor agencies such as UNICEF, DFID, UNDP, EU, UNICEF among others the table below depicts some achievements in six LGAs under the MDG-Conditional Grant Scheme between 2007-2013.

Table 4.5: MDG projects in education sector in some LGAs of Anambra State, in 2013

S/N	LGA	New Classroom Blocks	Renovated Classroom Blocks	Project Name			First Aid Box
				School chalk Board	Desk /Benches for Pupils	Instructional Materials	
1	Anaocha	1	4	52	-	67	-
2	Ekwusigo	-	10	144	126	74	-
3	Idemili North	2	6	83	-	57	52
4	Ihiala	-	12	126	80	1,520	-
5	Ogbaru	36	17	206	-	94	14
6	Oyi	6	29	276	-	55	56

Source: Adapted from MDG-CGS Publication of Anambra state⁸⁰

Fig.4.5 Photos of some MDG Projects in Schools



Central School, Ebenator



Central School, Ukpore



Comm Sec. Sch., Akwaihedri



CSS Azigbo



Hostel block at Com. Sec. Sch., Azigbo



Omaigwe Com. Pri. Sch., Osumenyi

Source: Adapted from MDG Conditional Grant Scheme, 2007-2013⁸¹


Fig. 4.6: Photos of some MDG Projects in Schools



Central School, Ebenator




Central School, Ukpok



Comm Sec. Sch., Akwaihedi



CSS Azigbo



Hostel block at Com. Sec. Sch., Azigbo



Omaigwe Com. Pri. Sch., Osumenyi

Source: Adapted from MDG Conditional Grant Scheme, 2007-2013⁸²

Despite all the positive developments and recorded achievements in the education sector in Anambra challenges yet abound in the education sector. The dearth of proper and adequate facilities translated into limited and in some instances, non-existent inter-collegiate sports. High enrolment rate resulted in bloated classrooms, which in turn affected the teacher-student ratio adversely. While the oversight management bodies such as Ministry of Education, PPSSC and ASUDEB, focused mainly on infrastructure, staff and academic development, they inadvertently overlooked the required stringent monitoring of private schools. Such failings gave rise to some illegal, non-registered and non-accredited schools, and created room for the proliferation of the so-called “magic Centers” that induced and influenced examination malpractices. Also overlooked, is the low enrollment and high dropout rate of boy students. In this context, Anambra still presented a paradox; the south-east zone to which Anambra State belongs which is considered to be one of the academically privileged zone, but generally records low male enrollment visa-vis female, Anambra State has the worst case scenario, as the 2003/2004 academic year records indicate.⁸³ This phenomenon, which started in the post-civil war years, has continued till date. Finally, it was observed that schools in Anambra like most schools in Nigeria were run mostly by female teachers. This reality reflected a national paradigm shift, in which teaching was no longer seen as a suitable male vocation.

UNICEF, 2013-2014

UNICEF during 2013-2014 assisted in the facilitation of three major programs: Basic Education (BE) program domiciled in Anambra State Universal Basic Education Board (ASUBEB), Early Childcare (ECC) focusing on pre-primary school and Non-Formal Education domiciled in the state Ministry of Education. Under this period, some areas of key achievement by UNICEF included:

- i. *Child friendly schooling was given a boost through the supply of TV sets, DVD players, power generating plants and pre-recorded instructions to one hundred and sixty-eight (168) Early Child Care Centers to facilitate teaching and learning;*
- ii. *Care givers were trained on Early Child Development Philosophy and Pedagogy;*
- iii. *Sustained high primary School enrolment and completion rates*
- iv. *Enrolment in the Non-Formal Education Centers increased from one thousand, four hundred and forty-six (1,446) in 2008 to eight thousand, one hundred and twenty-five (8,125) in 2009 representing 17.8 % increase. Enrolment in 2013*

rose to nine thousand, two hundred and seventy-three (9,273), disaggregated into two thousand and twenty-eight (2,028) males and seven thousand, two hundred and forty-five (7,245) female;

- v. *Non-Formal Education Centers in the State increased from thirty-two (32) in 2008 to thirty-eight (38) in 2009 and forty-six (46) in 2010. The number of Centers jumped to two hundred and eighty-five (285) in 2013.⁸⁴*

In 2013, a 2-day training was held for teachers on iodine monitoring, eye test was carried out in 3 LGA in the State,- Anambra West Awka North and Orumba South where actual testing of children in 35 primary schools was held; home economics was institutionalized in 42 Pilot Primary schools in the 21 LGA of the State with a supply of items required for domestic Science and needle work.⁸⁵

In the course of the activities, it was discovered that,

- i. *Teachers and Education managers have knowledge and skill to monitor iodine, health promotion and Eye test. Effect of lack of iodine unfold*
- ii. *Test field kit for iodine known skills and knowledge for monitoring, screening and Eye test gained/Achieved.*
- iii. *42 schools have their teacher's skill and knowledge developed.*
- iv. *42 primary schools equipped.*
- v. *Home Economics and needle work actualized in the State primary schools.⁸⁶*

Challenges discovered included, the difficulty in accessing the areas causing lateness of the participants, insufficient test kit and insufficient time for the monitoring. In all the performance of donors during this period brought revolutionary change as the recorded performance of students in Anambra public schools nationally and internationally can be attributed to the contributions of donors.

World Bank, 2014-2018

The support gotten from the World Bank in relation to education made it possible in 2014 for State Education Program Investment Project (SEPIP) to receive necessary financing to attain its core project development objectives which included, to support: need-based teacher deployment; school-level management and accountability; measurement of student learning and market-driven technical education.

By this partnership and support, Anambra State met the requirements for the achievement of the first year stipulated target and was reimbursed for these to the tune of ten million, forty-three thousand dollars (\$10.43M) and an additional replenishable advance one million dollars (\$1M) for Technical Assistance activities was also received.⁸⁷ So, Anambra State was able to achieve targets of the 2014, and was able to get reimbursed with a total of eleven million, forty-three thousand dollars (\$11.43M) from the World Bank.⁸⁸

SEPIP received Nine million, three hundred and thirty-eight million dollars (USD 9.338 m) for 2015 from the World Bank...and one of the key achievements has been that Anambra state has consecutively retained a No. 1 position in the 3 core Science areas in NECO and WAEC for the past 3 consecutive years.⁸⁹ Therefore, it has had positive impact on the students which is key to improvements in the economic and wealth growth of the state.

In 2016, the World Bank also partnered with SEPIP to improve the quality of education in the state through. This partnership directly affected and impacted on the lives of over one million, two hundred and sixteen thousand, six hundred (1,216,600) beneficiaries made up of students in the Anambra State public primary and secondary schools.⁹⁰ The project also engaged in capacity building of students, teachers, education officers and members of the School Based Management Committee.

One of the key achievements in 2016 was the approval of a NEEDs-based program (for the period 2014-2018) for deployment and retention of one thousand, one hundred and forty-four (1,144) qualified teachers in secondary schools in core subject areas, with targets, eligibility criteria, procedures, implementation plan and incentives of three thousand naira (N3,000.00) per month per teacher.⁹¹ A total of three thousand, four hundred and seventy-two (3,472) primary school teachers and one thousand, four hundred and thirty-three (1,433) secondary school teachers benefitted from DLI 1 in Anambra State.⁹² This increase in deployment of teachers to rural areas has propelled good learning outcome and has increased enrolment in those areas since teachers are now available to teach children in the rural areas.

All these made Anambra state to be one of the educationally advantaged states in the federation, bringing not just fame but development to the state, so that there was a positive blend of commercial and educational developments.⁹³ The state today therefore, is not only the commercial hub of the South-East but also one of the strongholds or educational bases of the region.

Despite the achievements of donors and SEPIP project, it has been observed that since nearly four years after the Obi Administration ended and the education support policy and strategies presumably

changed; the national ranking of Anambra State schools as no 1 in NECO and WAEC examinations dropped. This suggested that the education sector of the state needs more improvement to at least attain its previous laudable heights.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization, (UNIDO), 2014-2017

In 2014, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization commenced an intervention on Learning Initiative for Entrepreneurs (LIFE) in partnership with Hewlett Packard (Hp) in the state. The Learning Initiative for Entrepreneurs (LIFE) is a training program designed for students, entrepreneurs and small business owners to develop their business and Information Technology skills. The innovative e-Learning program sought to enable entrepreneurs to gain real-life business and technology skills to start, manage and grow their businesses. The courses were interactive and full of practical exercises that would give learners the skills to tackle daily business challenges they may face. The LIFE e-Learning was to be taught online and in classroom settings or face-to-face. The courses covered the areas of marketing, finance, communication and operations and include environmental topics.

The overall objective of the program in the state was to train 205 teachers in 41 selected senior secondary schools, including 11 technical/vocational schools, eight all-boys schools, five all-girl schools and 17 mixed schools in three senatorial zones of Anambra and at a local university.⁹⁴ As part of the agreement, the state government signed an agreement in 2017 to provide a counterpart funding of US\$150,000 to fund the three-year project while UNIDO provided US\$400,000 to support the project implementation at the national level.⁹⁵

The first program activity target was to undertake training of Master Trainers (MToTs), Training of Trainers, (ToTs), and then, these would ultimately undertake the Training of Students (ToS). Already, Dr. Uju Sussan Muogbo was sponsored by UNIDO to participate in a Master Training Course in Tunisia from 17th to 25th January, 2017 while the Training of Trainers have taken place from 1st to 7th October, 2017 at Uyo for twenty teachers from ten schools selected from the three Senatorial Zones that met the criteria to participate in LIFE.⁹⁶ The schools were: 1. St. John of God Science & Technical College, Alor. 2. Comp. Sec. Sch. Nawfia, 3. Orjiakor Mem. Gram. Sch. Adazi-Nnukwu 4. GTC Ihiala, 5. St. Peters Sec. Sch. Achina. 6. NSTC Nnewi, 7. Comp. Sec. Sch. Isuofia 8. GTC Onitsha, 9. CKC Onitsha and 10. DGMS Onitsha.⁹⁷

Due to the largely electronic nature of the program, the strict criteria for the selection of Schools by the UNIDO were: adequate Security, adequate teachers with ICT knowledge, adequate infrastructure

like: Internet facilities, available Computer hardware and software, standby Generator. Only nineteen schools fully qualified to participate in the program while other do not meet the criteria mentioned above.⁹⁸ Sadly post training, LIFE program has not taken any further step in the state.

Two years later in 2019 the project is nearly moribund. In an interview with Mr Frank Ukoh-the UNIDO -LIFE National Coordinator, he expressed his dismay and frustration over the attitude of the Anambra state government in providing the necessary materials required to see this laudable project come to life.⁹⁹ He further bemoaned that Anambra government was about to lose out on a great opportunity as it is on the verge of doing something great for her citizens and future generation because any youth equipped with skills from such as international training and duly certified has the prospect of being a successful entrepreneur after graduation.¹⁰⁰ Other challenges that faced the actualization of this program included: lack of Information Communication Technology (ICT) facilities in schools, lack of internet data, non-commitment of schools and very low teacher manpower. The program dictated that only teachers with ICT or entrepreneurship background and successful s in the ICT screening test can teach the program. So far, only a limited no of teachers in 10 schools passed these criteria but worse is the insufficient number of teachers in schools across the state as a whole and the few available are overburdened.

Mr Ikechukwu Odogwu the UNIDO-LIFE desk office in an interview, regretted that the state government was not sufficiently supporting the program despite all the efforts and written demands they have made. He noted that the schools such as Girls Secondary School, Ihiala had only six teachers while Girls Secondary School, Awgu had just one teacher.¹⁰¹ He further decried the degrading state of education in the state and noted that since the exit of the Peter Administration in 2013, Anambra schools lost their first place in WAEC and NECO to Abia and other states due to the insufficient attention to education by the current administration.¹⁰²

It appeared that the state government merely paid lip service to the UNIDO project in the state as the obstacle to its commencement is on the state. Since the government claimed that it has approved counterpart fund for the project, necessary funds should be released to ensure the immediate kick of LIFE with the ten schools that are ready to commence. This was in order not to further strain the relationship with UNIDO who already viewed the state as unserious. Likewise, the other challenges (lack of facilities) hindering other schools from keying into the program should be tackled by the government gradually especially the recruitment of teachers so that more Anambra youths can benefit from the training.

Government Reforms/ Development Programs

Through the support of, and partnership with the donor agencies, several government reforms have taken place in Anambra state. International or multilateral donor bodies such as the United Nations through its agency UNDP is in the front burner of this kind of intervention. These partnerships has tried to strengthen accountability and respect for the rule of law, compliance with international financial standards, provide inclusive, age-and gender-responsive, equitable access to Justice and reduce corruption through transparency.¹⁰³ Intervention activities of donors here are discussed below:

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 1997-2001

As earlier mentioned in the previous chapter, UNFPA commenced its 4th Country Program activity since January 1997 in Anambra state. The program was set to last for five years:1997-2001 with the objective to improve quality of lives while gathering population data.¹⁰⁴ The program scope was broadened to include the input of beneficiaries in the planning process for the first time. Consequently, the UNFPA/Anambra state Program Development Mission visited and worked in Anambra for two weeks in June 2017. The outcome was that:

- i. *The state sub-program was included as part of the overall activities to be implemented.*
- ii. *There was outstanding level of community involvement, participation and commitment.*
- iii. *Additional ten local government areas in Anambra was to be included in the sub-program and it made Anambra not only one of the few to states to have all her LGAs included but the state with the largest number of participating LGAs in the nation.*
- iv. *A ceremonial launching was also planned to assist in sensitizing the citizenry and it was eventually carried out by November, 1998.*
- v. *The Information, Education, Communication Committee of Idemili North Local Government headed by Chief Law Obieze was inaugurated and recorded remarkable strides such as advocacy, sensitization and distribution of IEC materials such as posters and newsletters*
- vi. *The Orumba south IEC led by the then local government chairman, Hon. E.I. Okeke-Ide of Umunze was also recorded to promptly pay its counterpart contribution for 1998 and 1999.*

- vii. *Trainings were held for two project staff for one week by UNFPA on expected outputs that will contribute to the establishment of methodology and operational capacity for population planning in state and LGA levels, in 1998.*¹⁰⁵


It was however observed that while this was a laudable initiative it had certain challenges including delay in project implementation as planned, poor planning by LGA using data which adversely affected the sustainability of the program and poor commitment to the payment of counterpart funding by the government as earlier agreed.

Fig. 4.7: Photo showing the signing of Memorandum of Understanding between the Former Administrator of Anambra State, Emmanuel Ukaegbu with UNFPA Country Representative, Bil Musola and others in 1998.



Source: Adapted from Qualifare, A publication of Anambra State Population and Development sub programme¹⁰⁶

Fig. 4.8 Drama Troupe organized by the state Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Working Group (IWG) in 1998



Source: Adapted from Qualifare, A publication of Anambra State Population and Development sub programme¹⁰⁷

Department of International Development (DFID), 2007

In 2007, the DFID sponsored a program on Voters Education of Anambra State for the 2007 General Elections. It was implemented by Community Health Education and Development in Africa (CoHEDA) a non-governmental organization and lasted from January to May 2007 within 100 communities in fourteen LGAs of the state. Activities carried out included:

- i. Advocacy/sensitization to Anambra State Association of Town Union (ASATU), Anambra State Independent Electoral Commissions (ANSIEC), Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), Anambra State Universal Basic Education Board (ASUBEB), Catholic and Anglican Bishops, Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN)*
- ii. A one-day sensitization seminar was organized for electoral officer in the 21 LGAs of the state*
- iii. Voters Education was carried out in eighty-two primary schools, one hundred churches, 100 major markets in communities and to one hundred towns and town unions.*
- iv. Behaviour change communication materials were developed in Igbo and English and aired in ABS and Purity FM Mgbakwu*

- v. *Monitoring and Evaluation was carried out by eight CoHEDA staff during the elections and visited thirty-one pooling stations on April 14, 2007 and fifteen pooling station on April 21, 2007.*¹⁰⁸

In an interview with Chinemelum Okafor, a former CoHEDA staff, she confirmed that the exercise was impactful and the citizenry received their message well, overall.¹⁰⁹ This testament validated the claims of CoHEDA and since the 2007 General Elections was peaceful overall, it suggested that the voters education was successful.

Fig. 4.9 Photos captured during mobilization visit to deliver Voter Education for the Pupils of Ezinator Primary school respectively by CoHEDA staff



A cross section of pupils of Ezinator Primary Primary School being addressed by CoHEDA field officers during the mobilization visit



Cross section of Igwedinna Pupils being addressed by the CoHEDA Mobilization Team during the mobilization exercise

Source: Adapted form the Report on the Mobilization of Anambra State for General Elections by CoHEDA¹¹⁰

European Union/World Bank, 2006-2011

In 2006, the Anambra State Government commenced an intervention program supported by European Union and World Bank on Support to Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP). One of the assessments or sub programs conducted under SRIP was the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment in Public Financial Management (PFM) in 2008. The Anambra State Ministry of Economic Planning, which anchored the state government's economic reforms, took the lead in this PFM assessment. It received assistance from the European Union Support for Reforming Institutions Program (EU-SRIP) and the World Bank. Both partners co-sponsored preparation of this report, with the EU-SRIP financing the lead consultant, the workshops, and technical sessions, while the World Bank funded the second consultant.¹¹¹

The PFM assessment is the fiscal and economic reforms initiated at the federal level in year 2004. The reforms included fiscal and budget management, procurement, fiscal responsibility, accounting, integration of HR and payroll management. The nature of Nigeria's federalism, which granted State Governments autonomy over their fiscal decisions, did not allow the FG immediately extend the reforms to state governments. Therefore, states such as Anambra had the opportunity to develop its own agenda tailored to meet its financial reforms and management needs. The Anambra State Government contributed hundreds of hours of staff time by raising an inter-ministerial technical team of about 12 directors to work with the consultants for the two weeks of data collection and assessment.¹¹² This assessment covered all areas of the Anambra State PFM system, including its primary MDAs. Finally, the team presented the findings at a dissemination workshop for Anambra State Government officials on June 30, 2008.¹¹³ The key objectives of the public finance management was to ensure that finance the state's annual budgets and financial plans are consistent with government set development priorities, that actual spending is directed towards the target area, to eliminate waste and corruption in public financial management in the state amongst others.

Some of the outcome of the reform include:

- *The introduction of bank-based revenue collection system which requires that every payment (including taxes, school fees, registration fees, levies etc) is paid to the state through the bank;*
- *Computerization of the state's payroll system to ensure that the payroll is properly managed;*

- *The introduction of a new Budget Classification & Charts of Account (BC&COA) which aimed at reclassifying the state's according to coding methods to meet with international accounting standards and to ensure transparency of information in all stages of the financial management process;*
- *The development of Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) with the purpose achieving fiscal discipline, linking state's expenditure to policy priorities, and instituting a three-year forward-looking costed plans to provide a consistent framework for the state's annual budgets;*
- *Public Expenditure Review (PER) which attempted to review the public expenditure system of the state and the strengths and weaknesses of the system with the overall objective of improving the capacity for financial management system in the state.*
- *Reconciling the state's debt profile with the national Debt Management of Office (DMO) and a programming of liquidating the state's international and local debts.¹¹⁴*

It was discovered that there are two gaps in the reform. First, it did not include activities of local governments under the state because, as a separate tier of government, each LG has its own independent PFM system. Second, it largely excluded government parastatals because it was not possible to obtain information about them. For reason of this lack of information, the reform could provide an analysis of percentage (by share of expenditure) of these parastatals. In all, the Support for Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP) of the European Union played a pivotal role in financing PFM reforms in the state albeit that some of its short comings.

DFID, 2010-2015

In 2010, DFID sponsored the South East Regional (Internally Generated Revenue) IGR working Group project. As part of the project, a South East Economic Forum was held at Ascort Resort Hotel, New Haven Enugu on August 3, 2010.¹¹⁵ The overall aim was to train government representatives from south eastern states on how to increase their internally Generated Revenue. Participants from Anambra state included Dr Clifford Okafor, the Chairman of CoHEDA. The keynote speech presented by Ifueko Omoigui, the Executive Chairman, Federal Inland Revenue Service and

Chairman Joint Tax Board pointed out the revenue generation from the south eastern states was poor with IGR statistics of Anambra at N6,023,865 in 2007, N6,063,449 in 2008 and 6,512,614 in 2009 and emphasized that the state needed to increase its revenue in order to meet its financial obligations.¹¹⁶

Lessons drawn from the forum for onward implementation at state levels included:

- i. The need to mobilise and sensitise the people on government IGR activities.*
- ii. Integration of IGR platforms to enable the creation of a central database to serve the state government more effectively;*
- iii. Provision of infrastructure and employment capacity building in Anambra Board of Internal Revenue.*
- iv. Identification of management initiative to bring all taxable adults and businesses in the state into the central data base.*
- v. Need to enforce compliance of the citizens.¹¹⁷*

From 2011-2013, DFID assisted the state government in the sponsorship of the State Education Sector Operational Plan (SESOP). SESOP is a Mid-Term Plan which contained an outline of the operational work program for the first three years of the State Education Sector Strategic Plan (SESP). The objectives of the Sector Strategic Plan (SESP) included to significantly increase the number of classrooms in schools, enhance renovation of dilapidated classrooms, laboratories and dormitories, provide adequate library facilities in schools, provide adequate ICT facilities, to track and monitor education expenditure and to ensure timely release of appropriate funds. The estimated total cost for successfully carrying out the initiative and activities in SESOP was five billion, seven hundred and sixty-eight million, eight hundred and seventy-six thousand naira (N5,768,876,000.00).¹¹⁸

In assessing actual performance against targets, the following was discovered:

Increased Number of Adults Accessing Quality Education: As at 2011, the Anambra State Agency for Adult and Non-Formal Education (ANFE) had 238 Centers, 26,340 student learners and 625 facilitators.¹¹⁹ Following the outcome of the 2010 mapping exercise in the State, which was conducted by UNICEF in collaboration with the State Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, the problem of girl-child and other non-formal education-related cases were identified. This gave rise to the need to establish more Centers in 4 LGAs and Women Education Centers in the State. Between 2011 and 2013, there were therefore additional 37 ANFE Centers with the student-learner enrolment increase

of 2,225 and 80 more facilitators... by 2013, Anambra State Agency for Adult and Non-Formal Education (ANFE) had 285 Centers with 705 facilitators and 28,965 adult-student learners spread across the six educational zones of the State.¹²⁰

Improved Technical and Vocational Education in the State: Prior to 2011, the State had 11 Technical and Vocational Education Centers... this figure increased to 16 in 2013.¹²¹ Also, out of a total of nineteen (19) technical subjects/skills or trades taught in these colleges, eight were accredited. Conscious effort was made by the State government in collaboration with UNIDO for accreditation of the remaining courses/trades. A total of 34 skills/entrepreneurship courses/trades are being planned under this scheme...by 2013, total enrolment in technical and vocational education colleges in the State increased from 1346 (170 males and 1176 females) in 2011 to 4741 (2794 males and 1947 females) in 2013.¹²²

Construction and Reconstruction of dilapidated classrooms, Laboratories and Dormitories: The state Government constructed and renovated a good number of classroom blocks and dormitories in both primary and secondary schools to address the challenge of infrastructural insufficiency and decay in education sector. One hundred and seventy-four (174) out of 253 public secondary schools had their libraries rehabilitated while over 200 laboratories was also renovated, equipped and made functional in our public secondary schools.¹²³

Provision of Functional ICT facilities in Schools: The State government distributed 10 computer sets each to 150 public secondary schools out of which 100 of the beneficiary schools have been upgraded to Microsoft Academy status with internet connectivity.¹²⁴ The State government also donated over 200 14-seater buses to secondary schools in the State (155-public and over 50 to private/mission owned). Despite all efforts by government to recruit more teachers, there was and still is a dearth of teachers in the public secondary and primary schools.

In April 2012, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) re-entered into partnership with the State Government. The State Partnership for Accountability, Responsiveness and Capability (SPARC) was one of the programs designed to provide technical assistance for governance reform. SPARC strived to assist the state government on policy and strategy development, public financial management, public service management and knowledge management. Summarily, some achievements were recorded in SPARC by the end of 2015.

On Policy and Strategy Development, they validated Anambra State Development Plan (2014-2018), produced an issue paper on Sustainable

Development Goals (SDG) implementation with recommendations to facilitate adjustment and developed a report on the review of the agriculture sector performance titled the Performance Measurement Processes for Sector Policies and Strategies. Under Public Financial Management, they updated the revenue model forecasts and supported the Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget to prepare documents for the for 2014 and 2016 budget, supported the Due Process Office supported to identify and quantify economy, efficiency and effectiveness gains during the 2014/2015 procurement processes and under a progress review of internally generated revenue Strategy implementation with focus on strategic priorities and sustainable improvement. Under public service management, a comprehensive state-wide Human Resources Management (HRM) Training Policy was prepared and presented to the Office of the Head of Service. A workplan for corporate planning roll-out and advocacy of the Human Resource Management was implemented across the Ministries Department and Agencies and capacity of the implementing staff improved to drive the governance reform processes across the state government. Under knowledge management, past cases of state government funding of reform initiatives including the lessons learned was captured and documented and the state House of Assembly was supported to improve capacity for oversight functions.¹²⁵

SPARC helped to make some improvement to the budget process of the state that has endured till today. It helped to emphasis the need to identify key individuals to work with in any reform process that is both in terms of their position and interests so they know what to expect and can articulate this to their colleagues. Most importantly, SPARC underscored the need to involve citizens in the budget process so they can hold government to account for its delivery.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2009-2013

From 2009-2012, UNDP commenced its 7th Country Program in thirteen states of the federation as agreed with the Federal Government to support Nigeria's efforts to achieve the MDGs through effective partnership with the relevant government institutions and other identified stakeholders. The four-year program circle largely derived from the experiences and lessons learned from the previous UNDP programs and it ended in Anambra state in 2013.

The 7th Country Program was anchored on four main programs:

- Economic Governance Program (EGP): It was implemented by the state Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget and dealt with prioritizing resources for development;
- Capacity for Governance Program (CGP): Implemented by the Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget via the Good Governance Committee and focused on with government accountability and public oversight in resource management through participation;
- Private Sector Development Program (PSDP): Implemented by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and dealt with growing the non-oil resource base and the promotion of inclusive markets;
- Sustainability and Risk Management Program (SRMP): Implemented by the Ministry of Environment and Anambra State Action Committee on Aids and dealt with protection of the resource base.

In her presentation, the Anambra State UNDP Partnership Manager, Mrs. Michelle Onugbolu during the end of the year partnership coordination meeting issued the detailed report below to show the achievement of UNDP 7th Country Program in the state.

To highlight these achievements, the UNDP assisted the state in the production of:

- *Anambra State Energy Policy*
- *Anambra State Public Procurement Law 2011 Simplified Version*
- *Technical Guidelines for Flood and Erosion Control Policy*
- *Abridged version of Anambra State Flood, Erosion Control and Water Conservation Technical Guidelines*
- *Guideline for participatory Budgeting in Anambra State*
- *Fiscal Policy Toolkit/Manual*
- *Solar Energy Electricity for Shoemaker SME at Okpoko and the Nnewi Incubation Center*
- *MDGs flyers*¹²⁶

In addition, the campaign on good governance expanded to cover the 21 LGAs in the State, Local Government /Community Budget Committee enhanced its community participation in the budget process and three hundred thousand naira (N300,000) worth of grants was distributed to 15 communities for small environmental management. ¹²⁷

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2014-2017

The UNDP 8th Country Program commenced in the state from 2014. Major intervention areas of the program were: Economic planning and Aid Coordination, Social Protection, Governance and Peace building, Livelihood and Youth Empowerment and Sustainable Development. Expenditure outlay for key and sub programs were:

- i. *Governance and Peace-Building – one hundred and forty-seven thousand, five dollars (\$147,500)*
- ii. *Governance and Peace-Building / HIV-AIDS - sixty-one thousand dollars (\$ 61,000)*
- iii. *Sustainable and Equitable Economic Development (Economic Planning and Aid Coordination) – one hundred and twenty-eight thousand dollars (\$ 128,000)*
- iv. *Sustainable and Equitable Economic Development (Livelihood and Youth Empowerment) – Seventy-eight thousand dollars (\$78,000)*
- v. *Human Security and Risk Management – three hundred and seventy-eight thousand dollars (\$ 378,000) ¹²⁸*

The table below presented an overall picture for the financial contribution of the UNDP 7th and 8th Country Program in the state for both the state government and the donor.

Table 4.6 UNDP/ANSG 7th & 8th Country Program Financial Contribution

7th Country Program	8th Country Program	Total Commitment	State Contribution
US\$ 1,340,129	US\$ 400,000	US\$ 1,740,129	US\$ 640,508

Source: Adapted from 2014 Interagency Report¹²⁹

From 2014-2017 the following were some of the key activities and achievements of the UNDP under governance and reform program:

- i. *Corruption risks in two MDGs related MDAs of Ministries of Health and Education identified and plans for their elimination developed*
- ii. *Monitoring and evaluation framework developed*
- iii. *CSOs trained and equipped for budget implementation monitoring*

- iv. *Local Government political and bureaucratic personnel sensitized on the procurement, fiscal responsibility and the freedom of information laws*
- v. *printed and disseminated the following documents:*
 - *Guidelines on participatory budgeting in Anambra State*
 - *Toolkit on budget tracking, monitoring and evaluation*
 - *Toolkit on Govt. budgeting, analysis and revenue forecasting*
- vi. *Produced a HIV/AIDS Anti-Stigma bill*
- vii. *Nutritional support to thirty-four (34) Support Groups of PLHIV (Persons Living with HIV/AIDS)*
- viii. *Sixty (60) youths and women groups empowered for self-employment*
- ix. *Provision of equipment grant for self-employment of twenty (20) physically challenged persons.*
- x. *Development of Aid Database (excel based)*
- xi. *Installation/Training of members of SME in Timber market Awka on the use and management of solar powered electricity.*
- xii. *Fabrication/installation of pilot waste recycling plant in Awka and training of stakeholder*
- xiii. *Equipped the Ministry of Economic Planning library with 20 desktop computers and laptops provided for the UNDP Desk Officers/UNDP team*
- xiv. *Developed the Ministry of Economic Planning, Budget and Development Partners Statistical Portal/Database*
- xv. *Conducted a Workshop on Ownership and Sustainability of Community Project*
- xvi. *Conducted a seminar for the Police Officers in Anambra state for Peace keeping and Conflict Resolution in preparation for the 2018 election in the State*
- xvii. *Conducted a book review with 200 participants from different LGAs in Anambra State on social protection scheme mapping book that was produced in 2016.¹³⁰*

European Union/World Bank, 2015-2019

The Anambra State and Local Governance Reform Project (ANSLOGOR) was supported by the European Union (EU) but implemented by the World Bank. The Project Development Objective was

to improve **transparency, accountability** and **quality in Public Financial Management** in Anambra. The areas of intervention include public financial management, local Government reform and project coordination. To enable it commence operation quickly, the state committed approximately N11 million in refurbishing an office space for the program and to defray the emoluments of program staff.¹³¹ Some of the procurements made and achievements recorded in 2015 included:

- i. *Procured three (3) motor vehicles for Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget; State Program Coordinating Unit; Office of Accountant General of the State;*
- ii. *Two (2) sound proof twenty (20) KVA gen Set for State Program Coordinating Unit; Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget;*
- iii. *ICT equipment- six (6) laptops, sixteen (16) printers, twenty-nine (29) desktop computers, two (2) photo copiers; seventeen (17) stabilizers; ten (10) scanners and seventeen (17) UPS for Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Office of Accountant General of the State, Ministry of Local Government, Office of Head of Service, Anambra State Internal Revenue Service;*
- iv. *Procurement of Office Equipment- three (3) Refrigerators, eight (8) Steel Cabinets, three (3) TVs, three (3) air conditioners, three (3) Water Dispensers, seventeen (17) Surge Protectors, one (1) Digital Video Camera, one (1) Still Camera, one (1) Project + Screen, two (2) External Hard drives, one (1) Flip Chart Stand, three (3) Sets of Internet Equipment with two (2) years Subscription, twenty (20) Power Extension Sockets);*
- v. *Procurement of Office Furniture- twenty (20) Office Chairs, five (5) Swivel Chairs, two (2) tables with three (3) drawers, four (4) Bookshelves.¹³²*

Other areas of achievement especially from 2017 include:

- i. *Strengthened capacity at State level for the coordination of law reforms and service delivery for Justice Sector institutions to provide inclusive, age &*

- gender-responsive, equitable and timely access to Justice and for anti-corruption institution to prevent and regulate corruption;*
- ii. Empowered Public, Civil society, communities and Media to advocate for, report and demand greater state promotion, respect and protection of human rights and to form social engagement systems and networks to participate in equitable and sustainable social development through utilization of evidence-based social communications tools, channels and mechanisms;*
 - iii. Strengthened capacity for state planning institutions for coordination, evidence-based and gender-responsive planning, budgeting, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation on vision 2020;*
 - iv. Strengthened capacity for statistical agencies, line MDAs and research institutions to better generate, analyze and use quality, timely disaggregated data and make it accessible for evidence-based decision making and programming;*
 - v. Developed age-appropriate and gender-sensitive, fiscally sustainable National social protection policy and framework based on context-specific, innovative, replicable and evidence-based.*
 - vi. Facilitated the passing of the Violence Against Persons Prohibition Law in 2017 which has established a regime where both indigenes and residents of the State have cause of action against all forms of violence and be protected under the law;*
 - vii. Trained one hundred (100) State Prosecutors on the Administration of Criminal Justice Law for a better understanding of the law and were able to highlight the inherent problems in the implementation of the law thus far, which resulted in suggestions for amendment of the extant law.¹³³*

In assessing the government reforms assisted by various donor agencies over the years, some issues are evident. The willingness to own and drive reforms is critical if governance improvement initiatives, particularly those supported by development partners, are to be sustained beyond the

period of the development support. This is simply because reforms are often resisted and when deemed too radical, may only receive lip service and not duly implemented by the government.

On the one hand some positive strides have been taken by the state government based on lessons drawn from donor reforms over the years. In order to improve transparency and management of contracts in the state, the Anambra State Government has recently established a contract database and assigned responsibility for its management and maintenance to a dedicated officer. The contracts database was able to detail where a project was implemented, the contractor, how much it costed, how much was paid and status of the project. This is a good example of consolidating on lessons learnt from reforms. Again, based on Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) improvement working in partnership with SPARC, Anambra State Government developed a robust IGR Improvement Strategy which it has started to implement. Between April 2014 and January 2015 Anambra's monthly IGR collection increased from a monthly average of N500 million to a monthly average of N1 billion...that is a whopping 100% leap in less than one year.¹³⁴

The Chairman of Anambra State Internal Revenue Service, Sir Okey Moka, attributed the increased IGR to robust computer based tax management systems and processes.¹³⁵ Mr. Andy Umeobi, Permanent Secretary Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget in an interview 2015 noted that, Anambra invested over N125 million to improve and fully automate the Anambra Motor Vehicle Administration System, strengthen and expand the number of existing National Drivers Licence capture Centers and keyed into the Joint Tax Board's Tax Identification Number (TIN) scheme, ensuring that the state's obligation—financial and otherwise to the board and the TIN project are always honoured.¹³⁶ Significant changes was also made in revenue collection and administration. Attempts was made to discontinue cash collections and most revenues - tax and non -tax – are collected and managed via the Pay- Direct platform. Staff of Anambra State Internal Revenue staff received some professional trainings on tax collection. Since 2008, the state has spent over two million five hundred thousand naira (N2.5 million) annually to organize a 'participatory budget forum,' a platform which allows communities and the organized civil society to make inputs into the budget.¹³⁷ Groups such as the Anambra State Association of Town Unions and the Coalition for Transparency and Good Governance articulated and presented community needs and civil society concerns respectively, during the budget forum.

On the other hand, most resources spent on government reforms failed to achieve its mark. The Human Resource Management Policy document sponsored by DFID makes a good case as it was hardly adopted for practical implementation. The Public Financial Management had for years preached accountability and good governance. Specifically, it advocated for the government to publish her expenditures publicly and in real time online. However, the various government heads have continued to decline the implementation of the reforms thereby paying lip service to the acceptance of the policy. Like most reforms it had a huge disconnect between the people and the proposed policy and demonstrated that most reforms sponsored by donors are impractical at this time, cannot be embedded, locally- owned and sustainable.

Agricultural Sector

The agricultural sector is another area that has received huge advisory and financial supports from some of the donor agencies and development partners. As far back as 1975, Anambra was a recipient of World Bank/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development donor aid in the Agricultural sector. With the dwindling oil prices, Anambra State have taken steps to increase agricultural produce in the state. The state government, in collaboration with donor agencies, empower farmers to increase food supply such as rice, cassava and other crop produce in the state as discussed below.

International Bank for Rural Development/ International Fund for Agricultural Development/World Bank/Federal Government of Nigeria /Anambra State Government, 1991-1997

Following it's the creation of Anambra in 1991, the Anambra State Agricultural Development Program (ASADEP) popularly called ADP continued to implement the Multi-State Agricultural Development Projects (MSADP) in the new Anambra state. MSADP was financed by World Bank, Federal Government of Nigeria and Anambra State Government to the tune of twenty-two million, four hundred thousand dollars which the new state shared with Enugu state.¹³⁸ The broad program objective was to improve the standard of living and welfare of the rural small holder farmers

throughout the state, by raising their productivity and farm income via integrated rural development. There were four major sub programs: Extension Services, Adaptive Research (Technical), Rural Infrastructural Development (Engineering) Services and Support Services. These sub programs had many components of programs under them.

Some of achievements recorded by the program by 1997 included:

- *Under the rural water scheme, ADP made huge capital investments towards the provision of potable water as well as for irrigation and other farm processing activities. Out of thirty -eight new water borehole projects inherited on bifurcation in 1991, twenty-five were completed while nineteen boreholes were rehabilitated out of twenty-six older boreholes inherited while three spring water schemes was fully constructed.*
- *Constructed twenty-seven rural feeder roads measuring about 184.3 kilometers in addition to 121 culverts and concrete drains measuring 3,990 line meter. While maintenance work was also carried out on about 300 kilometers of feeder roads between 1992 and 1997*
- *Constructed a new office complex, three skill development Centers, central stores/warehouse, maintained twenty PDP/store across the state*
- *Commenced the Fadama project with the formation of sixty Fadama Users Association and the registration of forty Fadama Cooporative Societies.*
- *Carried out extensive services recording 31,643 SPAT demonstrations with fifteen new farming technologies distributed and disseminated to the rural farmers via the 5,100 contract farmers*
- *Constructed six fish fingerling holding tanks*
- *Recorded a 20-hectare cassava multiplication, one-hectare yam minisett multiplication and 1.5 hectare cocoyam minisett multiplication farm all at Igbariam.¹³⁹*

The MSADP's attempt to improve the lives of rural farmers is commendable and ADP had endured till this day- retained based on its performance as a program implementing and extension arm of the state Ministry of Agriculture.

Fadama is a Hausa word regarded as the low-lying flood-prone lands found in the plains of rivers. Fadama areas are composed of deposited sediments and contain exploitable aquifers (water tables). It involves preparation of low-lying areas and flood plains for crops, agroforestry and livestock production.¹⁴⁰ Anambra state commenced participation in the Fadama I Project from 1996 although the project commenced in 1993 on the national level. It was the only state in southern Nigeria to benefit from the project. The Fadama project tried to ensure that agricultural production is carried on during both rainy and dry seasons in Nigeria. The National Fadama Facility (NFF) was established under the National Fadama Development Program (NFDP) loan No. 3541 UNI worth sixty seven million, five hundred thousand dollars (US \$ 67.5 million) to assist Fadama development in the states that met the pre-determined eligibility criteria from 1992-1999.¹⁴¹ To qualify for Fadama, Anambra ADP (ASADP) carried out a feasibility study of both the surface and shallow underground water resources in the state as part of its program to increase dry season crop production and other farming activities in the state. The study showed that small-scale Fadama (irrigation) was feasible in Anambra State, using simple low cost technologies to harness both the surface and shallow underground water resource.¹⁴² About 30,000 hectares of land in the state was then identified as having the capability to support Fadama development... about 66.67% (20,000ha) of the land could be irrigated by the provision of tube wells / wash bores, while 33.33% (10,000ha) could be irrigated by direct pumping/ diversion from surface water.¹⁴³ River Niger, Anambra, Mamu, Uiasi amongst other rivers with the numerous tributaries and streams proved capable of providing enormous low land and basins for Fadama development in the state.

The NFDP had the general goal of increasing food production in the state through expanded cultivation, using simple small-scale irrigation facilities and appropriate technologies. It was its aim to increase the land area under cultivation by providing an all-year round cropping of marketable and high-valued crops such as cereals (maize and rice), fruits and assorted vegetables. Fisheries and livestock production was to be incorporated into the Fadama program. The increase in the total population of these crops and livestock annually, would increase the incomes of the farmers and raise their standard of living. Furthermore, NFDP would serve as an insurance against crop failures as a result of environmental hazards. In all, the socioeconomic life of the farmers would be improved.

The strategies for achieving the above objectives involved the delivery of several inputs and services that would generate desired outputs. These include: (i) development of requisite infrastructure such as access roads, culverts, tubewells and pumps, etc. within the fadama areas in the state; (ii) provision of marketing/ storage facilities such as storage sheds, etc. and (iii) organizing farmers into Fadama Users Groups.

Following the widespread adoption of simple and low cost improved irrigation technologies, Fadama farmers was recorded to realize income increase from various crops, up to 65 percent for vegetable, 334 per cent for wheat and 497 per cent for paddy rice.¹⁴⁴ Fadama I neglected downstream activities such as processing, preservation, conservation and rural infrastructure that enhanced efficient evacuation of farm output to markets. In addition to this, the project did not take into consideration other resource users such as those for livestock and fishery. Adversely, it resulted not only in increased conflicts between the users but also restricted benefits to only those accruing from rice and neglected other crops production. All these led to reduced efficiency of the program.

International Development Bank (IDB)/ Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN)/Anambra State Government, 2008-2013

Following a tripartite agreement between the International Development Bank (IDB), Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and Anambra State Government, the National Program for Food Security (NPFS) was commenced in the state by 2008. The program was implemented by the ADP under the Ministry of Agriculture in the state. Nine (9) participating LGAs were- Awka North, Anambra East, Orumba South, Anaocha, Dunukofia, Nnewi North, Oyi, Ayamelum and Ekwusigo. The key objective of NPFS was to intervene through water management, livestock and crop intensification, home gardens and women-in-agriculture activities, poverty alleviation towards increased farmers income and ensuring food security. The tables below as presented by the Anambra state NPFS Program Coordinator Mr Joe Onugha during the interagency end of year review meeting in 2012 is instructive on the funds received from all partners to facilitate the success of the program.

Table 4.7 Funds received from Partners for the NPFS Program

NPFS ACHIEVEMENTS							
Funds received from all partners							
SOURCES	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Donor (IDB)	-	50,776,000.00	35,954,250.00	63,901,990.00	17,150,000.00	77,790,000.00	245,572,240.00
FGN	-	18,005,000.00	6,155,000.00	3,000,000.00	-	-	27,160,000.00
STATE	-	42,400,000.00	42,400,000.00	-	42,400,000.00	42,400,000.00	169,600,000.00
LGA	-	32,400,000.00	32,400,000.00	-	32,400,000.00	32,400,000.00	129,600,000.00
TOTAL	-	143,581,000.00	116,909,250.00	66,901,990.00	91,950,000.00	152,590,000.00	571,932,240.00

Source: 2012 Report on NPFS by the Program Coordinator¹⁴⁵

Major achievements of the NPFS included that they:

- *Constructed 1No. Micro-Earth Dam at Nkwelle Ezunaka, 9No. Bore holes fitted with hand pumps, 10No. rural market stalls, 1No. Dyke at Ogboji, 3No. ponds (2No. at Agulu & 1No. at Umuomaku)- 1No. completed, 2No. 80% completed.;*
- *Rehabilitated health Centers, boreholes, establishment of rural markets, livestock market design, rural roads*
- *Improved Market Information Services: 2 metric tons of maize were sold and distributed to farmers, 1500 copies of Farm Record Books were produced and trainings conducted for facilitators and farmers*
- *Acquired tractors to drive agro-processing and mechanization*
- *Increased Soil Fertility Management and Crop Production recorded as 24ha were achieved under yam/cassava/maize and cassava maize, 5ha were achieved for sweet potato production, 15ha rice plots, 15ha sole maize and 15ha tomatoes/vegetable were also established in 2013.*
- *Rehabilitated 1NO. Rural Clinic at Agulu and 4 health Centers equipped*
- *Stocked and reared fish in 4No. ADP Demonstration concrete ponds*
- *Recovered over 40% (₦7,140,00.00) on Tractors, as at July 2013.*

- *Recorded 100% in procurement of vehicles and vehicle insurance respectively and payment of implementation staff allowances;*
- *Recorded 50% achievement in PMU meetings, briefing of stakeholders, supervision/backstopping, exchange visits/study tours, among others.¹⁴⁶*

NPFS did not quite live up to its objectives. As observed, there were inadequate Extension Agents leading to very low extension agents to farm family ratio. This made it difficult to have effective monitoring and mentoring. There was also low recovery rate of disbursed loans from farmers. More so, many ministry staff exploited the opportunity to enrich themselves and did not strictly facilitate the recovery process. Till today only a small part of the loan issued meet their mark and was returned. Agriculture at that time was not particularly enticing for young people, more so, the absence of developed lands and tractors made agriculture less attractive for school leavers. Also, some resources such as vehicles were inadequate to ensure mobility for field supervision for staff, therefore, there was inadequate supervision. All these contributed to make the NPFs minimally effective.

International Development Bank/World Bank/Anambra State Government, 2008—2013

In 2008, the Third National Fadama Development Project (Fadama III – World Bank Assisted) commenced; even though it became disbursement effective in March 29, 2009. The project was worth four hundred and fifty-million dollars (USD 450m) (IDA USD 250m & FGN USD 200m) while Anambra received about seven million, eight hundred thousand dollars (USD 7.8m).¹⁴⁷ Fadama III was equipped with measures to correct the shortcomings of Fadama II. The development objective of Fadama III Project was to increase the incomes of users of rural land and water resources on a sustainable basis through diversification of agricultural activities. One of the key features of the project was to empower the communities to collectively decide on how resources are allocated and managed for their livelihood activities and to participate in the design and execution of their sub-projects. It employed community demand-driven (CDD) approach which emphasized and promoted beneficiaries' participation and ownership of subprojects from initiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation the developmental projects. Twenty LGAs in the State excepting Onitsha South participated. Beneficiaries of the project received grants for small-scale productive rural

infrastructure, income yielding assets and input support which were complemented by appropriate advisory services and capacity building activities.

Table 4.10 FADAMA III Disbursement Profile, 2012

Subproject	Number being implemented	Number completed	Number On-going	Total Project Cost (₦)	Amount so far disbursed (₦)	Balance to be disbursed (₦)
Asset Acquisition	403	141	262	260,645,384.29	189,330,327.41	72,576,224.62
Small Scale Community-Owned Infrastructure	77	32	45	217,764,885.29	177,404,109.21	40,360,776.08
Input Support	158	158	Nil	26,358,144.24	26,358,144.24	Nil
Total	638	331	307	504,768,413.82	393,092,580.86	112,937,000.70

Source: Report presented by Mrs. Evelyn Odiari, Ag. Fadamma III State Project Coordinator, 2012¹⁴⁸

Overall, there was recorded an increase in the income of farmers and in crop production from the Fadama III project as detailed by the table below. It also showed the project attempted to satisfy one of its objectives of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama resource users through effective and efficient delivery of productive resources directly to them while combating unemployment on rural locations of the state.

Table 4: 9 Estimated Income of the Farmers before and after Joining the Fadama III Project

Variables	Before		After	
	Amount (N)	% of Total	Amount (N)	% of Total
Rice	11,982,200	37.98	50,164,260	48.02
Yam	4,963,980	15.73	12,020,000	11.51
Maize	---			
Cocoyam	675,000	2.14	2,431,000	2.33
Cassava	13, 112,555	41.56	37,110,783	35.52
Plantain	215,100	0.67	232,400	0.22
Vegetable	598,60	1.90	2,516,260	2.41
Groundnut				
Total	31,547,435	100	104,474,703	100
Mean	328,619.11		1,088,278.16	

Source: Adapted from Okechukwu, Obodoechina. E.1 & Chidebelu Sand2, *Community Driven Development Policy as a Strategy for Rural Development: A Case of Fadama III Crop Production Co-Operative Societies in Anambra*¹⁴⁹

The Ag. Project Coordinator, Mrs. Evelyn Odiari further highlighted the following achievements of the project:

- *10.2% increase in the average real income of beneficiary households. (Fadama III Midline Impact Assessment supervised by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Washington, United States).*
- *Average of 15% increase in the yield of major agricultural produce in the State.*
- *About 257 hectares of land were cultivated in 2012 by Fadama crop farmers across the State.*
- *169 Fadama User Groups (FUGs) opened savings account with total deposit increase of N11,634,814.00 in August, 2012 to January, 2013. This is key sustainability measure in the Project implementation.*
- *166 (Nos.) Fadama Community Associations (FCAs)/404 FUGs benefitted from the various Project's community interventions.*
- *638 (Nos.) community subprojects are under implementation. The number of completed subprojects increased to 331 by December, 2012.*
- *1775 (Nos.) FUGs received a wide range of capacity building activities including community based procurement & financial management, result based M & E, savings mobilization, records/book keeping, participatory planning, market linkages, business management.*
- *Capacity building support provided to 82 (Nos.) staff of the Agric and BPRS (Budget, Planning, Research and Statistics) departments of LGCs benefitting.*¹⁵⁰

In view of the amount released for the project implementation and popularity of project, better results were expected. It was also observed that the project recorded periods of inactivity for some time. The reason for was blamed on the delay in clearance and fund disbursement from the world Bank. Worse is the low level of integrity of cash flow amongst farmers and even the project implementors who exploited the system to enrich themselves. Fadama users were supposed to produce all year round, but the irrigation facilities at Omor and Adani were posed with some tussles. The Federal Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture battled over who controlled the irrigation system yet causing another delay in project execution. The worse setback associated with the Fadama III project was the flood disasters recorded in Fadama communities that affected the efforts expended to increase food production in the state. However not all farms were affected and

some improvements was eventually, recorded overall. The project would have also recorded better yields if it were implemented/facilitated through the traditional Rulers, President – generals, NGOs and other stakeholders in the communities who would help to ensure that beneficiaries utilities the funds and input received accordingly.

World Bank/Federal Government of Nigeria/Anambra State Government, 2013-2019

The Federal Government of Nigeria requested the World Bank support for its Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA), which was adopted in 2011 to improve value chain of prioritized agricultural commodities.¹⁵¹ The need to shorten the constraint of time and other challenges of preparing a new project that would meet the urgency of the ATA as well as build on an existing well performing implementation arrangements of World bank supported Fadama III Project orchestrated the emergence of Fadama III Project Additional Financing. The Additional Financing (AF) fund is a grant to States from the World Bank Credit to Federal Government of Nigeria.¹⁵² It is commenced in 2013 in the state and it is ongoing. The Project Development Objective (PDO) of the Additional Financing lies with the parent project “to increase the incomes of the users of land and water resources on a sustainable basis”.¹⁵³

Also, Fadama III AF supporting clusters of farmers with comparative advantage and high potential to increase production and productivity of cassava, rice, sorghum and horticulture value chains and link them to better organized markets, including Staple Crop Processing Zones (SCPZs). Essentially it is to facilitate linkages between federation of producers and existing processors.¹⁵⁴ Anambra State was among the selected six Core States to benefit from the Fadama III Project AF with the task of ramping rice production in the State with its Staple Crop Processing Zone (SCPZ) situated at Omor, Ayamelum L.G.A.¹⁵⁵

The objective of the Additional Financing was to increase the income of farmers in the prioritized Staple Crop Processing Zones (SCPZs) on a sustainable basis.¹⁵⁶ The project was implemented in eight (8) potential Rice Producing Local Government Areas of the State within the 50km radius from the SPCZ with comparative advantage in rice production. They were Anambra East, Anambra West,

Awka North, Ayamelum, Ihiala, Orumba North, Orumba South and Ogbaru. One of their key achievements was the creation of one thousand, twenty-three (1,023) jobs in the State.¹⁵⁷

The achievements so far included:

- I. *8 Local Governments (Awka North, Ayamelum, Anambra East, Anambra West, Ihiala, Ogbaru Orumba-North, Orumba-South) signed MoU for rice value chain and cassava*
- II. *A total of 41.4km of roads was awarded to three contractors to grant access for the beneficiaries to their farmlands which contributed to increasing the number of farmers interested to farm in those areas from 18 PCs (70PGs) to 31 PCs (154 PGs).*
- III. *On-going Road Construction of Feeder Road Infrastructure, Sump constructed at Ihiala Irrigation site, On-going Construction of Surface Flooding Irrigation @ Ogborji, Orumba South LGA , On-going Land Clearing in Ogbaru and Ihiala LGAs*
- IV. *Forty (40) no MTPs site was established in 8No locations of Omor, Igbakwu, Ifiteogwari, Ihialla, Ufuma, Enugu-otu, Amanuke and Achalla in support to ADP.*
- V. *Fourteen (14) out of the twenty (20) approved Business Plans completed while four (4) BPs are yet to commence.*
- VI. *Fadama III AF Project commenced the process of empowering 241 graduate youth through the “Fadama Graduate Unemployed Youths Scheme (Fadama GUYS).”¹⁵⁸*

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)/Federal Government of Government of Nigeria (FGN)/ Anambra State Government (ANSG), 2010-2017

The Rural Finance Institution Building Program (RUFIN) was jointly funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and had 12 participating state governments including Anambra. The Loan agreement of US \$27.2 Million between International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Federal Government of Nigeria FGN and \$500,000 Grant from Ford Foundation was effective on 20th January 2010.¹⁵⁹ It had a life span of 7 years period which will be completed on 30th September 2017. RUFIN program was implemented along with other four participating Institutions namely the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP), Bank of Agriculture (BoA) and Federal Department of Cooperative (FDC).

The major focus of this project was to link rural farmers to micro finance institutions for credit. Finance secured through RUFIN would then contribute effectively to poverty reduction through job creation, improve income and food security as well as to increase general living condition of the poor households, with particular focus on the rural poor and especially women, youths and the physically challenged. Other expected outcomes of RUFIN was:

- *To strengthen Rural Microfinance Institutions (RMFIs) and establish linkage between these institutions in order to create a viable and sustainable Rural Finance system.*
- *To form RMFIs that will metamorphose into Microfinance Banks (MFBs) in the rural areas.*
- *To provide a bottom-to-top capacity building training aimed at mentoring and strengthening the RMFIs.*
- *To link the RMFIs to the RUFIN mentored and CBN certified 7 MFBs to provide credits and alternative external refinance like Microfinance Development Fund from CBN.*
- *To enable the RMFIs and members develop sustainable saving habits after their farm harvests to break off from chronic abject poverty chains as one of the MDG goals.*¹⁶⁰

The RUFIN beneficiaries were selected from the following farming communities:

- i. *8 communities from Ayamelum LGA in Anambra North Senatorial Zone.*

- ii. *16 communities from Orumba North LGA in Anambra South Senatorial Zone*
- iii. *10 communities from Awka North LGA, Anambra Central Senatorial Zone.*¹⁶¹

RUFIN has helped to strengthen Rural Microfinance Institutions (RMFIs) and establish linkages between these institutions in order to create a viable and sustainable Rural based Finance Inclusion. The Oraukwu microfinance bank which was one of the collaborating banks testified that the farmers have imbibed the culture of taking bank credit for farming purposes. The bank, in a meeting with the staff of the Partnership Coordination Department, RUFIN project officials and farmers from Amanuke stressed that a good number of farmers were prompt in loan repayment.¹⁶² Some of the key achievements recorded by the 2013 end of the year review meeting as presented by the program coordinator were:

- *No of RMFIs formed & strengthened: -----737*
- *No of RMFIs linked to MFBs:-----605*
- *No of loan beneficiaries:-----951*
- *No of people In savings groups:-----14,689*
- *No of RUFIN Apex Groups formed & strengthened as service providers in FGN's Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA):--24*
- *Amount of deposits mobilized :-----N8,974,622*
- *Amount of loan disbursed by RUFIN MFBs:-----N67,375,000*
- *Total amount of loan recovered:----- N39,212,050*
- *Total outstanding loan due for recovery:---N2,920,218*
- *Total loan not due for recovery:----- N25,242,732*
- *No of new women village savings groups formed: -----31*
- *No of RMFIs receiving services from RUFIN apex groups.---494.*¹⁶³

By 2017, towards the end of the project some of the recorded achievement include the following:

- i. *Two thousand, one hundred (2,100) benefitted (six hundred males and one thousand-five hundred females) from RUFIN Mentored microfinance institutions (MFI's).*
- ii. *Five hundred and eighty (580) farmers (two hundred Males, two hundred and eighty Females and one hundred youths) were trained by RUFFIN on group dynamics of training of trainers.*

- iii. *Increased no of Voluntary Savers to two thousand, four hundred and twenty-four (2,424) (Seven hundred and thirty-six males and one thousand, six hundred and eighty-eight females).*
- iv. *Trainings were given to farmers on Entrepreneurial Development, Gender Action Learning System, concept of village savings and credit groups' formation and volunteer networking*
- v. *Procurements of office equipment from state counterpart fund for: one Hilux Van for project monitoring and evaluation from draw down, four desktop computers to RUFIN MFBs, six laptop computers for data capturing, two desktop Computers, one set of digital video and photographic cameras, six sets of office furniture and one set of power point projector for trainings.*
- vi. *Regularly organized monthly review meeting for management staff to address challenges, quarterly meetings for the program steering committee and organized Strategic meetings for program stakeholders which include management Microfinance Institutions, Central Bank of Nigeria Bank of Agriculture and volunteers from which ideas were harnessed.*¹⁶⁴

RUFIN indeed recorded high number of beneficiaries and some successes. However, it was plagued by delay in the release of the government counterpart contribution which affected the overall program as actions did not occur as planned in line with the workplan. There was also delay in accessing the microfinance development fund to finance the MFBs. RUFIN objectives was further hampered the overall project success and further revealed that RUFIN objectives were further constrained by, delay in providing all the working aids from FGN/IFAD drawdown, high cost and unavailability of agro inputs, recent flood disaster in 2017, poor road networks in the rural areas and the fear of saving money in the banks by the rural farmers.

IFAD/FGN/ANSG/Local Government Councils (LGCs)/ Community Interest Groups (CIGs), 2014-2020

Another donor supported program under the Agriculture sector in the state was, the Anambra State Value Chain Development Program (ANSVCDP). The ANSVCDP was an International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) assisted program. It was co-financed by the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Anambra State Government (ANSG), the three participating Local Government Councils and the Communities/Commodity Interest Groups (CIGs).¹⁶⁵ The goal of the program was to reduce rural poverty and achieve accelerated economic growth on a sustainable basis. VCDP has entered into partnerships and collaboration with the Private sector, agencies and institutions (JIICA, NCAM, IITA, NSM, Stine Industries) in order to strengthen beneficiaries' capacities in production and post-harvest handling of their products.¹⁶⁶

The target groups selected for value addition program are categorized into two. Primary target group: (i) Poor rural households engaged in cassava and rice value chain (not more than 5ha). (ii) Small scale processors (processing capacity of 2mt/day for cassava and 4mt/day for rice. (iii) Marketers (with reasonable volume of produce) with emphasis on women and youths. Secondary target group: (i) Downstream operators linked to large number of primary target group. (ii) Local government councils. (iii) Communities strengthened to sustainably manage marketing infrastructure supported by the program. (iv) Private sector operators strengthened to provide quality services.

Anambra state VCDP focused on three dimensions: 1. Agricultural market development 2. Smallholders enhancement and Productivity: Sensitizations are organized for stakeholders and farmer organizations across Local government areas 3. Program Management and coordination, Anambra State VCDP promotes two commodities; rice and cassava through farmer organizations (Producers, processors and marketers). The participating LGAs in Anambra state include: Anambra East, Anambra West & Ayamelum (first tier began 2014- 2015); and in 2016 Orumba North and Awka North were included.

VCDP experienced some delay in actual commencement of the program especially in the release of funds as the end of 2017, some of their recorded achievements were:

- i. *Designed Environmental Social Management Plan (ESMP) for all infrastructures - land development, rural farm roads, rural market, water supply, irrigation schemes, agro-processing Centers – to mitigate environmental impact.*
- ii. *Developed Two hundred (200) hectares of farm land in order to encourage mechanized agriculture.*
- iii. *Established Commodity Alliance Forum and Partnership at State and LGA levels to bring all relevant stakeholders to address common issues.*¹⁶⁷

Environmental Sector

Under this section, focus shall be placed on two sub-sectors: erosion control sub sector under the Nigerian Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) and Water, Hygiene and Sanitation sector (WASH).

Erosion Control Sub-Sector

World Bank/Global Environment Facility (GEF)/ Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) 2013-2020

Southern states of Nigeria are plagued by erosion, but erosion is a peculiar environmental problem in Anambra state as almost all communities in the state are affected by one form of erosion or the other. In fact Anambra is currently the home of the biggest gully erosion in west Africa! The famous erosion site which is the Agulu-Nanka-Okoko set of gullies that is so terrifying that it has been declared a national disaster. Soil erosion, is the removal of rock and soil material by natural processes, principally running water, glaciers, waves, and wind. Available statistics indicated the presence of about 500 gully erosions spread across the rural communities... notable areas include: Aguata/Orumba L.G.A's with about 78 gullies, Nnewi 60, Njikoka/Aniocha 50 gullies, Idemili 46, Ihiala 40, Awka 30, Onitsha 22, Anambra/Oyi 16 gullies.¹⁶⁸ Presence of gullies such as the Agulu-Nanka-Okoko has been blamed on natural causes, overgrazing, lack of crop rotation, inappropriate farming techniques such as planting vegetation down the contour instead of along it, removal of

vegetative cover due to farming activities, deforestation due to logging and construction activities, diversion of run-off into defective drainage channels, housing activities, burrow pits along highways, quarrying activities for building construction and population increase leading to high intensity of human pressure on land.

Following series of effort of past government administration, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and World Bank (WB) collaborated to launch and sponsor the Nigerian Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP). Mr Chikelue Chuka-Okeke the NEWMAP procurement officer revealed that, the funding arrangement has a loan component from International Development Association (IDA) (who facilitated the thirty-year loan to Nigeria with a low interest of 0.005%) and a grant component from Global Environment Facility (GEF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).¹⁶⁹ The project became effective from September 2013 until 2020 and was designed to primarily support state-led investments to tackle soil erosion, its associated climate variability and change in specific sub watersheds. Initial intervention activities commenced with seven state-Abia, Anambra, Cross River, Ebonyi, Enugu, Edo and Imo. But from 2015 more states continued to join until twenty states of the federation were all participants in NEWMAP. Anambra in 2014 paid its government counter-part funding of five hundred million naira (N500m) to finally qualify to draw from the fund and commence project implementation that same year.¹⁷⁰

Based on its collaboration with the World Bank, NEWMAP has been controlling erosion in these thirteen sites across the state: St. Thomas Aquinas/Neros Plaza, Amachalla, New Heritage/Omagba, Ekweme Square/Federal High Court, Ugamuma-Obosi, Ikenga Ogidi, Enugwu-Ukwu, Abidi Umoji, Nkpor Flyover, Nnewichi, Ojoto, Ire-Obosi and Abagana. Activities are however most focused on the first four sites.

To appreciate the extent of what has been achieved so far by the NEWMAP project, there is need to highlight some of the steps and key success factors that have been applied in the running of the project under Micheal Ivenso, the Project Coordinator. These according to him include: a holistic watershed management approach, community participation/ownership, effective supervision and project management, action planning, technical support from the World Bank and safeguards.¹⁷¹ Safeguards are taken to mitigate certain potential impacts include the preparation of an

Environmental Safeguards and Management Plan (ESMP), Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and monitoring and evaluation baseline studies.

Prior to the physical construction repairs at an erosion site, the Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) is designed and it provides a framework of procedures through which NEWMAP will develop and implement environmental, social, health, and safety management systems and processes that will establish a foundation for sound mitigation of adverse impacts, enhancement of positive impacts, institutional responsibilities, indicative costs for mitigation and eventual monitoring of the ESMP.¹⁷² Total cost for the implementation of the ESMP developed for the rehabilitation of the Amachalla gully erosion site is estimated at USD 56,350.00 (fifty-six thousand, three hundred and fifty million dollars only).¹⁷³

Likewise, the Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan (ARAP)/ Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) will be prepared for each site. It is equally mandated that prior to construction, resettlement and livelihood restoration for the RAPs must be done. This meant that owners of the eroded land and the 10 meters around the eroded land (such land is eventually repaired and owned by the state government) must be duly compensated. Residents/tenants of building structures very close to the site with fragile health conditions, such as asthma and age-related issues, who may likely be adversely impacted by project activities must be temporarily relocated during the construction phase and be compensated for the inconveniences of relocation. Owners of farm land and economic trees or other valuables must also be compensated. Stakeholders consultation is a very important part of the ESMP process, as different groups in the community would be consulted. Consultations would also done with the identified Project Affected Persons (PAPs) to gather their concerns regarding the rehabilitation of the gully and how the project may affect them at the long run. Equally important is the setup of a community grievance redress mechanism through which complaints and disagreements can be smoothly resolved. It is anticipated that this would allow an unencumbered platform for people to express their dissatisfaction over compensation as well as avoid unnecessary legal delays as may arise. Costs for all these safeguards are borne by the state counterpart contribution.

Various alternatives to the planned design for the rehabilitation of each site are evaluated by professional and the best approach adopted. Options include: use of the rock lined chute, wood drop structure, vegetated overfall structure or do nothing alternative. In an interview with Mr Ejikeme Onuchukwu, the NEWMAP Environmental Safeguards officer, he revealed that the successful implementation of these safeguards process to conform, with the stipulated World Bank standard could take up to one to two (1-3) years for each site.¹⁷⁴ He further revealed that duration for actual construction of each site varied between (two to three) 2-3 years and that NEWMAP work on a batch of four erosion projects sites at a time for maximum effectiveness.¹⁷⁵

Table 4.10 Status of the 13 NEWMAP Erosion Sites as at August 2019

S/N	NEWMAP Projects Sites	LGA (Location)	Size	Population Impacted	% Completion
1	St. Thomas Aquinas/Neros plaza erosion site	Awka South	Length 122m, Average Width of 18m, Dept 8m	5,097	100
2	Amachalla erosion site	Awka South	Length 50m, Average Width of 30-40m, Dept 20m	5,072	97
3	New heritage/omagb a erosion site	Onitsha North	Length 400m, Average Width of 25m, Dept 15m	27,035	94
4	Ekwueme square/fed. High court-Phase I	Awka South	Length 0.32 and 0,05km, Average Width of 20m, Dept 16m	5,023	99
5	Ugamuma obosi erosion site	Idemili North	Length 4,303m, Average Width of 17.7m, Dept 5.1m	13,700	27.32
6	Ikenga ogidi erosion site	Idemili North	Length 1,697m, Average Width of 5.87m, Dept 4.7m	17,410	26
7	Enugwu ukwu erosion site	Njikoka	Length 1,927.87m, Average Width of 5.86m, Dept 4.7m	10,000	13
8	Abidi umujoi erosion site	Idemili North	Length 2,400m, Average Width of 23.5m, Dept 23.1m	16,274	31.42

9	Nkpor flyover erosion site	Onitsha North	Length 1,545m, Average Width of 505m, Dept 20m	11,000	43
10	Nnewichi erosion site	Nnewi North	Length 3,730m, Average Width of 110m, Dept 27m	52,824	18
11	Ojoto erosion site	Idemili South	Length 3,950m, Average Width of 41m, Dept 33m	6,694	36
12	Ire obosi erosion site	Idemili North	Length 4,150m, Average Width of 103m, Dept 53m	5,000	35
13	Abagana erosion site	Njikoka	Length 7.9km, 12.66 hectares	8,352	27

Source: *Official document of the Anambra State Project Management Unit of NEWMAP¹⁷⁶*

It is worthy to note that while three of these sites especially, Amachalla, New Heritage/Omagba, Ekwueme Square/Fed. High Court Phase I (contracted in the first phase for palliative work only) appeared nearly completed. But they are not certified completed by NEWMAP until the construction executed on the site by the contractor has been observed without damage for one and a half year. Any structural error recorded would mean recalling the contractor. It is also note worthy that palliative work has been carried out in in all 13 active sites by NEWMAP. This means that the worst damage has been controlled and the site would no longer spread unchecked for some time. Below is the pictorial presentation to further show before (2013) and after (2019) achievement/activities of NEWMAP in the eroded sites. NEWMAP is currently making plans to commence an intervention in the Nanko-Oko-Ekwulobia site.

Fig. 4.10 Before Photo and After of St. Thomas Aquinas/Nero Plaza Erosion Site in Awka.



Source: NEWMAP Detailed Pictorial Reference Booklet.¹⁷⁷

Figure 4.11 Before and After Photo of St. Thomas Aquinas/Nero Plaza Erosion Site in Awka.



Source: NEWMAP Detailed Pictorial Reference Booklet.¹⁷

Fig. 4.12 Abagana Erosion Site, 2013 Before NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁷⁹

Fig. 4.13 Re-awarded Abagana Erosion Site, 2019 during NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Field Work¹⁸⁰

Fig. 4.14 Amachalla, Awka Erosion Site, 2013 Before NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁸¹

Fig. 4.15 Amachalla , Awka Erosion Site, 2019 During NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Field Work¹⁸²

Fig. 4.16 New Heritage Omagba/Onitsha Erosion Site, 2013 before NEWMAP



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁸³

Fig 4.17 New Heritage Omagba/Onitsha Erosion Site, 2019 During NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Field Work¹⁸⁴

Fig. 4.18 Nnewichi Erosion Site, 2013 Before NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit of NEWMAP¹⁸⁵

Fig. 4.19 Nnewichi Erosion Site, 2019 During NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Field Work¹⁸⁶

Fig. 4.20 Ekwueme Square/Fed. High Court Erosion Site, 2013 Before Phase I NEWMAP



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁸⁷

Fig. 4.21 Ekwueme Square/Fed. High Court Awka Erosion Site, 2019 During NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁸⁸

Fig 4. 22 Nkpor Flyover Erosion Site, 2013 Before NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁸⁹

Fig 4.23 Nkpor Flyover, Erosion Site, During NEWMAP Intervention, 2019



Source: Field Work¹⁹⁰

Fig. 4.24 Abidi Umuoji Erosion Site, 2013 Before NEWMAP Intervention



Source: Anambra State Project Management Unit, NEWMAP¹⁹¹

Fig. 4.25 Abidi Umuoji, Erosion Site, During NEWMAP Intervention, 2019



Source: Field Work¹⁹²

With the intervention of NEWMAP, there has been enormous emotional and economic relief to affected persons whose buildings, ancestral lands and livelihoods were under imminent threat of destruction by gully erosion. Additionally, the intervention has and would improve flow of traffic in and out of the project area neighborhood upon completion, reduce costs of transport and delays on travelling along the access roads, improve livelihoods for the area residents and provide temporary job opportunities for both skilled and un-skilled laborers. The intervention has also improved agricultural productivity within the community and Anambra state at large. It has promoted afforestation programs (with all its benefits), minimized flooding and control of coastal overflow. It has tried to reduce fear of loss of property, increased the life span of roads, social interactions, opportunities for easy inter-state movement and business development. It also promoted goodwill and community appreciation of the NEWMAP intervention in Anambra State and Nigeria at large.

Interviewed respondents and immediate beneficiaries who lived very close to various erosion sites and nearly suffered irrevocable loss before the intervention had some remarks about NEWMAP. Mrs Anigbogu Florence, from Amachalla Awka, reiterated how her family lost a portion of their land with every rain fall, until NEWMAP intervened...she was even made a NEWMAP Ambassador and have been sponsored to places such as Abuja, Kano, Nairobi to tell her story and she further expressed her thanks to God, World Bank, NEWMAP and the state Governor for their assistance.¹⁹³ Chief Nzeakor from Abagana community, noted that NEWMAP intervention brought a wave of hope to Abagana and prayed for the quick completion of the project.¹⁹⁴ Mrs Theresa Okoye, a widow whose only source of income was from house rents recounted how all her tenants moved away from the three-story building and she nearly lost the house in erosion at Nkpor.¹⁹⁵ She noted that her husband died as a result of the money sunk into checkmating the erosion to no avail and recalled how she was miraculously rescued at the last minute, paid compensation of her tenancy in full and relocated to safety by NEWMAP while the erosion already eroding the foundations of her house, was controlled.¹⁹⁶ It appeared that NEWMAP intervention has been of great benefit. Micheal Ivenso was also applauded as an exceptional leader and the only Project Coordinator in Nigeria that has completed a project under budget, in record time and also returned excess fund to the World Bank.¹⁹⁷

On the other hand, some adverse environmental and socio-economic impacts arose from the intervention including: increased fugitive dust emission during preconstruction and construction phases of the rehabilitation, construction waste generation, possibility of seepage of fuel from machineries and effluent discharge into the watershed, thus impacting on the water quality. Also, site clearing led to loss of species diversity and abundance, including soil organisms, fungi, and bacteria. Noise and vibration from heavy-duty project vehicles and equipment resulted in nuisance for rural dwellers, increased frequency and incidence of occupational hazards may rise during construction activities. Loss of employment for laborers after the completion of the rehabilitation works would also be recorded. Again, the NEWMAP budget is oversubscribed by many states and since late 2018, the world Bank intervention fund was exhausted therefore causing a cease stop or further delay in constructions in some sites pending the commencement of the expected NEWMAP Additional Financing project.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sub Sector

European Union/ UNICEF, 2005-2011

The Federal Government of Nigeria in 1997 commenced the process of reforming water resource, in order to establish effective, efficient, functional, and implementable policy in the sector. In support of the reform process, the European Commission (EC), through the European Development Fund (EDF) agreed with the Federal Government, in December 2004, to fund the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Program (WSSSRP-I) at a total cost of one hundred and nineteen million pounds, sixty three thousand (£119.63 million).¹⁹⁸ The three tiers of Government (Federal, State and Local Government) and beneficiary communities would contribute thirty one million, forty-three thousand pounds (£31.43 million) and UNICEF one million, two hundred thousand pounds (£1.2 million).¹⁹⁹ The program commenced from July 2005 until 2011 and was implemented in the six focal states of Anambra, Cross-River, Osun, Kano, Jigawa, and Yobe.²⁰⁰ The overall objectives of the WSSSRP was to provide support for institutional and policy reforms,

demonstrate innovative approaches to service delivery and assist in the implementation of water supply and sanitation projects. The specific objectives of WSSSRP I were:

1. To improve water governance at federal level;
2. To improve water governance at state and LGA levels in the six focal states;
3. To improve water service delivery in urban areas in the six focal states;
4. To deliver water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion services in a sustainable and integrated manner in up to 1000 rural communities and 60 small towns in 25% of LGAs in the six focal states.²⁰¹

The rural water supply and sanitation component of the sector reform program under “objective 4” (mentioned above) was to be implemented by UNICEF through, Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies (RUWASAs), and LGA Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Depts/Units and community bodies at the State level. Under WSSSRP I, a joint WSSSRP working group (including UNICEF, SRIP, FGN and EC) adopted a performance-oriented approach based on commitment to governance reform known as Self Selection Criteria. Self-Selection Criteria is a set of standards which implementing states such as Anambra must adopt to select 25% of LGAs that the program would be implemented in. The reason was to ensure that the focal LGAs were selected in a transparent manner without any political interference or any other bias. The criteria for self-selection of small towns included: availability of population range (5,000-20,000 people); demonstration of willingness to own, operate and maintain WASH services; demonstration of willingness to pay cash contribution for capital costs, presence of legal framework in the State for transfer of ownership of WASH services; shortage of water and an existing market for water in the town; absence of free water schemes; and prevalence of water related diseases: onchocerciasis, filariasis, guinea worm and malaria etc.²⁰²


Anambra State Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (AN-RUWASSA or RUWASSA) is the implementing agency of the EU/UNICEF WSSSRP and one of the bodies that make up the state Ministry of Public Utilities. Its activities are basically in rural communities though often times their activities are extended to small towns. Activities of RUWASSA Centers on WASH (Water,

Sanitation, and Hygiene), increasing access to safe water resource to the citizens, combating water bone and excreta-related diseases, and thereby, improving the living condition of the populace.


RUWASSA tried to meet its objectives active during this EU/UNICEF WSSRRP I (the ninth European Development Fund -EDF). Water projects were implemented in five focal LGAs: Aguata, Anambra East, Ogbaru, Idemmilli South and Nnewi North. According to a study by Dominic, Ezeabsili and Okoro, WSSSRP I were not all that successful as a result of some limitations and delays, due to fund-sharing outline used...These fund-sharing ratios were as follows, UNICEF /EU 47.5%, FGN 25%, State Govt 12.5%, LG 10%, and benefitting community 5%... note that during the end of the projects another fund-sharing ratio was introduced with the EU-UNICEF and the State government sharing the whole project cost, and EU-UNICEF taking up the 75% of the total cost.²⁰³

Several rural water projects were completed during WSSSRP I in the State and some of these were hand pump boreholes, motorized boreholes and solar powered boreholes. In 2007-2103, UNICEF also sponsored some boreholes in line with MDG projects.


Fig. 4.26 MDG Borehole Projects in Schools




MDGs Water Project at Ezi-Awka Community Secondary School, Awka, Awka South LGA



Water Project at Igweamaka Primary School, Abagana, Njikoka LGA




Water Project at Igwebuikwe Grammar School, Awka, Awka South LGA




MDGs Water Project at Ilowodo Primary School, Ogidi, Idemili North LGA

Source: Adapted from MDG-Conditional Grant Scheme, 2007-2013²⁰⁴


Fig. 4.27 MDG Borehole Projects in Schools




MDGs Water Project at Onitsha North LG Headquarters



MDGs Water Project at State Primary School, Nteje, Oyi LGA



MDGs Water Project at Udeke Primary School, Abagana, Njikoka LGA



MDGs Water Project at Udoka Primary School, Amawbia

Source: Adapted from MDG-Conditional Grant Scheme, 2007-2013²⁰⁵

In 2008 nine hand pump boreholes were constructed at different locations in Ogbaru LGA. These location were Umueze-Akili Ogidi, Umuedem-Akili Ogidi, Igbuzor-Ossomala, Isiolu-Ossomala, UgoloOssomala, Community Primary school Akili Ogidi, Community Primary School Umunankwo, Community Primary School Ossomala and Community Primary School Ogbakuba.²⁰⁶ It is noteworthy that EU-UNICEF was the sole sponsor of the last four water borehole projects from the list of the Water boreholes built in Ogbaru in 2008. In fact, EU/UNICEF solely sponsored some of the water projects from 2008 to 2011, tagged EU-UNICEF Phase-1 School Borehole; successfully executed in eighteen primary schools in the State.²⁰⁷

From 2009 there was a change in use of technologies from mostly hand pump water boreholes to motorized water boreholes. In 2010, there was a sharp decline from the number of boreholes completed from thirty-four in the previous year to fourteen as a result of delayed funding from the federal government.²⁰⁸ By 2011, twenty borehole projects were sponsored for various primary schools in Ogbaru, Anambra East, Nnewi North, Aguata, Idemilli and in the same year 2011, EU-UNICEF Additional Fund Project (Anambra Reward Project) started in various Secondary schools in the State, but this time is was not restricted only to the five local government areas alone.²⁰⁹ All the water boreholes built during this program were all solar powered boreholes and jointly sponsored by EU-Unicef and the State government.

In 2012, EU-UNICEF SRIP (Support to reforming Institutions Program) II social Investment program which was jointly sponsored by EU-UNICEF and the State government was carried out in thirty different site locations/Communities in Ogbaru local government are, and they were all solar powered water boreholes.

Subsequent to the 2012 flooding in Anambra State that devastated and polluted all of drinking water sources in the Anambra West, the Bill and Melinda Gate Foundation intervened and gave out aid to support the affected population as regard safe drinking water points. In 2013, ten hand pump water boreholes were completed in Anambra West under Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) Flood Emergency Water Projects.²¹⁰ In addition to the 2013 completed borehole projects in the state, UNICEF Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), in collaboration BMGF jointly funded to

completion three solar water boreholes built in two local governments (Anambra East and Anambra West).²¹¹

Despite the above achievements of WSSSRP I, its effectiveness and sustainability were affected. It was affected by power problems although solar powered pumps were later introduced but it had the major disadvantage of low water pumping speed which fluctuates as the weather condition changes thereby taking much time in serving people. Poor design and location of overhead water supply tanks, was also a challenge as some of these tanks were located at valleys with low pressure to transport water some far distances from the reserve. There was no routine maintenance of these water supply systems by the supposed Wash Committee maintenance technicians. Most maintenance on these water systems were carried out at the time of major breakdown of the system, and such repairs are often done or sponsored by some individual from the community. Likewise, WSSSRP I suffered inadequate fund for replication of programs/projects in non-focal communities and LGAs since the major sponsors (EU/UNICEF) of most of these water projects mainly focused their fund and resources on some selected communities. The delay from 2005-2008, in putting in place a cost sharing mechanism for counterpart funding and a comprehensive framework also resulted in loss of time of which more boreholes could have been drilled.

European Union (EU)/UNICEF, 2013-2017

The Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Program II (WSSSRP II) is a successor of WSSSRP I supported also by the European Union and ended in 2011.²¹² Both WSSSRP I and WSSSRP II was implemented in the same six States. They are Anambra, Cross River, Osun, Kano, Jigawa and Yobe States²¹³. WSSSRP II aimed at consolidating the achievements of the predecessor project with a view to addressing the remaining fundamental weakness of the Nigerian water and sanitation sector. The project was implemented in two LGAs of Aguata and Anambra East through a self-selection process.²¹⁴ The participating Small Towns which were also selected through a self-selection process include: Aguata: - Oraeri, Umuona, Ula-Ekwolobia, Akpo, Nkpologwu, Ihite-Igbo-Ukwu and Nkpologwu and Anambra East: - Mkpunamdo Otu, Umuatuolu-Umueri, Igbezune, Enugu-Aguleri, Nando, Umuoba-Anam Enugu-Otu.²¹⁵

As part of the process to qualify for the program, the state paid its 30% State Counterpart Contribution worth four hundred and seventy-seven million, eight hundred and seventy thousand naira (N477,870,000.00) to commence- the WSSSRP II in 2013.²¹⁶ Below are the summary of achievements made by WSSSRP II between 2014 to 2017. The following program results were recorded by 2014:

- i. Baseline Survey conducted and relevant data collected*
- ii. Water Consumer Associations (WCAs) formed and successfully Inaugurated*
- iii. Ten small towns of WSSSRP I were successfully assessed.*
- iv. Water Supply and Sanitation Technology Options for the selected ten small towns identified.*
- v. Retreat on the State Water Bill was held for members of Anambra State House (ANSH) Committee on Public Utilities in Lagos to facilitate the passage of the bill.*
- vi. Water and Sanitation projects in the selected small towns have been identified and preliminary designs completed.²¹⁷*

Access to Potable Water

In this area, from 2015 the following landmarks have been attained, or being attained:

- i. The construction of forty-seven (47) bore holes is on-going in thirty (30) communities, thirteen (13) primary schools and 4 health facilities in Aguata Local Government Area. On completion, these boreholes which are reticulated within 1KM radius is expected to provide access to potable water to eighty-one thousand, six hundred and seventy-seven (81,677) persons.*
- ii. Also, thirty-five (35) bore holes are being constructed in twenty-nine (27) communities, three (3) health facilities and five (5) primary schools in Anambra East LGA. On completion, sixty thousand, eight hundred and twenty-three (60,823) persons would have been provided access to safe water.²¹⁸*

In addition, as at 2016,

- iii. *Fifty-seven thousand, five hundred (57,500) people (M-28,475 & F- 29,025) gained access to safe water supply through construction of twenty-three (23) reticulated Solar powered MBH in 23 communities of Aguata and Anambra East LGAs;*
- iv. *Four (4) nos Health facilities in Aguata & Anambra East LGAs were provided with access to safe water supply;*
- v. *Water Safety Plan activities implemented in two hundred and twenty-eight 228 communities of five (5) LGAs of Aguata- forty-five (45), Anambra East-thirty (30), Idemili South-sixty (60), Orumba South-thirty (30) and Anambra West-sixty-three (63);*
- vi. *Rehabilitation of ten non-functional water supply facilities and reactivation of Iron removal system at Umunnoko Aguleri, all in Anambra East provided additional access to twenty-seven thousand, five hundred (27,500) people.²¹⁹*

Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

- i. *Two hundred and seventy-two (272) Communities in Aguata and Anambra East with a population of two hundred and thirty-six thousand, four hundred and twenty-four (236,424) (f-119,644: m-116,780) attained ODF and are verified.*
- ii. *Sixty- one (61) out of the above number have been validated by National Task Group on Sanitation (NTGS).*
- iii. *ODF celebrated by one hundred and two (102) communities of Aguata and Anambra East.*
- iv. *Thirty (30) communities of three (3) LGAs of Njikoka, Dunukofia & Awka South triggered on Community Led Total Sanitation and are being monitored to Open Defecation Free status.*
- v. *Seven thousand and forty (7,040 (F-3,590 and M-3,450) additional people gained access to improved household latrine through construction of eight hundred and eighty (880) new improved latrines in Aguata & Anambra East.*

- vi. *One hundred and eighty (180) ODF communities of Aguata and Anambra East certified by State Task Group on sanitation (STGS).*
- vii. *One hundred and twenty (120) EHCs/SBMC established in the two (2)LGAs.*
- viii. *Additional three thousand, three hundred and sixty (3,360) (1896 females and 1764 males) school pupils from ten (10) schools of Aguata & Anambra East LGAs have access to safe excreta disposal systems through construction and use of eighty-four (84) compartments of Pour Flush Latrines.*
- ix. *Anambra State commemorated the 2016 Global Hand washing Day with the climax of crowning Her Excellency, Mrs Ebelechukwu Obiano, Wife of the Executive Governor of Anambra State, the WASH Ambassador of the State because of her lead role in Water & Sanitation affairs.²²⁰*

Other Achievements:

- i. Constructed reticulated solar powered borehole at Community Secondary School, Achalla supported by the Canadian Government.
- ii. Constructed 2 units of 3-compart Pour Flush latrine at Girls Secondary School, Amawbia.²²¹

The table below detailed the functional water schemes constructed from 2014-2016.

Table 4.11 Functional Water Schemes built by RUWASA with the support of The European Union (EU) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

S/N	Location Address of water Facility	LGA	Status of work
1	Okwuchi Ezeada Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed & Functional
2	Eziagulu-Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed & Functional
3	Umuchiana-Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed but not functional due to failed pump
4	Ifite-Aguluezechukwu	Aguata	Completed & Functional
5	Enugwu-Aguluezechukwu	Aguata	Completed & Functional
6	Umuaezunu Eziagulu-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional

7	Egbeagu Eziagulu-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
8	Umugama Eziagulu-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
9	Umuanevili Eziagulu-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
10	Obinuno Umuano -Nando	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
11	Isinyi-Nando	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
12	Iruozobia-Umueri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
13	Umuanwuna Ifite-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed but contained iron and solar panels was blown away
14	Ugume-Umueri	Anambra East	Completed & functional but contained iron
15	Obinetiti –Umueri	Anambra East	Completed but solar blown away
16	Okpo-Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed & Functional
17	Ihuokpala-Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed & Functional
18	Amaka Enuamaifite -Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed & Functional
19	Obeagu Ezionye-Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed & Functional
20	Umume Umudege-Igboukwu	Aguata	Completed not functional due to pump failure
21	Ihuwele -Igboukwu	Aguata	Completed & Functional
22	Obiokpala Ozalla-Isuofia	Aguata	Completed & Functional
23	Ezioka-Isuofia	Aguata	Completed & Functional
24	Agbako Awarasi-Uga	Aguata	Completed & Functional
25	Ezihe Umueze-Uga	Aguata	Completed & Functional
26	Owololie Ifite-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
27	Umungalagu Ifite-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional but contained iron
28	Farm Settlement Village2 -Igbariam	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
29	Umuala Eziagulu-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
30	Umuekete-Aguleri	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
31	Nnadi-Nsugbe	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
32	Umuenini Enuguotu	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
33	Umuokpoto Enuguotu	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
34	Amumu-Nsugbe	Anambra East	Completed & Functional
35	Umundeze – Mmiata	Anambra East	95% Completed
36	Ononaku Isioji-Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed & Functional
37	Umuechefu-Igboukwu	Aguata	Completed & Functional
38	Umudim Ibughubu-Umuchu	Aguata	Completed & Functional

Source: Victor Ezekwo, RUWASSA Program Manager²²²

Summary:

Aguata: 18 number water bore holes/schemes

Anambra East: 20 number water bore holes/schemes.

Table 4.12 Sanitation Facilities built by RUWASA with the support of The European Union (EU) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

S/N	Location /Address of Sanitation Facility	LGA	Status of Work
1	Comm. P/S Ifite Aguluezechukwu	Aguata	Completed
2	Comm. P/S Eziagulu Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed
3	Comm. P/S Ekwulobia	Aguata	Completed
4	Akpunoji comm. P/S Obeagu-Ezinye Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed
5	Ngo P/S Ihuwerre-Igboukwu	Aguata	Completed
6	Mbalaonye P/S Agbako-Awarasi Uga	Aguata	
7	Central school Agbudu-Ani Nando	Anambra East	Completed
8	Ezinando P/S Isinyi Nando	Anambra East	
9	St. Pius Primary School Isioji-Ezinifite	Aguata	Completed
10	Nwagazi primary school umunwadim Umueze-Uga	Aguata	Completed
11	Ezioka Primary School, Isuofia.	Aguata	Completed
12	Primary school, Agba Ekwulobia.	Aguata	Completed
13	Town school Umumeobe Uhuana Ifite-Ezinifite	Aguata	
14	Union Primary School, Ezeigbo- Igboukwu.	Aguata	Completed
15	Town School, Obeagu Umeohana-Igboukwu	Aguata	
16	Central School, Enuguotu	Anambra East	Yet to effect corrections on anomalies

Source: Victor Ezekwo, RUWASSA Program Manager²²³

**The sanitation facilities include pour flush latrines and hand washing facilities*

In 2017, RUWASSA achieved the following:

- *Constructed additional 7 Solar powered mechanized boreholes out of 43 planned water schemes in 7 communities of Aguata and Anambra East LGAs thereby providing access to 17,500 persons (males 8,550 & females 8,950) reducing water borne diseases among children/women within the communities;*
- *Developed 120 Water Safety Plan (WSP) in 120 communities;*
- *Certified additional 51 out of 106 Open Defecation Free (ODF) claiming communities in Aguata and Anambra East LGAs;*
- *Sensitized over 1,200 Stakeholders on Open Defecation Free Roadmap in the 3 Senatorial zones/179 autonomous communities of Anambra State thereby creating awareness on state-wide ODF by 2025;*
- *Established Volunteer Hygiene Promoters (VHPs) in communities of Aguata and Anambra East LGAs for sustainability of good hygiene practices;*
- *Recorded two new LGAs that have their investment plans in place through WASH Infrastructure mapping and development of LGAs WASH Profile report.²²⁴*

There is no doubt that water sector of the state has received good attention from donors and their efforts has increased access to clean and portable water supply, eco-friendly communities, promoted a culture and consciousness of hygiene among benefiting citizens in the state. However, it is not all good news as the intervention had some gaps that impeded its efficiency. Many solar powered boreholes across the state were no longer functioning nor can repairs be readily made because of the scarcity of solar submersible pumps in the state and country. There are also reported rampant theft of solar pumps by communities despite attempts to safeguard them. Field work was carried out to random WSSSRP locations across the state in 2017 to ascertain firsthand the condition of these acclaimed water projects by RUWASSA.

During a visit to Farm Settlement Primary School, Igbariam (LOT 6), it was observed that 2 units 3 compartments pour flush toilet were constructed in the school compound in lieu of the 2 units 5

compartments pour flush toilet that was supposed to be constructed. Around the project completed in May 22nd, 2017, there were open defecation and littering of the toilet environment with wastes. While the borehole was functional, it did not have a controlling unit and this resulted to overflow of water each time the water tanks were filled. Mrs Augustina Akwanya, the Headmistress of the school however relayed that the pupils and teachers of the school appreciated the efforts of RUWASSA for the projects constructed in their School regardless of the immediate minor challenges.²²⁵ It is noteworthy to point out that Igbariam community is not open defecation free and requires more action to address the situation in that location. Also that the residents of the area need to imbibe project maintenance culture to help elongate the lifespan of their projects.

At Igbariam Community (Lot 9), the presence of borehole, overhead tank, solar pump and panels, perimeter fence and signboard (Main unit and 3 Extension) was observed. The project completed on April 30, 2016 was functional and in good condition. Oraekwe Arinze, a Committee member of the community revealed that the community gathered themselves into 3 groups tasked with maintaining the borehole, keeping the environment clean and ensuring adherence with the law that no one fetches water from the bore as from 7pm.²²⁶ He also expressed his gratitude to the State Government and UNICEF for their supports.

At Umuala Eziagulu – Aguleri, a borehole, overhead tank, solar pump and panels, perimeter fence and signboard (main unit and 3 Extension) installed by RUWASSA in February 2015 was functional. Odikpo Michael, the Chairman of the Community revealed that, members of the community are delighted about the construction of the project and the community resolved to sell water at N5 per gallon to enable them raise up to N400, 000.00 which is 1/3 of N1.2 Million used for the project.²²⁷ He further revealed that they opened an account at First Bank, Otuocha where they deposit all the cash realized from the water sales and make repairs from the borehole/site from their money as the need arises...however, amount of sales recorded in two weeks is N2,000 or N3,000 but was reduced to N500 or N700 because of the rainy season.²²⁸ While it is commendable that the community maintain their boreholes, it is not good that they sell water that should have been free of charge therefore forcing some community members to go elsewhere to fetch water without payment.

At Ugume Umeri (Lot 12), a borehole, overhead tank, solar pump and panels, perimeter fence and signboard was installed in 2014 but was not functional. Interview with Mr Nwave-Ogugua Michael, Chairman of the Community revealed that the community was enjoying the water until it broke down and that the colour of the water changed overtime due to the presence of zinc on the ground.²²⁹ He hoped that faulty borehole would be restored soon as especially aged persons in the community found it difficult to fetch water. Overall, these interviews revealed that RUWASSA mostly delivered on their claim. However, the issue of maintenance of installed projects needs to be resolved. A functioning mechanism needs to be put in place to ensure that projects are enjoyed at all times as in line with the project objectives of EU/UNICEF.

Fig. 4.28 Photo of Governor Willie Obiano commissioning UNICEF sponsored RUWASSA borehole at Nando, Anambra East in February, 2016



Source: <https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/204927/obiano-commissions-27-solar-powered-boreholes-in-aguata-ana.html>²³⁰

Fig.4.29 Photo taken during interview with Mr. Ike Christian, secretary to the WASH com unit Aguata at Ezinifite Aguata in 2018



Source: <https://kapital929.fm/community-ownership-catalyst-for-project-sustainability>²³¹

Fig.4.30 Photo of UNICEF supported RUWASSA water project at Anwuli Primary School, Ezinifite Aguata in 2018



Source: <https://kapital929.fm/community-ownership-catalyst-for-project-sustainability>²³²

Fig.4.31 Photo of UNICEF supported RUWASSA water project at Nnando, Anambra East



Source: Victor Ezekwo, RUWASSA Program Coordinator²³³

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE

CHALLENGES OF DONOR AGENCIES AND DEVELOPMENT

Several challenges confront aids or grants administration in most developing nations of the third world¹. As a result of this, many aid initiatives have not seen the light of day as they are diverted to satisfying appetites of a few, and for which the aids were never meant for. The mal-administration of aid in these countries, Nigeria inclusive, made some of the donor agencies wary of lending further assistance; and where they still render assistance, they become excessively rigid and procedural which in turn negatively impact on the rationale of the aids in the first place².

What this chapter seeks to do is to look at some of these challenges, and examine if there are any likely way forward. It under took this examination within the ambit of : underlying motive of donors, donor fragmentation and proliferation, paucity and delays in the release of funds, inadequate work tools/ logistics and manpower, poor road networks in rural areas, level and quality of stakeholders' participation, corruption and capital flight, aid dependency, indebtedness, and dumping of obsolete technologies in the TWCs, among others³.

Underlying Motive of Donors

The argument some scholars have put forward is that one of the greatest obstacles hindering donor agencies and their activities from really engendering development in recipient countries is the selfish or ulterior motive that characterize aids donations⁴. To these scholars, aids always go with conditionalities that place the recipient countries at a disadvantaged position where they become dependent and their every action circumscribed along the whims and caprices of the donor agencies⁵. For instance, most times, aids issuance also means that aids (loans or grants) must be expended on goods and services from the donor country rather than on the recipient's choice of goods or services⁶.

Yet, the aids givers defend these conditionalities on the basis of the fact that without them the aids recipients could abuse the gestures. More specifically, the donor agencies justify their stringent conditionalities on the grounds⁷ of:

Safeguarded repayment of donor loans: A case is often made that conditionality of assistance is required to ensure that the project is implemented as agreed to ensure that the donor gets repaid according to the terms of lending. This is a weak argument as repayment of loans would depend critically upon a recipient's credit worthiness rather than any loan conditions. In addition, sovereign default on international borrowing has serious economic and fiscal consequences for the defaulter and as a result is relatively rare. International capital markets also exact a strong penalty for such defaults, thereby discouraging such perverse behavior. Therefore, safeguarding repayment of donor loans may be a weak premise for imposing loan conditions.

Strengthened recipient ownership of the assisted programs: Conditionality often forces a recipient to make political choices on reform options and to commit to specific policy prescription. In the absence of conditionality, such hard choices could not be made and policy makers may be inclined to simply kick the can down the road.

Ensured integrity of donor-assisted operations: This was traditionally done by having a special management unit run assisted operations and having appropriate budgeting, accounting and auditing of such operations. Such special arrangements impose significant additional costs for the recipient while limiting local autonomy and holding little assurance for the most effective use of donor funds. In view of this, in recent years donors have emphasized the reform of governmental systems to ensure integrity of operations rather than creating parallel systems. Minimum standards of transparency, integrity and accountability of governmental systems should serve as a pre-requisite for such assistance rather than imposing specific loan conditions.

Influenced recipient priorities or as an inducement/incentive for reform: In cases where there were serious conflicts among donor and recipient priorities, it made sense to use loan funds as an inducement to influence local priorities. Loan conditions could be used to achieve this change. The success of such conditions, however, may be limited by the extent of the fungibility of funds. In the extreme case, when the recipient already spends more than the assisted funds and it is an area of low priority for the recipient, loan conditions may not have much impact in changing recipient priorities.

Paternalism: The donor knows best what is good for the recipient. Donor conditions frequently embodied an implicit judgment that the recipient lacks the knowledge to pursue economic policies that serve its best interest and donor agencies have better knowledge as to what would work best. The “Washington Consensus” and the “Modified Washington Consensus” are examples that shaped loan conditions in the 1980s and 1990s. Such policies, however, did not safeguard aid dictum of “do no harm”, as the consequences of failure of lending operations are only borne by the recipient.

Signaled to safeguard the commitment to reform by the recipient: Conditionality was also advocated as an indication that the recipient is accepting conditionality and its associated possible adverse political consequences to demonstrate a commitment to reform. In practice, however, such signal was typically done by recipients to shift blame to external actors to undertake domestically unpopular programs or to attribute failure of such programs.

Sustainability: Loan conditions were sometimes advocated to sustain an assisted program over political cycles to overcome time inconsistency of commitment. The success of such conditions is, however, not assured as the new political administration may seek to renegotiate or suspend such operations⁸.

Be that as it may, there have been efforts to remodel the design and delivery of external development assistance with a trend away from donor-imposed design and conditionality to

somewhat participatory approaches to the same with recipients given significant opportunity to influence donor-driven program design and conditionality⁹.

We now turn to looking at some of the specific donor conditionalities for loans and grants, and other aids.

To start with, it may be important to state that the IMF, World Bank and European Investment Bank lending instruments and conditionality have evolved over time. Until the early 1980s IMF loan conditions¹⁰ focused on macroeconomic policies and IMF staff had a free hand carrying out the diagnostics and developing conditions that a borrower must accept. In the ensuing two decades, the demand for IMF lending softened and the IMF carved out a growing role in competition with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank among others in lending assistance for structural reforms. This led to an explosive growth in IMF conditions with an average of 17 conditions per program per year¹¹.

However, various evaluation studies suggested that these conditions had little structural depth and weak compliance. The international financial crisis of 2008 led to an explosive demand for the IMF's Stabilization assistance program. This helped the IMF to streamline its conditionality in 2009 and have a greater focus on areas of its competency. The requirement that all conditionality must be macro-critical – that it is critical to the achievement of macroeconomic program goals – was reinforced¹².

Income inequality and unemployment concerns led the IMF to emphasize “macro-social” criticality of its loan conditions¹³. Its guidelines to this end also emphasized recipient country inputs on loan design and conditionality. The overall thrust of the guidelines was to have greater parsimony in conditions (now about five or less per program per year) and greater flexibility in program implementation provided there is assurance of achievement of program objectives¹⁴.

World Bank loan instruments¹⁵ and conditions had also significantly evolved over time. Prior to the 1980s World Bank lending assistance was focused on physical and social infrastructure projects with conditionality on procurement, implementation monitoring and auditing. The effectiveness of these loans was measured by project outcomes and by pre- and post-project rates of return¹⁶. Compliance record with these conditions was good and a large majority of these projects had ‘successful’ outcomes, but about a third of such “successful” operations were not sustainable. The project rates of return, however, appeared less useful as they showed a consistent over-optimism in *ex ante* rates of return. However, in the World Bank’s judgement, these projects could not address the broader policy and institutional malaise that hindered development. In the early 1980s, the World Bank brought a greater emphasis to policy and institutional reform through policy-based lending programs¹⁷.

Policy-based lending¹⁸ brought a newer kind of conditionality in lending that emphasized broader policy reforms through legislative and executive actions. These conditions varied in terms of specificity, clarity, monitorability, enforceability and difficulty in implementation¹⁹. Conditions also varied by the economic and political clout of the borrowing countries. Large upper middle-income borrowers typically faced softer conditions whereas small low-income countries were subjected to a degree of detail that could be misconstrued as micromanagement by an external aid agency²⁰.

The conditions typically embodied the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’²¹ on policy reform and emphasized trade liberalization, Privatization, public enterprise reforms, and fiscal policy and tax administration reforms. The conditionality of World Bank lending accompanied by newer windows such as enhanced assistance from China for infrastructure assistance contributed to a softening of the demand for World Bank lending during the period 2001-05²². Subsequent World Bank internal management reviews of adjustment lending²³ stated that changed economic circumstances in recipient countries called for a move from adjustment lending to programmatic lending to have a sharper focus on governance and institutional reforms. Program lending through development policy and sectoral

development loans would provide opportunities to develop comprehensive medium- to long-term reforms. Loan conditions for such programs are intended to emphasize country ownership and sustained commitments to reform and strict compliance with loan conditions would be de-emphasized provided the client is on track in achieving mutually agreed reform objectives²⁴.

Both World Bank lending instruments and associated loan conditions have undergone profound changes over the last 50 years. It should be noted nevertheless that while instituting this new shift in emphasis on results in development policy lending, the World Bank continues to follow traditional conditionality in its investment project assistance²⁵. There has been greater flexibility in lending instruments and associated conditions for development policy in recent years²⁶.

A significant part of lending simply provides general budget support. Lending emphasis have shifted from the “Bank knows best” to joint learning and a greater focus on an enabling environment for better economic and social outcomes²⁷. There is a greater emphasis now on local ownership. Still, there are residual concerns with the mutual accountability framework as donor agency staff are incentivized to approve and disburse loans with little accountability in the event of failure²⁸. The system of frequent rotating appointments shields individual World Bank staff from accountability for failure while taking credit for loan approval and disbursement. The burden of failure rests solely on the recipient’s shoulders with no adverse consequences for the World Bank as the World Bank being the prime creditor would almost always be repaid. This contrasts with private bank lending where loan failures have consequences both for the lender and the borrower. These perverse incentives are at the heart of the problem of limiting development effectiveness of loan conditions²⁹.

Furthermore, EU member states and the European Commission provide development assistance in the form of grants. Together, they constitute the *largest donor of such assistance*³⁰. EU/EC policies on conditionality have evolved over time. Traditional

conditionality with unilateral input - or process-based donor conditions with little harmonization across member states and the EC dominated the EU aid regime in the late 20th century. The EU also imposed political conditionality relating to democratization and human rights in recipient countries³¹. Non-compliance with these conditions has often led to inconsistent sanction responses across countries. EU aid programs suffered from excessive concerns with input-related tasks and financial and procedural controls and insufficient attention to project quality and almost no attention to results³².

However, with the dawn of the 21st century, the EU has actively pursued to improve aid effectiveness by playing an active role in important international agreements that aim to reform the delivery of economic assistance. These include the 2005 Paris Declaration, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, the 2011 Busan Outcome document, the 2014 Mexico Commitment, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2016 Brussels 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The overall thrust of these agreements is to reform donor-recipient relations using the following principles³³, covering the following areas:

- i. focus on country ownership
- ii. transparency and mutual accountability
- iii. unconditional assistance
- iv. focus on results
- v. focus on forging partnerships for development
- vi. predictability of assistance
- vii. focus on inclusive and sustainable development³⁴.

In recent years, EU members and the European Commission have made modest progress in bringing aid programs in conformity with the above principles. The European Commission adopted a results framework in 2015 that emphasizes developing a results-based chain for assurance that program activities and inputs are consistent with the objectives to be achieved³⁵. Significant progress has been made on country ownership and focus on inclusive

development. Modest progress has been made on unconditional assistance and partnership principles³⁶. Transparency and mutual accountability goals remain elusive. There had been reversals on aid predictability by member countries and the results focus seemed on intermediate inputs; mutual accountability remains a distant dream as country systems are rarely used by donor agencies³⁷.

Again, multilateral development agencies are gradually moving away from traditional conditionality that emphasized input-based conditions as a tool for leverage and control ensuring that assistance funds were used for the intended purposes following processes laid out by the donor agencies³⁸. These agencies have recognized that while the traditional conditionality was intrusive, it also undermined the effectiveness of their assistance by reducing flexibility in program design to meet local conditions by the recipients³⁹. The new view is that the conditionality should be specifically tailored to the special circumstances of each recipient and focus on an agreed framework that will facilitate monitoring progress to achieve jointly shared objectives. The conditionality therefore should be seen as a tool of mutual accountability and due diligence rather than of financial leverage and input controls⁴⁰.

The new conditionality also emphasized country ownership as the key to the success of the project/program and sees sustained dialogue as key to strengthening recipient ownership as well as meeting fiduciary due diligence requirements⁴¹. The new conditionality saw outcome-based results focus as a means to enhance development effectiveness. There was also an emphasis on having fewer conditions that are critical to the project's success and have the necessary buy-in of the recipient government. Multilateral agencies also emphasized placing a greater emphasis on general budget support and rewarding reforming countries for prior actions taken⁴². In practice, multilateral agencies continue to practice input-based conditionality for traditional investment projects. For structural and institutional reforms, much confusion remains among outcome, output and intermediate inputs conditionality. In many cases, multilateral agencies impose conditions on intermediate inputs but construe these as outputs or outcomes⁴³. Notwithstanding the results focus in

international aid dialogues, it should also be noted that bilateral grant assistance that dominated overall aid flows has not seen much transformation and this assistance primarily flows through project assistance with input-based conditionality⁴⁴.

Related to aids conditionalities is the fact that it is the donor agencies that determine aid volume and patterns and this serves to corrupt the purely developmental objectives often professed by the donor themselves⁴⁵.

To this end, aids issuance becomes part and parcel of the larger imperialistic agenda of the West to perpetuate the subordination of the TWCs⁴⁶. Viewed in this light, aids can never engender development in the recipient countries, at best, it will only showcase a semblance of it⁴⁷.

Aids issuance become a huge business to the aids-giving countries, as it gives them the opportunity to gain access to sectors and areas of the recipient economy that they would not have been able to gain access ordinarily⁴⁸. This has informed the fragmentation and proliferation of aids or donor agencies in the TWCs, Nigeria inclusive. The more donor agencies the big countries have in the developing countries the access they will have to the countries, and the more they could protect the interest of companies and corporations owned by citizens of their countries⁴⁹.

This situation also leads to donor collusion to undermine the recipient nations⁵⁰. They colluded to hide relevant information regarding up-to-date treatment for certain diseases, clean energy, economic self-sufficiency and technological innovation, thereby making the recipient nations receivers of outdated or obsolete machines and other technological facilities⁵¹. These countries become dumping grounds of the West, and now China. Through this collusion, they deliberately instigate aids volatility so that the recipient countries will always feel helpless, making it such that the more they look, the less they see⁵².

Also, donor agencies performances have been assessed in the light of individual projects rather than overall sector performance⁵³. This lack of enhanced accountability has led to numerous flash-in-the-pan “success stories” which are really just “development experiments”⁵⁴ that fail to achieve the expected impact because of a lack of scaling up⁵⁵. Added to this is the fact that very few development agencies undertake systematic client survey and where these are done, the results have little bearing on actual programs⁵⁶. Recipient countries are also not at liberty to substitute aid from one donor for a (more desirable) program offered by another partner without losing overall aid resources; and on the premise of ensuring accountability and transparency in the utilization of funds, donor agencies continue to build parallel systems to deliver aids attached with burdensome requirements even where recipient capacities are strong, taxing the limited administrative resources of recipient nations⁵⁷.

The implication of this argument is that foreign aids serve as an instrument for projecting the commercial and political interests of the donors rather than that of the recipients, to the extent that “the developmental objectives of aid programs have been distorted by the use of aid for donors’ commercial and political advantage”⁵⁸.

Paucity and Delay in the Release of Funds

Another challenge that impact negatively on the activities of the donor agencies vis-à-vis the development of the recipient countries is the issue of paucity or the delay in the release of funds⁵⁹. As explained above, most times it takes very long a period to get approval on agreed aids released from the donor agencies, even long after the counterpart funding from the local or state government has been provided⁶⁰. These delays further emasculate the efforts of the recipient developing nation like Nigeria to bring about rapid development to its citizens⁶¹

The delay or deliberate reduction in the amount of funds to the recipient countries is actually one way to perpetuate the enslavement of these needy nations⁶². Programs are also phased over decades, a period during which the donor countries and agencies would have gotten

more than triple the amount ever going to be spent on the recipient countries⁶³. They get this by paving way for the companies and corporations of their citizens in the foreign aid-dependent countries, especially in the areas of them getting oil and gas, construction and other juicy contracts from the host governments, getting waivers, etc⁶⁴. The citizens then gladly repatriate their excess profits back to their countries where they carry out real and permanent investment. Aids, to this end, become an instrument of development of underdevelopment – as the West and other donor agencies feast from the proceeds of aids the receiving nations agonize from its long-term tragic inevitabilities⁶⁵.

Inadequate Work Tools/ Logistics and Manpower

Added to this is the issue of inadequate tools, logistics and manpower⁶⁶. Most times, the states may not have very skilled public servants who have vast experience and expertise to be able to understand the intricacies in aids agreements, and how to operationalize them⁶⁷. This made the State to sometimes enter into aids agreements that they do not really understand, and so their countries or states become entangled in the gimmicks and wiles of the so-called donor agencies⁶⁸. Less than 10% of aid recipient are considered as having the sound framework required to monitor and assess development results and then a quarter, link their development strategies with their national budget. Herein lies the fetishization of aids⁶⁹.

Corruption: Capital Flight

Some of the direst challenges that confront donor agencies' activities in the recipient countries border on the issue of political and bureaucratic corruption⁷⁰. Corruption is pervasive in virtually all states in Nigeria, and it has often made mockery of developmental programs, projects and policies, no matter how laudably they might be at conception⁷¹. Corruption in Nigeria could be seen in the following lights:

- i. Corruption is multidimensional and pervasive; it can be political, economic, or social; it could be private or public, and it could be national or international;
- ii. Corruption is a betrayal or disappointment because it involves the abuse of trust;
- iii. Corruption is murderous as its consequences can lead to the abortion of citizens' lives;
- iv. Corruption is anti-development as it can lead to the obstruction of the implementation of public decisions and policies which could bring about rapid development in society;
- v. Corruption is image-damaging to a nation, as it makes nationals of other countries to treat citizens of a corrupt country with contempt, suspicion and distrust;
- vi. Corruption is criminal as it goes against state laws and codes of honest engagement;
- vii. Corruption leads to more corruption as the corrupt will want others to be corrupt like him so that his own corrupt practices can be shielded – this means that it breeds Kleptocracy: government of criminals, by criminals and for criminals;
- viii. Corruption is inadvertently encouraged and celebrated by society, because most societies, especially the one like Nigeria, do not consider the means of wealth accumulation but just the ends – to this end, people can commit all manners of forgery, thuggery, perjury, robbery and looting to become wealthy, and care less about the law; the religious leaders and members, traditional rulers and subjects, all help to deepen the wits of corrupters;
- ix. Corruption is anti-democracy as it injures the cardinal tenets of accountability, transparency and service to the people; it leads to government without governance,

military without security, judgement without justice, and administration without advancement;

- x. Corruption is ‘sustainable’ in Nigeria as far as you find your way to power, or associate yourself with those in power; this is because power gives security to corruption and protection to corrupters⁷².

Despite the paucity of the aids often given, when the aids come, they are diverted into fulfilling personal or political interests⁷³.

It has, however, been argued that foreign aid encourages corruption and capital flight, essentially because it is seen as free money⁷⁴. Even when the aids come as loans, nobody cares, because the loans usually take years to be repaid.

So, the money could be stolen and stored in numbered accounts in banks in the issuing countries. Scholars have linked external loans or debt to capital flight⁷⁵. They distinguish four possible linkages between the two: debt-driven capital flight, debt-fueled capital flight, flight-driven external borrowing and flight-fueled external borrowing. Some have analyzed the relationship between the two using what they term ‘revolving door model’⁷⁶. This model posits direct and indirect linkages between external debt and capital flight. One of the linkages posits a direct causal effect, whereby external debt provides the fuel and/or motivation for capital flight, and vice versa⁷⁷. Thus, external borrowings are transformed sometimes instantaneously from capital inflow to capital flight, ultimately ending up abroad, usually in private foreign accounts⁷⁸.

There are many ways in which capital flight can occur. The conduits are many and it is almost impossible to develop an exhaustive inventory of channels⁷⁹. Some of the most significant channels in Nigeria are discussed below.

Firstly, transfers can take place through cash or monetary instruments. These are usually in the form of either foreign or domestic currency, traveller’s cheques or other cheques. In the

early 1970s, stories abound about Nigerian currency being carried out of the country and exchanged in big financial Centers like London and New York to be exchanged legally for other currencies at current market rates. In spite of the present economic predicament, there are still some African countries where the naira is exchanged for other currencies in the course of trade⁸⁰.

Secondly, capital flight can take place through bank transfers from a local affiliate of a foreign institution to a designated recipient abroad. This is possible at the market rate where no constraints or restrictions are in place⁸¹. Transfers can still be possible in the face of exchange controls but possibly at a less favorable rate. The history of the development of banking institutions in Nigeria shows the existence of local affiliates of foreign banks. That transfers of the type mentioned have been taking place in Nigeria cannot be in doubt. It is reasonable to claim, however, that such transfers may not be available for incomes that are illegally generated⁸².

Another method of transfer is through precious metals and collectibles, including works of art. Local currency is converted into gold, silver or other precious metals, precious stones, jewelry and similar assets that cannot only be abroad but that will also be able to retain their value. The sale values of these are usually high in foreign currency⁸³. Usually, governments tend to restrict or prohibit imports and exports of any such items. Such international transfers therefore usually involve smuggling, with its inherent risks⁸⁴.

The fourth mechanism of transfer is through false invoicing of trade transactions, where export and import invoices are either issued that are either different from agreed prices or faked⁸⁵. The expectation in the case of capital flight is that exporters will systematically engage in under-invoicing while importers over-invoice and in the process derive foreign exchange that is outside the control of the foreign exchange authority. The procedure for doing this is that the foreign supplier issues an invoice that is greater than the agreed price

of the product. The importer on receipt of the necessary foreign exchange remits it to the foreign supplier who then keeps the difference in a bank for the use of the importer⁸⁶.

On the export side, the invoice issued is for an amount in foreign currency that is less than the agreed price⁸⁷. The foreign buyer places the difference between the invoice price and the agreed price in a foreign bank account of the exporter and remits the invoice amount. It is this amount of money that is surrendered to the Central Bank for local currency at the prevailing official exchange rate. To measure the magnitude of invoice faking, partner country analysis is generally undertaken⁸⁸. Capital flight through false trade invoicing is generally applicable to the local affiliates of multinational companies, and owners of business engaged in international trade. It is known in some cases that false invoicing can be multiplied through a practice called round tripping. The process is one in which foreign currency assets are accumulated abroad at the official exchange rate via trade mis-invoicing (via over - or under-invoicing)⁸⁹.

Some of the assets are repatriated in the form of cash or other monetary instruments which are converted to local currency at a premium in the local parallel market⁹⁰. Whatever gain is made in local currency can then form the basis for further false-invoiced transactions. This in effect is arbitrating the official and parallel-market exchange rates. This method is commonly referred to as round-tripping in Nigeria⁹¹.

A fifth method of transferring money abroad is through the black market, until recently a thriving source of transferring funds abroad. The amount of money transferred this way is difficult to estimate⁹².

A sixth vehicle through which capital can be transferred overseas is through commissions and agents' fees, which are paid by foreign contractors into the foreign bank accounts of residents⁹³.

Finally, there are several factors that determine the volume and spate of capital flight, among these are: (i) external debt; (ii) macroeconomic instability; (iii) political instability; (iv) rate of return differentials; (v) capital inflows; (vi) stock of capital flight; and (vii) public policy uncertainty. These determinants are closely interwoven.⁹⁴

Other challenges confronting donor bodies and aids-for-development in Nigeria include: aid dependency (a sense of relaxation, waiting for external intervention), indebtedness, weak institutions and policies, insecurity or unending ethno-religious conflicts; lack of commitment to pro-poor strategies; and limited absorptive capacity⁹⁵.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The thrust of this study had been to examine the contributions donor agencies have made to the socio-economic and political development of Anambra state especially the United Nations backed donors. The research work examined their role in sectors such as health, education, agriculture, environment, government reforms, environment, among others.

The study examined the economic and political background of the state from 1991 up to 2017. It discovered that donors have been participating actively in the state especially in the health and education sector alongside other economic agenda of each administration. The Governor Peter Obi administration which lasted from 2006 to 2013 recorded the most vibrant donor agency activities in the state. Most of the donor activities played out well along with his ANIDS initiative which was predicated on the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals. Remarkable, the achievements of the MDG which was at a peak during his tenure attracted a significant amount of foreign and domestic revenue to the state.

The study reviewed the categories and operational framework of some of the various donors that have been operational in the state. The framework showed that as part of the conditions to commence project activity including the payment of counterpart funding by the state government to the donors to secure their commitment before funding can be released. It also revealed that from 1991-2000, the state government did not pay their counterpart fund significantly nor consistently financially to donor agencies who were willingly to execute diverse project at the time. These operational frameworks as discovered, were most effective when it had the input of all stakeholders as that would better create room the actualization of set objectives. According to Dr Clifford Okafor, it is very vital that the interest of stakeholders are captured while drawing these operational framework as it stirs the spirit of

community in the people to better enjoy and take care of the facilities which they asked for and received.¹ Amaka Ibeh, a beneficiary of the 2011 Roll Back Malaria initiative in Orumba South also opined that she felt carried along and more disposed to implement the environment sanitation advice she received during the advocacy session which allowed her to ask questions which were answered.² Likewise Mr John Omenka agreed that the polite manner of approach and interaction he had with a nurse during the 2014 immunization exercise in house in Awka enabled him to allow his child to be immunized because he understood that it was for their benefit.³

While assessing the activities of these donors it was ascertained that the state has benefitted tremendously. In fact, there has hardly been any year in which no donor activities were recorded since 1991. Even during the first 10 years 1991-2000 of the state when civilization had not spread to most towns in the states and information on health practices were poorly disseminated, it was the significant and available funding of donors which enabled the state to be able to provide better services to especially those in the rural communities. Even in recent times, the donor funds are heavily relied upon to augment the state's meagre federal allocation and internally generated revenue to provide basic social services to her citizens. Lady Uche Okafor, the Executive Director of CoHEDA- one of development partners of the state when interviewed and asked if she thought the activities of donors were effective, dramatically responded that between 1991-2000, that the state had little or nothing to offer her citizens to offer her citizens in terms of basic amenities such as good roads, education and medicare.⁴ She emphasized that if not for the benevolence of donors in financing projects that most of Anambra would have remained rural areas with many non-educated citizen and high mortality rate.⁵

The study examined certain challenges to the activities of donor agencies. It found out that inaccessibility to most aids-needed communities and villages often stall donor bodies from releasing funds. This inaccessibility the study found out is caused by poor road network, fallen bridges, eroded pathways, so that whole settlements are cut off from the rest of

adjoining towns or cities. Where this is the case, aids hardly get to the people. Even if they get to the people, the aids do not usually have local contents in terms of village or community stakeholders' contributions, so that aids-sponsored schemes, projects and programs do not gain the full participation, ownership and securitization from the host populations. The implication of this is that such interventions could easily be misinterpreted or misunderstood on the basis of differing cultural, traditional and communal practices like initiations, festivities, and other rites of passage. This could therefore lead to project sabotage, boycott or vandalization.

The research also found out that one of the major challenges adversely impinging on the effectiveness or productive contributions of donor activities on Anambra state, as it is with Nigeria, is the stringent conditionality often attached to aids or development assistance from the external donor bodies. Often, the conditions made it such that the state's own programs and projects could be radically redirected to suite the areas of national interest of the donor-country so that the state hardly has a say in the conception, formulation or independent implementation of the donor-sponsored schemes. More than that, the collaboration with these donor organizations also entails the entrenchment of a semblance of transparency on the part of the state so that even matters of intelligence or security sanctity are open to the donors to the detriment of the state, and country,

Furthermore, the study discovered that corruption on the part of local public and political officials in influencing projects and programs meant for other communities (in need), so that they will be sited in their constituencies, is a major inhibiting factor to aids performance in Anambra state. The attitude of politicians to always want to see every public good from the point of view of political patronage and prebendal distributions impinge on the positive performance of donor programs. Sometimes, donor funds are also diverted, misapplied and embezzled for personal gains. Added to this is the fact that some of these political and public office holders often stark these stolen monies in numbered accounts abroad, hence promoting an illicit culture of capital flight. To this end, the more aids are given the more a few cabal

becomes richer so that it will seem as though no aids have been given. The implication of this is that the donors could be discouraged from continuing giving anything to the state, except they get the commitment or guarantee that their monies will not be wasted. According to Chizoba Ibeh, the Planning, Statistics and Research officer in the Ministry of Health, most of senior government officials exploit the system for their own good with little conscience for public funds. They often demand, receive bribes from donor agencies staff which allows them to sign off on policies and projects of substandard quality.⁶ Miss Obianamma, the secretary of the donor coordination office was equally of similar opinion that if only leading government officials would shun corruption, that these donor project would yield more benefit for the citizens of Anambra socio-economically.⁷ Miss Uju Iloh likewise, a desk officer of the UNDP stated how many program officer go home with project files at the end of each project to ensure that they would not be called back for assessment at the end of the project lifespan. She also bemoaned the fact that most project officer too refused to divulge reasonable information when requested to cover their shady tracks⁸; a fact that also limited the study in the sourcing of material for this research work.

Conclusion

It was Dudley Seers who said that to understand if a country or state is developing or not three questions should be asked and answered. These three questions are: what is happening to poverty? What is happening to unemployment? And what is happening to inequality? He said that if two of these, or even the whole three are on the increase (not decrease), even with a rise in per capita income of workers, the country or state cannot be said to be developing.⁹ Earlier in this work Anambra state was quoted to be one of the states with the least poverty index. Donor agencies often hired indigenous staff to execute their projects and thus create employment opportunities. They have also tried to tackle inequality especially through their various programs with the state ministries. Affairs albeit to a limited number of persons.

Generally, the state has received front burner awards in education, economic, safety and agriculture awards in Nigeria. While the state has many societal ills like elsewhere, it has indeed benefitted directly and indirectly from the various donor aid.

However, the development impact of donors in the state is not as much as expected in view of the huge amount of resources that have been poured into the state. Be that as it may, it is not entirely in the place of the donor agencies to procure development for Anambra state. The onus falls squarely on the elected and appointed public officials. This also means that the state must not over-rely on the ‘goodwill’ or kind ‘gestures’ of any external donor body. This may just be the best panacea for donor failure and disappointment.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are therefore put forward for policy consideration and action:

- i. That before embarking on any initiative, scheme or project, donor agencies should do proper feasibility study first in partnership with stakeholders and opinion leaders of benefiting communities so that the necessary local contents will be incorporated in the final plan of action or memorandum of action;
- ii. That host communities should treat donor-sponsored schemes with the same respect and value they attach to their personal livelihoods so that these schemes do not get vandalized, sabotaged or rendered in operational;
- iii. That the donor agencies should not bite more than it can chew by embarking on overstretched projects; they should rather focus on few projects that are more realizable, financially, operationally and that could be completed within the shortest period of time possible. In Nigeria, once there is a change in political

leadership, virtually everything changes, including relations with the external community;

- iv. That the donor agencies should be encouraged to make use of more foreign personnel than the local ones as a way of minimizing bias, selfishness, laziness and corruption that are always associated with local personnel, especially the government officials. This however does not discount the fact that stakeholders from benefiting communities should be carried along;
- v. That having completed a project, the responsibility of maintaining such project should be shifted to the host and benefiting community which, conventionally, should show more care than apparatuses of the government.
- vi. There should be attitudinal re-orientation among Anambra citizens, in particular, and Nigerians at large, as well as the government in respect of being realistic and dedicated towards handling socio-economic problems, as against embarking on policies and programs just for the sake of it.
- vii. That new-breed donor agencies from Asia should be attracted to Anambra state as they have become one of the major trading partners with Nigeria.
- viii. That the tempo of government supports and producing the conducive atmosphere for donor interventions should continue in the state. Anambra state is already doing well, but of course there is always room for improvement.
- ix. That the state government should continue to partner with bodies like the EFCC and ICPC so as to deal with the monster of corruption and corrupt self-enrichment which scare away well-meaning donor agencies.
- x. That maintenance culture should be re-awakened in the state so that projects duly completed and functioning will continue to be enjoyed by the people.

ENDNOTES

1. Dr Clifford Okafor, c69 years, Medical Doctor; Interviewed at Awka, August 22, 2019.
2. Amaka Ibeh, c57 years, Pensioner; telephone interview, August 20, 2019.
3. John Omenka, c48 years business man; Interviewed at Awka, August 22, 2019.
4. Lady Uche Okafor, c63 years, Executive Director CoHEDA; Interviewed at Awka, August 20, 2019.
5. Lady Uche Okafor, Interview.
6. Chizoba Ibeh, c31 years, Planning, Research and Statistics Officer, Ministry of Health, Interviewed at Awka, March 11, 2019.
7. Obianamma Orji, c38 years, Statistician II, Partnership Coordination Department, Ministry of Economic Planning, Budget and Development Partners; Interviewed at Awka, June 10, 2018.
8. Uju Ilo, c37 years, UNDP Desk Officer; Interviewed at Awka, January 29, 2019.
9. Dudley Seers, “The Dudley Seers Questions That Are Still Relevant Today”, <http://ideas4develop.blogspot.com/2011/09/dudley-seers-questions-that-are-still.html>, Accessed July 23, 2019.

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S/ N	Names	Age	Occupation	Location of Interview	Date of Interview
1.	Agajelu Nnemeka	c46 years	Medical Doctor/Member TNF USA	Telephone interview	June 1, 2019
2.	Ajah Emmanuel	c50 years	Former State Coordinator, Stopes Nigeria	Government House, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 27, 2019
3.	Akwanya Augustina	c41 years	Headmistress, Farm Settlement Primary School, Igbariam	Farm Settlement Primary School, Igbariam (<i>Office Address</i>)	June 12, 2017
4.	Anene Florence	c46 years	State Immunization Officer, Anambra State Ministry of Health	Anambra State Ministry of Health, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 12, 2019
5.	Anigbogu Florence	c51 years	Women Leader	Telephone interview	October 7, 2019
6.	Anyikwa Charles	c65 years	Pensioner	Telephone interview	October 8, 2019
7.	Chinemelum Okafor	c38 years	Former CoHEDA Staff	Telephone Interview	August 20, 2019
8.	Chuka-Okeke Chikelue	c36 years	NEWMAP Procurement Officer	NEWMAP Office, Awka(<i>Office Address</i>)	August 30, 2019
9.	Ejidike Benson	c60 years	Civil servant	Anambra State Ministry of Agriculture, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	February 3, 2019
10.	Emodi Uche	c56 years	Former Chairman PDP Anambra State,	Opp. Fmr MTI, Housing Estate, Fegge, Onitsha	January 29, 2018
11.	Ibeh Chizoba	c31 years	Planning, Research and Statistics Officer, Ministry of Health	Anambra State Ministry of Health, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	March 11, 2019.
12.	Ibeh, Amaka	c57 years	Pensioner	Telephone interview	August 20, 2019
13.	Igwe Chinwe	c56 years	Former Program Account UNDP Anambra State	Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 11, 2018

14.	Iloh Uju	c37 years	UNDP Desk Officer	Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	January 29, 2019.
15.	Nwave-Ogugua Micheal	c63 years	Chairman, Ugume-Umueri Community	Nwave-Ogugua Micheal's Compund, Ugume-Umueri Community (Residence)	May 18, 2019.
16.	Nweke Godson	c70 years	Farmer and Blacksmith	Okpuno, Awka	January 12, 2019
17.	Nzeakor Chief	c46 years	Community Leader	Telephone interview	October 7, 2019
18.	Odikpo Michael	c57 years	Chairman, Umuala-Eziagulu Aguleri Community	Odikpo Michael's Compound, Umuala-Eziagulu Aguleri Community (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 18, 2019
19.	Odogwu Ikechukwu	c30 years	UNIDO-LIFE Desk Officer	Ministry of Education, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	August 15, 2019
20.	Okadigwe Mary Nkechi,	c38 years	University Lecturer	Department of Theatre Arts, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	August 23 rd , 2019
21.	Okafor Blessing	c37 years	Former WSSRP II Desk officer	Ministry of Public Utilities, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	November 4, 2018
22.	Okafor Clifford	c69 years	Medical Doctor and Project Manager, Community Health Education and Development in Africa (CoHEDA);	Harmony Specialist Hospital, No 5 Orogbu Street, Agu-Awka, Awka South (<i>Office Address</i>)	August 20, 2019
23.	Okafor Lazarus	c54 years	Director, Anambra State Ministry of Education	Ministry of Education, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	October 3, 2019
24.	Okafor Uche	c63 years	Executive Director CoHEDA	Harmony Specialist Hospital, No 5 Orogbu Street, Agu-Awka, Awka South (<i>Office Address</i>)	August 20, 2019
25.	Okeke Gabriel	c38 years	Desk Officer Ministry of Health	Ministry of Health, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	June 4, 2019

26.	Okoli Jona	c68years	Farmer	Okoli Jonas's Compound Ivite, Igbariam (Residence)	January 7, 2019
27.	Okonkwo A. Adaobi	c49 years	Desk Officer Anambra State Agency for Adult and Non-Formal Education	Anambra State Ministry of Education, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 13, 2019
28.	Okoye Theresa	c49 years	Farmer	Telephone interview	October 7, 2019
29.	Okunna Chinyere Stella	c60 years	Professor of Mass Communication Nnamdi Azikiwe University Awka/ Former Commissioner of Information, Ministry of Information and Culture, Anambra State, / Former Commissioner of Economic Planning and Budgets, Ministry of Economic Planning and Budgets, Anambra State/ Former Chairman MDGs Implementation Committee Anambra State/ Former Chief of Staff to the Anambra State Government	Department of Mass Communication, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	September 20, 2018
30.	Okwu Nwazota	c83 years	Traditional Title Holder in Atani	Okpuno, Awka	January 20, 2019.
31.	Omenka John	c48 years	Business man	Patient at Harmony Specialist Hospital, No 5 Orogbu Street, Agu-Awka, Awka South	August 22, 2019
32.	Onuchukwu Ejikeme	c31 years	NEWMAP Environmental Safeguards Officer	NEWMAP Office, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	August 30, 2019

33.	Onugbolu Michelle	c50 years	UNDP Partnership Manager Anambra State	Government House, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 11, 2019
34.	Oraekwe, Arinze	c60 years	Community Committee Member	Oraekwe Arinze Compound, Ivite Igbariam (Residence)	June 12, 2017.
35.	Orji Obianamma	c38 years	Statistician II, Partnership Coordination Department, Ministry of Economic Planning, Budget and Development Partners	Ministry of Economic Planning & Budget, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	June 10, 2018
36.	Osai Nneka	c27 years	Civil Servant	Ministry of Agriculture, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	January 20, 2019
37.	Ozoekwem Lawrence	c43 years	Former Coordinator for Rural Finance Institution Program (RUFIN) Anambra State	Ministry of Agriculture, Awka (<i>Office Address</i>)	May 12, 2019
38.	Udoh Frank	c53 years	UNIDO-LIFE National Coordinator	Telephone interview	August 15, 2019

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APPENDIX I



List of 15 Peer Educators trained in 2015 as part of the IMPACT project of FHI and USAID

NGO: COMMUNITY HEALTH EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (CoHEDA)
 PROJECT TITLE: HIV/AIDS/STI INTERVENTION AMONG YOUTHS IN TERTIARY INSTITUTION IN ANAMBRA STATE
 ACTIVITY: TRAINING OF PEER EDUCATORS
 INSTITUTION: COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, IGBARIAM, COLLEGE OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGY, OBOSI, ANAMBRA STATE UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ULI.
 DATE: 6TH - 12TH NOVEMBER 2005
 VENUE: EMBRACO HOTEL AMAWBA AWKA

S/N	NAME	INSTITUTION	HOSTEL ADDRESS	HOME ADDRESS	DESIGNATION	SIGN.
1	Elebeatu Nwanji Peace	A.S.U Tech	FTF Hostel Rm 110	No 1071 Isaac road Kakiri Kogi State	T.O.T	[Signature]
2	Oguelins Nwanne	ASUTECH	Ultimate Lodge	Umuochuku	T.O.T	[Signature]
3	Okafor Chinwell	ASCHT	Coppers Lodge	No 11 maduka drive nkporo-ga	TOT	[Signature]
4	UNDOZOR CHARLES T.	ASUTECH	AWGER ZONE	#117 AKWAKUMA	TOT	[Signature]
5	Eji for Ifeoma	College of Agric Igbaram	Ipeco Hostel	Nkwelle Awkuzi in Oyi L.G.A	TOT	[Signature]
6	Nwizu Ifeanyi Chukwu	College of Agriculture Igbaram	Lion Hostel	Ukoma Village Umuocha in Oyi L.G.A	TOT	[Signature]
7	ANNAOCY GLORIA U.	ASCHTO	Coppers Lodge	17 BIRAM SIA ULIAN ENUGU	T.O.T	[Signature]
8	IGWE OGBONNA A.	ASCOHT	Rainbow Lodge	EBONYI STATE L.G.A	T.O.T	[Signature]
9	EKWUAGANA PERPETUA	ASCOHT	Coppers Lodge	Ikonge Village Niteje Oyi L.G.A	T.O.T	[Signature]
10	NDEFO VICTOR	A.S.C.O.H.T	Campus 2	Ikongu L.G.A Ikongu State	T.O.T	[Signature]
11	Obichukwu Ann	ASCOAI	Hostel	Filedun in Dur autofia L.S.A.	T.O.T	[Signature]
12	Okafor Olayinka	College of Agric Igbaram	Precious Hostel	2 Zifokazu in Oyi L.G.A	T.O.T	[Signature]
13	ORAKWE CHUKWUNWANO T.	ASUISCH	ETH-MORE HOSTEL	9 ZUKS AVE fegge Eha	T.O.T	[Signature]
14	OBIEPUNA GLENE	ASCAI	ETH HOSTEL	26 NIGALGA STREET ORUITSHA	TOT	[Signature]
15	ETTA NATHANIEL	ASUTECH	UNIQUE LODGE	NO 7 DANWUJE STREET AWKA	TOT	[Signature]
16						
17						
18						

APPENDIX II

2016 REVIEW MEETING Reporting Template for DaO States-Updated HIV INPUT (Min. of Health)

	2016 REVIEW REPORTS FOR DaO ANAMBRA State	
<p>Reporting State: ANAMBRA Period of Reporting: 2016</p> <p>Report Prepared by: ANENE EBELE / FLORENCE ANENE E-mail /Phone: 07037834188/08064069779 fuanene@gmail.com ebeleanene10@yahoo.com</p>		
<p>Guidance Note</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using a Result Based approach to reporting, concisely describe the change that has happened or is happening at the subnational level that can be attributed to the UN program implemented: • Acronyms should be avoided to the extent possible. • <i>You can include pictures with appropriate captions, where possible.</i> 		
Activity implementation rate Analysis	<p>Conduct an analysis by outputs using number of planned activities vs number of implemented activities:</p> <p>Output 2.2.2 Planned activities=14, Implemented=6 Output 2.2.3. Planned activities= 15, Implemented =9 Output 2.2.4. Planned activities= 24, Implemented =21 Output 2.3.1 Planned activities =7, Implemented= 4 Output 2.3.2 Planned activities =3, Implemented= 2 Output 2.3.3 Planned activities =6, Implemented= 4 Output 2.3.4 Planned activities =1, Implemented=1 Output 2.3.5 Planned activities =1, Implemented=0 [Duplicated in 2.3.1]</p>	
Achievements	<p>Review and report on 3- 5 major achievements per output:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Capacity of 100 nurse midwives from Anambra Central & North senatorial zones built on Focused Ante Natal Care Package and 2000 mama kits distributed to 14HFs. ii. Development of Annual Operational Plan. The biennial Operational Plan was developed to articulate health intervention activities for mid-2015 and 2016 as a precursor for the development of the 2016-2020 State Strategic Health Development Plan. iii. Implementation of one Round of measles vaccine campaign [MVC] and two rounds of National Immunization Plus Days [NIPDS] iv. In pursuance of the national goal to reduce morbidity and mortality among the under-fives, a round of measles campaign was conducted from 29th January to 1st February 2016 in 21 LGAs and 330 wards of Anambra state. The targeted population of children under five was 911537 and 1,345,503 children were reached [147%] v. During the period under review, two rounds of Immunization Plus Days (IPDs) were conducted during which a total of 1,538,191 children of 0-59 months were immunized and protected against polio disease in the first round in February with 140% coverage and 1,492,855 children also immunized in March with a coverage of 139.2% against a target population of 1,102,424. LQAS survey showed that quality of supplemented Immunization activity remained high. vi. Conducted one round of Local Immunization Days (LIDs) in 8 high risk LGAs of the state for under fives on 9th -12th April 2016. Targeted pop was 424,612, children reached were 477,476. [112%] There is increase in routine immunization coverage from 118% in Dec.2015 to 121% in Nov. 2016. vii. Switch from tOPV to bOPV on 18th April 2016 was successful in Anambra state. viii. 16 solar freezers were repaired in 7. This increased cold chain capacity in these LGAs. ix. 78 Solar freezers were supplied by EU-SIGN to NPI program and has been installed in 21 LGAs. 	

- x. Enhanced outreach immunization services for hard -to- reach/ poor performing LGAs was done in 11 LGAs.
- xi. **Implementation of 1st Round Maternal Newborn Child Health Week**
- xii. In pursuance of the national goal to reduce morbidity and mortality among the under-fives, the first round of the Maternal, Newborn and Child Health Week- a high impact intervention was conducted in August, during which children and women were reached with various intervention packages. The achievements during the 1st round of MNCHW were as follows: a total of 1152299 children 6-59 months were supplemented with Vitamin A indicating coverage of 116 % [TP=992,181] under five children screened 519 were moderately malnourished and 1 severely malnourished and was treated. Improved awareness was also achieved on exclusive breast-feeding due to counselling activity of 338 ward counsellors in the 21 LGAs. 32350 persons were counselled and tested for HIV in all the 21LGAs, 120 persons tested positive and were referred for treatment in various facilities in Anambra state. 9,826 births were registered.
- xiii. AFP surveillance for polio eradication has remained on course with no wild polio virus recorded. Non-polio AFP rate move from 8.3 in 2015 to 9.7% in 2016. Stool adequacy is 99% as against 80% which is national average.
- xiv. 21 LGAs achieved the 2 core AFP surveillance indicators in 2015 till date.
- xv. Immunization management standards has been strengthened through the instituted monthly routine Immunization review meetings with peer review of LGA Immunization officers and this helped facilitate the review in progress of implementation of immunization activities.
- xvi. Monthly Cold Chain Officers review meeting were conducted in the state and the capacity of 21 Local Government Cold Chain officers were built on cold chain maintenance and data management.
- xvii. 40 stakeholders were sensitized on roll-out of one PHC per ward in Anambra state.
- xviii. Data Quality Survey for rural immunization was conducted in 4 LGAs which showed an improvement in data quality as evidenced in decreased number of unimmunized children.
- xix. Tracking quality and assurance through surveillance a total of 21 LGA DSNOs and their Assistants have been trained on surveillance with evidence of improved data management on data returns. This is in addition to the capacity upgrade of 120 focal points that has also improved the quality of weekly reporting of DS data. Again a total of 84 clinicians have been sensitized on active surveillance to increase the surveillance network. Support was also received from WHO on case base surveillance for measles and AFP with 191 AFP and 422 measles suspected and 8 confirmed cases. DSNOs monthly technical review meeting held till date.
- xx. For the period under review, joint integrated supportive supervision was conducted in the 21 LGAs and this has helped facilitate resolution of bottlenecks in implementation of RI services in the state.
- xxi. 58 health facilities staff trained on Dried Blood Spot collection, transportation and use of SMS Printer for retrieval of Early Infant Diagnosis result.
- xxii. Capacity of 6 State Team and 42 LGA team were built on data management
- xxiii. First semester (six months – January to June 2016) Elimination of Mother-To-Child Transmission (eMTCT) data validated
- xxiv. Developed State and LGA eMTCT bi-annual plans reviewed based on evolving bottlenecks
- xxv. Gaps in HIV/AIDS control at 21 LGA levels identified. Evidence based advocacy tools generated from BNA review meetings
- xxvi. Gaps identified in 102 health facilities on HIV services during supportive monitoring and mentoring visits
- xxvii. Conducted on the job mentoring in PMTCT cascade, EID, TB/HIV collaboration and M&E Skills for 102 health facilities in Anambra State.
- xxviii. Appraisal Meetings on Community Led Demand Creation for ANC/PMTCT Services in 10 selected LGAS (June – September, 2016).

	<p>xxix. Adaption of National Acceleration plan for pediatric ART (2016-2018)</p> <p>xxx. Capacity of 73 Health Workers from 8 high volume facilities in Anambra State built on provider initiated HIV counselling and Testing (PITC)</p> <p>xxxi. 80% of the nutrition state committee for food and nutrition [SCFN] workplan achieved.</p> <p>xxxii. 280 caregivers' capacities were built on IYCF, 150 caregivers in 3 LGAs were also built in complement food production using locally available foods / the use of MUAC in community infant and young child feeding [CIYF].</p>
Constraint	<p>Review and report on 3-5 major constraints:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The proposed trainings on FANC were not done in the other senatorial zones. • The distribution of mama kits was not done in all the HFs of the state. • Shortage of materials –shortage of human manpower has affected timeliness in program implementation. • Inadequate health commodities and plusses during MNCH week, de-worming tablets and shortage of HIV test kits which has affected coverage figures. • Attitude of health care workers to programs which affected service uptake. • Late approval and release of funds • Difficulty in vaccine distribution to LGAs and health facilities for routine immunization. • Poor reporting by M&E staff at the facility level
Lessons Learnt	<p>Document good practices, innovations and opportunities including in funding for State Budget Counterpart Cash Contributions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private sector integration is key in MNCH programs • Program planning should take into consideration seasonal trends e.g. avoiding farming and rainy seasons in fixing health programs. • Release of Government Cash Contribution when available • Good practices-The Executive Governor, Chief Willie Obiano and wife flagged-off all immunization campaigns in the state. • Innovation-Use of ipad /Android phones to monitor MNCHW exercise in 21 LGAs. • Greater involvement of Politicians in our TWG meetings is making HIV/AIDS a regular feature in the State Exco meetings • TWG meeting provided an opportunity for SASCP to widen her coordination capacity • TWG and SMT provided the only platforms for all partners supporting PMTCT services in the State to come together at intervals
Recommendations	<p>Highlight the 3-5 priority activities recommendations per output (Major activities that have significant funding from both government & UN agencies):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is need to train 300 Nurse Midwives on Essential Maternal Newborn care and Helping Babies to Breathe. • Procurement and distribution of Ambu bags to all the 355 MCH HFs in the state required. • Need to procure and distribute Mama kits to all the 355 MCH HFs of the state. • Capacity building of all the Doctors, Nurses and CHEWs in the 355 MCH HFs on ELSS, LSS, & MLSS required • There is need to train all the HWs in the 355 MCH HFs on the use of Anti – Shock garments. • Procurement and distribution of 400 Anti- Shock garments to the 355 MCH HFs of the state required. • Provision of 4-5 ice-line- fridges and 2 solar freezers at each LGA Headquarters. • Establishment of PUSH system of vaccine supply to LGAs and Health facilities. • Provision of computers for local immunization officers [LIOs] and cold chain officers [CCOs] of the 21 LGAs for proper data management. • Early approval and release of funds.

- To support LGAs in advocacy visits to LGs policy makers using findings of the BNA review meetings and developed LGA plans.
Major activities should be included. These are defined as activities with significant UN and preferably Government funding and expected to make major a contribution to addressing existing bottlenecks and achieving expected outputs.
- Need to expand the capacity of caregivers on the use of MUAC in other LGAs



Picture from Lanching of paediatric HIV treatment and Care Acceleration plan



DrJoe Akabuikie giving measles vaccine to a child.



Her Excellency Chief Ebelechukwu Obiano administering Vitamin A to a child.



Deputy Governor immunizing a child with oral polio vaccine at campaign flag-off.

