CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background of Study

The world is a severely bifurcated society. This assertion is not new to anyone- young or old, educated or illiterate, man or woman. It is replete with conflicts in every sphere of human endeavour. There is no nation in the world that does not have a multicultural background. Anjov is then right to hold that there is "No nation that can boast of speaking one language. No nation can proudly point to one common religious belief system"[1]. These undoubtedly breed conflicts. Conflict has been the scourge of humanity from the earliest times and has been seen as what underlies every reality.

 "Indeed, conflict lurks in all human affair as a *reason d' etre*of all human dealings. It is the underlying principle of all history."[2] We can say in this sense, that conflict possesses a metaphysical value as some philosophers like Heraclitus of Ephesus and Jean-Paul Sartre hold. Conflict is in fact, primordial to all things[3]. What matters is how to manage it to ameliorate or completely quell its negative effects. Wars, opposition, strike action or protest, boycott as well as passive resistance, are all forms of conflict. They ought to be there as a check for a minimum social order.

Accordingly, Hegel's position and literary conviction indicate that conflict is natural. With his triadic movement called the 'dialectic', he developed a philosophy of history based on change and freedom. "In Hegel, philosophy and history met."[4] He was the outstanding philosopher of history, as well as the historian of Philosophy.[5] World history is therefore seen as the process by which spirit comes to full self-consciousness of freedom. The human mind is the instrument of this awareness. The manifestation of spirit in the world history through human consciousness is

the world spirit. Both in his politics and history, Hegel regards nations as individuals, the individuals in whose spirits the dialectical moments of the world spirit are manifested.

The rationality of world history, according to Hegel, was the progress of the consciousness of freedom. The beginning for Hegel was the Oriental world, consisting of China, India and Persia. China and India and by extension the Arab nations were static, in which no change worth the name had taken place for thousands of years. They were non-dialectical, and, for Hegel outside the framework of world history,[6] owing to their unchanging nature of civilization. Interpreting Hegel, this implies that they failed to inculcate freedom with their intellectually rigid and long calcified political system, purged of consciousness.

Conversely, the Arab world, painted and presented as non-dialectical above by Hegel has recently witnessed the surge of the Arab spring which has eclipsed the activities of the region. Heretofore, there has been series of revolutions but the last straw that broke the camel's back was the eerie and spooky revolution which took place in 2011 with an almost apocalyptic tone. This aforementioned year goes down into the collective memory and reminiscence of humanity as an utter revolutionary year. It was a year of unprecedented disruption and quagmire in the Arab world which has ipso facto, overthrown three dictatorial, oppressive and debased regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. This has enthused the fire of havoc and rebellion in other countries like Yemen, Syria, Jordan etc., which is still very active. The domino effect of the uprising has even crossed the border inspiring the American Awakening[7] which started as Occupy Wall Street on 17th September, 2011 in New York. This is a movement that has assumed global dimension as a protest against economic inequality and corporate greed.

This wind of revolution which blew across the Middle East and North Africa began precisely in Tunisia with the self-immolation of a grocery seller, Mohammed Al Bouazizi. It was the story of a pleb 26 year old Tunisian who could not find a job after finishing college. His attempt to overcome poverty in the streets of SidiBouzid in central Tunisia was halted by a police officer who ceased his goods, claiming that Bouazizi was working without the necessary legal permit. However, the exact reasons behind his subsequent outrage are not clear and whatever may be the case, Mohammed Al Bouazizi's actions changed the history of Tunisia. On the 17th December, 2010, he set himself ablaze in front of a government building, the center for unemployed graduates, where some witnesses claimed he came to complain but nobody listened to him[8]. He died of the resultant injuries on 4th January, 2011. The ensuing popular revolt which spread like wildfire across the Arab world achieved its immediate aim in three countries: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Yemen and Syria are still boiling and their regimes already singing their farewell song.

We propose therefore, to examine critically the root causes of the grievances in the Arab world-Middle East and North Africa and consequences of the revolution. We also intend to establish a link between the present crises and the socio-political formation of the Arab world to expose whether or not, the recent uprising is a response or awakening in search of the consciousness of freedom as posited by Hegel. We maintain de facto that unless the Arabic despotism is obliterated and people's deprived freedom and rights restored, respected and revitalized with a kind of political system preferably, democracy, there may be no end to the conflict in the Arab world asmonarchism has become an outdated system of government.

1.2   Statement of Problem

Man by nature strives for freedom, liberty, justice and recognition. The people of the Arab world have known no peace in recent times due to internal and external strife, revolutions, uprising,

mistrust, dictatorship and illegitimate authority exercised by those in power. Even as this work is being composed, more conflicts are erupting across the Arab Nations. The above picture calls for a very serious academic investigation of conflicts in Arab world so as to understand them globally and possibly proffer lasting solutions.

Since the concept of freedom was the pivot around which Hegel's entire political philosophy was hinged, it was important therefore, to find the link between the realization of freedom and the process of history, not only of Europe but also of the Orient.

The questions that keep rearing up their heads are; to what extent has the non- dialectical nature of the socio-political state of the Arabs, according to Hegel, been a source of mistrust and basis for the strife? In what ways can the teaching of Hegel be linked to the present uprising in the Arab countries and is the recent uprising a response to or awakening of the consciousness of freedom as posited by Hegel? In what ways can Mohammed Bouazizi be related to the Absolute Spirit mantra of Hegel? And finally, if the current conflicts in the Arab world portend danger to the future of every Arab person in particular and the world at large, what philosophical solutions can be proferred?

1.3   Scope of Study

This study - "Arab Spring in the Dialectics of Hegel's Philosophy of History " will be carried out bearing in mind the nations of the Middle East and North Africa - precisely the countries within the area called the Arab world, namely: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Oman, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirate, and Yemen.

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The content covers the dialectics of Hegel's political philosophy and the recent uprising in the Arab world. The conflicts in the Arab world would be analyzed in terms of lack of legitimacy, authoritarianism, lack of democracy, influence of the West and the radicalism associated with their major religion – Islam.

The *Philosophy Of History* (published posthumously, delivered first 1822), translated by Carl J. Friedrich and Hegel, G. W. F. *The Philosophy of History,* J. Sibree (trans) will be the reference points in the entire survey. We shall draw largely from them as the main sources. Hegel's other workon Philosophy of Right and secondary sources will constitute also sources from where our arguments and references will as well be drawn from.

1.4   Purpose of Study

According to Jean Bodin, the final end of any subject must be understood before the means of attaining it can be profitably considered.[9] Therefore, this calls for the clear vision of this academic exercise so that its main purpose can be well attained. The study of conflicts in the Arab world on the background ofthe dialecticof Hegel's *Philosophy of History* is majorly targeted at digging deep into the ontological status of conflicts inview of finding a lasting peace to give way to the development of the Arab world, humanly and materially.MoreSpecifically, this study aims to find out; the root causes of the present uprising in Arab nations to find out whether there is a link between the present crises and the socio - political formations in the Arab world.

We intend also to expose the main contributors to the Arab spring, the differences and similarities in the four countries- Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, the outcome of the uprisings, the extent of the success/failure of the revolution and the lessons it portends. We intend to find

out whether the conflicts in the Arab world can be incorporated into the pattern of universal world-history; through investigating the extent, conflicts in the Arab world can be seen as part of global quest for freedom.Lastly, we shall submit philosophically, the way out of the conflicts in the Arab world. How a new form of political system of government, precisely democracy, can help to reduce the conflicts, the suspicion, injustice, corruption and dictatorship in the Arab world.

1.5   Significance of Study

On the course of this study, we perused through some works on the Arab Spring like; AndriFridikon's*Arab Upspring* published online, *Understanding in Conflict: a Hegelian Approach to Conflict Analysis and Transformation* by Ali E. Erol, *Edward Said's Orientalism and the Conflicts in the Arab World"* by Jude Odoh to mention a few. But none has been able to link the recent happenings in the Arab world to the dialectic of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*.

The result of this study will be of tremendous benefit to governments of the world in general and to Arab nations in particular as a source of information that will enable them to understand the Arabs better and help the Arabs present themselves better to the entire world.

Governments of the world will benefit from the result of the study because it will improve their knowledge and understanding of the Arab world, and bring about a positive and objective assessment of the Arab people before the rest of the world.

It will also be useful to the Arabs since it will enable them to know the aspect of their lives that directly or indirectly affect their approach to good government, justice and equality. Students and teachers will gain much insight regarding the best strategies and means to be employed in order to effectively and efficiently manage conflicts in different areas, in relation to the Arab world.

This study, where Hegel's dialectics and Philosophy of History can help in the understanding of the recent events in the Arab World will be of immense use to the government of Nigeria in forestalling such a "Spring" from taking place.

1.6   Methodology

This work is approached by first collecting materials from the libraries, satellite/digital television stations, journals, unpublished theses and internet sources. With these sources, effort will be made to analyze the various conflicts in Arab world. Consequently, the method of this research is basically a combination of philosophical analysis and dialectical method. Philosophical analysis to explain why there is always series of conflicts in the Arab World, and how a link can be made to Hegel's *Philosophy Of History*, for a better understanding of the conflicts. Applying the analytic method which explains the cause and effect relationship among variables, questions pointing to reason for the persistent conflicts will be raised. With this method, we intend to find out who promotes the conflicts and finally the processes that sustain them against every positive effort to contain it in the Arab World. Using dialectical method also that involves some contradictory process between opposing sides to attain the truth, which proceeds from 'thesis' through 'antithesis' to 'synthesis,' we intend to state the trend of events in each of the Arab nation. These events progressed from the injustice, incessant harassment of people by law enforcement agencies, torture and corruption to form the thesis while the self-immolation of the peasant trader, Mohammed Bouazizi and the culminating revolution by the people in the Arab nations form the antithesis. Consequently, the ousting of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan government by the people becomes the synthesis. To adequately carry out this study, we shall be admitting inductive reasoning and comparative study where necessary.

The work has six chapters. Chapter one dwells on the general introduction concerning the study. A conscientious attempt will be made in Chapter two to review all the related literature associated with the study, especially on the Arab Spring and *Philosophy Of History*. Chapter three of the work will succinctly reflect on the Arab identity and Nationalism, the historical and socio-cultural aspects of this identity and how it has generally generated conflicts in the Arab World and the sustaining errors and mistakes that gave rise to them and a new option of democratization.

Chapter four will expose the background from which Hegel's convictions and ideas were conceived, and the dialectic of his Philosophy of History. Chapter five of the work will concern itself with the Arab Spring in the dialectic of Hegel's world-historyand the prolonged pain of Arab-Israeli conflicts and the dire need of reconciliation and forgiveness, while Chapter six will be for evaluation and conclusion.

1.7   Definition of Terms

The ancient Greek Socrates once stated; [...]if you want us to talk, clarify your terms,"[10]while for C.C. Mbaegbu, "[...]people make use of words in their daily conversations. But ask them to define what they mean…they find them rather very difficult and elusive."[11]Let us therefore; consider some definitions and clarifications on some of the terms that may be recurrent on the course of our study.

Spring:
Spring describes the awakening of the nature, and at the same time, the awakening of human awareness.

Arab Spring:

The Arab Spring refers to the conflicts in the Arab world, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. It is also referred to as Jasmine Revolutions. This is a mass revolution or conflict that was sparked off on 17th December, 2010 after the self- immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi a trader in Tunisia, in response to police corruption and what he regarded as ill-treatment towards him. Arab Spring also "refers to the political paradigm shift in the moribund autocracies and dictatorships of the Arab world."[12] The wave of the popular protest was initially against the leadership of Tunisia and later escalated to other Arab countries like Egypt, Libya, and Syria and so on. We shall be using the terms-'Arab Spring' and 'Conflicts in the Arab world' interchangeably in the course of this research. Therefore, a definition of Conflict will be necessary.

Conflict:

Conflict is a phenomenon that cannot be explored in isolation of man and the larger society. This implies that conflict is basically meaningful in human situation because it is an integral part of man. It is man and society oriented. Thus, it is an inevitable social phenomenon that happens wherever two or more individuals co-exist.[13] conflict on broader level, also erupts between different nations of the world. Hegel sees conflict as contradictions. He maintains that; "Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an urge and activity"[14]

According to *New English Dictionary and Thesaurus*, conflict is: 'a fight; a contest; strife; quarrel, emotional disturbance'. It also means to be at variance; to clash (with); to struggle'.[15] For Kegley, Jr and Wittkopf, conflict "may be seen as inevitable and occurs when two parties

perceived differences between them and seek to resolve those differences to their own satisfaction".[16]

Dialectic

The word 'dialectic' is derived from the Greek word $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa$[17]. It is a line of thought, originating in ancient Greek philosophy, that stresses development through a back and forth movement between opposing propositions. It thus stands in stark contrast to Western philosophy's general emphasis on the permanence of being. The ancient use of the dialectic was essentially defined by Socrates and Plato and continued by the scholastic tradition. Succinctly put by W.F Lawhead;

> In Plato's dialogues, Socrates employed a dialectical method in which the confrontation of opposing ideas in the course of a conversation progressively led to more and more refined ideas, thus bringing the participants ever closer to the truth.[18]

This conception of dialectic derives ultimately from Heraclitus, as Hegel himself points out. "The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopedic of them, had already analysed the most essential form of dialectic thought."[19] According to Aristotle[20] the dialectic proper originated with Zeno of Elea. Zeno is famous for his paradoxes, according to which, for instance, a flying arrow can never reach its destination, because it first has to cross half the distance, and before that, half of that half, and so on ad infinitum. Zeno's paradoxes are counter-intuitive in that they seem to prove the impossibility of something that is obviously true.

In contrast to the Sophists, Socrates professed to search for nothing but the truth. By applying his well-known "Socratic irony," pretending to know nothing and letting his partner in dialogue expose and discover the inconsistencies of his own thought, Socrates sought to help others

discover the truth. Thus, the Socratic dialectic is not altogether different from Zeno's dialectic. Simply, instead of seeking to expose the inconsistency of familiar notions about reality (as Zeno did), Socrates sought to expose people's prejudice and intellectual laziness. Protagoras puts it more clearly;

> Dialectic is seen as a means of truth. Socrates believed that the authentic method of the philosopher is the analysis and intellectual progression through question-and-answer dialogue.[21].

Generally speaking, dialectic is a mode of thought, or a philosophic medium, through which contradiction becomes a starting point (rather than a dead end) for contemplation. As such, dialectic is the mediumthat helps us comprehend a world that is racked by paradox. Indeed, dialectic facilitates the philosophic enterprise as described by Bertrand Russell, who wrote that "[...]to teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it"[22]

Philosophy of History

According to EncyclopaediaBritanica, Philosophy of history is the study either of the historical process and its development or of the methods used by historians to understand their material[23].The term history may be employed in two quite different senses: it may mean (1) the events and actions that together make up the human past, or (2) the accounts given of that past and the modes of investigation whereby they are arrived at or constructed. When used in the first sense, the word refers to what as a matter of fact happened, while when used in the second sense it refers to the study and description of those happenings.

We have critical philosophy of history and speculative philosophy of history. Critical philosophy of history is the "theory" aspect of the discipline of academic history, and deals with questions

such as the nature of historical evidence, the degree to which objectivity is possible, etc. Speculative philosophy of history is an area of philosophy concerning the eventual significance, if any, of human history.[24] Furthermore, it speculates as to a possible teleological end to its development—that is, it asks if there is a design, purpose, directive principle, or finality in the processes of human history. Part of Marxism, for example, is speculative philosophy of history. Another example is "historiosophy", the term coined in 1838 by August Cieszkowski to describe his understanding of history.[25] Though there is some overlap between the two aspects, they can usually be distinguished; modern professional historians tend to be skeptical about speculative philosophy of history.

The notion of philosophical reflection upon history and its nature is consequently open to more than one interpretation, and modern writers have found it convenient to regard it as covering two main types of undertaking. On the one hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history in the traditional or classical sense; this is conceived to be a first-order enquiry, its subject matter being the historical process as a whole and its aim being, broadly speaking, one of providing an overall elucidation or explanation of the course and direction taken by that process. On the other hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history considered as a second-order enquiry. Here attention is focused not upon the actual sequence of events themselves but, instead, upon the procedures and categories used by practicing historians in approaching and comprehending their material. The former, often alluded to as speculative philosophy of history, has had a long and varied career; the latter, which is generally known as critical or analytical philosophy of history, did not rise to prominence until the 20th century.

Democracy

Etymologically, democracy is derived from two Greek words 'demos' meaning people and 'kratein' meaning to rule. It is therefore the rule by the people. The most common and unarguably famous description of such government is the one posited by one time United States President, Abraham Lincoln who tendered it as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". The *Chambers Twenty-first Century Dictionary* defined democracy as "[...]a form of government in which the people govern themselves or elect representatives to govern themselves."[26] Obviously democracy means rule by the people, the common people. An institution where freedom for the people, justice and equality of rights and privileges; both political, social or legal equality are recognized.

But Popper would decline to a definition of democracy as 'the rule of the people' because even though "the people may influence the actions of their rulers by the threat of dismissal, they never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense."[27] Thus, he sees democracy as that form of government that permits reform without violence, so the use of reason in political matter."[28] This runs concurrent with his method of piecemeal social engineering as against utopian social engineering that is ultra-revolutionary.

In the 21st century, democracy was redefined to imply liberal democracy. It is the dominant form of democracy. It is so coined knowing that democracy and liberalism share some differences[29]and in some circumstances democracy actually exists without liberalism. All said and done, any democracy must grant its people the right to choose their own representatives through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage.[30]

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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

A typical feature of philosophy is the demand that any piece that claims to be philosophy must not only be internally consistent but should have a system within which its interpretation and understanding are realizable. It is in line with this, that weintend in this research to review some of the literatures related to the topic of our thesis. Our method of review in this write-up shall be Thematic. This method implies an attempt at organizing in themes the summary of the "various approaches, interests, positions, achievements and deficiencies already encountered or raised in the area of study"[1]. We shall be re-reading, interpreting, criticizing and synthesizing the thoughts of many authors that were attracted by the Arab Spring. We shall further review authors on the submissions of Hegel on the Philosophy of History. Agreeing with some and disagreeing with some of their thoughts where necessary and shall end after having created the gap necessitating the place of this thesis.

The term "Arab Spring" is an allusion to the revolution of l848 in Europe, which is sometimes referred to as the "Springtime of Nations" and the Prague Spring of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the aftermath of the Iraq War, various commentators and bloggers who anticipated a major Arab movement towards democratization used it.[2]In 2005, protests, unrest and changes seemed to begin to sweep the Arabworld, with continued ripple effects from the fall of Saddam and the painful moves towards the democratization of Iraq. Somehow, this period came to be referred to as "The Arab Spring" on January 6, 2011. As the protests in Tunisia were gaining even larger

mass, and two days after the death of Mohammed Bouazizi in the hospital following his self-immolation, Marc wrote a post on *Foreign Policy* called "Obama's Arab Spring" thus:

> Are we seeing the beginning of the Obama administration equivalent of the 2005 "Arab Sring", when the protest in Beirut captured popular attention and driven in part by newly powerful satelite television images inspired popular mobilization across the region that some hoped might finally break through the stagnation of Arab autocracy? Will social media play the role of Al-Jazeeera this time? Will the outcome be any different?[3]

The 'Arab Spring' is the popular rejection of the politicaland economic scenario that has prevailed across the Arab World from Moroccoto Yemen over the last 100 years. In the post-colonial era following the Second World War, country after country in Asia, Latin America and, recently, in Africa, moved towards establishing a democratic political system. Nevertheless, the Arab World was excluded from this political evolution and remained mired in despotic and tyrannical rule over polities that were politically and economically stagnant and functioned primarily to serve the interests of the despots and their immediate coterie; as well as Western interest rather than those of their own population.

This Arab order emerged from the arrangements put in place after the First World War by the 'Versailles and other agreements. David described the Versailles created political scenario in the Middle East as follows:

> The Middle East became what it is today ...because the European powers undertook to reshape it. During and after the First World War, Britain and her Allies destroyed the old order in the region irrevocably; they smashed Turkish rule of the Arabic-speaking Middle East beyond repair. To take its place, they created countries, nominated rulers, delineated frontiers, and introduced a state system of the sort that exists everywhere else; but they did not quell all significant local opposition to those decisions. The settlement of 1922, therefore, does not belongentirely or even mostly to the past; it is at the very heart of

current wars, conflicts, and politics in the Middle East' [4]

Commenting on the above countries that, witnessed the Arab Spring, Ryan, observed that the demonstrations were precededby high unemployment, corruption, lack of "Freedom of speech" and other forms of freedom andpoor living conditions. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in the affected countries, and have resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators.[5]

Chossudovsky, Cunningham and Nazemroaya observed well the reason for America's involvement in the Arab Spring according to them:

> America is no "role model" of democratization for, the Arab World, comprising some 22 countries with combined population of 300 million. US military presence imposed on Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and other Arab countries over decades; coupled with Washington-inspired "free market" reforms, are :' ' the root cause of state violence; Washington's agenda for Egypt and Tunisia was to hijack the protest movement; what prevails in Egypt is the maintenance of a de facto military regime. In Tunisia, following the October 2011 parliamentary elections, the neoliberal policy framework remains unscathed.[6]

They went forward to argue that From Washington's standpoint, that all the regime replacement no longer requires the installation of authoritarian military rulers, as in the heyday of US imperialism. Regime change can be implemented by co-opting political parties, financing civil society groups, infiltrating the protest movement, and by manipulating national elections. According to Lucan: The ultimate objective is to sustain the interests of foreign powers and to uphold the "Washington Consensus" of the IMF/World Bank economic agenda.[7]

In reaction to the above, Amy opined that 'Al-Qaeda appears to have itself in the southern desert, buying weapons and recruiting new fighters.[8] The Government, the Police, and the official armed forces- such as they exist-are essentially powerless. Parliament here is so divided

that it cannot even count votes properly. With no end to the chaos in sight, the international community is resigned to voicing support for whichever elected official that appears to be legitimate. However, since politicianlegitimacycan vary from day to day, that support means little to nothing. Protests beganthatdayinSidiBouzid, captured by cell phone cameras and sharedon the internet. Within days, the protests escalated. About a month later, the Tunisian president,Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled from the country. The momentum in Tunisia set off uprisings across the Middle East that became known as the ArabSpring.

This chapter consists of several articles about the Arab Spring that are collected and examined. While it would be nearly impossible to cover everything that has been written about the topic, there are seven main themes identified in the literature review, namely (1). Monarchical resilience (2) Democratization and Modernization (3) Economic Factors (4) Gulf Cooperation (5) Social Media (6) Arabism and Religion (7) The Roles of Armed Forces

Monarchical resilience

Many scholars have focused on the Arab monarchies and how these have proven to be very resilient in the face of political challenges. In an article authored by the American Scientist and former president of the American University, Cairo- Lisa Anderson, she notes that the major ruling monarchies in the world reside in the Arab world, where they rule more than a third of the countries of the Arab league[9]. This still remains true today. The Arab monarchies of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain (although major clashes occurred here) have all remained reasonably unaffected in the wake of the Arab Spring. Ludger Kühnhardt[10] as well as Tétreault[11] and Jones [12] in their various articles share the same view with Anderson. There are many different explanations to the resilience of the Arab monarchies. Anderson puts forward arguments such as regional exceptionalism and cultural

determinism, as the factors necessitating monarchy which is traditional and by that a congenial type of regime in the Islamic world.

Nevertheless, Elliot Abrams in an article entitled, "Dictator go, Monarchs Stay" claims the opposite, that it is actually the historical connection of the Arab monarchies that give them their strength and legitimacy[13]. He explains how the monarchy is often sustained by religious belief, and this gives them more legitimacy than any self-appointed strongmen[14]. According to Anderson many republican regimes in the region mimic the monarchies in the sense that they are so called "presidential monarchies" regimes in which a strongman dominates a state with relatively few stable political institutions.[15] This might be exemplified by a famous quote from the former Tunisian president Bourguiba. When asked by a journalist in the 1960s about Tunisia's political system, he exclaimed, in a perhaps Louis XIV inspired quote, "The system? What system? I am the system!"[16]. It is possible that the position expressed by Bourguiba might as well be seen among many Arab leaders, at least before the Arab Spring.

Historically the Arab monarchies were an instrument of European imperial policy, and especially British. Important to note here is that almost all the states in the region, monarchies as well as republics, are a product of the twentieth century. The role of modern Arab monarchies in the process of state formation and – perhaps more importantly – nation building has played a major role in fostering their legitimacy. In fact, Anderson further asserts that the relative strength of the monarchy does not lie in anything but its affinity with the projects of nation building and state formation[17]. In this light, it is important to remember that almost all monarchies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), with the exception of Oman and Morocco, are creations of the 20th century. Thus, "[…]the regime usually pre-dates the state and the nation,"[18] leading to the

regime, to then build a state and nation around itself rather than deconstruct an already existing nation in its rule. Thus, modern Arab monarchies, generally employed by former colonial European states as means for effective state-formation within colonially drawn lines, have been able to mold entire national identities with the royal family centrally legitimating this identity.[19]

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, emerging as a British mandate following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War 1, serves as an example of a successful project of 20th century nation-building in the Middle East in this way. Although the Hashemite family originally hails from Mecca in Western Arabia and was handed over the Transjordan area occupied by different ethnic and social groups by the British in the 1920s, many citizens of Jordan today will call themselves "Jordanian", as opposed to primarily identifying with their ethnic lineage.[20] Furthermore, despite the significant ethnic cleavage between East and West Bankers in Jordan today, in addressing the issue, no prominent Jordanian Palestinians call for separation, while all are integrationist and in support of the regime, "looking to their leadership for hope and direction".[21] Apart from the example of Jordan, the formation of the Saudi Arabian state and nation was a result of the conquest of territory by a tribal alliance with the assistance of British and U.S. assistance.[22] Thus, it is impossible to separate the national identity of Saudi Arabia from the royal al-Saud family itself. In Kuwait and Morocco, colonial powers recruited and manipulated ruling families to provide administration for colonial rule.[23] In all these examples, the monarchy existed before the modern state, supplying the unique advantage to ruling families of creating a state and nations whose identity would be contingent on the existence of the monarchy itself. Comparing state formation projects of modern Arab monarchies with those of republics, we see that authoritarian presidents in this light cannot possibly represent

the same kind of legitimacy that monarchs can to their people, due to the nature of the nations themselves.

Many monarchies also claim legitimacy on the grounds of religion, divinity, or history. Both the royal families of Jordan and Morocco claim to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, while King Mohammed VI is commonly called 'Commander of the Faithful', implicitly asserting their families' divine right to rule.[24] Perhaps the clearest example of a monarchy that claims legitimacy through religion, however, is Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is often referred to as "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques", referring to Mecca and Medina.[25] The nature of the founding of Saudi Arabia – through the political authority of the al-Saud family and the religious leadership of the al-Wahhab – along with subsequent religious characteristics of the state such as the active political role given to the ulama, as well as the fact that its judicial system is based on sharia law, all enforce the religious legitimacy of the royal family. This, in turn, makes opposition to the state a complicated and difficult endeavour; as to challenge the state would seem to be challenging aspects of Islam itself.

States such as Morocco, Oman, or Bahrain may also claim legitimacy through their families' history. Despite being a country of Shia majority and a Sunni ruling family "[…]that has never really reconciled the narratives of the Khalifa family's long-ago conquest"[26], the close to 200 year reign of the al-Khalifa family in Bahrain grants them some degree of historical legitimacy that many authoritarian presidents of republics cannot attest to. The presence of the Alouite dynasty in Morocco from 1666 to the present day also grants the Moroccan monarchy a similar degree of legitimacy – it would be difficult for the Moroccan people to imagine their country without its monarchy.

We also touch upon the importance of the role that the paradigmatic differences between a monarchy and a republic play in fostering the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. In other words, as republics are nominal democracies, presidents will necessarily 'pretend that people have a voice' by holding elections and other such means, whereas "with the monarchy, no one's pretending there's a democracy".[27] In Mubarak's Egypt, the political system appeared to have all the devices for a constitutional and democratic political system. In practice, however, skewed elections, restrictions on freedom of organization, and broad presidential appointive powers created a system where all lines of authority ultimately led back to the president.[28] This is not unique to pre-transition Egypt – such means to maintain authoritarian rule while maintaining a façade of democracy characterized politics in pre-transition Egypt and Libya, as it does in Syria, Algeria and Yemen. With their people living within such blatantly corrupt democratic political systems, nominally granted the rights and freedoms of a democracy while experiencing the insignificance of their vote every election period, it is not surprising that authoritarian presidents will then be perceived as utterly illegitimate in the eyes of the masses.

Furthermore, some autocrats such as Gaddafi and Mubarak were preparing their sons to succeed them, where President Bashar Assad of Syria did in fact succeed his father. "People in a monarchy expect their son to take over power… In what are nominally republics, there was a lot of resentment from seeing sons taking power."[29] Monarchs thus avoid such problems associated with maintaining authoritarian rule in the framework of a republic, which will in turn fuel perceived lack of legitimacy for the ruler, making authoritarian presidents more vulnerable to the Arab Spring.[30]

Democratization and modernization

The Arab Spring represents a periodof democratization in the Middle East; it was not the first time that this occurred in the region. Algeria's democratization in the late 1980s leading towards local elections in 1990 represents a case of an Arab state democratizing without external influences. The Arab Spring is yet another period of democratization in the Middle East that helps to illustrate the ways that Arab leaders use democratization as a political tool to maintain their regime stability.

Rhidiputs it best in his article on "Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy." He says:

> Because Arab regimes have failed to create a robustPolitical society in which non-Islamist can secure the kind of organized popular support that islamists command, these hybrid. Regimes have created circumstances under which free electionscould well make illiberal Islamist the dominant opposition voice, leaving democrats (whether secularist orIslamist) caught between ruling autocrats and Islamist would-be autocrats. Hence the great dilemma in which substantive democratization and genuine pluralism become at once more urgently needed and more gravely risky. Ultimately, democratization is putting the principles of democracy into practice through the use of specific rules and procedures by tracking the creation or limitation of these rules and procedures.[31]

Rinaand Tanjasaw the condition in the Middle East and North Africa particularly of Libya and lamented that 'The issues facing civil society and the transition are very specific to Libya, a country where there has been no constitution, no political system, and, norudiments of civil society.[32]Accordingly,Rime Allaf, observed that the revolt in the Arab world and the uprising is not just economic, but very importantly, it is political. She maintains that however imperfect European democracies are, they do not deny freedom of expression as do a number of autocratic Arab governments. Nor does she believe, as some analysts suggest, that the Arab world is going through its own version of the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.[33]

A common feature of the uprisings was the depression of authoritarian states where the people felt deprivation of freedom and human rights. For decades, these Arab countries had lived without basic human rights such as the freedom of speech but also fear from their governments while they themselves had lived in wealth and power without taking care of their population.Acccordingly, MostafaBassyouni argues that "…what they all had in common was the exclusion of the vast majority of their people from any say in the decisions that affected their lives. Even the most banal decisions made under these regimes were often devised to ensure their stability and power before the interest of the people."[34]

Bassyouni is very reliable as any kind of democratic aspects did not exist in these Arab countries and every attempt to implement these was hit with an iron fist. Some of these countries were in theory democratic and claimed to be, but in practice there was huge democracy deficit. For example in Egypt, Syria and Tunisia there had only been one candidate running for president for decades and if any other would announce a candidacy they would be congested with sudden change of laws as in the case of Syria with president Bashar al-Assad. However the case of Libya differs as there were no presidential elections and Gaddafi initiated his own political system: Jamahiriya. The people had for decades not been part of any decision-making even though they became the affected ones such as with the rise in food prices, which made poverty rise further, even though they were supposed to reside in a democratic state.

The states ruled only in favour of the power and their fortune with no consideration of their populations and this argument is relevant for all these countries. Those who opposed were exposed to police brutality, torture and even death. Layla Al-Zubaidi and Joachim Paul argue that there was no existence of human rights – thousands were executed, imprisoned, exiled, and dissent silenced in many other ways. This had been the fear of most people in Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya and Syria and many even experienced it themselves. Throughout the past decades this fear barrier has been slowly broken by different riots and events in the states as people were suffering further which led to the events of the year 2010/2011.

In line with the chosen theme for this study, there is also literature that brings up the modernization theory as a possible explanation for the Arab Spring. Randall Kuhn uses the modernization theory when analyzing the Arab Spring. He claims that no other developing region has seen such improvements in the human development, for instance declining child mortality, increased schooling and longevity. This human development fosters a set of higher expectations among the citizens on the government, including the right to self-determination. In his conclusion he suggests that this might eventually lead to a democratic change.[35]

Filipe R. Campante and David Chor broke down the modernisation theory and decided to focus on education as an underlying mechanism. They discussed the interaction between schooling background and economic circumstances, and especially the scarcity of job opportunities for university graduates. They further described how the pace of growth, i.e. modernisation, does not keep up with the education profile of its population.[36] They do not make a clear conclusion of their result, but the result displays how factors as youth population, unemployment, economic growth, and education, are all intertwined.

Blaming some ignored indicators, MalekAmmar, posited that in recent decades, rising living standards and literary rates as well as the increased availability of higher education, have resulted in an improved human development index in the affected countries; and that the tension between rising aspirations and lack of government reform may have been a contributing factor in all the protests.[37] Many of the internet-savvy youth of these countries have studied in the West, where

autocrats and absolute monarchies are considered anachronisms. A University Professor of Oman, Al – NajmaZidjaly referred to this upheaval as youthquake.[38]

Economic factors

The economic factors behind the Arab Spring have been one of the main explanations used by media and also by many scholars. One noteworthy example of how these factors could explain the Arab Spring is The Economist's "Shoe-thrower's index", which measures the Arab countries' vulnerability to revolution. This index is made up by putting together and weighing a number of indicators that they believe feed unrest in the Arab world, such as youth population, years of government in power, corruption, GDP per capita, and several other indicators. The result shows that the potential for unrest in the Arab world 2010, was highest in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Syria, while countries like Qatar, Kuwait, UAE and Lebanon had the lowest scores.[39] The index lacks theoretical backing, but is to some extent empirically supported.

However, other scholars support some of these indicators. The economic impoverishment of the majority of the people, staggering food prices, high rates of unemployment, and especially among the large youth population - are all regarded as plausible roots and causes for the Arab Spring.[40] Especially the deteriorating food security and living standards in the region is said to have led to the uprisings. John Pilger in his article "Behind the Arab Revolt is a Word we Dare not Speak" argued that the revolt in the Arab World is not merely against a resident dictator but a worldwide economic tyranny designed by the US treasury and imposed by the US Agency for International Development, the IMF and World Bank.[41]In affirmation of the theme,JavidSalman Ansari insisted that the conflicts are not far much removed from the increasing food prices and

global famine rates and that they involve threats to food security worldwide and prices that approach levels of the 2007-2008 world food price crisis.[42]

Another article focuses on the youth population and discusses the Arab Spring in terms of a "youth revolution". The high unemployment among the young people in this region is seen as a major problem, with youth unemployment as high as 80 % in some areas. The overall conclusion is that frustration with the lack of jobs makes the youth population more prone to protest.[43] Emmanuel Martin claims that one of the more forgotten causes for the Arab Spring was the lack of economic freedom in these countries. The government policies required tremendous administrative steps to set up a formal business, which Martin sees as a part of the political oppression and authoritarianism in these countries.[44]

In the case of Morocco, Badimon makes a similar connection between the high unemployment among university graduates and the social unrest during the Arab Spring. However, many of the university graduates were reluctant in joining any political alliance against the government, as there was a risk that this would jeopardise their chances of getting hired in the public administration.[45]

The lives of many Arabs follow a trajectory of sentiments that starts with irritation and inconveniences; grows to anger, vulnerability and resentment; and finally reached desperation and degradation. Treated as something less than human by their governments, barely able to make a living and enduring the added pain caused by decades of invading foreign armies and, in the case of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, Israeli colonizers and siege-masters, they have endured humiliations so severe that they can no longer endure it in silence or acquiescence. The revolt we are witnessing may not only be about ideology. It is mostly about men and women who, so

brutalized by their own and foreign powers, are asserting their fundamental humanity – their right to use all their human faculties; to read, speak, listen, think, debate, create and enjoy to the full extent of their God-given ability or desire, whether in culture, politics, art, media, technology or any other arena.

The Gulf Cooperation.

Other scholars focus on the resilience of the gulf monarchies. While one could argue that their resilience is due to oil and wealth, Tétreault asserts that another common denominator for these Arab countries are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Countries like, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are all members of this organisation. Tétreault argues that the aegis of the GCC have helped these countries against the political challenges during the Arab Spring. One example here is how Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent troops to Bahrain to help their security forces quell the protests in 2011.[46]

LudgerKühnhardt follows the same line of thoughts, but focuses more on the role of Saudi Arabia as the protector of monarchies. He argues that Saudi Arabia, as the main power in GCC, is particularly interested in supporting the Arab monarchies. This would also explain the motive behind inviting Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC, which were understood as a means to curb and curtail reforms that could challenge the existing structure of power in these countries. Some would claim that Jordan has, in the wake of the Arab Spring, become a battleground between those who would like to see a more democratic country and those who would like to maintain economic stability. Saudi Arabia together with the rest of the GCC is in the forefront of the actors who wish to preserve the economic stability in the region, and thwart any democratic reforms that might threaten this stability.[47]

In the article, "Saudi Arabia versus the Arab Spring", Toby Craig Jones examines how the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been able to evade public unrest and revolutions during the Arab Spring by seeking the support of the religious establishment, as well as offer a package of economic reforms by, for instance, allocating money to aid the unemployed. The article also corroborates previous articles that claim that Saudi Arabia with its regional hegemony and fear for regional democratisation, has tried to counter the revolutions in neighbouring countries. The Saudi Arabian dynasty of Al Saud fear that democratic change will threaten their power, but also the privilege and excess that comes with it.[48]

 In line with this, Lisa Anderson describes another aspect of the monarchy, "[…] no king wants himself or his successor to be the end of the dynasty. This is no doubt a very powerful motive for the monarch himself." Referring to the famous, presumably, apocryphal quote, made by the French king Louis XIV, while addressing the Parliament of Paris on 13 April, 1655. "L'Etat, c'estmoi." - "I am the State." or "The state,that is me."[49] Some scholars argue that while the coup-proofing strategies that Saudi Arabia has adopted have proven to be successful for now, this strategy cannot respond to political challenges in the long-term, and therefore reforms will be needed.

The recent expansion of membership, coupled with the apparent reassertion of Saudi leadership within the council against Qatar and the UAE, has led to real impacts of GCC membership in maintaining the resilience of Arab monarchies. There are two main reasons for Saudi Arabian urgency in initiating forceful and meaningful action in the light of the Arab Spring. Firstly, following the United State voicing concerns about human rights violations during the crackdown in Bahrain, the Saudis have apparently decided that their traditional allies cannot be trusted. The

second is that real consequences of the protests within any of their member states could thus have real implications back home.[50]

The Saudi-led GCC 'counterrevolution' has attempted to prevent the potential disruptive effects of the Arab Spring on its member states through economic, military, and ideational means. Composed (with the exception of Morocco and Jordan) of oil-rich rentier states, the GCC's individual members' response to the events of the Arab Spring so far has been to increase expenditure on public services, salaries, benefits etc. in order to weather the storm and appease the people. Therefore, the GCC has promised $20 billion to aid development projects in Bahrain and Oman for the same reasons, fearing that lack of increased public spending in these states could be insufficient in the face of mass protest or civil unrest. Furthermore, by sending military support to Bahrain in the midst of one of the worst periods of violence throughout the crackdown, Saudi Arabia signaled its determination to prevent significant disruptive effects of the Arab Spring on GCC member states to GCC members as well as the rest of the world. Finally, through its actions, it appears that Saudi Arabia is contemplating the role of the GCC as replacing that of the Arab League in fostering Arab unity in this time of stress. Such a role for the GCC not only would bind the monarchies more tightly together, but also increase their domestic survivability along with popular legitimacy.[51] Although the Saudi-led GCC counterrevolution has led to real results such as in taming the situation in Bahrain, MehranKamrava warns that "[…]the extent to which this strategy is likely to succeed in the long term remains to be seen."[52]

Social media

In recent research about the Arab Spring it has been much in fashion to discuss the role of social media, making it almost mandatory to address this topic in some ways. In some articles this is termed as a "Twitter" or "Facebook revolution,"[53] but also "cyberactivism"[54] and "social media revolution."[55] However, social media could both be seen as an effective tool for the rebels, but also for the repressive machine.

Many scholars agree that social media played a significant role, but was nonetheless not the main cause of the Arab Spring or the determinant factor. For Khondker, Social media was an "accelerator"[56] of the Arab Spring, or a vital tool, but the most important underlying factor was the presence of revolutionary conditions. Daniel describes the self-immolation of fruit seller in protest against the Tunisian government and then simply states that new media helped to make this a national event which brought "virtual and real revolutionaries … out in droves to protest".[57] Peter Walker was quick to conclude that the Wikileaks release of US diplomatic cables acted as a catalyst for the revolts.[58]

Arabism and Religion

War, conflicts, revolts and uprising have become some of the words associated with the Arab World and the history of their religious and political developments. For centuries, they have been involved in one conflict or the other. Think of the 1936-39 revolt in Palestine. In the 1930s, wealthy Arab youths, educated in Germany and having witnessed the rise of fascist paramilitary groups, began returning home with the idea of creating an "Arab Nazi Party". By 1935, Jamal al-husayni established the Palestine Arab party, the party was used to create the "fascist-style" youth organization, officially named the "Nazi Scout". The organization recruited children and youth, who took the following oath: "Life – my right; independence – my aspiration; Arabism –

my country, and there is no room in it for any but Arabs. In this I believe and Allah is my witness."[59]

The question of Palestine and opposition to Zionism became a rallying point for Arab nationalism from both a religious and a military perspective. The fact that the Zionists were Jewish promoted a religious flavor to the xenophobic rhetoric and strengthened Islam as a defining feature of Arab nationalism. The humiliating defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war gave some impetus to conflicts and revolts here and there in the region. Arabs have been exposing and engaging themselves in reckless conflicts that even their enemies were not ready to envy them. Think of the Iran-Iraq war! It stood out to be one of the greatest human tragedies of recent Middle East history. The resources wasted on the war exceeded what the entire Third World spent on public health in a decade.[60]

At some point, those who supposed to care, contain and control the conflicts looked the other way, as if conflicts are regional programme of the Arabs. One typically humanitarian State Department official explained in 1983: "[...]we don't give a damn as long as Iran-Iraq carnage does not affect our allies in the region or alter the balance of power."[61] Stephen Shalom regrettably reported that Iran-Iraq war was not a conflict between good and evil. But though both regimes were repugnant, it was the people of the two countries who served as a cannon fodder, and thus ending the war as soon as possible was a humane imperative. Instead of lending its good offices to mediation efforts and diplomacy, however, Washington maneuvered for advantage, trying to gain vis-à-vis the Soviet Union – and to undercut the left. The United States provided intelligence information, bogus and real, to both sides, provided arms to one side, funded paramilitary exile groups, sought military bases, and sent in the U.S. Navy – and all the while Iranians and Iraqis died.[62]

The Role of Armed Forces

Some authors analyse the role of the armies in the Arab Spring, and thus how the armed forces acted differently in the Arab countries. For instance it is suggested that some of the variation between the outcomes of the different countries during the Arab Spring, could be explained by the role of the armies. This is for instance exemplified by the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, where the army in one way facilitated the overthrowing of the governments, while there was stronger military resistance against the protesters in countries like Libya and Syria.[63]

These regimes' concentration of wealth and brazen corruption increasingly offended their militaries. Ben Ali and Mubarak both came from the professional military; indeed, Egypt had been ruled by former officers since 1952. Yet in both countries, the military had seen its status eclipsed. Egypt's military leaders controlled some local businesses, but they fiercely resented Gamal Mubarak, who was Hosni Mubarak's heir apparent. As a banker, he preferred to build his influence through business and political cronies rather than through the military, and those connected to him gained huge profits from government monopolies and deals with foreign investors. In Tunisia, Ben Ali kept the military at arm's length to ensure that it would not harbor political ambitions. Yet he let his wife and her relatives shake down Tunisian businessmen and build seaside mansions.

 In both countries, military resentments made the military less likely to crack down on mass protests; officers and soldiers would not kill their countrymen just to keep the Ben Ali and Mubarak families and their favorites in power. A similar defection among factions of the Libyan military led to Gaddafi's rapid loss of large territories. As of this writing, however, Gaddafi's use of mercenaries and exploitation of tribal loyalties have prevented his fall. And in Yemen, Saleh has been kept afloat, if barely, by U.S. aid given in support of his opposition to Islamist terrorists

and by the tribal and regional divisions among his opponents. Still, if the opposition unites, as it seems to be doing, and the United States becomes reluctant to back his increasingly repressive regime, Saleh could be the next sultan to topple.

Ellen Lust does instead look at the relationship between Islam and democratisation. She means that it is not the religion itself that stalled the "third wave of democratisation" during the Arab Spring, but it was instead the fear of political Islam. This fear was used by the regime to drive a wedge between Islamic and secularist opposition groups, in order to weaken their efforts to struggle against the regime.[64]

With the role of the armed forces in the Arab Spring we end the first part of the review. We shall now concentrate on the related literatures to the second part of the topic of our study– Philosophy of history.

According to Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, History is the study of the past in all its forms. Philosophy of history examines the theoretical foundations of the practice, application, and social consequences of history and historiography. It is similar to other area studies – such as philosophy of science or philosophy of religion – in two respects. First, philosophy of history utilizes the best theories in the core areas of philosophy like metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics to address questions about the nature of the past and how we come to know it: whether the past proceeds in a random way or is guided by some principle of order, how best to explain or describe the events and objects of the past, how historical events can be considered causally efficacious on one another, and how to adjudicate testimony and evidence. Second, as is the case with the other area-studies, philosophy of history investigates problems that are unique to its subject matter. History examines not what things are so much as how they came to be. History

focuses on the unique rather than the general. Its movers are most often people who act for a variety of inner motives rather than purely physical forces.

Specifically, Speculative philosophy of history aims at synthesis of vagaries of events in the universe into a single world-history - philosophical history. In this regard, history ceases to be pre-occupied with the past but incorporates the past, the present and the future. Thus, whatever happened, happens or will happen, anywhere and whenever in the world is part of this single patterned philosophical history. The implication of history so conceived is that one spirit or motivation is behind every event in the universe, good or bad.

Many Philosophers of history agree that the force of philosophical history is conflict but are in disharmony over what the conflict is about. For instance, St Augustine of Hippo held world history as that of salvation – man's fall and his redemption.[65] But Immanuel Kant claimed it is the struggle between the social and antisocial tendencies in man.[66] Hegel thought it to be the conflict of opposites as the Absolute Spirit works freedom through man.[67] In the same vein, Karl Marx maintained that the spirit of history in the strict sense is the class struggle arising from economic situation.[68]

Francis Fukuyama interpreted Hegel to hold world history as the history of man's struggle for universal recognition and declared that the same history has ended with the emergence of liberal democracy where such universal recognition is achieved.[69] Conversely, Huntington could not accept the end of conflict in the world historical process as posited by Fukuyama. For him, granted that liberal democracy has achieved equal recognition of all men, it has not achieved equal recognition of all civilization. The refusal to accord universal recognition to all cultures

and religions has created a new form of conflict – the clash of civilizations –and thus has kept history in philosophical sense moving.[70]

Right from the ancient time, philosophers have occupied themselves with the actual force of world history. History properly so called indicates not just independent events of the past but a kind of pattern in which individual events of the world in the past, present and future can fit in. Simply put, it represents a kind of background on which individual events such as the rise and fall of great men and societies, wars, and so on find their place.

Agitating the mind as regards history is the question of whether it is cyclic or linear; but more importantly of the actual force behind the perceived progress of history. Most philosophers subscribe to the idea that history is not just linear but also eschatological. Commenting on this issue Fukuyama writes:

> Both Hegel and Karl Marx believed that the evolution of human societies was not open-ended, but end when mankind had achieved a society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings. Both thinkers thus posited an "end of history": for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society.[71]

Regarding the primordial force behind independent events of history most philosophers opine that conflicts resulting from contradictions inherent in the nature of things, man and society, are the beginning and the sustenance of the progress of history. However, what they take the nature of these oppositions to be and how they bring about progress in history are divergent as there are philosophers of history.

Arguably, the most outstanding of these philosophers of history was Hegel. He was the outstanding philosopher of history, as well as the historian of philosophy[72]. "with such exalted

appreciation did Robert Hartman begin his introduction to Hegel's philosophy of history"[73].In an attempt to define philosophy of history, Hegel says that 'the general definition that can be given is that the philosophy of history means nothing but the thoughtful consideration of it.'[74]

The concern of this engagement is Hegel's submission that conflicts of opposites are the motive behind the world-history towards the evolution of state where the essence of spirit – freedom, will be fully manifested. The salient point of Hegel's philosophy of history is that conflict is necessary and inevitable aspect of world-history. War indeed causes insecurity of property and life, but this is paradoxically a necessary evil. Hegel also believed that since modern warfare was impersonal, it was destined to become less barbaric and more humane than what it was in the past. He also asserted that the invention of the gun would make wars more rational, rather than based on personal whims and fancies, including personal enmity. He wrote: "[…]it is for this reason that thought had invented the gun, and the invention of this weapon which has changed the purely personal form of bravery into a more abstract one, is no accident"[75]. He explicitly rejected the Kantian notion of perpetual peace:

> Perpetual peace is often advocated as an ideal towards which humanity should strive. With that end in view, Kant proposed a league of monarchs to adjust differences between states, and the Holy Alliance was meant to be a league of much the same kind. But the state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation. Hence even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy.[76]

In view of the above, some philosophers quickly classified Hegel's thoughts as a **murderous racism.** Hegel's philosophy was seen to have delivered the likes of Stalin, Hitler, etc and in agreement with this, Oguejiofor wrote that "[…]his philosophy formed the theoretical structure of the murderous and racist nationalistic movement which Adolf Hitler was to bring to practical

perfection in National Socialism with terrible consequences."[77] A whole new generation of Hitler Youth was indoctrinated, every media outfit propagated anti-Jewish sentiment in every German household and slowly, after less than a decade, the stage had been set for the genocide of some six million people. As Russell -puts it, "[…]this is a very superfine brand of freedom; it does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp."[78]Surely, problems abound in Hegel's conception, and more thinkers were quick to point them out.

Another theme very recurrent in Hegel's Philosophy of history is that of **dogma (a Closed Society).**For Schopenhauer, in particular, who regarded himself as…opponent and the purveyor of the real truth to mankind,[79] the whole notion was nothing but sophistry. Even for those who are more sympathetic to its main premises, significant questions remain. He insists that Hegel's panlogism seeks to encompass all reality and historical development into one huge mental scheme reflecting the emergence of the absolute self.

In his work, A History of Philosophy, Ruge shared Hegel's belief that history is Teleological. This implies a progressive advance towards the realization of freedom, and that individual right or   freedom is attained in the state, the creation of the rational General Will[80]. He was thus prepared to give full marks to Hegel for having utilized Rousseau's concept of the violence generally and for having grounded the state on the universal will which realizes itself in and through the wills of individuals[81]. At the same time he criticized Hegel for having given an interpretation of history which was closed to the future, in the sense that it left no room for novelty.[82]

Adopting Hegel's conception of sovereignty as the 'idealism' of the state, that unity which infuses all its constituent parts and makes them into its organs or limbs, but rejecting Hegel's claim that

this unity is realized only through the figure of the monarch, he asserts that 'sovereignty is nothing but the objectified spirit of the subjects of the state' and asks, against Hegel: What sort of state idealism would be that which, instead of being the actual self-consciousness of the citizens, the common soul of the state, were to be one person, one subject?'[83]

In the Hegelian system, according to Ruge, historical events and institutions were portrayed as examples or illustrations of a dialectical scheme which worked itself out with logical necessity. Hegel failed to understand the uniqueness and non-repeatable character of historical events, institutions and epochs. And his deduction of the Prussian Monarchical constitution was a sign of the closed character of his thought that is of its lack of openness to the future, to progress to novelty.

For Soren Kierkegaard Hegel is too ambitious. In his works '"Introduction" In Fear and Trembling, he developed a critical attack on what he regarded as Hegel's ambitious attempt to enclose the whole of reality in his conceptual scheme. The abstract objectivity and systematization of Hegel ignores the importance; the uniqueness and the individuality of the human person.

Kierkegaard has scant sympathy with what he took to be Hegel's view, that a man realizes his true self or essence in proportion as he transcends his particularity and becomes a spectator of all time and existence as a moment in the life of the universal thought. Hegelianisrn, in Kierkegaard's opinion, had no place for the existing individual right: it could only universalize him in a fantastic manner: and what could not be universalized it dismissed as unimportant, whereas in point of fact it is that which is most important and significant[84]. To merge or sink

oneself in the universal, whether this is conceived as the state or as universal thought is to reject personal responsibility, and authentic existence[85].

One philosopher who has launched frontal attack on Hegel again and again is Karl Popper. He thinks that Hegel is the progenitor of **Fascism and Totalitarianism.** In his famous book - *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, he wrote that Hegel was a major enemy of the open society along with Plato and Marx. He stressed the origins of Hegel's historicism to three ideas developed by Aristotle: (i) linking individual or state development to a historical evolution; (ii) a theory of change that accepted concepts like an underdeveloped essence or potentiality; and (iii) the reality or actuality of any object was reflected by change. The first one led to the historicist method, which in Hegel assumed a form of "worship of history"; second one linked the underdeveloped essence of destiny, and the third helped Hegel to formulate his theory of domination and submission, justifying the master-slave relationship. He called Hegel's era an "[...]age of dishonesty", in which Hegel became important philosopher with the backing and patronage of the Prussian state. No wonder Hegellianism was an apology for Prussianism. Hegel's principal aim was "[...] to fight against the open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick William of Prussia".[86]

Many other authors as well as scholars insist that Hegel's Philosophy is mainly a **deification of the state.** Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy was highly critical of Hegel's glorification of the state, particularly since the state Hegel chose to fete more than any was the pre-curser to one of the most horrific and brutal regimes to ever come to power[87].

 Russell insists that Hegel certainly places a lot of emphasis on the importance and role of the state, in a similar vein to Rousseau. People choose to abide by the law for the good of the general

will and the state enforces this law. For him, Hegel seems to underestimate the power of the state to influence and guide the entire geist of the age, as happened in Nazi Germany[88]. The seeming lack of responsibility the state holds to the individual for Hegel does seem somewhat heartless on face value, though Russell points to his view of history as being partly the effect and partly the cause of the teaching of world history in German schools. Hegel was writing at a time when many were attempting to unite the confederation of Germanic states, something not achieved until 1871. For Russell, the question we should be asking is whether the state is good per se, as an end. Do the citizens exist for the benefit of the state, or the state for the benefit of the citizens?[89] Hegel holds the former view; the liberal philosophy that comes from Locke the latter. Another anomaly in Hegel's argument is that the same logic that led Hegel to prefer a state to a collection of anarchic individuals should also have led him to conclude that a world state could be better than a collection of anarchic states.[90]

Russell also takes issue with Hegel's theory of dialectic, saying "I cannot see any justification… for the view that world history repeats the transitions of the dialectic. It required... some distortion of the facts and considerable ignorance."[91] This obviously led Russell to ridicule the notion that such a process is working towards an absolute, something which Nietzsche also rebutted[92].

Like Rudolph Haym, Popper was very critical of Hegel's deification of the state. He was also critical of the bureaucracy's role in stabilizing social sciences, which assumed that historical prediction was their principal aim, and which assumed that this aim was attainable by discovering the "rhythm" or the pattern": the laws or the trends that underlie the evolution of history[93].

Moreso, in chapter 12 of the same book, Popper unleashed a famous attack on Hegelian philosophy of history, in which he held Hegel's thought to some degree responsible for facilitating the **rise of fascism**as another sterling theme. This according to him was feasible in Europe considering his thoughts that were encouraging and justifying irrationalism. Popper similarly notes that "Hegel's hysterical historicism is still the fertilizer to which modern totalitarianism owes its rapid growth."[94] In swift opposition to this Poppers' position, Walter Kaufmann writes, "it would be absurd to represent Hegel as a radical individualist but is equally absurd to claim as Popper does, that Hegel's state is totalitarian"[95]. Also, Singer insists that Popper can be criticized further on the following grounds: (i) all his quotations were not from Hegel's own writings; (ii) one of them was a mis-translation; (iii) the Hegelian state did not incorporate only the government but referred to the entire social life – there was no glorification of the government against the people; and (iv) the popper quotations needed balancing by others[96].

However, as some authors have negatively criticized the philosophy of Hegel, others arose to canonize him on several grounds. Commenting on the enormous influence of Hegel, Engels wrote:

> What distinguished Hegel's mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the prove of the former.[97]

In furtherance of the above, praising Hegel's method, Marx wrote to Engels:

> In the *method* of treatment the fact that by mere accident I again glanced through Hegel's *Logic* has been of great service to me … .
> If there should ever be time for such work again, I would   greatly

like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence, in two or three printer's sheets, what is *rational* in the method which Hegel discovered but at the same time enveloped into mysticism.[98]

From the foregoing, it is obvious that most authors that reacted to Hegel's philosophical history could not water down the presence of such history. However, most of them were perhaps unaware of the philosophical foundation on which Hegel built his thesis. This philosophical ground is the historical contention that conflict is the spirit or force behind world history.

In the work of Marx and Engels the dialectical approach to the study of history became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. With Karl Marx, the notion of a dialectical movement in history became directly linked to the notion of the struggle of the proletariat against capitalism. For Marx, the notions of opposition and confrontation became central, and the subtle implications of Hegel's sublation were abandoned. Making renewed use of the thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad, Marx's thought clearly implies that the thesis is destroyed by the antithesis before a synthesis is achieved. He applied his dialectical method to the material or social world that consisted of economic production and exchange.

Precisely, for Marx, conflicts exist as a result of strife of the means of production. In his analysis, the existence of classes in the society necessitates the existence of conflict in the society. These classes; which are the class of those who owns the means of production and that of those who does not or sell their labour relate in such a way that there must exist necessarily conflict, as a result conflict is inherent in the relationship between them. Marx analysis is relevant and significant because economic resources are scarce at least in many developing nation as in the

Arab world and the competition for them; between groups may constitute an open source of conflict.

A study of the productive process explained all other historical phenomena. Marx noted that each generation inherited a mass of productive forces, an accumulation of capital, and a set of social relations which reflected these productive forces. For Marx, the mode of production and exchange was the final cause of all social changes and political revolutions, which meant that for minds or thoughts to change, society would have to change. He considered matter as being active, capable of change, a conception found in Hobbes.

> Our conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real processes of production, starting out from the simple material production of life, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this (i.e civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; further, to show it in its action as state, and so, from this starting point, to explain the whole mass of different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc., and trace their origins and growth.[99]

In Marxist thought, dialectical materialism implies that reality is essentially material (mind being a mere superstructure). He insists that;

> Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a historical evolution.[100]

Historical materialism is the application of that concept to the development of history, seen as a series of revolutionary clashes between social classes with opposing interests. Thus, for Marx, conflict is the only real source of progress and development and having said this, he and Engels went further to launch attacks on the standpoints of Hegel.

Accordingly, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels believed Hegel was "standing on his head," and claimed to put him back on his feet, and "his system itself, was a colossal miscarriage"[101] They tried ridding Hegel's logic of its orientation towards philosophical "idealism," and conceiving what is now known as materialist or Marxist dialectics. In furtherance of this, this is what Marx had to say about the difference between Hegel's dialectics and his own:

> My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurges of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. [102]

Nevertheless, Marx "openly avowed [himself] the pupil of that mighty thinker" and even "coquetted with modes of expression peculiar to him." Marx wrote:

> The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.[103]

At the heart of Marxist dialectic is the idea of contradiction, with class struggle playing the central role in social and political life, although Marx does identify other historically important contradictions, such as those between mental and manual labour and town and country. Contradiction is the key to all other categories and principles of dialectical development: Development by passage of quantitative change into qualitative ones, interruption of gradualness, leaps, negation of the initial moment of development and negation of this very negation, and repetition at a higher level of some of the features and aspects of the original state.

The Marxist view of dialectic as a framework for development in which contradiction plays the central role as the source of development is perhaps best exemplified in Marx's *Capital,* which outlines two of his central theories: That of the theory of surplus value and the materialist conception of history.

Criticizing Marx, Popper holds that his political teaching ushered in communism and it was put "into practical action through the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, which divided the ideological world into the capitalist West and the socialist East, with the rest of the world turned into the battle grounds in the quest for strategic control and domination."[104]

The philosophy of clash of opposites as the propeller of the world-history is still very much alive in this our era. Recently, it found expression in the work of Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man.* In the said work, Fukuyama subscribed to the theory of dialectical movement of the world-history but, however, declared that the dialectical movement has come to an abrupt end with the emergence of liberal democracy thereby marking the end of history. He opined that:

> A remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism and most recently communism… liberal democracy may constitute the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the final form of human government and as such constitute the 'end of history.'[105]

The first step to misreading Fukuyama is the failure to comprehend what he meant by the end of history which flows from what history is for him. Fukuyama accepted Hegel's definition of history as "[…] the progress of man to higher levels of rationality and freedom, and this process had a logical terminal point in the achievement of absolute self-consciousness."[106] Sequel to this

definition of history, Fukuyama did not mean, by the "end of history", "[…] that there would be an end to events arising out of the births, deaths and social interactions of humankind, or that there would be cap on factual knowledge about the world."[107] No, independent events will continue to occur. What he meant by the end of history was his interpretation of Hegel's and Kojeve's[108] end of history. According to Fukuyama, "Hegel believed that alienation – had been adequately resolved at the end of history through the philosophical recognition of the freedom possible in the liberal state."[109] the implication is that the emergence of the modern universal and homogeneous state (liberal democracy) represented the end point of human ideological evolution beyond which it was impossible to progress further.[110] Thus the end of history means the end of human ideological evolution, which democracy represents, and for Fukuyama "[…] meant the end of not only of large political struggles and conflicts, but the end of philosophy as well."[111]

Fukuyama's idea of liberal democracy as marking the end of history was largely influenced by the end of the grueling and perilous cold war between the West and the East as a result of the collapse of communism in the early 90s. He believed that communism and fascism were the two major rival ideologies that challenged liberal democracy[112] but "[…] a growing belief that democracy was the only legitimate source of authority in the modern world"[113] led to their collapse. The growing number of countries adopting liberal democracy starting from the first sign of the collapse of communism and following the complete fall of the Berlin Wall[114] "[…] is the fact that democratic government has broken out of its original beachhead in Western Europe and North America and has made significant inroads in other parts of the world that do not share the political, religious, and cultural traditions of these areas."[115]

Despite all this, Fukuyama claims that his submission that the emergence of liberal democracy marks the end of history is not propped on empirical evidence of the collapse of communism but on "[…] a trans-historical standard against which to measure democratic society, some concept of "man as man"[116] This stems from his conviction that the judgment of democracy lies in its ability or otherwise to fulfill the concept of man as man.[117] Therefore, an all important question is, according to him, what actually constitutes man as man, that is, man as different from other animals?

To answer the question, Fukuyama relied heavily on Kojeve's claim that desire for recognition is the most fundamental human longing, not shared by any other animal and the struggle for recognition is the primordial force behind historical process.[118] By implication, any political arrangement that is able to settle this struggle for recognition mollifies the spirit of history and therefore brings it to an end. Sequel to this, Fukuyama rejected what he views as economic history of Hobbes, Locke and Marx in favour of Hegel's philosophy of history and its interpretation by Kojeve; for:

> Not only is man not determined by his physical or animal nature but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate the animal nature. He is free not just in Hobbes's formal sense by being physically unconstrained, but free in the metaphysical sense of being radical undetermined by nature.[119]

Fukuyama, therefore, admits Kojeve's submission that:

> Hegel's first man is radically different from the animals in that he desires not only real 'positive' objects … but also objects that are totally nonmaterial. Above all, he desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be recognized. Indeed for Hegel, an individual could not become self-conscious … without being recognized by other human beings.[120]

This quest to be recognized by others, accordingly, triggered off the first bloody war in Hegel's state of nature[121] and so started the world-history. Going technically, Fukuyama maintains that the thymos present in man seeks outlet in the form of megalothymia (unequal recognition) and will be satiated in isothymia (universal and equal recognition) [122]. Consequently, the history which started with the struggle of one to be recognized by the other will be terminated by all recognizing all equally.

All the events of the past, Fukuyama holds, are simply steps towards the realization of an epoch of the last man, the man without chest,[123] who does not seek to be recognized above others and the emergence of that epoch marks the end of history because the spirit of history is satisfied and moves further.[124] For Fukuyama, the present day liberal democracy is the dream era. Liberal democracy, he claims, provides us with not only the freedom of property but also the recognition of our dignity. "The liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of self-worth. Thus both the desiring and thymotic parts of our souls find satisfaction."[125]

Modern liberal democracies recognize all human beings universally by granting and protecting their right.[126] Liberal democracy has therefore reconciled the contradictions inherent in other political and economic arrangements of the previous epochs by satisfying the megalothymia not by imposing "[…] constraints on natural instincts for aggression and violence" but by fundamentally transforming the instincts themselves.[127] Liberal democracy is thus the perfect and ideal state and the flaws found therein result from incomplete implementation rather than the principles of democracy. Relying on this, Fukuyama avows, "[…] we can argue that history has come to an end if the present form of social and political organization is completely satisfying to human beings in their most essential characteristics."[128]

By this submission, Fukuyama foreclosed the possibility of evolution of better social and political organization from the present day liberal democracy. But surprisingly he admitted that some aspects of inequality will remain in this "perfect" state: "[…] not all social inequality was eliminated but that those barriers which remained were in some respect "[…]necessary and ineradicable" due to the nature of things rather than the will of man."[129] Now if the nature of things, nature of man inclusive, makes inequality ineradicable, one wonders how in democracy unequal persons will be recognized equally. Fukuyama here seems to have involved himself in the error Aristotle long ago found with democracy, namely, that it recognizes the unequal as equal; because people are equal in some respects they think they are equal in all respects; "[…] because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal"[130] The type of society Fukuyama thought liberal democracy was, would have been possible if men were absolutely equal.

Besides, if the nature of individual flows into the nature of state and that the struggle for recognition can manifest in the form of nationalism, religion, and culture, as Fukuyama acknowledged,[131] and that some form of nationalistic megalothymia will remain in liberal democracy,[132] then, what stops the shift of the battle for recognition from individual level to between states, cultures and religions. He actually admitted that all these pose problems to the realization of democracy, maintaining that "[…] the thymotic origins of religion and nationalism explains why the conflicts over values are potentially much more deadly than conflicts over material possessions or wealth"[133] but down played their perniciousness in plunging mankind into the next level of conflicts to keep history moving.[134] In Fukuyama is seen over-emphasis on the social tendencies of man to the utter neglect of his anti-social tendencies which Kant held to be the spirit of the world-history. Yet, he acknowledged that:

> The fact that peace in historical state systems has been so difficult to obtain reflects the fact that certain states seek more than self-preservation. Like giant thymotic individuals, they seek acknowledgement of their value or dignity on dynastic, religious, nationalist, or ideological grounds, and in the process force other states either to fight or to submit. The ultimate ground of war among states is therefore thymos rather than self-preservation.[135]

Furthermore, Fukuyama did not even envisage his universalization of Western brand of democracy, which John Mill had pointed out to be a replacement of the tyranny of one with tyranny of majority[136], as an imposition on the whole world and as quest by the West to be recognized by the entire world. In addition this perceived imposition is capable of generating reactions from other regions of the world thereby opening the door of history he thought liberal democracy had closed to a fresh struggle for recognition. Samuel Houtington capitalized on this weak stand of Fukuyama and made name by declaring that the fall of communism had only opened a new vista for world-conflict which he called "clash of civilization."

The so much time spent dealing with Fukuyama is deliberate because of the strong connection between his work and Hegel's "Philosophy of History," where it is hoped that the conflicts in Arab world could be hinged to become a philosophical study. The position of Hegel on philosophy of history was critically reviewed. The foundations, the opinions, the sustaining variables and indices of conflicts were also considerably considered. Scholars reviewed, posited their reasons for the conflicts based on their background, specialization, faith, and even interests.

With Hegel's position and judging by remarks and comments made by scholars interested in Arab affairs, and the litany of revolts/conflicts in the region, it is clear that what he submitted was not completely an empty idea. The import of the review of the philosophical history carried out in this chapter is that a view of the theory of clash of opposites in Arab world from the

perspective provided here will assist to make it philosophical and thus incorporates it into the philosophical world history where conflict is viewed as a propeller of history.

However, despite series of efforts made by several authors to understand the basis, causes and ripples of the Arab Spring, attempts have not been made by any author reviewed solely tounderstand and present the Arab Spring in the framework of the dialectic of Hegel's Philosophy of History. This study therefore, is an attempt to fill this gap.

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CHAPTER THREE: CONFLICTS IN THE ARAB WORLD

3.1   The Arab World and North Africa

A nation's history cannot be fixed at a certain starting point, nor can it be dated from a specific event. It rather comprises a continuum of events emanating from beginnings that may belong to as remote as was the case for the Arab nation – although the course of her history has not adhered to a single pattern. The Arabian Peninsula was the original home of these people, and through its climate and geographical location it both fashioned their natural environment and impressed a common stamp on the history of their civilization.

Arabian's geographical position between India and the Far East on the one hand, and the Mediterranean World and the West, on the other hand, showed at a glance the international trade routes. This had a decisive influence on both the settled and nomadic societies of the Peninsula. The region has been subjected to series of domination by external powers and elites. At the height of its power in the 16th and 17th centuries, the tri-continental Ottoman Empire controlled much of the Middle East and North Africa. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, all parts of the Arab World (apart from Saudi Arabia and Northern Yemen) fell under European imperial domination. In the 1950s and 1960s, most states won independence, but soon came under control of military dictatorships.

There are many common characteristics shared across this vast region of about 325 million people. The primacy of Arabic as the written and official language of the region (though some ethnic minorities use other languages) is recognized. They have close similarities in manners, customs, political and social systems. With regard to faith and religion, Islam has a large dominance; although some countries have significant Christian and small Jewish or other

religious minorities, though their culture is largely rooted in Islam. They have a shared history of external domination principally by the Ottomans, British, French and Americans with their continued influence on the laws which they imposed on them. Freedom of association and expression, which are the vital elements for fostering civil society, remained under strict control.

In some countries, prolonged states of emergency, restrictive legislation or special courts provided regimes with sweeping powers to regulate political parties and civil organizations.

The region enjoys a rapid population growth in recent decades, with a high percentage of young populations; with a resultant high level of unemployment, especially among young people. They are exposed to rapid urbanization and a significant concentration of population in capital cities. The Arab world has embarrassing continuing high rates of illiteracy, especially among women. Only two-thirds of Arab adults can read and write with understanding, one of the lowest adult literacy rates in the world.[1]

There is always a high rate of emigration, forced migration and brain drain in the Arab World. Staggering numbers of Syrians, Lebanese, Palestines and Iraqis many of whom have professional qualifications have left their various countries and there are almost as many Syrians outside the country as there are residents. The prolonged impact of foreign occupations, armed conflicts and military interventions on civil `society and human rights abuses, especially in Palestine, Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq and now in Syria have remained a constant attribute in their daily life experiences. They enjoy the membership of the league of Arab States. The League is an organization set up in 1945, with the declared aim of protecting the interest of the Arab countries.

It must be remarked that there are the uneven pace of spread of literacy and modern education. In the countries like Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, earlier access to education and

development of newspapers created an intelligentsia which helped in the formation of a viable civil society. By comparison, Gulf States remained closer to tribal values. There is also a regrettably uneven distribution of wealth. While the oil-rich Gulf States have attracted significant numbers of foreign workers from elsewhere in the Arab world – other states are among the world's least developed. For example, Yemen ranks 150th on *UNDP's Human Development Index*.[2] There is also a disturbing uneven development of civil society, while countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen have many civil society organizations, there are few in such states as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya.

The concept of political culture has been widely used by political scientists as a tool for interpreting political behaviour. In its biological usage, a culture is a medium in which an organism lives; the nature of the medium will affect the viability and behaviour of the organism. Culture in its broadest social application according to the dictionary, is "the body of customary beliefs, social forces, and material traits constituting the distinct traditions of a social group". Politics David Easton has suggested, is "the authoritative allocation of values,"[3] and Harold Lasswell has defined it even more succinctly as the process that determines "[...]who gets what, when and how".[4] One can easily agree that the beliefs, forces and traits that constitutes a social culture must profoundly affect the society's political process.

In his famous lecture of 1882, Ernest Renan posed the question, "what is a Nation"? His answer was that nationhood resided in the collective will of the people to live together as a community. Nowhere is the task of definition more difficult than in the Arab World, where the multiplicity of primordial identification includes kin group, sect and universal religious community. In the industrialized west, their identifications are for the most part of only marginal significance to national politics and, in any event, are easily distinguished from nationalism. But in the Arab

World, all three are frequently closely related to a national identity. For example, the national identity of Jordanians or Kurds is coloured with tribalism; the national identity of Lebanon and Yemen has been associated with a particular sect; and the national identity of Saudi Arabia and Libya or the *Muslim Brotherhood* is infused with Islamic symbols. Yet, there remains a kind of group identification that cannot be subsumed under these categories.

The principal dimensions of Arab nationhood appear to be a collective awareness of a common history, a distinctive language and culture (literature, art, and folkways), a degree of similarity in appearance which is not racial since the Arabs are an amalgamation of races and do not practice racial exclusivity – and a historic, geographic homeland. "The Arab nationalism in which we believe", wrote Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, "is based…not on racial appeal but on linguistic, historical, cultural, and spiritual ties, and on fundamental vital interest".[5]

The hallmarks of modern Arab identity are, on the ethnic dimension, Arabic language and culture, and on the religious dimension, Islam. On both dimensions, the inhabitants of the Arab world are generally homogenous. The Arab world today is also over-whelmingly Islamic. Except for the Sudan and Lebanon, each with nearly half its population non-Muslim, the Arab states are either almost wholly Muslim or contain small but important Christians minorities of around 10%, as in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian community.

According to Sati al-Husri, the most influential theorist of modern Arab nationalism,

> Every person who speaks Arabic is an Arab. Everyone who is affiliated with these people is an Arab. If he does not know or if he does not cherish his Arabism, then we must study the reasons for his position. It may be a result of ignorance – then we must teach him the truth. It may be because he is unaware or deceived - then we must awaken him and reassure him. It may be a result of selfishness – then we must work to limit his selfishness.[6]

There is no doubt that contemporary Arab nationalists agree with this broad definition. Anyone whose native tongue is Arabic belongs to the *Umma al-arabiyya*, the Arab nation, and partakes of *Uruba*, Arabism. Just as the Jews consider themselves the people descended from Abraham and his Son Isaac, the Arabs, another people arising from a group of tribes, claim prophetic ancestry.

3.2   The Legitimacy Problem in Arab Politics

Without legitimacy, argued Max Weber, a ruler, regime, or governmental system is hard – pressed to attain the conflict– management capability essential for long-run stability and good government. While the stability of an order may be maintained for a time through fear of expediency or custom, the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept the rightness of the ruler's superior power.[7] As David Easton puts it:

> The inclination of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favour both of the authorities and of the regime. A member may be willing to obey the authorities and conform to the requirements of the regime for many different reasons. But the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees the objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent on specific inducements or towards any kind, except in the very long run.[8]

The governmental system and leadership that is genuinely national that partakes of the nation's history, that acts in accordance with the society's values, and that protects its broadest concerns

is likely to be regarded as legitimate, even though particular decisions and leaders may be unpopular or unwise. A ruler, regime, or governmental process that is not widely perceived as clothed in legitimacy is not able to function authoritatively.

The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource, largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all present Arab governments. Arab politics today are not only volatile, not just unstable, although instability remains a prominent feature; they are also unpredictable to participants and observers alike, because twenty four hours are so long a time for things unthinkable to happen. Fed by rumour, misinformation and lack of information the Arab political process is cloaked in obscurity and Arab politicians are beset by insecurity and fear of the unknown.

The legitimacy problem in the Arab world is basically the same as that in most newly independent rapidly modernizing states. In essence, it results from the lack of what DankwartRustow has designated as the three prerequisite for political modernity: authority, identity and equality.[9] The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community which does not conflict with other sub national or supra-national communal identification. Without authoritative political structures endowed with "rightness" and efficacy, political life is certain to be violent and unpredictable. Equity, the third prerequisite for political legitimacy, is specifically a product of the modern age, which the Arab world may be dated from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798.

Personal leadership plays a major legitimizing role, of course, in the Arab monarchies; in fact, in all of them the King, Amir, Sheikh, or Sultan does not merely reign but rules. All the Arab regimes, whether "conservative" or "progressive," during their reigns before the Arab spring swept many of them away, exploit ideology assiduously in their pursuit of legitimacy. But in the revolutionary republics it has been magnified into what David Apter calls political religion. Some efforts the politicians and leaders do in the Arab World to ensure that their illegitimacy attracts some legitimacy, did not and will not yield anything, unless and until they do and apply the right principles of assuming powers and discharging same in accordance with the legitimate laws acceptable to all.

3.3 Phases of the Conflicts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria

In this Section, we shall be examining four countries'- **Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria** - role in the Arab Spring by clarifying their historical background that led to the uprisings. Each of the four countries has their own unique telling of the Arab Spring though shares some similarities too.

3.3.1 Tunisia

Tunisian society has experienced a number of uprisings, social and political protests during its modern history[10]. In 1978 there were demonstrations, which were organized by UGTT (*Union Générale des TravailleursTunisiens,* General Union of Tunisian Workers) to protest against worsening financial crisis in Tunisia. Many demonstrators were killed and injured, including UGTT leader HabibAchour. It was followed by the bread riots in 1984, which were held because the price of bread and other staples were increasing almost doubly. Both these riots in Tunisia's

recent history can be considered according to AdibNehme as "…uprisings of civil society against statist regimes."[11]

Few years after this, on the 7th November 1987 Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, then prime minister of Tunisia, announced that a team of doctors had declared HabibBourguiba mentally unfit to govern and that, as the recently appointed prime minister, he was assuming power. He promised Tunisian economy to flourish and the country to move towards democracy. He organized the country's first multi-candidate election in 1999, which he won with a farcical 99,44% of the vote. This earned him the nickname Mr 99%, although he was also known as Ben A Vie (president for life).[12] When people realize that things do not change when they need to, they start to demonstrate, but neither of these previous demonstrations turned out like the one on 2011, which the world knows as Jasmine Revolution and which was the root of the Arab Spring.

On the 17th December of 2010 twenty-six year old Mohamed Bouazazi was illegally selling fruits and vegetables on the streets of SidiBouzid, he lights himself to fire as police comes to stop him. In the beginning it seemed just an ordinary incident just like many others in the streets of Tunisia or the other Middle Eastern countries, but this time it was different. It turned out that this unknown Tunisian man started the series of rebellions against corruption and tyrannical governance. As George Joffé argues there were spontaneous demonstrations in sympathy with Mohammed Bouazizi's action taken in hand by local branches of the UGTT, together with representatives of lawyer associations and journalists.

They organized series of rolling demonstrations around the country, culminating in major demonstrations in the capital Tunis, in protest against the regime's repressive policies since 1991, when it had first turned on the country's Islamist movement, Annahda.[13] The question is,

how did the events develop in Tunisia to lead such a revolution in less than a month, in such way that nobody beforehand could have predicated or planned for such an outcome?[14] Firstly, the main answer is the new social media and spread of Internet and technological developments in the Middle East. The key issue is that contrary to the customary media it is very hard for governmental authorities to take over the control of social media. Dale F. Eickelman argues in *The Middle East's Democracy Deficit andthe Expanding Public Sphere* that "Many governments in the Middle East are deeply suspicious of an open press, non-governmental organizations, and unrestricted expression that the 'restive' public, increasingly educated and influenced by hard-to-censor new media, can take action."[15] That is why they controled as much as possible print media, radio and television.

As there is a shortage of independent media, dissatisfied youths have searched for alternatives, such as new social media, to participate in the public sphere. Many people on the streets filmed what happened with Mohamed Bouazizi and posted these videos on YouTube and Facebook and tweeted about it in Twitter so the rest of Tunisia and the world would know the situation. Therefore it can be said that the social media, the shocking pictures and videos were one of the most important part of the uprising. As the Tunisian youths were already very angry they kept protesting against what happened in SidiBouzid, against corruption and political condition.

During the protest, they had their mobile phones with them in order to record everything and post it online right away. "At the point when demonstrations reached the nation's capital, Tunis, protesters had stopped calling for policy changes, and started calling for President Ben Ali's removal. On January 14, Ben Ali absconded to Saudi Arabia. In just a month, the people of Tunisia had successfully brought down their dictator."[16] Former Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's dethronement showed clearly that collectively minded people have huge

power to do important things that matter. Never before had people of Tunisia experienced this kind of fellow feeling and as the other nations of Middle East were inspired by Tunisia, soon the fellow feeling covered whole Middle Eastern and North African region. Secondly, the reason of the uprising is high unemployment among well-educated young people in Tunisia. The reasons according to Mehdi Mabrouk are weak policies in higher education: state is making higher education more easily accessible at a time when demographic growth generated far greater demand and it encourages two thirds of all university students towards literature and the human sciences, irrespective of what their future employment opportunities would be.[17]

It is clearly the government's role to organize the education system and when it is seen that something is wrong, it has to be changed. Tunisia needs less skilled and lower paid industrial workers, therefore the state must change education policies in order to educate more employees for these kinds of jobs. As people without jobs get stressed, they feel deprived and need a change. They are more likely to go out to the streets, even while knowing about the violence they will receive by doing so. People lost their fear. They are not afraid anymore and in this kind of situation "…death is more attractive than life under such conditions."[18]

The fact that there were so many jobless educated people in the country might be the reason why these events happened. Educated people are more likely to use the Internet and therefore they are familiar with the news from the world, such as democracy in Western countries. People of Tunisia have not experienced freedom of press, speech and expression and as seen from Internet that most of the world had these liberties, they started to compare themselves with them and they felt deprived. The people of Tunisia felt that their right to certain goods and conditions was barred. This caused the action of uprising in order to have democratic state, although many feel that Western way of thinking and democratic ideology can never be spread in Middle Eastern

countries. Obviously there are big cultural differences between Western world and Middle East, but these differences cannot hold people back to make decisions for themselves and live in a country where everyone has equal opportunities.

On the other hand, stable democracy is based on long experience, which Arab countries do not have. Hence, it is hard to say if Arab people understand the meaning of human rights and are ready to respect them as they have very long history of patriarchal manners. The other aspect we can use to explain the conflicts in Tunisia is the Relative Deprivation Theory where Ben Ali's and his relatives' luxurious lifestyle mocked the state of poverty in the country. As Tunisian economy was mainly based on industries and tourism, it had a huge downfall during the world economic and financial crisis in 2009. Therefore people of Tunisia did not like to see how their leader was spending money as the unemployment rate was increasing and economy was deteriorating. Reacting to this, Joshua E. Keating described in *Lifestyles of the Rich and Tyrannical* how Ben Ali's son-in-law was having a massive dinner, including more than dozen dishes and frozen yoghurt flown in by plane from Saint-Tropez and yet more he owned a pet tiger, which he kept in cage and who consumed four chickens per day.[19]

According to the duo of Francesco Cavatorta and RikkeHostrupHaugbølle "... of all Arab countries, Tunisia was believed to be one of the least likely to experience such a massive uprising against a regime that had seemingly obtained a number of notable achievements."[20] This is true as Tunisian women's social and legal status differs a lot from the others in the Middle East: they are allowed to file for divorce and have a right to vote and therefore Tunisia women played an essential role in bringing down the regime. The fact that women came outto the streets and protested together with everyone else clearly demonstrates thatTunisian society

should have already been one step closer to a new democratic era asTunisia is also been "…long considered as the most liberal among the Arab states…"[21]

Unfortunately it is not as Emma Murphy discusses;"Islamist tendency has deep roots and historically wider appeal than it is oftencredited with. Thirty years of fierce repression, and regime discourses that focusedon violent factions and episodes, combined with the high visibility of secular publiccultures in the capital, obscured very real significance of Islam for rural populations,lower socio-economic strata and formats of opposition activism."[22]With the first free elections after the uprising, Islamist party Ennhada came into power. They were criticised about their Islamic views about the role of the women. Nevertheless they set up few statements regarding to woman's right and gender equality and as Edit Bauer, a member of European Parliament stated in her interview to the European Parliament television, "without equality there will be no democracy in the Arab world."

3.3.2 Egypt

Slogans such as *the people want to bring down the regime* and *leave or go* are just a few of the many, chanted by civil society in Egypt during the Arab Spring in 2011. Egypt was the second country after Tunisia, which revolted against its regime to end decades of corruption and torture. For thirty years the country had been harshly ruled by president Muhammad Hosni Said Mubarak (1928), who became president without a democratic election. Mubarak was forced to step down on 11 February 2011 due to the pressure from massive protests in Cairo and other essential cities. Opposition against the Egyptian rule already began in the 1970s and it is important to establish that then and now the antagonism was and is not signally about democracy.

Furthermore, civil society such as the lower class and social movements such as the Labour unions are significant actors in the 2011 uprisings as it was events initiated by them within roughly past thirty years, which lay the foundation. In 1977 the ground breaking event of the Bread riots occurred and Timothy Mitchell argues "…the Egyptian government announced it was accepting the demands of the International Monetary Fund…to eliminate food subsidies and doubling the price of bread, groups of workers, students, and the urban poor marched to the centre of Cairo. The demonstration turned into riots and spread…"[23] As Mitchell argues it was the different groups of civil society, which joined hands and opposed the government's decision to liberalize the economy, as it would result in even further poverty and neglect of the people. It can also be argued that this was the beginning of an era where people lacked confidence in the Egyptian government.

Moreover, in February 1986 the violent Egyptian Conscription riots was sparked by Mubarak wanting to prolong the Central Security Forces period of conscription from three to four years and argued by Hillel Frisch that they were "…poorly paid and poorly armed…"[24] We believe that both these revolts were based on economic grounds and that the riots by the many diverse groups of civil society such as the labour movements lay the base for the 2011 uprisings. However, in April 2008 protests in Mahallah based on economic grounds appeared called the Egyptian General Strike as food prices rose and with low wages the workers within the state textile industry revolted. Labour activist Kamal Fayoumi states in his article *The Labour Movementand the Future of Democracy in Egypt* that "Mahallah is the mother of Tahrir. On April 6, 2008, they said the whole country was in Mahallah. On January 25, 2011, they said everyone was in Tahrir."[25] . This argument underlines the significant influence that previous protests had on the 2011 revolt as they inspired and removed the fear barrier gradually.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the essential characteristics of all the rebellions were the police brutality against protesters and illegitimacy of protesting which caused protesters from many diverse backgrounds to join and support each other. FaoudAjami captures it well in *The Sorrows of Egypt* that "Thus faced with a relentless campaign of subversion, the regime responded by showing no mercy. The state apparatus was given green light to root out armed Islamic groups and to do it without the kinds of protections and restraints a society of laws and honours expects."[26]   The labour activists from the April 6th Movement, Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ultras Ahlawy supporters of the Egyptian football club Al-Ahly revolted together but it was the privatization of the economy throughout the past 30 years by leaders such as Mubarak which was the background for the uprisings. It was mostly Islamic groups who opposed Mubarak's reign and he did everything in his power without consideration to the law and the people to quell the situation but the hate against him grew and his influence decreased. In the years following the people of Egypt suffered even further as poverty, unemployment and increasing prices ravaged the people.

In 2011 Egypt changed forever when the educated youth of Egypt joined hands and initiated the uprising. They united on the basis of similar interests such as civil society and created social movements. It can be argued that these movements were responsible, for making civil society in Egypt even bigger with one goal in mind: democracy. The social movements and civil society, especially in the case of Egypt, were dependent on each other for the uprisings to succeed. The Civil society was most dominant as they initiated and planned the protests. This is evident in the fact that "Egypt's 2011 revolt had coalesced around a group of about 15 young political activists who represented a broad swath of political ideologies…they were instrumental in plotting the

demonstrations that unravelled the regime…uniting Islamists and secularists…led to the ouster of Mr. Mubarak…" [27]

One of the key aspects of the 2011 protests was the unity, common goals and lack of fear within these social movements and the reason for their victory. This thesis argues that the many restrictions imposed by the government such as the 6 o'clock curfew, shut down of the Internet etc., was the cause for even more revolts in Egypt. As the situation boiled hotter, the government became even more desperate and more violent but so did the protesters. This is evident in the documentary *The Arab Awakening theEnd of a Dictator,* where the young demonstrators such as MiralBrinjy who argued that in the beginning, it was about the amount of people but when provoking methods such as the deprivation of Internet, it became a violation of personal freedom and this inspired even more people to join. [28]

Another significant factor which contributed to the massive protests was according to Mark Lynch who in his famous book *The Arab Uprising: The UnfinishedRevolutions of the New Middle East,* argued that

> "…for changing Egyptian minds about participation in protests…[was] Khaled Said, a young man dragged from an Internet café…and beaten to death by police…After the young Alexandrian died from horrific police abuse, a group…created the Facebook page "We Are All Khaled Said" to organize protests in his memory…"[29]

This is very significant for uprising as the sacrifice of this young Egyptian helped form civil society as many felt this could be their own son or husband, due to this drastic choice the people could now identify themselves with the opposition. Moreover, the death of Said assisted in breaking down the fear barrier and it can be argued that many felt that if he was willing to die for this cause so were they.

The youth who initiated this were well educated both in Egypt and the rest of the world and had therefore, seen and been educated on alternative ways of regimes such as democracy where the people had freedom and rights. This created a sense of deprivation as in other countries people had freedom and did not fear in their state and Egyptians felt that they deserved this as well. Furthermore, globalization and technology such as the Internet also assisted in creating this sense of deprivation as the Internet and foreign media would criticize regimes such as Mubarak's and influence these young people even further by showing alternatives and ways to change this. Even though, the youth felt deprived so did the rest of the people all suffering under the Emergency law which had existed since 1967 and "The statutes that make up emergency law forbade most public gatherings, effectively criminalising protests, and allowed security officers to search and arrest anyone without probable cause. They also provided for indefinite detention and rendered judicial review ineffective."[30]

For so many years the people have been suffering under this law and felt deprived of their basic human rights and therefore, they found motivation from globalization, media and education and formed civil society to end this deprivation. With the help of each other they became a unit that would have the power to end this totalitarian regime in Egypt. The only reason civil society in Egypt is so open and public is due to the fact that the fear barrier has been removed. The 18 days of extremely broadcasted protests that began on the 25th January 2011 in Tahrir Square ended when President Mubarak renounced his presidency on 11th February 2011. The Supreme Counsel of the Armed Forces (SCAF) immediately took over power in Egypt. For many, this did not change the situation, as many feared that their wish for democracy and more freedom became even more doubtful than during Mubarak's period. With this resultant state, the concern of the

people was in its place, as the SCAF was not democratically elected and also these generals derived from the previous regime, which was the main reason for the Arab Uprising in Egypt.

Reacting to the above, HamzaHendawi argues in his article *Egypt's Arab Spring: A revolutionGone Astray* that "The military has solidified its hold, giving itself overwhelming powers while governance of the country has faltered, leaving Egyptians worried about turmoil in the streets and a faltering economy."[31] . This is essential; as Egypt could not undertake a democratic path with the SCAF in power and this could very easily lead to further protests where the military would have to use violent force to stay in power and even more would be killed or injured as the people would once more be repressed. Nevertheless, it issignificant to mention that many supported the military in taking power after the resignation of the former president but it can be argued that they had not seen the consequences of this as they were blinded by happiness due to the end of an era of Mubarak.

In his article, *The Arab Revolts*, MouinRabbani summits that the people in the Arab world have been inspired by neo-liberal reforms and that radical change can only occur if the old regime is being transformed.[32] This is true to an extent because the Civil society in Egypt was inspired by Tunisia and the democracies of the Western world and like Rabbani is arguing further that these liberal visions can only be applied if the regime is being transformed. However, the old regime cannot only be transformed but has to be removed completely otherwise, there would always be traces of a totalitarian character such as with the SCAF being in power. Furthermore, the Egyptian civil society demanded free elections not history repeating itself such as with both Anwar Sadat (1918-1981)taking over the presidency after Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) and Mubarakautomatical succeeded Sadat without any democratical elections.

The Society of the Muslim Brothers (MB) was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Bannaas a social movement and a response to the British occupation that has played anessential part in Egyptian history for a long time. In 1952 they supported the military coupcreated by Nasser during the Egyptian Revolution to facilitate their ideology andaims. However, they did not support the constitution to transform Egypt into arepublic and this had grave consequences as their organisation became illegalised.Many members including famous SayyidQutb (1906-1966) were imprisoned, torturedand killed. Describing them JayshreeBajoria submits in his article *Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood,* that "The Brotherhood's original mission was to Islamize society through the promotionof Islamic law, values, and morals. An Islamic revivalist movement from its earlydays, it has combined religion, political activism, and social welfare in its work. Itadopted slogans such as "Islam is the solution"…"[33]

During the 2011 uprisings the organization played avital role. This is aptly captured by SouadMekhennet and Nicholas Kulish in their article *With theMuslim Brotherhood Set to Join Egypt's Protests, Religion's Role May Grow,* as they explain that "…the largest organized opposition group in the country announced…that it wouldtake part in the protest. The support of the Brotherhood could well change thecalculus on the streets, tipping the numbers in favour of the protesters and away fromthe police, lending new strength to the demonstrations and further imperilling…Mubarak's reign of nearly three decades."[34] Today the MB is a very large organization with many members and most probably the movement will continue to attract many more people as it is based on Islam and resides in Muslim countries which easily cannot be combined and compared to a country based on a diverse religion. However, through their wish for democracy and welfare work in the lower classes, they have proven to be so popular that

theyformed their own party called the Freedom of Justice Party in 2011 and once put forward a presidential candidate: Mohamed Morsi Isa El-Ayyat in 1951.

3.3.3 Libya

In 1969 the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1942-2011) took over power in his country and elaborated a new socialist political system known as "Jamahiriya", which can be translated as State of the Masses. Under the new rule civil society forces were excluded from the political power, which was centralized around Gaddafis "sultanistic" rule.[35]The original idea behind Jamahiriya was based on citizens' active participation on decision-making. It was supposed to be an example of 'direct democracy'. All Libyans were envisioned to take part in the decision making locally, through people's congresses and popular committees, but in reality, this was not the case. Majority of the people felt they did not have any impact on the political decisions made and only a small minority attended the congress meetings regularly.[36] In affirmation of the above, Gaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam (1972), once gave a very descriptive speech in 2009 where he stated that "In theory, Libya is the most democratic state in the world," where the emphasis was on the word 'theory'.[37]

The original idea behind the Jamahiriya system would have been considerably more efficient than the present day democratic societies with elections and campaigns, but in reality, Jamahiriya did not leave any space for independent social or political action.[38] Private ownership, free press and retail trade were outlawed unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, where the civil community flourished. Moreover, in Libya there were predominantly non-existing political alliances, non-networks of economic associations and non-national organizations, as these had not had the possibility to function under Gaddafi's rule. The functioning possibilities of civil society in

Libya had been restricted for many years and there was no space for social movements either. In the 1990's there had been a radical Islamist movement called the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group opposing the regime but the movement was abolished and members ended up in prison.[39]

During the revolution in 1969 the Libyan people supported Gaddafi and they probably would have in 2011, if he had kept his promises.[40]Another important fact about Libyan society is the tribal variety within the population and the strict divisions between territories and cities. For example, the capital Tripoli had been significantly more pro Gaddafi than the city of Benghazi.[41]This is why Libya has been described as grand desert with two towns on both ends and sand between them.[42]

On February 17th 2011 peaceful demonstration was held in the Libyan town of Benghazi.[43] The demonstrators demanded democratic reforms in Libya and protested against human right abuses and political corruption. They wanted to permanently end Gaddafi's rule.[44]The demonstration would not have been as massive as it was, if Gaddafi's regime had not arrested citizens two days earlier and these arrests gave an excellent advertisement channel for the protesters.[45] This supports the resource mobilization theory, which emphasizes the importance of communication as a channel of informing and gathering social movements. Gaddafi ordered the military groups to stop the demonstration with violence. Despite the vicious brutality from the troops, the protest quickly spread.

During the first week of protests, the regime forces slaughtered hundreds of people and these deaths were published in the social media and on Al-Jazeera TV-channel. The brutal images had a strong impact on the citizens and even those who previously experienced the brutality of Gaddafi, were mortified as he, himself had sworn, that "there will be no mercy."[46] The Libyan

protests occurred right after the collapse of Ben Ali and Mubarak's regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. This timing gave the protesters self-confidence and Arabs in the whole region saw Gaddafi's violence as an offence against them and therefore, made the protesters to gain huge support. The common feeling was that if Gaddafi's repression and violence against his own citizens had turned out to be successful, it could have encouraged other Arab regimes to follow his example. However, on the other hand, if the protests had turned out to be prosperous, it would have inspired other Arab protests aiming for democracy.

Two days later after the protests began, Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam announced the situation in Libya was not comparable with Tunisia and Egypt and that is why Libyans should not follow these examples. Furthermore, he accused television channels and Facebook of misinforming the citizens of what was proceeding. According to him other groups originally caused the violence, not his father's regime. His speech ended up causing immense demonstrations, which were confronted with more brutal violence. At this point Marc Lynch indicates that the conflict turned into a civil war and events started to move hasty and developed fast. On 21st February 2011 Al-Jazeera's Islamist face Yusuf al-Qarawi urged someone to lynch Gaddafi in order to end the country's despair.[47] Access to Internet information and television channels was blocked by the state and they hoped the protests would settle down. Among the people this action generated a feeling of anxiety and uneasiness and the protesters had the town of Benghazi under their authority which is significant as the city for a long time had been the centre of Gaddafi's opposition.[48]

With this success in Benghazi, on February 27th 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed by groups who opposed Gaddafi.[49] Benghazi had become the symbol of a new Libya and while Gaddafi's troops had material superiority over the rebels, he had also taken power in

many cities as they approached Benghazi. Owing to this, the rebels announced that if no action by the international community was taken soon, the death rate of civilians could get tremendously higher. However, because of the presumed victories the rebels gained self-confidence and some of the protesters were against a foreign intervention. For example the human rights campaigner, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, stated in Benghazi that the rebels are strongly against the intervention and he wished Libya to be liberated by the Libyan people.[50] The no-fly zone was taken in use and on 18th March 2011 the UN Security Council authorized the use of "…all necessary means in order to stop the killing."[51] The intention behind this initiative was to protect the civilians from violence and harm.

The intervention by NATO under the approval of the Security Council and further approval by the Arab League made sure the protesters and rebels were supplied with military weapons.[52] Later on, the involvement of international society received criticism and suspicions of its motives.[53] However, the Arab activists were content with the intervention, which was seen as a sign of support from the West. The anti Gaddafi forces formed NTC, which can be seen as a temporal "alternative government" for the Gaddafi regime. NTC were recognized by several other nations and many Libyans switched from Gaddafi's to the rebel's side. In August 2011 the Gaddafi regime collapsed and in October 2011 Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed.[54]With this, the NTC can be seen as a successful social movement because it was able to take over the power from Gaddafi and get recognition from foreign states.

Describing further the situation in Libya, Lisa Anderson, writes that "Libya under Qaddafi has borne traces of the Italian fascism that ruled the country in its colonial days: extravagance, dogmatism, and brutality."[55] It can be said that the uprisings in Libya led to an internationally recognized civil war. The ethnic, tribal and religious tensions were forgotten when the people

rose together against the oppressive regime.[56] George Joffé claims that changing the political system in Libya, which was based on full autocracy, could only result into civil war. He further, believes that local activists did not have the required resources and socio-political infrastructure to challenge the regime with effective social movements and therefore, the violent conflict was inevitable.[57]

These factors explain greatly, why in Libya it was not possible to have a successful uprising without violence involved as the citizens were not used to be part of the decision making process nor express their grievances freely. They did not have organizations or associations, which could have impacted the collective life, which supports Joffé's argument. A well-functioning civil society in Western terms requires information and knowledge on how to express dissatisfaction effectively and get attention to their demands. The rebels might not have known many ways to get attention to their needs except going to the streets and protesting powerfully. In the case of Libya, it can be argued that Gaddafi would not have given up power without a long a brutal fight.

The social movements built by the rebel forces, impacted and got their aims attained by using violence because it was necessary in this particular situation. For Arabs worldwide, the situation in Libya was a significant part of their own battle for democracy. Al-Jazeera provided the people a possibility to follow the conflict closely and without censorship, which made it feel as a personal fight to many. The news from Libya made the main headlines on TV-channels around the globe and a great amount of information was available on social media sites as well.[58]

The Libyans were not satisfied with their leader and societal life and the brutal violence by the regime forces started the final countdown for the current regime. Common appeals were the base of the rebel groups, which in the end became a functioning social movement. However, it can be

questioned whether these anti-government movements were as successful as the ones in Tunisia and Egypt since the uprising was completed without a civil war and violence in the same scale as in Libya. The role of Islam was not as significant in the Libyan uprising as in the neighbouring countries and Gaddafi did not tolerate independent religious movements in the society. Still, there were various Muslim groups who were not officially organized and who were not literally Islamists.[59] This lack in religious action made it more challenging for the Libyans to organize themselves effectively. Still the protesters were successful in organizing themselves due to the strong and psychological deprivation and feelings. The example set by the protesters in Egypt and Tunisia gave them self-confidence and the publicity and media attention worked as powerful tools, which lead to the foreign intervention and the end of Gaddafi's era.

3.3.4 Syria

The conflict in Syria is largely influenced by Syria's history. The history of modern day Syria is riddled with foreign control and military coups. It is this history that allowed for the set-up of the Ba'athist regime under the leadership of the al-Assad family. To gain an understanding of the current conflict it is essential to firstly take a look at the history leading up to the current conflict.

Syria was for four centuries part of the Ottoman Empire until 1916. At that point the Arabs used the opportunity of World War I to revolt with the aid of the British military. While Britain had promised the Arab countries full independence, under the Sykes-Picot agreement France and Britain divided the Middle East between them leaving Syria under French control. Syrians rebelled and in 1936 Syria was given partial independence. During World War II there occurred military confrontations between French troops allied with the Germans, and Free French troops allied with the British. In 1941, the British army and its French allies occupied Syria and

promised full independence after the war. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the French did not keep said promise.

Syrians protested again and in 1946 Syria became fully independent. The period following the independence and leading up to the establishment of the Ba'athist regime were marked by political instability. Several coups and conflicts occurred and Syria was under threat from the West due to improving Syrian-Soviet relations. It also suffered from conflicts with Syria culminating in the Six Days War in 1967. The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party came to power in 1963, and finally in 1970 Hafez al-Assad, the father of current president Bashar al-Assad, led the Correction movement that brought security and stability to Syria after years of political turmoil.[60]

The Ba'ath regime under Hafez al-Assad reshaped what was then an unstable regime into a robust one through a "…'neo-patrimonial' strategy that concentrated power in a 'presidential monarchy' buttressed by his faction of Alawi lieutenants commanding the heights of the army and security forces."[61] This regime was very durable but provoked resentment amongst the majority Sunni community due to the political domination of the Alawi minority. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular, led several urban rebellions against the said regime. Any revolt was brutally suppressed and had success in doing so because "…the army, Damascus and the rural constituency of the Ba'ath remained loyal."[62]

The regime generated a permanent fiscal benefit supported by Arab Gulf states due to Syria's status as a front line state towards Israel. It also received cheap arms from the Soviet Union. Under Hafez a project of economic liberalization was started which was further expanded under Bashar.

In 2000, following Hafez's death, Bashar took over the presidency and proceeded to open the Syrian economy to the world market. He as well went ahead with adapting the country to globalization through for example, the introduction of the Internet. Ba'athist policy was abandoned in favour of a 'middle' way through expanding the private sector instead of privatizing the public sector. Slowly but surely, Bashar worked towards the removal of members of his father's regime and inserted his loyalists in the army and security forces. He appointed reforming technocrats into government and in 2005 the 'old guard' was fully swept from power. In doing this Bashar was free to install the reforms he wanted but inadvertently weakened his capacity to sustain his power over society.[63]In 2001, as Bashar took power, there was a build-up of intellectual forums through which Syrians discussed possibilities for reform. The common threads through these forums were the call for increased transparency and accountability from the regime, the respect for human rights, and the lifting of the emergency laws. There was especially a disagreement with the image presented internationally of Syria as the birthplace of civilization and focusing on the past.

Many Syrians found out that the reality did not fit with this image, especially due to actions from the regime. These voices became more and more vocal, releasing literature and making public statements, until the regime cracked down on dissenting voices and opinion in the autumn of 2001. These events would later become known as the "Damascus Spring,"a possible precursor to the current conflict.[64]The reforms put in place by Bashar's regime became almost indistinguishable from neo-liberalism, favouring economic growth while neglecting equality. The public sector was increasingly privatized and labour laws were increasingly cast aside. Parts of the public sector were turned over to crony capitalists who exported their wealth rather than

re-investing in Syria. In practice, the reformists "…focused on making Syria a centre of banking, tourism and cross-regional trade."[65]

Unemployment increased as cheap imported goods flooded the Syrian market, and very little of the economic growth 'trickled down' to ordinary people. A combination of the rise of a new ruling class of crony capitalists and financial austerity programs further alienated the majority of Syrians. Bashar's regime was perceived by the people to be "…abandoning the poor for the sake of the rich."[66] It is from this background of oppression and lack of proper representation that the uprisings in Syria spawned from.

Banking on the events transpiring in Egypt and Tunisia, Syrians gained a new form of courage against a regime which they have been living in fear of for four decades, and a long turbulent political history prior to that. While there were smaller events in different areas in Syria, the first mass mobilizations occurred in Dar'a. ReinoudLeenders and Steven Heydemann in affirmation wrote, that the opportunity structures in Dar'a were especially conducive to early mobilization because "…paradoxically, no one expected it to start there…" due to the assumption that Dar'a was largely loyal to the Ba'ath regime.[67] Urban Syrians also perceived it as 'backward, marginal, conservative, and isolated' as both the regime and opposition activists set their sights on urban areas as hotbeds for mobilization along with the Kurdish areas in the northeast. Due to this, Dar'a was largely overlooked as a possible catalyst for mobilization in Syria. Regime violence and repression in the area further aided in the mobilization of the tribes in Syria.

In furtherance of their views, Leenders and Heydemaan maintain that "…all accounts of the events suggest a level of coercion in Dar'a in early 2011 which was only to be seen elsewhere in the country much later in the uprising, including mass arrests, torture, the use of live rounds

against crowds and targeted individuals suggesting a 'shoot-to-kill' policy, the deployment of snipers on rooftops and the prevention of medical treatment for the injured."[68] The reason why the increased violence had the opposite effect than intended (increasing protest and defiance) may perhaps lie in the clan values of the area. With strong values of justice, honour, and dignity the increasingly violent methods employed by the regime in Dar'a was perceived as adding insult to injury.[69] With increasing regime violence adding further insult to these values it becomes much more difficult for individual members of the clan to sit idly without risking being marked as a traitor to the clan.

The networks existing in areas like Dar'a aided as well in the organization and mobilization of the protests and dissent against the al-Assad regime. Firstly, the area has a high amount of migrant workers. The outbound migration is often organized through social networks based on factors such as clan membership and city/village of origin. The important part of this process is that due to the social networks involved in gaining contact with prospective employers and shelter/housing left many of these workers spending large parts of their lives living abroad with other Dar'awis. Secondly, comes the cross-border traffic and linkages between Dar'a and Jordan. Much of Dar'a's social and economic life is directed towards Jordan, with strong clan/family ties existing between the border regions. Agricultural produce from Dar'a is moved to Jordanian cities close to the borders. There is as well a busy traffic of people across the borders. As Leenders and Heydemann state "…all these various, highly mobile economic activities, legal and illegal, are organized via elaborate trust-based networks linking family or clan members, major traders, money exchangers, smugglers, truck drivers, taxi drivers and unregistered drivers, and indeed corrupt customs officials." They further state that there is a high crime level existing in the region. The criminal networks required to sustain such activity means that there is an already

existing network required to sustain activity, which the regime regards as criminal.[70] All of these networks point to the region being very inter-connected and these connections could well have been the necessary element for the mass mobilization seen in Dar'a and similar areas.

It is as well interesting to note that in areas such as Dar'a there was a notable lack of individual key figures in the mobilization. Instead, the social networks and their inter-connectedness replaced the role usually taken by individual movement leaders. For example there are references to neighbourhood committees, which were often formed spontaneously. The demographics of the committees are described thusly: Some members were poor, others were quite well off, some were unemployed, and others ran their own businesses. Their ages varied from twenty-six to forty-eight years. They came from most of Dar'a's main clans. Some had relatives abroad, mostly in the Gulf. Most had spent time in prison, but none for serious crimes. Together they bundled their resources, skills and connections, and initially began negotiating with the security forces to stop the bloodletting. Failing this, they provided protection and intelligence to the protestors, and encouraged army soldiers to defect. Relentless regime violence did the rest: "There was an unprecedented togetherness and each person felt like he knew the others for years. The authorities' transgression actually made the bond between them much firmer."[71]

This description shows that these committees were able to organize themselves effectively in what seems to be a fairly non-hierarchical structure. Instead of leaders stepping forth to organize movements, people collectively pooled their resources together in hopes of organizing the mass protests, which occurred. This template spread out over the entire region and eventually leads to

every village and town having its own committee. These committees then worked together and communicated, again using the already existing social networks as a basis for cooperation.[72]

Similar features are exhibited in other regions, which mobilized in the early moments of the uprising. The existing informal social networks and the tribal values allowed for these regions to become an unlikely fuse for the mass protests, which occurred. The regime violence as well served only to strengthen the resolve of these regions as the strong sense of honour and justice existing amongst the tribes and clans aided in people perceiving regime violence not as a frightening deterrent but as an insult that must be fought against. The inter-connectedness of the regions meant that there already existed informal networks, which at the same time were embedded in life of the region but difficult for outside actors to understand or undermine. Collectively, these factors allowed for these perceptively unlikely regions to become the catalyst for the events to come. One of the main problems with giving support to the Syrian opposition is that it has been difficult to put a unified face to the uprising. These come in part from the way the uprisings have been organized without any formal leadership.

In October 2011, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was formed by a group of mostly exiled Syrian dissidents; this was an attempt to organize the different opposition groups and to perform as a functioning opposition government. There has however been a large amount of infighting, and while Western allies have recognized it as a legitimate representative, many are wary due to the volatile nature of the SNC and the deep divide between some of the groups therein.[73] At the same time, grassroots protest movements in Syria remain largely ignored, leading as well to a feeling amongst some of the protesters that those who try to push themselves forwards as leaders are only "imposing their leadership on a popular uprising that had commenced and spread without them."[74]

Many of the SNC's members are well-known opposition figures both in the Damascus Spring and earlier political activity in the 1980's, which gave the SNC some credibility when it began. They hold forth that they will not negotiate with the current regime. They are made up of members of the Damascus Declaration, the Muslim Brotherhoods, National Figures/National Bloc, the Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Democratic Organization, independent figures, and members of the Local Coordinating Committees. The make-up of the current SNC differs largely from itsoriginal charter, leading to accusations of restructuring to favour certain groups above others.

The divisions within the SNC have increased frustrations both by foreign partners and the grassroots organizations on the ground.[75] The Muslim Brotherhood also gained a large amount of control over the SNC. Having been effectively exiled since the 1980s, the long disconnect with Syria has made many Syrians wary of the Brotherhood. At the same time, there is a perception that the Muslim Brotherhood has effectively taken over the SNC. This has led to worries amongst the populace that the Brotherhood may be trying to take over the revolution. Armed opposition leaders as well accuse the SNC of being a front for the Brotherhood, leading to leaders not wanting to cooperate with the SNC.[76]

Another widely recognized opposition organization is the National Coordination Committee (NCC) based in Damascus. It is a coalition of different opposition groups and is the only opposition organization to advocate dialogue with the regime. This has led to its position as being recognized by the Syrian government due to the moderate views. This has however alienated some groups, especially with the increased violence from Assad's regime. It also lead to an accusation of the NCC being a puppet organization controlled by the regime. There is again

a divide here behind the formal organization and the more loosely organized grassroots movements.[77]

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is another significant actor. Colonel RiadAsaad and six other Syrian army officers formed it out of a refugee camp in Turkey. The FSA portrays an image of having control over forces on the ground, where the reality is that it has not the power to do so. Instead, there is evidence to show that insurgency groups throughout Syria have voluntarily aligned themselves with the FSA as to give a more unified image to the armed opposition. While the FSA may not have as much control over ground forces as they say they do, the fact remains that some of Syria's most effective militias maintain direct ties to the Free Syrian Army. Instead of functioning as a formal military chain of command it operates much more like an umbrella organization.

These opposition groups all have different conflicts within and conflicts of legitimacy. The SNC and NCC are both accused of being puppets, whether for the regime or for the Assad regime. The FSA has maintained a level of legitimacy amongst ground forces maybe because of its apparently decentralized organization. It remains to be seen which organization would assume control in the case of the downfall of Assad's regime, but it remains clear that any organization will have to work to gain legitimacy amongst the grassroot organizations, which have emerged. It is perhaps they that hold the most influence over local legitimacy. The main factor in the Syrian conflict is perhaps that of economic woes along with the lack of political freedom. With the election of Bashar al-Assad, the socialist programs set up by his father were quickly abandoned for favour of economic liberalization.

However, this economic liberalization leads to money being concentrated only amongst a certain elite and with the decline in employment in the public sector people saw them as being deprived not only in relation to the elite but also to how their lives were before. With many unemployed and facing the threat of homelessness, economic grievances were allowed to fester and the protective measures set up by Hafez al-Assad were weakened. This allowed for an opportuned moment of uprising, which has continued until this day. While there is a lack of political legitimacy amongst many of the representative organisations such as the SNC and NCC, the grass-roots movements continued fighting and protesting on their various grounds and may still bring forth a new Syria.

3.4   Consequences of Arab Spring and Lessons

The Arab Spring or Jasmine Revolutions began on 17th December, 2010 after the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi a trader in Tunisia, in response to police corruption and what he regarded as ill-treatment towards him, sparking a wave of popular protest against the leadership of Tunisia. Additional important factor to note was the lack of freedom that many citizens experienced together with human rights abuses and the recent rapid increase in commodity prices, particularly food and oil. Furthermore, many Arab states were 'Kleptocracies'. This means the ruling elites used their power to further their own causes, often financially. This was more-often than not done overtly. To date, revolutions have occurred in Tunisia, and Egypt; a civil war in Libya resulting in the fall of its regime; civil uprising in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen; major protest in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Oman; and minor protests in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Western Sahara. The protests

have shared techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies, as well as the use of social media to organize, communicate, and raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and internet censorship.[78] Many demonstrations have met violent responses from authorities, as well as from pro-government militias and counter-demonstrators.

The ripple effects of the uprising have been felt in many places. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14th January, 2011, following the Tunisian revolutions and protests. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 11th February 2011 after 18days of massive protests, ending his 30years presidency. Former Libyan leader Mummar Gaddafi was overthrown on 23rd August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC) took control of Bab al-Azizia. He was killed on 20th October 2011, in his hometown of Sirte after the NTC took control of the city. Additionally, governments in Jordan have been removed – instigated by King Abdullah. The Iraqi Prime Minister promised to not seek re-election at the end of his term in office. Economic concessions were made by King Hamad of Bahrain, Sultan Qaboos of Oman and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. King Mohammed of Morocco also made political concessions in order to maintain relative peace and stability within his country.[79]

Ultimately, the Arab Spring could cause enormous and far-reaching impacts across much of the world, both politically and economically, having knock-on social effects. In short, what started out as a feeling of low-lying dissent at government actions and high commodity prices has shown the potential to transform the way we have viewed the world for much of the latter part of the 20th Century; probably since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism.

The effects of the Arab Spring are numerous. Firstly, if the protesters achieve one of their principal aims, then Arab nations will begin to hold free and fair elections – democracy will (hopefully) become commonplace in the Arab world. The principal near-term consequences of the Arab Spring, therefore, are that a new global spotlight has been directed at dictatorial regimes. All of these regimes are now scrambling to buy off popular discontent with salary increases, new state subsidy packages and fake promises of political reforms.

Simultaneously, new recognition has been given to democratic movements and the aspirations of millions of Arab and Muslims who seek political freedom, social justice and dignity. Prior to the Arab Spring, it was long assumed that the voice of the region did not matter in terms of western policy. There was a tacit assumption that this voice was too fractured, too politically immature or incoherent or too radical to be taken seriously. Akbar Ahmed, the former High Commissioner of Pakistan to United Kingdom, observed that the uprising has both short-term and long-term implications. Both are enormous. Both are historic. For the first time ever, there is a genuine revolution reverberating throughout the Arab world and it has been encouraging for three reasons. First, it was led by young people – idealists – many of them skillfully utilizing social media.

 The revolts had common characteristics running across the nations – these include but not limited to – Civil Disobedience, Civil Resistance, Demonstrations, Online Activism, Protest Camps, Rebellion, Revolution, Strike Actions, Uprising and even Urban Warfare; and by last count over 38, 000 people have offered their lives for the struggle.[80]

The countries where citizens are more actively agitating or fighting for their rights –Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen are the advanced to date – have very different local

conditions and forms of governance, with ruling elites displaying a wide range of legitimacy in the eyes of their people. Governments have responded to the challenge in a variety of ways, from the flight of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan leaderships to violent military repression in Syria, and Bahrain, to the attempt to negotiate limited constitutional transformations in Jordan, Morocco and Oman. A few countries that have not experienced major demonstrations – Algeria and Sudan are the most significant – are likely to experience domestic effervescence in due course. Only the handful of wealthy oil producers (like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) seem largely exempt, for now, from this wave of citizen demands.

Moreso, the resultant effects of the Arab Spring have been mixed in the four countries studied here. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has taken over, but there are still protests over the control of the military. In Tunisia, the moderate Islamic party Ennahda won the popular vote with a new constitution that has been drafted and implemented. We see in these two countries the influence of Islam in the political arena following the uprisings, with the Islamic influence in Egypt being more volatile. In Libya, the knowledge of what democracy is, was misunderstood and therefore the implementation of such a system must wait.[81] It is also the clearest example of a revolution amongst these samples as both the government and military power were overthrown. In Syria the conflict is ongoing and has developed into a full-scale civil war with little signs of a peaceful resolution in the near future. Women, poor people, and uneducated people had a large role in the uprisings. There is a certain level of solidarity, which has been built up by these uprisings in the Arab world. In the midst of the various conflicts there has been a build-up of the idea of citizenship leading to the release of political prisoners. In Tunisia a new constitution has been written. In Libya an assembly was put together to draft a new permanent constitution that

will then be put for a referendum. The constitution in Egypt was suspended and a new draft is going to be put up before any election.

There are however on going protests against newly elected President Mohamed Morsi, where "…the most common refrain was not about the constitution; it was a call for 'the fall of the regime."[82] Civil society has been given a new area for functioning, especially in Libya where civil society was repressed by Gaddafi's regime. For example in the way they have founded the Libyan Civil Society Organization, which is "…an alliance of Libyan individuals, serving as an independent, non-governmental promoter of social justice and equal opportunity."[83] This form of organization would not have been allowed to exist under the rule of Gaddafi. The biggest difference in outcomes is probably in Syria where the Assad regime still sits in power. This is due to the Assad's regime persistent fight against the opposition and the lack of international response where both Russia and China have used their veto power to suppress Security Council resolutions aimed at international intervention in Syria. The uprisings have spread their effects to over 15 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. After much debate it can be argued that lack of consciousness of freedom, economic situation and lack of social justice were the main contributors of the Arab uprisings. For decades the populations of these four countries had been considered inferior in many aspects, however within the economy, social injustice clearly prevailed. In these countries financial decisions were made in favour of the upper class while the rest were suffering and poverty rose. The bread riots in 1977, 1978, 1984, 1985 and 2008 in Tunisia and Egypt evidently show this pattern of disagreement.

Furthermore the rise of labour unions and unemployment rate further indicates the injustice. Accordingly these are some of the most essential issues as they laid the foundation of the 2010/2011 uprisings. Lynch captures the situation very well as he describes it thus:

> …repression could not prevent popular mobilization from reappearing. New waves of protest and challenge from below would recur – economic protests in the early 1980s, serious pushes toward democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and then a steadily gathering tidal wave of protest that rose over the entire decade of the 2000s.[84]

Another essential factor was the social media. However, it can be argued that social media functioned as a tool. It had two functions: it gathered people and helped them to organize the demonstrations, and secondly it generally raised the awareness of what was happening and provided information, giving people free arena to share their thoughts and have a discussion. People providing information to people helped in circumventing the state's monopoly on the creation of information and news. Conventional media sources therefore gained a new source for which to describe current events of the region. It can further be understood from the viewpoint of Lynch as he concludes that;

> This went beyond simple media attention. Arabs identified with each other across borders and saw their struggles as intimately and directly linked. When the Tunisian uprising began, history tells us that it was almost inevitable that it would spread across the region.[85]

The role of the Islamist movements and the tribal division are also significant for the uprisings, however their roles were more essential in certain countries such as the MB in Egypt and the tribes in Syria.

Two words capture every important dimension of the Arab Awakening: "domination" and "legitimacy". They explain why the Arab region is erupting, and what needs to be done to satisfy popular demands. The typical Arab citizen, with few exceptions, has felt dominated in recent decades by his or her government. Hundreds of millions of Arabs feel they have been denied their human rights and their citizenship rights, the result of decades of socio-economic stresses and political deprivations. These include petty and large-scale corruption: police brutality; abuse

of power; favoritism; unemployment; poor wages; unequal opportunities; inefficient or nonexistent public services; lack of freedom of expression and association; state control of media, culture and education; and many other dimensions of the modern Arab security state. At the same time, ordinary men and women in countries across the region have seen small groups of families in the ruling elite; grow fabulously rich, simply because of their connections.

Young people sparked the revolt because they are generally the ones who suffer the most grievous consequences of the failed political order. They are unable to enjoy life's full opportunities and rewards, in terms of education, employment and income and material well-being. Millions of young Arabs took to the streets in greater part of 2011 because they refused to consent in either the legacy of stunted citizenship or the prospect of limited life opportunities. Their increasingly mediocre and irrelevant educations meant that they had difficulty finding jobs that pay enough to live decently get married and start a family. They saw in front of them, an entire lifetime of restricted opportunities and stolen rights. When they tried to speak out against unfair and corrupt practices, they were prevented from doing so by police and security agencies.

The revolt we are witnessing is not about ideology. It is mostly about men and women who, so brutalized by their own and foreign powers, are asserting their fundamental humanity – their right to use all their human faculties; to read, speak, listen, think, debate, create and enjoy to the full extent of their God-given ability or desire, whether in culture, politics, art, media, technology or any other arena.

The structural and political antidote to humiliation is legitimacy: a governing system that is anchored in the consent of the governed and is accountable to the needs, rights and aspirations of citizens. Public institutions and decisions should reflect the will of the majority while protecting

the rights of minorities. The two most critical elements of legitimate governance systems in Arab-Islamic lands are accountability and a sense of justice, or equity. Constitutions, parliaments, electoral laws and other mechanisms can be devised in many forms – tinged with Arabism, Islamism, tribalism, cosmopolitanism – but above all, they must be legitimate in the eyes of their people if the societies are finally to emerge from the dark tunnel of the security state and its stultifying, corrupting legacy. Legitimacy opens the door to normalcy in politics and daily life.

The citizen with rights – the most basic element of legitimate statehood – is the first building block of the Arab Awakening. Mohamed Bouazizi inspired the mass protests that have planted the seeds for stable citizenship across the region – the spontaneous action of a single indignant and dehumanized person resonated widely and powerfully with millions because of his refusals to live in domination. He should be seen in the same light as a line of historic figures around the world whose self-sacrifice transformed their societies – Rosa Parks (United States of America), Lech Walesa (Poland), Steve Biko (South Africa), Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic), Nelson Mandela (South Africa), Andrei Sakharov (Former Soviet Union), Aung San SuuKyi (Myanmar) – because millions of their countrymen and women shared the same goals.

When hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets in January and February 2011 to remove the Mubarak's regime, they tasted their first dose not only of individual empowerment but also of collective citizenship rights. When they returned to the streets in July 2011, they reaffirmed their insistence on transforming their government so that it was more legitimate in their eyes, and reflected the two critical elements they felt were missing from the old system: accountability and social justice.

Egyptians and Tunisians, and all Arabs, as we will soon learn, do not want to see their fellow countrymen and women killed by the hundreds without anyone being held accountable. This is what Arab regimes have routinely done; it is also what Israel has done in Palestine and Lebanon, and what the United States and other foreign armies did in Iraq in recent years. It is not surprising that these three – the corrupt Arab regimes, Israel and the United States – are the main targets of anger and indignity, because a central message of the *ArabAwakening* is that there should be no abuse of power or killing with impunity. Behind this emphasis on accountability lurks an equally important concept that is central to the spirit of the Awakening: social justice, the critical but underappreciated philosophical underpinning of the new Arab citizenry.

Social justice is about removing structures that abuse and subjugate citizens and turn them into powerless victims of oligarchies and autocracies. It is about ensuring that public authorities reflect the values, and serve the needs and rights, of citizens. Egypt leads the way in this important new dynamic, in which millions of individuals have come together to demand that the authorities rule with the consent of the governed. In the Egyptian case, the citizenry insisted that the transitional authority, before their elections, that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, carry out the key demands of the January revolution. For the first time, public opinion mattered in some Arab countries.

Even as demands grow for these three building blocks: credible governance, the basic rights of the citizen and citizenry, and a legitimate state authority that is accountable to the people's demand for social justice – we are witnessing the fourth element in the Arab Awakening: the birth of politics. In Tunisia and Egypt, citizens directly contested for power by forming groups that engage politically with other groups to define new state norms and policies. These included civil society organizations, religious movements, political parties, the private sector, military

authorities, youth groups, labor movements, women's organizations and many others. As contest for and over power developed through a combination of means – parliamentary, electoral, and judicial and media actions, as well as peaceful street demonstrations – it midwifes the birth of pluralistic, citizen-based politics. This contrasts sharply with the legacy of Arab decision-making, monopolized by ruling families and elites who depended heavily on foreign powers for their survival.

These developments point to the ultimate issues at stake in the Arab revolts, the prize: national sovereignty and self –determination. The contest over sovereignty has been at the heart of the confrontation between citizen ruling authorities since December 2010, but it dates back to decades. It is about who holds ultimate power, who is in charge of decision-making in the nominally independent Arab countries. Most national decisions in Arab countries for much of the past century have been made by small groups of unelected men who dominate the political space with their security services. A widely shared public sentiment across the region is that Arab ruling elites have responded more to the dictates of foreign powers than to their own people. When decisions have been made internally, they have primarily carried out the interests of the ruling families and their cronies, or the security and military systems that were the ultimate power brokers. Nowhere in national decision-making did ordinary Arab citizens feel that their voices were heard, or that their rights and sentiments mattered.

Egypt is once again the region-wide test case of what happens at this delicate and probably decisive transitional moment. The demonstrators who returned to Tahrir Square and other city centers across the country in June and July 2011, before suspending their protests for the holy month of Ramadan in August, and those who continued to take to the streets in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen – want to make power answerable to the will of the citizenry. Through the

instrument of citizen sovereignty, Arabs are struggling to shed the ugly and embarrassing legacy of the modern statehood, in which they enjoyed independence without real self-determination and citizens for the most part never had an opportunity to define national values, governance systems, ideologies or policies.

The Arab Awakening is in the first stages of creating a citizen-based sovereignty that values, freedom, social justice and equal opportunity. It is an audacious quest, for Mohamed Bouazizi and the millions of Arabs inspired by him, just as it was for Rosa Parks and the civil rights movement in the American South. Let us now proceed to chapter four of our research where we shall study the dialectic of Hegel's philosophy of history.

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
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE DIALECTIC OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

4.1Dialectic

Generally speaking, dialectic is a mode of thought, or a philosophic medium, through which contradiction becomes a starting point (rather than a dead end) for contemplation. As such, dialectic is the mediumthat helps us comprehend a world that is racked by paradox. Indeed, dialectic facilitates the philosophic enterprise as described by Bertrand Russell, who wrote that "[...]to teach how to live without certainty, and yet without being paralyzed by hesitation, is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it"[1]

Dialectic is a line of thought, originating in ancient Greek philosophy, that stresses development through a back and forth movement between opposing propositions. It thus stands in stark contrast to Western philosophy's general emphasis on the permanence of being. The dialectic movement refers either to a mental process or to a process believed to occur in objective reality. When the dialectical movement is seen as occurring in the mind, as in the Socratic dialectic, it essentially means a process by which a person gradually comes to reach a certain insight. That understanding of the dialectic is generally compatible with traditional ontology and its focus on eternal being (for example, the Platonic ideas). When the dialectic is seen as a movement

inherent to objective reality, it has frequently implied a conflicting development, as in Marxism, rather than a harmonious type of development, as the fundamental characteristic of reality.

However, for Rene Descartes, "There is nothing so strange and so unbelievable that it has not been said by one Philosopher or another."[2] This conception of dialectic derives ultimately from Heraclitus, as Hegel himself points out. "The old Greek philosophers were all born natural dialecticians, and Aristotle, the most encyclopedic of them, had already analysed the most essential form of dialectic thought."[3] Therefore, let us take a short chronological survey of other philosophical positions on the concept of dialectic. Certainly, as in the nature of Philosophy, there have been differences due to a great diversity of terminological uses, but more essentially to a tension between two fundamental tendencies. With thinkers such as Heraclitus, Hegel, and Marx, the dialectic refers essentially to a conflictual movement inherent to reality. With Socrates, Plato, and the scholastic tradition initiated by Aristotle, the dialectic refers to a movement of the mind in search for truth.

The ancient use of the dialectic was essentially defined by Socrates and Plato and continued by the scholastic tradition. Succinctly put by W.F Lawhead;

> In Plato's dialogues, Socrates employed a dialectical method in which the confrontation of opposing ideas in the course of a conversation progressively led to more and more refined ideas, thus bringing the participants ever closer to the truth.[4]

Moreover, the idea of dialectical movement appeared earlier in the thought of Heraclitus, where it carried a very different meaning. Heraclitus represents what could be called the prehistory of the dialectic. Though he never used the term to refer to his own philosophy, he was credited with pioneering the way of the dialectic by Hegel and Engels, who applauded his departure from what they perceived to be the static tendency of Parmenides and his successors. In fact, Heraclitus was

an earlier pre-Socratic than Parmenides, and his thought is proof that the dialectical frame of mind has been with Western philosophy from the very beginning.

Heraclitus' thought was dialectical in the sense that he believed everything to have originated from fire, the symbol of movement and development through self-consumption. His best-known statements are that "all things are in a state of flux"[5] and that "war is common to all and strife is justice."[6] Heraclitus thus believed that, ultimately, all things could not be reduced to a fundamental unity of Being (as for Parmenides), but rather to a dynamic principle consisting of a contrasting or even conflicting interaction between opposites. Heraclitus' dialectic was one of nature and not of the mind.

According to Aristotle[7] the dialectic proper originated with Zeno of Elea. Zeno is famous for his paradoxes, according to which, for instance, a flying arrow can never reach its destination, because it first has to cross half the distance, and before that, half of that half, and so on ad infinitum. Zeno's paradoxes are counter-intuitive in that they seem to prove the impossibility of something that is obviously true.

Zeno's paradoxes have long been denigrated as mere sophistry, but they have recently received renewed attention and praise for their insight into the nature of mathematics. Zeno was a disciple of Parmenides, the philosopher who first introduced the notion of the permanence of Being as opposed to the primacy of movement stressed by Heraclitus. If Being is immutable and permanent, the natural conclusion is that all movement is illusion[8]. This is precisely what Zeno was trying to show with his paradoxes.

Accordingly, after Zeno, the dialectic has become known as the art of logical discourse—the ability to analyze and control the workings of the human mind from a variety of perspectives. In

other words, the dialectical movement was reduced to the human mind's handling of eternal and immutable ideas, not to the acknowledgment of the concept of continuous quantity[9] within reality.

Following Zeno, the school of the Sophists transformed the dialectical method into a mere tool of persuasion, even through the use of invalid arguments, eventually giving the school the bad name associated with the notion of sophistry, called "eristic" by Plato. The most prominent Sophist, Protagoras, holds that "Knowledge is limited to our various perceptions and these perceptions will differ with each person"[10]. He is also said to have introduced the idea that to every statement there is an equally valid counter-statement, which would make him another distant precursor of the Hegelian dialectic, rather than a practitioner of sophistry.

In contrast to the Sophists, Socrates professed to search for nothing but the truth. By applying his well-known "Socratic irony," pretending to know nothing and letting his partner in dialogue expose and discover the inconsistencies of his own thought, Socrates sought to help others discover the truth. Thus, the Socratic dialectic is not altogether different from Zeno's dialectic. Simply, instead of seeking to expose the inconsistency of familiar notions about reality (as Zeno did), Socrates sought to expose people's prejudice and intellectual laziness. Protagoras puts it more clearly;

> Dialectic is seen as a means of truth. Socrates believed that the authentic method of the philosopher is the analysis and intellectual progression through question-and-answer dialogue[11].

For Socrates, it comes very close to the related notion of dialogue—an exchange that eventually leads to the truth. Once the eternal truth is attained, the movement stops.

In Plato's later dialogues that are believed to express his own thought (even though Socrates still appears as the protagonist) the dialectic appears as a method of division in which concepts and ideas are sorted out in a hierarchy, from the more general to the more particular. Whereas Socrates' method was more inductive and synthetic, consisting in gradually helping his discussion partner reconstruct an idea of the truth in his own mind, Plato went on to a method emphasizing analysis and the organization of ideas in one's own mind.

In the *Republic* (VI-VII), Plato presents the dialectic as the supreme art to be mastered by the philosopher-king of his ideal state. The dialectic had become the art of practicing logical thinking, rather than the art of discovering the truth through discussion. Inheriting Plato's tradition of thought, Aristotle did not do much with the dialectic but developed his systematic logic with the use of syllogisms. For him, the dialectic proper had become secondary, a method for intellectual training and searching for truth based on probable premises.

Under the leadership of Chrysippus, the ancient Stoics developed a well-known school of formal logic, which they called the dialectic. But the term dialectic was also used by them to refer to a variety of intellectual activities, including grammatical theory. The tradition of equating the dialectic and logic with a broad range of applications became the norm into the Middle Ages.

Thus, the dialectic came to be known as one of the three original liberal arts or trivium (the other members are rhetoric and grammar) in Western culture. In ancient and medieval times, the rhetoric and the dialectic (or logic) were both understood to aim at being persuasive (through dialogue). While the rhetoric focused on the art of speaking, the dialectic dealt with the logical skills of analysis, the examination of theses and antitheses, and the use of syllogisms.

The modern (nineteenth to mid-twentieth century) use of the dialectic was introduced by Kant's critique of traditional dogmatism. It was given an entirely new meaning by the German idealists, particularly Hegel; then transformed again into dialectical materialism by Karl Marx. With the advent of Kant's philosophy, the notion about dialectic dramatically changed. Since, for Kant, it was not possible for humans to reach any certain theoretical knowledge about the ultimate nature of things, much less about those issues that are not objects of the senses (God, freedom, and eternal life), the dialectic came to take on a negative connotation. In Kant's system, the ancient dialectic is called the "logic of illusion," because it is seen as the intellectual play with propositions the validity of which thinkers had no way of ever verifying.

In the "Transcendental Dialectic," an important section of his *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant makes use of so-called *Antinomies,* which are four sets of opposing propositions on issues such as the existence of God. Thereby, Kant intends to show that both contending propositions, the thesis as well as the antithesis, can be proved right, though they are mutually exclusive, thereby exposing the futility of a reasoning involving propositions that are beyond the grasp of human intellect. The thesis and antithesis thus are not followed by a synthesis that would conclude a dialectical movement. Rather, they are followed by the realization that such movement is impossible, or at least that it cannot possibly lead to valid conclusions.

Thus, with Kant, the notion that an unmoving, transcendent Being, the source of all reality, could be discussed and known by the human mind came to an abrupt end. And, to a large extent, so did the dichotomy between permanence, associated with that Being, and movement, associated with the world of existence.

Philosophical investigation found its new starting point in the consciousness of the self. Johann Gottlieb Fichte was the first to reintroduce the notion of a full dialectical movement starting from the self or Ego, making use of the thesis, antithesis, synthesis terminology that has been inaccurately associated with the thought of Hegel. The interaction between thesis and antithesis occurs through the confrontation between the Ego and the non-Ego (the world), which appears as the object of the Ego's moral action. In the words of Copleston; "[...]the ego and non-ego tend to cancel one another out, if both are unlimited."[12]Thus, in Fichte, the world of the mind and that of external reality came to face each other, their synthesis being a form of unity between the two. The idea of that triadic movement was taken over by Schelling, who moved the emphasis from the Ego to the more universal notion of the Absolute. Insisting on this Schelling posits that, "The Absolute identity is not the cause of the universe but the universe itself. For everything which exists, is the absolute identity itself. And the universe is everything which is."[13]   From there, the idea of a universal dialectical movement towards a cosmic fulfillment in the Absolute would emerge with the thought of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

With Karl Marx, the notion of a dialectical movement in history became directly linked to the notion of the struggle of the proletariat against capitalism. With Marx, the notions of opposition and confrontation became central, and the subtle implications of Hegel's sublation were abandoned. Making renewed use of the thesis, antithesis, synthesis triad, Marx's thought clearly implies that the thesis is destroyed by the antithesis before a synthesis is achieved.

In Marxist thought, dialectical materialism implies that reality is essentially material (mind being a mere superstructure). He insists that;

> Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern
> science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials

increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a historical evolution.[14]

Historical materialism is the application of that concept to the development of history, seen as a series of revolutionary clashes between social classes with opposing interests. Thus, for Marx, conflict is the only real source of progress and development.

Many philosophers have offered critiques of dialectic, and it can even be said that hostility or receptivity to dialectic is one of the things that divides twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy from the so-called "continental" tradition, a divide that only a few contemporary philosophers (among them Richard Rorty) have ventured to bridge.

One philosopher who has attacked the notion of *dialectic* again and again is Karl Popper. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a paper entitled "What Is Dialectic?" in which he attacked the dialectical method for its willingness "to put up with contradictions."[15] Popper concluded the essay with these words: "The whole development of dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science."[16]

In appreciating the dialectic, one question is whether it over-emphasizes the role of conflict in development. In Eastern worldviews such as Daoism, development occurs through harmonious interaction of natural polarities, such as male and female. Conflict in nature may also beget development, but acting in a different way. This same confusion has pervaded concepts of the dialectic in philosophy, particularly in Marxism.

However, With Hegel, the dialectic regained a central position in philosophy, being no longer a simple means to achieve the truth, but the key characteristic inherent to all reality. In fact, for Hegel, dialectic was "the only true method" for understanding pure thought. He described dialectic as:

> ... the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of predicates of understanding is seen in its true light…the Dialectical principle constitutes the life and soul of scientific progress, the dynamic which alone gives immanent connect and necessity to the body of science.[17]

It was Hegel's well-known achievement to have introduced the fully developed notion of a dialectical movement through a *necessary* progression. Rather than being the result of a confrontation between two independently existing entities, thesis and antithesis, the dialectical movement in Hegel's thought appears more as an internal potential or as a necessary movement due to latent contradictions inherent to all entities, mental and material. In his sweeping overview, ranging from logic to history and world affairs, Hegel tries to show that each finite entity has within itself the germ of its own negation. This negation, however, does not lead to actual destruction but to *sublation* (Aufhebung) into a higher entity, the synthesis. It accepts dialogue and conversation, and as R.G. Collingwood pointed out, the very basis of the Dialectical method is a "constant endeavor to convert every occasion of non-agreement into an occasion of agreement"[18]. The German term for sublation implies, at the same time, cancellation, putting aside, and raising to a higher level, all of which is contained in Hegel's notion of the dialectic.

In the *Logic,* for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being; but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing; yet both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming, when it is realized that what is

coming into being is, at the same time, also returning to nothing (consider life: Old organisms die as new organisms are created or born).

Hegel rarely uses the terms of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In point of fact, the terms 'thesis', 'antithesis', and 'synthesis' are more characteristic to Fichte[19]. He uses a variety of triadic expressions, such as affirmation, negation, negation of negation; in-itself, for itself, in-and-for-itself, "being, not being or nothing and becoming"[20]. Hegel insists that the true meaning of the dialectic had been lost for most of philosophy's history. For him, Kant rediscovered the triad, but in his thought it remained "lifeless." Since, for Kant, ultimate reality was still perceived as transcendent and unreachable, it could not possibly yield a conclusive synthesis. Hegel attempted to move the dialectic back into the mainstream with the idea that it was the Absolute itself that gradually achieved full self-awareness through a dialectical movement culminating with the human mind. The transcendent Absolute and everyday reality were thus reunited in the view of Hegel.

As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making implicit contradictions explicit: Each stage of the process is the product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. Socrates, however, essentially tried to debunk hidden assumptions by showing the contradictions hidden in the mind of his uncritical discussion partner. "Sometimes, in this way, Socrates would lead the other person to accept a truth"[21]. In the case of Hegel, the dialectical tension resides in reality itself. For him, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rational, constitutional state of free and equal citizens.

The Hegelian dialectic cannot be mechanically applied for any chosen starting point. Critics argue that the selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used as the antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice, when an antithesis is selected to suit the user's subjective purpose, the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical, not logical, and the resulting synthesis not rigorously defensible against a multitude of other possible syntheses. In fact, the details of Hegel's description of the dialectical movement, notably in the area of the natural sciences, indeed appear to be highly arbitrary and sometimes inaccurate.

The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.[22]

According to understanding of dialectic in this metaphor, conflicts, though "they negate the given situation" cannot exist if it were not for the conditions in which they happen.[23] In other words, every situation inherently has its own negation, every status quo inherently has its resistance, every couple inherently has their couple problems, and every war inherently opens the door for anti-war movements. If it was not for the inequalities in the U.S. political system, for example, there would not be a civil rights movement. If there was not any conflict, there would not be the field of conflict resolution.

In addition to this big picture sense of dialectical existence of conflicts, we can identify dialectical patterns in conflicts themselves. During a mediation session, we will most likely hear positions and counter-positions, arguments and counter-arguments, narratives and counter-narratives. A party will employ a negation when he or she is confronted with a position or an argument that differs from their own. Two countries at war will have different perspectives on the history of their dispute and those perspectives will most likely try to negate each other.

This means a conflict will unfold in a dialectical pattern. When A contradicts B, this means these two parties are in a state of conflict. Where B is the status quo, A is its negation; where B is the thesis, A is the antithesis. Their meeting will result in a synthesis, regardless of an intervention. Synthesis means nothing more than the clash of thesis and antithesis. What kind of synthesis it will bring about, however, might depend on the intervention or lack thereof. For example: There might be a synthesis which becomes an intractable conflict with a constant stalemate, just as experienced between Israel and Palestine. There might be a synthesis which becomes an intractable conflict, not with a constant stalemate, but with lack of communication and lack of willingness to engage the conflict, just like there has been between Turkey and Armenia. The synthesis might unfortunately end up being a violent act, such as murder, war, or genocide.

In the three cases above, the newly established synthesis becomes the new status quo. In such cases, the intervener needs to shoulder the role of "contradiction" as he or she tries to negate the conflict situation. The purpose of the clash between the new status quo, "the conflict," and the intervener is to supply a momentum, as aforementioned. The momentum will be towards "the Understanding." Without having to confront the conflict as an established status quo, it would be

best to guide the clashing parties to a synthesis that would bring the parties closer to "the Understanding." Such *perfect intervention*, unfortunately, is rarely the case.

In a more macro sense, conflict can be understood as a negation of the status quo and peace efforts as a negation of the conflict. The resulting product would be 'the synthesis' or the new status quo which also has a further negation, and this dynamic would keep unfolding.

Systematically, this research shall move from his most comprehensive triad of logic, philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, where we shall study the triad of subjective spirit, objective spirit and the absolute spirit.Our study of Hegel's dialectic falls specifically within the realm of objective spirit. Here, there is also the triad of abstract right, subjective morality and social morality or the ethical life. The first moment of this triad forms yet another triad of property, contract and wrong. Our movement develops; from these moments of abstract right, through subjective morality, in the direction of the third part - social morality — which has the triad of the family, civil society and the state — the ethical substance. But the dialectic is an unending journey of the absolute spirit in the process of self-consciousness of freedom. It should be amazing if any of these moments fails to evolve its own triad as we shall proceed to his Philosophy of History.

4.1.1 The Dialectic of Objective Spirit

In the dialectic of the philosophy of spirit, the objective spirit is the antithesis to the subjective spirit where Hegel treats of the soul in three levels: as a natural entity in the physical world, as a sensitive feeling being; and as a being that can express itself and act upon the world through its body.[24]

The objective spirit is the antithetical realm of actualization of the soul in which thought and impulse are combined in freedom. The interaction of subjective and objective spirits leads to the emergence of the absolute spirit on the synthetic realm of art, religion and philosophy. Let us study the moments of the dialectic of objective spirit.

Thesis: Abstract Right or Law

In the third and last section of the philosophy of subjective spirit, Hegel studies the activity of the finite spirit which has become conscious of its freedom whereby he asserts that 'the actual freewill is the unity of the theoretical and practical spirit: free will which exists for itself as free will... will as free 'intelligence.'[25] As the Absolute objectifies itself in nature, so does Spirit express itself in history issuing, as it were, out of its state of immediacy.[26] The first phase of this self-objectification of the Spirit is the sphere of rights. The mind that has attained personality acquires the capacity for rights because personality is both 'the concept and the basis of the system of abstract and therefore formal right.'[27]

At this stage, the stage of abstract personality, there is no particularity of the will. And so there are no particular interests, property and welfare of the individual. The rights are still essentially a matter of possibility, and so, to say that one has right at this level is not to say that he possesses already such, but that he has a permission or warrant to possess a thing. He has the right to possessing property.The person, at this stage, is still immediate, that is, not yet mediated by objectification, self-expression and appropriation. It is not yet tainted by material content. It is still within itself. And so, in relation to the external world, it is restricted round-about and struggles to 'lift itself above this restriction and to give itself-reality, or in other words, to claim that external world as its own.'[28]

The struggle to free the person from the nullity of external restriction and contentless personality leads in the direction of the reification of my rights through the appropriation of material things. This appropriation is not a mere internal act of the will but an effective acquisition by occupancy. 'My inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to make it my property; to secure this end, occupancy is requisite.'[29]

In the relations of a person with its property, the following modes can be distinguished - possession, use, and alienation. Possession is accomplished by either grasping the thing physically, by forming it, or merely by marking it as mine. The person's use of a thing reveals the thing as by nature self-less. This use therefore effectuates its destiny for the end of material thing is to be used, to be appropriated, to be made a property by the conferment of personality by a person. And, as a person appropriates a thing by putting his will into it, so can he alienate his property from himself by withdrawing his will from it. He can thus abandon the property or transfer its ownership by yielding it to the will of another person.

Contract of Rights

Contract involves the transfer of a thing which I have previously made mine by putting my will into it, to another, a second person who now appropriates it to himself by replacing, with his own will, my will, which I now withdraw.In the realm of property, I - a person — realize my personality, but only in relation to the material world; only I, am, as a person. Alienation of property makes possible the existence of contract - 'the transference of property from one to the other in conformity with a common will and without detriment to the rights of either.'[30]Contract, which is made possible by the alienation of property, makes possible in turn,

the realization of my existence on an interpersonal plane. It provides me the medium for communicating with another person as a person.

Contract therefore constitutes the first stage of the unification of wills, realization of a common will, and the movement towards the ultimate arrival at/of the absolutely universal and concrete will. Value is the point of community between the subjects in the contract. It is the medium and measure of exchange, the universal in which they participate. 'A person by distinguishing himself from himself relates himself to another person, and it is only as owners that these two persons really exist for each other.'[31]

Furthermore, in the contractual relation of persons, there is an implicit union of wills. Even in this union however, there is still the possibility of the particular wills veering or even deviating to different positions from that of the union. When this happens; it violates the will of the contract, and this is wrong. Thus the transition to wrong comes to be when the contracting wills still maintain particular wills at variance with the universal will stipulated by the contract. This negation is implicit already in the concept of the contract. Wrong, as such, is only the actualization of the negation implicit in contract. The resulting antithesis directs the movement towards subjective morality.

Antithesis: Subjective Morality

This is the transition from the realm of right to the realm of morality. The transition consists in the personalization of the will to negate crime implicit in crime itself.The punishment at the level of right, even though implicitly demanded by the crime, is still external for it is inflicted by an external authority. This punishment is supposed to be the negation of a negation - crime. But crime originates internally and so cannot be effectively negated except by yet another internally willed

negation achieved by the particular will willing itself to be harmonized with the universal will or the principle of the will. In this way, the will is reflected into itself so that it sees itself not just as existing in itself but also as existing for itself. This is the achievement and stage of subjectivity, which means that such a will has achieved subjectivity and thus made morality possible.

But this is still subjective morality. There is not yet a perfect harmony between the particular will and the universal will. Hence, the particular will sees the dictates of the principle of the will as ought, duty and obligation. This is the Kantian morality of interiority. Hegel sees it as 'a one sided concept in which the mind cannot rest.'[32] The mind therefore demonstrates the insufficiency of the purely formal concept of morality by its refusal to abide therein. Having achieved its being in itself and for itself, the subjective or moral will seeks to externalize itself in action.

Indeed action becomes possible only with the realization of the moral will. And the subjective will, unable to persist eternally in subjectivity, cannot develop further in the sense of objectification without realizing the phenomenon of action. The action of the subjective will does not comprise all and any arbitrary or accidental change, alteration or happening in the external world consequent on the objectification of the subject. For any such happening to qualify as the action of the subjective will, it must be known to the subject as its action. It must bear essentially on the concept as an ought, and it must bear on the will of others. That is to say that the act must be consciously willed by the subject. There must exist in the action, a relation between the particular will and the principle of the will. And it must be an act in relation to other subjective wills.

Following from those conditions, my responsibility for my action does not include unforeseen circumstances. And on the other hand, I cannot exonerate myself of all consequences of the action. To hold the contrary for either implication would negate the concept of a free subject who acts purposefully. The morality of an action has three moments, namely: purpose and responsibility, intention and welfare, good and conscience.

Purpose and Responsibility

In popular speech, purpose and intention are used synonymously. In the Hegelian matrix, the two are distinguished. Purpose stands as a means to an end which is intention. The purpose of an action is the alteration caused in the state of affairs of an external environment by a subjective will. The responsibility of the will in this action extends in general to such alterations in the external world which can be traced to the will, and not also to such other alterations as are not included in the purpose of the will.

Intention and Welfare

The intention is the end for which a subjective will wills an action. An action may lead to many particular consequences. These consequences could be seen as particular units. "Purpose, as issuing from a thinker, comprises more than the mere unit; essentially, it comprises that universal side of the action which is the intention.'[33]It is this universal side of the action that confers on the particular unit or purposes its moral character and relevance. Intention is therefore a relevant moral factor; of course not the only relevant moral factor. It is the universal quality of an action which is not merely implicit but is known by the agent, 'and so shall have lain from the start in his subjective will.'[34]

The specific satisfaction which this end - intention - brings to the subject as its particular agent is welfare. It is in this welfare that I see the subjective worth and interest of the action for me.[35] Contrasted with this end, every other thing about the action is reduced to a means. My welfare is 'the content of the intention.'[36] This sounds quite egoistic. And so, one may ask, is Hegel propounding egoism? Not necessarily. This is only a description of the realm of subjective morality which must be transcended and yet preserved in the dialectical journey of the spirit. Hegel's contention here is rather a rejection of the Kantian notion that 'an act losses its moral value if performed from inclination.'[37]

The welfare of the one, Hegel contends, since it is a moment in the universal will, is also the welfare of others. My right to particularity is consequent on my freedom. This freedom is a universal principle. And so any intention, which in its particularistic, tendency contradicts this substantive basis; is itself negated. Thus, 'an intention to secure my welfare or that of others…cannot justify an action which is wrong.' [38] Nor thereby should my will for the universal exclude or negate my will for my welfare.The totality of a man's particular ends or welfare constitutes his existence or life. When this is in peril in confrontation with the rightful property of someone else, this life may claim a right of distress because 'there is on the one hand an infinite injury to a man's existence...and on the other hand only an injury to a restricted embodiment of freedom.'[39]

This does not imply a denial of the rights or capacity for rights of the injured, but it reveals

> [...]the finitude and therefore contingency of both right and welfare, of right as the abstract embodiment of freedom without embodying the particular person and of welfare as the sphere of the particular will without the universality of right.[40]

The foregoing circumstance presents the need for subjectivity which, in its particularity as a comprehensive whole, is the embodiment of freedom. In the integration of right and subjectivity we find the two moments present in right and subjectivity: the moments of good and conscience.

Good and Conscience

The good is the concrete, absolutely determinate universal while conscience is infinite subjectivity inwardly conscious and inwardly determining its content[41]. The good is the unity of the principle of the will and the particular will. It is the taking up into an integral whole of abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the contingency of external fact whereby their essence is retained but their self subsistence superseded. 'The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute and aim of the world.'[42] In the good, both right and welfare shed their particularities and become essentially universal in principle.

As it is, this good is still an abstract universality which has not yet acquired concreteness. Thus conscience is still immersed in subjectivity. Conscience, at this stage, is the subject's absolute certainty of himself that what he wills is the good. True conscience is the disposition to will what is absolutely good.[43] This should not be interpreted however as crass subjectivism for the true conscience has fixed principles and it is aware of these as its explicitly objective determinants and duties.[44] At the level of subjective morality, conscience is still only the formal side of the activity of the will which as yet has no objective content but is still characterized by infinite abstract self-certainty.[45] The ideal integration of the concepts of the good and conscience results in the higher plane of social morality: the ideality of the good with the subjective will (conscience), an ideality which is concrete and the truth of them both in Ethical life.[46]

Synthesis: Social Morality or Ethical Life

The concept of abstract right was an external universal which had to grow into the concept of subjective morality to acquire the capacity of being for itself. Both are however one sided notions that have to be verified in the higher synthesis of the concept of social morality. In the dialectical development of the sphere of objective spirit, they reveal themselves as moments or phases in the development of the concept of concrete ethics, phases which have at the same time to be negated, preserved and elevated.[47] The ethical life, as the synthesis of abstract right and subjective morality, provides the content and' the concept for the universal realization of both. It is the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-conciousness.[48]

The ethical order is a universal self-consciousness perceived by the individual in himself as possessing distinct existence and yet not alien to him but as constituting his own essence. The subject here finds that he is the ethical order and the ethical order himself. He thus finds the laws and institutions-of the' ethical order naturally and logically binding on his will because he stands related to them as to the substance of his own being.[49] In this setting, the bond of duty, which, in the realm of abstract right, was external, and in the realm of subjective morality, appeared imposed and generally restrictive, will now become a form of liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse and from indeterminate subjectivity devoid of extension and actuality. As with every synthetic moment in the triads of Hegel, the ethical life or social morality also develops its own dialectic triad.

4.1.2 The Dialectic of Social Morality

The dialectic of social morality has the family as its thesis, civil society as the antithesis of the family, and the state as the synthesis of the family and the civil society. Hegel's way of

exposition of the journey of the spirit towards absolute concrete self comprehension on this plane is to study the essential natures of these three moments and to show the dialectical progression from one concept to another.

Thesis: The Family

The family is the immediate substantiality of spirit.[50] its specific character is love - the mind's feeling of its own unity.[51]Individuality as self subsistent personality is not yet present at the moment of substantial unity of the family. At this stage, the individual sees himself primarily as a member of a whole united by the bond of love. The rights of the individual are derived rights.

The family itself devolves around three pivotal moments. The first moment is Marriage. This is the form assumed by the concept of the family in its immediate phase. The second moment is the Family property and capital, where the external embodiment of the concept also involved here is the attention paid to the family property and capital. Finally, is the education of children and the dissolution of the family[52].

Marriage

Marriage is the ethical life at the level of immediacy. It is the first point as such of the unity of the family constituted by the mutual consent of the partners which involves their free surrender of two different personalities and their rights to individual existence in order to form this one union. The union, although originating at the physical level, attains rationality on the level of mind as a self-conscious love. Love thus becomes the ethical moment in marriage. In marriage then, the family acquires unique personality which is born of the fusion of the personalities of the partners.

The Family Capital

The unity or personality of the family is manifested when the family, acquiring property as a person, realizes its external existence. This property is transformed into capital when it becomes the embodiment of the substantial personality of the family.[53] The concept of capital endows property with permanence and security in relation to the owner - in this case the family - and in exclusion of right of claim of all others. It also transforms property from the arbitrariness of a single owner's particular needs and desires into something ethical, into labourand care for a common possession.[54]The husband as head of the family administers the family capital.

The Education of Children and the Dissolution of Family

The substantial unity of marriage between the partners is yet an inward unity of disposition. In the children, this unity acquires an external, objective and explicit form. The children are a manifest integral expression, by the parents, of the unity and love that constitutes the family.From the ethical unity of the family, and the children as the manifest existence of this unity, the maintenance and education of the children from the family capital follows as a necessity and a right. These rights, as well as the right of the parents to the obedience and service of their children, are not legal but ethical rights demanded and granted by the ethical bond of the family.

In educating its children, the family aims, first of all positively in relation to itself, to instill ethical principles into the children that they may possess these as their natural feeling - the feelings of love, trust and obedience - feelings that consolidates the family unity.This education however, which makes for strong family unity, carries within it, the seed of the dissolution of the family for, in relation to the family, it aims negatively at raising the children from the physical level of instinctive behaviour to self subsistence and freedom of personality.[55] These traits will not only

possess the children with the power to leave the natural unity of the family, it will make this natural unity the myth of a past epoch.

The dissolution of the family therefore follows as a natural consequence. Hegel calls this the ethical dissolution of the family[56]. Besides this ethical dissolution which is caused by the children coming of age and being recognized as legal persons, the family can also be dissolved by the death of the parents, especially the father, which results in inheritance of the family capital. This is the natural dissolution of the family.The dissolution of the family gives rise to free and independent persons now released into the open society formed by others similarly grown from the family system. This is the negation of a society - the family - but a negation which results in the formation of another society - civil society.

Antithesis: Civil Society

The concrete person who has emerged from the natural unity of the family to become the object of his particular will is the first principle of civil society. In his striving to satisfy his personal particular wants, the individual finds himself caught in a network of interrelations with other individuals equally seeking their own particular satisfactions. Thus interdependence becomes the second principle of civil society.

In civil society, the idea is embodied in the particularity of selfish inclinations as well as in the universality of social existence which constitutes the ground and necessary form of particularity as well as its guiding hand and final end. Three significant moments are distinguished in civil

society -the system of needs, the administration of justice, and the police and the corporation. Let us study these briefly.

The System of Needs

Particularity, in its contrast with the universal principle of will, shows itself as subjective need. It attains objectivity by means of external things, labour and effort exerted to procure its satisfaction. But the satisfaction hereby acquired is not subjective particularity for in impinging on the needs and wills of others, it assumes the element of universality.The needs at issue in civil society are not just the needs of man as an animal. They are social needs, which is a conjunction of natural needs and mental needs on the mental plane where the mental imposes its universal form on the needs so that it is no longer the needs as such but man's universal opinion of them that man seeks primarily to satisfy. At this realm moreover, the needs are no longer restrictive shackles but means of liberation because they are now internal, of man's own making. It must be noted however, that this liberation is still abstract liberation.

Work, by which man acquires and prepares the tools for satisfaction of needs, results in education which proceeds from the desire to work, through specialization and co-operation, to objective activity and universally recognized aptitudes.[57] This objective and universal recognition of specialization and talents paves the way for division of interdependence and the development of machines.In this state of affairs, the satisfaction of subjective needs necessarily becomes also the satisfaction of communal needs. A man earns his livelihood by contributing to the universal permanent capital. What one draws from the general purse is conditioned by what he invests therein - his capital and his skills. The inequality in nature unfolds into inequality of capital and eventually of moral and intellectual attainment.

Through dialectical evolution, the complex relations of production generate three classes in society - the substantial or immediate class of agriculturists, the reflecting or formal business class; and finally the universal class of civil servants. The substantial class has its capital in the natural products of the soil which it cultivates. The business class adapts raw materials to required end-products and makes them available to the final consumers. The universal class pre-occupies itself with the universal interests of the community.

Hegel, nevertheless, holds that while it is in accord with the concept of civil society that class divisions exist, the notion of pre-ordained allotment of individuals to classes is quite at variance with the realization of the concept. The class to which a person may belong depends on a lot of factors such as birth, natural capacity and other contingent circumstances. Ultimately however, the essential and final determining factors are subjective opinion and the individual's arbitrary will.[58]An individual may not however, belong effectively to more than one of the classes.

The Administration of Justice

At the level of consciousness and volition, the principle of the system of needs possesses the universality of freedom. But it is still abstract freedom - the right to property. That this right may attain actuality, it is transformed into the protection of property through the relatedness produced by the system of production and recognized, enhanced and promoted by education, to the level of universal validity.This right acquires the force of law by being posited by thought as right and valid. This determinate character conferred by thought converts right to law. Laws must not only be right however, they must also be accessible to the people for whom they are made. They must be comprehensive and universally known for them to possess the binding force.

In civil society, right passes over into law and, in so doing, acquires a determinate independent existence. It stands or fails on its own merit over against the individual interest and willing. Any violation of the law is therefore no longer a subjective crime which is rectified through revenge by the injured individual, but a crime against the society which has to be reconciled with itself by a public authority - the court of justice.

The Police and the Corporation

In the pronouncement of judgment on particular cases, the unity which the idea loses in the emergence of civil society is once more recaptured as civil society returns to its concept i.e. to the unity of the implicit universal with the subjective particular. This is the beginning of a process of actualization of unity which will, in its course, require and involve the function of both the police and the corporation.The function of the police is called into being to promote the realization of the common end of civil society by removing accidental hindrances to the actualization of particular rights by preventing crime, and by regulating the relation of the individual with other individuals and with public institutions. The ultimate reason for police action is that the universal be preserved and that private actions take their cue from this and be ultimately raised to the universal.

The corporation comes into existence essentially for the business class, which Hegel calls the seed of revolt, to coordinate their mutual interests and protect these against external and internal injuries as well as to endow this class, essentially concentrated on the particular, with some concrete universality. It recalls the unity of the family lost in civil society and reconstitutes this, no longer on a natural basis, but on a rational basis. The family is the first ethical root of the state. The corporation is the second root, planted in civil society.

Synthesis: The State

The universality of the family is undifferentiated universality which lives to be eternally dissolved by its own seed into the antithetical particularity of civil society devoid of concrete universality. None can persist in being by itself nor can the two co-exist independently for they are contained in each other.[59] They are therefore necessarily synthesized by the dialectical process into the differentiated universality of the state. The state, says Hegel, is the actuality of the ethical idea.[60] As the actuality of the substantial will, it is also the ethical mind which knows itself, thinks itself and executes what it knows and thinks of itself. In the state, self-consciousness becomes objective and concrete self-consciousness which has realized its essence, attained its end and acquired its substantive freedom.

The state is also rational, not just natural, being as it is, the actuality of the substantial will which it possesses in the particular self-consciousness, though at the level of universality.[61] As the absolute end in which the highest freedom is realized, the state has a supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the state[62]. There are also the three moments in the idea of the state which are the constitution or constitutional law, international law and philosophy of history.

Constitutional law

The state is the actuality of concrete freedom.[63] This entails not only the development and recognition of the individual rights of the person already achieved in the lower spheres, but also that the individual now actually identifies his particular interests in the interest of the universal. His interest, as it was, grows into the universal such that the universal cannot be realized in isolation of the particular interests, nor does the individual now live just for his own end but, in all

he wills, thinks or does, he proceeds in the light of the universal. It is this principle in the concept of the state which allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.[64] It is this principle that grants the state its prodigious strength and depth and signifies its uniqueness in history and assures its perseverance in being.

The state is above the sphere of family and civil society and as well, is their immanent end. In it, the distinction between rights and duties disappear into a unity in which individuals have duties to it in the proportion in which they have rights against it. Mind is the actual idea travelling all the way from family through civil society to its concrete universal self comprehension in the state. In the family and civil society, it takes on finiteness in order to arise there from and raise them to actual infinite mind - the state. In these lower spheres also, mind is developing the institutions which comprise the components of the constitution in the spheres of particularity. They constitute the foundation of the state; and being the institutions wherein particular freedom is realized and made manifest as rational, they also inspire the citizen's trust in the state. The state nonetheless transcends all these transforming their subjectivity to objectivity, actual to itself as the ideal unity of freedom and necessity. This necessity appears to itself as both freedom and necessity. It is the inner self-development of the Idea. As the substance of the individual subject, it is his political sentiment. As the substance of the objective world, it is the organism of the state[65]This organism includes the strictly political state and its constitution.

The political sentiment - patriotism - is the certain conviction founded on truth. It is a product of the trust which the rational institutions of the state engender. In this condition of trust assured by true foundation, there evolves the consciousness that my interests, both substantive and particular,

are contained and preserved in the state's interest and end.[66] The other ceases to be other to me and in obeying its commands, I obey myself and so feel and manifest my freedom instead of subjection and bondage.

As earlier observed, this political sentiment is determined by the institutions of the state. These institutions are various members of the organism. These members constitute the various powers of the state with their functions and spheres of action.[67]The organism formed by all these powers and institutions is the constitution of the state. The constitution has two aspects: the aspect of the state's relations within itself and the aspect of its relation to other states.

International Law

Considering that the reality of external relations calls forth the possibility of war, why does the state not stay within itself and by itself to remove all the trouble of external relations! But can it? No! The state cannot stay all by itself for it is an individual subject whose tendency is to objectify. The external relation of the state with other states is the prerogative of the crown. These include: to command the armed forces, to conduct foreign affairs, to make war and peace, and to conduct treatises of all kinds[68]. All within the sphere of external relations and so devolve exclusively on the monarch.

International law refers to the formal contracts between sovereign states. It arises from the relations between them; and fact of their sovereignty renders the absolute actuality of international law an 'ought-to-be' absoluteness.The sovereign power of the state entitles it to such recognition from other states. But this is a formal and abstract title which acquires its actuality from the constitution and gene situation of the state i.e. from its content. The recognition in question is therefore ultimately dependent on the will of recognizing state.

But it is also reciprocal and implies certainly a degree of indifference to and concern for involvement in each other's domestic affairs.

The first precept of international law is that treaties ought to be kept.[69]This is however, an ideal. The fact of sovereignty as first condition of relation already reduces international relations to a form of Hobbes and state of nature. There is no judge with obligatory powers over states. Hence, if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war.[70] Disagreement between states could come severally through injury to the widespread connections and many sided interests of the state and its citizens. This is more so, because, the state being essentially mind, does notstop, in the incident of injury, at the mere noticing of the factof injury, but travels further in its reflection to conceptualize the idea of such an injury as the idea of a danger threatening from another state, together with calculations of degrees of probability, intentions, etc., which cannot be overlooked in consideration of its own security.[71]

While the ideal precept of international law summons good faith from states, in reality, the individual state's welfare is the highest operative law of inter-state relations. This state of affairs follows from the very nature of the state as a concrete whole existing absolutely in itself and for itself. Hegel rejects the position that politics should conform to morality as resting on superficial ideas about morality. The welfare of a state, he argues, has claims to recognition totally different from those of the welfare of the individual. [72] The state embodies the principles of existence as an ethical substance. It is therefore wishful fancy which displays ignorance of the nature of the state to demand that it be judged by one of the many universal thoughts supposed to be moral commands.[73]

In all, international relations are sustained principally because states recognize each other as states, as absolute existents. This fact remains even in war when force and chance overtake rights. Besides this mutual recognition, these relations are also guided by the customs of nations.

The fact however that states come into relation as particular entities threatens the very autonomy of the state as each being by nature desires to grow and increase as much as it can go. Their particularity constitutes a barrier to the relations. Their actions and exchanges are destined, in their finitude, to develop into the dialectic of the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its right over all these finite minds in the history of the world which is the world's court of judgment. [74]This then leads us to the study of Hegel's Philosophy of history.

4.2 Philosophy of History

Kant argued with the help of philosophical reasoning that human nature was permanent and unchanging. Hegel in contrast pointed out that human nature, like everything else, changes from one historical epoch to another. He dissected the historical process of mankind critically and comprehensively with his enduring dialectical method. Lauding his achievements, Kaufman submits that "It was Hegel who established the history of philosophy as a central academic discipline as part of the core of any philosophic education,"[75] While for Odimegwu, "in Hegel, philosophy and history met."[76].

Hegel distinguished three ways of writing history: original history which is primarily a description of the actions, events and conditions of society which the historian had before his eye reflective history which is not necessarily confined by the limits of the time to which it relates, but whose

spirit transcends the present.[77] Reflective history is subdivided into universal pragmatic, critical and abstract species. Finally there is philosophical history which is the category of Hegel's history and our present concern. While, the previous modes required elaborate explanations, this mode does call for one because its nature is not as self-evident.

According to Hegel, the only model or scheme with which philosophy approaches history is the simple idea of reason.[78]Reason rules history and so the history of the world is a rational process. But even this simple conception cannot leave the data of world history unaffected. Hegel remarks in this regard that there is no such thing as absolute impartiality in the composition of history. Absolute absence of bias or even prejudice is either sheer folly or mere myth or both. No historian approaches his material without some preconceived categories. If this is the case, then the approach of philosophy is laudable for no other principle can be better or more desirable than the philosophical proposal of reason. And so, while the philosophical history will insist on empirical methods and data because this is appropriate to the historical discipline, it will also, as a philosophical exercise, involve principally a tracing of the metaphysical thread in the course of world history.

Philosophy of history is therefore, seen as the process by which spirit comes to full self-consciousness of freedom. The human mind is the instrument of this awareness. While this process may pass through individual human minds however, the primary units in the dialectics of the world spirit are nations, not individual humans. Indeed, both in his politics and in his history, Hegel regards nations as individuals, the individuals in whose spirits are manifested the dialectical moments of the world spirit.

Different nations at different points in history are given the special duty of advancing this self-consciousness of the world spirit in their particular genius. At such moments, such nations are dominant in world history and it is only once that such a nation can make its hour strike.[79]Before and after this moment, a nation is insignificant in world history and it is without rights in relation to the nation which is the vehicle of the current stage of development of the World Spirit. And just as the action of the individual gains substantiality in identification with the state and loses its substantive being and right opposed to the state, even so do the actions of nation's relation to the World Spirit. They are the living instruments what is in substance and actuality the action of the World Spirit and they merit honour, right and value in the measure in which they contribute to its development.

Even though the primary units in the dialectic of the world spirit are nations, Hegel also talks about world historical individuals such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and Napoleon Bonaparte through whom the World Spirit, in special ways, realizes significant progress in its march through history. The interest of the philosopher in these individuals is not in their particular passions but in what the World Spirit has accomplished for itself through them.

There are four significant phases in the development of the Spirit's self-consciousness of freedom. Hegel divides world history and civilization into four epochs and assigns them to these phases of the World Spirit. The first is the stage of immediate revelation in which absolute unity and substantiality of mind constitute the principle. The consciousness of individuality is as yet underdeveloped and unrecognized. To this first realm, Hegel consigns what he calls the Oriental civilization, which consists of China, India and Persia. They did not comprehend the idea of freedom since a single person (the monarch) was supreme, subordinating all others under the rule

of oriental despotism. This despotism was not just based on the fear of persecution and cruelty, as that would mean that the subjects have consciousness of their own. This however was not the case because the subjects lacked consciousness. Accordingly, the individuals lacked the capacity for moral judgments of right and wrong. Nothing was questioned, and subservience to the despot was total.

However, Hegel conceded that this lack of individual consciousness of freedom showed itself differently in other cultures and civilization. The Chinese state was modeled in a family way, whereby the emperor paternally provided to the populace as if they were his children. In India, the static and unchanging nature is explained by the natural caste system's ordination of despotism. Based on the above, both China and India were outside the process of history, as they both manifested captured development.

Among the oriental states, Persia was clearly different. The modern process of history that Hegel spoke of starts here. Persia was a Theocratic monarchy anchored on Zoroastrianism, which believed in worshipping the light. The Persian emperor was similar to the Chinese one, for both had absolute power. However, they are different in their actual position. In Persia, the loyalty to the state was not the same as that within the family; it was on a general note. Yet, the ruler was an absolute one and his rule was based on a general criterion rather than a natural one.

In the second phase the substantial mind is endowed with knowledge thus has both content and the growing consciousness of individuality. The principle is ethical individuality as beauty.[80]

At this stage, according to Hegel, we find the ancient Greeks. Like Marx's notion of primitive communism, the Greek notion of freedom was only partial and not total. This limitation is based on the reasons that, the Greeks used slaves, which implies that they had only a partial realization of freedom, as a universal philosophy could not exclude any section.

This incompleteness of freedom was reflected in another way, as the Greeks did not have any conception of individual consciousness. The major difference between the Oriental world was that whereas in the Orient, obedience came from external agencies, while for the Greeks it was derived from within. It was habitual obedience, without a universal or impersonal principle. They identified completely with the city state and the motivation was natural. The dominant precondition for freedom was for Hegel the existence of the capacity for critical insight, and reflection and since the Greeks lacked it, their realization of freedom was only partial.

The achievement of the Greeks was their essential homogeneity, which stood in sharp contrast to the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire was heterogeneous and diverse. This brings us to Hegel's third phase, where there is growing depth of consciousness of individuality and knowledge reaches abstract universality which results in infinite opposition to the objective world. This is for Hegel, the stage of the Roman civilization. Here there was neither a natural patriarchy as in the Orient, nor a customary bond of the Greeks which enforced strict discipline, backed by force, among them. In contrast, there was the Roman constitution and legal system that sanctioned individual rights as one of the basic precepts. This led to constant tension between an absolutist state power and the spirit of individual freedom, which made the Roman civilization an unhappy one.

By the time of Constantine, Christianity was the official religion of the Roman Empire, and continued for 1000 years of the Byzantine Empire though the western part was detached from it by the barbarian invasions. But this Christianity for Hegel was both decadent and stagnant, and led to the rise of the contemporary world. And this is the final moment- the fourth principle, where the opposition is overcome and converted so that mind receives in its inner life its truth and concrete essence, while in objectivity it is at home and reconciled with itself.[81] The

spirit at this realm bears its truth and is conscious of it as thought and as a world of actual laws.[82]

This is the spirit at the Germanic realm. The German nations who "were the first to attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free, that it is the freedom of spirit which constitutes its essence." And with this, the movement of the world history, for Hegel, had reached its destination.Based on the above, Hegel draws the conclusion that: The East knew and to the present day knows only that one is free; the Greek and Roman world, that some are free; the German world, knows that all are free[83].

This is one conclusion too many. It is indeed a very fragile ending and many authors and observers found it a hard pill to swallow. In particular, Odimegwu did not spare Hegel as he queries: "And so has world spirit come to the end of its journey with the Germanic realm?" He further maintains that;

> In spite of his passion and love for his fatherland, Hegel would not draw this conclusion, the force of the dialectic compels him to recognize that world history continues eternally even though in time, and that America is the land of the future. One wonders however what will be the principle and stage of consciousness of freedom of the World Spirit in the land of the future since all are already free in the Germanic civilization of Hegel.[84]

For Plamentaz, the question for Hegel which he had no satisfactory answer is; why the spirit should be ultimately tied to the nation states when a synthesis in the universal process looked more logical when the process of history itself was universal[85]

Despite these severe criticisms by various authors, Hegel has unique influence and impressive structure on which he built history. For Hegel, history had certain meaning, purpose and significance. It was not just a record of the past. It was on the opposite, a progressive evolution and the world-historical individuals were decisive on the process of this evolution. However, history

was not made by states or for states, or by world-historical individuals. It was made by people for people, by the absolute spirit through the world-historical individuals like Mohammed Bouaziz in the Arab world. This is one of the claims which we intend to expound as we progress to chapter five.

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CHAPTER FIVE: ARAB SPRING AND THE DIALECTIC OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

5.1   Arabs and the Politics of Hate

One of the most read purveyors of knowledge about Arabs is *New YorkTimes* Columnist Thomas Friedman. Friedman, a frequent commentator on the Middle East, was a keen observer of the Iraq war, which he saw as a chance to kick-start reform in the Middle East. He figured out why the war had gone so badly, and in a remarkable *New York Times* opined, "**Mideast Rules toLive By**". This is in the form of fifteen immutable rules about Arab political thought.

> **Rule 1:** What people tell you in private in the Middle East is irrelevant. All that matters is what they will defend in public in their

own language. Anything said to you in English, in private, doesn't count.

Rule 2: Any reporter or U.S Army officer wanting to serve in Iraq should have to take a test, consisting of one question: "Do you think the shortest distance between two points is a straight line?" If you answer yes, you can't go to Iraq. You can serve in Japan, Korea or Germany – not Iraq.

Rule 3: If you can't explain something to Middle Easterners with a conspiracy theory, then don't try to explain it at all – they won't believe it.

Rule 4: In the Middle East, never take a concession, except out of the mouth of the person doing the conceding.

Rule 5: Never lead your story out of Lebanon, Gaza or Iraq with a cease – fire; it will always be over before the next morning's paper.

Rule 6: In the Middle East, the extremists go all the way, and the moderates tend to just go away.

Rule 7: The most oft-used expression by moderate Arab pols is: "We were just about to stand up to the bad guys when you stupid Americans did that stupid thing. Had you stupid Americans not done that stupid thing, we would have stood up, but now it's too late. It's your entire fault for being so stupid."

Rule 8: Civil wars in the Arab world are rarely about ideas – like liberalism vs. communism. They are about which tribe gets to rule.

Rule 9: In Middle East tribal politics there is rarely a happy medium. When one side is weak, it will tell you, "I am weak, and how can I compromise?" And when it's strong, it will tell you, "I' m strong, why should I compromise?"

Rule 10: Mideast civil war end in one of three ways: a) like the U.S civil war, with one side vanquishing the other; b) like the Cyprus civil war, with a hard partition and a wall dividing the parties; or c) like the Lebanon civil war, with a soft partition under an iron fist (Syria) that keeps everyone in line. Saddam used to be the iron fist in Iraq. Now it is us. If we don't want to play that role, Iraq's civil war will end with A or B.

Rule 11: The most underestimated emotion in Arab politics is humiliation. The Israeli-Arab conflict, for instance, is not just about borders. Israel's mere existence is a daily humiliation to Muslims, who can't understand how, if they have the superior religion, Israel can be so powerful.

Rule 12: Thus, the Israelis will always win, and the Palestinians will always make sure they never enjoy it. Everything else is just commentary.

Rule 13: Our first priority is democracy, but the Arab's first priority is "justice." The oft-warring Arab tribes are all wounded souls, who really have been hurt by colonial powers, by Jewish settlements on Palestinian land, by Arab kings and dictators, and, most of all, by each other in endless tribal wars. For Iraq's long-abused Shiite majority, democracy is first and foremost a vehicle to get justice. Ditto the Kurds. For the minority Sunnis, democracy in Iraq is a vehicle of injustice. For us, democracy is all about protecting minority rights. For them, democracy is first about consolidating majority rights and getting justice.

Rule 14: The Lebanese historian KarmalSalibi has it right: "Great powers should never get involved in the politics of small tribes."

Rule 15: Whether it is Arab-Israeli peace or democracy in Iraq, you can't want it more than they do.[1]

In view of the foregoing, Friedman portrays the Arabs in the first four rules as labyrinthine thinkers, not to be trusted in negotiation. The next few rules portray Arab politics as hopelessly tending toward violence and extremism. There is also a line of thinking that change is impossible and most political outcomes in the region are mechanistically predetermined; and he finally wraps up this analysis of the Arab political scene by suggesting that regional politicians are guided by angry and irrational behaviour.

It is true according to James Zogby, that in the past hundred years the Arab world has seen dozens of major conflicts that spilled over into inter-or intra-state violence. In conformity to the

myth of a monolithic "Arab mind", he further elaborates on another myth: that the Arab world and Arab identity are nothing but fractured fictions. The myth claims that the region is so diverse and complicated that it can't really be described as a cohesive "world' and that there are no unifying threads establishing a shared identity. There is also a disturbing idea that Arabs are fire-breathers, who are angry and consumed by contempt for all that do not queue into their regional affairs the way they want and especially as it concerns their religion. The supposedly monomaniacal obsession of Arabs with politics is equally a clear indication also.

The main source of volunteers for the Afghan jihad were from the Arab world, and thousands of people who came to be known as the "Afghan Arabs" poured in from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and several other countries. Up to that point, militant Islamists in these countries had no program outside of isolated acts of urban terror. The Afghan war served to unite them, train them, and give their movement life. [2] For the first time, it seemed as if a global "community of believers" had come together to fight against infidel encroachment in the region. When the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, it marked a high point for the global Islamist movement, and it legitimized the extremist tactics of the militants in eyes of others who would look to them as a way forward. Their job complete in Afghanistan, the holy warriors now dispersed to other regions such as Bosnia, Kashmir, and elsewhere to carry on the holy war.[3] The former CIA asset, bin Laden, in alliance with the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahari, formed all-Qaeda and turned the Afghan jihad into a global phenomenon.[4]

Another consequence of the Soviet-Afghan War is the emergence of the Taliban and various militant Pakistani Islamists. The Afghan War created a massive refugee crisis and three million Afghans were transplanted to Pakistan. Impoverished and displaced, the Afghan refugees sent their children to free schools (madrassas) based on the Deobandi tradition of Islam. These

children lived in the Madrassas and were cut off from their families and society in general, providing the Ulama an excellent opportunity to brainwash them in the ideas of Deobandi Islam.[5] These Afghan children also mixed with Pakistani children of different ethnic origins and started to forge a universal Islamic identity. This generation of children then emerged as two factions: the Afghan Taliban and the Sunni extremist militias who not only carried their struggle into Kashmir but also massacred and harassed Shia in Pakistan. The Jamaat-e Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), the Ulama party associated with the Deobandis saw this as a way to advance their agenda.

With the backing of Benazir Bhutto's government in Pakistan, the Taliban began to take control of Afghanistan in 1994, and finally captured Kabul in 1996. Once in power they applied the Deobandi philosophy not only to their own community, but to Afghanistan as a whole. While the various mujahideen groups in power in Afghanistan had already started to Islamize Afghan society, the Taliban took it to a new level. Women were forced to wear the veil and were not allowed to take jobs; men had to grow beards and wear certain types of clothing; a "virtue/vice" police was set up to enforce their brand of Islamic morality; television, music, and movies were strictly forbidden. In short, the atmosphere inside a madrassa was reproduced in Afghanistan's cities and villages. Other than the enforcement of their religious dogma, a basic level of commerce, and warfare, the Taliban took little interest in anything else. They preferred the country to the city, and traditional ways to modernism.

In short, the Afghanistan (and Pakistan) played no small role in unleashing various Islamist forces. The "Afghan Arabs" introduced more extreme discourses and tactics into the Islamist movement in various countries; some carried the holy war to other regions; the mujahids who stayed on would train a new generation of neo-fundamentalists; bin Laden would form al-Qaeda

and set his sights on the West; and the Taliban and various Sunni Islamist groups in Pakistan would go on to attempt to Islamize the region.

5.2   The Prolonged Pain of Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab nations are represented by 21 separate countries. There is only one Jewish nation with a tiny country, Israel. The combined territories of Arab countries are 650 fold greater than Israel. Their population is 50 fold greater than Israel. The average per capita GDP in Arab countries is $3,700 versus $18,000 for Israel, despite the fact that many Arab countries have world's richest oil resources. According to Charles Krauthammer:

> Israel is the very embodiment of Jewish continuity: It is the only nation on earth that inhabits the same land, bears the same name, speaks the same language, and worships the same God that it did 3,000 years ago. You dig the soil and you find pottery from Davidic times, coins from Bar Kokhba, and 2,000-year-old scrolls written in a script remarkably like the one that today advertises ice cream at the corner candy store. Israel became a nation about 1300 BCE, two thousand years before the rise of Islam. The people of modern day Israel share the same language and culture shaped by the Jewish heritage and religion passed through generations starting with the founding father Abraham. Since the Jewish conquest in 1272 BCE, the Jews have had dominion over the land for one thousand years with a continuous presence in the land for the past 3,300 years. After the Romans conquered Jerusalem about 2,000 years ago, Jewish people were expelled and dispersed to the Diaspora, and the Land of Israel was ruled by Rome, by Islamic and Christian crusaders, by the Ottoman Empire, and by the British Empire.[6]

Throughout centuries Jews prayed to return from the Diaspora to Israel. During the first half of the 20th century there were major waves of immigration of Jews back to Israel from the Arab countries and from Europe. In 1948 Jews reestablished their sovereignty over their ancient homeland with the establishment of the modern State of Israel.

The Arab–Israeli conflict refers to the political tension and military conflicts between the Arab League and Israel and between Arabs and Israelis. The roots of the modern Arab–Israeli conflict lie in the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism towards the end of the 19th century. Territory regarded by the Jewish people as their historical homeland is also regarded by the Pan-Arab movement as historically and presently belonging to the Palestinian Arabs. and in the Pan-Islamic context, as Muslim lands.[7] The conflict between Palestinian Jews and Arabs emerged in the early 20th century during the 1920 Nebi Musa riots, exploding into a full scale civil war in 1947 and expanding to all Arab League countries with the creation of the modern State of Israel in May 1948.

The conflict, which started as a political and nationalist conflict over competing territorial ambitions following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, has shifted over the years from the large scale regional Arab–Israeli conflict to a more local Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as large-scale hostilities largely ended with the cease fire, following the 1973 October War. Consequently, peace agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt in 1979, and Israel and Jordan in 1994. The Oslo accords led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1993, though a final peace agreement has yet to be reached. A cease-fire currently stands between Israel and Syria, as well as more recently with Lebanon (since 2006). The conflict between Israel and Hamas-ruled Gaza, which resulted in the 2009 cease fire (although fighting has continued since then), though not directly related with the Arab League is usually also included as part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and hence the Arab–Israeli conflict. Despite the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the generally existing cease fire, the Arab world and Israel generally remain at odds with each other over specific territory.

Jewish, Muslim and Christian groups invoke religious arguments for their uncompromising positions. Contemporary history of the Arab–Israeli conflict is very much affected by Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious beliefs and their interpretations of the idea of the chosen people in their policies with regard to the "Promised Land" and the "Chosen City" of Jerusalem.[8]

The Land of Canaan or *EretzYisrael* (Land of Israel) was, according to the Hebrew Bible promised by God to the Children of Israel. According to biblical studies and archaeological evidence, the Israelites ruled that land from the 13th or 14th century BCE to the 1st century BCE (with short periods of foreign rule), remaining an ethnic majority of the population in the area until the 7th century CE. Muslims also claim rights to that land in accordance with the Quran. Contrary to the Jewish claim that this land was promised only to the descendants of Abraham's younger son Isaac, they argue that the Land of Canaan was promised to all descendants of Abraham, including his elder son Ishmael, from whom Arabs claim descent. Christian Zionists support Israel because they recognize an ancestral right of Jews to this land, as suggested, for instance, by Paul in Romans 11. Some also believe that the return of Jews in Israel is a prerequisite for the Second Coming of Christ.[9]

 Before World War I, the Middle East, including Southern Syria (later Mandatory Palestine), had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire for nearly 400 years. During the closing years of their empire, the Ottomans began to espouse their Turkish ethnic identity, asserting the primacy of Turks within the empire, leading to discrimination against the Arabs.[10] The promise of liberation from the Ottomans led many Jews and Arabs to support the allied powers during World War I, leading to the emergence of widespread Arab nationalism. Both Arab nationalism and Zionism had their formative beginning in Europe. The Zionist Congress was established in Basel in 1897, while the "Arab Club" was established in Paris in 1906.

The conflict between Israel and the Arabs is one of the most profound and protracted conflicts of the twentieth century and the principal precipitant of wars in the Middle East. There are two major dimensions to this conflict: the Israeli-Palestinian dimension and the Israeli-Arab dimension. The origins of the conflict go back to the end of the nineteenth century when the Zionist movement conceived the idea of building a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This project met with bitter opposition on the part of the Arab population of the country. The upshot was a clash between two national movements for possession of Palestine. There were two peoples and one land, hence the conflict.

The neighbouring Arab states became involved in this conflict on the side of the Palestinian Arabs in the 1930s. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the main weight of the conflict shifted from the local or inter-communal level to the inter-state level. In 1967 the conflict was further complicated by Israel's capture of the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. From this point on, these states had a direct territorial dispute with Israel quite apart from their commitment to the Palestinian cause.

On the root cause of the conflict there are widely divergent views. Most Arabs maintain that the root cause of the conflict is the dispossession and dispersal of the Palestinian Arabs, an original sin which was compounded by Israel's subsequent territorial acquisitions. In their view, Israel is an inherently aggressive and expansionist state and the real source of violence in the region. Most Israelis, on the other hand, maintain that the root cause of the conflict is not territory but the Arab rejection of Israel's very right to exist as a sovereign state in the Middle East. According to this view, the basic Arab objective is the liquidation of the State of Israel while Israel acts only in self-defense and in response to the Arab challenges. But whatever one's view

of the origins and nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there can be no doubt that this conflict has been a major cause of wars in the Middle East.

A second source of tension and instability which at least on one occasion, in June 1967, helped to tip the balance in favour of war is to be found in the relations among the Arab states. In theory all Arab states subscribe to the idea of Arab unity but in practice inter-Arab relations are characterized more by conflict than by co-operation. Israel is widely held to be one of the few solid pillars propping up Arab unity, the one issue on which all Arabs, whatever their other differences may be, can agree. Opposition to Israel follows naturally from the belief that the inhabitants of the various Arab states, including the Palestinians, form a single nation and that Israel has grossly violated the sacred rights of this nation.

A distinction needs to be made, however, between the rhetorical and the operational levels of Arab foreign policy. Whereas at the rhetorical level the Arab states were largely united in their commitment to oppose Israel, at the operational level they remained deeply divided. The conservative states tended to advocate containment of the Jewish state, while the radical states tended to advocate confrontation. For this reason, the conventional wisdom on Israel's role in inter-Arab relations is not entirely convincing. As a number of scholars have pointed out, the conflict with Israel has imposed enormous strain on the inter-Arab system.Far from serving as a goal to unity, the question of how to deal with Israel has been a serious source of dissension and discord in inter-Arab politics.

A third source of instability and war in the Middle East is the involvement of the Great Powers in the affairs of the region. Two features of the Middle East help to account for the interest and rivalry it has evoked among the Great Powers in the twentieth century: its geostrategic

importance and its oil reserves. Great Power involvement is not a unique feature of the Middle East but one that affects, in varying degrees, all regions of the world. What distinguish the Middle East are the intensity, pervasiveness and profound impact of this involvement. No other part of the Third World has been so thoroughly and ceaselessly caught up in Great Power rivalries. No other sub-system of the international political system has been as penetrated as the Middle East.[11]

When the role of the Great Powers is considered alongside the other two factors - the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab relations - we begin to get some idea as to why the international politics of the Middle East are so complex, endemically unstable, and prone to violence and war. Against this background what is surprising is not that seven full-scale Arab-Israeli wars have erupted in the postwar period, but that some of the other crises in this volatile region did not end up in war.

The 1948 Arab-Israeli war was the climax of the conflict between the Jewish and Palestinian national movements which had been three decades in the making. As the mandatory power in Palestine, Britain had repeatedly tried and failed to find a solution that would reconcile the two rival communities in the country. In February 1947, the British cabinet decided to refer the problem to the United Nations and the struggle for Palestine entered its most critical phase. The United Nations, on 29 November 1947, passed its famous resolution which proposed the partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jews accepted the partition plan; all the Arab states and the Palestinians rejected it vehemently.

The Palestinians launched a campaign of violence to frustrate partition and Palestine was engulfed by a civil war in which the Jews eventually gained the upper hand. At midnight on 14

May 1948, upon expiry of the British mandate, the Jews proclaimed the establishment of an independent state which they called Israel. The following day the regular armies of the Arab states intervened in the conflict, turning a civil war into the first full-scale Arab-Israeli war, a war which ended in defeat for the Arabs and disaster for the Palestinians.

Arab solidarity in the struggle for Palestine was more apparent than real. The Arab states, loosely organized in the Arab League, loudly proclaimed their solidarity with the Palestine Arabs and promised to provide money and arms. But behind the rhetoric of solidarity, the reality was one of national selfishness and dynastic rivalries, notably between King Farouk of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. King Abdullah, who had reached a secret agreement with the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians, was reluctant to play the part assigned to him in the Arab League's invasion plan. The Arab League's invasion plan was designed to prevent the creation of a Jewish state whereas his plan was to let the Jews have their state and annex to his kingdom much of territory assigned by the UN to the Arab state.[12] Divisions of this kind go a long way to explain the failure of the Arab states to coordinate their diplomatic and military strategies in the battle for Palestine.

If America was first to accord de facto recognition to the State of Israel, the Soviet Union was first to accord de jure recognition. The Soviet Union supported partition and the creation of a Jewish state chiefly in order to weaken the British position in the Middle East. In early 1948 the Soviet Union permitted the emigration of Eastern European Jews and sent a shipment of 10,000 rifles and 450 machine-guns. During the summer of 1948, in violation of the UN embargo, the Jews received more substantial shipments of arms from the Eastern bloc which helped to tip the military balance against their opponents. The critical factor in the outbreak of the Palestine war was thus the dispute between the Jews and the Arabs. The Palestinian attack on the Jews

provoked the civil war while the Arab invasion in May 1948 provoked the official war. Inter-Arab rivalries contributed much less to the outbreak of this war than they did to the subsequent military defeat. None of the Great Powers wanted war in Palestine but Britain lost control of the situation while support from Washington and Moscow encouraged the Jews to proceed to statehood by force of arms. If in 1948 the Great Powers played only a limited role on the Middle East stage, in 1956 the reverse was true. The war, which broke out in October 1956, pitted Britain, France and Israel against Egypt. One of the many paradoxes of this war was that Britain and Israel, despite the bitter legacy of the past, joined arms to attack an Arab state which had long been associated with Britain. Another paradox was that Britain and France, old sparring partners in the Middle East, found themselves on the same side in this war.

Whereas the Suez war had been the result of deliberate planning, the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 was the result of a crisis slide. President Nasser appeared to challenge Israel to a duel but most observers agree that he neither wanted nor expected a war to take place. What he did was to embark on an exercise in brinkmanship which went over the brink. On 13 May 1967 Nasser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable, he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border and expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai, and, on 22nd May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

On 5th June, 1967 Israel seized the initiative and launched the short, sharp war which ended in a resounding military defeat for Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The decisive factor in triggering the crisis that led to the Six-Day War was inter-Arab rivalries. It may sound perverse to suggest that the war owed more to the rivalries between the Arab states than to the dispute between them and Israel, but such a view is supported by the facts. The Arab world was in a state of considerable

turmoil arising out of the conflict and suspicions between the radical and the conservative regimes. A militant Ba'th regime rose to power in Syria in February 1966 and started agitating for a war to liberate Palestine. President Nasser came under growing pressure to stop hiding behind the skirts of the United Nations and to come to the rescue of the embattled regime in Damascus.

Nasser suspected his Syrian allies of wanting to drag him into a war with Israel while they suspected that, if push came to shove, he would leave them to face Israel on their own. Nasser's first move, the deployment of the Egyptian army in Sinai, was not intended as a prelude to an attack on Israel but as a political maneuver designed to deter the Israelis and to shore up his prestige at home and in the Arab world. This move, however, started a chain reaction which Nasser was unable to control.

In early May 1967 the old quarrel between Israel and the Arabs seemed almost irrelevant. As Malcolm Kerr observed in The Arab Cold War, the Arabs were more preoccupied with one another than they were with Israel. Even when the Israelis first appeared on the scene, they were merely there as a football for the Arabs, kicked onto the field first by the Syrian hot-heads and then again by Nasser. The Israelis, however, took a different view of themselves. It became a case of the football kicking the players.The superpowers did very little to prevent the slide towards war. The Soviets fed Nasser with a false report about Israeli troop concentrations and supported his deployment of Egyptian troops in Sinai in the interest of bolstering the left-wing regime in Damascus and in the hope of deterring Israel from moving against this regime. Their subsequent attempts to restrain Nasser had very little effect. They probably hoped to make some political gains by underlining their own commitment to the Arabs and the pro-Israeli orientation

of American foreign policy. But they seriously miscalculated the danger of war and they were swept up in a fast-moving crisis which they themselves had helped to unleash.

In fact, the American position during the upswing phase of the crisis was hesitant, weak and ambiguous. President Johnson initially tried to prevent a war by restraining Israel and issuing warnings to the Egyptians and the Soviets. Because these warnings had no visible effect on Nasser's conduct, some of Johnson's advisers toyed with the idea of unleashing Israel against Egypt. Johnson himself was decidedly against giving Israel the green light to attack. His signals to the Israelis amounted to what William Quandt termed `a yellow light' but, as for most motorists, the yellow light amounted to a green light.[13]

The March 1969-August 1970 Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition was a direct result of the problems created for the Arab world by the Six-Day War of 1967. Israel had not only won a resounding military victory but ended the war in possession of large tracts of Arab land - the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula. UN Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called on Israel to withdraw from these occupied territories in return for peace with the Arabs but the Israelis and the Arabs interpreted Resolution 242 rather differently and Israel's position progressively hardened. Israel became attached to the new territorial status quo and was confident of her ability to maintain this status quo indefinitely. Her strategy was to sit tight on the new cease-fire lines until the Arabs had no alternative but to accept her terms for a settlement. The result of the war affected the geopolitics of the region to this day.

For a short period the Arabs closed ranks against the common enemy and the bitter consequences of defeat but the old divisions gradually reasserted themselves. The main division was between the advocates of a political settlement and those who believed that what was taken by force could

only be recovered by force. At the summit conference held in Khartoum in late August 1967, these divisions were papered over by means of a resolution which was dubbed the three `noes' of Khartoum - no recognition, no negotiations and no peace with Israel. The conference demonstrated the uselessness of pan-Arabism as a framework for deciding a realistic policy towards Israel. The political option was rejected even at a time when an Arab military option palpably and painfully was not available. While Arab unity was preserved at the declaratory level, at the practical level each Arab state was left to decide for itself how to go about recovering the territory it had lost.

In 1969 Egypt initiated The War of Attrition, with the goal of exhausting Israel into surrendering the Sinai Peninsula. The war ended following Gamel Abdel Nasser's death in 1970. The War of Attrition ended in a military draw between Israel and Egypt and it was followed by a deadlock on the diplomatic front which was not broken until 6 October 1973 when Egypt and Syria launched their well-coordinated surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur – the holiest day of Jewish calendar. The Yom Kippur War can be traced to three factors: the failure of all international initiatives for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute; the emergence of an Arab coalition which was able and willing to do battle with Israel; and the steady flow of arms from the superpowers to their regional clients.

The United States contributed to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War indirectly and inadvertently by supporting the Israeli policy of trying to maintain an untenable status quo. Republican President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, approached the Middle East from a globalist perspective and sought to keep the Soviet Union out of the area. They perceived Israel as a strategic asset and a bastion of regional stability. They embraced the Israeli thesis that a strong Israel was the best deterrent to war in the Middle East. In

accordance with this thesis, they provided Israel with economic and military aid on an ever growing scale while declining to put pressure on her to return to the pre-1967 lines. Even after Sadat expelled the Soviet advisers, the Americans persisted in this standstill diplomacy which eventually drove Egypt and Syria not to accept Israel's terms for a settlement but to resort to war.

The 1982 Lebanon war was the result of the unresolved dispute, or only partially resolved dispute, between Israel and the Arabs. The origins of this war can be traced back to the rise to power in Israel of the right-wing Likud Party headed by Menahem Begin in 1977. It was Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 which started the war in Lebanon and provoked the clash with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forces on Lebanon's territory. Officially the war was called `Operation Peace for the Galilee' to suggest that its purpose was purely defensive, to secure the Galilee against attacks from the PLO forces stationed in southern Lebanon. But the broader aims of the war were to create a new political order in Lebanon, to establish Israeli hegemony in the Levant and to pave the way to the absorption of the West Bank in line with the Likud's nationalistic ideology of Greater Israel. In this sense, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was only the culmination of a long process of Israeli intervention in domestic and regional Arab politics.[14]

The chief architect of Israel's war in Lebanon was defense minister Ariel Sharon. A ruthless and cynical politician, he was also a great believer in using force to solve political problems. Sharon's `big plan' had a number of objectives. The first objective was to destroy the military infrastructure of the PLO in southern Lebanon and thereby to break the backbone of Palestinian resistance to the imposition of permanent Israeli rule over the West Bank. The second objective was to help Bashir Gemayel, leader of one of the Christian militias, in his bid for power so as to bring about a new political order in Lebanon and one which was expected to be amenable to a

peace agreement with Israel. The third objective was to defeat the Syrian forces in Lebanon and to replace the Syrian protectorate of the country with an Israeli protectorate. In short, the idea was to use Israel's military power in order to accomplish a politico-strategic revolution round Israel's eastern and northern borders. It was not the much-vaunted Israeli aspiration to peaceful co-existence with the Arabs that inspired this war but Sharon's relentless drive to assert Israeli hegemony over the entire region.[15]

Israel's position in the Gulf crisis and war was distinctly anomalous. On the one hand, Iraqi aggression against a fellow Arab country seemed to support the often-repeated Israeli claim that much of the violence and instability in the Middle East is unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, by posing as the champion of Palestinian national rights, Saddam Hussein managed to mobilize a significant degree of Arab popular opinion, secular as well as Islamic, on his side. On 10 August 1990, Saddam shrewdly proposed a possible Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territory. This proposal, though rejected outright by both Israel and America, created some sort of a linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli crisis. For the remainder of the Gulf crisis, Israel tried to maintain a very low profile. Even Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli population centres, following the outbreak of hostilities around 1990, could not elicit military retaliation on Israel's part. This uncharacteristic Israeli forbearance ultimately defeated Saddam's efforts to turn an Arab-Arab conflict into an Arab-Israeli one.

Recently, records have it that Israel has been engaged with individual Arab nations in conflicts outside of the generally engaged wars with Arab – Nations as an entity. For example, in October 1994, Israel and Jordan signed a peace agreement, which stipulated mutual cooperation, an end of hostilities, and a resolution of other issues. The conflict between them had cost roughly 18.3

billion dollars. Israel and Iraq have been implacable foes since 1948. Iraq sent its troops to participate in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and later backed Egypt and Syria in the Six Day War in 1967 and in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In June 1981, Israel attacked and destroyed newly built Iraqi nuclear facilities in Operation Opera.

In 1970, following an extended civil war, King Hussein expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan. September 1970 is known as the Black September in Arab history and sometimes is referred to as the "era of regrettable events". It was a month when Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan moved to quash the autonomy of Palestinian Organizations and restore his monarchy's rule over the country. The violence resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people, the vast majority Palestinians. Armed conflict lasted until July 1971 with the expulsion of the PLO and thousands of Palestinian fighters to Lebanon. The PLO resettled in Lebanon, from which it staged raids into Israel. In 1981, Syria allied with the PLO, positioned missiles in Lebanon. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. Within two months the PLO agreed to withdraw thence. The 1970s were marked by a large number of major, international terrorist attacks, including the Lod Airport Massacre and the Munich Olympics Massacre in 1972, and the Entebbe Hostage Taking in 1976, with over 100 Jewish hostages of different nationalities kidnapped and held in Uganda.

In December 1987, the First Intifada began. The First Intifada was a mass Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the Palestinian Territories. The rebellion began in the Jabalia refugee camp and quickly spread throughout Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinian actions ranged from civil disobedience to violence. In addition to general strikes, boycotts on Israeli products, graffiti and barricades, Palestinian demonstrations that included stone-throwing by youths against the Israel Defense Forces brought the Intifada international attention. The Israeli

army's heavy handed response to the demonstrations, with live ammunition, beatings and mass arrests, brought international condemnation. In mid-1993, Israeli and Palestinian representatives engaged in peace talks in Oslo, Norway. As a result, in September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, known as the *Declaration of Principles* or Oslo I; in side letters, Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism, violence and its desire for the destruction of Israel. The Oslo II agreement was signed in 1995 and detailed the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. Area A was land under full Palestinian civilian control. In Area A, Palestinians were also responsible for internal security. The Oslo agreements remain important documents in Israeli-Palestinian relations. As violence between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants intensified, Israel expanded its security apparatus around the West Bank by re-taking many parts of land in Area A. Israel established a complicated system of roadblocks and checkpoints around major Palestinian areas to deter violence and protect Israeli settlements. However, since 2008, the Israeli Defense Force has slowly transferred authority to Palestinian security forces.[16]

In July 2006, Hezbollah fighters crossed the border from Lebanon into Israel, attacked and killed eight Israeli soldiers, and abducted two others as hostages, setting off the 2006 Lebanon War which caused much destruction in Lebanon. An UN-sponsored ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006, officially ending the conflict. The conflict killed over a thousand Lebanese and over 150 Israelis, severely damaged Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displaced approximately one million Lebanese and 300,000–500,000 Israelis, although most were able to return to their homes. After the ceasefire, some parts of Southern Lebanon remained uninhabitable due to Israeli unexploded cluster bomblets.[17] Intermittent fighting continued between them since then,

including 680 rocket attacks on Israel in 2011. On November 14, 2012, Israel killed Ahmed Jabari, a leader of Hamas's military wing, launching Operation Pillar of Cloud. Hamas and Israel agreed to an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire on November 21, 2012.[18]

A report by Strategic Foresight Group has estimated the opportunity cost of conflict for the Middle East from 1991–2010 at $12 trillion. The report's opportunity cost calculates the peace GDP of countries in the Middle East by comparing the current GDP to the potential GDP in times of peace. Israel's share is almost $1 trillion, with Iraq and Saudi Arabia having approximately $2.2 and $4.5 trillion, respectively. In other words, had there been peace and cooperation between Israel and Arab League nations since 1991, the average Israeli citizen would be earning over $44,000 instead of $23,000 in 2010.In terms of the human cost, it is estimated that the conflict has taken 92,000 lives (74,000 military and 18,000 civilian from 1945 to 1995).[19]

5.3   Dialectic of the Arab Spring.

Mohamed Bouazizi inspired the mass protests that have planted the seeds for stable citizenship across the region – the spontaneous action of a single indignant and dehumanized person resonated widely and powerfully with millions because of his refusals to live in humiliation. His self-immolation and refusal to be dehumanized are direct quests for this universal recognition and this did not wait for long to yield results as it sparked off mass agitation for freedom and justice whose opposites characterized the entire Arabian space. Fukuyama captures this more clearly as he quotes Hegel thus:

> And it is by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it
> tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is
> not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at

> first makes its appearance… The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.[20]

We can at least say that according to Hegel there are certain people who exceed their time and who progress the Spirit of World History. People who embody the History of the World are according to Hegel not bound by the laws and morality of their time (since they are beyond it).[21] They are justified by the results of their actions, which they might not be necessarily aware of. To use Hegel's favorite example, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and especially, Napoleon Bonaparte who introduced so many reforms in Europe in so many different areas that no one else could have pushed the progression of World History if it was not for Napoleon.

Through them the World Spirit, in special ways, realizes significant progress in its march through history. The interest of philosopher in these individuals is not in their particular passions but in what the World Spirit has accomplished for itself through them[22]. That is why, according to Hegel, the millions of deaths in Napoleonic wars were justified.[23]Arguably, was Hegel to present another list of historical individuals Mohamed Bouazizi would have been on the merit list of the historical individuals.

Furthermore, Hegelian dialectic of conflict has to do with freedom. Why the concept of freedom is important for a Hegelian framework of conflict goes back to the dialectical understanding of conflict. With a swift dialectical move, Hegel submits that the essence of Spirit is Freedom:The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite–Matter. As the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom.[24]In furtherance of this, he maintains that:

> Matter possesses gravity in virtue of its tendency toward a centralpoint. It is essentially composite; consisting of parts that exclude each other. … Spirit, on the contrary, may be defined as that which has its centre in itself. It has not a unity outside, but has already found it; it exists in and with itself. Matter has its essence out of itself; spirit is self contained existence.[25]

Hegel goes on to explain that the unrestful relentlessness of the Spirit's consciousness constantly pushes for more Recognition. Defining the Spirit's measure of Recognition as Freedom, Hegel concludes, "the final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of the Spirit, and ipso facto, the reality of that freedom."[26] This means that every conflict in the world happens because there is a lack of Recognition and Freedom in the conflict situation.

The above position was indeed the case of the Arab World. The choking grip of the tyrannical regimes was massive.Those in power lived in frivolities while the poor masses languished in abject poverty with the enormous taxation policy to further contend with. For the tax payers to watch the likes of Ben Ali's in-law spending beyond the boundaries of Tunisia only to feed on imported youghurt when they are paying through their noses was a constant nudge on the spirit's consciousness to push for recognition and freedom. Another heart rendering instance is the feeding of pet tiger with four chickens every day while some country men cannot boast of a square meal per day. It was a very horrible and pathetic condition.

The monarchical system of the Arab regime was too personal as most of them are concerned about themselves and their immediate families.They wanted to rule as long as they can live and die in power with every arrangement for their sons to continue from where they stopped. This may actually be the basis on which Hegel hinged his fallacious conclusion that the Oriental world was static and non-dialectical for only one man knows and is known to be free.

Conversely, the singular act of this young Tunisian has proven that if not all, that many can be free. It called on the same unrestful restless spirit that Hegel talked about in manyother Tunisians that responded with immediate show of fellow feeling that eventually pulled down monstrous regime of President Ben Ali.

This brings us to Hegel's idea that every entity in the world, from humans to states, is related to each other with mutual recognition and freedom. To explain this further, let us contrast Hegel's idea of free will to relational freedom. Hegel does not oppose an understanding of "fully reflexive, free human mindedness."[27]This means a power to create a world in one's own image, so to speak, or a free will of agency. Although he does not oppose it, such an understanding of free will does not concern Hegel.

According to Hegel, the existence of relational freedom is much more prominent, liberating, or limiting than any kind of free will one can ever possess. A "perfect freedom and independence, 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I,'" is the idea of freedom Hegel sees as most important, this "being with self in another" is a collectively achieved relational state.[28] It is involving oneself, relating oneself to others, being active with others via deeds and practices.Such an idea of relational freedom focuses on our relationships, which can enable more for us, instead of mainly focusing on the enabling power of individual agency. This 'I' that is 'We', was the song of the Arab Spring in 2011 as the injustice done to the young Pleb fruit seller was an injury to all which led to one of the greatest mass revolution in the history of Arab World.

According to Hegel's ontology, world history is a process by which the Mind actualizes self-consciousness. This means history is teleological, that is, it is going towards an end. It also means historical progress is governed by the Mind and, at the end, the Mind will reach a state in

which it can see itself perfectly in what has become the realization of this entire dialectical unfolding as well as of the status that is reached at the end, "being with self in another."[29]

The Arabs in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria especially did not embark on this mass revolution and civil disobedience just for the fun of recording the massive death of their brothers and sisters which our records placed around 38,000 lives. It was an enterprise targeted at making the World History where the mind actualizes self-consciousness. Surely, their history is becoming more teleological with their new found "being with self in another" professed in their collective push and quest which translated to the immediate crash of three autocratic regimes and still making massive wave in many other Arabian regimes who are now conceding better promises to the masses and rescinding awkward and anachronistic policies in their regions. With the successes recorded so far the people in the Arab World now understand the immense powers in their coffers. This in mind, they are making frantic efforts to formalize this their new found consciousness with reviews of their constitutions and economic policies to givebetter life to the people and general development of the region.

Moreover, Hegel offers a rather unique take on conflict. Although he does not define what conflict is, nor even use the word like we do, a large portion of his work can be interpreted in terms of conflict, just like the Arab spring and its unfolding. In some lines, Hegel talks about a disruption of the norm as a negation of the status quo. Arab spring is the negation of the given situation, whether big or small, violent or non-violent, within the borders of mutual understanding or not; a negation (Arab spring) is a contradiction. It is a negation of the autocratic regimes in the Arab World. It is a negation of the Armed Forces brutality of the impoverished

people of the Arab World. It is a negation of the overbearing economic policies on the people. And indeed, a negation of evil bans on freedom of press and media houses.

Treating conflict as the only way to overcome the status quo and achieve a better state of being, a Hegelian framework suggests that conflicts are natural phenomena, a result of the duality of existence. This suggests a dialectical understanding of nature, as well as conflict. Here, it is only imperative on some analysts that paint and present the Arabs as cantankerous and belligerent to have a rethink especially on the current wave of the Arab Spring. The Arab World under study was discovered to be living below human standard of living which could have been the imminent reason that culminated to the self-immolation Mohammed Bouazizi. He saw nothing again to live for since every effort to succeed wass meted with absolute brutality by the regime.

"The philosophical system of Hegel" for Odimegwu "could be described as a complex centripetalling dialectical triads."[30] According to Hegel, everything in the universe is dialectical. Conflicts are constructed as dialectical. It is nearly impossible to see a non-dialectical conflict. There is constant unfolding of narratives-counter narratives and action-reaction between agents. A dialectical way of thinking is the basis of Hegelian understanding. Quoting Hegel, Speight claims that not only "the very nature of thinking is dialectic…finite things are inherently dialectical."[31] Perhaps the best example that can be provided is found in the preface of the *Phenomenology*. With the following example Hegel shows that dialectic is not just an unfolding of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but an interlocking system with many layers.

As was mentioned in the beginning of this essay, one of the consequences of a dialectical mode of thinking is the acceptance of the idea that nothing ever ends but rather evolves in a dialectical unfolding towards a goal. The realization of this dialectical unfolding and its end is called "the

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Understanding." In line with this, the incessant harassment of policemen and the bottleneck government system translated into the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi to form the thesis which accordingly culminated to the horror of mass protest and mobilization against their government as the anti-thesis and the resultant removals of Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and death of Muammar Gaddafi of Lybia as well as the continuum in other Arab nations, the Synthesis. The movement is still on and recurring towards the goal of self-recognition and freedom in many other eastern countries like Syria, Bahrain and Iraq.

The Orient was understood to be static in time and place. It was understood as being eternal, uniform and incapable of defining itself. This was in opposition to the West which saw itself as being dynamic, innovative, and expansionist. Succinctly for Hegel, "the east knew and to the present day knows that one is free."[32]Ironically, for the past six years through their consistent violent and non-violent movements the Arabians have shown the progress of consciousness of freedom which is the rationality of world history.[33] They currently know that one can't just be free, if not all, many should be. Therefore, through civil disobedience, strife and strike they upturned the status quo in the Arab World which is a dialectical understanding of nature. This explains more why through their historical individual - Mohamed Bouazizi who refused to be humiliated and inspired the mass protests; the Arab World has remained in the world headlines seeking attention from within and international communities to be liberated from the inhuman treatments meted by their government and agents.

From the fore-going, one can conveniently conclude that Hegel's argument about *Oriental world* can be justified partly based on the continued errors and wrongs which dominated the Arab region and her history. It appears that his prophecy of world historical individuals came to fulfillment with the Arab Spring and its attendant changes and impacts. All his attacks on the

East, both in politics, Economy, military, and religious abuses have all come to pass with the recent events.As regards politics –history has shown that all the wicked kleptomaniacs and dictators that have ever played any major role in Arab world, have been monarchs who believed that only one is free; the Khomeinis, the Saddams, the Gaddafis, the Mubaraks, - just name them.

It could be said that the Arab spring has a formidable root and connection with the *Philosophy of History* of Hegel. What has happened, what is happening, and what may happen in future as a way of ventilating their anger, the Arabs will always remember that one of their own, in a foreign soil alerted the world of the wickedness connected with the type of politics, economics, religious indoctrination, groomed and maintained in their region by the bottleneck monarchs. All these help to show how the promotion or otherwise of what Hegel taught, helped to spur the Arabs to this revolutionary revolt that has changed their lives and history.

5.4   Conflicts and Reconciliation: A Case for the Arab World and Nigerian Society

Conflicts occur when people (or other parties) perceive that, as a consequence of a disagreement, there is a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. It is indeed a meaningful experience in peoples' lives, not to be shrugged off by a mere "it will pass". Participants in conflicts tend to respond on the basis of their perceptions of the situation, rather than an objective review of it. As such, people filter their perceptions (and reactions) through their values, culture, beliefs, information, experience, gender, and other variables. Conflict responses are both filled with ideas and feelings that can be very strong and powerfully guided to our sense of possible solution. Generally, creative problem – solving strategies are essential to positive approaches to conflict management.

Reconciliation comes in when aggrieved parties in disputes agree to lay down arms and bury their differences amicably. It may not have been so easy to achieve because of the protracted

nature of the conflict or differences. One can reconcile with his creator. One can also reconcile with his/her perceived enemy or adversary. Nations can reconcile with other nations that have engaged them in arms conflicts or diplomatic tension. Since our generation has seen so much trouble, wars, tensions, disputes and uprisings, the dire need to face the lane and side of reconciliation is very superior to any other direction. Disagreements are bound to occur amongst nation, due to politics, economics or even greed and mistakes,but we cannot die claiming rights after rights. The dead usually leave before actual judgment and sympathy come; hence the need to take the option of reconciliation especially in the Arab world that has known no peace for years unending.

In the case of the Arab world, there are litanies of those to be reconciled. The need to reconcile nation with nation, community with community, religion with other religion, non-African Arabs with the Arabs of North Africa, Arabs and the rest of the world. The cost of conflict should serve as the bed-rock of this reconciliation agenda. Taking a look at cost of conflict – which attempts to calculate the price of conflict to the human race, one sees the indices of loss, deprivation, humiliation, injustice, marginalization, and other dangerous prospects for further conflicts.

The cost of conflict methodology taken into account different costs a conflict generates, including economic, military, environmental, social and political costs. The approach considers direct costs of conflict, for instance, human death, expenditure, destruction of land and physical infrastructure; as well as indirect costs that impact a society, for instance migration, growth of extremism and lack of civil society. The cost of conflict in Middle East calculated the direct and indirect costs of successive wars in the Middle East. Some interesting findings from the report include the following points: 7 out of the 10 military spenders in the world are currently from the Middle East, and the cumulative military expenditure is expected to double in the next 10 years.

The region has the highest number of military personnel per million people in the world. The most unique feature in these reports is the opportunity cost of conflict – that is the economic benefits that could have been accrued had there not been conflicts in these countries or regions.[34]

Logic means truth – the principles and strategy of correct thinking. If the contemporary Arab leaders had the faculties of mind and vision and leadership intellect, they would have established people's based system of governance, public institutions to deal with issues of peace and conflict management, be open to listening and learning for effective characteristics and adaptability to the making of a future defined as intelligent leadership. All tragedies cause pain and inflict short/long term sufferings to the unintended victims – the people – the common humanity – the ripple effects lasting ages and the gut feeling that nobody cares for the living mankind of the Middle East and its painful sufferings.

There is genuine need for reconciliation and lasting forgiveness on the part of the leaders. The poor people deserve their mercy and consideration. They know why the people are revolting, they know that they are the root- cause of it, they know why the people are not ready to give up, they know the route to peace, and they know also that violence is not the only answer to crises. People in the blood scarred streets of Syria and feared corridors of the Arab authoritarianism ask when would the blood- thirsty Draculas stop the vengeful killings and perpetuated insanity so that common sense and rationality could return to the ground.

Given the will and proper sense of understanding of time and history, there are problems which are solvable without resorting to violence and blood sheds. The questions therefore are: Do dictators ever care for any rational approach? Do they give any importance to the words of wisdom? Do they ever exercise any genuine desire to a dialogue unless they are hit over their

heads? So what are the so called intelligent hubs of the global community doing to stop the bloody atrocities in the Middle East? Millions perished in Rwanda under the ethnic cleansing. Was there any lesson learnt? The basic issue in Arab world today, is how to stop this daily carnage of precious human lives. As insanity continues to flourish, rationality is absent. But it seems the global community is waiting, watching and talking, but doing nothing.

I think the Arabs need this reconciliation more than how the rest of the world needs it. It will bring out their best, in terms of human resources, economic resources, intellectual activities and even political presence to be felt in the world. Long time ago it was the Arab culture and flourishing civilization that spoke the language of the people and enlightened the Europe with new ideas, knowledge, inventions, science and vision for change and human emancipation. But not anymore as Arabs societies are caught in the delusional oil-generated economic prosperity and overburdened by modern ignorance and stupidity of the uneducated ruling elites, they are unable to see the light out of the box.

The need of peace comes to mind frequently, when one thinks of Israel's unrelenting war against the undefended, basically unarmed, and stateless and poorly led Palestinian people. The disparity in power pushes tears down one's eyes. Israel has been equipped with the latest in America built (and freely given) air power, helicopter gunships, unaccountable tanks and a superb navy as well as a state of the art intelligence services. Israel is a nuclear power abusing a people without any amour or artillery, no air force or navy or army, none of the institution of a modern state. Indeed those unending conflicts have made language (especially that of peace) to be sundered from reality.

Generally, governments of the world have a big responsibility to get it right in shaping and promoting policies in the Arab world. Businesses heavily invested in the Middle East, educational institutions charged with preparing the next generation of global citizens, and news media that inform the public and define the West all need to get it right too.

This reconciliation can be achieved faster by involving Educators and Educational institutions. Since, educating students about the Arab world is a joint effort; governments all over the world can play a part by distributing resources to expand Middle East studies programs. Universities with large Arab and Muslim student populations should take advantage of their presence to create dialogues and exchange opportunities. The Arab governments should promote greater understanding and should send citizen delegations to visit and engage in conversation with communities around the world. These and many other positive steps can indeed help heal the wounds of hatred, erase the errors of stereotypes, pacify for the greed of imperialism, rectify the negative knowledge of indoctrination, ameliorates the arrogance of discrimination, help balance the injustice of domination, and finally to soothe the pains of ignorance of what the Arab world was, is and will be in the minds of those who always see them as conquered people. The Arabs should also be open enough for the rest of the world to feel and see them as people who are not congenitally disposed to violence, belligerency and lack of Consciousness of freedom.

The Nigerian society should also learn from the consequences of the Arab Spring especially in their field of politics. There have been incessant conflicts erupting from one election to another. This calls for the said reconciliation between individuals, political parties, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary for no nation thrives in the face of upheavals. Rule of Law should be given a huge chance in our practice of Democracy and not the arbitrary breach of court injunctions which we experience almost on daily basis. Our leaders should not see their office as

the opportunity to take revenge and witch-hunt those in opposition parties under the cover of fighting corruption. Educational Institutions have enormous roles to play especially in the lives of our Moslem brothers in the face of the lingering Boko Haram attacks. Regular seminars, campaigns and orientations will help to change their mind sets for a better Nigeria.

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CHAPTER SIX: EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

6.1   Evaluation

History, imperialism, religion (Islam), autocracy, monarchy, and illiteracy, have collectively kept the Arab world in the column of evil, terrorism, backwardness, closed, belligerent and aversion for freedom and democratic experimentation. The Arabs have remained almost on the point where modern civilization met them or vice-versa. What Hegel chronicled in his work, yes, was a misconception and negative history of the Oriental world-Arabs, but they have not helped matters either. They lack what it takes to remain united. Arab nationalism, which became "anti-imperialist" after 1920, became "revolutionary" after 1948. The Palestine war had demonstrated that the Arabs, despite their formal independence, remained politically disunited, militarily weak, and economically underdeveloped. The failure could still be blamed on imperialism, and much Arab nationalists thought went into drawing images of a global conspiracy, which allegedly implanted Israel to assure the west's continuing domination of the Arabs. But some intellectuals also began to suggest the existence of intrinsic weakness in Arab culture and society, arguing that these had made the task of the Zionists easier. I think that it was when the Arab nationalists casted themselves as "revolutionaries," then their opponents turned "reactionaries."

Since their creation, individual Arab states had never hesitated to give priority to their separate interests. Yet they had been persuaded by their perceived lack of legitimacy to pledged formal fidelity to the Arab nation, and thus risked being dragged into crises generated by other Arab states, or being accused of breaking Arab ranks for staying out. Kamal Salibi, Lebanon's prominent historian criticized Arab nationalism for deluding the general run of the Arabs into believing that the political unity they had once experienced under Islam was in fact an Arab national unity which have subsequently lost, or of which they have been deliberately robbed. I think this made it difficult for them to properly accommodate the political realities of the present.

The flood of oil income that followed the 1973 war also permitted regimes to buy off the dissent. The states had not only become illegitimately legitimate, they become omnipotent. In the words of one Syrian intellectual: the cancerous growth of the state has been accompanied by the increasingly diminished power of everybody and everything else, especially what some Arab thinkers and leaders enjoy calling "The people." As a consequence, Arab society is on the whole cancelled out as a reality of political significance in the reckonings of all Arab regimes.

By the time communism collapsed, the Arab lands had become the last preserve for protracted one-man rule. The Arab rulers have no sense of time, history or strategic direction – often they live in modern prison cells – called palaces built with petrodollars – stolen money from public treasury. People live in fear of being annihilated by the ruthless forces of the authoritarian rulers. But the men – the rulers who were universally hated and feared claim to have achieved major milestones by their secretive police gangs, ruthlessness and success leading to degeneration and savagery of vicious acts against the very people they claim to serve and govern. The leaders' first step always was the consolidation of the ruling families and their transformation into political institutions which owned the state. The real meaning of the consolidation of the family was the

entrenchment of central decision-making at the highest bureaucratic level in the ruling elite. The efforts of the ruling families extended, through the monopolization of government and wealth, to the prevention of the rise of social and political forces independent of the state, expressing the interests and ambitions of various groups of the population. Thus they prevent the rise of political parties, proscribe the establishment of social and political movements which are not loyal to them, suppressed trade unions and similar organization, recognizing them only as public service associations. They extend an iron grip upon school curricula, and suffocating censorship is generally imposed upon the information media, and mass communications, as well as the penetration of the religious institutions.

In relation to their chief religion – Islam, Arab nationalism erred strongly in breaking the primary bond of Islam during the Arab Revolt during the colonial presence, when some Arab nationalists betrayed their fellow Muslim in order to side with the British, who naturally betrayed them – a just reward for those who placed their trust in unbelievers, some Muslims will conclude. Some leaders of Arab nations compounded their error by abandoning reliance on God and his divine law, in order to become liberals, fascists and socialists, in mimicry of foreign ideological fashion. And while they professed respect for the faith of Islam, they filled their prisons with the truly faithful, whom they accused of subversion for preaching the word of God. The religious authorities in Arab nations armed with this spurious tradition are ever ready to sanction tyranny and repress freedom. Hence, among Arabs and Muslims, the worst of tyrants are frequently men in religious garb, preaching their bigotry from the sanctity of mosques and legitimizing their cruelty in Allah's name. This is what occurred in Iran in 1979 when Iranian nationalists, supported by religious authorities, painted the Shar of Iran as a monster supported by the U.S. and drove him out.

The Arab World in my understanding is not the only people colonized. Imperialism dotted the history of many nations. Africa has suffered the sit-tight agenda of rulers. The economic equation has never been equal or near equal in Africa and in other climes. Rigging and inconclusive elections have consistently been reported in many parts of the world. Civil society organization and Amnesty International have records upon records of human rights abuses registered around the world. People have revolted against imperialism before and now, but they moved on when the common enemy disappeared. In all, the Arabs have generally refused to move on. Their preference to hostility and terrorism has constantly ridiculed their revered religion – Islam. Some of their sit-tight rulers have been guarded, supported, encouraged and even adored by some Arabs who should have made moves. Economic inequality is almost constant in every nation of the world, but I think this evil has propelled many to face hard work and determination than violence, intimidation and show of hatred to wrong persons.

The Arabs should not opt for freedom from foreigners. This may breed resentment and ingratitude. The shoe thrown at George W. Bush, the then American President in Baghdad by Iraqi journalist was ever revealing about Arab and Muslim temperament. The worst display of Arab sickness however was the extent to which Iraqis descended into the barbarity of sectarian violence after freedom was brought to them, instead of seizing upon the opportunity to build a prosperous society. Egyptians have gone forward not surprisingly after overthrowing a dictator – overwhelming members to vote for the sort of religious – based authoritarian rule from which Iranians wish to escape.

The West needs to understand the present tumult in the Arab–Muslim world is part of an immensely complex historical convulsion. Only after Muslims have drunk in full measure from the poisoned tumbler of Islamism will they eventually learn with sufficient humility what

freedom means and democracy requires. Since the West cannot fast forward history of Muslims, it should decide with wisdom and prudence to leave the Arab-Muslim world to find its own path towards a decent future.

6.2   Conclusion

The spread of education on a wide scale in the Gulf and Arab countries, the rise in the standard of living, and the increase in income levels are factors which naturally lead to a rise in the level of expectations among the members of the Middle and lower classes. The affluence and prosperity which the Gulf and Arab countries have witnessed have been superficial, because they have depended upon government expenditure without this expenditure being accompanied by the broadening of the productive base of the economy. The effective monopoly of the sources of power and wealth which the ruling elites practice creates 'mobility closures' in society which will lead, with the passage of time, to increasing friction between the social classes and ranks.

Thus the desire to improve one's employment situation or to guarantee a higher level of income, and especially the right to seek a higher social standing on a new social ladder, comes to be regarded as acquired right. The members of these classes however face a reality which does not recognize their rights, since they confront obstacles to mobility which prevent the realization of their expectations, while seeing with their own eyes the mobilization of authority and wealth by the ruling elite in a provocative manner. This naturally generates situations in which pressure on the political system increases, presaging the flare-up of a vast social struggle between the ruling elite and the populace in general.

Faced with these realities, the most common question then is: Is it possible to create social and political movements at the local levels in the shadow of the organized repression and armed violence of the authoritarian states? The decisive factors in this activity are seriousness in the creation of popular movements and the readiness of the populace to rally round to defend them and the legitimacy of their demands, not the reaction of authoritarian governments. But this fear has been erased by the Arab spring. Despite the bravery of those who have been beaten, tear-gassed and shot while demanding change, even less has been transformed in majority of the Arab countries.

That notwithstanding, there are a few more truths that should be transmitted. One is that this is not a region that is uniquely unsuited to democracy, or has no constitutional traditions or has always suffered under autocratic rulers. But this is also a region where debates over how to limit the power of rulers led to the sustained constitutional effervescence in Tunisia and Egypt in the late 1870s, and to the establishment of a constitution in the Ottoman Empire in 1876. These show that the Arab nations are not insulated, immune or impervious to democratic experimentation.

 Regardless of the best explanation or combination of explanations, it is clear that authoritarianism has proven resilient in the Arab world. The Arab Spring broke down the illusion of regime invulnerability. But the confluence of conditions and authoritarian strategies that blocked political change in the past can be expected to pose challenges for democratization going forward. The fundamental historical shift in recent decades is that democracy no longer has any serious competitors as a legitimate system of governance. Particularly after the dissolution of the *SovietUnion* and the rejection of *Communism* as a form of government across Europe, governments in all countries transitioning from authoritarianism espouse democracy, even though many fall short in practice. No governments, even those that purposefully bolster

autocrats beyond their borders, now openly propose any transplantable alternative to democracy. Institutions in the international system promote democracy as a universal norm.

The Arab States have a long way to go to undo the terrible legacy of repression and stagnation and move towards democracy, the rule of law, social justice and dignity, which have been the universal demands of their people as occasioned the Arab spring. Not forgetting the *Revisionisttheorists* who argued that democracy is incompatible with Islamic culture and values, I think what the Arabs needed urgently now is democracy, since monarchy and other archaic options have collectively failed them. Definitely, some Arab countries can pull off reform by themselves, while some must be assisted. The intellectuals of Arab descent have longed for this form of political change, not only to break the hold of authoritarian regimes, but also to revitalize Arab societies, opening up their economies and societies alike. The issue of democracy has been on the political agenda repeatedly and in some cases it has advanced substantially, only to be abandoned again. I think this is the time to make it take root, germinate and bear fruits of unity, continuity and progress.

For years Americans and Arabs have done talks on democracy. For instance when President Clinton asked the Palestine leader Yasser Arafat to agree upon the *CampDavid* peace plans that had been negotiated on July 2001, Arafat answered with words that meant: If I do what you ask, Hamas will take over tomorrow. The Arab Saudi spokesperson, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, constantly reminded the American government if they push their government too hard, the results may not be Jeffersonian style democracy but a *Taliban* style theocracy.

The Arab leaders of the Middle-East are autocratic, corrupt and iron handed. But they are much more liberal, tolerant and pluralistic what might become of the replacements. The elections in

many Arab countries may deliver politicians that have a similar views of the Middle-East that are similar to Osama bin Laden than a monarchy Jordanian Liberal leader such as King Abdullah. In 2005 the emir of Kuwait, with support from America, recommended that women should have a right to elect. But the Kuwait parliament which was picked in a democratic way (but was also filled with Islamic fundamentalists) denied the initiative. A similar dynamism is real in almost every Arab country. In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco, in almost every political issue, the monarchies are usually much more liberal than the people they lead. And even though they talk much about elections, many Islamic parties have shown negative impressions on democracy; they see democracy as a form of western government. They will happily try to attain power by elections, but will develop their own theocratic regulations.

Nowadays the Arab world are trapped between countries that are autocratic and a society that has shallow way of thinking, these two are not a suitable condition to which democracy can grow upon. The grievous dynamic relation between these two has created political conditions which are filled with religious extremity and violence. When the country tries to be repressive, the opposing society grows much more violent, pushing the country to be much more repressive. Unlike the West, where liberalism generates democracy, and democracy has become the fuel for liberalism. The path that Arabs has taken, has established a dictatorial government which then from this dictatorial government, terrorism has been born. But terrorism is the only manifestation that has been continually publicized, but in fact there are more problems which are the cause of the dysfunctional relationship between government and its people, there are economic failures, social entrapments and intellectual impoverishments.

The central dilemma of democratic reform in Arab countries can be summed up fairly simple. Presidents and kings remain too powerful, untrammeled by the limits imposed by effective

parliaments and independent judiciaries. Countervailing institutions remain weak, if they exist at all, not only because constitutions and laws deliberately keep them that way, but also because they are not backed by organized citizens demanding political rights, participation, and government accountability. This does not mean that there is no desire for democracy on the part of Arab publics. Recent opinion surveys suggest that in the abstract there is strong support for more open political systems, increased protection of human rights, and broader personal liberties.

However, the existence of a general, diffuse sense that democracy is a good thing is quite different from the existence of organized constituencies that provide a counterweight to the authoritarianism of incumbent governments. The demand, or better the desire, for democracy is present in the Arab world today; what is lacking is a supply of broad-based political organizations pushing for democracy, political parties, social movements, labour unions, large civic organizations. Unless and until such constituencies develop, the future of democracy remains extremely uncertain. In many countries, governments face stronger pressure from organized citizens, however, they will not take steps to truly curb the power of the executive by strengthening checks and balances and allowing unfettered political participation.

Small constituencies for democratic change do exist in the Arab world. Many intellectuals have embraced the idea of democracy and popular participation and are speaking up with increasing openness on these issues. This is not a new development. Political elites that believe in political reform have long existed in the region. Arab intellectuals have been keenly aware of the need for change ever since the intensification of contacts with Europe in the nineteenth century drove home the extent to which the Arab world was stagnating. But until recently, intellectuals have been divided about what change was necessary to revitalize the region. Not all looked to democracy for salvation. Nationalism, both as the nationalism of one country or as pan-Arab

nationalism, has been an important response to the challenge of change. In the last decade, however, the idea of democracy has come to occupy an increasingly large space, even if it is challenged by the upsurge of Islamist idea.

The Arab debate about democracy, which was rife in the early part of the twentieth century but was later almost completely absent from political discourse, has been relaunched. The concept of liberal democracy now enjoys support from Arab intellectuals who rejected it in the 1960s and 1970s as a western ideology unsuitable to Arab culture and countries. These intellectuals are disenchanted with their governments, want political reform, and, despite the growing anti-western and particularly anti-American sentiments in the region, are ready to accept that democracy is a valid political system for the Arab world. The intellectual elite has come to see democratic reform as an absolute necessity not only to break the hold of authoritarian regimes, but also to revitalize Arab societies, opening up their economies and societies, alike. Even Arab governments, under pressure from their citizens and foreign governments, feel they must echo this sentiment that the time for reform has come. The willingness to implement reform is another matter.

The prospects for democracy in the Arab world depend on the growth of constituencies committed to furthering the democratic goal, ideally because they are truly committed democracy, but at a minimum because they see democracy as a means to gain power and further their interests. No democracy promotion effort from the outside will achieve much unless internal constituencies develop. In these circumstances, we cannot ignore the commitment of some Arab leaders to democracy remains as superficial as that of the Islamists and the regimes. It is deployed as a slogan for mass mobilization against the existing order, and then as a shield against the revenge of a triumphant Islam. But even as some Arab leaders speak of democracy,

their eyes remain fixed on the horizon, awaiting the next Nasser, the next Saddam – the man who will save the Arabs from themselves and unite them. Even now, when the slogan of democracy is on everyone's lips, half of the Arab nationalist intellectuals still believe and hope that Arab unity can only be achieved by force, not by democracy.[1]

Democracy does not always remain an elite ideology without mass support. In well-established democracies, habit, and early education and to some extent national identities make democracy a broadly accepted ideology. Believing in democracy is part of being American, and most Americans would say they believe in democracy even when in practice they accept non-democratic values. The same is true in many other countries. But even in non-democratic countries, democratic ideals can gain widespread support and become a catalyst for political mobilization. Some Eastern European countries such as Poland, democratic principles were an inspiration through the mass movements that did toppled their government in the past. The failure of democracy to develop a broader appeal in the Arab world is thus not an inevitable consequence of the nature of democracy, but a phenomenon that needs to be explained.

Past experiences illustrate that putting in place a new constitution, or amending an existing one, is important to laying a foundation for democratic governance and enshrining protection of civil liberties, human rights, and other valued norms. But also, for immediate practical purpose, constitution making can be used to foster successful democratization by consolidating consensus and keeping potential spoilers on board. The international community, through multilateral actions or international organizations, should encourage creation of mutually reinenforcing and supporting structures in the Arab world, such as a regional organization for democracies that could attract and facilitate the delivery of institution-building assistance and reinforce democratization through moral suasion.

Several factors can make democracy into an ideology that attracts a mass following. When people have embraced order, more facilely popular ideologies with disastrous consequences for example, the radical, expansionist nationalism of fascism and Nazism, disillusionment gives democracy mass appeal. Or democracy can be perceived as the only alternative to an existing hated political system. In Eastern Europe, democracy was seen as the opposite of communism, in the same way as the United States was seen as the opposite of the Soviet Union. In Latin America in the 1980s, democracy won new support from populations tired of the conflict, instability, and poor governance that they had experienced for decades under populist regimes or military dictatorships. Other factors also facilitated the acceptance of democracy in these parts of the world, including a perception that democracy was part of their cultural background and long-standing political aspirations. In Eastern Europe, furthermore, the example of the more prosperous, stable, and democratic west was also a strong factor in creating support for democracy.

Results have shown that democracy that develops when people become deeply dissatisfied with the existing leaders and political systems can be very short-lived or, in some cases, more apparent than real. The movement for democracy that developed in Serbia, leading to the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic, has not led to a stable democratic system. The outcome of the recent transition in Georgia is still unpredictable. And it is already painfully clear that the pro-democracy movements that developed in many African countries during the 1990s, in Zambia or in Senegal, for example, were in reality movements for change, rather than for democracy. The rejection of an unpopular regime should not be confused with a desire for democracy and even less with the existence of a political movement capable of supporting the demand for democratization over the long haul.

European nationalism in the nineteenth century had a democratic component. The political elite, that led the fight for a state supposedly coterminous with a pre-existing nation also upheld the century anti-colonial nationalism, led by European-educated or at least European-influenced elites, also embraced some democratic ideals. Full acceptance of liberal democracy, however, was tempered by the desire of the ideologies of anti colonial movements to distance them from the west and to develop systems based on an indigenous culture and values. Additionally, the appeal of the Soviet model, particularly strong in the 1960s, and the unwillingness of the new political elite to accept checks on their power also limited the implementation of liberal democracy.

Spreading democracy is a tough job. But that does not mean that the western countries (especially America) stops trying to help the democratic liberal powers. This also does not mean to fully accept the authoritarian regime as an alternative that has little side-effects. This means that a much more sophisticated way is needed. The event of pushing the countries in doing democratic elections in the past decade has proven to be a contra productive way in handling the matter. The diversity of cultures and the difference in societies needs a different government basis. This is not a warning to accept any kind of political system but rather a suggestion to better organize liberal democracy that is more diverse. True democracy not only balances democracy and liberalism but also other powers to create a system that performs perfectly. Understanding this system is an intellectual work to bring back the liberal constitutional tradition which is actually the heart of Western political systems and in doing good governance around the world. The clash between democracy and liberalism has not yet become a thing of the past. Democracy has always become a never-ending homework for every country believing in democracy.

In light of resistance to democracy in much of the Arab world, observers such as Samuel Huntington have advocated the notion of a "clash" between Arab and Western civilizations. This resistance even led to arguments such as "Arab exceptionalism", a phase that prescribes that Arab nations are immune to economic modernization and democratization, or that these concepts form part of the "clash". Huntington attributes to "non-rational" Islamic revivalism and Shi'a fundamentalism the lower likelihood of democratic development in Islamic countries.

Middle East scholar Louise Faweett notes how the United Nations Development Programme's*Arab Human Development Report 2002,* drafted by Western-educated Arab intellectuals, is modeled 'on universal democratic principles.' In additions, Faweett argues that "Constitutional democracy is viewed not only as an intrinsic good by the putative globalisers who drafted this report; it is also an instrumental necessity if the region is to stop stagnating and begin to catch up with the rest of the world".[2]

Despite the long listed bumps along the road to true democracy in Arab World, I think and feel that the way out is Democracy. This choice is based on the fact that the option it will provide will be based on the consent of the governed. The people are the sovereign – they are the highest form of political authority. Power flows from the people to the leaders of government, who hold power only temporarily as against the family transfers of power they have lived in for so long.

Laws and policies in this system require majority support in parliament, but the rights of minorities are protected in various ways. The people will be free to criticize their leaders and representatives genuinely, and to observe how they conduct the business of government. This system will see to it that elections occur at regular intervals, as prescribed by law; and that those in power cannot extend their terms in office without asking for the consent of the people again in

an election. All parties and candidates must have the rights to campaign freely, to present their proposals to the voters both directly and through the mass media.

Since Democracy is a system or rule of laws, and not by individuals, the laws then protect the rights of citizens, maintain order, and limit the powers of government. It is our submission that with this type of political system in place, the incessant and lingering conflicts in the Arab World will be grossly minimized and will become a thing of the past. Freedom and justice, a direct irony of the choking grips of their monarchs and dictators will be enjoyed in the political terrain of the Arab World. Surely, the blood of the likes of Mohammed Bouaziz shall without doubt form a negation to the autocratic regimes in the Arab World which invariably will give birth to a Consciousness of freedom and a new system of government-genuine democracy. This is the dictates of the dialectic of Hegel. Affirming the positions and conclusion of this study, the thoughts of Saleh, Chalala insists:

> Since the "doom and gloom" chorus is founded on the new authoritarian policies of Islamist Tunisia and Egypt… the political and social hardships caused by these regimes to be expected and even necessary in order to achieve genuine democracy. As Hegel introduced into the discussion, the "negative" manifested by the immense sacrifices of the Egyptian and the Tunisian peoples for the past two years, are a precondition to achieve the "positive," that is the birth of genuine democracy. It is the Hegelian dialectic; an idea challenged by counter idea, to subsequently produce a new idea.[3]

Succinctly for InsafRabadi, after September Eleven[4] the world entered a new phase, the world's attention turned to a new Middle East; the winds of change swept intensely blowing towards the Arab region, carrying new philosophical thought such as freedom, democracy and human rights, as the technological revolution of communications like satellites and social networks had contributed in breeding the ground for this new visitor.

Endnotes

1. AsadAbuhhalil, "A New Arab Ideology: The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism," *Middle Eastern Journal*, 46 (1992), pp. 22-36.

2. L. Fawcett, *International Relations in the Middle East*. (Gosport: Oxford University press, 2005), p. 123.

3. ElieChalala, The Arab Spring Hasn't Bloomed Yet… But Hegel's "Philosophy of History" Says it Will!http://www.aljadid.com/content. Surfed, 3rd July, 2018.

4. InsafRabadi, *Change: the Philosophical and the aesthetical Concept inspired by the Arab Spring Movement.* www.iiste.org . surfed 1st August, 2018.