

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Post-independent Africa and state constitution are overwhelmed by disparate group agitation, tribal protests and secessionist conflicts. This is despite the fact that the basis of the colonial establishment of the state was unity and oneness of the people. Equally, this is irrespective of the fact that majority of the continent are sworn democracies; democracy, as such, was instituted on the promises that it has the capacity to solve majority of the problems that could arise in social relations and political organization. In Europe, the attainment of a democratic organization and governance in nineteenth century, gave basis for the political recognition of different individuals as equal; hence, the state assumed the basis for these individuals to assert their social integration, oneness and development. In other words, from then it became common for individuals to identify themselves on the basis of the nation-state. But in African states, the case is different as successive democratic regimes continue to witness the persistence of secessionist movements and agitation. This situation has even degenerated to the division of some states into two as was the case of Sudan (now Sudan and Southern Sudan); yet, these two states have not rid themselves of this social situation. In fact this has come to assume an insuperable position in the political life of the continent: there are the Niger-Delta/Biafra group in Nigeria, Southern Cameroons Independence Restoration Movement (Ambazonia Movement) in Cameroon, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Tuaregs) in Mali, Movement for Democratic Forces of Casamance in Senegal, Western Sahara Polisario Front (Sahrawis) in Morocco, Afar Liberation Front (Afar State) in Ethiopia, Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda in Angola and Zanzibar Civil United Front in Tanzania. States such as Libya has been completely overran by secessionist groups such that the once developed and progressive state has dissolved into interminable civil war and tussle for political control; the list goes on and on. The problematic posture of this becomes obvious against the backdrop of the fact that state constitution is assumed to be a

higher evolution in social relations; humanist aspirations, social flourishing, growth and development should, as necessities, flow from this position. However, Africa seems to be caught in the web of political impasse and the demand to assert her true self in all ramifications tends to aggravate the situation all the more.

Obviously, the present condition buttresses that the continent is a shadow of her past self and miles away from the contemporary understanding of statehood. Historical evidences record that the social organization of traditional Africa was humane, harmonious, well organized and progressive with minimal group antagonism or dissent. This was because community values and aspirations had the welfare of individuals in the society at the center ensuring that the individual's level of identification with the community was effortless and non-solicited. The tribal pattern of life evolved naturally as the indigenous communities were self-contained and self-supporting with little or no contact between these communities, and with the outside world. This innocent seclusion helped the communities to maintain relative development pattern and rhythm. Walter Rodney makes more precise elaboration on this thus:

The African continent reveals very fully the workings of the law of uneven development of the societies. There are marked contrasts between the Ethiopian empire and the hunting groups of pigmies in the Congo forest or between the empires of Sudan and the Khoisan hunter-gatherers of the Kalahari Desert. Indeed there were striking contrasts within any given geographical area.¹

Irrespective of this unevenness in progress, however, communalism was the dominant social practice and this dictated the basis of life and social relations in these societies. That is, family and kinship relations predominated the earliest social existence in Africa. "Every member of an African society had his position defined in terms of relatives on his mother's side and on his father's side."² Traditional African family was a strongly knit unit, defined by endless social interaction and interpenetration geared

towards individual's welfare and togetherness, and all social relations and activities were determined and explained from this basic ontology. For instance, economic activities in the traditional setting centered mainly on the land, nature's gift to man. That is, land provided the traditional African his/her subsistence because on it he/she cultivated crops and raised animals. Cultivation of the land, as such, was a communal activity solely for entire human survival, so was not left for the individual land owner alone. In fact, land in the communal indigenous setting belonged to the community or clan, and the individual was just seen as holding it in trust on behalf of the community. As such: "[...] no one could lay hand on a particular land and lay claim as the owner, for such practice would be a contradiction of the status quo."³ For this reason, also, labour that tilled the land was equally, a co-operative activity and operates on such spirit. "The labour that worked the land was generally recruited on a family basis, a single family or a house hold would till its own plots and it would also be available to share certain joint farming activities with other members of the extended family or clan".⁴ Each individual tried to assert his place, his humanity and, indeed, his social identification with the group by participating in the communal labour. This combined co-operative effort at production ensured that enough was produced from the land to sustain the communal traditional system. Although communalism meant that each community or clan produced just enough to satisfy its immediate needs, yet, excess production of goods stimulated trade, ensuring that other few needs were met. Traditional Africa had innumerable trade routes, through which external communication was facilitated and inter-tribal coexistence and relations enhanced.

Morality is another factor that enhanced peaceful coexistence, harmony and individuals' identification with the indigenous tribal system. Communalism implied that morality consisted in what to do or to avoid in order to maintain harmony and wellbeing in social relations, not just of humans but of all the other forces that inhabit

the environment. That is, in indigenous Africa “there is intrinsic order of things which is the essential condition for the integrity of being. Hence in the indigenous African society there (was) no purely personal morality.”⁵ Consequently, “in all African societies during the early epoch, the individual at every stage of life had series of duties and obligations to others in the society as well as rights: namely, things that he or she could expect or demand from other individuals.”⁶ Traditional African religion was the source of indigenous morality and also the basis of the communal humanist cohesion and relationship. God was the law giver and the moral codes deriving from the divine, held all members of the society together in communion, as members of a family. As such, “the African world is primarily a religious one in which any social organization or activity is given a strong religious interpretation and meaning.”⁷ This implies that the elaborate religious life style of the traditional society translated to an advanced traditional political structure, since indigenous priests also doubled as political leaders. Although communalism was widely common, there was obvious social stratification, which is one of the defining features of an emerging political structure. “Social stratification...went hand in hand with the rise of the state. The notion of royal lineages and commoner clans could not have any meaning except in a political state”⁸ Naturally, increased population, invention of new tools, division of labour and higher production and material appropriation, meant that some groups acquired more than others, hence assumed leadership and decision making roles over others. On another hand, the existence of various age grades, secret cults and castes necessitated well defined social norms, enforcement of laws and compliance to laws. These maintained uniform orderly relationship among the different families, social structures and in the means of subsistence. They equally accounted for well-organized military presence in the communities; territorial security lay behind the rise of indigenous African states like Sudan, Songhai, Mali, Kanem-Bornu, Benin and Oyo empires. But, the relations of the different strata in indigenous Africa was unique, as there were hardly secessionist antagonism associated with stratification in contemporary African states. Consequently, traditional Africa, based on this pattern of

existence, showed considerable overall social harmony and progress before the first White men arrived on the shores of the continent.

Scholars believe that it is the Western incursion into African continent that precipitated the effective disruption and distortion of its humane perception of life, uniform harmonious social existence and relations. This is the intention in Rodney's position that, "when two societies of different sort come into prolonged and effective contact, the rate and character of change taking place in both is seriously affected to the extent that entirely new patterns are created."⁹ Therefore, the patterns created in the African case has been detrimental to her overall social evolution and progress ever since; contemporary states in Africa, as noted, are exact cases of political upheaval and social disintegration. The first stage of this distortion came from the relegation of everything African to the background as primitive and uncivilized. This instilled perennial doubt in the African, of his/her erstwhile consciousness, values and social state. This translated to the gradual acceptance of the inferiority of his/her person, by the African, compared to the White man. The force of this incarnation, both in its material and epistemological instances, signaled the obliteration of the humanity of the African. C.B. Okolo alludes to this thus:

The fact is that conquest of Africa through colonialism and slavery also laid the continent bare to the outside world and seriously began to loosen the bonds which tied the African to his old world, its culture, traditional values, myths and legends.¹⁰

This equally prompts Egbeke Ajah's assertion that;

this delusionary metaphysical belief, that is, to be was to be like the other, and to be like the other was to act, dress and talk like the other, also provided the evidence-in the material instantiations and inculcation in the consciousness of the colonized-for its own veracity.¹¹

Slavery was the physical manifestation of the European racial stance in Africa, since its intention was that the harsh work situation in America was exclusively for sub-

humans, the black race. Though this signaled the obliteration of the African, but the manner in which this was done drew more blood from the already dying traditional system. By dumping of various attractive European consumer goods onto the waiting laps of the indigenous elites, Europeans easily disposed them towards autocratic disposition, tribal wars and raids which exacerbated tribal antagonism on the continent. In other words, “a chain reaction was started by European demand for slaves (and only slaves) and by their offer of consumer goods—this process being connected with divisions within African societies.”¹² The sheer quality of these consumer goods, excited the appetites of the indigenous African leaders to the extent that they instituted social domination and exploitation, even within their immediate communities; subsequently, deepening fratricidal quarrels within the kinship system. This announced the demise of the traditional humanism as the question of the initial brotherly trust, social integration and inter-communal cooperation degenerated into conflicts in the modern societies thereafter. Slavery ushered in colonialism as both shared the same basis, racial denigration. Colonialism deepened the balkanization already introduced through slavery, while, at the same time, consolidating racism. Colonialism is explained by “the simple fact that no people can enslave another for centuries without coming out with a notion of superiority, and when the colour and other physical traits of these peoples were quite different, it was inevitable that the prejudice should take a racist form.”¹³ Consequently, it was convenient for the Europeans to explain their continued presence in Africa, this time, as part of elevating the African to human status. Showing the effect of this change in strategy on the Igbo of Nigeria, Ajah observes:

With European colonization of the African continent, western systems of education, religion, science and technology were introduced among the Igbo. Material and cultural conditions of self-aggrandizing and metaphysical delusion were institutionalized and incarnated in the consciousness of the Igbo.¹⁴

Also, Okolo believes that “education and Christianity, integral parts of modern civilization, brought their own strong influences to bear on the African, causing important transformations in his values and world views.”¹⁵ The argument here is, therefore, that before vacating the continent, the Whiteman ushered in an African, who in every respect, is confused about his person, his social values and political constitution. This has translated to the fact that the African continues to grapple with the reality of his new political constitution without successfully coming to terms with it. Even the introduction of political parties as substitutes to tribal co-existence and as a platform to define relationship on a wider social setting did not yield the desired effect. Instead, independent Africa has collapsed into conflict and secessionist agitations. The idea is that the Blackman is in contention for the vacancy left behind by the Whiteman. This for Frantz Fanon implies that “the native is an envious man; he envies the position of the settler and would at the slightest opportunity want to occupy the settler’s place”.¹⁶

No doubt, “the struggle for independence in Africa could not have been possible without the African affirmation of the self as a social and cultural being.”¹⁷ Ramose calls this self defence. According to him, “self defence is a natural, perhaps even an instinctive reaction of all living organisms confronted with imminent injury”.¹⁸ Though this is true, the Blackman’s success in this regard is seriously challenged by basic supposition of the problems of tribal antagonism and secessionist conflicts, crisis of national integration and identification, which ultimately depict his inability to truly define himself politically, fueling the question of his existence and identity as a being in the world. Foremost African leaders and nationalists had generated ideologies like Consciencism, Ujamaa, Welfarism, and Humanism to reflect their perception of the ideal political position for the continent, yet, these have done just little to assuage the political predicament on the continent. In fact, some of these ideals have added to exacerbate rather than cure the political dilemma of the Blackman. That is;

Some of the aspirations of Africa's pioneer nationalists have met with relative success but newer problems have emerged in their place or old ones have come back forcefully in new dressings. This greatly undermines any achievement that could have been made.¹⁹

The fact that Africa records high rate of socio-economic backwardness, political maladministration and instability, poverty, internal antagonism and conflicts, culminating in the inability of individuals to identify with their national aspirations, buttress this position. Consequently, a review of the political situation on the continent is imperative. This would properly happen in the light of an ideal; "a sound philosophical grounding for the African political landscape today is urgent as it is necessary."²⁰ This to be successful, has to be "both responsible and responsive; listening to the needs of the African people, and taking a guiding role in the way politics conscious of the African individual, in particular, and the human person, in general should be conducted"²¹. In other words, a re-evaluation of the basic philosophies on which most modern African states operate is called for. The supposition, therefore, is that the value and practice of popular government, the presumed widely accepted form of government in contemporary Africa, needs adequate critical tinkering.

1.2 Statement of Problem

There is in contemporary Africa increasing incidences of tribal agitation, ethnic confrontations and other unpatriotic acts, reminiscent of the failure to properly transit to matured nationhood. This subsists in spite of the fact that it has been decades since European presence was withdrawn from the continent; there has been sustained effort to blame all the travails of the Blackman on the Whiteman. However, the present failure of the African to truly assert his/her socio-political status quo depicts a nagging inability to come to terms with an essential part of his/her heritage-the state. The African finds it hard to identify with this new political reality, as is apparent in how difficult it is for him to exhibit patriotic sentiments towards the state. As a result, the question of national identification and consciousness has come to assume, almost, an

insuperable stance in contemporary African political discuss. This gave basis for the thriving of post independent Reconstructionist ideologies in post-independent Africa. Kenneth Kaunda used humanism to designate this current in post independent Zambia. He tried to show how this could be realized locally in form of Zambian nationalism or patriotic spirit, at the level in which every Zambian lived, and in form of African unity or states cooperation, at the level of the Continent. That is, he intended humanism to serve as basis and guide for national integration, and enhanced regional interaction or action at the continental level, that is, in social, economic and political spheres. However, the massive agitation that ushered the ouster of Kaunda and, as history recorded, that Zambia witnessed its worst economic downturn under his administration, raises much concern about the success of his humanist philosophy and aspiration. Consequently, one wonders why Zambian humanism failed to consolidate his leadership or, at least, achieve practical significance, especially, in economic respect for Zambians. Equally, there is the question of to what extent Zambian humanism contributed to the emergence of authentic African person.

No doubt, African scholarship has contributed seriously to the charge of necessitating the emergence of the African person via charting paths to African socio-political emancipation; that is, enabling the thriving of African states. The essence of negritude and other such theories that emphasize the values of the African person, in this regard, cannot be over-emphasized. However, the attainment of statehood throws up another basic problem, that is, the problem of how to rule? On this basis, some of the theories of negritude have not been forthright, or at best had constituted grounds for dictatorship, repression, right abuses and overall political failure on the continent. Consequently, are these themes still relevant today? Is it still possible for the themes of African personality, African unity, African socialism, African consciencism, African humanism and authenticity to cultivate an environment conducive for African social progress today? Also, there are instances of demand by groups within different

states in Africa, for political self-determination, on a purely national or ethnic line rather than remain parts of the larger political units which the colonial masters had, ab initio, constituted. The basis of this is seen in the state's failure to guarantee proper conditions for the securement of rights and privileges by the individuals and groups. This has raised the level of ethnic sentiments and antagonism while decreasing emphasis on national integration and patriotism. As such, there arises the need to further subject the prevalent political option in Africa to critical review; hence determine how the seeming thorny obstacle to national integration and consciousness on the continent could be resolved. It is of utmost importance to explore the positions of citizens' access to democratic rights in African states, seeing that most part of the continent are sworn democracies. This could help reduce the rise in antagonism and conflict in contemporary Africa, which seem to possess mostly ethnic basis and definitions. The tendency of leadership to assume strong unitary control does little to this regard; it would only breed totalitarianism, which is inimical to the emergence of viable Africa.

1.3 Purpose of Study

The purpose of the study is to appraise Kenneth Kaunda's idea of humanism as it concerns achieving a viable state in Africa. To do this, the study brings out, in the first place, that the political life of African societies was primarily altered by western incursion into the continent; by this different indigenous tribes were forced to co-exist and forge a common national identity without any consideration of their interests. This initial step put African politics and independent states at the cross-roads by making the African conscious of his tribal inclinations, hence, causing tribal allegiances to superimpose over civic responsibility and collective wellbeing. Therefore, it is colonial impacts in Africa that laid the initial basis of why it is difficult to properly transit to modern statehood in Africa. Secondly, the study posits that it is to counteract this colonial position that Kaunda introduced a form of revolutionary humanism to purge Zambians of the experiences of the apartheid leadership, initiate national integration

and achieve a viable African state. But, while on a theoretical level, his ideals tend to showcase unique African experience, on a practical level of state realization and administration, it failed to engender the same, hence initiate individuals' commitment to the state. It rather instituted a replica of the erstwhile colonial usurpation of power and suppression of dissent, whose sole intent was the enthronement of elitism and class control rather than distribution of welfare. As a result, the study depicts that this failure portends a lack of understanding or the inability of the Blackman to grapple with the dynamics of the state institution in the continent. Leadership and state administration in Africa are reflections of the mounting difficulty the African experiences as he tries to acquiesce himself with the most significant legacy of his colonial experience. Thirdly, the study showcases that the growing antagonism and tribal clashes witnessed in different African states reflect the level of comfort the individual finds in the ethnic groupings rather than in identifying with the larger state organization. The fact is, though most African states seem to have favoured democratic governance since the dawn of independence on the continent, yet, the political culture of these states reflect so little or nothing close to this ideal. Most scholars agree that the political culture of Africa is best called a pseudo democracy; this is because African states fancy fascist authoritarian control garbed in democratic apparel. Consequently, social disorder, political upheaval, citizens' agitation and state failure are common place in African political life. Politics in Africa needs to liberalize power, pursue citizens' interests and rights, and general social welfare before states on the continent would be viable.

1.4 Scope of Study

The study focuses on nationalism in Africa, hence, it falls within the field of socio-political philosophy. It tries to capture western politics in Africa which contributed and constituted part of the deplorable condition of contemporary African politics, the African strive to free herself from this interminable web of degeneration, and the role that philosophy could play in proffering solution to governance in Africa.

Consequently, it is, properly, African philosophy. Kenneth Kaunda's conception and implementation of humanism in post independent Zambia is taken as the primary focus and start-off point; the study presents the colonial activities in Northern Rhodesia leading-up to its independence and evolution into a Zambian state, its post-colonial socio-economic reconstitution and governance, social progress and lapses. To properly capture his arguments, Zambian Humanism is considered and classified in the same parlance as other efforts at discovering a true social and political identity for post-colonial African. True statehood and viable political process still remain problematic in contemporary Africa; hence, philosophical excursus is undertaken to reveal the true meaning of nationalism, its implications and purpose. This is to properly situate the study within the philosophical discipline and as well, reveal the necessity of philosophical underpinning for proper leadership, social ideology and the overall social progress of any people. The study analyzes from the traditional communal life style until the African contact with western colonialism and apartheid. The impact of European culture on the indigenous African which translated to the present African political constitution-the state, is critically considered in line with Kaunda's perceptions, and viable options sought to build an African political identity that is true and is, also, at par with the contemporary political reality. Kaunda's idea of one-party government and fascist leadership depict growing African misunderstanding of the essence of state powers. Authentic contemporary African state of affairs ought not adopt nor reflect this. It should, rather incorporate proper features of popular government which the independent states in Africa had overwhelmingly embraced and purport to practice till date.

1.5 Significance of Study

The study is significant in a number of ways, and to a number of people. To the political scientist, it is an analysis of state organization and governance, particularly, the African experience. No amount of this can be said to be enough considering the interminable political crisis which contemporary Africa seems to be mired in. In

epistemology, it is a presentation of African social circumstance, consciousness and personality. Western philosophy has sustained, for a long time, doubts to the reality of this; however, this adds to postulate, not only its reality, but its important addition to the whole gamut of knowledge, as such. The study also benefits social thinkers and historians. This is as it relates particular African social situation, and the colonial invasion and activities that culminated in the evolution of African continent into a number of independent states; that is, apartheid policies in Northern Rhodesia is relayed as a guide to understanding the form of social relations that precipitated increased nationalists' activities in what has become independent states in contemporary African continent. Of most importance is that this ought to be understood against the background of western question on the African initiated by western scholarship, prompting the need for the African to assert himself, as a mark of his existence, and in defence of his Africanness. Twentieth century witnessed intense rise in nationalists' activities and ideologies on the continent as a sign of this response; many other literatures have since been written either to accentuate these views or to open other areas that they failed to adequately address. The epistemological demand on the African and the social effects of colonial/apartheid era provide basis for a more sincere critical assessment of the African socio-political values and structure (no amount of this can be sufficient), not just by Africans but equally, by non-Africans. Therefore, if the scholar is African, he is given a foundation on which to assess and comprehend the present social situation and relations within the continent, hence proffer ideals that would necessitate the best situation that suits the African person as part of humanity. And for the foreigner who is interested in African social issues, he would be able to acquaint himself with, and take clearer position on the indigenous social circumstances leading up to the colonial era, without prejudice. His understanding of the western role in the destabilization of social life on African continent would humble him into accepting part of the blame for the social woes of the Blackman, instead of limiting himself only to fierce criticisms. Colonialism represents an indiscriminate balkanization of African continent just to satisfy European

nationalism and ego; historical facts ought to reflect this position clearly, and more often. The most crucial significance of the study is its moral appeal for social reconstruction and good governance. The advent of statehood in Africa is riddled with antagonism and conflicts occasioned by political anomaly, insincerity and failure. That is, contemporary African political problems rest majorly on the irresponsibility and recklessness of leadership and governance on the continent; hence, the study points out the necessity for a sound theoretical basis to leadership as the foundational stage to retracing the false steps African leaders have taken on the question of governance on the continent. Also, since Africa is trailed by backlog of social degeneration and inability of patriotic spirit to precipitate among the people, the study proposes a leeway to revamping African socio-political life style, and, in that way, align the continent in line the seeming adopted universal political system of mankind. In this respect, the study benefits not just philosophy but, also, politics. The study, also, impacts on sociology and social works. It raises the awareness that the European apartheid policies contributed greatly in initiating the African into a culture of segregation and ethnic cleansing; the complexity of this has intensified in contemporary Africa. Nigerian civil war, Rwandan genocide, Libyan and Egyptian Crisis, and, at the present, the xenophobic attacks against migrant blacks in South Africa, are few instances that portray the African as reclining to the racial seat left by the colonialist. In this regard, too, the study demands that more attention be paid to the issue of racial interaction and its present trend, and that the black man makes a return to the initial communal ideals espoused in concepts like African humanism and *Ubuntu*. Lastly, this study would constitute an addition to other literatures on African political ideals in projecting African peculiar circumstances, challenges and efforts made to reposition African political life to be at par with others in the world. It is hoped that it would provoke further investigation, particularly, into governance in Africa, and democratic governance in general. Consequently, the study is proposed as a guide to all those interested in understanding African cultural personhood and social

circumstances, with the intention of building a viable African political culture that extends beyond the confines of the African continent.

1.6 Methodology

The method of our study is hermeneutic. Etymologically, hermeneutics derives from the Greek verb, '*hermeneuo*', to interpret and the noun '*hermeneus*', translator or interpreter. The term, hermeneutics is itself a Latinized version of the Greek word, '*hermeneutice*'. Richard Palmer presents a view that, "[...] the roots of the word hermeneutics lies in the Greek verb, '*hermeneuein*' generally translated 'to interpret' and the noun '*hermeneia*' meaning interpretation".²² It is probably to reflect these views, which are also incorporated in Greek mythology that Ekei offers a definition of hermeneutic when he asserts that "hermeneutics, from the Greek word, '*Hermes*' implies an interpretative and evaluative philosophy from which inner meaning of cultural symbol is harnessed from its outer meaning".²³ The association of the Greek god, Hermes to hermeneutics derives from his multiple roles as an inventor of speech, interpreter, thief, liar and trickster; hence the unease attached to the messages he delivers, because such messages require further interpretations to derive their exact meanings. This, in other words, implies that words can reveal or conceal truths, and that language consists of signs that could lead to ambiguity. Therefore, the essence of hermeneutics as art of disambiguity; a science or art of interpretation to achieve coherence, consistency and clarity. As a theory of interpretation, it originally applied to the field of the sacred, the divine and their messages, so, was initially regarded and used as scriptural exegesis. However, its modern use goes beyond this mere text or literary interpretation and embraces the understanding and interpretation of both linguistic and non-linguistic expressions: history, myths, fables, symbols, and other cultural expressions of people; semiotics, presuppositions and pre-understanding. The intention here is that humans are susceptible to error in judgment due to cultural influences, hence;

Hermeneutics therefore is a principle of interpretation of our sources of prejudice. It is a principle of proper

investigation which imposes on man the obligation to always examine his inherited prejudice, belief, tradition and custom. Since the sources of certain prejudice that accompany our judgments and statements are prone to error, they need constant hermeneutical scrutiny and critical evaluations.²⁴

Implicit in this position is that hermeneutics is a method of approach to reality and as well a way of being. It specifically emerged as a theory of human understanding, beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey, which gave basis to the interpretation of the existential conditions of man's being in the world in Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The last two scholars insisting on hermeneutics as a direct, non-mediated understanding of being, and not just a way of acquiring knowledge. In other words, "hermeneutics is not only about symbolic communications. Its area is even more fundamental: that of human life and existence as such".²⁵ It is in this form that hermeneutics as such has provided critical horizon for many of the discussions in contemporary philosophy; the reason we employ it in this study.

Since philosophy questions and thereby, tries to understand the issues surrounding existence, one could rightly argue that philosophy is hermeneutics. However, such existential understanding is context dependent and culture bound, giving this method a phenomenological outlook. "This is what a renowned philosopher of hermeneutics, Hans Georg Gadamer expresses when he draws our attention that '*nobody speaks from nowhere*'. To speak therefore is to express one's point of view, somehow tinted by certain prejudice of tradition, experience, authority, belief, orientation, culture et.c".²⁶ It is from this basis that prominent African philosophers had argued for hermeneutics as the condition for the possibility of African philosophy. Hermeneutics, therefore, insists on uncompromising interpretation, description and evaluation of the African cultural data before we can arrive at what we can properly call philosophical. In other

words, it implies seasoned clarification of meaning and description of the life experiences of the African people: religious, moral, social, economic and political aspects of life. As it is, majority of Africa witnesses politico-existential crisis at the moment, which raises concerns and calls for continual discussion of contemporary African polity; hence, hermeneutics is adopted for the clarification of the political stance and ideological conceptions within the continent. To reflect this intention, the study is presented in Six Chapters. Chapter One is the general introduction. This comprises the background of the study, statement of problem, purpose of study, scope of study, significance of study, methodology and definition of terms operational in the work. Chapter Two is the review of the concept, humanism as presented by Kenneth Kaunda as a national ideology for Zambia by relevant literatures. Chapter Three is an investigation and analysis of the pre and post independent social circumstances that led to the introduction of humanism as a guide in Zambia's national life. This includes, presentation of the person of Kenneth Kaunda and his personal ideology and beliefs that precipitated as Zambian humanism. This analysis is a leeway to understanding the social circumstances on the continent within the periods before and after independence from colonialism and the introduction of social ideologies to guide the entire continent toward total decolonization. Chapter Four takes a critical survey of the concept of nationalism. Our intention is to determine the philosophical basis and relevance of the state in general, and, in doing so, properly define the relationship that ought to exist between the state and the individual in the society. This would properly situate the study within the context of political philosophy, as Kaunda intended Zambian humanism as answer to this perennial social question in philosophy. We hope to unravel the root to the growth of patriotism or its lack in a state. Chapter Five traces and analyzes the basis of antagonism in contemporary African political life. It reveals why national or civic spirit hardly exists in the present political structure on the continent, consequently, strive to nationalism in Africa seems to dissolve into interminable conflicts. The relevance of the chapter lies in the effort to build authentic nationalism based on a known indigenous ideal. Chapter Six takes a critical appraisal of

the study to determine how far its purpose is achieved. A critical review of contemporary socio-political situation on the continent in the light of determined democratic values is initiated to properly position Africa on the path of the political form she seems to have warmly accepted. The political trends in different independent African states reflect complete deviation from the basic principles of democracy, which serve as measuring parameters of any or would be democratic government. Hence, the study joins in the on-going demand for the re-evaluation of leadership in Africa as a way to revamp her political terrain, thus, cultivate greater allegiance to the state through enhanced individual's accessibility to civic rights.

1.7 Definition of Terms

For clarity and better understanding of the study, we consider it necessary to attempt definition and analysis of some basic terms, especially as they are operational in this study. This corroborates Wittgenstein's position that words picture reality, so to understand reality is to understand words that represents it. Equally, this is necessary as these terms underscore the basis to the study; hence, emphasizing as Gadamer observes that no one speaks from nowhere. This, put in another form, shows that the background is very significant to the evolving of the foreground. Consequently, the study defines the following terms: humanism, state, fascism, apartheid and nonviolence.

1.7.1 Humanism

The word humanism derives from the Latin *humanitas* meaning human nature, civilization and kindness. *Humanitas* corresponds directly with the Greek concepts *philanthropia* which is a friendly feeling towards other men, and *peideia* which translates as love for or training in the liberal arts. For this reason, humanism right from onset has been used in two senses; benevolence towards one's fellow human and the values imparted by good literatures (*bonae litterae*) or human learning. However, the use of the term at a time tended to equate humanism with philanthropy alone, relegating its reference to literature or arts. Hence, in the Fifteenth Century

Renaissance, the Italian term *umanista*, which stands for a teacher or student of classic literature, was coined to re-emphasize the importance of the liberal arts in positing the higher place of man among other animals in the world. Within this time in Italy, teachers and scholars of philosophy, poetry and rhetoric were called, and they equally regarded themselves as humanists. But whichever the use, what is obvious is that humanism is a life stance, an attitude or idea that espouses the value and agency of humans: individually and collectively. “It is a broad category of ethical, metaphysical, epistemological, (religious) and political philosophies in which human interests, values and dignity predominate”.²⁷ humanism underscores ultimate faith in humankind and belief that human beings possess the power or potentiality of solving their own problems, through reliance upon reason and scientific method applied with courage and vision. In other words, humanists prefer approaches to knowledge based on scientific evidence (sensory experience) and critical thinking rather than basing it on dogma and superstition. This is to signal complete breakaway from earlier reliance of scholarship on the supernatural to explain all aspects of being; a reason skepticism forms an integral part of humanism, since based on its use of the scientific method all knowledge or policies whether scientific, moral or social are tentative. Frank Edwards represents the common acceptance of humanists thus: “we recognize that the tools for testing knowledge-the human senses and human reason-are fallible, thus rendering tentative all our knowledge and scientific conclusions about the nature of the world”.²⁸ This other words implies that there are no absolute norms of life or of the society. Decisions and policies are formulated based on how they affect human lives, individually and collectively at a time. Frank Edwards elaborates more:

We maintain that human values make sense only in the context of human life. We ground our ethical decisions and ideals in human needs and concerns as opposed to the alleged needs and concerns of supposed deities or other transcendent entities or powers. We measure the value of a given choice by how it affects human life, and in this we include our individual selves, our families, our

society and the peoples of the earth. This human perspective limits us to human ways of comprehending the world and to human drives and aspirations as motive force.²⁹

This shows why modern humanist ideologies and movements are more or less forms of secularism; a non-theistic life stance because the divine is given least consideration, if at all. This is obvious in Frank Edward who, again, writes; “and, indeed, most humanists are non-theistic, have a non-absolutist approach to ethics, support death with dignity, and value global thinking”.³⁰ But this is not to imply that the secularist’s position entirely pervades humanism. Rather, humanism forms a component of any philosophical system or ideology that emphasizes human flourishing, goodness and establishment of a better world for the future generation, theistic and non-theistic alike. To this regard, the study would term humanist, any ideology aimed at finding the purpose and meaning in life and existence of any people in question. Bearing this in mind, one could talk of cultural, religious, ethical, political, educational and secular humanism, in as much as these are structures that emphasize the primacy or essence of humans in the world. In philosophy, there is no consensus on the particular epoch in which humanism could be said to have begun; “the first noticeable humanist is said to be the 5th century B.C figure, Protagoras, who asserted that “man is the measure of all things”. Socrates, the ancient Greek philosopher who suggests “man know thyself” is yet another. However, some scholars are of the view that humanism commenced only with the Renaissance in its bid to locate the proper status of the human person in the universe”.³¹ Though this, the fact is that the history of thought maintains consistent internal logic, so that even the renaissance humanism traces back to the Greek philosophers. The central emphasis of philosophers, right from the Greek period has been that humans ought to assume central position as players in the game of life and in determining the affairs of the world. Consequently, the human person is called upon to make the best of life in this world, take delight in earthly achievements and build a better life here on earth at the present and for the future, relying solely on his potentials. This shows that the humanist positions are responses to the human perennial

need for self-importance in the world and, to find clear and definite answers to the problems and challenges of his life in the universe.

African humanism in line with general humanist conception has the good of human being or the African as its central focus. But unlike the atheist position commonly associated with general secularist humanism, African humanism intertwine with the traditional African religion. This is because religion is central to the African understanding of his/her world, which is why he/she has been variously described by scholars as incurably religious. However, at the center of the traditional religious practices is man, through whom the supernatural is perceived. Hence, African religion is principally anthropocentric. That is, even “God is said to exist for the sake of man”³² and the relevance of the spiritual or divine depends on how they affect human lives. Man is not seen as an individual but in a community. “The community makes the individual. An African worth or identity among the people depends on where the community places him/her.”³³ This is the root of the concept, *Ubuntu*, which literally translates as I am what I am because of who we all are; an idea that underlies African philosophy of existence. But this is not the same as the idea of collectivism implicit in Western Communism. Rather as Okolo observes, “in African philosophy, self is not completely dissolved into an object”.³⁴ And as C. Nze also adds; “the individual is free even though his will is determined by his community. As a member of the whole, he enjoys that amount of freedom which derives from the collectivity”³⁵; but, as an individual, he is defined by particular circumstances that surround his life. This idea, equally, opposes Capitalism, which encourages individualism, unnecessary competitions and exploitative tendencies. “It is an attempt to recapture and modernize the community’s way of life practiced by the traditional African before his exposure to the world and values of the white man”.³⁶ African humanism, therefore, considers the value, interest and good of man individually, and, more important, collectively. The African is most concerned with the happiness of others and catering for common

good, and this is done in such a manner that its impact extends to the entire humanity. In other words, the relational philosophy of the African depicts the fact that humanism transcends race, linguistic group or creed. That is why Azenabor argues that, “it repudiates discrimination and reaffirms the spirit of cosmopolitanism, the spirit of international friendship, brotherhood and compassionate concern for fellow human beings throughout the globe”.³⁷ The evolution of African humanism is tied to the exploitative and dehumanizing historical experiences of the African, and the debilitating effects these have on the progress of the entire continent. Consequently for Njoku “African statesmen conceived that theoretical discourse has some practical implication for the rehabilitation of Africa; hence the founding of discourse on ‘African Identity’. Discourse on African identity and *negritude* led up to the basis for advocates of African (humanism)”.³⁸ That is, African humanism was conceived “based on the perceived need for liberation, freedom, independence, rebirth, emancipation, enlightenment and intellectual awakening on African personality and identity”.³⁹ This is the reason, according to Makumba, why African ideologues found it convenient to adapt their humanist ideologies to the Marxist spirit; though they entirely reject Marx’s materialism, atheism and determinism. African humanism “has certain basic common characteristics by which it is identified. Its three fundamental themes are: the problem of continental identity; the crisis of economic development; and the dilemmas of control and class formation”.⁴⁰ Consequently, it includes all the ideologies that treat themes, contexts, experiences, history, and challenges of Africa along with their social, cultural, political, economic and physical wellbeing. Discussions and debates on these have continued to evolve beginning from the nationalist epoch and gaining much momentum at the present. African scholars have variously used the concept Pan-Africanism, *Negritude*, *Ujamaa* Socialism, Welfarism, African Socialism, African Personhood or Personality etc., to depict this position.

1.7.2 State

The word, state in modern English has varied meaning and uses:

It refers to the physical condition of a thing, place or a person at a specific time; it shows an individual's social status, estate or way of living; it explains an entity that is politically organized under a government within a specific geographical area; it implies the concerns or process of government in a country; and as a verb, it is used to express or depict something formally either in speech or writing.⁴¹

The study accepts and reflects all these meaning and implications of the word. Etymologically, the word state is from the Latin, *status* meaning social condition, status or way of living; this derives from the root word, *sto, stare* which is the Latin verb, to stand. Other Latin derivatives of the word, *civitas* and *res publica* are used to depict the legal commitment of individuals to the society and idea of social organization or public affairs. These ideas equally reflect in the French cognate, *estat* or *etat*, which is used to designate estate and the fact that the power to legislate is vested on those who have social status or estates. In fact, the English word, state, is a direct contraction of the word estate. Therefore, obvious from its etymology is that the word, state has two basic references; a form of organized political unit or association and a mode of being or existence.

There are varied theories by scholars concerning the existence of state as a political unit. The lack of consensus is because of variance in perception of the origin and function of the state. Irrespective of this, there is agreement that state is composed of these features outlined in *The Substance of Politics* by Appadorai; “a definite territory, population, a government and sovereignty”.⁴² To this would be added the pursuance of common good, because Appadorai equally opines that “the state exists to promote social good on the largest possible scale”.⁴³ Therefore, state can be commonly seen as a political organization with a government that maintains a legitimate use of power within a certain defined territory towards the realization of common good. This definition distinguishes state from such social relations like the tribe which is marked

exclusively by kinship or family relationship and social institution like government, which is just a machinery of the state, for political legislation. Okolo posits that a tribe is usually united by language, custom, ideals and common ancestry, “consequently life at a tribal level falls short of an ideal life for man or is rather an incomplete state in the growth process of man’s socio-political development”.⁴⁴ This accentuates Aristotle’s position that it is only in the state that man can achieve full self-realization and satisfy his needs as an incarnate spirit. The existence of government in the state depicts the fact that “certain institutions in the society are regarded as legitimate exercisers of the authority to make decisions for the community as a whole”.⁴⁵ The latest statement shows the position of the state with respect to Society. The state is just a political arm or an aspect of Society; Society, as such, contains other complex networks of relationship outside the state. Appadorai exposes this more:

The state is one of the social groups, a society, not Society. It is the most important group, but still not identical with Society. There are many groups in Society like the family, the caste, the church and the trade union which do influence social life, but which owe neither their origin nor their inspiration to the state. Again, there are social forces like custom, imitation and competition which the state may protect or modify but certainly does not create; and social motives like friendship or jealousy which establish relationships too intimate and personal to be controlled by the great engine of the state.⁴⁶

Based on this, the state is an instrument of Society for social organization and regulation. And the absence of which it would be in doubt if a genuine political community really exists in such area. The presence of the state, as such, reveals the non-political aspect of Society; the area of an individual’s private life, expression and interaction, which should be immune from unnecessary state interference. Otherwise, as Appadorai, also, posits, “to equate state with Society would justify state interference in all aspect of the life of the individual. That may lead to over government, a totalitarian view of the state, and the consequent tyranny of state

control”.⁴⁷Invariably, this would negate the essence of the state, which is to promote conditions that enhance individual’s freedom and general social wellbeing. It is this situation that puts Rousseau’s General Will and Hegel’s Absolutism under question marks. For, the state to enthrone good life and good life alone, its existence and operation should take into consideration the attainment of general good, as well as the individual’s self-realization and freedom. It is seen from this position that it would be understood that, “statehood not only represents a body of institutions, but also a set of attitudes that we associate with civilization”.⁴⁸

On another hand, state seen as a mode of being or existence, depicts self-consciousness of self and existence. These constitute the principle of identity; the idea that “every being (or body) is determined in itself, is one with itself and is consistent in itself”.⁴⁹State as identity literally translates as sameness in all that constitute the objective reality of a thing or a being. It connotes uniqueness, individuality and distinction in things or among people; distinctive characteristics of any individual or shared by members of a particular social category or group. Tagbo Ugwu understands that it is “unity and persistence of personality or individual comprehensiveness of life or character”.⁵⁰In this regard then, state describes how one construes one’s self model and which in turn influences others perception of this model. Consequently, questions like who am I or who is a person, are addressed by the concept of state; since these border on peculiar attributes, ideals, values and beliefs which differentiate such persons or people from others. An aspect of this is the fact that one cannot attain full and proper self-consciousness and perception independent of a context or an environment; the same applies to the other, who is interested in understanding the subject. This is the social state or condition or environment. Erik Erikson conceptualizes social condition or state as resulting from a dynamic interplay between the individual and environment; this implies that, “the environment in which a child grows in plays a significant role in providing support and identity”.⁵¹Consequently,

One's mode of being, that by which he or she is said to be distinct from another, can only be properly seen from the cultural and social perspectives. Culturally, social state is the feeling of belonging to, as part of self-conception and self-perception, to a nationality, ethnicity, religion, social class, generation, locality and any kind of social group that have its own distinct culture. This is such that social condition is both an essential feature of the individual's life and also that of the group that has its members sharing the same cultural identity. This comes about through one's solidarity with the cultural ideals, values and beliefs of one's environment to the extent that these begin to manifest in such individual's attitude, beliefs and behaviours. Also, the perceived group, its mores, set ideals, labels and conventions to which the individual identifies, forms his or her social state. These assign social roles, responsibilities and rights that properly set out the individual's mode of being, identity or social existence. Seen from this perspective, state describes nationalist affiliations; and it is this sense of affiliation that is, and which gives rise to sense of nationalism.

1.7.3 Apartheid

Apartheid is an Afrikaans word that translates as separateness, apartness or apartheid. It literally means "the state of being separate or apart".⁵² Apartheid is a social system of separateness or segregation developed and enforced, mostly in South Africa, by the Afrikaner regime that ruled the country from 1948 to 1994. This ideology and programme of action was built from the idea that every race is distinct and has its separate destiny laid down for it by God. Consequently, each people have unique culture and development path which run parallel to each other. The implication then, is that racial paths do not meet (and should never meet), as this would interfere with the original plan instituted by God. Arising from this, is a common belief among the Afrikaners, of unequal level of development among races, a reason they maintained

that they have separate higher evolution than the other races in South Africa. C.B. Okolo notes that from this emanated “the principle of master-servant relationship under girding the policy and philosophy of the apartheid system”.⁵³ By implication, the regime evolved and legalized a system of stratification of the entire social life and structures, that were rigidly enforced. So, under apartheid, the rights, associations and movements of the majority black inhabitants and other ethnic groups were curtailed, and minority rule was instituted. Inhabitants were classified into four racial groups: black, white, coloured and Indians, and residential areas were equally segregated in this respect. The blacks, mostly, were denied political representation and citizenship; they were only recognized as citizens of 10 tribally based self-governing homelands called Bantustans. And if they were to enter any white residence for any reason, which were few, they are strictly required to carry passes or identification cards. Also education, Medicare, beaches and other social services were segregated, with bold inscriptions erected in these places to this effect. To properly reflect this ideology, the social services that were made available to the blacks were inferior compared to that of the other races. Okolo gives a detailed explanation of this social situation thus:

Over the years of its official history (since 1948), apartheid has of course meant much more than “a state of remaining apart”. Different forms of agony, injustice, frustration, in short, of man’s inhumanity to man are behind the term. In the South African context, the context of its original creation and practice, apartheid has steadily taken two well-defined meanings for both whites and blacks. For the former, the Afrikaner people, it is essentially a state of “separate but unequal (higher) development” whereas for the Africans and other sub-groups who form majority of the population, the harsh realities and indignities of the system have constituted an unforgettable experience of oppression, perhaps the worst kind of racial injustice known to man.⁵⁴

Apartheid was meant to consolidate the colonialist's policy for Africa; that is, the policy of the inferiority of the black race to the white race. According to Ramose, this policy was founded on the expansion of widely known Aristotelian dictum to read, "man is a rational animal was not spoken of the African, the Amerindians and the Australasians: all the indigenous peoples of their respective countries from time immemorial..."⁵⁵ As such, at the heart of the apartheid regime was enshrined the principles of social, economic and political discrimination, segregation and exploitation on the basis of race. Its aim was to limit the Blackman's social progress, thereby demonstrate the superiority of the white race over the black race. Nowadays, the word is used to describe any system or philosophy that encourages segregation, discrimination and exploitation. It has become an explanation for "a life of privileges and plenty for the one; ignominy and degradation for the other".⁵⁶ Indeed, any attempt to separate humanity in any form, on whatever basis has come to be connoted or perceived to reflect the idea of apartheid or apartheid. Apartheid being a colonial policy was at the basis of the rise of nationalist movement, especially in Southern part of Africa.

1.7.4 Fascism

Fascism is a socio-political movement that thrived in Italy after the First World War. Because of the period and the manner in which it sprang up, Samuel Barrantes believes that it is opportunistic and demagogic. According to him, this is because "it arose after the Great war amidst massive economic and social instability defined by disillusionment with not only the future of Italy but with the state of humanity as a whole".⁵⁷ Sabine and Thorson, also, corroborate this assertion while describing the movement from the personality of Mussolini who championed this movement in post war Italy. Thus:

Their leaders were men with neither the interest nor the aptitude for philosophical construction. Though the beliefs and ideas and prejudices that went into the making of their ideologies had been long in existence, they had never been part of a coherent body of thought. And when they were put together to make a “philosophy”, their combination was largely opportunist. They were chosen with a view to their emotional appeal rather than to their truth or their compatibility, often with a cynical indifference to intellectual honesty.⁵⁸

Fascism developed on the promises of repairing the social and economic devastation occasioned by the war period. In Italy for instance, the war incited a general feeling of defeatism and disillusionment on the citizens, due to the huge financial burden it placed on the nation, and the number of war casualties it suffered. To this regard, in Barrantes’ opinion;

Fascism was an ethos, much more than a political or historical movement. Fascism permeated past, present and future by absorbing politics, society, philosophy and religion, all of this predicated on the promise of satisfying human drives. Indeed, fascist state only existed to the extent that it was believed in, its promises inextricably linked with individual self-actualization.⁵⁹

Consequently, the massive demoralization that followed the First World War easily transformed the fascist movement into a national ideal, making it a cultural cult with very wide appeal. This is why fascism was able to exercise considerable national control, and engender strong unity in the state; that is, it translated to a unitary or collectivist control. This idea of collectivism is implicit in the Latin derivation of the word, *fascis*, which according to Appadorai means a group or cluster. In his exact words, the word “is used of a cluster of plants or branches which grow stronger by being thus bound together”.⁶⁰ As a political theory, it describes a government headed by a dictator, who maintains absolute control over all the social activities, structures and life styles in the state. To achieve this, fascism exalts the state or party authority and interests above the individual needs and freedom; that is, the state or party

determines the good and interests of the individual, and, usually, this do not differ from the good and interests of the state or party as such. By implication, this is “the creation of a State of truly sovereign authority which dominates all the forces in the country and which at the same time is in constant contact with the masses, guiding their sentiments, educating them and looking after their interests”.⁶¹ Another basic feature of fascism is that it is diametrically opposed to pacifism. To the fascist, revolution and war are sure paths to eternal peace: thus, if you want peace, prepare for war. It equally opposes socialism which espouses public ownership and participation in state control. In fascist ideology, the state is supreme and exercises absolute control in all ramification; in other words, it emphasizes limited political participation. In this regard, also, it represses liberalism and political opposition. As such, liberal democracy is alien to the fascist. Appadorai rightly captures the fascist critic of democracy thus:

The majority, simply because it is a majority, has no power to direct human society; the sum of wills is not the same as the general will. The majority is not necessarily more reasonable than the minority. The democratic notion of the equality of man is wrong. Democracy indeed gives power to the masses to decide innumerable issues, about which they cannot possibly have the knowledge required to exercise a sound judgment; the masses are led by clever, unscrupulous demagogues who have the gift of the gab.... Fascism believes in the principle that authority is exercised for the sake of the community, but is not derived from the community. The specific sanction of a government is its power, its ultimate sanction, its reasonableness.⁶²

One is, equally, misled if he thinks that fascist denouncement of democracy implies that it aligns with individualist ideology as such. In fact, fascism does not tolerate the individualist philosophy of the capitalist. It rather insists that, “the conduct of life cannot be left to the individual choice of the people; it must, instead, be determined for them by a power which is above them, and comprehends them, viz. the state.... (Guiding ideal is) ‘all within the State; none outside the State; none against the

State”.⁶³ Therefore, the State or party in power is all there is; hence, fascism is totalitarian.

1.7.5 Non-Violence

Non-violence is an alternative to violence or the use of force. It is a philosophy and plan for social change that rejects the use of physical violence, but rather emphasizes the use of active peaceful means to achieve the desired end. It arises from the bid to provide a platform against the consideration and use of violence in arriving at social and political change. Matt Meyer believes that this is because;

twenty-first century political analysts are increasingly realizing that militarism is a dead end: it has become obvious that the on-going global expansion of the military-industrial complex has not brought us peace and new research on the effectiveness of civil resistance as a way to expel intruders and topple dictatorships has sparked wider interests in the idea of nonviolent statecraft.⁶⁴

Consequently, in advocating peaceful behavior in the midst of conflict, nonviolence embodies love and respect for one's enemies. It recognizes the importance of dialogue and utilizes this in negotiation and problem solving. In other words, nonviolent practice does not aim to destroy the oppressor, but to eliminate oppression and injustice, which it considers obstacles in social relationships. Consequently, Ezeani shows that central to the philosophy of nonviolence is the belief that;

If we wish to achieve just ends, the means we use must also be just. Proponents would argue that it is fundamentally irrational to use violence to achieve a peaceful society. Although absent of physical threat or retaliation, nonviolence is not passive and implies the very opposite of weakness or cowardice. The power of nonviolence lies in patience and self-control motivated by the intention to meet human needs and promote a more just society.⁶⁵

Non-violence was made popular by “the Indian political activist and social reformer, Mohandas Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King jnr”.⁶⁶Gandhi built his theory around the concept, *Satyagraha*, which literally means insistence on truth or holding firmly to love. He uses *Satyagraha* as a method that counters the injustice of the oppressor through the force of truth and sacrificial love. Following this line of thought, Martin Luther elaborates that non-violence is not for cowards, as it does not resist oppression; it seeks not to humiliate the opponent but to win his friendship and understanding; its force is directed against evil of oppression rather than the oppressor; it is a disposition to accept blows from the opponent without striking back; and it avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of the spirit.⁶⁷ Therefore, the power of non-violence lies in endurance, and not returning hatred for hatred. It seeks to enhance the human situation by tackling the evil represented by injustice and social oppression, so as to improve and strengthen relationship. To do this, non-violence employs positive actions such as protests and boycotts as against negative ones embodied in retaliation or use of force. It is in this manner that the study employs this term.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Is Africa ready for independence? When this question was proposed as topic on NBC’s “THE NATION’S FUTURE” debate of April 15th1961, just before Zambian

independence, there were two responses; no, from the colonial representative at the time, and yes, from Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. J. Freire d'Andrade, an attaché to the Portuguese embassy in Washington on behalf of the colonial powers was emphatic in objecting to the granting of independence to African nations at the time. The basis for his objection was, as he argued, that “many countries in Africa are not ready for independence because of the fact that they do not think as we do and have different conception of progress than ourselves”.¹ His response embodies and reflects Western dehumanizing perception of the African, the kind behind Lucien Levy-Bruhl *Primitive Mentalite* and the Hegelian assertion that the African is incapable of transcending self to posit the existence of a Being; “so that the knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting”.² In fact, Mogobe B. Ramose in his work, *African Philosophy through Ubuntu*, captures the basis of the colonialists’ disposition towards the African when he restates Aristotelian belief thus; “man is a rational animal” was not spoken of the African, the Amerindian and the Australasians: all the indigenous peoples of their respective countries from time immemorial....”³ His postulation is that;

Aristotle’s definition of man was deeply inscribed in the social ethos of those communities and societies which undertook the so called voyages of discovery apparently driven by innocent curiosity. But it is well known that either by accident or design these voyages changed into violent colonial incursions. These incursions, unjustifiable under all principles of the theory of the just war, have had consequences which are still with us today.⁴

The basis for the western incursion into the African continent was purely racial and cultural obliteration. Driven by this spirit, it was convenient for them to deny, on one hand, consciousness to the African. Richard A. Wright reports that non-African scholars had “often refused to even consider African thought as potentially philosophical”.⁵ G.T. Basden makes this refusal explicit in his *Among the Ibos of Nigeria*, while asserting that, “the word “morality” has no significance in the Ibo

vocabulary. On the other hand, where the natives have remained untouched by outside influence there is nothing exactly corresponding to the “social evil” of European life”.⁶ This has come to spell out the convenience with which some Western scholars tend to point out Placid Tempel’s *Bantu Philosophy*, as an example of such an attempt to illumine the untutored African mind by benevolent Europeans. This initial denial necessarily graduated into the second; the denial of the humanity of the African. A South African real estate agent, Penny Sparrow succinctly posits this mindset when she postulates thus; “from now, I shall address the blacks of South Africa as monkeys as I see the cute little wild monkeys do the same pick drop and litter”.⁷ D. A. Masolo summarizes the foregoing in these words; “western attitude had started as a mere cultural bias, supported loosely by a racist orthodox biblical ideology. But it gradually grew into a formidable two-pronged historical reality: slavery and slave trade on one hand, and academic expressions on the other”.⁸ We had earlier shown the obviousness of this in the decades of colonial occupation of the continent with its accompanying atrocities and doubts about African philosophy.

But, western policies and operation on Africa elicited its opposite, in terms of the awakening and response on the part of the colonized. Ramose believes that this was natural, as is the act of self defence in all living beings. He succinctly posits that “Self defence is a natural, perhaps even an instinctive reaction of all living organisms confronted with imminent injury. A large segment of humanity accepts that in the name of self defence one human being may injure or even kill another, if killing is the only and necessary option in the circumstance”.⁹ In other words, the African “response to the specific ideological attitude-the western white attitude-that intended to annihilate black culture and civilization”¹⁰ is characteristic of the African in particular and humanity in general. In this way, racialism and colonialism laid the basis for African humanism and social considerations to assume philosophical prominence. It sparked off what scholars have come to call the ‘Rationality Debate’. There was

need for the African to assert his identity and humanity in the face of colonial occupation and denigration of his person; this accounted for the rise in, and abundance of nationalist ideologies and struggles on the continent in the period between late 1950s and 1960s.

In Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia and part of the former Central African Federation, the rationality debate played out in terms of the pre-independence nationalist struggles in which Kenneth Kaunda was prominent, and in the post-independence political ideology, humanism, which he adopted to build an African state free of neo-colonial influences, and to forge patriotism among the citizens. Just as in most parts of the African continent, apartheid in Northern Rhodesia came with strong racial segregation and denial of rights to the blacks who were the majority race at the time, by the minority white population. The situation was made even worse by the British government's superimposition of a federal government upon the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland (which constituted Central African Federation), which gave a large measure of political authority to the white settlers in all the three territories. That is, the formation of the federation gave the settlers better wages, good living and working conditions, and other basic amenities comparable to that of the majority black populace. In the paper, 'Kenneth Kaunda and the Quest for an African Humanist Philosophy', Anthony Kanu elucidates Kaunda's experience of this:

Blacks were not also allowed to eat in the same restaurants with whites. So many times he was thrown out of restaurants and shops because he was black. At the time, the colonial government made little investment in education and medical care. It was so glaring that after the British left, for only less than a 100 indigenous people were graduates.¹¹

The high point of this dehumanizing marginalization was that the blacks were granted very small representation in both the federal and regional legislative councils, and, were overwhelmingly denied franchise during electoral processes. Kaunda described

the situation in one of his petitions against the formation of Central African Federation to the Queen of England. Thus:

We drew attention to the fact that in the referendum conducted in Southern Rhodesia which had declared in favour of Federation, the white population, numbering 128,000, had approximately 49,000 voters on the electoral roll, while the African population of nearly 2,000,000 had 429 voters on the roll. Also, in the legislative councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to whom the question was next referred, there were only two Africans in each council in memberships of 23 and 18 respectively.¹²

Kaunda came to the realization and implication of such discrimination much earlier in life, during his secondary school days, through one of his teachers, Daniel Sonquishe. As such, one easily understands the horror with which he views the inhuman activities of the Apartheid regime in Central African Federation, which according to him was an “insult to my race and my people”.¹³ And the eagerness in his affirmation of the need for African independence during the N.B.C’s debate, in this manner; “I would be very much surprised if anyone in the 20th century could seriously challenge the readiness of Africans to rule themselves in their own countries at this time... It is today a glowing reality, visible to anyone who has eyes to see”.¹⁴ What is obvious from Kaunda’s perception of independence is that he was not just concerned about the dissolution of the Central African Federation and liberation of the then Northern Rhodesia from the white minority rule, but for the decolonization of the entire African continent, and the realization of a situation in which different races of mankind can co-exist on equal basis in the struggle towards nationhood. Hence, he moves towards this realization in his conception of humanism, which he sets out in his correspondence with his friend, Reverend Colin Morris, and which later turned out the book, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris*.

Kenneth Kaunda's conception and adoption of humanism is more on the basis of action than it is an idea. Consequently, what he espoused as humanism is his personal beliefs and guide to political activity which he hoped would lead Zambia to nationhood, if adequately implemented. James R. Scarritt in his review of the aforementioned work elaborates that:

Seldom has there been a book containing the philosophy of a single man which reveals as much about a political system as this one does. Kaunda does not present a full-fledged ideology, but rather a series of excerpts on a wide variety of subjects, most of them eminently practical. The fact that the book was written in this form and that it was written at all provide significant clues to understanding Kenneth Kaunda and his role in the Zambian political system. Kaunda is not primarily a man of ideas, but rather a man of action. Thus it is not surprising to see a book which represents ideology in the process of formation.¹⁵

Therefore, what Kaunda did was to lead his audience towards the understanding and operation of the concept through vivid description of the part he played towards Zambia's independence, and in the shaping of its socio-political situation afterwards. That is, the operation of humanism in his understanding is more or less for political action. Scarritt, again, exposes this; "the content of *A Humanist in Africa* should be understood in the light of the book's function in the Zambian political system".¹⁶ Kaunda, himself, even clarified this position by stating; "I suppose I could be called a humanist, though I have never had the leisure to read the standard works on the subject".¹⁷ Consequently, his adoption of the term was a matter of convenience, and a generalization of his understanding of African ontological status quo. The traditional African world was man centered and life affirming. Kanu Anthony confirms this when he writes that "the choice of this ideology was based on the fact that Africa had always contained much indigenous socialism which the colonialists had tried to destroy, and so the Zambian humanism was an attempt to rescue the pre-colonial values and traditions and to use these as the basis on which to build a modern state".¹⁸ William H.

Crane posits the same view in his own review of the work. According to him, “the 1960s have produced a spate of diatribes against colonialism, some good and some bad, written by African politicians. This book is different, not because it is any less vociferous in its criticism of the colonialist mentality, but because it affirms most positively the human values on the basis of which the new independent African states must build”.¹⁹ Scarritt, equally, accepts that the term depicts the general commitment of the traditional Africa to man-centered values but adds that its use is both more specific and less specific. For him, “it is less specific than African socialism with respect to economic policies but more specific than other terms with respect to emphasis on the individual”.²⁰ This is understandable because Kaunda’s ideas on humanism laid great emphasis on decolonizing the African mind from colonial influences without clear position on how this could translate to a viable state, hence, theoretical humanism failed to properly connect to practical Zambian life. Zambian Humanism was greeted with wide acceptance on inauguration, for its pragmatic African orientation, but ran into confusion in practice, especially on economic development terms. Scarritt brings out this when he posits that the interviews he conducted with the Zambian political elites showed that they shared Kaunda’s pragmatic orientation, though they felt there was necessity for further ideological clarification. This lack of further theoretical basis from which action could be taken, Kanu contends, became significant to why humanism was not strongly rooted among Zambians, hence failed to launch the nation into strong socio-political growth after independence. Kaunda depicts failure to recognize the significance of sound theoretical basis for viable political option, arising probably because of his eagerness to free Zambia of all colonial presence, and, as a result, his humanism created a political pattern which failed to translate to a sound socio-economic growth for independent Zambia.

That Kaunda had more interest in action than in theoretical codification, no doubt, tends to cast doubts on the originality of the theoretical insights expressed as *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris*, and as such, its authorship. In the first place, Kaunda's idea of humanism comprised of series of letters, probably written at different times, to his close friend and confidante, Reverend Colin Morris. As observed by William Crane:

The letters have doubtless been heavily edited and material from numerous letters reorganized under convenient headings, for no busy politician would have the time to produce such faultless and polished prose, whatever his literary gifts. The discerning reader might be put off by the intrusion of a near-perfection of language and neatness of moral categories which more easily befit the preacher than the politician.²¹

This observation, equally, raises another point, the fact that Colin Morris, whom the letters were addressed to, was a white missionary and President of the United Church of Zambia at the time. In other words, it seemingly represents an attempt by a European to represent an African mind-set. This reality stares the work, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris* in the face. However, though the expressions, probably, might have been tampered with, yet the force of the ideas, the vividness of the experience and the consistency of the inherent logic is truly African, and would only have come from one who had first-hand experience of the situation in question. Even Crane, after all, acknowledges that the inherent convictions in the work were authentic Kaunda. Still, the mentioning of Colin Morris introduces us to his vision and assessment of Kenneth Kaunda, having been his close friend and associate throughout the period spanning the pre-independence struggles and continuing long into his presidency of the new state of Zambia.

Colin Morris understands Kaunda as a nationalist, whose vision and ideology for an emergent African nation played out through his life drama, and could only be glimpsed

from reviewing his life's story. Hence, one could rightly say that Morris wholeheartedly accepts Kaunda's proclamation of himself a humanist, even before attempting to ascertain the implication of what Kaunda construes as humanism as such. Take this open declaration for instance; "I am an admirer, quite unashamed and not a little sentimental, of Kenneth Kaunda. And if this brief assessment of him smacks of sycophancy then I can only claim that what some may regard as immoderate praise I would term accurate description".²² This admiration for the man is quite understandable, especially, when one understands as he further observes, that Kaunda held both his destiny and that of many in his hand at the time. One, therefore, would not be surprised that he, from the onset, delves into the description of Kaunda's rigid attachment to personal principles which later evolved into Zambian humanism. Morris avows the sincerity of Kaunda's beliefs, and the rigid discipline with which Kaunda applied these beliefs to action by dubbing Kaunda, a nationalist with outstanding morality. This implies then, that he perceives Zambian humanism as a moral ideology channeled towards a morally justified course. As he emphatically observes:

There is a distressing tendency in the modern world for a public personality to get less than his due from friends because they are afraid of being called toadies. It is often left to those who know him least to assess his quality. But it seems to me that where one is in a position to testify to the goodness of a man whose character is of vital interest to millions, then one should shout one's discovery from the house tops, and the Devil with the detractors.²³

And to further clarify this position with respect to the question, if it is possible for a political office holder to be moral Morris, also, writes:

My knowledge of Kenneth Kaunda has taught me that there is an affirmative answer to be returned to such questions for he operates according to a rigidity of moral principle which could well be cold and repulsive if it were not shot through with great humanity. It is not easy to take one's stand openly for morality in politics without

appearing priggish or Olympian. It is possibly Kenneth Kaunda's greatest attribute that he has shown that goodness can be attractive.²⁴

Consequently, it is not a surprise that, from this position, Morris easily debunks the popular aphorism that politics is a dirty game, and goes on to postulate the morality of Kaunda's political ideology and subsequent actions. He posits that these actions are founded on Kaunda's personal sacrifices and strict moral principles, which mirror his unwavering dedication to the course of Northern Rhodesian independence, which he situates on humanistic principles. In the review of Kaunda's autobiography, *Zambia Shall be Free*, Robert Rotberg notes that Kaunda makes this moral dedication obvious when he foreswore "smoking, drinking and eating of meat"²⁵, in order to identify with the neglect, maltreatment and denials meted out to the Rhodesian blacks in Central African Federation by the white settlers. J.G. Markham equally accepts this inflexibility in Kaunda's moral beliefs and actions but adds that this was rather reminiscent of his father, who also being a missionary, school master and a strong disciplinarian, was "determined to mold his children according to strict Christian principles".²⁶ Kenneth Kaunda had a very deep Christian background. And being a Christian, as Morris avers, means that "for him a principle is once and for all, and he must testify to it not by pious prating but personal sacrifice. He imposes his abstention on no one else nor does he make it a public issue. It is his quiet, personal witness; his way of identifying himself with even the minor sufferings of others".²⁷

The moral streak in Kaunda's ideal is Christian as much as it is Gandhian; a reason why he wholeheartedly embraced Gandhi's non-violence as a practical disposition towards the independence struggles of Zambia. Christianity and Gandhi's non-violence have implicit humanist tendencies, hence, it was easy to weave Zambian humanism around these ideals. This is why, Rotberg posits that, "he (Kaunda) became convinced that Gandhian non-violence was the only approach to the struggle for political freedom".²⁸ The extent of this influence and conviction, as Markham rightly observes,

is such that Kaunda often cited the examples of India in discussing what form the political struggles in Zambia should take, though he knitted this with Nkrumah's positive action. Nkrumah had succinctly, explained to Ghanaians that "positive action means the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we can cripple the forces of imperialism in this country. The weapons of positive action are: legitimate political agitation, newspaper and educational campaigns and constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of absolute non-violence".²⁹ Kaunda employed non-violence, importantly, as a strategy for the preservation of life, because he attached much importance to the lives of the Zambian blacks, and by extension Africans, as much as he did winning their independence. This was in being true to his conception of humanism as much as it formed the basis of African ontology on which he built his understanding of this concept. According to Morris, this perspective on non-violence differentiates his perception of the concept a little from the Gandhian intention of putting the oppressors to shame in order to change their behavior patterns, where no amount of coercion would. Gandhi viewed non-violent disposition and operation solely as character purifier. This is obvious from Hannah Arendt's observation that, "non-violence recognizes that sin is everyday occurrence which is the very nature of nation's constant establishment of new relationship within the web of relations, and it needs forgiveness, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly".³⁰ But, Kaunda added the dimension of saving the lives of the Zambian blacks which was constantly threatened by the apartheid tactic employed by the white settler government. In all, the point is that Kaunda, like Gandhi, attached much sincerity, fairness and commitment to the practice of non-violence; even when this was met with negative response from the domineering white authorities, against whom it was directed. Morris shows this by arguing that it was not uncommon for nationalists under the guise of non-violence to still instigate their followers into violence, especially at the point when the nationalist gets tired of the violence of the colonialists' power. But Kaunda differed in his consistent adherence to his avowed

principles. Markham paints a clearer instance of this with the deliberations at the First All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra. According to him, the 1958 conference had insisted that nationalists' struggle throughout Africa be conducted on a non-violent positive action basis, but had to permit violent retaliation by those on whom the colonial powers used violence. "This last clause was inserted only at the insistent request of the Algerians, who at the time were at war with France".³¹ Any other leader could have relied on this clause to unleash violence, in retaliation, on the apartheid regime at the time. However, Kaunda chose otherwise; even to the point when his allegiance to this philosophy and its rigid demand on his followers put his leadership and popularity on the balance. In Rotberg's admission, the long months he spent in prison helped much to reinforce this attitude, hence "throughout 1960 and 1961, he managed, with great difficulty, to contain much of the impatience and the latent violence of his fellow UNIP politicians and the African masses".³² That he was able to hold the impatience and tempers of his colleagues in check and file signifies his humanist's orientation and his high moral pedestal. "Some great leaders have waded to power through the spilt blood of their followers. That Zambia's freedom struggle was virtually bloodless is testimony to both Kenneth Kaunda's example and his powers of persuasion".³³ Persuasion formed an integral aspect of his positive action and non-violence. D. Ikedia brings this out in what Kaunda had said in one of his pre-independence speeches; "our main armament was not guns but words-thousands and thousands of words, written and spoken to rally our people, to lay our claims before the British Government and the world, to express our anger and frustration at the denial of our birthright to rule our own country".³⁴ After Zambia's independence Kaunda, equally, wrote, "had we acted on the basis of a blow for a blow, the history of the last days of Northern Rhodesia and the first days of Zambia would have been written in blood".³⁵ That he chose otherwise, as we had earlier shown, is a question of his conviction about non-violent principles in particular and morality in general. This shows as Morris notes about his person that "there is no compromise on the moral principle once he has committed himself to it".³⁶

Morris argues, also, that for this reason Kaunda was unpretentious about integrity in public service and his religious faith. He shows this by citing an instance of Kaunda's dismissal of two cabinet ministers for fraud in contractual dealings, which a company had with their ministries. Morris argues that most leaders would have considered such a minor offence, and permitted the actions of both public officers; but Kaunda had to dismiss them. The reason, according to him is that, "Kaunda had assured the people of Zambia that nothing short of the highest standard of integrity in public servants would be tolerated".³⁷ The basis for this could be found in Kaunda's strive towards reduction of human exploitation and suffering, which he considered off-shoots of colonial-capitalism, and the realization of a patriotic spirit, which he saw as the culmination of his concept of humanism. Kaunda believes that religion and religious attitudes reinforced this spirit and played significant roles towards its cultivation. For this reason in the work, *Introduction to African Philosophy*, Maurice Makumba observes that "in his humanism, which he also called *Zambian Humanism*, religion played a central role, and Kaunda saw the need for religious believers to harness the power inherent in their faith for socially desirable ends".³⁸ This for Anthony Kanu, is why *Zambian Humanism* shares the same basis or foundation with *Christian Humanism*. This as he notes is "because of the Christian principles basic in them: the concept of God as creator, including of the human person; the dignity of the human person; the equality of human beings, regardless of position in society".³⁹ The much religion formed integral part of Kaunda's personal habit, is equally the much he intended it to be a necessary guide to *Zambian national life* in all its aspects without exception, to lead towards the evolution of true patriotic spirit. A remarkable thing about this attachment to religion is that, although, "it is fashionable for most national leaders to invoke the almighty, if only to demonstrate that they are prepared to take second place to someone, who, mercifully, is not in the running for their particular office. Kaunda's faith works out itself in personal obedience".⁴⁰ For this reason, it is

not surprising as Makumba further adds, that his intention was for the national life to epitomize the person of Christ, “to whom all humanity must measure”,⁴¹ not just in his disposition to serve others, but also, in the ability to accommodate and tolerate all men irrespective of colour, culture and social situation. This brings up another significant point about Kaunda’s attachment to religion, obvious from the Biblical parable of the Good Samaritan; the Christian value and attitude of love, racial and religious unity, and service. Here, Morris, again, observes that Kaunda’s humanist ideology worked towards greater association of different races and tribes in terms of reduction of denominational differences. That is, he tried to incorporate into religion the same idea he had for politics and social life. Morris succinctly explains this standpoint:

The theologian might describe him as a syncretist—someone concerned to bridge the gap between different religions and to incorporate into his experience the best elements of them all. Though impatient to labels, Kaunda describes himself in the following pages as a Christian humanist but he can make himself at home in a cathedral, mosque, temple or synagogue with an ease that makes nonsense of religious divisions. Zambia is a secular state not because its president undervalues the Christian contribution to national life, but because he sees his nation as a meeting ground not only of many races but also of many religions.⁴²

This posture reminisces the communal relational features of African ontology, which Kaunda used to introduce and consolidate his idea of humanism for Zambians. In the paper, ‘Africans and African Humanism: What Prospects?’, Fidelis Egbunu accepts that the “humanist philosophy is naturally strewn with traditional African humanistic undertones, such that, it is, as it were, believed to be so congenial with the African environment and that it is also inalienably anchored on the communalistic or relational nature of the African society”.⁴³ This basis magnifies the cosmopolitan aspect of the African world-view, and Kaunda adopted this to his socio-political policy. Nelson Mandela encapsulates this by the concept, *Ubuntu*,⁴⁴ by observing that a traveler

through a country could stop at a village and would not have to ask for food or water or shelter, for the people would naturally entertain him. Basis of this, is found in what Nwoko calls Universal Consanguinity; that is, an idea that “all men share a common blood despite colour, race, religion”.⁴⁵

This communal spirit, and the sincere fairness by which Kaunda applied it to action, according to Morris accounted for the success of his diplomatic mediation in inter-racial issues as a president. The social situation that precipitated independent Zambia bequeathed him with a mistrust between the dominant black race and the minority white settlers, and most crucial, the fact that the country's economic survival depended on the then Southern Rhodesia, governed by white settlers at the time. Morris explains the disposition of Kaunda towards this seeming social paradox:

The economy of the state is abjectly dependent on copper, which in turn requires a large expatriate community to provide the technical and professional skills to exploit. An inherited history of racial antagonism has led to a situation where, in the sharply defined spectrum of colour, to be trusted by one racial group is, by definition, to excite the suspicion of the other. Yet the toughest white copper-miner will confess, however grudgingly, that he is prepared to remain in Zambia so long as ‘that chap Kaunda remains in power’. He is able to perform the feat of instilling some degree of security in the white community without alienating the support of the black masses who have put him in power.⁴⁶

Kanu sees this as accentuating the Zambian humanist principles of egalitarian society and working together to achieve national productivity and growth. Indigenous African societies favoured the equality of individuals, and did not permit any form of discrimination; traditional Africans promoted team spirit in wresting food from nature, a reason they frowned at any perception of loitering. Egbunu elaborates on Kaunda's adoption of these humane indigenous values:

In it he sees a high value placed on the life of a human being; high premium on dignity, compassion, humanness, and respect for humanity of another; there is a shift from confrontation to mediation and conciliation, good attitudes and shared concern; reestablishment of harmony in the relationship rather than retributive justice; it favours reconciliation rather than estrangement; it is towards changing conduct and not just punishment; promotes mutual understanding rather than conflict; favours civility and civilized dialogue premised on mutual tolerance.⁴⁷

In this regard, the antithetical position of this to the apartheid mentality, which favoured racial segregation and discrimination or the neo-colonial spirit, which thrived on exploitation and alienation, is easily obvious. Unlike the apartheid regime, Kaunda intended his humanist policies to draw his rivals into mutual understanding, but all the while remaining true to the course of African emancipation and Zambian nationhood. That is, where the apartheid government instilled autocracy and repression, Kaunda intended to initiate dialogue and mutual relationship. Morris succinctly captures this disposition thus:

There is about him the traditional courtesy of the old Africa. This ability is a consequence of his humanist philosophy. There is only one standard of valuation of all human beings. He refuses to make false choices between the sophisticated and the primitive, the intellectual and the peasant. He wears the trappings of power almost with an air of apology for fear that they might cut him off from ordinary people.⁴⁸

The apartheid-colonial position lacked these dynamics of indigenous Africa; it rather, sought to maintain its position at the expense of, and exploitation of the black populace. This, as has been said antagonizes humanism, hence, the tenacity and vigor with which Kaunda campaigned for the decolonization of the entire African continent, and for African unity. Kaunda would only tolerate a social situation that permitted co-existence of different social status, colours and religious affiliations in harmony and equality; colonialism negates or destabilizes this fundamental African social position.

The fierce discrimination of the colonial apartheid era was why Kaunda, at a point, had to deviate from his long time preaching of, and attachment to non-violence to campaign for violent liberation of the then Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), from the colonial powers. He saw the continued existence of the colonial principle of inequality and racial oppression, anywhere on the continent, as fundamentally un-African and an abuse of humanity. As such, Zambian Humanism involved all tactics that would depose and change this colonial status quo. It is from this perspective that Makumba posits that though in the work, *Kaunda on Violence*,

Kaunda treats of the legitimacy of violence in the liberation struggle of Africa. Yet, the book depicts a conceptual evolution in Kaunda, once an ardent supporter of Gandhi on the theme of non-violence, now transformed into a supporter of the armed struggle for the liberation of the African continent from the chains of European colonialism and imperialism.⁴⁹

Kwame Nkrumah and other nationalists on the continent had, as Kaunda did, regarded the existence of white-settler government and imperialism in any part of the African continent as a sign that the entire continent had yet to be liberated from colonialism. And this being basic to the principles of Zambian humanism, necessarily demanded the freedom of all of the entire African continent from colonial subjugation, this time at any cost, and by all means. In reviewing *Kaunda on Violence*, Mwizenge S. Tembo describes the dilemma of this change for Kaunda thus:

As a Christian and a staunch believer in non-violence, Kaunda painfully describes how he came to support the armed struggle for freedom and majority rule in Zimbabwe. He explains the moral anguish he underwent in changing from being a 'pacifist' to a 'non-pacifist'. He indicts the western nations, particularly Britain, of duplicity and hypocrisy.⁵⁰

Roy Lewis believes that the reason for this indictment is Kaunda's acceptance of the need for force. "But he wanted it exerted by Britain and Britain alone within the

context of her colonial responsibilities. The failure of the Wilson Governments to use force when it was still possible is the abiding grievance which colours all British-Zambian relationships”.⁵¹ First, colonialism was a western project, and Britain being a major purveyor of this situation, especially of the apartheid regime in Central African Federation, meant that it carried the bulk of the blame for this conceptual change in Kaunda. Secondly, Gabriel Banda reports that the British government had prior information in 1965, of the intention of the white government in Southern Rhodesia to enforce Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.), yet refused to take pre-emptive action against, nor use force to quell this; instead, they had to douse the intention of the Organization of African Unity to carry out these pre-emptive acts in their place. The basic intention of the U.D.I. was to perpetuate apartheid in Southern Africa. As Banda captures it; “the independence of Malawi and Zambia quickened efforts by the white settler community in Southern Rhodesia to takeover and prevent of true independence involving the native black African population. The Smith team wanted to avoid the principle of “No Independence Before Majority Rule”.⁵² And the fact that Britain could only come up with an economic sanction as an alternative to direct force and intervention, showed its indirect support of this process that stalled complete independence in Africa. Equally, there was the fact that the whole process puts the newly independent nation of Zambia in a tight corner, socially, economically and militarily; Southern Rhodesia being the major route and connection of Zambia to the outside world then. Roy Lewis elucidates more:

When the Federation was broken up it was realized that Northern and Southern Rhodesia were Siamese twins and that severance would be dangerous to health, so much so that the Rhodesians did not believe the operation could be done, and that Zambia would remain as much a prisoner of the southern African economic zone as were Malawi and Botswana. Zambia was tied in trade, finance, agriculture, business structure and above all communications.⁵³

Hence, Kaunda easily accented to violence as an aspect of, and, equally, as accentuating his position on Zambian humanism. Makumba captures Kaunda's perception and treatment of violence in this manner:

Yet the legitimacy of violence if understood in the sense of self-defence falls well within his Christian Humanism, which seeks self-realization in God. Such a realization is not supportive of oppression but at the same time it does not absolutize violence. The real answer to human suffering and oppression is to be found only in God, a liberating God. Whereas Kaunda concedes that violence is never morally justifiable, it may, however, be permitted if it is in reaction to the violence of an oppressor, and for Kaunda, such a reaction is forgivable in the eyes of God almighty.⁵⁴

Therefore, Kaunda treated violent-humanism as an aspect of Christianity in as much as it is channeled towards deriving better social situation for mankind. Social equality and justice are basic principles of Christianity which are also implicit in Zambian Humanism, and if the use of violence could bring about this in any social situation, then such use is morally justified and permitted. Seen from this perception, the violence implicit in Kaunda's idea of humanism is essentially aspect of Christian humanism.

There is in scholars' consideration of Kenneth Kaunda's ideal, the tendency to dwell only on his political contributions to the realization of the Zambian state; that is, Zambian humanism is only understood in terms of its political significance. Markham shows this in opening his review of Kaunda's *Zambia Shall be Free*. He writes;

this autobiography brings out very clearly the consistency of purpose behind the political development of an African nationalist leader, who was from very early days was dedicated to the independence of his country, Zambia

(Northern Rhodesia), and who has taken leading part in the struggle against the Central African Federation.⁵⁵

Rotberg continues in the same manner, arguing that even a historian or political scientist would find very little about him, in the work that is controversial. This is because “[...] Kaunda refuses to engage his readers more than momentarily. The important incidents in his life are not discussed in any detail. Even the reasons for his attachment to non-violence remain vague”.⁵⁶ The same disposition by authors features prominently in the review of *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris*, we have so far, considered. For instance Scarrit began his review with this assumption;

Kaunda does not present a full-fledged ideology, but rather a series of excerpts on a wide variety of subjects, most of them eminently practical. The fact that the book was written in this form and that it was written at all provide significant clues to understanding Kenneth Kaunda and his role in Zambian political system. Kaunda is not primarily a man of ideas, but rather a man of action. Thus it is not surprising to see a book which represents ideology in the process of formation.⁵⁷

From this basis, one would easily understand Kanu’s summation that Kaunda is widely remembered, “not totally because of his contributions as a philosopher but as one courageous leader who actively participated in the independence struggle and first president of their great nation (Zambia)”.⁵⁸ Consequently, humanism as Kaunda presented it could only be considered “significant as a guide to official thinking and action”.⁵⁹ These observations are true; yet, had these scholars paid more consistent attention, they would have discovered other ideological implications of Zambian humanism beyond the realization of the nation’s independence. At least they would have seen the epistemological angle of the ideal, as a participation in the debate on negritude instead of accepting, just as they did, that Kaunda’s thought was still in the process of formation. It is on the basis of this acceptance that Scarritt had emphasized that Kaunda’s ideology contains inherent weakness of failing to make “specific connections between the concept, humanism and the practical problems it is meant to

solve, and that this gap can be bridged by further ideological codification”.⁶⁰If our scholars had consistently furthered their consideration of Kaunda, they would have found out why his ideology failed to connect with these practical problems it was meant to solve. As such then, the significance of their consideration of Kaunda lies in the fact that they introduce the need to consistently follow his ideals on humanism to a logical conclusion. In other words, Kenneth Kaunda could be considered eminently practical, yet, there is need for more philosophical attention and clarification of his theoretical ruminations in order to enable this connect properly with the practical bearings.

In the work, *African Philosophy: Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa*, E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu attempted the philosophical consideration and elucidation of Kaunda. In the first place, these scholars consider Kaunda's ideas to be in line with existentialist philosophy. Their argument is that Kaunda's Humanism, Senghor's Socialism and Manganyi's Being-Black-in-the-World propose a concrete socio-cultural description of man, the kind particular to existentialism. They postulate this argument thus:

...they are representative, fairly complete and internally coherent, and because they attempt to propose a genuine and positive African contribution to a better understanding of man and his world. In that sense they are truly philosophical in the existentialist sense: on the basis of a concrete and phenomenological analysis of concrete man in his historical and socio-cultural setting, they propose an intuitive vision of an ideal that transcends the narrow confines of that particular setting.⁶¹

Basically, existentialism pre-occupies itself with what it means for human being to exist. According to Omoregbe, existentialists “analyse and describe the peculiar characteristics of human existence”.⁶²Through such peculiar analysis, existentialism aims at the universal description of man's social condition of existence in the world.

This philosophical consideration was popularized in the contemporary era, according to Samuel Enoch Stumpf, because “the individual had been pushed into the background by systems of thought, technological forces and historical events. The major systems of philosophy had rarely paid attention to the uniquely personal concerns of individuals”.⁶³ In other words, the dehumanizing of humanity in the western system, especially its furtherance in German idealism, which culminated in the inhumanity of the Second World War, gave impetus for existentialism to flourish in varied forms; in poetries, novels, theatres, arts, atheistic and theistic expressions. But this different forms did not change the consistency of the central idea of this movement. In Enoch Stumpf, understanding, “whether they were theists or atheists, the existentialists all agreed that traditional philosophy was too academic and remote from life to have any adequate meaning for them. They rejected systematic and schematic thought in favour of a more spontaneous mode of expression in order to capture the authentic concerns of concrete existing individuals”.⁶⁴ Ruch and Anyanwu believe that the humanist ideals of Kaunda share in, and also express the same spirit. For them, this is because “he tries to show how, in the post-colonial (and post-federation) situation and at the level at which every man lives, humanism can and must be realized in form of nationalism locally and in the form of African unity at the level of the continent”.⁶⁵ This makes universal appeal because Kaunda aimed not just at the determination of the worth of the African man, but at that of man as man; since, this is a reaction against the inhuman treatment of man exhibited in form of apartheid-colonialism and imperialism on the African continent. Although, as these scholars observe, Kaunda recognized the civilizing value of colonialism, yet, he was more emphatic on its devaluation and degradation of the worth of man in Africa, and the fact that this effects persisted, even after the independence of different African states, in form of the alienation of the Blackman from himself. Ikenga Oraegbunam considers epistemological denial the apex of this alienation, particularly the fact that significant aspects of African culture were considered European in effort to perpetuate this. In his words:

It is this that led Hegel to refer to North Africa noted for its richness in civilization as 'European' Africa. Hence, the colonialist philosophical outlook on what they call primitive societies cause European writers to alienate Africa from its historical context. This prejudice abounds in such works as Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* (1885), Emile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1915) and A. Allier's *The Mind of the Savage* (1929). Consequently, the fact that there was African philosophy, for instance was largely ignored in academic circles except when it served as an illustration of what is primitive. Philosophy then was conceived of as a special preserve of the higher breed of humanity, namely, the Europeans.⁶⁶

Equally, and following closely from this first position, Ruch and Anyanwu argue that Kaunda's humanism is a contribution to the rationality debate that was growing on the continent at the time. That is, western denigration and denial of reason to the African gave rise to an African response and defence of his rationality, nay humanity. Consequently, they argue that "Kaunda wants to restore to post-colonial Africans not only their human dignity, but their conscious awareness of their human dignity".⁶⁷ This is not just a mere mental recognition of this fact, but a physical motion or social action towards its realization in terms of national consciousness or patriotic spirit. Njoku reflects this attitude when he succinctly posits that "African intellectuals think that in the African search for an identity, 'is' must imply an 'ought'. Philosophy of action is an ideology and an ideology has a rule of action to work up to".⁶⁸

The fore-going exposes why the birth of socialism on African continent was a practical response to the quest for an African uniqueness, nay humanism in the world. That is, "African statesmen conceived that theoretical discourse has some practical implication for the rehabilitation of Africa; hence the founding of discourse on 'African identity'. Discourse on African identity and negritude led up to the basis for advocates of African socialism".⁶⁹ Most African socialists' movements combined

traditional African uniqueness with Marxist's theory of socio-economic growth; Marxism gave militant force to African socialism. The same idea Kaunda employs in Zambian humanism, which in the words of Kanu, is "a form of African socialism, which combined traditional African values with western socialist and Christian values".⁷⁰ The Marxist's trend of the socialist's movement in Africa served two purposes; to make the movement revolutionary and as basis for economic growth. The incorporation of western value to sharpen the African ideal is why Ruch and Anyanwu refer to the socialist ideologies as synthesis philosophies; that is, a synthesis to the tension created by the antagonism of the thesis of the colonial position and the antithesis of negritude. And because this was meant to depict unique African experience and response in the face of dehumanization, they also describe African socialism as "salvation philosophy".⁷¹

However, Kaunda intended to salvage not just the African personhood from alienation, but, also, to use humanism more as basis for the realization of the universal dignity of man destroyed by the apartheid regime in Southern Africa. That is why the new African social identity he proposed was intended to depict a shift in paradigm, away from the erstwhile indigenous African social picture, and that created by the effects of colonialism on the old African. In other words, a modern African state is supposed to be far complex from the initial tribal setting of the indigenous Africa, but at the same time free from the antagonism and conflicts that constituted the colonial interference in African continent. Consequently, he held that the modern man should be free from the crisis of identity that bedevils the post-colonial African. On this Ruch and Anyanwu postulate that;

For Kaunda, we must provide the people with a new sociopolitical identity to replace the traditional tribal identity which has been eroded both by the artificial partitioning of Africa and by the new socio-political structures introduced by colonialism and to which the modern citizen owes

allegiance. A new pride in his nationality must replace the older and more natural pride of belonging to a given clan or tribe.⁷²

Humanism, in this respect, is understood as a basis for the creation of national integration and abiding commitment of the individual to the state. Most scholars accept that tribalism and clannish sentiments had adverse effect on, and contributed much to the ease with which Africa fell prey to western domination. Walter Rodney, for instance, shows that it was fundamental to *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. He posits that “it is often said for the colonial period that vertical political division in Africa made conquest easy. In those societies with ruling groups, the association with Europeans was easily established; and afterwards Europe hardened the existing internal class divisions and created new ones”.⁷³ In the *Wretched of the Earth*, Frantz Fanon alludes also to Europe’s capitalization on this technique for domination, and adds that attachment to the tribe constituted major pit fall to the rise of national consciousness in independent African states; that is, “the nation is passed over for the race, and the tribe is preferred to the state”.⁷⁴ These reasons make obvious why Kaunda argued for a new socialist identity in newly independent Zambia, in particular, and for Africa as a whole. He believes that:

...the masses can only be given back their pride through nationalism, i.e. a feeling of belonging to a free, independent and self-sufficient political entity. This nationalism gradually and hopefully develops into patriotism when the citizens begin to look upon the territory of their state as their “patria” or “fatherland” and begin to look upon their fellow citizens as their most closely related brothers, i.e. when a feeling of community, of a natural social entity, has grown out of the artificial political entity.⁷⁵

Kaunda intended this social ideal as both “a mode of thinking and a manner of being”.⁷⁶ That is, unlike negritude, it was meant not to dwell much in abstractions, but to be, eminently, practical, so, easier to grasp. Ruch and Anyanwu completely accept

this belief. For them, “the masses are not moved by abstractions; they must have something concrete and at a human scale to which they can attach themselves”.⁷⁷ The idea of possessing one’s own political entity makes greater appeal to the African than the general disposition of continuing to grapple with such abstractionlike negritude. On another hand, negritude also falls short of realizing universal human dignity, which Kaunda intended to bring to bear in this case. Negritude speaks particularly of the African and for Africans alone. Zambian humanism, on the other hand, was intended both as a practical guide to the realization of a socio-political entity, and a cosmopolitan African socialist determination and definition of man; therefore, had broader aims.

According to these scholars, the first stage to achieving this consists in the introduction of antithetical policies to oppose the thesis of the colonial condition. “All colonial policies were based on the same logic and ‘philosophy’, namely that of the superiority of European culture over African culture. They also had the same objective: to culturally obliterate the colonized people by refashioning them and recreating them into a ‘higher culture’”.⁷⁸ To change this world view, the people, in the first place, would have to be “presented with a common ideal”⁷⁹, which would unite them in the fight against a common enemy. This involved in all the activities that were employed to promote the course of negritude on the continent leading to the expulsion of the colonial masters with their social domination of the African, and the liberation of the continent. But, the euphoria of this achievement and of having a political entity or state ought to be just a stage in the actual aspiration and goal, patriotism. The reason, according to Ruch and Anyanwu, is that “this stage of independence is based on another negative step; an antithesis. We have got rid of the hated master, but we have not yet found ourselves as a people in a positive sense, i.e. for a positive common ideal or common good”.⁸⁰ Again, “nationalism may be sufficient to bring men to fight and even to die for this ideal. But what is needed afterwards is an ideal for which people

will live, work and struggle in free harmony, mutual understanding and personal respect year-in and year-out”.⁸¹ Besides, there is the tendency that “without the common enemy of colonialism, nationalism is bound to stagnate unless it can be transformed into authentic patriotism”.⁸² Consequently, what is required at this stage, is for the leader or party, that led the pre-independence struggles, to be truthfully and rigidly committed to reaching the set condition; that is, to be able to translate the feeling and sentiments of nationalism to patriotism. Ruch and Anyanwu restates Kaunda’s argument on this regard:

Admittedly, for a while loyalty to a leader may be the only focal point around which people can rally and in whom unity can crystallize. A certain form of paternalism is necessary in the beginning to give people time to adjust and mature to the new reality of the nation. But the leader must have the humility to gradually switch this personal allegiance to patriotism, i.e. to love for the country. Not all leaders in Africa have shown this charisma of humility.⁸³

The last statement depicts the fact that most African leaders from independence had ridden on this paternal feeling even to the extent of instituting dictatorial regimes in their various states. Chukwudum Okolo, Areoeye Oyebola and Chinua Achebe allude to this fact in their separate meditations on the problem of social progress in Africa. At the party level, greater humility is most needed, especially by the leader, to guard against interparty rivalries and personality clashes that could easily degenerate to factionalism, leading back to the social condition which is being avoided in the first place. Ruch and Anyanwu point out that this is why Kaunda recommends the virtue of humility in the first place; and it was to cultivate this that Kaunda “insists that humanism must be Christian Humanism”.⁸⁴ About this, Kaunda had given an instance of his personal adoption of Christian values to accentuate humility in his life, and reduce unnecessary abuse of power as a leader. He intended this to reminisce the humility and service to humanity in the person of Jesus Christ, manifest specifically in

the biblical story of the Good Samaritan, as shown earlier. According to Makumbathis implies that;

As a Christian humanist, he believed that the drive towards human self-realization is God-centered, thereby finding its perfect example in Christ, the God-man, to whom all humanity must measure. This is the culminating point of Kaunda's passionate belief in the perfect realization of the worth and possibilities of the human person.⁸⁵

The adoption of Christian values in Kaunda's ideology and the way he elaborately employed this, is why Schreiter calls this ideal "local theology".⁸⁶ Anthony Kanu, also, believes that Zambian Humanism is Christian Humanism because of this "inherent Christian principles in it".⁸⁷ It sees God as the father of all man, and humanity as equal before Him. From this perception, Kaunda's open declaration for Christianity should be understood as his attempt at uniting different religious beliefs or denominations in his quest for a united African identity, and instituting harmony among different races of mankind. Kaunda believed that Christianity should necessarily play greater role towards greater unity of races, not just in African continent, but in the entire universe. The existence of various denominations in Christianity, for him, did not reflect Christ's message of oneness; it, rather, depicts antagonism and conflict which reflected that national consciousness was yet to rise from Africans. According to Ruch and Anyanwu:

This does not mean that politics should be clericalized or that any particular religious denomination or church should be favored by the state. Kaunda has a highly ecumenical attitude towards all religious people and he only asks that they should take their faith, whatever it might be, seriously in order that it might irradiate their relationship with their fellowmen and thus contribute towards the peace and harmony of the nation as a whole.⁸⁸

Religion should aim towards authentic nationalism; that is, at statehood, which for Kaunda was the culmination of all social expressions and institutions. In other words,

Christianity should work same way that traditional religion did in indigenous communalism; hence, help deepen the communion of individuals in a new state. This would, on another hand, strengthen their affiliation to the state.

One obvious fact in scholars' consideration of Kaunda, is an open and unguarded admiration for his personality and political contributions to the liberation struggle in Africa, particularly, in the independence of Zambia. This could be, probably, because of the strict and sincere life style he incorporated into the African liberation struggle. However, this open praise precipitated less thorough and consistent scrutiny of his views, ensuring that these scholars failed to consider Zambian humanism as the basis of one-party politics in post-independent Zambia. Consider, for instance, J.G. Markham's observation that *Zambia Shall be Free*, Kaunda's autobiography "brings out very clearly the consistency of purpose behind the political development of an African nationalist leader who was from very early days dedicated to the independence of his country, Zambia and who has taken a leading part in the struggle against Central African Federation"⁸⁹ or William Crane's description that his other work, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris* is "an essential reading for any expatriate coming for the first time to Africa. (In it) Kenneth Kaunda takes his right place among the great champions of African man-Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor and others-in contending that independent Africa has something distinctive to give to the world, something more important than her rich natural resources"⁹⁰ or James Scarritt's contention about the same book that "seldom has there been a book containing the philosophy of a single man which reveals as much about a political system as this one does".⁹¹ These observations are reflections of unguarded admiration of Kaunda's personality. Even Anthony Kanu's summary that Kaunda represents a figure among the people of Zambia and Africans that cannot be forgotten easily because of his "courageous leadership and active participation in the independence struggle",⁹² is equally, a forthright admission to this. While not denying the significant place that

Kenneth Kaunda occupied in the independence struggles in Africa, the fact is that we are obliged to follow the evolution of his ideal to its logical end, hence assign it a rightful place. This gap, Ruch and Anyanwu, failed to posit; as a result, they neglected to mention that Zambian humanism constituted a practical contradiction to the theoretical assertion of humanist ideal. Equally, had these scholars stretched their philosophical consideration further, they would have connected Zambian humanism to one-party rule, as had been mentioned, hence, resolved why theoretical humanism failed to translate to practical success in post-independent Zambia.

Scholars that project humanism as the basis to one-party system in Zambia, describe the ideal as a myth built to support the imposition of a political travesty. Chiponde Mushinge believes that the sole intention of this was to deceive rather than to garner socio-economic growth as Kaunda supposed. Espousing this position in "The Evolution of One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1972", he argues, first of all, that Zambian humanism, as a personal ideology of President Kaunda, was "principally a strategy designed to exclude people of different political views from the political scene".⁹³ In other words, it is a power tussle strategy built to secure the position of the President and other few elites in the post-independent state. This being the case, it becomes clear why the ideal achieved so little practical relevance among Zambians, and also why it was "largely functioning at the level of official rhetoric".⁹⁴ Secondly, considering the political terrain this idea fostered in Zambia, at the time, Mushinge believes that Kaunda had, from the onset, tailored this theory to produce a monolithic world-view needed to instil one-party system in the newly independent nation. This is because Kaunda through his perception of humanism proclaimed and rationalized economic development, and how this was anchored on strong national unity and obedience to the central government. "Humanism, like Confucian teachings, emphasized, among other things, loyalty to authority, and a good Humanist was said to be one who obeyed authority".⁹⁵ Consequently, it becomes clear

that humanism was an ideological monopoly purposely intended to explain the political path Kaunda had wanted post-independent Zambia to go. Finally, Chiponde, equally, posits that;

Zambia's post-1972 history has demonstrated beyond doubt, that while economic development became elusive and people's unity illusory under one-party rule, the system helped Kaunda not only to hold on to power through the establishment of a highly centralized and personalized state, but also to present himself as the "father" of the nation and "symbol" of its unity.⁹⁶

This understanding demonstrates, for him, that Kaunda's humanist philosophy, when thoroughly scrutinized, is essentially, a camouflage meant to deceive, therefore, institute fascist and authoritarian governance. This position is obviously a complete departure from the already established understanding of Kaunda as a foremost nationalist, and very significant to Zambia's independence life. However, be this as it may, a fact that all our scholars neglected to point out which Kaunda's perception of humanism depicts is a fundamental misunderstanding of the role, nay, function of the State power by the African.

This basic misunderstanding is what has degenerated to the mutilation of democratic ideals in the operation of modern States in Africa, prompting the tendency to blame western democracy as the bane of most the problems that exist on the continent; the African tends to anchor his failures on the political policies and decisions of the European. This is as C.B. Okolo confirms that "in spite of differences in their manner of expressions, the point is that the rallying views of many African intellectuals and political leaders particularly in the late fifties and sixties (when anticolonial temper was high) were that the cause rested squarely on Africa's former colonial masters and their continued overt and covert activities in the continent".⁹⁷ It is on this ground that Kaunda tends to outrightly reject certain social policies because of their foreign basis to the enthronement of a supposed African ideal. He had outrightly rejected liberal

democracy as “ideologically distasteful”⁹⁸ to Zambia. This gives away his political economy as a façade; as it reflects, solely, a ploy to perpetuate oneself in power position and not the “Salvation Philosophy” which Ruch and Anyanwu call it.⁹⁹ Kaunda reminisces Fanon’s observation that “there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler’s place”.¹⁰⁰ Consequently, it is obvious that the political crisis that has given rise to the difficulty in identification with modern states in Africa is constituted by the mutilation or misrepresentation of democratic principles not the failure of these principles themselves, as Kaunda tries to show. The study takes this position, while on the voyage of exploring the challenges and possibility of true democratic culture in Africa.

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CHAPTER THREE

KAUNDA AND HIS HUMANIST PHILOSOPHY

3.1 Life and Times of Kenneth Kaunda

Kenneth David Kaunda was born on 28th April 1924 in Lubwa, in the hills of the great watershed between the great Luangwa and Chambezi rivers, Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia. At birth, his Malawian parents gave him the Bemba name, *Buchizya*, ‘the unexpected one’; “for he was the last child, and was born in the twentieth year of their marriage”.¹ His father, David Kaunda was a Church of Scotland missionary teacher, the first to be sent “to the Bemba-speaking people of the Chinsali District of Northern Rhodesia”.² He exercised the major influence in the life of young Kenneth, for he learnt from childhood, from his father, to be morally strict and obey without question. Equally, Kenneth Kaunda observes that it was his father’s attitude to violence, and the punishment he had meted out to him for fighting, that channeled his mind early in life towards non-violence. His father had beat him up for fighting with the young son of a school master at Lubwa. To him, this sign of disapproval and the healing medicines his father had applied to his sores afterwards, “rubbed into his childish mind the wickedness of violence and never to fight with his brother man”.³ Also, being the child of a church missionary teacher meant that Kaunda imbibed Christian teachings and values early in life; hence his complete attachment to Christianity in life. About this Kaunda avers:

My father was for many years headmaster of the school but later in life, he was ordained as a minister of the church. This responsibility meant that he frequently went off on tours round the villages visiting his people. My dearest memories of him concern family hour before he departed on those tours. He would call my mother and my brothers and sisters and we would sing some hymns and he would pray with us. How I loved to sing with him. Indeed, my mother has often told me that as a very young child I would stand up on these occasions to imitate him as he beat time to music.⁴

It was this obvious love for Christian hymns that was later to start Kaunda off on the road of instrumental music: hence, he was very instrumental to the formation of his school dancing troupe while he was in the secondary school at Munali, and later was the director of the school Church choir at Mufulira, as a teacher. Although a

missionary teacher, Kenneth's father could have openly shown his disavowal of the white minority rule and racialism in Northern Rhodesia at the time, and the fact that Christianity, represented by the white missionaries then, failed to condemn this outrightly. Kaunda mentions this while describing a particular incidence of his father's disagreement with the white missionaries Mr. McMinn, Rev. Maxwell Robertson and Dr. Brown, about what he preached in a sermon one Sunday after service. He recalls this incident thus; "suddenly I was startled by a loud bang and looking around I saw that it was my father who had thumped the table; he had jumped to his feet and was speaking animatedly to the missionaries".⁵ His understanding, and the impression of this episode on young Kenneth could have added to his later awareness of the racial discrimination against the Africans at the time, though he did not exactly posit this. However, the fact is that his knowledge of his father though brief, as he died when Kenneth was 8 years old, caused such profound influence that shaped his entire life perception afterwards.

Another significant influence on the young Kenneth Kaunda was the traditional communalist organization and behavior that obtained within the African setting at Lubwa at the time, especially around his home. That is, the extended family practice whereby the African does not see himself as an individual or lone being, but courts and cherishes the company of others in the community. Kaunda describes his experience thus; "although we were five children in the family, I never remember sitting down to a meal with just ourselves present. There were always numerous guests and visitors in our home".⁶ He explains that his parents were able to sustain this practice by adopting the traditional socio-economic practice which required maximum utilization of the land and hard work in the process of wrestling survival from nature. He writes;

My parents could never have entertained so many guests
and visitors in our home on the meagre salary of a

minister, had they not made big gardens for growing food. My mother made soap which she gave to those who helped with digging and weeding. Ten miles away they grew rice in a river bed and not far from Lubwa they cultivated a large area of land. Their generous hospitality became famous and their home was known everywhere as Galilee-place of peace and rest.⁷

This explains the harsh condition of survival and poor social situation that surrounded the existence of the Africans during the colonial era in Northern Rhodesia. In the first place, there was little or no access to basic human needs like food, water and houses, comparable to that of the white settlers. Secondly, the colonial government rarely invested in education for the natives, and the ones that were available were poorly maintained, and costly for some of the Africans to attend. This was, obviously, why Kenneth's father had intended him to study abroad, in South Africa, with Z.K. Matthews but died before this could take place. Thus after his father's death, Kenneth like other natives, resorted to working for long hours in the school gardens or mission farms in order to earn their school fees. According to him, "in this way, for three months of the year, I earned my school fees and later in life, when I became a teacher, it gave me great sympathy for school boys who had to struggle to get school fees for their education".⁸ Even at this, the native education in Northern Rhodesia at the time was characterized by lack of school buildings, good teachers and learning aids. Under this situation, Kaunda progressed through primary education in Lubwa to teacher's training programme and secondary education in Lusaka. He was among the first students to be admitted to secondary school when the first secondary education was started in Munali, Lusaka in August 1940. His first influence at school was his principal at Lubwa, Rev. Maxwell Robertson, who had emphasized hard work, perseverance and discipline among the students through the introduction of the Boys Scout Movement. "Most of the boys in the school were in one or other of the scouts troops and Maxwell Robertson deliberately cultivated the scout spirit and loyalty to the troop to breakdown our tribal rivalries".⁹ It was from this movement that Kaunda learnt to stand up to bullies, and the bullying of younger students in the secondary

school. Also, the regiment of orders in the scout movement meant for him that dissention within a group was intolerable. Another influence on Kaunda at this level was his Fort Hare graduate teacher, Daniel Sonquishe. According to Kaunda, it was this South African that had the greatest awakening in his life, for it was through him that he came to understand the meaning and reality of apartheid in Northern Rhodesia. Relating Sonquishe's experience he avers:

I heard innumerable stories of the indignities which my fellow Africans suffered at the hands of the white men in the union. Sometimes Sonquishe would say to me: 'Kenneth, it is almost too late for us to do anything about it in South Africa; we've lost our chance, but here it is not too late. Young men like yourself must make sure that what happened to us in the south will never happen up here. It is up to you now.'¹⁰

Consequently, Kaunda was not surprised when much later in life he began to receive those social discriminations and denials that were meant to remind him that he was just an ordinary African.

On completing just two years(1941-1943) in the teacher's training course, he was called back home to work as a teacher and boarding master at Lubwa Upper primary school, due to lack of teachers. After four years here, he left to Tanganyika in search of a better condition of service with his friends, Simon Kipwepwe and John Sikoni, but the condition of service they found according to him, was not that favourable after all, so they returned back. He also applied to be an instructor in the army in Lusaka only to be dismissed after a day of service, reason being that, in his own words; "I think news must have reached the army that we were 'undesirable characters'".¹¹ Part of Kaunda's years of teaching in Lubwa was his membership of the Chinsali African Welfare Association, which he was part of its foundation members. This platform that consisted of Boma clerks and local teachers represented the welfare of all Africans in all matters with the white government. The composition of this association and the

consistent strength with which it represented the affairs of the native masses to the colonialists, was according to Kaunda, why the settler administration regarded them as representing no other person but themselves. He explains; “we who believe that we are the mouthpieces of the inarticulate masses to express their own feelings of frustration in a society dominated by white settlers are branded as political agitators giving way to personal ambition and lusting for power”.¹² Yet Kaunda admits that notions like this raised from their championing of this platform helped greatly to sustain his spirit and belief, later, in the struggle against the formation of the Central African Federation, and the aspiration for the independence of Northern Rhodesia. Later when Kaunda was permitted to start African National Congress (ANC), Chinsali branch, it was adopted and began as an arm of this welfare association.

Kaunda for a time led an unsettled lifestyle. This meant that his wandering from one place to another in search for a greener pasture, gave him a firsthand knowledge of the deplorable social condition of existence and discrimination against Africans in the then Central African Federation. He had a fair share of this, especially when in early 1948 he was accepted as a teacher and boarding master in a school for the United Mission to CopperBelt, Mufulira. In the first place, there was the challenge of making ends meet and supporting his family on a meagre teacher’s salary of six pounds a month. To this end, he for a time bought second-hand American clothes from Congo and sent them on to be sold in his home in Chinsali, at small profits. He explains how this worked; “at the end of the month when I had received my salary, I would organize a group of schoolboys and on a Saturday afternoon we would cross the border, at Mokambo and come back wearing the strangest assortment of clothes”.¹³ This knack to survive imbued him with the relentlessness to help fellow Africans to also survive the social hardship created by the apartheid-colonial era. He describes how:

Many of the borders at the school had difficulty in finding their school fees, so I organized them into a self-

help club. They bought seeds and made gardens near the school to grow vegetables. These I bought for the school instead of going to the market. In this way, a number of boys earned their school fees. Some of the older boys wanted to join the local branch of congress, of which I was vice-secretary, and in order to raise their subscriptions, they agreed to bring along each a penny per week which I collected.¹⁴

Secondly, in Mufulira Kaunda for the first time experienced racial segregation. He writes that, “Africans were not permitted to enter the European shops by the front door. If they wanted anything, they had to go to a hole in the wall at the side of the shop to ask for it”.¹⁵ He considered this denigration an insult on the African in his own land, hence disposed his mind towards ending it. To do this, he adopted a form of Ghandhi’s nonviolent resistance, to reduce the risk of losing African lives, but mixed it with acts Kwame Nkrumah had considered as positive actions.

This seeming understanding of, and sharing in the plight of the native black masses so endeared him to them that he excelled in the organization and mobilization for African welfare in the colonial Federation. This accounted for why he quickly rose to the forefront of the fight for the political independence of Northern Rhodesia. As a teacher in Mufulira, he was elected by other teachers to represent them in the Urban Advisory Council, and from there, in 1949, to the Provincial Council. In the same year, he served as an interpreter and adviser on African affairs to Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, a white settler and member of the Northern Rhodesian legislative council. Through this role he garnered knowledge of the colonial government and valuable political skills that served him well later on as a member of the African National Congress (ANC), the first major anti-colonial organization in Northern Rhodesia. He served as a District Secretary of the ANC for Chinsali, from 1951-1952, and then as a Provincial Organizing Secretary for the Northern Province, from 1952 to 1953. In November 1953, he was promoted to the post of Secretary General of the congress, making it

necessary that he moved to Lusaka, thus, was able to acquaint himself with the rank and file of the movement, especially its President, Harry Nkumbula. Later on, Kaunda and Nkumbula forged an alliance that fought hard against the formation and establishment of the Central African Federation, though this attracted their denunciation and subsequent imprisonment by the colonial government. However, the experience of imprisonment had a radicalizing impact on Kaunda. In October 1958, he split with Nkumbula's ANC on a suspicion that Nkumbula was willing to compromise on the issue of black majority rule, and formed the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC). He gives this as his reason:

We all knew and appreciate how much Mr. Nkumbula had done ever since he took over from Mr. Mbikusita. But I take the view that it would have been national suicide politically to have allowed Mr. Nkumbula to continue to guide the nation in the way he was doing. So our critics are quick to point out to us that we should have removed him from presidency instead of ourselves breaking away. I hope those will be wiser when they have realized what was happening inside the congress at that time.¹⁶

The ZANC did not last long as it was banned in March 1959, as a militant organization, and in June Kaunda was sentenced, again, to prison, this time for nine months; which he spent, first, in Lusaka, and then, in Salisbury. Irrespective of this, ZANC metamorphosed to United National Independence Party (UNIP) under Kaunda's deputy, Mainza Chona and other ANC breakaways. And when Kaunda was eventually released from prison in January 1960, Chona stepped down for him to ascend as the party's president. The prison experience and the fact that he led the most populous African movement at the time, pushed Kaunda to organize a massive civil disobedience in 1961, what was called *Cha-Cha-Cha* campaign. It was believed that this action was mostly inspired by his visit, the year before, to Martin Luther King jnr., in Atlanta Georgia, USA. This precipitated a violent clash between the Africans and the colonial government. On the outcome of this he notes that, "no one more than I

regrets the violence that took place in the Northern Province, but if you drive an animal into a corner and torment it, you may expect that in its fear and rage it will slash back at you”.¹⁷ Eventually, this yielded result as the 1962 elections, which saw a coalition between UNIP and ANC, and Kaunda was elected as minister of local government and social welfare. And when UNIP won a land slide victory in the January 1964 general elections, Kaunda became prime minister, and subsequently elected the first president of Zambia formerly known as Northern Rhodesia on October 24.

Kaunda's presidency, from the onset, was embroiled in crisis. First, there was the June 1964 Lumpa Church uprising and antagonism with the ruling party, which, gradually, led his administration to adopt One-Party Government. Secondly, “in addition to internal crises such as the Lumpa church conflict, the UNIP leaders' challenges included the formulation of a foreign policy. In the tense cold war climate of the early 1960s, they favoured neutrality”.¹⁸ This position implied that Zambia failed to get much help from its former colonial masters in its relations with its Southern neighbours. An aspect of this also, involved aiding fellow African nations to achieve total independence. Kaunda strongly supported the anti-apartheid movement which opposed the Ian Smith regime and minority rule in Southern Rhodesia, which at the time remained under colonial government. Ikechukwu Kanu observes that this support remained consistent “even at the cost of military and economic reprisals against Zambia”.¹⁹ The 1965 Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in which he accused Britain and USA of neglect and complicity, the deteriorating Zambian economy and Kaunda's increasing clamp-down on opposition contributed greatly to his dwindling fame in office. Therefore, international demand and pressure for a return to a multi-party politics, after some period of authoritarian democracy, culminated in his defeat in the 1991 general elections by the opposition leader, Fredrick Chiluba. “In May 1996 the Zambian legislature passed an amendment to the constitution preventing

presidents from serving more than two terms in office and requiring presidential candidates to be at least second-generation Zambians”.²⁰ Sequel to this, Kaunda was prevented from contesting in 1996 elections, and Chiluba also tried to deport him from Zambia on the grounds that he was a Malawian. Subsequently, in March 2000 Kaunda retired from politics and since then has involved himself more with charitable organizations fighting HIV/AIDS. Although, Kaunda’s rule degenerated to autocracy, he is one of the acclaimed founding fathers of modern Africa, especially, because of his humanist ideas, which he popularized as *Zambia Shall be Free* (1962); *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Collin Morris*(1966); *Letters to My Children*(1980); *Kaunda on Violence*(1987); *Humanism in Zambia and A Guide to its Implementation, part I and part II* (1988); *State of the Nation, volume I: Politics and Government*(2007). He married Beatrice Kawecha Banda in 1946, and remained with her till she died in 2012. Their marriage was blessed with eight children.

3.2 Apartheid in Central African Federation

Apartheid was one of the fundamental factors that propelled the European intrusion and balkanization of the African continent. Some of the earliest writers on African history had stated that curiosity and mercantilism brought Europe close to the shores of Africa, yet, this spirit, from the onset, was garbed in the cloak of racial segregation. Consequently, it was convenient for the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 to further perpetuate the domination of the African by dividing and annexing parts of the continent, without African consent, to different competing European interests. That is:

In 1885 all the major powers of Europe met in Berlin to discuss, among other issues, how best to partition Africa between them with a minimum of conflict and according to a series of predefined rules. The Berlin conference decreed, in very simple terms, that effective occupation and administration would represent acceptable proof of annexation. A basic prerequisite for this would be some sort of treaty of friendship or an official appeal for protection on the part of whatever tribal leadership held sway over any particular area.²¹

As such, parts of the continent that was to be subsequently called Central African Federation became a British colony. The initial thrust for the occupation of most of the African colonies were done by commercial companies on behalf of the colonial nations. In the case of the British territories on both sides of the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, the British South African Company (BSAC), led by Cecil Rhodes, was granted by Royal Charter of the British Crown, administration and exploitation. A treaty between the BSAC and the local *amaNdebele* monarch, Lobengula, made it possible for the pioneer column of the company, comprising of 500 handpicked volunteers to arrive in fort Salisbury on 13th September 1890, in search of raw gold and cheap labour to extract it. These were made up of the company officials and a select South African security personnel. Thus:

Unlike a vast majority of local or tribal groups from which treaties and concessions were extracted during the process of African partition, the *amaNdebele* represented a powerful, widely influential and centralized monarchy very much akin to their distant cousins, the Zulu. A large swath of territory lay under either direct or indirect *amaNdebele* control, reinforced by highly organized, disciplined and effective military structure. It required a great deal of coercion and no small amount of dishonesty to coerce Lobengula into signing what was in effect a limited mining concession within his territory- this known as the Rudd concession after the protagonist in the enterprise, Charles Dunell Rudd- upon which was framed an application to the British Government for the granting of a Royal charter.²²

Later on, the realization of the duplicity of the foreign company, by the native leadership, and the fact that the white settler sought opportunity to expand further into the African hinterlands, easily led to war, in which the settlers defeated and pacified more native territories. With this, the wealth of the acquired Matabele and Mashona territories, in form of lands and livestock, was lavishly distributed among the settlers as war booty, while the native Africans were given limited reserve space in areas not traditionally favoured. From this “preceded a general sense on the part of those whites

now spreading out in Matabeleland that the amaNdebele had been comprehensively defeated and would in future be supplicant to white authority. The same was believed of the Mashona, the traditional enemies of the amaNdebele”.²³ This victory of the settlers signaled the carving out of the Independent Southern Rhodesia as a colony, a status which was to be fully recognized on October 1, 1923. The name, Rhodesia is a recognition of the roles that Cecil Rhodes played in the establishment of the colony.

Unlike their Southern neighbours, the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were easily pacified by the BSAC as a source of cheap labour for the gold and coal mines of Southern Rhodesia and the copper mines in Katanga, Congo. This was possible through treaties voluntarily signed by the respective African ruling chiefs, thus submitting to the imperial protection. Because of this, company officials were posted to different parts of the protectorates to levy taxes in order to force the natives to seek cheap employment in the mines. Put succinctly:

Two outstanding events have occurred in the present century which have helped to make the Northern Rhodesia we know today. The first was the introduction of a Native Tax in 1900 in north-eastern Rhodesia, and in 1904 in north-western Rhodesia. The sum demanded from individuals was small, but the total obtained was considerable, £57,000 out of the total income of Northern Rhodesia in 1910-11. Much more important from the point of view of racial contacts, it was the imposition of this tax which compelled the tribal African to leave his village and go away to find work, sometimes as far as Southern Rhodesia, or South Africa. The effect of this needs no explaining or emphasizing. The other happening occurred many years later, and was the opening up of the Copperbelt as we know it today, which began in 1828 and culminated in the territory becoming in 1953 the biggest producer of copper in the world.²⁴

The large quantity of copper produced within the colony bespeaks the extent of native African labour employed, but more important and appalling, was the low cost of hiring

these. “In 1958 the value of copper produced was £70,141,287. The wages paid to Africans amounted to £6,318,573. During 1950, the mining industry provided employment for 7,350 Europeans and 39,780 Africans. These figures speak for themselves”.²⁵ In other words, the settlers earned better wages though they contributed less than the African did in the running of the mines. Aspect of this were poor working conditions and tiny economic grants for the social development and welfare of the natives in the colony. “In 1938 these arrangements were criticized by a visiting financial expert, Sir. Alan Pim. In a report to the colonial office, he urged more public investment in roads, schools and health services, for Africans as well as whites”.²⁶ The worry thus expressed, depicts the gap created in social relations between the blacks and white settlers in the protectorate. British imperial control over the colony allowed the white settlers to maintain color bar not just within the copper industry but also in all aspects of the social life within the protectorates. Ikechukwu Kanu relays from Kaunda’s experience that, “blacks were not also allowed to eat in the same restaurants with whites. So many times he was thrown out of restaurants and shops simply because he was black.”²⁷ In politics, racial segregation was even more pronounced within these colonies. Stewart Gore-Browne, one of the early white settlers in Northern Rhodesia, opined that the entire political administration of the protectorates was in the hands of the white company officials. “And even when the imperial government took over from the chartered company in 1924, and replaced the settlers’ Advisory council by a legislative there was still an official majority, and at the head of everything a Governor who was all powerful in every respect. Africans had neither votes nor representatives”.²⁸ The political organization within the protectorates maintained the apartheid socio-political structure inherited from South Africa, which had an independent legislative path from the rest of British Empire. This meant that the natives had in no way, a say in how their affairs were conducted. Consequently, Kaunda questions; “can anyone wonder that we sometimes feel bitter about the European settler who treats us like some kind of sub-human species in the land of our birth?”²⁹

But, in as much as the administration of the colony of Southern Rhodesia and the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland favored the interests of the settlers at the expense of the Africans, it, still, feared the overwhelming black population; particularly in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that had fewer European settler population. The extent of this fear was added to by the fact that the colonial organization of the colonies in the style of modern societies led to the evolution of first generation of educated blacks from the local education systems. The fact that these generation of blacks showed clearer understanding of the workings of modern societies and the need for some degree of self-determination increased the threat felt by the settlers all the more. Consequently:

The first white response to this was the enactment of the land Apportionment Act of 1931 which established the rules of land occupation very much in favour of the whites. At the same time industrial development within the colony was creating a black working class within the urban settlements of Rhodesia that had no corresponding provision for black occupation of the towns and cities of the colony. Pivotal to the land Apportionment Act was the fact that urban areas fell under land reserved for whites, meaning that, despite the necessity to do so, blacks were not permitted to permanently reside in any urban area.³⁰

As part of this act, the administration equally encouraged wider white immigration, resulting in systematic displacement of blacks in settlements earmarked for white occupation only. In Northern Rhodesia for instance, the settlers' number which was less than 2 percent of the entire population, rose from 22,000 to 37,000 between 1946 and 1951 (the other two colonies witnessed the similar occurrence). This forced Africans into the rural areas; what was regarded as native reserves, and easily created overcrowding, soil exhaustion and food shortage in some areas. Whites competed for the available lands with the blacks for agriculture; the social legislation granted them

upper hand to this regard. Such legislation also made sure that Africans were remote from the market, which greatly affected their cash income. On the copper mines, the difference in wages between white and black miners led to massive strikes by the newly introduced and budding African trade unions. This had the effect of further alerting the settler administration to the evolving political consciousness among the blacks, deepening their fear all the more. Thus:

After the (Second World) war the new Labour Government in Britain began to promote the formation of African trade unions, and by 1949 half the African mine workers in Northern Rhodesia belonged to a single Union. In the same year, new legislation confirmed that (in contrast to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) African Unions had the same bargaining rights as those of white workers. Meanwhile, between 1942 and 1946, African teachers, clerks, foremen and clergy had formed welfare societies both in the mining towns and in rural areas. In 1948, these gave rise to the Northern Rhodesia Congress. Some of its members sat on the African Representative Council set up by the government in 1946. This body had no power, but it criticized the political and social conditions, especially the informal colour bar.³¹

With these signs showing African conscious evolution, coupled with their overwhelming united population, mostly in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the settlers realized that their only option of further, entrenching white supremacy and dominion was to amalgamate these two black dominated protectorates with the colony of Southern Rhodesia, where they had considerable population size compared to that of the blacks. Amalgamation would give the government to the South, thereby give settlers more opportunity to circumvent the political aspirations of the blacks. A united black front in form of the African National Congress in the two protectorates had submitted a proposal, calling for a universal adult suffrage and increased political representation in the administration. This was a reflection of, and an aspect of the conscious awakening of the blacks to the reality of colonialism, and importantly,

apartheid that became prevalent within the 1950's and 1960's in African continent. Equally, Britain had realized that the future of the continent lay in ultimate black self-determination and had begun to disengage from its colonies. Hence, the British imperial government greatly opposed the idea of amalgamation at first, but had to give in to the suggestion of a kind of federation when presented with arguments of economic profits from the rise in copper prices at the time. Kaunda succinctly presents this situation thus:

‘Paramountcy of native interest’ was the political guideline of the British protectorate up to 1949. This was interpreted to mean ‘...if and when the interests of the indigenous people conflict with those of immigrant races, those of the former shall prevail’ (Devonshire Declaration 1923). This has always been too much of a stumbling block for settlers whose unyielding ambition has been amalgamation of the two Rhodesias to which Africans on the other hand are vehemently opposed. In 1948, this policy was replaced by the so called ‘Partnership’ without any respect for African opinion. Later, we were told it was the foundation stone of the new federal state of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.³²

But, this Partnership structure as Kaunda perceived it, from the views of Sir. Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern), the first Prime Minister of the Federation, was like the relationship between a horse and its rider. “The settler is the rider and the African is the horse”.³³ Elias Mtepuka is even more explicit on this when he observes that “the prevailing conception among all European political parties is that it must be a partnership that holds up whites as seniors and blacks as inferiors, atleast for the foreseeable future (which is a popular Rhodesian euphemism)”.³⁴ Although this was the practical reality of the partnership, yet the white dominated government led the entire world into the misconception that what existed was a kind of multi-racial state. Hence Mtepuka argues further that “both at home and abroad liberals have hailed its

“partnership” policy as the only hope in white-settled Africa. So strong indeed is the myth that prominent men who have vociferously protested against “apartheid” in South Africa have come out on the side of the Federation, without even stopping to see whether “partnership” in theory tallies with “partnership” in practice, or to reflect on what constitutes “apartheid”- the word or the deed”.³⁵ The fact that this idea of partnership arose at the time when apartheid was in full gear in the neighboring South Africa, made it all the more difficult to perceive that the “lips which mouth “partnership” are betrayed by hands which manipulate “apartheid”.³⁶ So that its use in the first place was conceived as a happy contrast to the inhumanities of the apartheid regime. Thus:

There is no consistency between “partnership” in the abstract and “partnership” in the concrete. A cursory glance at the Federal Constitution would show that the term is of little significance even theoretically. First, it is not part of that section of the Constitution which is legally enforceable. Secondly, it is not even defined. It imposes no *definite* obligation, even morally, on those who wield the scepter of power. And it has often been repudiated by European politicians, including Government spokesmen, who claim it is an imposition of the Colonial Office. Even where it has been found expedient to use the slogan, it has been subject to so many varying interpretations that it is utterly absurd to regard it as a political policy or theory at all.³⁷

Thus, in August 1953, despite wide spread black opposition to it, this form of political structure and absurd social co-operation was established as Central African Federation, and it lasted till December 31, 1963.

Major Black opposition to this idea of Federation came, largely, from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, due to larger concentration of native blacks there than in the South. The vehemence of this opposition rested on the fact that Southern Rhodesia dominated the franchise, not based on general numerical strength or natural economic

endowment but on the greater population of settlers in it than in the other parts of the federation. In other words, although the wealth of the federation lay in the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia, yet, throughout the 1950s, Southern Rhodesia controlled the economic, military and political life of the partnership. The fact of this was in the citing of the key administrative structures of the supposed partnership very close to the seat of the federal government in Salisbury. Besides, the deception in the idea of federation or partnership was most visible in the fact that the referendum which voted in favour of a federation was exclusively conducted in Southern Rhodesia. In this process, African representation and voice was not considered, and as such not sought. Kaunda avowed this in one of his petitions against the formation of the federation to the leadership of the British Whitehall. He writes:

We drew attention to the fact that in the referendum conducted in Southern Rhodesia which had declared in favour of federation, the white population, numbering 120,000, had approximately 49,000 voters on the electoral roll, while the African population of nearly 2,000,000 had 429 voters on the roll. Also, in the legislative councils of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to whom the question was next referred, there were only two Africans in each council in memberships of 23 and 18 respectively. All the African members had voted and spoken strongly against the scheme.³⁸

Because of this massive denial of franchise to the native blacks, and that this was done on the basis of complete denigration and neglect of the African person, Kaunda equally posits; “I determined on out and out opposition to the Central African Federation. I was not against federation in principle but against the federation which had been imposed on us”.³⁹ Imposed because the person of the African was utterly neglected and maltreated.

Second testimony to this imposition is the fact that the capital of the Federation was moved to Salisbury, announcing a decade of white dominated federal government,

with less emphasis on territorial politics. Part of this is that Sir Godfrey Huggins, Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister at that time, resigned his post to ascend as the first Prime Minister of the newly constituted Federation. In this form also, the distribution of assets and social amenities within the Federation gave greater advantage to the white Southern Rhodesia more than the other two partners to the Federation, irrespective of its smaller population size when compared to the other two together, and economic endowment. For instance, there was the issue of electricity generation from the waters of the Zambezi River: Kafue river site in Northern Rhodesia was first proposed and preliminary work started there towards this idea before the Kariba Gorge scheme in Southern Rhodesia came up. However, with the formation of the Federation, Kaunda notes that little more was heard of the Kafue scheme, as more attention was channeled to the “far more ambitious and much more costly Kariba scheme”.⁴⁰ Again, in as much as this project benefitted the South most, its citing equally dispossessed more than 29,000 Africans in Northern Rhodesia of their homes and lands. Showing the lack of regard for the native opinion and welfare on this issue by the federal government, Kaunda, again, writes that “as everyone now knows, the Kariba was quickly carried through, and resulted in the formation of an enormous lake, completely swamping the area above the dam, which had been the home of thousands of Africans for many generations”.⁴¹

Thirdly, complete flouting of native opinion on the formation of the federation was most obvious in the constitution of the political organization of the Partnership. The entire governance of the federation maintained white superiority over the native black population. As noted before, this was enshrined in the heart of the federal constitution, which specifically conceded this. The first instance was in the federal assembly:

The Federal parliament consists of 35 members. Twenty-nine of these are European, six Africans. Three of the Europeans are nominated by Governors (in Northern

Rhodesia and Nyasaland) or elected (by predominantly white electorates in Southern Rhodesia) to represent African interests. Except for the two nominated members from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all Europeans are elected under an individual franchise. The two African members from Southern Rhodesia are elected by the colony's whole electorate, consisting of about 70,000 Europeans and (now) about 560 Africans-which clearly indicates who calls their tune, and how they must dance to be successful politicians. The present African members for Southern Rhodesia are both members of the ruling (federal) party, and were returned with the party's support. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are protectorates, only British subjects (in practice Europeans) have the franchise.⁴²

The distribution of federal seats based on territorial representation was, 17 members from Southern Rhodesia, 11 from Northern Rhodesia and 7 from Nyasaland. The basis of this distribution was racial, because it granted majority representation to Southern Rhodesia with the largest white population at the expense of Northern Rhodesia which contributed the bulk of the federal revenue and Nyasaland, which had the highest population. The worst is that the franchise which elected these members of parliament was purely European, since just under 500 Africans were considered eligible to vote as British subjects, compared to over 50,000 white voters. Legislation required Africans compulsorily to qualify as British protected persons before they could be able to vote in an election; that is, the African was required to first attain British citizenship before he could be considered a member of the Federation in the first place. The basic idea here was that political participation required an extent of civility, seen as the exclusive reserve of the whites, which the African would, probably, grow up to. And since this was up to the settlers to determine, only few Africans were able to qualify for it. This Kaunda explains that:

Legislation extending the franchise to Africans is being enacted, although it will ensure that power remains in "Civilised" hands, that is, white hands. The franchise will be based on a two-tier roll, most adroitly conceived. The

higher tier, the real repository of power as it will elect the majority of the members of parliament, will demand very stiff qualifications (which only Europeans have the opportunity to attain). The lower one will allow lower qualifications, thus admitting more Africans as well as all the voters on the upper roll. This will elect minority of the M.P.s. In effect, the scheme will give “Civilised” persons two votes each, and Africans one emasculated vote each. This is the substance of the partnership which a benevolent aristocracy is prepared to concede.⁴³

On further specification, this franchise legislation demands that Africans earn a stipulated minimum income or possess its equivalent in fixed property and attain a high standard of education in English, ascertainable by test to qualify. And all these aspect of socio-political development lay within the compass of European control. Hence, it was convenient for the white settler to impose and strictly enforce the policy of racial inequality and restrictions.

The extent and implication of the colour bar was evident in the different colonies that made up the partnership with slight variance. It was most rigid in Southern Rhodesia, where due to the fact of conquest, the administration maintained the rigorous and ruthless discipline of a conqueror. In Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, it was milder due to the inherited system of imperial control keyed to indirect rule, which groomed a cohesive and confident black political consciousness, coupled with their domineering black population. Nevertheless, the master-slave or superior-inferior basis of association was still strongly instituted, either way;

This can be more easily explained by reference to some of the things that Government has done and the way it has done them. It has opened post offices in “Native locations” and “Native reserves” in Southern Rhodesia, for the first time in the colony employing Africans as post masters “to serve their own people” in “their own areas”, at less than a quarter of a European postmaster’s salary. It has decided to admit Africans to the Federal

Civil Service at inferior salary scales and conditions of service to those of Europeans (except for doctors). A black lawyer with the same training, qualifications and experience as a white one must get less than the white. A black schoolmaster with a degree must have a lower rating than a white schoolmaster, even if he is not a graduate. An African state registered nurse and state certified midwife must be graded below the white one, even if the white has lower qualifications.⁴⁴

Other social forms of these are separate residences, railway stations and banks; public buildings had separate entrances and counters for the blacks. Any form of social contact or relationship between whites and blacks were strictly forbidden under threat of severe punishment. In other words, whites were never to marry or have any emotional relations with blacks. As a result the blacks were made to carry passes if they were ever to enter or had anything to do within the European quarters. Kaunda describes a particular experience of his thus:

Later that year we discovered that although we lived in what was called a Central African Federation, as Africans we were restricted in our movements. When Harry Nkumbula and I arrived in Salisbury to attend a meeting of the four African members of the Federal parliament who represented Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we were each issued with a deportation order at the airport. We were called Alien Natives. How can you be an alien if you are also a native of the country?⁴⁵

However, the worst of this treatment meted out to the Africans was the marginalization in the purchase of consumer goods. According to Kaunda, Africans were overcharged or given short weight by the predominantly settler shop owners; in the butcher's shops they were expected to buy meats already wrapped in parcels without knowing or inspecting the quantity or quality of what was in them before; they were usually prevented from entering shops through the doors rather, they were made to go through the hatchways in the streets. There was a particular instance of Mealie meal, the staple food within the Federation, which was sold at forty-pound bags. Europeans who bought this usually had it delivered to them free of charge, while

Africans were expected to take their own delivery, even though prices remained the same. The prevalence of these social practices reflected the helplessness of the African situation in the federation, even with the institution of the African Advisory Councils and African Legislative Representatives for the remedying of their grievances. The fact of social segregation had a debilitating effect on humanity, and the fact that this case took a racial path, completely destroyed the person of the African. Yet the height of the African discomfort lay in the irony contained in the policy of partnership of races which the white government in the Federation swore to uphold. The very consideration of its particular implementation in Northern Rhodesia is why Kaunda concludes that;

Northern Rhodesia is a country of deep-rooted contrasts, deep-rooted because everything has been planned on apartheid lines, everything has been running, is running and within the foreseeable future will continue to run, on those lines. In this lies the root of all the present trouble. This 'apartheid' of political, economic and social planning is admittedly more pronounced here because it takes racial lines and so must be faced as such. It is difficult for one who is genuinely interested in making multi-racialism successful to think of those at the helm of the governments concerned as being serious-minded about the racial problem.⁴⁶

Thus, to bring this irony to lime light and to postulate the African position, Kenneth Kaunda and his contemporaries, under the umbrella of the African National Congress adopted non-violent resistance to racial segregation and colonial domination.

3.3 Non-Violence and Zambian Independence

Non-violent resistance aligns with the universal desire to pursue greater peace among human races and reduce militarism in modern state relations. It has proven effective strategy in toppling intruders, dictatorship and racism, especially with Gandhi in India, Martin Luther King Jnr. in America and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. For this reason, the Pan-African movement in Northern Rhodesia conveniently adapted it to similar situation, though in different environment. African National Congress in Northern

Rhodesia believed it the most suitable weapon of presenting the African grievances and demand in the face of an atmosphere charged with racial segregation. Consequently, Kaunda opines that, “the African National Congress has always stated its belief in non-violence and, as the years went by, I became more and more convinced that the only way is to win your enemies to your way of thinking and not to defeat them by violence”.⁴⁷

Kenneth Kaunda being an integral part of the Pan-African Movement in Central African Federation, was at the fore-front of the non-violent resistance. He had imbibed non-violence from childhood, from his father’s disposition towards a fight he had with the young son of a schoolmaster at Lubwa. He concedes that, “perhaps it was that early disapproval by my father that taught me not to fight with my brother man”.⁴⁸ This and the fact that his parents, being Christian ministers had inculcated in their children the virtues of generosity and communal spirit, by providing material comfort to the African community at Lubwa, could have greatly influenced his adoption of Gandhi’s philosophy of racial equality and non-violence. As such, the non-violent ideals which he instituted, and on which the Pan-African movement in Northern Rhodesia operated towards its independence was entirely Gandhian. He concedes to this too:

It is a good coincidence that we should be writing on this very important subject at the time when not only India but the entire world is remembering the father of India and the man who put the powerful weapon of ‘non-violence’ into practice. With it, he defied one of the then most powerful imperial and world powers-the British Empire. For years, he brought suffering upon his own body and ended up a victim of a dirty tool of imperialism. We might add this that it was perhaps fitting that he should end up like that...a more noble end could not be found.⁴⁹

In as much as non-violence for the African movement was basically Gandhian, Kaunda sharpened it with what he considered positive actions, borrowing from the

teaching and experiences of Martin Luther King jnr. and Kwame Nkrumah. As a result, the non-violent struggle in Northern Rhodesia employed boycotts and protests as strategies, imitating what Kaunda called the three Nkrumah “S’s”- service, sacrifice and suffering.

The colonial interest in establishing a partnership of the three African colonies of Central African Federation was to prolonged dominion, and this was sought on purely racial lines. For this reason Kaunda openly confesses; “I determined to expose this system for what it was, an insult to my race and my people”.⁵⁰ He equally, expresses that this was the collective aspiration of all the blacks in Northern Rhodesia in this manner:

We criticize and condemn the present set-up as undemocratic, unethical and entirely un-Christian and, therefore, unworthy of self-respecting people. It is a government of the privileged few, by the privileged few and for the privileged few. It is these few that the Welensky governments in Central Africa are arming. He is creating all-white battalions, in spite of the existing regiments which are mixed racially.⁵¹

He was even more emphatic of the aim of this general aspiration in this position:

I wish to state here categorically that we shall untiringly attack systems that for reasons of race alone deny about three million Africans the full enjoyment of democratic rights in this country. But I shall always pray that no bitterness shall come into the picture and that we freedom fighters shall be forever colour-blind. We make no apologies for being in the forefront in the struggle for national independence and self-determination. **FREEDOM IS OUR BIRTHRIGHT** and we simply are determined to achieve it.⁵²

The general denial of franchise and non-representation at the parliament for the natives, made it very difficult for the African to plead his case politically. Generally,

the African desired that the government should stay true to the agreed idea of partnership it preached and nothing more. And since lack of representation in the government had denied him this, he had to rely on organized group action to achieve this; organized mass movement had served as the basis for most African's demand for freedom in the different colonies. Kaunda explained that this was the reason of the African National Congress:

The primary objective of Congress is to improve the lot of the up-to-now badly exploited African, either by negotiation, or by action, where negotiation fails. In this way, the gap between the privileged and the underdog is being narrowed; and the narrower the gap, the greater chance there is of the different races living together in peace and harmony.⁵³

This implied the existence of a democratic governance, pursuant of equal representation and common good. In other words, the Northern Rhodesian Africans sought an end to the apartheid-colonial policies and restrictions. This postulated the spirit of the time, as different African nations had either gotten their independence or were demanding for it from their colonial masters. And since the government was purely white, entertaining little of the African opinion, the "Congress regarded itself as the means through which African people could express their legitimate aspirations".⁵⁴ That is, racial equality in a fully independent state. And as we had earlier stated, the means Africans adopted to pursue this was purely non-violence plus positive actions.

Kaunda and his compatriots chose this because for them it perpetuated the course of humanity more than any other option available. Non-violence projected his conception of humanism which he explains thus:

Now, in a situation like ours where the oppressor is armed to the hilt, the oppressed, before man discovered the comparatively new method of passive resistance, had either to succumb to oppression or come out in open

revolt against it. History is full of such incidents. Succumbing to oppression is undignified and unworthy of any self-respecting man. On the other hand, open revolt often leads to the killing of countless of people, those very people for whom freedom is sought. So we resort to the third method-the method of passive resistance or non-violent methods plus positive action. We have no intention at all of making our people cannon-fodder for colonialist guns.⁵⁵

Kaunda vehemently emphasized this as the chosen path which all Congress branches in Northern Rhodesia ought to abide by, hence, he equally argues:

We implore all our officers everywhere to stress more and more to all our people to remain non-violent. We must deny Government a chance for mowing our people down with machine-guns. It has happened before on the Copperbelt and it can on a larger scale if we give them a chance. This does not mean that you should co-operate with what is evil, far from it. Refuse to have anything to do with anything that is unworthy of man.⁵⁶

Gandhi believed, as expressed, that non-violence usually placed the oppressed on a higher moral pedestal over the oppressor. But, in as much as the Pan-African movement in Northern Rhodesia desired to secure African independence from the white minority domination, it solely intended to do this in order to deepen inter-racial co-operation. According to Kaunda, “we have based our policy on humanitarian principles. It is not anti-white, but anti-wrong. We have many friends among men of all races. We shall not fight against white racialists and at the same time be racialistic ourselves”.⁵⁷ And to achieve this, Kaunda, continually, exhorted patience in non-violence, in words and deeds from his compatriots.

However, in July 1961, shortly after Kaunda’s release from prison, and his, subsequent, assumption of the leadership of the United National Independence Party, a splinter of the African National Congress, non-violence gave way to violence in the

Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda had foreseen this as depicted in this argument in the Congress Circular of January 1958 that “Africans have behaved remarkably well even in the face of provocation. But let us say there is limit to everything”.⁵⁸ And on February 1961, just on the verge of this violence, in his statement, ‘MY PEOPLE ARE TIRED’, he equally warned that should the colonial administration continue to frustrate the aspirations of the Africans, a situation could result which may make *Mau Mau* seem like a child’s play. In his own definition, “*Mau Mau* meant not only a massacre of the whites by black people, but also a massacre of blacks by whites”.⁵⁹ Other writers on this, like Elias Mtepuka had equally anticipated this degeneration to chaos, and mentioned it to criticize the perceived British complicity in the maltreatment of Africans by the white settlers. This is seen in this position:

But Britain’s surrender to the settlers in Central Africa will mark the real beginning of the African freedom struggle in these territories. West African independence (Ghana and others to follow) and the freedom marches of Africans in other parts of the Continent are bound to influence the Africans in the Federation. There is no doubt about that. There is a danger, however, that in their frustration the Africans will turn to an extreme racial nationalism and start a hate-back and hit-back campaign, which might intensify the racial conflict. It is a tragedy that Britain has completely ignored this possibility.⁶⁰

And this negligence did result in the burning of whole villages, schools and putting up of road blockades, and killing of some Africans by the federation security forces. This violence in the Northern Province could partly be seen as a spill-over from the violence that had earlier broken out in the neighbouring Nyasaland in 1959, which resulted in the imposition of state of emergency in that part of the Federation by the white government. But whichever be the case, the fact is that these unrests added to quicken the dissolution of the Central African Federation on 5th July, 1963. Kaunda expresses it thus:

There are always those who say that violence pays and that it was what happened in the Northern Province that made the British government again change its mind. It is not for me to say what goes on in Whitehall, all I know is that now in 1962 we have been given a Constitution in which we have decided to work for majority rule in Northern Rhodesia. For the first time in our history we may be able to use the ballot box to break up this ugly Central African Federation.⁶¹

Consequently, in 1964, precisely on 24th October, Northern Rhodesia achieved its independence as the republic of Zambia, while Nyasaland became the republic of Malawi, same year. The election that followed this saw Kaunda and the UNIP winning majority of the seats in the parliament and constituting the first political administration of the independent Zambia. This coincided with Kaunda's admonition that, "when we organize our people, it is important to note that we are building an organization that should not only get us self-government and, ultimately, independence, but an organization sufficiently strong to run our government. Putting it briefly, we are organizing to bring into being here a government of the people, by the people and indeed for the people".⁶² On this chosen course, which for them befits the human nature better, Kaunda and his compatriots set out to navigate the young nation through.

3.4 Zambian Humanism: Theory and Praxis

On attainment of independence, Kaunda led the new Zambian administration to choose a guiding social ideology: Zambian Humanism. In 1967, this was made a national philosophy and the basis for building a modern Zambian state, which would incorporate multi-racialism. Kaunda explains that "the choice of this ideology was based on the fact that Africa had always contained much indigenous socialism which the colonialists had tried to destroy, and so Zambian humanism was an attempt to rescue the pre-colonial values and traditions and use these as the basis on which to build a modern state".⁶³ Primarily, this emphasizes the fact that indigenous African society placed man (irrespective of colour) at the center of all activities; social,

political and economic. But, though this ideology was adopted as a principle to guide the national life, yet Kaunda confesses that it was as much his personal life guide. His words are; “I feel that it might be useful to attempt to put into words my philosophy of life. It seems to me that when the people place great power in a leader’s hands they have a right to know the code of values in terms of which he will exercise it”.⁶⁴ This admittance raises the question of whether Kaunda saw any difference between his personal beliefs and national goals and aspirations; this is as most African leaders tended to run their respective states as though they were running a heirloom. However, the fact is that Zambian humanism was made to apply in the various aspects of the national life of Zambia for the 27years that Kaunda was the president of Zambia; it was supposed to direct both individual and groups’ activities to a common pre-determined goal and unity.

3.4.1 An Idea of Nationalism

Like most other thinkers on African nationhood, Kaunda identifies the growth of nationalism that ushered in independence on the continent with the African growth in self-awareness and desire for greater self-determination. The colonialists had infused into the African mind the fact that man, in the African-person, was inferior and subservient to societal institutions. ThisKaunda believes is the misrepresentation of human worth and possibilities, hence, set out to establish that modern government should recognize the values inherent in man and help him to realize this. Consequently, in opening his work, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris*, he refers to himself as a humanist:

I suppose I could be called a humanist, though I have never had the leisure to read the standard works on the subject. I have a passionate belief in the worth and possibilities of man and I expect him to someday to achieve perfection. By perfection I do not mean sinlessness. But for all his weaknesses, man is growing in self-knowledge and will one day fully realize his capabilities. He is painfully thrusting his way forward and must eventually evolve social, political and

economic institutions to which he will be completely adjusted, and within which his vices will be neutralized and his virtues strengthened.⁶⁵

He accepts that this confession is a testament to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's belief that "man has the growing capacity to situate himself in space and time to the point of becoming conscious of his place and responsibility in relation to the Universe".⁶⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel had postulated, similarly, the idea of the unfolding of knowledge and the gradual movement of the spirit towards self-discovery through human reason. Kaunda understands that this is what played out in the African continent at the time, in practical form as nationalism. Accordingly, he posits that "there has been a kind of telescoping of time on the African continent so that this progressive movement of mankind onwards and upwards can be clearly traced".⁶⁷ Nationalism encapsulates all the activities that projects the African struggle for freedom from imperial domination. Kaunda observes that nationalism was called into action because of the destructive effects of colonialism on the African; that is, that it devalued man and destroyed his self-confidence in the African. Specifically, his argument is that:

They dinned into the African mind the idea that we were primitive, backward and degraded, and but for their presence amongst us, would be living like animals. The result is that even today in an independent African state you will find a certain sector of the population suffering from a Bwana complex. They cannot stand on their own feet as free men but must look over their shoulder all the time for the approval of the Whiteman.⁶⁸

Therefore, nationalism served as a wake-up call for the African; to awaken him to his humanity and its demands. D.A. Masolo observes that Aime Cesaire's poem, "Return to the Native Land",⁶⁹ served the same purpose. In other words, the humanity of the African became the basis of nationalism, and for Kaunda, it assumed this position from Teilhard de Chardin's assertion. He buttresses this further:

I would like to claim that phrase as the philosophical basis of nationalism. To 'situate oneself in space and time' is surely to discover one's identity, which was beaten out of shape by the impact of colonialism, and to 'become conscious of place and responsibility in relation to the Universe' speaks of the dignity and stature of Man. He must measure himself not against the rest of the animal world, nor in terms of the little fragment of local history through which he has lived, but against the Universe itself.⁷⁰

Kaunda considers nationalism an expression of African humanism, since it drew its live-power from the African people. This humanist expression then, he accepts as the fundamental difference between African society and Western society. The nineteenth century marked the height of humanism in Western culture, depicted in exploration and voyage; however, its resort to imperialism, expressed in racialism in Africa, was its decline in this respect. Kaunda surmises that the West discarded the value of humanism with colonialism, to satisfy its ego, giving room for Africa to assume its rightful position as the cradle of man. According to him, "we in Africa have always had a gift for enjoying man for himself. It is at the heart of our traditional culture..."⁷¹ This human centeredness of the African world was why the African was able to withstand the forces of colonialism. That is, African values which have the service to man at its center is far more superior to the European technology and politics which is intended to demonstrate European powers. Kaunda explains this position more:

It was nationalism, of course, which restored self-confidence, for it taught us what we could do together as men, and only as men-at no stage in the freedom struggle had we the material power or military might of the colonialists. It was humanity in revolt that won us our freedom. I believe we triumphed not because we had the greater power, but because we occupied the superior moral position. This fact, enlightened colonial powers such as Britain recognized, and could no longer rule us without forfeiting their self-respect. When I came away from London in 1964 with Zambia's independence

constitution in my brief case, I and my colleagues were greeted at Lusaka Airport by a huge cheering crowd and in that most moving moment it struck me afresh that it was people who had done this thing. It was triumph of a man-centered society over a power-centered society.⁷²

Following from this, Kaunda concludes that Africa could be the last place where man could really be man; “let the West have its Technology and Asia its Mysticism! Africa’s gift to the world culture must be in the realm of Human Relationships”.⁷³ To explain this further, he went on to describe what he considered the basis of African humanism. In the first place, African has greater affinity with the Universe, so has a better understanding of nature. This is because by living close to nature, he experiences the forces of nature directly rather than rely on mere description of the Universe which is common with the scientific method. That is:

Those people who are dependent upon and live in closest relationship with Nature are most conscious of the operation of these forces: the pulse of their lives beats in harmony with the pulse of the Universe. They may be simple and unlettered people and their physical horizons may be strictly limited, yet I believe that they inhabit a larger world than the sophisticated westerner who has magnified his physical senses through invented gadgets at the price, all too often, of cutting out the dimension of the spiritual.⁷⁴

This firsthand experience of the composite, yet unitary feature of the Universe forces the African to regard nature with awe and approach its understanding with respect and humility. Hence he tries to live in accordance with the natural rhythm rather than dictate to or try to shape its activities. Doing this requires that Africans work together in wrestling survival from nature. This way, they exhibit the harmony and communion in the Universe which are natural demands as much as it is cultural. The opposite of this consciousness is expressed by the European as Kaunda depicts:

It is easy, of course, to romanticize Nature, but this is an error more likely to be made by those comfortably

protected from it than people like myself who have experienced its cruelest moods in disease, blight, famine and drought. To be exposed to Nature and to have to live your life at its rhythm develops humility as a human characteristic rather than arrogance. Men are more companionable and take the trouble to live harmoniously together because they know that only by acting together can they reap the benefits and try to overcome the hardship of Nature.⁷⁵

Secondly, the unity in the Universe which translates to cultural communion exerts same influence on the psychology of the African. The fact of this was evident in the intricate bond of relationship which existed in the tribal societies. Here, “persons are not conceived as existing forces side by side independent of one another. Neither does Man-living and departed, live independent of lesser forces. There is always constant interaction and influence of one force on another”.⁷⁶ From this, Kaunda goes on to distinguish the tribal society from western society. He qualifies the tribal community as a mutual society. This stems from the fact that the African concept of life abhors individualism, but was rather geared towards the satisfaction of the basic human needs of all its members. “Individuated and discrete self tends to reflect the basic ontological relationship of the average Europeans”;⁷⁷ but the African believed that ‘I am because we are, and since we are I am’. C.B. Okolo interprets this to mean that the African is essentially a being-with, and it is this that underlies his very claim to the title “African”.⁷⁸ Okere explains this understanding to read that the “self is congenitally communitarian self, incapable of being, existing and really unthinkable except in the complex of relations of the community”.⁷⁹ Ekei describes it as active belongingness of all man; “this implies not just living in the community but participating actively in its life and activities”.⁸⁰ This active participation for Kaunda means that:

Most resources such as land and cattle might be communally owned and administered by chiefs and village headmen for the benefit of everyone. If for example, a villager required a new hut, all the men would

turn to and cut the trees to erect the frame and bring grass for thatching. The women might be responsible for making the mud-plaster for the walls and two or three of them would undoubtedly brew some beer so that all the workers would be refreshed after a hot but satisfying day's work. In the same spirit, the able-bodied would accept responsibility for tending and harvesting the gardens of the sick and infirm.⁸¹

The fact that this communal spirit and solidarity is extended to accommodate the weak, the sick, the aged and even strangers, Kaunda equally qualifies the tribal community as accepting society. Because community was the basis of life, individuals were assessed not because of their material contributions to the society but because they were there. Social existence counted more than individual achievements. Thus, the survival and welfare of the members of the community were collective aspiration and undertaking. According to Ekei, it is from this basis springs the obligation to care and show concern to the weak and indigent members of the society; justice as care and concern. He argues that "while every individual needs communal care out of moral justice, there are few others that need even closer attention in terms of justice-as-concern".⁸² This specifies why Kaunda observes that he was horrified at his first encounter with the Western idea of Old peoples Home, which, he believes, treats the aged as if they were social nuisance rather than with respect they deserved for being there. He argues that this was the result and product of a society conditioned by individuality, in which what matters most is an individual's contribution, not his being. His argument runs thus:

No doubt a defender of the western way of life might reason that institutions for the care of the old people are inevitable in large-scale societies and that but for the efforts of the state and voluntary agencies many old people would starve. This is undoubtedly true but it merely serves to underlie my point that in a society which regards person to person relationships as supremely important no one can be so isolated that responsibility for his welfare cannot be determined and assigned.⁸³

In this respect, the western society, though considered highly civilized and advanced, has something to learn from the indigenous tribal society.

Thirdly, Kaunda qualifies the tribal society as inclusive society, as against the European exclusive society. The inclusiveness of the tribal society was expressed in the extended family system in which individual's responsibilities was not limited or restricted only to his or her immediate family members, rather expanded to the entire community. The basis of this is found in the African metaphysical conception of life and existence. Based on the relational ontology of the Africans, family hood included all the members of the community and extended through the departed of the society till God. Kaunda alludes to this thus:

Let me give you an example of the inclusiveness of the traditional society. I do not restrict the title 'father' to my male parent. I also address my father's brothers as 'father'. And I call my mother's sisters 'mother' also. Only my father's sisters would I address as 'aunt' and my mother's brothers as 'uncle'. My 'brothers' would include not only the male children of my father but also certain cousins and even members of the same clan who have no blood relationship to me at all. Now this, to the western mind, very confusing state of affair, is not merely a matter of terminology. These are not just courtesy titles. With the title "father" for example, goes all the responsibility of parenthood and in return all my 'fathers' receive my filial devotion. Hence, no child in a traditional society is likely to be orphaned. Should his literal parents die, then others automatically assume the responsibility for his upbringing. By the same token, no old person is likely to end his days outside a family circle. If his own offspring cannot care for him then other 'children' will accept the duty and privilege.⁸⁴

In his autobiography, *Zambia shall be Free*, Kaunda makes this state of affair clearer with a particular personal experience:

Old man Mr. McMinn, whom we called *Shikulu*-‘grandfather’-my own father and the other missionaries had created out of nothing a busy community of order and peace, which I look back upon with a deep thankfulness, realizing how much I owe to my early training in that place. Although we were five children in the family, I never remember sitting down to a meal with just ourselves present. There were always numerous guests and visitors in our home. During the term time there were always boys with us, sons of my father’s friends who could not find fees and whom my parents out of kindness had taken in.⁸⁵

These instances, more or less, support the fact that African society is man-centered. This is not merely aggregate of social constitution but more of the composition and disposition of African psychology. “Kaunda wants to restore to post-colonial Africans not only their human dignity, but their conscious awareness of their human dignity”.⁸⁶ This way, this basis of the tribal culture would not be lost even in the face of the massive influence of Western ideals.

Kaunda further believes that African mind or person, conditioned by the harmony found in his metaphysical world-view is able to adapt properly to the tension created from his experiences of reality. This means that the African could hold two contradictory ideas and values in fruitful tension or harmony. This understanding is why the African doesnot admit of any conceptual division between the natural and the supernatural worlds, but regards them as aspects of the same reality. He argues that this is the basis to why the African is able to deal comfortably with the reality of racial differences without resorting to racial arrogance or the idea of superiority and inferiority of races, which is common toWestern psychology. “The Westerner has an aggressive mentality. He cannot live with contradictory ideas in his mind; he must settle for one or the other or else evolve a third which harmonizes or reconciles the other two”.⁸⁷ For this reason, he easily fell into the deep pit of racial denigration which characterized colonialism. But the African differs in that his fundamental ontology

admits of diversity in relational interaction. Hence, he “certainly avoids the danger of treating people as things”.⁸⁸ Kaunda believes that on this basis the African could regard the split created in his personality by colonial influences as an asset, since it is obvious that he is able to weather the tension that results therefrom. “One of the discoveries we are making about man in Africa is just how adaptable he can become and how his nature can expand to measure itself against the magnitude of the challenges which face him”.⁸⁹ In other words, this situation increases the possibilities of the African. However, Kaunda warns that the danger of imperialism is that it has the tendency to superimpose and dominate the social realm of life, employing the influences of science and technology. And with this comes the greater danger of its attendant materialism, which tends to alienate man from man; thus, try to erase the social domain which is African. The African personality, shaped by culture and tradition is profoundly humane; the obviousness of this is deduced from the following characteristics, which E.A. Ruch and K.C. Anyanwu present as follows:

1. The African enjoys meeting and talking with people for their own sake and not merely for what they are doing, what class they belong to or for their productive usefulness;
2. He is patient with trials and is used to his dependence on nature;
3. He is forgiving: his anger usually does not last long. This is shown graphically in the speed with which he has overcome his resentment at having been for so long under colonial domination. He does not (at least generally) keep grudge against whites for having degraded him for long, provided of course that the whites respect him and his human dignity;
4. He loves rhythm, music and dance, all of which are physical expressions of man’s life-force.⁹⁰

To these Kaunda equally, adds:

Allied to this sense of rhythm is our optimism. Africans are great optimists, they have a sunny outlook and hate gloom and pessimism. The source of our optimism is not the ability to ignore unpalatable facts and refuse to look steadfastly upon the dark side of life. Our optimism

springs rather from our faith in people. It is faith in the goodness of people that we must reinstate in africa.⁹¹

This depicts for Kaunda the belief that in the long run, man will triumph. He intends that this belief should be restored in people just as social institutions should be structured towards realizing this in social life.

3.4.2 Humanism of God

Humanism in Kaunda's conception is Christian humanism. God is the father of all men, and to him all their actions and lives ought to measure. That is;

While we are all children of our earthly parents by physical birth, we become by spiritual birth, in a special sense, the children of God. And in that spiritual relationship, all men should live in peace and love. If people do not belong to our race, colour or nation we must not hate them, for we are all God's children, and God's children must work together to banish sin from the heart and not to work against one another.⁹²

From this basis he goes on to explain his understanding of Christian Humanism:

By Christian humanism, I mean that we discover all that is worth knowing about God through our fellow men and unconditional service of our fellow men is the purest form of the service of God. I believe that man must be the servant of a vision which is bigger than himself; that his path is illumined by God's revelation and that when he shows love towards his fellow men, he is sharing the very life of God, who is Love. When man learns, by bitter experience if in no other way, that the only hope for the peace and happiness of the world is to give political and economic expression to love for others we shall have entered not the kingdom of man but the kingdom of God.⁹³

He expresses this position in difference to the common secularist humanist position, especially as posited by H.J. Blackham in his *Objections to Humanism*. Most humanist principles, especially in the West, do not recognize any supreme authority outside human welfare, and on this basis de-emphasize absolute moral norms and policies as

fallible and tentative. Human institutions and policies have no other end than the prevailing human condition in that particular society. Consequently, to counter this position in Blackham, Kaunda avers:

He claims that ‘there is no supreme-exemplar of humanist ethics, because, on humanist assumptions, there is no *Summum bonum*, no chief end of all action, no far-off crowning event to which all things move and for which all things exist, no teleology, no definite human nature even’. I am certainly not a humanist in Mr. Blackham’s sense if this quotation describes the basis of the humanist case.⁹⁴

Kaunda’s humanism reflects the major tapestry which runs through humanism in Africa, discernable through African religion, which informs the basic African world-view. In African religion, just as in other religions, teleology plays a principal role. Hence Kaunda goes on to posit;

I do not believe that we were intended to thrash our way blindly through history, either as individuals or as nations. Every act of obedience to God must take us nearer to some great goal. Only God knows what the great blueprint of life is, and the most that we can do is always to be ready for God to cross our path and lead us off in some strange, new direction.⁹⁵

But, though man is answerable to God in the end, yet, African religion is principally anthropocentric. Religion is focused on the enhancement of human existence rather than the divine; “even God is said to exist for the sake of man”.⁹⁶ Because of this, Kaunda argues that Christianity should serve man towards realizing his social possibilities. That is, religion ought to reinforce man’s faith in the goodness of man, and the desire to make life better for all man. Kaunda lays more emphasis thus:

I believe that the legacy of certain types of Christianity which emphasizes the sinfulness and depravity of man is more of a curse than a blessing to us. I doubt that the

people of Africa really knew what misery was until the missionary came.... I do not mean that they were never sad, cast down and reeling before life's blows. But they never made the cult of misery a way of life which is what bad religion taught them. A people who have had their self-confidence driven out of them by aggressive colonialism need a faith which strengthens their belief in their own possibilities, not one which has them groveling before an Old Testament God, beating their breasts and wailing about their unworthiness.⁹⁷

However, man's perfect self-realization and Attainment of his life's possibilities is, still, strongly anchored on God. Makumba points this out by showing that Kaunda believes "that the drive towards human self-realization is God-centered, thereby finding its perfect example in Christ, the God-man, to whom all humanity must measure".⁹⁸ The person of Jesus teaches both personal lesson and service to fellow man. Kaunda notes in this respect that a fundamental virtue which the humanist should possess is humility; Jesus was a perfect example of humility in service. He writes:

For all my optimism about man's possibilities, I do not make the mistake of forgetting that he is God's creature, with all that this means both in limitation and in dignity. Nor do I deny the reality of sin. The besting sin of the humanist is pride. The significance of Jesus Christ is surely that He spells death to our pride by showing us how far short of God's design for us we are. He is the Man against whom all men must measure themselves when they try to live the life of love. Then they will discover that He lived the perfect life of love not by His own unaided ability but because He was totally submissive and obedient to the will of God.⁹⁹

On another hand, Jesus teaches that the basis of Christianity lay in the commandment, 'thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself'. He showed the necessity of this law in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and stressed that even a member of a despised social class could embody service to humanity. Consequently, Kaunda argues that "humanism operates on the boundary between religion and politics as a channel for the

best gifts of all true faith: compassion, service, and love-to be lavished on the nation's people".¹⁰⁰ During the independence struggle, he had constantly reminded his colleagues that Christian religion had something to teach them about political organization. This admission, also, shows how deeply perturbed he felt on the failure of the missionaries to openly back the struggle for freedom, majority rule and racial emancipation in Northern Rhodesia. As a result he notes that "Christian principles can never be split, they have either to be accepted, or sacrificed as they are. In our opinion, for Christian churches not to condemn racial discrimination, whether practiced by black or white governments, or any other groups, is to sacrifice Christian principles. What is immoral cannot safely be passed as Christianly right".¹⁰¹ Makumba understands this to imply that "Kaunda saw the need for religious believers to harness the power inherent in their faith for socially desirable ends".¹⁰² The necessity of this finds explanation in Kaunda's conviction that human life cannot be confined only to the present life because it contains a spark of immortality. This can be deduced by reason which is God's gift to man. Man's actions tend towards God's will. He controls all things and to Him man must submit through love and service.

3.4.3 Centrality of Man

Kaunda believes that man is intrinsically good, thus has dignity. This is why, in the first place, he fully accepts Teilhard de Chardin's summation that "man is growing in self-knowledge and will one day fully realize his capabilities"¹⁰³ as the basis of his humanist ideology. In other words, he believes that the collective realization of human dignity and the restoration of the centrality of man in the world, will get all social institutions-politics and economics- back on the right track and working properly. He feels that the significance of this is founded on the fact that the contemporary era has lost its appreciation of the value of man, and have subsumed him under institutional operation and efficiency, as is common to Capitalism. Therefore, to bring man back, again, into focus, his welfare should be made to assume center stage. To realize this, he openly theorizes:

How can we humanize our politics in Zambia so that the humblest and least well-endowed of our citizens occupies a central place in Government's concern? The point of departure must surely be to look afresh at Man-not Man for anything or Man as anything but Man in himself-and sing his praises unashamedly. For until every person learns self-valuation, it is pointless trying to humanize Government and other institutions within which Man tends to be subsumed.¹⁰⁴

Man has possibilities and limitations. Kaunda accepts that this fact places his nature on a different pedestal from that of animals. Man is an animal because he shares the same nature with other animal; yet, "is it not amazing what this frail creature has achieved by using his mind and imagination in place of lost instincts?"¹⁰⁵ Equally, Kaunda argues that although man has recorded so great inventions and achievements, his greatest shortcoming and challenge comes in the area of social relationship; "his inability to live in community and to make his highest faculty, love, the law of his being".¹⁰⁶ And the very confrontation with this problem, places two choices before him. According to Kaunda:

The choice is between rejoining his animal ancestors and struggling against his lower Self in order to achieve spiritual freedom. There is a price to be paid either way. To align oneself with the animal world is to sacrifice dignity for comfort. To choose human freedom is to purify one's spirit through suffering and sacrifice. And by every decision he makes, man shows whether he belongs to the past or the future; whether he is a biological dead-end or a new departure in evolution, thrusting upwards into the realm of the spirit.¹⁰⁷

Whichever be the path man takes, the fact is that such choice propels him towards the goal of the Universe. Kaunda entirely agrees with Teilhard de Chardin that life evolves progressively towards a greater form of being. Though this realization is comforting, it still constitutes a challenge to man. Confronting this challenge requires

him, therefore, to put up his best efforts as he thrusts through the course of life, or else relapse to the level of animals. Kaunda shows how this plays out by considering the qualities he believes are unique to man. In the first place, he considers that only man has the capacity for suffering. By this he means to differentiate suffering from mere experience of pain, which he believes is a quality of lower animals. For him “pain brings out the very highest or the very lowest in man-it will either degrade him and reduce him to the animal, or it can be used creatively to accomplish some purpose. Strike a child and he will suffer, not because he feels unpleasant sensation but because he senses a change in relationship”.¹⁰⁸ This in other words implies that “suffering is the ability to understand and use pain in a constructive way”.¹⁰⁹ This definition follows from his understanding of the idea of non-violence in Gandhi and Martin Luther King jnr as is obvious from the statement; “the key to the philosophy of non-violence is that it transforms pain into suffering. It welcomes the pain inflicted by others and uses it to alter relationships”.¹¹⁰ This alludes to the principle of civil disobedience and non-cooperation, which are basic tactics employed in non-violence to effect social improvement and reconstruction. The operation of this appears thus:

Civil disobedience and non-cooperation as practiced under Satyagraha are based on the “law of suffering”, a doctrine that the endurance of suffering is a means to an end. This end usually implies a moral upliftment or progress of an individual or society. Therefore, non-cooperation in Satyagraha is in fact a means to secure the cooperation of the opponent consistently with truth and justice.¹¹¹

In reference to the above, Kaunda, also, brings out the tendency of man, in terms of modern social organizations, to degrade the dignity of man through denial of love. That is, that the refusal to suffer for the sake of another tantamount to non-recognition of the value of man operational in modern societies. He elaborates:

The very attempts of modern societies to insulate themselves from suffering have resulted in a refusal of love, for the willingness to love and be loved makes

suffering inevitable. And in the refusal of love, modern man feels pain without the possibility of transforming it into suffering. In trying to shut out suffering, man only turns into something useless and degrading. To be a man implies a willingness to accept the responsibility and dignity of suffering; where this capacity is lost, man once again takes his place in the animal world.¹¹²

He intends by this statement to show the position adopted by the apartheid regime and policy in Northern Rhodesia before the independence of Zambia. The racial programme of the apartheid regime refused to accept the reality of man in the African, hence, treated him like an instrument and a means to the sustenance of the prevailing social structure rather than use these structure for his good.

Secondly, Kaunda believes that the dignity of man rests on the fact that man has a name. For him, name does not mean the common label, man, which refers to a whole specie, but “the means by which we are identified and distinguished from each other”.¹¹³ Based on African ontology which is essentially human centered, Africa is rich in names, since names reflect the interconnectedness of relationship which characterizes this worldview. Consequently, “to be known by name is to be dependent, linked with one the one who utters it, and to know all a man’s names is to have a special claim upon him”.¹¹⁴ Names usually depict the extended family spirit of the African. On another hand, name describes special circumstance surrounding a person, his particular achievement or a special event related to his person. In other words, though the individual is essentially part of the whole or community, he still retains his individuality as a mark of distinction. In his work, *African Social and Political Philosophy*, Okolo clearly supports this claim when he writes that, “in African philosophy, self is not completely dissolved into an object. An individual existence has a double status and import”.¹¹⁵ Kaunda furthers this by stating that, “the importance of man having a name is that it speaks both of his uniqueness and of his dependence upon others”.¹¹⁶ As such, name is very significant in the African worldview unlike in

the Colonial-Christian position, where it was a matter of convenience. The Western-Christian colonial view bespeaks of racism and denigration of man in the African. Consequently, Kaunda argues that, in this tradition, “it was less trouble for the White Man to dub a servant John or David than to go to the trouble of learning his true name, which would be to demean himself and come down to the African’s level”.¹¹⁷ The significance of a name is in the fact that on it lies the individual’s humanity and dignity. This arises from, as had been shown, both his interconnectedness with others in the society and his individuality. Kaunda believes that each man is unrepeatable, since it is impossible for any other person to share the same point with him in space and time. Each person makes a distinctive mark and contribution, which is particular to him, and non-identical. To this regard Kaunda rhetorically asks; “is it not the tension between that element in his nature in which he differs from all others and the element which he shares with them that produces most of the great things of which he is capable of?”.¹¹⁸

Lastly, Kaunda believes that man is an end in himself. He holds that this is obvious in the fact that he was made in the image of God, and was from the onset given dominion over all things. So, man is therefore, the pivot of the world. This is what Protagoras implied in the idea that man is the measure of all things. African ontology, which is mostly religious, in reflection of this, places man at the center of all the interacting vital forces. Paul Ogugua, in his *Igbo Understanding of Man*, succinctly posit this in stating that “at the center of the universe is man. Every being and God is at the service of man. Man through physical activities, sacrifices, rituals, prayers, et.c. maintain the balance in the universe”.¹¹⁹ However, to Kaunda, the materialistic capitalism of the modern society has reduced man to a mere means to an end. He shows this distortion thus:

The industrialist uses him as a means to wealth. To the demagogue he is the means to power, to the selfish lover

the means to gratification. The war-monger uses him as cannon-fodder; to the economist he is a statistic; to the mass entertainer, he is an instrument to be manipulated. Everywhere Man is being used. And once he becomes a means to an end then all his abilities and activities can be exploited and organized to serve the interests of the nation, the state or the society. He ceases to be the absolute standard by which all systems should be measured. Instead, he has to twist his personality and reduce his stature in order to fit into the system.¹²⁰

This is exact reflection of the racist structure of colonialism and imperialism in Africa. Apartheid policies alienated man by using him as a means to service social and political units of the modern world. But man is not an abstraction or a mere object, but real and concrete being. For this reason, Kaunda advocates that social and political institutions of the society should be made to help man realize his possibilities, so claim and retain his place in the world. Physically, these units of the modern world dwarf man, but morally and intellectually, they are just fragments of his possibilities. Hence, man should not be used to service efficient government, national pride and international prestige. “And we can only avoid doing this by having faith in him and creating the conditions of life which will enable him to justify this faith”.¹²¹ Kaunda, by this, declares that he has faith in man, so stands in defense of man.

3.4.4 Dignity of Labour

Kaunda treats of the dignity of labour as a path towards the realization of man's possibilities. Labour constitutes the path in the evolution of man's being. Consequently, he considers work very essential to the very existence of man and human societies. Work is the essence of man and the determinant of who he is. His integrity, his uniqueness and the furtherance of his aspirations is dependent on the strength of his will and effort. To reflect this, Kaunda treats the legitimacy of hard work as a way of building a modern society, and chastised Zambians on the progress and development of independent Zambia as a modern free nation. He avers:

No man, no nation can exist without work. All growth depends on activity-on work. Even animals have to work to obtain food. In our environment there can be no development, no progress, physical or intellectual, without effort. Effort means work. So work is not a curse: indeed, among human beings it is the most cardinal of the means to manhood and a key factor to the development of our civilization. The defense of our liberty, freedom and independence means work. The furtherance of the aims of freedom and independence, the realization of our economic, social and cultural goal demands hard work.¹²²

By this Kaunda intends to identify work with the collective spirit of Zambians, their aspiration and attitude towards national development. Therefore, work implies the common effort of people towards realizing nationhood. To this end he makes a classification of persons based on their attitudes to work; there are category of men who work exclusively for money and comfort alone. “Their philosophy is simply minimum effort at work and maximum benefit and leisure time. They are menace to society”.¹²³ Because their attitude run contrary to the aspiration of nation building and what conscientious labour stand for. There is a second group, which consists of nationalists, whose understanding of work is fundamentally a service to the nation. These men do not work for remuneration but essentially to promote national growth. “They believe that certain tasks have to be performed in order that the Nation can satisfy its needs; work on such tasks has to be done strenuously and successfully. Work done for delight, is heartily done”.¹²⁴ The spirit employed in the nationalist struggle derives from the traditional definition of life in terms of co-existence and solidarity. In other words, work is seen as a corporate responsibility, in which no worker can succeed without the support of others. As cited by Okolo, Bede Onuoha notes that in the social dynamics of the traditional African societies, every member of the extended family was a worker, as the system eschews “loiterers”.¹²⁵ In depiction of this ideal, Kaunda observes that “in a humanist society, conscientious workers must always consider the interests of other fellow workers and members of society in

general and the harm done to them through irresponsible behavior such as laziness, drunkenness at work, or illegal strikes which can bring development to a grinding halt”.¹²⁶ The third category of workers consider work not only as a service to the nation, but also means to achieving personal worth; that is enhancing individual possibilities. Here, work is a vocation to fulfil life’s demands, and in doing this, the individual attains life’s dignity. As such, work is the essence of life, granted to man by the creator from the onset. Kaunda explains:

This is fundamental in our Humanist philosophy. We must regard work as part of the process of improving man’s inherent qualities; we must regard work as the process of man’s efforts to become a better man. Work is, in this case, both an instrument and part of the process of self-fulfillment. Looking at it from this angle, there is nobleness and a sacredness in work. There is, therefore, reason to derive joy from work. There is reason to do much more than we are required by , say, regulations, even beyond normal working hours, if only to improve our creative powers and capacity to solve even more difficult problems in life.¹²⁷

In this regard, work is a demonstration of usefulness, both, to oneself and to the society. Man’s life has a purpose, which is why he is different from trees and animals; work is the practical manifestation of this purpose. At this point, Kaunda observes that the essence of attaining independence by African nations is to reduce their dependence on their colonial masters; that is, to become self-reliant through their own efforts. In other words, Africans should not play the beggar nor be beggars, for begging does not accord one dignity or self-respect. In his words, “national decency, national dignity and national respect and prosperity all depend entirely on the success of our creative efforts and hard work to maintain the highest possible level of production of goods and services which constitute our national cake”.¹²⁸ He believes that this would help curb the intensity of imitationism of the West, which overwhelms the African personality. This requires unity of purpose and action, to build a strong, free and prosperous nation, by all citizens. Independent and democratic Zambia can only make

meaning in a situation of social and economic freedom made possible through conscientious work.

3.4.5 Significance of Education

The significance of education in *Zambian Humanism* is easily seen from two points; it constituted the basis on which the Europeans denigrated man, in the being of the African; and to perpetuate this denigration, they instituted racism in Central African Federation. Basically, colonialism thrived in Africa because the African was seen as untutored, hence unenlightened. To reflect this belief is why J. Freire's Andrade, an attaché to the Portuguese embassy states that, "many countries in Africa are not ready for independence because of the fact that they do not think as we do and have a different conception of progress than ourselves".¹²⁹ This belief is even given much emphasis by G.W.F. Hegel in this observation:

The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, the very reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas-the category of universality. In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained the realization of any substantial objective existence-as for example, God or law-in which the interest of man's volition is involved and in which he realized his own being. Thus distinction between himself as an individual and the Universality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, underdeveloped Oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so that the knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher that his individual self, is entirely wanting.¹³⁰

Consequently and to perpetuate this belief, it was convenient for the then established form of partnership in Central African Federation to run education on apartheid basis. Kanu Ikechukwu brings out this in observing that, "at the time, the colonial government made little investment in education and Medicare. It was so glaring after the British left for only less than a 100 indigenous people were graduates".¹³¹ Kaunda adds an elaborate description of the situation in a memorandum the African National

Congress presented to the federation government on the need to revise the level of education given to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia. He writes:

As far as technical education and training was concerned, progress was slow that Africans found it difficult to take advantage of the agreed plan for advancement in the mines and in other branches of industry.... 'If the government of Northern Rhodesia has the principle of Partnership at all at heart it must give Africans the same opportunity and standard of technical education and training as the Europeans. There is no apprenticeship scheme for Africans in any industry in Northern Rhodesia. Africans are explicitly excluded from the terms of the Apprenticeship Ordinance. The mass education of Adults, of great importance to a community seeking a further franchise, has been allowed to die out for lack of government support and enthusiasm.¹³²

Therefore, this kind of education made available for the African was meant to keep him subordinate and perpetually in the shadow of the Europeans. In way, it was to make so obvious the fact of psychological difference between them, hence, the subservience of the African to the European.

To counteract this situation, Kaunda emphasizes education of the African as a way of liberating him from the clutches of the European domination. According to him, unless the African organizes himself like the Whiteman does, he would remain in this subservient position, and it would be difficult for him to re-acquire his freedom, entirely, from the white settler. His emphasis is not just on deposing colonialism, but on establishing a multi-racial society based on majority rule, in which the African has, as it is, a prominent stake in. So, Kaunda views the education of the African as paramount, both to the realization of the modern society, and in its maintenance. This otherwise implies that democracy in Africa by necessity requires education in order to flourish and to build a society which puts premium on social equality. Kaunda lays more emphasis thus:

But democracy is of little benefit to the people if they are to remain uneducated and the number of illiterates remain high. Democracy cannot flourish properly unless the people are able to understand and take part in the institutions that democracy has forged for them. Our immediate aim therefore is to ensure that the peoples of Northern Rhodesia receive universal education up to the highest level that the sources of the country will allow; for only by a high level of national intelligence and education can the people attain their aspirations and thus consciously and effectively participate in the democratic institutions of the country. Hand in hand with education goes the principle of equality of opportunity, which must be another pillar of democratic institutions, for without it the nation becomes immediately split between the haves and the have-nots, and no sense of immorality which one's children kindle can compensate for opportunity that these children are denied.¹³³

This democratic setting, when realized conforms well as a necessary condition towards the attainment of man's life possibilities in Africa. As such, Kaunda sees education as a means to accessing these possibilities. Man has the ability to situate himself in space and time to the extent of understanding his place and responsibilities in the universe; education aids this understanding. For this reason, when Zambia became independent, Kaunda built many schools and colleges to cater for professionals and technicians needed to sustain the socio-economic structure of the young state; he had perceived hunger, poverty and ignorance as detractors to man's quest to situate himself in building a modern society. From this perception he considers that education has a moral force; the experiences he had while in prison made him conclude that education has the role of lifting man away from crime, while also enabling him to access certain social services that are put at his disposal to help him in case he commits crime. Again, during this time Kaunda was appalled at the number of young Africans that were convicted of various crimes by the apartheid regime, and at the fact that this government made it almost impossible for them to seek social avenues to freedom. This had made these youthful inmates to, instead,

recline to the false sense of security provided by the prison environment. He explains that in the end the future African society is made worst off by this government's negligence; "think of the thousands of boys and girls who don't find places at schools. What is there to stop them 'graduating' at this underworld 'University' by the thousands?"¹³⁴ The reality of this added to intensify his stand and struggle against apartheid and imperialism.

3.4.6 Future of Democracy for Africans

Nationalism and its accompanying activities was a struggle to establish a democratic state of affair in African continent; that is, an identity that would befit the African person. This is the case, since the attainment of independence marked the beginning of popular government, and the establishment of the principle of adult suffrage, which were the basis for the desire of independence in the formerly dependent territories. "Democracy is denied in those states which are either still dependent upon outside rule or where a section of the people-often the majority-are denied the rights and freedoms considered inherent in a Democratic State".¹³⁵ Consequently for Kaunda, the attainment of independence by the for colonies demonstrated man's possibility to situate himself in space and time, a stage towards the realization of his other possibilities; his ability to measure himself against the universe. However, the realization of this social situation is usually fraught with challenges; for instance, the revolutionary form of change and alterations in independent Zambia came hand in hand with a kind of psychic shock to the formerly colonized people. That is, the aftermath of a colonial overthrow manifested in form of a psychical state of difficulty in adjusting to independence, and moving towards the expected possibilities, for the Africans. According to Kaunda, this came from the sudden realization, by Africans, that the attainment of independence has not fully reproduced their expectations-desired personal and social changes-at least, not in the immediate present. The realization is that after independence, more is still needed to be done, and more effort is required of them still to arrive at the modern society they seek. Therefore, rather

than the feeling of difference, the reality of freedom left the former colonized persons feeling more like their old selves under colonialism. This is because the struggle for supremacy between their traditional self and colonial experiences persists, leading into the new socio-political constitution. Kaunda explains why:

It takes more than the lowering of a Union Jack, the stroke of a pen and the passing of an act of parliament to wipe out the past. However exciting the vistas that open up before a newly independent state; however radically different the power-structure of the new state from the old; it is still *old* people who constitute the *new* state. No blessed amnesia steals over them on the morning after Independence Day. They carry with them into the new society as part of their baggage the experience and heritage of their colonial past in spite of all their attempts to wipe the state clean. Human nature is not, in the short run, changed by constitutional instruments.¹³⁶

The fact of this has a debilitating effect on the individuals' speed of adjusting to freedom, and the flourishing of their possibilities. And newly independent administrations add to the extent of the problem they inherited from the colonial masters, if they ignore this fact. On the other hand, its recognition would go a long way to easing the rate of the people's adjustment to independence situation.

Colonialism and its debilitating effect on the African is long-lasting, according to Kaunda, because it incited in the African "a series of contradiction-a strange mixture of advantages and disadvantages, curses and blessings".¹³⁷ In Ruch and Anyanwu's description, the African becomes "schizophrenic: a split personality".¹³⁸ This is because colonialism in its wake had impressed on the African an uneasy union of two alien values, such that he is neither at home with one nor with the other. For Kaunda, this implies that colonialism freed the African from ignorance, diseases, superstition and slavery by enlarging his life horizon, yet on the other hand, it introduced a deepening awareness of servitude. This "arises from the inferiority complex of the

African vis-a-vis the technically superior Europeans”.¹³⁹ Colonialism brought different form of security in terms of the rule of law, which freed Africans from the arbitrary power of their tribal chiefs, and money economy which lessened their dependence on the unpredictable nature. But on the other hand, it took away their social identity, found in their tribal ties and relationship within the network of existence. It introduced a wider followership and solidarity far greater than the old tribal relationship in terms of political parties, trade unions, social clubs, churches etc. “But urbanization, which brought men together, also effectively separated them out into lone units, having to fend for themselves and feeling infinitely remote from the village’s little welfare state where the old, the sick and the incapable were accepted as legitimate charges upon the charity of all”.¹⁴⁰ Lastly, colonialism brought about a situation for greater attainment and realization of potentials, but with this came greater possibility of failure. “While it opened up greater opportunity for vertical social mobility through social competition, it has also introduced mechanisms which restricts these opportunities to an elite, from which the weak are excluded, if they are not totally degraded in their human dignity itself”.¹⁴¹ Unlike this, the traditional tribal society valued man, and gave him a place because of who he is and not because of what he has achieved. Thus, while it is acceptably true that the influence of colonialism on the African has its benefits, it has, equally, sown a far reaching psychological side effects. For this reason Kaundasuccinctly confesses that “honesty compels us to recognize that the colonial impact has sown confusion and set up tensions in the minds of the African people which added appreciably to the difficulties facing the governments of independent African states”.¹⁴²

Equally, the colonial influence on the African asserted itself in terms of psychological restiveness of the people to political authorities and controls. Kaunda posits that the problem with this state of affair is that, though it was built up due to the colonial political frustration of the African’s desire for freedom during the pre-independence

era, yet, “it takes more than exuberant participation in independence celebrations to work it off. It persists beyond the removal of its rational causes”.¹⁴³ Hence, it could manifest in the post-independent African states in form of aggression and violent demonstrations against the new administration. This pent-up energy of the people, manifest in nationalist struggles, according to Kaunda, ought to find expression in practical terms. It has to find expression in constructive development plans and activities of the new state; that is, in the common effort to build a thriving independent modern state.

Nationalism was a concerted effort to drive out a common enemy, colonialism-the basis of Blackman’s split identity. Kaunda explains that:

...nothing succeeds in uniting people so effectively as the struggle against a common enemy. Traditional differences are forgotten, internecine strife ceases and all energy of the people are harnessed to drive them towards one goal. In Africa, colonialism has provided a convenient if hardly warlike Common Enemy in opposition to which a people traditionally divided along tribal, linguistic and regional lines, achieves Unity. In its militant phase, nationalism is the great solvent of traditional divisions. Intellectuals stand shoulder to shoulder with peasants, urban dwellers with rural folk, and personal enmities between leaders of the people are played down in order that all eyes may be focused upon the one target-the dispossession of the colonial power.¹⁴⁴

But, with the deposition of the common enemy came a change in momentum and phase in the national struggle. At this stage, it dawned on the African that he has to determine and define himself; who he really is, his goals and aspirations, not individually but collectively as a people, a nation. Since the common enemy is done away with, he now has nothing to blame for his failures to assert himself properly. This realization sets in again the tension between doing things the colonial way, or going back to his traditional social way of life. Kaunda points out that at this stage, the

essence of the negritude as ideology became very obvious. “The negritude debate has drawn attention to the fact that the question being asked all over Black Africa is ‘Who am I?’-it is a search for a stratum of experience which is neither a colonial importation nor a legacy of the tribal past; it is the attempt to discover what it means to be a modern African”.¹⁴⁵ Yet, Kaunda, equally, feels that negritude is too theoretical, and suited best the intellectual activities done in the university classrooms, hence falls short of the practical end being sought. In his summation, “the masses are not moved by abstractions; they must have something concrete and at a human scale to which they can attach themselves”.¹⁴⁶ Now that the common enemy is no more, what the people need is a common social ideology, which could easily apply to practical life, to replace the vacuum created by the removal of the common enemy. This stage in the national life is very crucial, therefore, Kaunda believes that it falls on the leader or party whose function was crucial in the struggle against colonialism leading up to early independence days to steer the people in the needed direction. Thus:

The ideology of nationalism must find a new mode of expression which will stir the people to throw themselves whole heartedly into the work of nation-building. We African leaders are well aware of the potency of the Common Enemy Concept and want to give it a new twist by calling our people to make war upon the elemental problems such as hunger and unemployment which threaten the existence of our State. These are the new, impersonal Common Enemy. ‘Freedom!’ as a watch word must be given an essential qualification-‘freedom through Hardwork!’. The stirring calls once made for the people to stand shoulder to shoulder against the colonialists must now go out as an appeal to tackle together great social and economic problems.... By personal example, the power of the party and skilful use of propaganda, the people must be made to realize that these new impersonal Common Enemies are as great a threat to their nationhood as ever the colonialist were.¹⁴⁷

Even at this, Kaunda also recognizes the tendency of some post-independent African leaders to deceive the people by representing neighboring nations as the common

enemy, under the guise of building national unity. There are some others who could revive traditional tribal or regional conflicts and division while searching for a scape goat to replace colonialism. He considers these attempts to delude and divert attention of the populace immoral and in the long run futile. For him, any political leader has a representative responsibility. “He must expect to be held to account if things go wrong and ought not to complain of injustice or victimization. It is the abnegation of leadership to ‘get out from under’ when responsibility has to be assigned”.¹⁴⁸ As such, collective effort should be geared towards finding that ideal for which the people would live, work and struggle together in unity and mutual understanding. “It is primarily through the evolution of a genuine culture that a people discover their national identity”.¹⁴⁹ In other words, this collective ideal would unite the entire people, irrespective of tribal divisions into a nation. This process should be founded on a firm cultural substratum. And it should as well not be entirely diffused of western principles, in as much as the independent nation is committed, as such, to running the economic and bureaucratic institutions left behind by the colonialists.

3.4.7 Expatriates and Racial Relations

Kaunda believes that the success of Zambian nationalism, obvious in the granting of independence to Zambia, would most likely elicit certain psychological dispositions from the white settlers with the demise of colonialism. He premises this belief, basically, on the fact that most settlers in the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, had vehemently objected to the granting of freedom to the black majority, on the assumption that the African was still premature to handle his political, economic and social advancement. This, he believes, could culminate into fear in the settlers that they might, likely, experience the reprisal of their apartheid policies from the black man, once he had been granted independence. Kaunda’s understanding is that;

Many Europeans feeling bitterly resentful at what they regarded as a ‘sell-out’ by the British Government, approached independence in a negative frame of mind,

fearful of the future. Possibly they were afraid that we Africans might return the Compliment and treat them to a dose of the same 'partnership' they had offered us!¹⁵⁰

With this perception, he decides to dole out how he feels that the settler-whites could make a psychological adjustment to African independence, and equally contribute to the building of national unity through inter-racial harmony. First step is total commitment to the Zambian course. In this regard, Kaunda believes that "there can be no adjustment to a new society without *commitment*-a willingness to identify oneself with a country's destiny, rejoicing in its hopes, sharing its fears, standing firm in times of hardship".¹⁵¹ This means, for the Europeans, a complete acceptance of Zambia as their home, without the mental calculations of weighing its advantages against its disadvantages; in which case they are undecided whether to stay or leave to a more comfortable nation. This demand for total commitment from the settler is partly because, on independence, only very few Africans were qualified professionals and technicians compared to the overwhelming number of these among the settlers. As such, the number of qualified man-power required to run the social and administrative machinery of the young state, which are also its inheritance from these whites, was lacking. Consequently, this situation necessitates adequate contribution of the white race; not just as groups but more important, individual professionals and technicians. Kaunda succinctly explains:

In the advanced, mammoth nations of the West, the contribution of the individual, however useful, seems to have little effect. Here in Africa, the dedicated man or woman can see the results of his work dramatically depicted before his eyes. Some stone in the edifice of the nation is his very own, a permanent testimony to his contribution. And the efforts of that individual are correspondingly valued by the people who receive his service. One teacher, doctor, engineer or farmer in Zambia, makes a difference. We have not got endless reserves of human resource. It is a cliché of the West that no man is indispensable. Maybe so; but in the new states of Africa it is more likely that what a talented and

dedicated individual refuses or is unable to do will remain undone-a unfilled gap in the walls which must weaken the whole structure.¹⁵²

And the very consideration of the extent of these problems faced by newly founded African states, requires that all the races, resident in it, work harmoniously together to succeed.

Kaunda equally believes that it is possible that any indecision, on the part of the settler, to commit fully to Zambia arises from the fact that a good number of them settled in Africa under the impression that it was a safe-heaven. Colonialism heightened this false feeling of safety through its insulation of the white race on the continent from the harsh realities like poverty, diseases, ignorance and unemployment which Africans had always known. The colonial government had granted the white race privileges which were far beyond those given to the indigenous races, such that they were sheltered in a kind of blessed ignorance. However, with the change of political administration on attainment of independence, the veil of ignorance has been subsequently lifted. These social difficulties, which had been there all along during the colonial era, now constitute a new hardship for the settlers, probably, to the extent of having them look around anxiously for an alternative safe-ground. To this regard, Kaunda argues that some of them could have all the while packed their bags, mentally, in case the national aspirations and project fail to materialize. Consequently, he advises that “this kind of approach can spell only unhappiness and insecurity.”¹⁵³ Kaunda’s postulation is that Zambia is not a state for transient residents, oblivious of their place among the people. Consequently, they have either to commit to the struggle of building the new nation, by joining hands together with the indigenous races, or stand just by the side as spectators, without constituting distraction to the main players. In other words, they are to refrain from being hindrance to progress in this struggle to nationhood.

The long years of colonialism built on apartheid foundation, had left the European mind on a kind of superiority complex, such that it could find it hard to adapt to change. “And since changes are occurring now thick and fast, they tend to regard such changes as directed against them, as though a malevolent Government in Lusaka spent much of its time thinking up policies aimed at intimidating or victimizing them”.¹⁵⁴ Kaunda accepts that the basis of this feeling rest on the fact that the aspiration for an equitable society, introduces such structural changes that denies them such benefits and convenience they were accustomed to during the colonial era. As such, having lost what he was not supposed to have in the first place, the European finds it difficult to adjust to the change that comes with independence in Africa. He even finds it hard to accept that the intended structural changes work towards equitable distribution and reward for labour, apart from race or colour. Kaunda considers it, necessarily fair, that the black man should be made to attain those opportunities, which the apartheid regime had denied him, before he could be seen to be reasonably fit to compete with the European in a democratic setting. Referring to the European frame of mind that takes a contrary view to this, he avers:

What these critics forget of course, is that there is no chance of even beginning to build a non-racial society on the historical foundations we inherited from the colonialists.... For how can a *Zambian*, denied education, advancement and positions of responsibility compete on equal terms with expatriates who have had the benefit of all these things over a long period of time? Therefore, our present *Zambianisation* policy is not the extreme swing of the pendulum from the end of the arc labelled *European* to that labelled *Zambian*, but the attempt to get the pendulum back to a central position before setting it in motion again. We have first to clean up a historically accumulated mess and give *Zambians* the fair opportunities of advancement they have been so long denied, before we can move on to that stage of friendly competitiveness between *Zambians* and non-*Zambians* in the economic and administrative sectors of our society-

the 'bestman for the job' concept-which is what we understand by a non-racial policy.¹⁵⁵

Be this condition hard as it may seem, the European has to accept it as testimony of his adjustment to the new society. He has to come to terms with the fact that he is now part of a new society, which its guiding initiatives and motives are not exclusively his, as they were during the colonial period. Though, this could seem different and strange to him, it does not mean that they are inferior or wrong; that change is not European does not mean difference, since the African is not trying to replay a black version of the colonial society. "The underlying motive of all our methods and policies is the creation of a modern African society-a society which will reflect the genius of our people".¹⁵⁶ To Kaunda, this requires greater acceptance and identification with, from the settler. The settler needs to be a follower now that he no more has the monopoly of political control; modern Africa is no place for any European who cannot accept this fact.

Again, in the independent state it is understandable that the European is fearful of the future given the fact that he has lost the grip on political power to the majority blacks, whom he had for long subjugated politically. Kaunda believes that Africans are forgiving people and derive no joy from retribution. However, this forgiveness excludes the fraction of settlers who chose not to put faith in the new independent Zambia, but, rather prophesy and anticipate its collapse into chaos and bankruptcy. Kaunda lays more emphasis:

Now for all our forgiveness and tolerance as a people, one thing we do demand of everyone, white and black, is loyalty to Zambia. And loyalty is beyond no one's power to give. Those whites who are not prepared to offer it will find Zambia a hard and inhospitable place. We shall have no more mercy upon them than any nation at war would have upon traitors in its midst. I repeat, the price of our tolerance is loyalty to the State.¹⁵⁷

The ability of the European to adopt this change pattern, would go a long way to ensure his stay and thrive in Africa; it implies that though he contributed immensely to the foundation of modern Africa, yet, he is willing, now, that positions have changed, in humility, to work alongside the African, as colleague, in building the new society. This camaraderie would have progressed with much ease had the European tried to understand the African as a human being instead of treating him as a thing before the independence. Therefore, “the consequence of that period of artificiality in relations between the races is that many Europeans may as well be ruled by men from Mars in terms of understanding they now have of their fellow African citizens”.¹⁵⁸ But those Europeans who did understand the African and treated him as fellow humans are free from this fear, having made friends with the Africans before the independence. And even at this, Kaunda feels that these later group should bear certain things in mind. First, they should not adopt a cheap imitative spirit, the kind that overwhelmed some Africans during the colonial period. This had left them hanging in between two worlds, yet not a member of either worlds. Kaunda, rather, advocates a heterogeneous society. He avers:

Our sympathetic white citizens ought not to make the opposite error. We do not expect, as price of identification with our society, the abandonment of all that is genuine part of own culture. We recognize that Zambia will be all the richer for the wealth and variety of human types within it. It would be a very drab society indeed if all behaved and spoke identically. There is a distinctive contribution to be made by our white citizens and therefore there is no need for them to try to imitate us or demonstrate their fidelity by turning their backs upon their own people. We are not interested in white *Africans*; it is white *Zambians* we value-Europeans who are committed to our country and its future, loyal to our State, serving according to their gifts and providing a distinctive colour in the rich tapestry of our national life. Identification need not mean absolute uniformity.¹⁵⁹

Consequently, their position and sense of commitment should serve to convince the other whites of the unreasonableness of their fears. Secondly, as part of new Zambia, the European is expected to bring the European independent and critical judgment to bear on national problems. This should not be accompanied by unnecessary pessimism which could introduce divisive spirit and antagonism, but a constructive judgment that shows identification with national policies and progress. In Kaunda's understanding, "the essential prerequisite of such criticism must always be some degree of understanding of our African way of doing things. It is no use telling us that we ought to do something in a certain way because that is how Europeans always did it".¹⁶⁰ To this end, Kaunda warned against the tendency of the European to see the new African from the perspectives of their earlier stereotypes and denigration of the Blackman. These stereotypes, for him, belonged to the past which the African had progressed beyond. He believes that the present calls for an appraisal of relationship in terms of honesty and realism, unobscured by false sentimentality about the past. Put succinctly, this reads; "we do not expect uncritical adulation from our white supporters; neither can they expect from us a favoured treatment".¹⁶¹ Lastly, in as much as the uncommitted whites entertain a future thoughts of Zambian failure, those whites that are committed to the survival of the national project should guard against, what for Kaunda, is a superficial optimism. That is, the belief that policies will easily translate to success, and dreams quickly come to reality. They should rather, be patient in order to fully grasp the peculiarities of the African problems and project. This, as Kaunda believes, is that though some of the Europeans emotionally shared the Blackman's burdens during his struggles, and even bought into his aims and purposes of nationhood, yet, they can never fully comprehend the inner logic of the African mind. Hence, they could easily fail to understand the problems he has to contend with and appreciate the delicate balance of forces which he has to consider before taking an action. That is, while the European tends to think in terms of statistics, blue prints and development plans, the African mind concentrates more on man and his feelings. The

African believes that people have their own will, hopes, dreams and fears, which must be put into cognizance as the new society takes shape.

Finally, Kaunda accepts the fact that there could be the tendency for Africans to value the European commitment to the modern society in terms of contribution alone, rather than their presence in it. In other words, they could be likened to machines rather than humans. This could be, probably, because, right from the pre-independence period, the settler had enjoyed monopoly of technical, professional and administrative skills. "Hence the African mind has been conditioned historically to think of Europeans in terms of their usefulness, particularly in the upper echelons of industry, commerce, the professions and government".¹⁶² Kaunda equates the basis of this utilitarian valuation of man to colonialism. As such, he, also, believes that the African will in time get over this mindset, and come to value the European contribution on the basis of his being a member of the new society. This is easily seen from African traditional society, where person's presence was cherished and valued most than what he or she had to contribute to the society; that was why no segment of the society was ever regarded as superfluous to it. Consequently, Kaunda believes that the committed Europeans would come to be cherished members of the modern African society not because of their skills but because they are considered humans. Their patience and sincere understanding that Africans would eventually come to this realization would aid the collective adjustment of both races in the new society.

3.4.8 Future of Nationalism in Africa

The task of nationalism in Europe was easier compared to Africa; it served to unite into a nation people who already shared the feeling that they are bound by a common culture and language. But in Africa, it served a different purpose. Nationalism, in Africa, originated as a movement of protest against colonialism and imperialism. The reason could be deduced from the stage in social evolution within the continent before the invasion of the Westerner; pre-colonial Africa comprised of a growing number of,

and, often, antagonizing tribes. Hence it was impossible for nationalism in Africa to follow the same path, nor have the same meaning, as it happened in Europe. Kaunda attests to this thus:

With exception of certain traditional kingdoms such as Ashanti, Buganda, Barotse, or Zulu, the basic unit in Africa appears to have been the tribe, which far from having a sense of oneness with its neighbours, often regarded them as mortal enemies. Nor has African nationalism always had the advantage of common language and culture to act as cohesive factors to bind the people together. More often than not the task of evolving common culture and language has only begun once the independence struggle is over. Nor, failing language and cultural unity, has there normally been one great religion such as Islam which could provide a focus of unity. Indeed, the opposite is often the case religious divisions on the African continent have been a major cause of disunity and strife.¹⁶³

Because of this, doubts had been entertained as to whether the liberation struggles that ushered in independence in the continent, properly deserves the term nationalism instead of Africanism. However, Kaunda believes that nationalism properly suits these struggles, since they mirrored the solidarity of the aspiration to create a nation out of the varied social divisions initiated through colonialism. Nationalism in Africa began as an intellectual agitation by few educated blacks but gradually turned into a large mass protests and demand for political emancipation and sovereignty. It was propelled by men together in form of labour unions and welfare congresses. Urbanization facilitated the availability of men; so intensified this new allegiance. Education on its part increased the extent to which they could go to improve their experience of the legislative process. The institution of racial discrimination and exploitation, launched nationalism into its militant phase. Lastly, the existence of tribal rivalry, and increase in personal differences introduced competition which hastened the pace at which the solidarity in freedom struggle moved to achieve its aim. But, with colonialism deposed on the continent, there arises a new challenge for African nationalism; that is, what

becomes its basic target as was the colonial powers? Kaunda captures this dilemma thus:

The withdrawal of the colonial power, whilst solving one great problem, raises another equally acute for the nationalist leader. The discipline and solidarity of the national movement and the impetus built up during the freedom struggle are vital to the success and survival of the new nation. Yet unless new, exciting and worthwhile goals can be proposed for nationalism, there is danger of the movement of protest turning inwards upon itself and becoming destructive of the national good.¹⁶⁴

Thus, Kaunda accepts that to find the way around this new challenge is bulk of the problem facing the nationalist leader.

Nationalism, seen in this form, is just a stage to the realization of the national aspiration. And having achieved its aim, there arises the necessity to make a further transition from this to the next stage in the national life. This is because:

Nationalism has too narrow a good, independence; but independence for what? We are free from, but what are we free for? Nationalism may be difficult to bring men to fight and even to die for this ideal. But what is needed after wards is an ideal for which people will live, work and struggle in free harmony, mutual understanding and personal respect year in and year out.¹⁶⁵

This ideal or set target or aspiration is nationhood expressed in patriotism; love and devotion to one's country. Having achieved independence, Kaunda argues that "this is something which will have to be engendered (in Africa), because until independence few Africans were aware in this sense that they had a country – their loyalties were more restricted and fragmentary."¹⁶⁶ This restriction as noted earlier, being due to the fact that the African still clings, tenaciously, to his tribal alliance, hence, is hardly aware that he has progressed beyond this after independence. Loyalty to one's nation, the basis that patriotism requires has to be more specific and well defined. This differs

from the kind found in Nationalism, which in a sense, was too general, and on the other hand, too restricted. In its general sense, it depicted the ‘Africanness’ of the people; the solidarity demonstrated across the face of the continent in their fight against colonialism. This is loyalty, too wide ranging and abstract, hence, failing to provide something concrete to which the people can attach themselves. “Pan – Africanism, while it may be an ultimate aim, is too broad a concept for the masses to grapple with in the beginning of their independence”.¹⁶⁷ Equally, because nationalistic movement was in the main, a political movement its loyalties were too narrow being just sentiments to the party and its leadership. More than this, “patriotism demands a certain degree of loyalty to every element in the nation as well as one’s comrades, and which must have social and cultural and religious elements as well as political.”¹⁶⁸ The leader of the Nationalist party, because he is central to the actualization of the aim of the movement also commands a lot of loyalty. He is the people’s mouth piece. “He suffer with them and on their behalf. They speak through his voice and he leads them where they have trusted him to take them.”¹⁶⁹ Yet, this loyalty to the leader cannot suffice for or substitute patriotism. The nation is bigger than, and out lasts the leader, hence he is not indispensable. But, be this as it may, the position of the leader is the center of national unity, balance and support. Kaunda accepts that this paternal feeling is necessary at the beginning to help the people gradually grow and mature into a nation. “He has been chosen and has survived because he was able to hold in balance tribal, regional and personal factions; because the people had reason to believe that he would not be exercising his power in an arbitrary manner, favouring this group against that one, drawing his ministers from one area or tribe.”¹⁷⁰ This responsibility tends to exults the position of the leader to that of a superman, and some leaders have also ridden on this to institute dictatorial regime in some African states. But, what is required is for him to be able to transfer the loyalty for party or his person to loyalty to the nation. It requires strong morality and humility for a leader to be able to make this switch from personal allegiance to patriotism; to shift the people’s attention from

himself to the state. At this juncture, Kaunda brings in the need for religious virtue as basis through which this could be possible. His exact words are:

Without doubts, this lionization puts a great strain on the character of the leader of a nationalist movement. He needs all his moral fiber to avoid a corrupting effects of great power. There must be a rationality about his policies and behavior which make it clear to the humblest citizen that he acts not on the basis of masterful whim but as a servant of the State. I personally find that my religion is a useful antidote to any megalomaniac tendencies I might develop. I never cease to remind both the people and myself that I am not a supreme potentate but a humble servant of Almighty God. I do not miss any opportunity in my public utterances of turning the people's eyes away from me towards God as the true sustainer and protector of the nation.¹⁷¹

Kaunda accepts that for the nationalist leader to properly transform the people's allegiance to patriotism he needs to maintain absolute control of the State. While this may not necessary imply favouring his colleagues at the expense of the opposition party, it nevertheless ensures his continuance in office, which is deemed a necessity for the existence and thriving of the young State. This demands consolidating his position as the head of the State, leader of the party, and strengthening of the party's control of the loyalty of the people. He believes that this would limit opposition, and, invariably, sedition in the state; because, it is common for the opposition party "to view the president, not as the heads of State, but as the leader of a party they are pledged to over throw at the polls"¹⁷² Consequently, according to Kaunda, "If the leader is to direct the people's loyalty to the state over a period of time, he must first be in undisputed possession of it. The larger the number of personalities who have an absolute claim on the people's loyalty, the greater the possibility of tribal or regional divisions being intensified".¹⁷³ Therefore, the leader ought to take control of all political authority in the state, as in a unitary state. Kaunda considers this the most realistic political option for Africa. He accepts this position because he believes that

the leader cum head of state, necessarily, have an adequate knowledge of what the people need than what they want. He is able to properly determine this through the party officials, which, according to Kaunda, are reflectors of public opinions. These officials, because they stand in between the leader and the people, are able to properly assess the effects of the government policies and actions on the daily lives of the people, and present this to the president. The reports of this assessment, which are always made available during party caucus meetings, help the head of state to steady the course of the nation without vacillation. To be steadfast to these national needs, requires moral integrity from the president. According to Kaunda;

There are no mechanical substitutes for integrity in a national leader.... Whilst understanding the concern of political scientists and theorists to evolve institutions of government which will neutralize any negative qualities in the Chief Executive, I still maintain that moral fibre and character are more important than any mechanism of government in ensuring justice for all.”¹⁷⁴

The people would sooner or later come to the realization that the will of the State is for their best needs. Just as they would also easily realize that seeming popular government policy is intended to dupe them.

Kaunda sheds more light on how the leader would further aid the transformation of nationalism to patriotism. In the first place, the leader has the responsibility of assessing and choosing those who would fill in different public positions. But in doing this he must not be quick to choose his own successor. “ This is a fool hardly thing to do, given the highly fluid State of politics in Africa; it is also the ultimate cruelty to the young man concerned, who would as a consequence excite the envy and spite of disappointed aspirants who might do everything possible to destroy him.”¹⁷⁵ Secondly, the leader should recognize that the nation is held together not only by political forces; “a whole network of cultural, religious and social factors play an important

role.”¹⁷⁶ These socio-cultural factors constitute arteries through which the vital sentiments of patriotism flow. Thirdly, it is a necessity for the leader to ensure respect for national symbols; “the protection and extension of national symbols is of paramount importance in simulating patriotism”.¹⁷⁷ These practices are expressions of the transformation of nationalism to patriotism. The future generation of the nation should be the special target of the cultivation of this expression. Therefore, education should be the vehicle of transmission of this guarantee of national stability. About this Kaunda argues that:

All education is indoctrination-the selection of certain themes and ideas from amongst the limitless accumulation of human knowledge which reflect certain truths that the educators regard as important. We make no apology for the fact that we intend to indoctrinate our children in the glories of Zambia and the privileges of being citizens of Africa. Providing the spirit of free enquiry and critical faculty is not impaired, we believe that nothing but good can come from moulding the child’s mind in such a way as to make him a useful and constructive citizen of our future society.¹⁷⁸

The cultivation of this national spirit is equally intended as an antithesis to the practice of civil disobedience that ushered in independence. In other words, “now that the authority reflects the expressed will of our people and the police are the instruments of that authority, the trend must be reversed by education and propaganda”.¹⁷⁹ The job of organizing this massive nationalistic education falls on the party. “It is a structure of communication and control.... It has got to engage in such constructive nation building activity as will show it to be a servant-organization of the State”.¹⁸⁰ This expression is in keeping to its basic aim of ensuring that the nation comes first.

Kaunda also considers that intellectuals have roles to play in the transformation of nationalism to patriotism, having championed the social revolutions that announced independence in Africa. He describes who comprises this group:

By intellectual, I mean anyone who has a level of modern education beyond that of the mass of the people and who is prepared to become politically involved. The intellectual must be distinguished from the academic who is not a man of action but dedicated to the disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. He must also be distinguished from the scholar who is versed in traditional lore-the Confucian Scholar in China, the Islamic Scholar in Middle East or the tribal elder in Africa. The intellectual is essentially an engaged man, applying modern training to political purposes.¹⁸¹

Teachers, lawyers, doctors, journalists and clergymen comprised the intellectuals in the pre-independence struggles in Africa. The task of leading the pre-independence struggles fell squarely on the shoulders of the intellectuals because of the failure of the traditional institutions to properly mobilize the people, and because the new social paradigm, nationalism, sought, transcends mere tribal engagement. The intellectual needed a wider social situation in which to exercise his critical faculty. On the other hand, the intellectuals were brought into politics because the socio-economic discrimination introduced by colonialism shut all doors to their path of social advancement. Consequently, in their frustration to break into the white elite society, they turned back to their own kith and kin, and became the rallying point of nationalist activities. Equally, the intellectual's mastery of the colonial language fully launched him into politics. "Literacy is the most powerful weapon in the nationalist's armoury".¹⁸² The colonialists well aware of this had tried to use this against the nationalist movement by appealing to the self-interest of these group in the hope of pulling them away from the masses. "Many of the African intellectuals who were founders of the African National Congress of South Africa were politically destroyed because they became tainted with this touch of white patronage".¹⁸³ Hence, it required strong moral courage for the intellectual to stand by his people during the struggle for political emancipation. There is the fact that in Central African, the independence struggles happened while many of its intellectuals were still studying in schools abroad. As such, it was the ordinary masses that had to make great sacrifices and

contributions to the struggle. However, on the attainment of independence, the intellectual returns only to be favoured with high position in the government based on the consideration of his educational qualification. Kaunda believes that this could excite the envy of these ordinary freedom fighters, who believe they had made greater contribution to the course of freedom; this could be source of potential tension and antagonism that could tear the party and government apart, if harmony is not achieved between these two groups. According to Kaunda, the difference between the intellectual and the freedom fighter lies in the temperament and experience which each brings to governance. The freedom fighter is audacious and a mob orator, but these qualities though suited for the pre-independence struggles, are less required for the administrative responsibility of the government after independence. This area is for the intellectual, with a trained analytical mind that can probe problems and assess priorities with great degree of impartiality. Because he speaks the international language of government, he can also feed the results of his reading and research into cabinet debates. Consequently, the role of the freedom fighter would be the communication of government policies to the people. For Kaunda, this is his greatest asset. That is “having dramatized the issues involved in the freedom struggle and motivated the people to act and suffer together, he is the ideal man to put across Government policy in colourful and simple language and to stir them to the work of nation-building”.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, both the intellectual and freedom fighter have valuable contributions to make towards nation-building. This implies that the leader should work to strike a balance between the roles of the two groups. Kaunda posits; “in practice I have discovered that it is possible to blend the mentalities of freedom fighter and intellectual within a government in such a way as to reinforce their strengths and neutralize their weaknesses, providing the leader himself can bridge the gap between them in understanding and insight”.¹⁸⁵ He also understands this blending of mentalities in the light of the fusion of western and traditional elements which for him should be at the basis of modern African society. Thus:

Whereas the genuine intellectual tends to be Western oriented, the freedom fighter often has his roots in traditional Africa. Each is prone to see a future society taking shape according to their own experience. Providing their debate does not develop into personal antagonism, some kind of equilibrium is achieved between the claims of the traditional and of the modern as elements in the new society through their joint presence in Government.¹⁸⁶

To actually strike this equilibrium, the leader must not show preference for one at the expense of the other.

Kaunda perceives nationalism to depict the concrete life of Zambians: their brotherhood, courage and sacrifice that won them their social freedom. According to him, “it is people, organized for given purpose, motivated towards certain goals and sharing certain emotion and fears”.¹⁸⁷ He expects this to continue into the new society, gradually leading up to a One-Party State. Though Kaunda recognizes a multi-party democratic system, yet he forecasts a situation whereby the diversity and sophistication of the people would be limited and contained within a democratic system set up by the nationalist party. Consequently, he avers:

I confidently expect to see the virtual obliteration of the opposition at the next General Election, not by draconian repressive measures, but through that ‘painless killer’-the ballot box. Then the nationalist movement will be involved in massive reorganization and structural changes to ensure that the democratic process of free debate and exchange which formerly occurred across the floor of the Legislature is even more firmly institutionalized within the governing party itself.¹⁸⁸

This democratic setting is different from the colonial western model which is more, to him, an imposition, and not suited to the political aspiration and spirit of the Africans. The nationalist movement expressed the spirit of the Africans that is why it received

massive support. “Many one-party states are natural consequence of this process. The mass of the people supported one-party and was prepared to trust that party with the task of guiding the new nation”.¹⁸⁹ Secondly, the existence of various tribes in Africa, and the delicate nature of relationship between them, makes the existence of opposition party unnecessary. For Kaunda, this is because “historical causes of division tends to be so deep-seated that the very foundations of the State could be torn out if opposition group were given too much latitude to inflame opinion.”¹⁹⁰ But this does not imply that the idea of opposition is foreign to African tradition; in the indigenous societies members had right to dissent from a view point. However, once a consensus had been reached through vigorous open debate of an issue, it was considered a crime for one who was privy to the decision to continue to contend the same issue. Consequently, allowing opposition to thrive in the modern state could spell an open invitation to sedition and use of violence. For Kaunda, no well-meaning state or government would allow freedom, in this context, to exist in the first place. Besides, new African states exist in a situation comparable to the state of war; and in such situations, “there is not time for endless debate and arguing. Decisions have to be taken quickly and decisively. Inevitably, therefore, the legislature ceases to be the major focus of power”.¹⁹¹ The African adoption of one-party system is an answer to the call of desperate times; he has to answer to the challenges of national survival, Kaunda concludes.

Although Kaunda favours authoritarian central government, he, nevertheless, opposes military regime. He accepts that the military is a highly organized institution that could easily effect mass mobilization and control, but discredits its tendency to use of physical coercion and repression to this respect. The military could easily achieve national unity across tribal and regional division more than the politician could relying on persuasion through this tactics. There is also the possibility that the military could

see itself as an instrument for instituting uniform administration in a state. But even in this regard, Kaunda still considers military government not desirable. For him:

There are whole areas of a nation's life where government conscious of the deep feelings of the people must desist from the use of the power at its disposal in order to persuade. Education rather than coercion is the only way in which certain national goals can be achieved. Military government has only one tactic-the unquestioning use of physical force. And for a government's image to appear before the people primarily as an authoritarian agency is bad for morale and poor education in democracy.¹⁹²

The fact of this, is that the military mind is not versed in politics. That is, "it knows little of the compromise, accommodations and persuasions which underlie political decisions".¹⁹³ Part of this, is that there is no check to military power, and it is not accountable to the people, so can constitute greater problems to stability of the State. Thus, no circumstance should generate, or justifies military takeover of government.

3.4.9 Humanism of African Unity

Most African nationalist leaders envisioned closer ties between independent African states in the areas of economy, defence and foreign policies. This ideal, detractors of African affairs considered impossible. Their contention was that there are many obstacles in the way of realizing any form of continental unity. These include varied national self-interests, geography, divergent culture and languages, varying political systems and economic structures, and disputes initiated by the colonial balkanization of the continent. In spite of these, Kaunda believes that Africa shows greater affinity for unity among its states more than any other continent. According to him, this "conviction is not only wide spread throughout the continent; it is also urgent".¹⁹⁴ The basis of this urgency is both psychological and economic. The psychological reason is obvious in the fact that independent African states have not developed the derogatory and discriminatory attitudes characteristic of Europe and their apartheid policies. In Kaunda's words, "the minds of our people are still malleable. They may well be more

amenable to the sacrifices which wider links will demand at this moment than in twenty-five years' time".¹⁹⁵ The economic aspect is explained by the fact that Africa has much wealth, in terms of its large expanse of land, compared to its population. Kaunda further explains how this would translate to African unity:

And what wealth Africa has locked away in the ground! Tentative geological surveys have already proved cobalt, radium, copper, diamonds, gold, manganese, vanadium, bauxite, coal, iron and tin. Many resources lie dormant because few states have the capital and skill to exploit them efficiently. Instead of piecemeal appeals for aid and isolated efforts, an overall strategy is urgently required so that costly duplication and reduplication can be avoided and loans raised on a much wider basis than the single State, whose credit worthiness may be very limited. Many of our individual efforts to exploit this great wealth, though profitable in the short term, may prove to be robbery of the earth in the long run because we have not rationalized our efforts and treated some of these resources as reserves.¹⁹⁶

Kaunda considers a common ownership of all the natural resources on the continent by all the African states irrespective of wherever it is situated. These resources are to be used to prevent the continent from degenerating into slum status. Consequently, Pan-Africanism assumes an economic necessity.

The forging of African unity also, necessarily demands that the obstacles to this process be tackled. For Kaunda, the first and most potent of these obstacles is neo-colonialism; subtle attempt by former colonial masters to use, either economic or political means to manoeuvre independent African states to further subjugation. This usually, could be subtle financial, diplomatic or ideological web weaved around independent nations, which curtails its freedom of action. Though, proclaiming the fact that the era of physical dominion of Africa is long gone, yet, the influence of the colonial powers could still be seen to lurk around in the continent. The problem with

neo-colonialism according to Kaunda is that it obstructs the mutual trust and filial relation which should exist between African states. As a result:

Neo-colonialism is destructive of Africa's Unity because it creates mutual suspicion amongst newly independent states. We find ourselves asking: is that truly the voice of a particular people speaking or is international finance or an imperial power speaking through them, luring us away from our goal for their own purposes? African Unity is going to require considerable sacrifices from individual states.¹⁹⁷

Therefore, in foreign relations each African nation is to act not only in its own interests, but, importantly, towards the promotion of the unity of African states.

The second obstacle, and closely associated with the ideals of neo-colonialism, is the infiltration of foreign ideologies, particularly, communism, into young African states. The problem with the acceptance of communism is that it will align Africa with one of the world's power blocs (i.e. the Eastern power bloc); Africa had maintained non-aligned position in the struggle between the world's two great power blocs. Kaunda posits that Africa remained non-aligned in the ideological conflict because she cannot afford to take sides. "The problem of securing her own freedom is such that she cannot surrender it to the external power blocs".¹⁹⁸ Secondly, the liberation movement within the continent was nationalist rather than communist; thus, communism is foreign to Africa. Nationalism represented the authentic search for African personality. Apart from this, communism is divisive, and creates a lot of fanaticism. For this reason, Kaunda concludes that:

Any success which the communist bloc may achieve in aligning African States with it is destructive of African Unity, and causes a shift of loyalty from Pan-Africa to Pan-Communism. Ideological subservience must be seen for what it is-a subtle and debilitating form of colonial domination which can carve up Africa as effectively as

anything achieved by the Great Powers in the late nineteenth Century.¹⁹⁹

The issue of foreign aids to underdeveloped nations constitute the third obstacle to the unity of African states. Apart from the fact that these aids are usually small, there is the general position that the receiving nations should have no say in or about these aids, since they are meant as charity. “A collective version of the penny given to beggar or the coin dropped into the collection box, and by definition charity is supposed to be unplanned, spontaneous and businesslike”.²⁰⁰ This brings out the unpredictability which surrounds foreign aids, a reason it is difficult to be incorporated into any long-term economic planning development of the receiving nation. Besides, this unpredictability raises the tendency for the donor nations to employ aids as means of directing the path of the economic development of the poor nations. To this end, they usually grant aids in piecemeal, tied to specific projects, and, only, granted to their chosen favourite nations. For this reason, Kaunda advocates the need to “get rid of the concept of foreign aid as a form of charity offered by the rich to the poor”.²⁰¹ Instead, he argues that aids should be instituted to express a form of economic interdependence of our one world. The concept of aids has moral implication which he postulates thus:

The obligation of the rich to help the poor is partly a matter of morality but can also be justified on the grounds of enlightened self-interest. The political instability which is a consequence of economic distress in the underdeveloped country has its effect in shrinking the market for the products of the advanced nation. Rationally applied economic aid is good business sense because it will provide scope for private investment and help create an ever-larger world market.²⁰²

The nature of our world is such that upheaval or revolution in one part is felt in another. And economic distress being the major cause of these in smaller nations, makes a moral demand that foreign aids be institutionalized as the very minimum the world owes to every part of it. Yet, this does not remove the fact that the greater

responsibility for aids falls on the alliance of African nations; that is, African states owe each other this duty more, no matter the capacity of the donation. “The offer of a handful of maize from a virtually empty storehouse, though derisory as a solution to a poor neighbor nation’s problem compared with the avalanche of aid from the West, is symbolic both of mature nation hood in the donor, and of an identification which will bode well for Africa’s future Unity”.²⁰³

Kaunda argues that the evolution of African Union should not take the pattern used by the colonialists in the mapping out of national boundaries; the colonial masters had brought many races on the continent into alliance without regard for national or tribal differences. The fact of this is obvious in the sense that majority of African nations are still coming to terms with the understanding that they have become independent states. As such Kaunda avers that, “African States can no more be expected to abandon national sovereignty immediately to a United States of Africa than European nations can be expected to form the United States of Europe”.²⁰⁴ He believes that this is because, “the more successful we are in sharpening a people’s consciousness of being a nation, the less likely they are to take kindly to submerging that new-found identity in a wider union”.²⁰⁵ However, he, also, accepts that there are indications in the above that point to the feasibility of strong African Unity. First is the institution of economic and communication ties between neighbouring African states, necessitated by the international and continental politics. For instance, there is the fact that Zambia was forced to build its economic road through Tanzania in the East of the continent rather than through its Southern neighbours, because of the apartheid regime in Southern Africa. Second is that there are still some African nations under colonial administration. In other words, “the urge to free them has become the basis of a common African foreign policy”.²⁰⁶ This is because the political domination of any part of Africa is an indication that the whole of the continent has not truly achieved its freedom. Third is the endorsement of the charter of African Unity by the summit of

African Heads of State in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This charter, in Kaunda's view, "like every similar document is a most potent force for achieving large scale goals of the human race. It testifies to the fact that individual nations are prepared to place themselves under the goad of some larger good and acknowledge that they are not laws unto themselves".²⁰⁷ Fourth, and flowing from the fore on, is that the Unity of Africa embodies the diversity and wealth of ideology within the continent. This for Kaunda depicts that the "eventual unity will not be the result of the imposition of one dominating national personality but will result from dialogue amongst many leading to a growing consensus to which political and economic shape can be given".²⁰⁸ Finally, Kaunda emphasizes that the youth must be the vehicle for the transition to African Unity. This according to him is because majority of African peoples and leaders are youths. To achieve this, he argues that, "our young men must be educated to see Africa whole and to see it steadily".²⁰⁹ He believes that all this ideal, at the initial stage, may appear intellectualist and a talking point of few, however, it would gradually get to that point where it assumes the basis for popular mandate. In other words, one would require it to win elective position. At this stage, it would assume practical significance.

The discussion on the possibility of continental unity, for Kaunda, invariably envisages greater and wider unity in terms of international and intercontinental alliances. An instance of this is found in terms of the Commonwealth alliance; association of nations that were formerly British colonies and Britain itself. Kaunda describes this as a "transformation of Britain's Empire into a friendly groupings of nations, who voluntarily enter into a relationship which in no way hinders their individual freedom of action or thought".²¹⁰ According to him, this dispels the fear that the Commonwealth could be a subtle move by Britain to perpetuate its colonial influence over these nations, or that this constitute obstacle in the path of African Unity. The fact is that the Commonwealth impresses on each member nation the need

to recognize and accept the equality and freedom of each other. This in Kaunda's words teaches this lesson:

Without under-valuing the sentiment which attaches to this tradition-rich symbolism, my own view would be that responsible Commonwealth leaders find in the challenge to live in amity with other members from whom they differ radically in foreign or domestic policy a minuscule version of the ultimate challenge-the possibility of world government. Our feeling is that unless we can grow in community with nations whose attachments are grounded in the same tradition of British tutelage, there is little hope of accommodation on a world scale being achieved. When serious attempts are made to create the first tentative structures of government, it is the Commonwealth which will have most to contribute by way of experience and knowledge.²¹¹

However, Kaunda, still, feels that the high morality, which Britain espouses by leading other nations into the Commonwealth alliance would make little meaning if she fails to openly condemn the racial discrimination and domination on the African continent, particularly that which existed in the Southern Africa at the time. The Ian Smith government in Northern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) had opted for Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and this had deepened the racial antagonism in that country, even as much as this affected Zambia politically and economically. Also there was the operation of apartheid policies by the white government further south of the continent. Britain was indicted for complicity with the policies of both regimes, because of its liberal stance on apartheid issues on African continent. Consequently, Kaunda opines that, "Britain can lead the Commonwealth by moral influence along paths which will enrich every member only if her *bona fides* on the racial equality is beyond reproach. There can be no compromise as far as the independent States of Africa are concerned on the issues of smashing the residual racist regimes on the continent and freeing millions of Africa from the scourge of white domination".²¹² If Britain fails to align with, and pursue this continental need, the independent African States would have the sole option of mobilizing towards this aim, alone or in another

alliance. This is because, their leaders had eloquently agreed to unify the Continent, as is obvious from the gathering of African Heads of States in Addis-Ababa, and their signing of the Summit's Declaration.

3.5 Zambian Socio-Economic Structure under Kaunda

The Zambian social and economic situation under Kenneth Kaunda cannot be fully grasped outside the pre-independence capitalist and exploitative colonial system which inaugurated his regime. The foremost is that Zambia inherited a legacy of socio-economic dependence due to its geographical location; Zambia, carved out as a south central nation, is sandwiched in between eight other African nations. Consequently, as a landlocked country in Central Southern Africa, sharing borders with these eight other countries (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania, Congo-Zaire, Mozambique, Botswana, Angola) whose social, economic and political histories have been checkered, Zambia could not escape the influences of her neighbours. Yet, among these nations, Zambia's political and economic history, especially between the last decade of the 19th Century and independence in 1964, was more closely interwoven with that of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (the present Zimbabwe and Malawi), having been part of a federation with these states. Scholars had described this political situation and its attendant dependence as marriage of convenience between a rich bride (Zambia) and a sturdy husband (Zimbabwe), with an economically sickly Malawi accepted as an unavoidable mother-in-law in a matrimonial home. The last observation depicts the fact that it was Rhodesia or Zimbabwe that was to a large extent determine the economic direction of Zambia, and also the fact that Zambia's economic dependence was mostly, politically planned from the onset, to the advantage of the white minority rulers of the federation, concentrated largely in Rhodesia. This arrangement ensured that Zambia was dependent in administration, trade route, power and energy supply, technical support and machinery. Secondly, the colonial administration operated an economic system based on export-import balance; as a British colony, Zambian economy was overwhelmingly geared towards the export of

copper with manufacturing and agriculture left severally undeveloped. This structure made sure that Zambia, from the onset, dwelt hugely on large scale importation of goods and technical services to survive. To perpetuate this order, the colonial masters maintained racist policy on education and technical training. The white minority government made little investment in the education and the advancement of the native blacks. “For instance, Zambia was one of the least developed countries in education on the African continent, with only about 100 university graduates, 1500 graduates with secondary school certificates and about 6000 with two years of secondary school education”.²¹³ This, invariably, translated into lack of the required manpower and knowledge needed to support the growth of the local economy. It entrenched a system in which the entire economic structure and development of the colony was dependent on expatriate technology, knowledge and skill. Besides, the strict apartheid policy that ensured the maintenance of urban life style dominated by the whites to the neglect of rural areas, which belonged to the blacks, necessitated a situation where the control of the entire colonial economy was one-sided. Kaunda alludes to this situation in one of his speeches on Zambia’s economic reforms:

...Zambia achieved independence on 24 October, 1964. At that time the people of Zambia took over political control but the colony was dominated entirely by foreign and expatriate business. How this came about does not need going into at this particular moment. All I need say is that when Zambia achieved independence all these foreign and resident expatriate businesses were operated by foreign and expatriate people. No Zambians had been given opportunity to make a career in business; no Zambians could be found in jobs above those of unskilled and semi-skilled workers in industry. It was obvious that during the time of the Federation the expatriate business men had chosen to create a closed shop very much like the European mine workers’ Union of Northern Rhodesia which had an agreement with the mining companies that only white people could be employed in certain jobs or in the mines.²¹⁴

In other words, the benefits of the system were not equitably distributed. This capitalist orientation which obtained within the Central African Federation, ensured that Zambia, even on the attainment of independence, was heavily dependent on outside help, that is, on its white dominated Southern neighbours to keep its economic machinery running.

Therefore, the UNIP government under Kaunda inherited, on Zambia's independence, an economy that, though, was viable-because of the high demand in copper at the time, was largely dependent on external expertise and capital. There was equally the problem of political management and administration, as there were only few educated Zambians capable of running the machinery of government inherited from the colonial masters. Faced with these, and the question of disparity in tribal, regional and party affiliations, the independent party led by Kaunda decided to develop a national ideology that would guide towards nation-building and economic development. As such, humanism was introduced as this "guiding principle, driving force and social cement".²¹⁵ This was at a time that engendering patriotic spirit among citizens, was uppermost in the minds of most independent governments. Kaunda intended to avoid the exploitative situation created by the earlier colonial system by making the African (man) the center of all economic forces. As earlier stated, he has strong belief in the oneness and equality of humans. This reflects in his opinion that, "there can be nothing more important in God's creation on earth than MAN".²¹⁶ Consequently, this ideal opposes the imbalances of the capitalist structure. It rather emphasizes that:

The moral foundation of society lay in the tradition of the village: equality between members of society, mutual support, participation in collective work and decision-making, absence of exploitation, and self-reliance. Humanism advocated the elimination of social classes and economic exploitation, equalization of the distribution of social rewards between elites and masses and between rural and urban sectors, the creation of an

urban working class which was conscious of its responsibilities to the less-favoured rural masses, the encouragement of collective and cooperative forms of production in agriculture, state ownership of a significant portion of the means of production, national social and economic planning, and the progressive elimination of the nation's dependence on foreign firms and foreign transport routes.²¹⁷

Kaunda believes that the African understands by heart the concept, egalitarianism; the basis of the traditional African economic structure. Consequently, he intends the modern economic life style to reflect this basic African identity. But for this to happen, there has to be gradual movement towards reduction of dependence on expatriate knowledge and skill. This is by the state economic life being taken over and ran by Africans, in accordance with this basic ideal which they solely understand. To effect this, Africans would have to be promoted into the economic positions formerly occupied by the expatriates, and government would set in motion measures that would check competitions such that African businesses would grow to replace the foreign ones. This would announce the gradual takeover of Zambian economy from the expatriates, leading towards the desired African economic identity. He does not consider this as an introduction of racial antagonism, rather, a way of equalizing the opportunities the African had been denied by the colonizers under colonialism. So, in April 19, 1968, the UNIP government under Kaunda introduced the *Mulungushi* Economic Reforms. This reform established the guidelines to limiting major aspects of the Zambian economy only to Zambians and state control alone; what Kaunda referred to as the Zambianization of economy. This implies the nationalization of all major businesses and companies in the new state. He believes that:

When this happens, we will truly have achieved a national economic identity. When this happens, we shall not be judged as to whether our methods of business are western or eastern, capitalist or communist. When this happens, our methods of business will be simply Zambian. I consider this as the first essential step in implementation of the philosophy of humanism because I

feel that Zambian business men will agree to operate within the frame work of this social philosophy which is entirely Zambian and which therefore they understand by instinct.²¹⁸

Based on this definition, businesses were to operate as cooperative ventures deviating from the exploitative individualism of capitalism. To this regard, Kaunda also observes; “I want Zambian business men to develop so that they can be of service to their fellow human beings”.²¹⁹ The state was to assume a more central position as the owner of all economic resources, ensuring equitable distribution of all economic proceeds. This was to be such that in Zambia, every Zambian’s contribution would be, ultimately, “for the benefit of men through the state”.²²⁰ The implication of this process was not just to ensure government control of all economic activities, but, it, importantly, signified a proposal of the state for national unity. Thus, the nationalization policy was an ideological move conceived to reduce state dependence on external influence, and, more important, “to determine the political direction of class and group conflicts within the post-colonial state”.²²¹ in other words, equalization of economic opportunities, reduction of exploitation and cultivation of national spirit were at the heart of Zambian humanism.

Zambian economy was one of the most developed economies in the continent within the first decade of the country’s independence. This was because of the steady increase in price and demand of copper boosted especially by the Vietnam War. Zambia was to become the third world largest supplier of copper. However, this was to make an alternate reversal from the mid-1970s. Sharp decline in world’s copper prices, ensured that Zambia began to experience economic difficulties. According to Timothy Shaw, this was bound to be the case, since the state’s economy was overwhelmingly geared towards the export of copper alone, to the neglect of agriculture and rural development. He succinctly writes:

Zambia was one of the most dependent economies when measured along the contribution of a single dominant industry to exports and government revenue. Copper contributes 95% of Zambia's exports, 55% revenue, 40% gross domestic product, and 15% direct employment. Income from copper exports determine Zambia's capacity to import both capital and consumer goods.²²²

Dependency created by high import to export balance and government nationalization of the major industries and businesses in the country, aggravated Zambia's economic strait all the more. Nationalization gave the government 51percent controlling share in the main areas of the national economy, giving it the primary responsibility of accumulating and sharing wealth in line with the policy of humanism. This, in other words, discouraged and limited foreign investment; in its place, various forms of local cooperatives were encouraged to set up businesslike ventures. But in reality, Zambia's economy always remained dependent on external capital due to export of copper. In practical terms, the export of the nation's main resources created social elites, especially in the parastatals, created by government ministries to manage the mines, who maintained political position through the production and control of copper prices. Again, Shaw argues that these elites adopted the affluent life styles of the colonialists; their association with the transnational companies that operated the mines perpetuated this life styles. His words is that "the Africanisation of the state has introduced a new ruling class more committed to the maintenance of the established political order than was the colonial elite".²²³ With this, the inherited dependence on copper, the high rate of urbanization and rural underdevelopment remained. This social situation, also, put pressure on the professed humanist ideal through the introduction of capitalist tendencies, hence intensified class, sectional and regional conflicts. Consequently, the issue of egalitarian society and equal distribution of wealth was seriously called into question.

As had been earlier stated, the colonial education system ensured that on independence, only few native Zambians were educated. Hence, the state's inherited dependence on expatriates' skills and technology, mostly, from the white dominated Rhodesia, to run its government and economic structures remained. James Scarritt observes that this ensured that "Europeans came to be seen primarily as resident expatriates valued primarily for the economic contribution they were making to the country. (As such) the Zambian government made some sacrifices to keep Europeans happy, such as liberalizing currency exchange restrictions and externalizing pensions".²²⁴ This kept secured the economic gap between the whites and blacks rather than check it. However, the major strain on Zambia's economy was to come with the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on the Rhodesian state by the international community. Zambia's huge involvement came from the fact that Kaunda's government was less tolerant of the minority rule in Rhodesia, and was, equally, much vociferous in the movement for the decolonization of the entire African continent. As such, the extent of Zambia's reliance on expatriate skill and technology was greatly cut short. On another hand, having been part of the former Central African Federation meant that Zambia inherited a structure of dependence on Rhodesia for its oil supply, coal for the mines, electricity and transport route to the sea. But with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the Zambian nation was forced to carry out most of its economic transactions through the longer and much costly East African route through Tanzania. Scarritt captures the situation thus; "U.D.I. placed great economic strains on Zambia, and the failure of Zambian expectation of Rhodesian collapse to materialize greatly aggravated these strains".²²⁵ Kaunda equally makes more elaborate analysis and assessment of this economic strain on Zambia thus:

Rhodesia declared independence unilaterally, which imposed upon us the need for even more government spending in order to create new import route and alleviate problems created by the new situation. The result was that when our demands were highest our ability to bring

supplies was curtailed.... Some sectors of industry and commerce are taking deliberate advantage of the transportation and economic problems besetting this country for their own private gain. There is increasing evidence of grossly inflated mark-ups, inflated beyond any level justified by transportation or cost of distribution in Zambia.²²⁶

Zambia's painful economic stakes were more or less results of its adopted national philosophy than of its geographical location. But, even at this, Kaunda was more committed to paying the high price of this principle. He favoured the use of forceful intervention to initiate majority rule in Rhodesia; and when this was not forth coming he ensured that the wider world was seriously committed to the terms of the sanctions it later settled for on this issue. Also, Kaunda for a long time committed Zambia's economy to backing the liberation struggle in Rhodesia, Angola and South Africa, and to sheltering the refugees displaced by the unstable socio-political situations in these nations. This and the fact that he easily severed economic, social and political ties with these nations, because of their colonial policies, further helped in crippling the already struggling Zambian economy.

From 1975, Zambia experienced about 30% decline in per capita growth; and by 1977, it had completely exhausted its foreign reserves. The worsening economic situation put Zambia at the mercy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. With dwindling investment necessitated by the nationalization of the mines, inefficient transport system and dissension within party and government ranks, it was not long before Zambia was saddled with enormous debt it found very difficult to pay. By 1984, about 60% of its foreign exchange earnings went into debt servicing. Consequently, the country was placed under the heavy yoke of the International Financial Organizations, a situation some scholars interpreted as another phase of colonialism. In an attempt to change this situation, the Kaunda led government entered into several agreements with the donor agencies, such as currency devaluation and

removal of subsidy on consumer goods, especially, food items. This structural adjustment programme made the prices of food to skyrocket, forcing thousands of urban Zambians to take to the streets in open riots. Subsequently, the UNIP government restored back food subsidy in rejection of the structural adjustment policies; Kaunda described these donor agencies' policy as "ideologically distasteful".²²⁷ He explained that the subsidy removal policy was against his humanist ideal of reducing human suffering. But this move cost Zambia the support of the International Monetary Agencies. The nation, having lost its foreign supports, reverted to its own conceived Internal Economic Recovery Programme. This initiative emphasized growth from local resources; Kaunda urged Zambians to look to agriculture rather than mining for solution. But the rural development policies, though, it consumed lot of foreign aids, were mostly ill-conceived, and failed to quell rural-urban mobility. Even, "urban dwellers refused to pay the high prices that might have encouraged more farmers to produce for the market".²²⁸ So, this could not help to lift Zambia out of its already deteriorating economic crisis. Eventually, Kaunda returned to the negotiation table of the international donors, though by this time, this did little to abate the rising disenchantment with his authoritarian one party regime, and the intensity of the demand for a return to a multi-party democratic system. Consequently, in October 1991, Kaunda and the UNIP government were voted out of office. The UNIP government, led by Kaunda created deep economic straits in Zambia, yet the root of this and its attendant underdevelopment could be traced to the pre-colonial, colonial and settler periods of the Central African history.

3.6 One Party State

On December 3 1972, Kaunda and the UNIP regime in Zambia announced the introduction of a one-party democratic state, outlawing not only existing opposition parties, but, also, banning all future initiatives to form opposition. Kaunda justified this political action on the basis of Zambian humanism; humanism was used as the

basis of all government initiatives in the post-colonial Zambia, especially, economic development. So, the establishment of the one-party democratic system was not seen as an end in itself, but was seen as a means to an end; national unity based on equality of all human races, this taken as primary basis to Zambian socio-economic development. The 1968 election campaign in the country had witnessed violent clashes between the ruling party, UNIP, and other rival political parties. Apart from this, there was equally antagonism that frequently arose on the legislative level of governance in the parliaments due to various party, sectional and regional affiliations. Consequently, Kaunda found it convenient to introduce one-party state as a measure to control perceived national division along tribal, sectional and regional lines visible in the various parties. Kaunda saw the one-party system and centralization of government as perpetuating nationalism and solidarity reflected in the humanist philosophy, Pan-Africanism and non-alignment in the face of the prevailing cold war era.

Though Zambia became a one-party state in 1972, scholars believe that the evolution of this political situation dates back to the colonial era. In fact, Chiponde Musingeh argues that the assessment of the colonial and post-colonial Zambia would reveal areas of continuity in the manner in which power was exercised, for instance, there was a culture of authoritarianism in the colonial era which continued into the post-colonial era. He succinctly posits:

We argue that the roots of one-party rule in Zambia lie in the modus operandi of the British colonial order imposed in the territory between 1890 and October 1964. The colonial system in Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, sacrificed democracy at the altar of “law and order”. Colonial rule was by nature very authoritarian; it systematically suppressed freedom of expression and association, including the tolerance of dissent. When the nationalist parties eventually emerged, they functioned as

mirror images of the colonial system which they were meant to fight. For instance, these parties emphasized loyalty or obedience to the top leadership. Any dissenting views were ruthlessly suppressed and labelled as counter-revolutionary and unpatriotic.²²⁹

As such, while the settlers' were preview to democracy, the apartheid policies they instituted in Southern Africa lacked the essentials of democratic governance; hence, tight social control and repression of the activities of African natives was common in the colony. Part of this was that social evolution, socio-political organization and the recognition of the Africans, were entirely defined and determined by the white settlers. Consequently, "in post-colonial Africa, the new leaders inherited the colonial masters' tight exercise of power, making it part of the new political culture".²³⁰ The basis of the nationalist parties that fought for, and won Zambia's independence were founded on this culture. So national politics in the subsequent post-colonial state was conceived in terms of centralization and personification of decision making by the leaders of the new state. The party came to assume supreme control over members, who were required to follow without question the political perceptions of top party leaders, else, they were seen as cooperating with the colonialists to ruin the state. Thus, rather than learn to tolerate differences, the early nationalists learned the opposite lesson; party leaders perpetuated this by inciting their followers into intimidation and suppression of perceived opposition parties, whether internal or external. Again, Mushinge argues that it is to reflect this posture that the UNIP, the party that eventually assumed leadership of Zambia on its independence adopted the slogan, "UNIP is fire and anyone who plays with it gets burnt".²³¹ Even the gradual metamorphosis of the first nationalist party ANC (African National Congress) into UNIP, in the first place, exposes the same lack of tolerance for divergent views. Kaunda and his group broke away from Harry Nkumbula led ANC to form the UNIP because of their perception of Nkumbula's high-handedness and intolerance of divergent views. Yet the formation of this new party equally failed to discard the authoritarian control of its predecessors, as it soon began to witness the same internal struggle for control among its members.

Hence, the attendant intra-party rivalry within the post-colonial ruling party, UNIP, was a result of the struggle by members for the control of the government and state economy.

Intra-party or inter-party disputes in the pre-independence nationalist struggles were submerged under central authoritarian leadership. For this reason, party structures lacked mechanisms for resolving members' antagonisms, and for proffering amicable solution to differences. This foundational structure laid the basis for the post-colonial government; hence, these party rivalries, intra or inter, that crystallized into the post-colonial state served as basis for the imposition of one-party government. A fundamental contradiction is that the colonial government that served as the political school for the post-colonial leaders was not democratic, yet it handed over power to the Africans on a democratic constitution. In other words, there existed, *ab initio*, a confusion arising from what the African inherited, and what he was eventually expected to do afterwards. Mushingeh exposes the confusion arising from this demand for political pluralism by the inherited post-colonial constitution in Zambia thus:

...political pluralism both inside and outside parliament had its own problems. There was both inter-party and intra-party rivalry, most of which seems to have been officially backed in each party. In the various parts of Zambia supporters of UNIP quarreled and fought with supporters of the opposition parties. In parliament, the government increasingly found it difficult to swallow the idea of an opposition party whose task was that of a watch dog, ensuring that the government was accountable to the people of Zambia both in word and deed. Opposition attacks on government policy were usually misconstrued to be personal attacks on individual ministers.²³²

Faced with these party conflicts, most especially the power tussle amongst the leaders of the UNIP and the external threat posed by the white dominated Southern Rhodesia,

Kaunda's regime became increasingly intolerant of criticisms. Therefore, President Kaunda through the act of the parliament banned political pluralism in Zambia. He based this on the need to create a political situation that would be conducive for Zambia's economic development.

3.7 Violent Humanism: Lumpa Church Massacre and The Rhodesian U.D.I

Zambian humanism was intended, essentially, as a pacifist ideology. The basis of this pacifism was founded on Kaunda's ideals of the primacy of man, racial co-existence on equal basis and common purpose expressed in form of nationalist spirit. This was why Kaunda, from the start, made non-violent resistance the *modus operandi* of the nationalist movement and agitation in Northern Rhodesia. He made this clear in opining that, "I kept insisting that our policy was one of non-violence".²³³ Douglas Anglin lends credence to this by stating that:

Dr. Kaunda is a man of acute moral sensitivity whose natural inclinations are to eschew violence as inconsistent with his philosophy of Christian humanism. Violence, whether physical or institutional, deeply offends his keen sense of justice and human dignity. Throughout the struggle for Zambian independence, he strove valiantly and largely successfully to constrain his militant followers as far as possible to the path of peaceful protest. Even after independence, he continued to preach non-violence. His convictions were expressed most eloquently in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 which argued persuasively in favour of reliance on non-violence and negotiations where possible.²³⁴

But even at this, Kaunda admits that there are situations in which violence could be permitted as necessary substitute to non-violence. To him, both strategies remain relevant aspects of the Zambian humanism. Maurice Makumba treats Kaunda's admission of violence in terms of his conceptual evolution, from pacifism to non-pacifism. He accepts that this is an essential aspect of Kaunda's humanist philosophy based on the fact that it is a reaction against the perceived continued western influence

and presence on the continent. Seen from this perspective, the humanism of violence becomes evident, since it is defined as a “reaction to the violence of an oppressor”.²³⁵

The Lumpa church episode depicted the pattern of European divide and rule policy in Africa. Scholars believe that the adverse effect of this policy was that it made the African more conscious of his tribal inclinations, hence, the continent has dissolved into war of tribes, ever since. The Lumpa church episode exhibits, in every inch, this trait of tribal breakaway, antagonism and conflict. Alice Lenshina, a native Zambian convert to Christianity, founded the Lumpa church in 1953, first, as part of the Church of Scotland. But this quickly changed with her creation of a separate church for the blacks, and her insistence that her followers submit their witchcraft materials for destruction, as a sign of submission and admission into the church community. On this last demand, she drew a huge followership, with church members required to dwell in separate and, largely, stockade lands and villages. Other established churches began to lose members to the Lumpas as a result. Also, Lenshina usurped traditional offices by exercising judicial functions, reception of tributes and voluntary labour. She also repudiated politics by insisting that her followers should “seek yee first the kingdom of God”.²³⁶ This demand alienated sizeable number of Africans from joining in the independence struggle against the colonial administration in Northern Rhodesia. And on the assurance of the certainty of Zambia’s independence in early 1964, this was perceived as potential threat to the incoming African government, especially with regard to its intention to achieve complete national unity. Unfortunately, the defiance against political authority, especially, the political authority which was to form the first ever black government in Zambia on October 24th 1964, proved the greatest undoing of the Lumpa church members. Consequently, conflict with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was inevitable “for the party ruthlessly let little stand in its way of achieving massive, preferably exclusive, dominance”.²³⁷ In the conflict that ensued thereafter, more than 700 people were massacred, more than 400 wounded, and

the rest of the Lumpa faithfuls fled into exile, to Congo. Kaunda, the minister of local government, at the time, had accented to the massacre of the Lumpa church members based on his non-tolerance of tribal antagonism and denominationalism (which for him was exacerbated by racialism), and the need to present a common identity in the demand for a Zambian state. He had concluded that religion should assume central role in the aspiration for nationhood, not antagonize or stand against it. This intention expressed in his autobiography reads; “in a young country like Northern Rhodesia, churches have big part to play in its development. They cannot hope to succeed by confining their work to church buildings”.²³⁸

Although, the Lumpa episode exposed Kaunda’s humanist definition of violence, his extensive treatment of this was seen in terms of Zambia’s foreign policies during his presidency. The foreign policies of Zambia, which reflected its adopted national ideology-Zambian humanism, bespeaks of dependence and non-racialism according to Timothy Shaw; that is:

Their inheritance of dependence on the white regimes and of domestic racial tension led to the advocacy of Humanism, which is concerned with people and with dignity; it is a reaction to Zambia’s colonial history, and to the continuing problem of minority rule in Southern Africa. Humanism is designed not only to overcome internal racial conflict, but also to advance alternative international order in Southern Africa based on racial equality and respect.²³⁹

If Zambia was essentially connected to its Southern neighbours based on its colonial past and geographical location, its adoption of the humanist ideology made this connection even more critical. It is common that a state’s internal policies and disposition, to a great extent, determines its foreign relationship or policies. As such, Zambian humanism was, essentially, against racialism and inequality practiced by its Rhodesia at the time, as Kaunda made obvious in stating that; “*apartheid* as practiced

to the South of us...is in direct contradiction to *Humanism*".²⁴⁰ Consequently, the bulk of Zambia's foreign policies, during the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, concerned Southern Africa, particularly, Rhodesia. This was because the whole of the Southern Africa at the time was seriously committed to the policy of perpetuating minority rule and racial discrimination. This situation Anglin, further, makes clear thus:

Throughout the troubled years since the independence of Zambia in 1964, Southern Africa generally and Rhodesia in particular have been the central foreign policy preoccupations of Zambian decision makers. The basic conflict stemmed from the fact that the two neighbours north and south of the Zambezi were each seeking to upset the status quo in Rhodesia-though in opposing directions. While Salisbury regime is pressing for the removal of the residual legal impediments to its unfettered exercise of power, Lusaka was committed to eradicating continuing minority rule there.²⁴¹

Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I) was the highest decision in terms of racial policies; and this, alternatively, heightened the internal crisis of the Zambian nation, economically and ideologically. Consequently, Kaunda found himself calling for the use of force to overthrow the then Ian Smith regime that declared itself independent of the British dominion on November 11 1965. At first, he wanted this force exerted by Britain alone within the context of her colonial responsibilities. However, the British parliament at the time, led by Harold Wilson, failed to apply the needed force when it was still possible, opting for the imposition of sanction instead. Britain had feared that open use of force in any form might trigger racial conflagration within the region. For Kaunda, this stall of action signified Britain's gravest omission, probably, her indirect support to the perpetuation of the apartheid colonial policy in that region of the African continent. For this reason, Kaunda considered Britain a sell-out in the Rhodesian issue. For him, more precise direct armed intervention was the only way that would have forced the Smith regime into peaceful negotiation. He conceived this armed struggle to be consistent with his pacifist predilections; to him, "it could even be the only chance of sparing Southern Africa the racial conflagration

which Britain feared”.²⁴² And, even if this had been the case, Kaunda would have endorsed only African guerrilla warfare, carried out specifically by the Rhodesians themselves alone. “He justifies this line on the principle of non-intervention in African affairs-the principle of opposing any form recolonisation”.²⁴³ He was, equally conscious and eager to prevent the interference of bigger African countries in the sovereignty of the smaller ones. In other words, in as much as Kaunda endorsed continental, regional cooperation and brotherly aids under the aegis of Pan-Africanism, his acceptance of non-alignment emphasized only an informal sort of association to avoid subordination of one independent nation to another.

Kaunda’s commitment to the principle of violent humanism equally reflected in the extent he forced Zambians to accept the consequences of his policies. He was committed not only to backing the Rhodesian freedom fighters but, to also providing some of them with training and base camps in Zambia. He was forthright with this as his observation shows:

Zambia has not hidden the fact that she has given all possible assistance to the liberation movements. She has fearlessly called upon the oppressed people in Southern Africa to rise against their oppressors. Zambia has no moral right to prevent the oppressed people from taking up arms against their oppressors if these oppressors use arms against defenseless and innocent masses.²⁴⁴

Nevertheless, his principal objective had always been to limit the war, hence steer the warring groups towards peaceful negotiations. Therefore, while he seemed to favour the use of violence, he was, all the time, very prepared to cut the blood shed short and recommence negotiation. This was as far as the change in social status quo advocated in Southern Africa was met. His admission is; “we will never, never rest until Africa is wiped clean of the foul stain of *apartheid*. We cannot live with it, or come to any accommodation with those who impose it on the black masses of South Africa”.²⁴⁵ His

disposition to peaceful negotiation, in as much as it was economic as it was also, showed his openness towards the issue of racial harmony and co-existence. About this, he was even willing to dine with the devil; he tried to form an accord with Vorster's apartheid regime in South Africa with the hope of persuading the Smith regime in Rhodesia to transit peacefully to majority rule, and avoid the ghastly alternative. He had hopes that with South Africa's cordial relationship with Rhodesia at the time, Smith would be more attentive towards any move that Vorster might initiate. He explains this gesture in terms of the Christian conception of forgiveness; "unless we are able to forgive the enemies who cannot possibly make up to us for what they have done, we go stark raving mad with bitterness and hatred".²⁴⁶ This shows Kaunda's commitment to Christian principles, which he placed at the basis of his humanism. This commitment though it permits violence in terms of self-defense, does not absolutize its use.

3.8 Critique of Zambian Humanism

Theoretically, Zambian humanism reflects the essentials of African socialist philosophy: humanism, communalism and egalitarianism. The central principles of Zambian humanism as highlighted by Kaunda makes this evident. Raymond Mwangala presents these principles thus:

- a. The human person at the center- the human person is not defined according to his color, nation, religion, creed, political leanings, material contribution or any matter.
- b. The dignity of the human person- humanism teaches us to be considerate to our fellow human beings in all we say and do.
- c. Non-exploitation of man by man- humanism abhors every form of exploitation of human beings.
- d. Equal opportunities for all- humanism seeks to create an egalitarian society-that is a society in which there is equal opportunity for self-development for all
- e. Hard work and self-reliance- humanism declares that a willingness to work hard is of prime importance; without it nothing can be done anywhere.

- f. Working together- the national productivity drive must involve a communal approach to all development programmes. This calls for a community and team-spirit.
- g. The extended family- under the extended family system no old person is thrown to the dogs or to the institutions like old peoples' homes.
- h. Loyalty and patriotism- only in dedication and loyalty can unity subsist.²⁴⁷

By this, Kaunda intended to institute a policy which if followed, would launch a national life that is uniquely African in orientation and practice in independent Zambia. This was conceived as an antithesis to the racist-exploitative structure which white colonialism had initially instituted in Northern Rhodesia. Reminiscent of the fact that the basic ontology of the Africans antagonizes the European capitalist ideological structure.

However, on the level of implementation, there was a gradual shift in structure from this theoretical ideal; that is, theory failed to properly translate into practical life in the new state. The reason for this, probably, is that, although, Zambian humanism was modelled after the traditional African social life style, yet, it is, essentially, Kaunda's personal conception of life, and his own definition of the goals of politics for modern Zambia. That is, it is his personal ideology based on his perception of African tradition and Christian religious doctrines. This is as he admits that:

It was partly to throw off the moods of despair which from time to time threatened to destroy me that I prayed and thought my way through what has been somewhat gradually called the philosophy of Zambian Humanism. It is simply the goodness about man (sic) derived from my study of the bible and other great writings, supplemented by my own experience.²⁴⁸

Because of this, the idea tended to assume further interpretation and implication, apart from its initial position, as a stand against racialism and exploitation. For instance, Chiponde Mushingeh believes that Zambian humanism was actually a façade,

intended to hide the primary objectives of the first president of Zambia. According to him, it was rather an account of, and strategy towards Kaunda's political dominance in the country. That is, the humanist ideology was put forward to bring to bear the president's controlling influence as a philosopher; it was reported that Kaunda frowned at anybody who tried to expand this view intellectually. Mushingeh shows this conservatism in these words:

Humanism, like Confucian teachings, emphasized among other things, loyalty to authority and a good Humanist was said to be one who obeyed authority. Humanism was at best an attempt to create a monolithic thought process among the Zambian populace. Like in almost every African country where one-party rule was imposed, the ideological monopoly was a prelude to the creation of the one-party state in Zambia. From 1967 onwards, anybody who either criticized aspects of humanism or was opposed to it, automatically earned the label of Zambia's enemy. This included discussions of the philosophy.²⁴⁹

Consequently, from this position, Zambian humanism accounts, more or less, for a propaganda meant for the seizure and usurpation of political power by Kaunda and his UNIP cohorts. To this regard, it reminisces the apartheid regime, under whose tutelage this first political class in Zambia was groomed, and whose political practices they followed, though couched to reflect African ideal. Therefore, Zambian humanism was specifically the basis to, and was meant to pave way for the introduction of the one-party structure in the country.

Mushingeh describes how this was realized in four broad categories. In the first place, the humanist policies were depicted to view multi-party democratic setting and liberalism as a distraction to national survival and progress. Kaunda reveals this position in stating that "national survival is the basic good; all other qualities such as unlimited freedom of expression are contingent upon it. The great enemy of freedom is not totalitarianism but chaos".²⁵⁰ As such, political pluralism was deemed chaotic,

hence, perceived as inconsistent with nation building, tribal unity, and even economic development. In short, it was viewed to have contradicted the Zambian state motto adopted at independence that read; “One Zambia, One Nation”.²⁵¹ Consequently, strong unitary and authoritarian state control was deemed more necessary. Secondly, the existence of various tribes in Africa and the belief of high susceptibility to tribal antagonism, required that a national ideal be instituted, which would unite different tribes under a single party and a single leader. In an atmosphere vigorously challenged by apartheid and imperialism, Africa needed to present a common response and identity. Hence, “in the state’s campaign, Kaunda was portrayed as the architect of Zambia’s unity, without whom Zambia could easily disintegrate into tribal warfare”.²⁵² And humanism, given its African roots, was seen as a means to developing social consensus, expressing patriotic sentiments and abhorrence of conflict, as opposed to factionalism which political pluralism entailed. In other words, humanism was applied as a repressive tool, seen as a guarantee of political consensus conceived as characteristic of ideal state. Thirdly, there was also the issue of confronting the external threats posed by the fact that independent Zambia, being a land-locked nation, was surrounded by other African nations, who at the time, were still under minority colonial governments. Mushigeh makes a succinct analysis of the situation:

The existence of apartheid in South Africa, Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique, and the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Southern Rhodesia were also given as important factor in the quest for one-party rule. National unity dictated that Zambians rally behind the ruling party in order to be able to withstand pressures emanating from the settler-dominated South.²⁵³

Kaunda understood that these could pose major distraction to his desire to exert a controlling influence on the populace and direct them towards his own belief of racial equality and unity. Hence, he accepted that being the major advocate of humanism, and the primary foreign-policy spokesman of Zambia, at the time, necessitated that undivided loyalty be given to him. This reflects Kaunda’s admission that leadership in

new African states ought to be centre of an intense focus of loyalty; a notion which depicts a winner knows it all attitude or that a leader is beyond reproach. It expresses will to power mentality. This position shows that humanism is just a fascist approach intended specifically to deceive, hence, perpetuate oneself in political position. Mushingehe supports this with his postulation that humanism neither achieved tribal unity nor economic development in post-1972 Zambian history. Lastly, Kaunda's will to power was also expressed in the manner in which he cajoled the African National Congress (ANC), the most strong opposition party to his governing United National Independence Party, into an alliance in June 1972. According to Mushingehe, this was named Choma Declaration, after the Choma province where the pact was signed, and this process, in the introduction of the one-party rule, involved not only stick and carrot, but that "the manner in which the carrot was dispensed reminisces the colonial tactics of divide and rule".²⁵⁴ That is, when this accord was reached between these opposing parties, the former leadership of the ANC realized that it was a ploy to systematically incorporate them into the ruling party, then prevent them from running for strategic positions within UNIP, notably, that of the party chairman which had only a sole candidate, Kenneth Kaunda. This strategy, equally, divided and weakened the ANC, thus, ensured that the last obstacle to achieving the one-party rule was entirely removed, the other opposition parties having been outlawed.

On economic level, Zambian humanism favoured socialist mode of wealth acquisition and distribution, to reflect the traditional African communal economy. The traditional society was basically egalitarian, and this equality was made to spread to all areas of the indigenous life style. Ekei exposes the extent of this equality in his discussion of Justice as Care in the traditional Igbo setting:

In caring, the traditional Igbo organize themselves to wrestle with the problems which ordinarily are beyond

individual capacities. For instance, there is collective efforts in building (mud) houses, and in erecting thatches upon them. Such collective ventures spread in other departments of life as constructing pathways, building bridges, and clearing farmlands, and market places. The ethical implication of this is that without such concerted efforts of the individuals, through co-existence, co-operation, and caring, human life is likely to be highly precarious. Thus it is an activity that tends to promote the human survival and flourishing in the communal setting.²⁵⁵

The aged, the sick and the less privileged were not excluded from this equality expressed through care in the indigenous setting. On this, Ekei also points out that in the communal society, “that man is generally limited makes him subject of moral right accruing from communal care: that he is less privileged due to one misfortune or the other, makes him the subject of concern”.²⁵⁶ Kaunda accepted this fundamental equality of man in the African setting and made it the basis of his socio-economic ideology for Zambia. That is why his prelude to the implementation of the nationalization policy in 1968 was, as he observed, that in the time of the Central African Federation, the major businesses, industrialization and transportation were limited only to the expatriates. As such, no native Zambian was allowed opportunity to make a career in any part of the major economic life of the colony. So, humanism meant the equalization of opportunities and bridging of these racial gaps created by colonial incursion; that is, Zambianisation of the major means of production (state control of the national economy). This control was also conceived to help boost economic development that would be uniquely African. However, scholars have come up with positions that depict that beyond the seeming intension of the nationalization policy to reduce exploitation based on class formation and to encourage development, the policy was primarily instituted to maintain political control by the then ruling nationalist party. In the words of Timothy Shaw this reads that “the ability of the ruling class to maintain political order in Zambia is related to the production and price of copper”.²⁵⁷ He explains that the policy meant that Zambia’s major economies and

its structures were controlled by the government through its ministries and parastatals. The parastatals oversaw the running of the companies responsible for copper mining, the main source of the state's foreign income, and undertook negotiation with them on behalf of the government. These government positions were exclusively occupied by party members whose sole interests were personal embourgeoisement and, also, were prepared to further the control of power at any cost in as much as these interests were continually met. These officials were equally in charge of domestic trade and price regulation on locally consumed products. For Mushingehe, the nationalization policy was part of the long-term plan of Kaunda to introduce the one-party rule, hence maintain dominance over his political rivalries. He argues that Zambia saw greater economic prosperity in the years of political pluralism that preceded the introduction of the one-party rule. Consequently, "the imposition of the one-party rule in Zambia in 1972 had more to do with the desire on the part of Kaunda's faction to maintain political hegemony in the country than with economic development and maintenance of national unity per se".²⁵⁸ Therefore, the Zambianisation of economy as an aspect of humanism functioned largely to consolidate state's control of the economy as a way of strengthening Kaunda and his supporters' hold on power. Put in another way, the ideology was put up to show the manner in which the regime in power was prepared to confront challenges to its political dominance, both domestic and foreign.

Another way of grasping this position properly, is by bringing to realization the fact that humanism in the nationalization policy failed to bring about the equalization of economic opportunities and distribution. It, instead, gave rise to a new state elites, and an era of state capitalism. The rise and embourgeoisement of the political class was a common feature of many newly independent African nations (an inheritance from colonialism), but in the case of Zambia it was a significant departure from its adopted national ideology, humanism. Consequently, humanism may have stood its ground

against racial discrimination, but, it was, at the same time, permissive of other social inequalities, and the relationship between the state's owned parastatals and multinational corporations, a paradigm which encouraged the growth of elitism of party officials. As it is, the interests of the foreign companies in Zambia's copper industries coincided with the interests of her ruling class to enthrone class inequality despite its official rhetoric of humanism. This, equally, explained Zambia's perpetuation of the foreign policy of dependence on imported goods and man-power for decades following its independence. Shaw explains that:

Given the inherited dependence of Zambia on foreign investment, technology, skills, and trade, its foreign-policy values may be seen as an expression of the intent of the elite to exert control over their society and resources. The leadership of Zambia perceives a relationship between internal and international challenges to its dominance; if it is to confront these linkages, it has to develop and articulate a foreign policy which attacks both. Humanism is designed to serve these interrelated purposes.²⁵⁹

Thus, humanism so presented was a social ethos but which expressed and served only the interests of Zambia's ruling class. And as an official rhetoric, it was used to back up as many interests as the regime in power could come up with for its control of state power, a reason why scholars have equally called it an amorphous ideology. Shaw argues that Kaunda was well aware of these contradictions and problems in the implementation of the policy of humanism. According to him; "although he is increasingly critical of Zambia's continuing dependence, and embourgeoisement of its elite, he is permissive towards both because of the imperatives of his office".²⁶⁰ In other words, his priority and preference of the presidential position necessitated that he could not compel implementation of the more radical demands of theoretical humanism, instead the social reality of Zambia always lagged behind this theory.

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- ²⁵⁵. J.C. Ekei, *Justice in Communalism: A Foundation of Ethics in African Philosophy*, (Lagos: Smagh & Co., 2001), pp.178-179
- ²⁵⁶. J.C. Ekei, p.179
- ²⁵⁷. T.M. Shaw, “Zambia: Dependence and Underdevelopment”, p.7
- ²⁵⁸. C. Mushinge, p.101
- ²⁵⁹. T.M. Shaw, “Foreign Policy of Zambia: Interests and Ideology”, pp.79-80
- ²⁶⁰. T.M. Shaw, p.80

CHAPTER FOUR

PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM

4.1 Origin of the State

Basically in the idea of nationalism is the implication that the state exists, and that it does for a purpose. There is, implicitly here, the belief that man had always sought a platform in which he can identify his being; a sort of a mirror on which he could assess an image of himself. The result of this is the invention of political association. Political association then provides the answer to the question of social identity, which, as it is, assuages man's quest to truly realize his nature as a political animal. History reflects the various efforts man has put into defining his existence in this regard. But how well he has gotten close to doing this, is central to political thought; thus, the constant attention paid to these foundational questions; how to rule?; who to rule? Appadorai puts it this way; "among the first questions which political theory raises is: what is the origin of the state? Have men always lived under some form of political organization? If they have not, what are the causes that brought about the original establishment of government?"¹ As it is, scholars have put forward varying ideas and theories concerning the origin of the state. We note from the onset that these theories are but conjectures, as there exists no exact records as to when, why or in which form the state actually started. Yet, it should be granted that these pinpoint that the institution of organized lifestyle marked a stage in conscious evolution of man. That is, that political consciousness underlies why political organization or association was necessary, so, constituted in the first place. The state is, in this respect, a rational establishment for man's social good. By rationality is recognized basic aggregate of consents or union of wills in the constitution of the state; in other words, there could

have been an initial agreement between the ruler and the ruled, whether openly expressed or implied (apriori consent) as to the best way of defining or determining the common good of all. Fundamentally, this involves how to reconcile the exercise of authority, human rights and freedom in order to avoid tyranny on one hand, and anarchy on the other. This implies that the extent of state influence and control, and individual's allegiance to the state organization, is central to the idea of the state existence, as such. For only on this basis could a community be said to be rightly organized, and order be enforced. The various theories of state origin could be subsumed under the following considerations.

4.1.1 Theory of Divine Origin

This theory is considered the oldest concerning the primary origin of the state, going by its common acceptance in the primitive societies. Political authorities in the primitive societies were usually connected to unseen powers, which was why leaders, here, were regarded as incarnates of the gods. Known commonly as the theory of divine rights of kings, this position has its basis in the biblical verse that reads; "let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgement".² From this, Appadorai deduces the idea that, "the state has been established by an ordinance of God; its rulers are divinely appointed; they accountable to no authority but God".³ Consequently, this theory is essentially theocratic conception of the state. It necessarily derives from the common acceptance that God created and controls all things in the world; in which case, state authority could be adjudged to spring from the divine injunction to Adam, the first man, to fill and subdue the earth. Even the early Jewish monarchical leadership followed in this pattern. There are many Old Testament scriptural references that God appoints, dismisses, and even slays rulers. Indian primitive epic, also, contains many sources that refer to the divine origin of the state and government. The most common version

posits that men approached Brahma (the creator) to provide them with a king, who would protect them from the terror spread from the anarchy and strife in the world. Thus, Brahma spared a portion of his power, and a being in human form emerged to rule for the protection of all. And since these rulers were partly gods, they were considered super humans; hence arises, also, the belief that the earliest rulers were priests, magicians and kings. The implication of this is that the state exists to represent the will of God for the people; that is, the rulers being earthly representatives of God. Therefore, “obedience to the state becomes a religious as well as a civil duty; disobedience sacrilege”.⁴

References to the divine right theory gave basis on which the patristic philosophers asserted the supremacy of the church over political affairs; thus, societal laws were considered to be direct deductions from the natural laws, which are reflections of the eternal laws. St. Augustine, for instance, argues that it is the very reflection of the eternal laws (justice) by the temporal laws that is the basis of statehood. According to him, the laws of the state are not just expression of the state’s power to legislate, but an expression of the divine will which precedes the state. The state is not autonomous, but exists to enforce rules according to justice, which is an eternal standard meant for it. In other words, “if the laws of the state were out of harmony with natural law and justice, they would not have the character of laws, nor would there be a state”.⁵ Natural law, for Augustine, is man’s participation in the eternal laws, and justice being an aspect of this law, regulates not just the relationship between people, but also between man and God. The love of God is the highest service required of man, since it is the justification of individual love for his fellowman, and common recognition of the same law which makes a multitude of such like men. Therefore, “to serve God and to love one’s fellowman are, among other things, to recognize that all people should also have this inviolate right and opportunity to love and serve God. Love is the basis of justice”.⁶ By this, Augustine raises the love of God above the coercive functions of the

state; religion above the state. The state is but a reflection of man's sinful state. Consequently, Augustine divides humanity into two cities or states; those who love God (City of God) and those who love themselves (City of the World). Individuals who belong to either of these cities are found both in the church and the state.

The obvious trend of this theory is the acceptance of the idea of infallibility of rulers, which clearly exposes the state to acts of despots. History has records of such occurrences. Yet, Appadorai believes that the theory "has the merit that idealistically interpreted it may create in the mass of the people a sense of the value of order and obedience to law, so necessary for the stability of the state-and in the rulers a moral accountability to God for the manner in which they exercise their power".⁷ However, it is a common knowledge that the ideal is utopic and unrealizable. Hence, this idea tends to suppose that the ruled has no other part in the state except unquestioning obedience to the ruler, who is the symbol of the state.

4.1.2 Force Theory

This is also one of the oldest theories of origin of the state in classical writing. It holds that the state originated in conquest and coercion; that is, it is as a result of the subjugation of the weaker by the stronger. Thus, central to this theory is the idea, 'war begat the king'. This envisages the ancient belief that the state is a creation of constant war and invasion of great warriors that dominated the weak, which happened over a long period of time. Appadorai exposes how this happened:

With increase of population and the consequent pressure on the means of subsistence, there was also an improvement in the art of warfare. Fighting became the work of specialists. A state is founded when a leader, with his band of warriors, gets permanent control of a definite territory of a considerable size.⁸

In the primitive societies, this occurred by the invasion and domination of another tribe by an already well established, stronger tribe or through immigration and conquest.

The basic picture here is that the state symbolizes power and dominion. A situation which gave rise to the idea that the state is the highest form of human organization; that is, the idea that the state is superior to any other form of human association. In ancient scholarship, Thrasymachus represented this idea with the dictum, ‘might is right’, an invariable acceptance that the law is the interest of the ruler or the state. In modern era, German philosophy made full exposition of the idea in the thoughts of both Hegel and Nietzsche. They accept that force is central to the idea of the state and that this dignifies it. Hence to Hegel, the state is the absolute spirit, and exercises supremacy over all of its individuals. “Every individual citizen should therefore endeavor to bring his will in conformity with the will of the state”.⁹ In other words, the state, a representation of the subjugation of the weak, shapes the entire state of affairs in the way they ought to be. Nietzsche justifies this as might makes right; an expression of will to power. The state embodies the superman, implying that “it is above ordinary moral or ethical restraint and it is greater than any individual. It is not limited by something insignificant as individual rights”.¹⁰ There is record that it is this philosophy that laid the foundation of Fascism and Nazism in Europe, and it has come to justify all sorts of extreme nationalism in our world at the present.

The basic inadequacy of this theory is in the fact that it supposes that the state is an independent institution and authority from its people. That is, “the state is a self-contained being, an organic personality in and of itself, all-powerful and total”.¹¹ This supposition has serious implication with regard to natural human rights in the society. Just as it equally means that there is no basic difference between the state and other

social institutions in the society. This is a collectivist view, as it justifies state interference in every aspect of the individual life as in totalitarian societies, where human freedom suffers. The fact is, while force is at the basis of the state formation, yet it is insufficient to assume it is the sole element to this.

4.1.3 Kinship Theory

This theory traces the origin of the state to blood relationship. That is, the root of the commonwealth lies in the primitive family. Thus, the state is gradual enlargement of the primitive family. Scholars in this position submit that the primitive family had all the curbs and controls which constitute the modern state. They analyze the features of the state to align with the characteristics of the family: the family members constitute citizens, its house represent territory, its head stands as government and its freedom and devotion show sovereignty. The family gives its individuals lessons on rights and responsibilities, adjustments and discipline, love and sympathy which promote fellow feeling. These are basic training on good citizenship, which is an essential requisite for state life. Hence, the family is the matrix of the state. Aristotle accepts this view of family origin of the state. This for him followed a gradual process of natural evolution, from family through the village to the state. This graduation to the state is natural because man is intended by nature to live in a political society; naturally, man is a political animal. Therefore, the state is a necessity, implicit from man's potentialities. Mukherjee and Ramaswamy elaborate this more:

The state was an instrument for an individual's self-perfection. Far from being artificially or contractually created, it evolved naturally. Aristotle contended that man by nature was a political animal, making the state necessary and desirable. The significant point to note is that Aristotle's reference to nature confirmed the debate between *nomos* (convention) and *phusis* (nature) that dominated Greek political theory in the fifth Century B.C. As advocates of the *phusis* argument, both Plato and Aristotle asserted that the state and its laws were more than a product of convention. It was a natural institution

reflecting individuals' needs and purposes, given human gregariousness and sociability.¹²

The development from family to village and to the state reflects the growing complexity of human needs and the desire to adequately satisfy these. This satisfaction cannot be fully achieved as individual, hence, man's innate sociability and the desire to come together and live in a society.

There are two basic contentions in the kinship theory, and this concerns who was the initial head of the primitive family, and along which lineage succession ran. Some scholars accept that descent was traced along the patriarchal bloodline, while others hold onto the matriarchal bloodline. The patriarchal theory as championed by Henry Maine, traces succession and authority along male descendants. The state originated from an aggregation of different families united by the authority and protection of the eldest male parent. In other words, "father or patriarch occupies a dominant position in the family. All the members of the family pay due homage to him. His authority is recognized by all of them".¹³ This authority stands unchallenged over his children, their properties and extends even to matters of life and death. This was basic to the structure of the ancient social organization. Through marriage and remarriage, the patriarchal families expanded into a clan, then to a tribe and finally the commonwealth. Commonwealth was defined in terms of blood ties of members, united in pursuit of common good, under the subjugation of the highest male ascendant. Appadorai relates that the patriarchal society has three features according to Edward Jenks; male kinship, permanent marriages and paternal authority. Explaining this he observes that "integral to this theory is that members of the patriarchal family should be able to trace their descent through the male. Men are counted as kin because they are descended from the same male ancestor".¹⁴ Permanent marriage meant that a male primogenitor was permanently married to either a woman or women as the society allowed both monogamous and polygamous marriages.

Aristotle holds this view in his rejection of Plato's communism and abolition of private property. For him, marriage makes possible the family which is a natural establishment for the satisfaction of man's daily needs, and also the basic unit of the state. The scriptural account, especially from the creation of Adam to God's covenant with the Jewish patriarchs, recognizes the paternal authority; the reason ancient Jewish tribes trace their descent from their male primogenitors, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Equally, "in early Rome the *patria potestas* (literally the authority of the father) 'extended to all the descendants of a living ancestor, no matter how old they were' and comprised even the power of life and death to say nothing of control and chastisement".¹⁵ Patriarchal theory expresses the controlling authority of the male ancestor.

On the other hand, there is the matriarchal theory. It holds that in the primitive societies, bloodline relationship and descent was traced along the mother's line. This was because there was no permanent family and marriage system in this social setting. Consequently, "the primitive group had no common male head, and ...kinship among them could be traced only through the woman".¹⁶ Scholars who argue along this line claim that this was the earliest structure of the primitive societies, at the time when human civilization was still in the hunting and fruit gathering stage. The belief was that children were raised whenever two wandering groups met, after which they separated; the children born as a result, were mostly raised by their mothers. Since there was no permanent life style or property, all relationships and descent were traced through the mothers alone, who took care of whatever small groups there were. These small groups were not families as there were no permanent male heads and the children were not usually from the same fathers. Rather, the institution of the family was a later development at the time men began to recognize the values of women in tending flocks, and at homes. This was when marriage was instituted and the matriarchal societies turned into the patriarchal system. Apart from this, Edward

Jenks, a proponent of this idea had argued that the tribe instead of the family was the basis of social organization in the primitive societies. His study of the ancient Australian societies shows that group affinity was not on the basis of blood relationship, but through some symbols like animals or trees; these were called totem groups. Usually, a particular totem group married all the members of another totem group giving rise to a polyandry and polygamy also. Therefore, “the tribe instead of the family, is the primary group; in time it breaks into clans; theses turn into households; and ultimately into individual members”.¹⁷

The first fault of the kinship theory is the tendency to regard the family as the basis of the state. It is rather more correct to recognize that the state is caused by many other factors like force, religion, political consciousness and social agreement, of which the family is just one. Besides, the state is more than an expanded family. The two social concepts are very much different in essence, organization, function and purposes. Concerning the opposing positions of the patriarchal and matriarchal theories, it is not a historical fact that either of the systems was the only system at a point in time. The best we can do is to accept that there was a parallel development of both of the systems in civilization; even though the patriarchal theory commands more acceptability.

4.1.4 Social Contract Theory

Social contract theory views the state as a product of a deliberate and rational act of the people in a society. This act was in terms of an agreement or contract entered into by the entire people prior to the establishment of a civil society. With this agreement, a body politic and government were set up to which all the parties to the contract were subject to, and had thereby, mandated to legislate on their behalf. Thus, the social contract is “the idea that the ruler and the ruled agreed on their respective roles and had obligations to one another....The notion that the ruler governed by the consent of

the governed was always implied by this theory”.¹⁸ This then negates the claim to the unlimited political power or divine right to rule by absolute monarchs. The contract is the right of the parties for voluntary and deliberate overthrow of corrupt rulers and to organize a new government that promotes common interests of all the people. Consequently, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the basis of the contract theory was popular sovereignty; “the power of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferred, and committed to them in trust from the people, to the common good of them all in whom the power yet remains fundamentally, and cannot be taken from them without a violation of their natural birthright”.¹⁹ In this stead, social contract is considered the avant-garde to modern democracy.

As considered by its popular proponents, the history of the world is divided into two; the period before the formation of government called state of nature, and the period after, referred to as the civil society. In the state of nature, there existed no society, government and political authority; as such there was no law to regulate the relationship of people. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau accept this basic point, but differ about the features of life in the state of nature, reason for converting to the civil society and the terms of the contract. They, however, accept that the nature of life in the state of nature made it necessary for a changeover. With this changeover, a government came into existence which gave the people security of life, and property, though the initial natural liberty of the former state was lost. Government assumed the role of the impartial judge and social security for individuals in the society. Thus, the contractarians believe that government was not a natural condition. “Government was a deliberately and rationally conceived human invention, and the social contract was the act of people creating and empowering government”.²⁰ Again, even though the state of nature was uncomfortable, it was not totally lawless as there was the natural law which guided individual lives. These were absolute and

universal set of truths which applied and regulated the lives of individuals in this state equally. Therefore, “it is not moral for anyone to make an equal unequal, so all people owe each other certain considerations, which came to be called natural rights”.²¹ Lastly, there is implicit in the idea of the contract the fact that people are rational; that is, with regard to understanding their problems and rationally proffering solution to it. In this instance, the institution of government was a rational and deliberate attempt to solve the problems the people encountered in the state of nature. The commonwealth, in which each individual’s volition was part to, was a rational process.

Hobbes observes that the state of nature was characterized by chaos occasioned by strife of individuals for self-preservation. In this state, “there was no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”.²² Even though man had the natural law, yet this could not guarantee control and freedom. Locke and Rousseau refuse to accept that the state of nature was essentially a state of war. According to Locke, though there was no government in this state, men were guided by the natural law which legislated to all as equals, and commanded that no man should interfere in the life, health, freedom and possessions of another. The absence of a superior among them meant that each of them was left with working out his own interpretation of the law of reason. “The result is that while the state of nature is not a state of war (as it is in Hobbes’ view) it is still ‘full of fears and continual dangers’ and man’s enjoyment of rights is very insecure”.²³ For Rousseau, “this state of affairs, a period of ideal bliss and happiness, disappeared with the emergence of private property”.²⁴ Hence to exit the inconveniences of the state of nature, men entered into a contract, by giving up their control of their natural rights. Hobbes argues that by this “a supreme coercive power is instituted. The contracting parties are not the community and the Government but subject and subject”.²⁵ The state, thus created exercises absolute control over all the parties and its

law is sovereign. Unlike this position, Locke and Rousseau point out that the original contract did not immediately institute a government, rather, it led into a community or society. Locke further adds that after this initial contract, another contract was made to establish a government. That is, in replacing the state of nature, the people created the civil society by a contract, after which they made another contract by which the government in the person of the ruler or the legislator was inaugurated. This implies that government is part to the contract unlike Hobbes' Leviathan. Rousseau differs from Locke in that he accepts that government was an establishment by the act of the parties to the contract. However, in both, sovereignty lies with the parties to the initial contract not with the government as Hobbes would have us believe. In the *Two Treatise of Government*, Locke explains:

The legislative power constituted by the consent of the people becomes the supreme power in the commonwealth, but is not arbitrary. It must be exercised, as it is given, for the good of the subjects. Government is in the nature of a trust and embraces only such powers as were transferred at the time of the change from a state of nature. The legislature must dispense justice by standing laws and authorized judges; no man can be deprived of his property without his consent, nor can taxes be levied without the consent of the people or their representatives. Finally, the legislature cannot transfer its powers to any other person or body. It is but a delegated power from the people, who alone can dispense of it.²⁶

Locke's postulation in the above clearly depicts that there is no complete surrender of all rights in the contract. The parties agreed only to the enforcement of the natural rights, while retaining the rights to life, liberty and property. This partial surrender of rights places limitation on the powers of the government or state; that is, it functions only to arbitrate between individuals. The people can only commit to government as long as it operates within the contract that established it, else, it would be dissolved.

Sovereignty lies with the people, though, this is latent. But in Rousseau's idea, everyone surrenders all his rights to the community. This implies that:

The community, therefore, becomes sovereign. Its sovereignty is as absolute as that of the Government in Hobbes is. Prima facie, there is no need to limit its sovereignty in the interests of the subjects, for the sovereign body, being formed only of the individuals who constitute it, can have no interests contrary to theirs. From the mere fact of its existence, it is always all that it ought to be (since, from the very fact of its institution, all merely private interests are lost to it).²⁷

Individuals only retain such rights allowed to it by the law or which the law does not prohibit; sovereignty here is absolute as in Hobbes, but it lies in the contract not with the government. There is complete swallowing of the individual by the general will, and the individual can only achieve freedom or happiness by staying true to this will.

The social contract theory has been widely denounced on the grounds that it espouses ideas that are fictitious. For instance, the idea of a contract antedating the establishment of the state is not historical, neither is the idea of state of nature. Part of this, is that the theory presupposes that there existed in the state of nature a basic understanding of what the state actually is in the parties to the contract, before the actual establishment of the contract. In other words, how could the primitive people who had no knowledge of the state conceive the idea of establishing the state by a contract? Can one have an idea of the goodness of the state who has never had experience of the state? Sir Henry Maine explains this confusion as the case of putting the horse before the cart; the theory supposes that contractual agreement is the beginning of the society when, in fact, it is status. Appadorai, extensively, exposes the stand of Maine:

Contract, according to Maine, is not the beginning but the end of society. The idea of contract postulates that individuals who enter into the contract are free to do things in their own way; but, says Maine, the evidence of

early law and custom shows that primitive man had no such freedom. Primitive society rested not upon contract but upon status. In that society, men were born into the station and part they were to play throughout life. It was not a matter of choice or of voluntary arrangement in what relations men were to stand towards one another as individuals. 'He who is born a slave, let him remain a slave; the artisan, an artisan; the priest, a priest-is the command of the law of status.'²⁸

Early society moved from status, and with the growth of age, this was replaced with contract. Also, the above position makes obvious that men in the primitive society were unequal, whereas the contract theory supposes that there existed fundamental equality of men in the state of nature. Lastly, political scientists and sociologists have univocally established that the state existed as a result of a long process of development underlid by factors as kinship, force, divine sanction, family, contract and so on. As such, the state as an institution cannot be reduced to a product of an individual will, else, it would imply that there are situations in which the state lacks sufficient authority over its individuals. For instance, in a situation where the state's authority contradicts the individual's will. The state should not be reduced to such a partnership that could be easily be dissolved at the fancy of such parties to the contract. Yet, it should still be realized that the idea of a contract is always implicit in the concept of political association. This reduces the tendency of the state to abuse its authority over the citizens.

4.1.5 Natural Evolution Theory

The theory of natural evolution considers the state a product of gradual development over time by the human society. This consideration of the state as a natural process started with Aristotle. In his *Politics*, Aristotle believes that man is by nature a political animal; that is, nature intends man to live in a political society. This is evident through man's gift of speech. In other words, humans are social beings and naturally gather in a community to interact with one another. Aristotle avers:

This congregation takes place for reasons that go beyond simple biological necessity. Indeed, a community is a necessary condition for human fulfilment. The formal organization of the community is the state. The formation of the state is as a result of people's natural inclination to interact.²⁹

Thus, it is only within this natural environment that man can truly be human; hence, he who has no need of the state is either a beast or a god. The state enables man not only to interact but also to achieve his other potentialities which define his goal of life, namely, happiness. So, it is an instrument for man's self-perfection and fulfilment, and therefore, the pinnacle of social evolution. Historically, the primitive family is at the root of the formation of the state; the primitive family was "brought into being by such elemental needs as those for shelter, food and the propagation of the race".³⁰ Aristotle accepts this based on his consideration that the primitive men were brought together by the urge for sexual satisfaction and self-preservation. But man's needs are not limited to these daily necessities, hence, the association of a number of such families to form the village. Though the village was established for higher needs, yet it lacks self-sufficiency, requiring that there be further progression to another stage of association. This third and final stage-the state, for Aristotle, naturally springs up from a union of several villages. "What is distinctive about the state is...that it first produces the condition necessary to a really civilized life. It originates in the bare needs of life but it continues for the sake of a good life".³¹ Consequently, the state is natural to man since he necessarily desires good life, and its formation follows a gradual natural process through grossly imperfect beginning towards a perfect organization of men. The state follows from man's natural desires as it is only in the state that these desires can be adequately satisfied.

The basic contention here is that the state evolved out of the complexity of human needs through the ages. That is, the state is a natural outgrowth of various factors and

forces, as we had earlier considered individually, working through history. Because of this, Appadorai believes that the natural evolution theory commands wider acceptability; it avoids all the lapses inherent in considering these factors separately as the basis of the state. These factors represent the various historical stages and forces that created the state and which it has progressed through in its formation. The implication is that the beginning of government cannot be tied to any particular time or cause, but can be shown to be a progressive increase in complexity of human society through different ages, driven by these influences. In the first place, there is kinship which ties the basis of the state to the principle of command and obedience. The enforcement of this principle in the earliest societies, was always common among those groups bound by blood ties, with definite male or female authority. There were families, clans and tribes whose memberships were based on blood relationship, which was the first element of social unity and basis of organization and control. Within this organization could be found council of elders with a chief as a political head, whose command was binding to all the members of the group. Whether or not this organization followed a patriarchal or matriarchal line, the fact is that it furnished the basis for the rise of the state as an institution. Closely linked with the primitive social unit is the idea of religion and common worship. Appadorai opines that common worship was undoubtedly a strong element in wielding of primitive families and tribes together. In this social setting, ancestor worship was very common as it gave family members access to the family or tribes' altar, where they paid homage to their dead ancestors and solicited protection and guidance. Implicit in this form is that;

...we find that the medicine man or magician, who naturally held predominant position, acquired or was elevated to the position of kingship. The primitive man had implicit faith in the existence of spirits, the spirits of the dead and the spirits of nature. The medicine-man, professing ability to control them by means of his sorcery, naturally came to be regarded with mysterious awe and acquired unique influence.³²

In this society, religion, slowly and gradually, became a powerful instrument for maintaining control over its people.

The rise of economic classes and private ownership was equally significant to the origin of the state. This was necessitated in the early societies with the increase in population size, which forced people to lead a settled life. Consequently, there was need for a recognized authority to define and enforce the rights of individuals within the defined territory. This authority defined property rights and property relations, issues concerning inheritance, theft and exchange of goods. Related to this and also very significant to the rise of the state is the issue of security and warfare. “The demands of constant warfare often led to the rise of permanent headship when a tribe was driven to appoint a leader. The continuity of war conducted to the permanence of leadership”.³³ Thus, war changed tribes into political entities and in this way the modern states came into being. Lastly, the rise of the state is traced to the rise and influence of political consciousness among individuals. Aristotle believes that man from the onset had always been politically conscious, because he is by nature a political animal. That is, he had always been conscious of the need for defense and protection of his life, liberty and property, and regulation of social conduct and economy. This began as a slow process in the primitive family, but has gradually translated to the growth of the state and government.

4.2 Nationhood and Statehood

The concept ‘nation’ is not synonymous with the term state, even though politicians and some scholars tend to interchange their use often. As we had earlier stated, “a state exists where there are a territory, a people, a Government and sovereignty; it may lack the feeling of nationality, or of oneness among the people, and yet remain a state”.³⁴ It is essentially a political arm of the society, since it implies organization for law and

government. But the term, nation is a social concept, as is obvious from its Latin derivation, *natus*, which means birth. Leon Baradat explains:

Indeed, the concept nation is not political but social. A nation can exist even though it is not contained within a particular state or served by a given government. A nation exists when there is a union of people based on similarities in linguistic pattern, ethnic relationship, cultural heritage, or even simple geographic proximity.³⁵

Thus, central to the existence of a nation is consciousness of unity or oneness among its people. This, probably, could be why the commonest feature around which a nation is formed is ethnicity. While this may suggest that members of a nation share common descent, it is not entirely true that people should be related by blood to be members of the same nation; strong cultural pattern, history and common world view are other essentials of national identity. In other words, a nation is a natural order of association in the absence of the coercive forces of the state laws; natural sentiments and affinities underlie a nation; while the state is an association on the basis of the law. Nation stands for the unity of a people; the state politicizes this union.

The tendency to associate the state with a nation has given rise to the question as to whether the state should be organized as a uni-national state or a multi-national state. Majority of the states in the world are multi-national states, while only very few, like Israel, Germany, Austria and Hungary, are uni-national states. Even at this, most scholars would accept that the ideal political associations are those in which a particular nation constitute a political unit. According to Nwoko; “the best political society...is that where the natural elements of the nation (nationality) blends with the legal or coercive elements of the state”.³⁶ The common acceptance of this position is that nation-states possess a homogeneity which makes it easier for the members to subordinate their differences to the common good. The harmony thus created by the sense of homogenous values, make it relatively easy for the government of nation-

states to function effectively unlike in multi-national states. Rousseau's idea of General Will implies this belief; that is, a good political community means a homogenous population. Herder and Fichte are equally outstanding in this regard. Herder accepts that diversity of cultural groups in the world was natural and that each should strive to preserve their heritage and make sure it remains pure. For this to happen, the realm of the state must coincide with that of the nation; nations should be ruled by natural government. "Multi-nation states were thus unnatural, but not because Herder feared that one nation may dominate another. Rather, they were unnatural because states containing more than one nation posed a threat to the principle of diversity".³⁷ In this regard, nations that politically unite under a state have the potentials of losing their identities, thus disappearing. Following the same basis, Fichte called for the unification of the entire German speaking nations into one independent German state; he considers the separation of the Germans from the rest of the world natural. According to him, language was not merely a way of verbal and written expression. "It was rather the repository, as it were, of a peoples' national character and heritage. The way individuals think and perceive the world was determined to a great extent, by their language".³⁸ The implication in this is that, the more social bond is stretched or more nations are accommodated in a political association, the slacker it becomes; a small state is usually stronger in proportion to its size, so preferable to larger ones. Governments should correspond to nationalities. It is only in such situation that "the hidden natural and legal treasures in customs and traditions could be easily harnessed to the advantage of the people".³⁹ Therefore, since multi-nation states, most often, lack these, they are clearly placed in an unsatisfactory condition; the lack of basic consciousness of a bond of unity increases the tendency of failed states.

The fundamental question that this raises is: should every nation constitute a state? In as much as the notion of nation-state is closer to the ideal form of political society, yet,

if commonly accepted, it would significantly increase the number of agitation for self-determination on national basis. This would, invariably, increase the pressure in most of the already established states to disintegrate on the basis of national constitution. This process could, equally, obtain within a nation-group, if any perceived difference is assumed to actually exist among its people; after all, anywhere a distinction can be drawn between groups of people (be it linguistic, religious or otherwise), the possibility exists that these differences will lead to a different nationhood between the two groups of people. Take for an instance Somalia, where the effects of French, Italian, British and Ethiopian imperialism has divided the Somali people into four different nations on the basis of a superimposed political cultures. Or Nigeria, with its three main ethnic divisions, yet, in actuality, these contain more than 150 other small linguistic groups. On another hand, it could deepen the force of ethnic cleansing that is being witnessed in some states in parts of the world at the present.

The fact about having a uni-national state is that it requires that loyalty and identification be defined based on ethnicity and physical attraction rather than by political institutions and moral-rational principles which the idea of state should represent. Such associations based on physical similarities do not purport civilized life which properly befits humans, and who should be governed by the moral and rational principles the state represents. Hence, multi-national states represent attempt by men to submit themselves to law and principles rather than hold exceptionally to allegiance based on ethnicity. Appadorai cites Lord Acton in this regard:

Acton held that the combination of different nations in one state is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of individuals to form a society. Inferior races make progress by living in political union with races intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by their contact with a younger vitality. Nations in which the elements of organization and capacity for government have been lost, either

through the demoralizing influence of despotism or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger race and a less corrupted race. This fertilizing and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one Government. The 'multi-national' view has the merit of drawing attention to the healthy idea that not every people is capable of creating and maintaining a state; only a people of political capacity, possessing manly qualities, understanding and courage, and able to defend itself, can rightly claim to establish an independent state.⁴⁰

Therefore, the uni-national principles tend to lessen the potentials for interaction and mutual help among nations or groups. In addition, multi-nationalism tends to reduce totalitarian control, because individual freedom is better protected from an overpowering government. The multiplicity of associations and diversity of interests reduces the possibility of the government being dominated by a particular interest or group as we had in political dynasties.

A genuine political association is that in which, "the body-politic, having emerged, gives basis to the formation of a national community of the small nationalities around this existing body-politic".⁴¹ That is, the existence of the state causes the recognition of the nations under it. This form, as we had mentioned, is more common. It is entirely natural and proper for a group that has developed sufficient cohesion to recognize itself as a nation, to desire its own space where it feels at home and believes that its own cultural identity is recognized, respected and honoured. Usually, this is found in being part of a larger community of nations, in a federalism. Thus:

Federalism offers at least the potential for distinctive cultures that nonetheless share a common identity at some level to unite together and have the space for both their unity and diversity, allowing room for common action where there is common agreement and room for separate space where there is different cultural ideals.⁴²

It is following this idea, J. Maritain insists strongly that, “the body-politic should develop both its own moral dynamism and the respect for human freedom to such a point that the national communities which are contained within it would have both their natural rights fully recognized, and tend spontaneously to merge in a single higher or more complex National Community”.⁴³ Kant had this structure in mind while he describes the state as a federation of rights or relationship of wills of individuals, and their freedom in this relationship. This is, a condition which necessitates relationship between individuals and nations as a whole in a social state. Here, what we have is a relationship of rights or coexistence of wills expressed to their fullest without hindrance. Kant sees right as the sum total of those conditions with which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with the universal law of freedom. Thus, the political state in Kant’s view is a kingdom of rights, since it should establish the sum total of those conditions with which the will of one person (or group) can be reconciled with the will of another person (or group) in accordance with a universal law of freedom. In the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, he calls this condition autonomy; “that condition in which human beings both individually and collectively can preserve and promote their freedom of choice and action to the greatest extent possible...”.⁴⁴ In this case, what is constituted is a union of ends under the law, and since each end is a law-giver unto itself, protection of public interests becomes the purpose of the political association or the commonwealth. Also, this protection of public interests and promotion of rights implicitly requires coercion which is a hindrance to right; that is, right and coercion of right are one and the same thing. Equally implicit, is the principle of reciprocal coercion, which harmonizes the right of every individual or groups in accordance to universal law of right. Consequently, right actions are those which by themselves or their maxims enable the freedom of wills to co-exist in accordance with a universal law of right. In Kant’s view, then, the constitution of wills provides ground for common action, while the freedom of wills gives room for private concerns. Put in another form, absence of common actions breeds failed states while the lack of room

for private concerns produces unitary states or totalitarian control, leading to revolt and anarchy.

Deriving from the above, it is fundamental to note that:

Statehood provides the basis for the recognition of various nations in the world order. many nations exist that do not have states, whether we are talking about the free people of Taiwan, the Kurds, the Basques, Tibetans, the Nevesians, the Tuaregs of the Sahara, or any number of other people.... A lack of statehood makes a people particularly vulnerable, as there is no “safe place” for a nation to have as a base which provides a recognized home base as well as a sounding board for making sure that the world and its international bodies are aware of the treatment of a particular people. All too often the issues and identities of stateless nations are assumed not to exist at all because there is nowhere on the map that can be seen as belonging to that particular people under their own self-government.⁴⁵

But more important is that statehood confers common identity on different nations and various groups. Absence of this produces a situation where individuals or groups compete for their exploitation of national institutions, with the group that can summon the greater cohesion to take control instituting a tyrannical government. In this case, there exists lack in the basic requirement for a political association in that there is a lack of common identity between those who rule and those who are ruled. “Wherever people are grouped together, the fate of those who are in those group will depend on the level to which that group shares a common culture and world view and loving concern for other members of the group”.⁴⁶ This necessary ideal the concept of statehood is meant to convey.

4.3 Purpose of State Sovereignty

State sovereignty implies the power of the state to legislate for itself and its citizens. This shows the supremacy of the state over its people, institution and territory. Appadorai succinctly explains this “as the power of the state to make law and enforce the law with all the coercive power it cares to employ”.⁴⁷ But while the power to coerce is one thing, another, equally, important thing is obvious in the question: why do men obey the state? To properly answer this question, it is pertinent to determine whether the state exists to maximize its citizens’ loyalty, solely, or to cater for their welfare as well, apart from their loyalty. In other words, does the state define its own good, exclusively, outside that of its citizens? We stated that the state differs fundamentally from the society; it is one of the institutions in a society-its legislative arm. As such, to what extent ought citizens to obey the state?

Hegelianwise, the state has its own definite goals which are superior to those of its citizens. Its function is to, solely, maximize the loyalty of the citizens towards the pursuit and attainment of these goals. This is because, the state emphasizes unity and supremacy. In other words, it is the embodiment of the absolute or universal will, consequently, the authentic will of individual citizens. This defines the state as a veritable manifestation of universal reason. The universal reason is not particularistic but the synthesis of individual reasons, therefore, superior to, and far removed from temporary and irrelevant considerations. Laski sums-up this view of the state thus:

It is to be all-absorptive. All groups within itself are to be but the ministrants to its life; their reality is the outcome of its sovereignty, since without it they could have no existence. Their goodness is gained only through the overshadowing power of its presence. It alone, so to speak, eternally is; while they exist but to the extent to which its being implies them. The All America, includes, “implicates” in James’s phrase, its constituent states. They are one with it and of it-one and indivisible. Each has its assigned place and function in the great whole which gives them life.⁴⁸

Man seeks freedom; and this can be found, only in conforming to the voice of reason. The will of the state as the manifestation of universal reason is the dictate of true freedom. Thus, the highest duty of the citizen is to conform his will to that of the state. That is the exact definition and attainment of freedom. The individual is subject to the will of the state, and it has right to impel the individual towards achieving its will. In other words:

The individual cannot therefore be considered as the ultimate end of society. Society has its own purposes of preservation, expansion and perfection, and these are distinct from, and superior to the purposes of the individuals who at any moment compose it. In carrying out its own proper ends, society must make use of individuals; the individual must subordinate his own ends to those of society.⁴⁹

Obviously, the fact here, is that the state is regarded as a mystic force or an entity whose existence predates and transcends its individuals. Its institution is of the absolute spirit which manifests itself through human activities to fulfil its universal will. That is, the state means more than its citizens; “it suggests that it is possible to work for humanity otherwise than by working for men, to serve nationality otherwise than by serving the members of a nation”.⁵⁰ Appadorai argues that this claim is grandiose and serves no other purpose but to magnify the will of the ruler to rule. Thus, in Thrasymachus, this intention was explicit as might is right, while Hobbes exulted it into the recklessness of the Leviathan. But, be this as it may, it has its high points in state control and direction; since all the diverse individual interests are brought together in the unity of the state. Laski tells us that “we have to admit...that all parts of the state are woven together to make one harmonious whole. The Unity is logically necessary, for were there independence, one group...could act upon another”.⁵¹ In other words, the unification of the severalty make intelligible rational interpretation; the state has the power to bind all wills into its own. In this position, the state assumes moral preeminence in all its activities. It is always right, and its position and ideals are always good. Consequently, citizens are obligated to obey the state

without objection. For instance, they are obligated to fight with the state whether or not they feel the justice of its course; it is lack of patriotism to go against this. This is because what the state ordains possesses special moral significance superior in authority to the claims of any group or individual. The general will includes the will of all in the state and expresses it.

The more the above position is expanded, the more its inherent problem surfaces. The fact is, it suggests that the state is always moral in all its pursuit, therefore, binding on all individuals and groups in the society. Invariably, this suggestion absolves all limitations from a human institution, which it assumes is inherent in parts of this institution or groups which exist side by side with this institutions. Thus, the state should assume and enforce all wills or social decisions; the state is an all knowing and all moral supreme pontiff. To this Laski observes that:

For practical politics there seems no moral rightness in such an attitude as this. We have, in fact, to deem acts right and wrong. We do point to groups within the state, or parallel to it, and urge that they are really harmful and really beneficent. We judge them in reference to themselves. We take what may be appearance as actually constituting reality. We credit, in short, human knowledge. We say that there is something in appearance. If we cannot credit it, assuredly there is nothing in which belief is at all possible. Its finite character we freely admit. We cannot know all things. We have to be content with a certain specialism, leaving omniscience to the Absolute.⁵²

Implicitly then, nothing contains all things; things could stand in relation to one another, but nothing is all inclusive. The state, its individuals or groups are real and distinct wholes; that they stand in relations does not imply that they, their wills, could be fused together. Hence, for instance, one cannot be judged by the conduct of the state to which he belongs. "We judge his conduct in life in reference to himself and

not in reference the state of which he is part”.⁵³In other words, the individual does not derive his meaning from his state relations, and this cannot form the sole criterion by which he should be judged. Thus, there oughtnot to be unified allegiance of individuals with the state; citizen’s allegiance to the state should, rather, be solicited than obtained by compulsion. Citizens’ allegiance to the state should be obtained based on the explicit or implicit goodwill possessed by the state machinery or for which the state stands for. That is, “men accept its dictate either because their own will find part expression there or because, assuming the goodness of intention which lies behind it, they are content, usually, not to resist its imposition”.⁵⁴There are other social forces in the society which help to form choices of men. The ability of the state to command allegiance would depend on the extent it is able to outdo these other forces in its representation of goodwill. Therefore, to Laski“it is a will to some extent competing with other wills, and Darwin-wise, surviving only by its ability to cope with its environment. Should it venture into dangerous places it pays the penalty of its audacity. It finds its sovereignty by consent transformed into impotence by disagreement”.⁵⁵This implies that the state’s power to coerce its individuals through its instruments lies in its ability to represent the best will; the state rules by consent of men. Sovereignty represents ability to secure consent.

It is staying true to this, and as divorced from the Hegelian position, that Aristotle argues that the state originated for the sake of good life, and exists to pursue the best life. His postulation is that;

It exists for the exercise of the qualities which make men good husbands, fathers and heads of households, good soldiers and citizens, good men of science and philosophers. When the state by its education and laws, written and unwritten, succeeds in evoking and maintaining in vigorous activity a life rich in noble aims, and deeds, then and, not till then has it fully attained the end for which it exists.⁵⁶

John Locke identifies this end of the state differently. According to him the chief end of the state is the preservation of man's property-lives, liberties and estates. The state is a will-organization constituted by the constituent wills essentially to this end. For the Utilitarians, the state should maximize the greatest happiness over unhappiness. Implicit is the idea that men desire surplus of pleasure over pain in ideal situations; men desire social good over evil. To Laski, the state exists to provide and enforce rights. Rights include things or conditions that enhance individuals' lives in social setting, thus have practical rather than a priori bearing. Appadorai captures Laski's representation of rights as necessary demand of the state. Thus:

Men can be enabled to realize the 'best that is in themselves' only if the state provides 'rights'. Rights are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek in general to be himself at his best. They have a content which changes with time and place. They are prior to state in the sense that, recognized or not, they are that from which its validity derives. Rights are, therefore, the groundwork of the state.⁵⁷

To this should be added that Laski, also, concedes that the state's enforcement of rights evokes the principle of reciprocity on the part of the individual. A reason he, again, explains that right "is something the individual ought to concede because experience has proved it to be good".⁵⁸ Hence, individual rights are limited by the rights of others, and are defined to suit prevailing social conditions. Rights are not absolutes, so to say.

The point here is that the state, as a coordinated reason, has the pursuit of social good as its sole end. Since it is essentially a union of wills in Kant's definition, its primary purpose ultimately, is the guarantee of conditions that enhances the co-existence of these wills, which in themselves are ends. Consequently, the state is just a means to the attainment of the end. Here, Appadorai observes that the state is put on trial; "the state can win the allegiance of its citizens only by the efforts it makes to give their

rights increasing substance”.⁵⁹ This is its purpose, outside which it may as well be assumed to not exist at all, in the first place.

4.4 Nationalism and Popular Sovereignty

With the enlightenment and its emphasis on reason, arose an increased demand for self-determination, free association, communication and popular political participation. In Europe, it gave basis to the agitation to transit from absolute monarchy, the prevalent socio-political situation at the time, to a more popular political determination; this was the desire for national recognition, identification and popular suffrage. Enlightenment in England witnessed serious tussle for political supremacy between the monarch and the people; though Thomas Hobbes gave absolute power to the king, the overthrow of James II brought to end the idea of divine right to rule, ushering in the dominance of popular will. In the glorious revolution, Englishmen expressed their right to be recognized as Englishmen and therefore contribute more to their political determination; that is, increased rights of the people to legislate for themselves which, invariably, limited the power of the monarchs over them. John Locke sought to give basis to this change in political status quo. His acceptance of basic human dignity, liberty and equality led him to limit the power of the sovereign only to determination of standard of rights and arbitration of right between individuals; that is, over his property-life, liberty and possession- the individual has absolute right. Thus, the Glorious revolution set off the idea of a liberal and egalitarian society, although, massive egalitarianism was later to come through the French revolution; Locke's theory, as it were, concentrated more on securing power for the Parliament over the king in England. That is, arguably, the English Glorious Revolution depicted the massive demand for national right and recognition, however, its climax was witnessed in the French revolution. French revolution “saw the violent destruction of the traditional hierarchical political and social orders-the French monarchy, the privileges of the French Aristocracy and the political power and authority of the Catholic Church and replaced by a new political and social order

based on the principles of human rationality, freedom and equality of all”.⁶⁰ That is, in France, “the French revolutionaries rose against their king and called upon people to assert themselves as French men and women whom the government should serve rather than the reverse”.⁶¹ Feudal France had seen the greater percentage of the population in the third estate subordinated to the will and arbitrary use of the fewer first and second estates of the realm; the third estate was no more than the tool of the other estates for driving the economic process. But increased mass production fuelled by the enlightenment, demanded the reversal of this social structure; consequently, the increased mass demand for the right to social and political self-determination. This derived from the implication in Jean Jacques Rousseau’s theory that individuals properly become humans only after they have become citizens. Rousseau viewed state creation and identification with the state to represent the possibility of moral goodness, hence, identifies popular sovereignty with highest good of man.

We noted that ancient Greek thinkers, especially Aristotle, believed that the state exists for the attainment of the best form of life possible. Rousseau accepts this belief but argues that this was non-existent in the state of nature, the state which the original person lived. According to him, “in the state of nature, the individual was guided by instinct and not by reason. He differed from animals only because he possessed a will and a desire for perfectability”.⁶² He quickly adds that though man was guided by instinct, this state was not chaotic and insecure as Hobbes supposed, rather, life was peaceful and quiet. But this peace was, also, not fulfilling, and men desired to improve themselves. Therefore, they were compelled to forge a social contract, thus, forming a community in which such improvement is possible alone. “The community then established a moral code that made human perfection (and even becoming human) possible. In the state of nature, people were more animal than human”.⁶³ Rousseau sees social improvement as a possibility, just as social deterioration and inequality are, also, more likely situation in the community, especially with its sophistication. He

accepts that private property, which is at the basis of the formation of the community, ensured the greed and domination of fellow men by the rich property owners. Government was then instituted only to protect the interests of the property owners, thereby perpetuate the inequality between the rich and the poor. Consequently, though men were born free, they became prisoners to their own selfishness and to their rulers. However, this situation does not require a return to the innocence of the state of nature, for it would mean to give up the chance for improvement. “Instead, people must build a new community structured so that a moral existence is possible. But to accomplish this, people would first have to break the social and political chains binding them, overthrowing the old order and establishing a new one based on the three cardinal foundations of moral existence: liberty, equality and fraternity”.⁶⁴ This new moral order would entail people giving up themselves or surrendering completely to the community, and its demands. That is:

By giving up their rights and powers to the group, they would create a new entity. The society would become an organism in which each individual contributed to the whole. By giving up their individual powers, people would gain a new kind of equality and a new kind of power. They would achieve equality because they would all become full contributors to the group. Enhanced power would also accrue to the community, the sum greater than its individual parts.⁶⁵

This new association would be guided by the General Will; a combination of the wills of all the individuals in the association legislating for the good of all of them.

For Rousseau, the General Will is the moral will of the community. It could not be wrong because the individuals could not legislate what is wrong for themselves. Therefore, it is the authentic will of the individual. Individual is guaranteed freedom, which is essential to his nature, by subordinating his will to the General Will; whoever refuses to be free shall be constrained to be free. This implies that the majority, which

forms the General Will, is always right, and the minority can only enhance their power by complying with the position of the majority; by this, Rousseau advocates the essentiality of popular sovereignty, though tied to bit of autocracy. Equally, individual's will, for Rousseau, is inalienable and non-transferrable. For this reason, he favours each individual's direct participation in legislation over a representative government. To this effect, he required that the state be small, the extent that would make each individual direct participation in the law making process easier; Rousseau favours the Greek city-state form of association. The significance of this idea is that it inspired the general demand for popular government and suffrage across Europe, and today underlies all nationalist aspirations. However, its insistence on the supremacy of the General Will over the individual raises concern with regard to the promotion of minority rights. That is, this insistence fails to guarantee the recognition of the minority position, as such, hence encourages the tyranny of the mob. Again, since the French revolution, national determination has assumed more central position in politics, and with it the rise in number of independent multi nations-states. This, surely, requires the determination of a different basis on which popular consent should revolve, as the idea of General Will entails greater problem as it would in smaller states.

4.5 Popular Sovereignty: On Liberty and Equality

The question of minority rights rises to the fore with the insistence of nationalism on popular sovereignty, especially in the philosophy of Rousseau. As we noted, nationalism translated to popular identification and democratic control, but this, equally, produced other concerns about individual liberty and common good. Rousseau laid the basis for popular consent and sovereignty; his interest lay in justifying a system that would mark a significant shift from the prevailing order at the time. Hence, he hardly considered possibilities implicit in the political system he proposed. That is, that "democracy could suppress tyranny and become oppressive itself because of the lack of fair representation of all the members of the society".⁶⁶

Rousseau's absolutist conclusion makes this most obvious; that popular sovereignty could degenerate into the tyranny of the mob. This is as he accepts the General Will as the authentic expression of the wills of all the individuals in the state, consequently, permits no dissenting will from this will. This is the true meaning of freedom. In this regard, also, even if one wishes not to be free, he or she would be constrained to be free. The society has limitless power over the individual.

John Stuart Mill differed from this position. He favours the principles of popular sovereignty in his essay, *On Liberty*, but, he explores, specifically, the nature and limits of power that can be legitimately exercised by the society over the individual. Popular consent in his understanding did not imply fair representation of all views involved; public authorities could be an expression of the tyranny of the majority, just as Rousseau had supposed. Thus, Mill sought to guarantee the individual as much liberty as possible that would necessitate his or her self-realization. This for him, constitute the sphere of civil liberty, a social condition in which the individual is completely in charge of his life, absent unnecessary interference, either by the society or another individual. Individual's will is absolute here, for the action undertaken concerns his life and conduct alone. Murkherjee and Rmaswamy explain the implication of this:

In its negative sense, it meant that society had no right to coerce an unwilling individual, except for self-defense. "It is being left to oneself; all restraints qua restraints is an evil". In its positive sense it meant the grant of the largest and the greatest amount of freedom for the pursuit of the individual's creative impulses and energies, and for self-development. If there was a clash between the opinion of the individual and that of the community, it was the individual who was the ultimate judge, unless the community could convince him without resorting to threat and coercion.⁶⁷

Thus, only with regard to others can the individual be constrained. “The realm which pertained to the society or the public was the space in which coercion could be used to make the individual conform to some standard of conduct”.⁶⁸ Outside this, the law should be indirectly involved in a person’s lifestyle, which specifically compose the realm of civil liberty. The region of civil liberty covers three areas; liberty of conscience (thought and opinion), liberty of association, and liberty to live as one pleases. Kant had championed the idea of individual liberty, but he was most concerned with the autonomy of the will; he emphasized the application of the natural law more, rather than the operation of social legislation. Mill, on the other hand, concerns himself on how social legislation could aid self-realization and social diversity which to him promote growth; individuality is adjudged the basis of social advances.

Generally, social legislation advocates conformist ideals; thereby producing social tyranny of the individual. “Social tyranny was exercised in subtle forms like customs, conventions and mass opinion, which did not make an individual stop and think where and how one had come to acquire these. In other words, there was absence of “individuality”.⁶⁹ Individualism, here, does not simply imply to live as one wishes but a capacity for a choice, a disposition to creative enquiry and responsible thought. It is a refusal to bend to an assertive social policy that insists on total conformism. Instead, one is encouraged to question and insist on the right of the minority to dissent from the intolerance of oppressive majority. This according to Mill, signifies freewill and self-development, in as much as it facilitates social creativity. In other words, the right of the individual or the minority to insist on their position ensures that ideals are subjected to critical scrutiny from other points of view, apart from the majority stand, of arriving at the truth. Mill accepts that dissenting position could be true such that its suppression would rob the society of an important knowledge; and even when it is false, its falsehood would strengthen the correct view which it challenges, thus

strengthen credibility. In his estimation, only a representative democracy would promote this state of affairs, for representative democracy encourages the development and growth of civil liberty.

Mill regards representative democracy as the ideally best form of government. This is because it is “the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented as against the general misconception that democracy is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented”.⁷⁰ This implies proportionate representation of all groups and classes, both majorities and minorities in the process of legislation. Representative democracy identifies individuality with equality; individuals were equal regardless of social status, and only on the basis of popular sovereignty is the government legitimate. In other words, if the minorities are not properly represented, the government becomes tyranny of the majority. Mill’s argument is for equal recognition of both the minority and majority groups. Only this qualifies the government as government of equality. In addition, Mill, also, advocates the limitation of the rights of the majority against the minority as a way to encourage this recognition of the minority position. This proportionate representation is necessary for social progress and individual self-development. “Interaction between individuals in a democracy ensured the possibility of the emergence of the wisest and recognition of best leaders. It encouraged free discussion, which was necessary for the emergence of the truth”.⁷¹ Implicitly, representative democracy affords the individual the opportunity to develop his personal virtues while carrying out social responsibilities. He is able to identify his needs and the interests of the society; democracy should enhance individual good and collective good simultaneously. For this reason, Mill made education and civilization prerequisites to the proper functioning of representative democracy. Education affords an individual better opportunity of pursuing his or her liberty. Thus, he advocates education for all, and plural suffrage for the better educated; the uneducated were to be denied the right

to vote. Others he denied voting rights are those who cannot pay taxes, those dependent on public welfare, the legal bankrupts and moral deviants. Mill judged that ability to secure basic social necessities and morality constituted basis to unhindered exercise of liberty. Consequently, apart from these group, the right to vote were to be conferred on all irrespective of gender or status, who should use it for public good. Lastly, on the exercise of franchise, Mill accepts open ballot rather than secret ballot system of voting, on the basis that the later hides the voting process from public eyes. Voting is a public trust, and, therefore, should be performed under the watchful eyes and criticism of the public. Mill's insistence on universal franchise is to promote his belief that political participation enhances the individual's reason and judgment. Political participation "enabled the participant to attain moral maturity, for when an individual undertook a public action, he felt that not only the common weal is his weal, but that it partly depends on his exertions".⁷² This depicts true exercise of autonomy.

4.6 Framework for Social Legislation

Significant to nationalism are the requirements of social identification, social participation and state control. Herein lies the individual's passion for social identification and strive to contribute to social progress, individually and collectively. John Stuart Mill identifies social progress with individual liberty; "he regarded individual self-development and diversity as the ultimate ends, important components of human happiness and the principal ingredients of individual and social progress".⁷³ To him, the enhancement of the citizens' potentials translates to strong feeling of social identification and determination to participate in political process which connect to social progress. Therefore, the end of the state is the pursuit of happiness; that is, freedom and self-development of its citizens, which ultimately in the end is for its collective social good. Consequently, Mill argues in his *Representative Government*, that the criterion for a good form of government or state depends on the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the

government is exercised. Intelligent and virtuous citizens make for a successful government, just as a government whose citizens cultivate habits of selfishness, ignorance and stupidity is bound to fail. In other words, the measure of the goodness of government is the degree to which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the citizens, individually and collectively, since, apart from the fact that their wellbeing is the primary objective of the government, their good qualities supply the force which runs the machinery of the government. And, “the consideration of this criterion should extend to the functioning of the machinery of the government. For instance, the judiciary, the executive and the legislative should work with the best intelligent and virtuous members available”.⁷⁴ Their overall good translates to the common good of the state.

In defence of individual liberty, Mill accepts that education of the individual is a necessary condition for an enhanced individual autonomy, hence, adequate participation in the state affairs. Murkherjee and Ramaswamy explain further:

On liberty constituted the most persuasive and convincing defence of the principle of individual liberty ever written. Like his father James Mill, he also believed in the individual's capacity for education, by which he meant not only intellectual training of individual or cultivation of critical enquiry, but also the training of individual character. He regarded individual character as a result of civilization, instruction, education and culture. Happiness for Mill was the ability of the individual to discover his innate powers and develop these while exercising his human abilities of autonomous thought and action. Happiness meant liberty and individuality. Liberty was regarded as a fundamental prerequisite for leading a good, worthy and dignified life.⁷⁵

The early Greek philosophers were the first to insist on happiness as the end of the state, and education as helping to improve virtue cultivation in the state. Aristotle, in his *Politics*, opined that all citizens belong to the state, such that cares bestowed on

each as part of the state, naturally flows back to the whole, which is the state. Thus, adopting this basic idea, Mill “described the state as an instrument that would bring about transformation of the human being. The state played a crucial role in shaping the ends of an individual through education...”.⁷⁶ These role manifest in absolute liberty of conscience, belief and expression, which are signs of human progress. Importantly, this marks of autonomy when employed in political participation is most beneficial to the society, as it is to the individual. Consequently, Mill advocated education as the basis of exercise of suffrage; the most educated, for him, were to be given plurality of votes in order to attain proportionate representation in the state.

Social identification and control, also, requires economic security; that is, one knowing that there does not have to be much struggle to provide the necessities of life. Mill championed economic independence as a way of enhancing liberty. Economic independence, for him, means situation of influencing the social economy to improve the social situation of the workers or individuals in the society. He explains this to fall in line with his idea of securing minority rights. Industrial revolution in Europe gave rise to capitalism and its exploitation of labour. Though the political system, democracy, engendered popular political rights, but, capitalism denied workers similar rights in the area of economy. Consequently, labour and its reward, was exclusively determined by the owners of industries and business not by political rights; in other words, economy constituted constraint to liberty. Equally, though capitalism encouraged individualism, its exploitative design generated unhappiness which the state ought to protect citizens from; that is, the freedom which the political structure guaranteed was greatly diminished by the economic system. In this situation, “it became clear that people could be controlled by economic forces the way they had been controlled by government in the past. Capitalism, which had been developed by liberals, and was long supported by them, because it tended to increase individual wealth and freedom became suspect because of its ability to exploit people”.⁷⁷ As a

result, Mill sought a way of bringing the popular control in government to bear on the tyranny of the capitalist economic system. This necessitated a slight deviation from his laissez-faire policy to advocacy of optional areas of interference. That is, he introduced socialist principles into capitalism without wholly abandoning individualism. Murkherjee and Ramaswamy expose this evolution in Mill. Thus:

Mill was attracted to socialism because of its idea of human cooperation or partnership, but he was equally keen to preserve individuality and freedom. He did not advocate socialization of the means of production. He realized the need to change capitalism by bringing in the ethic of social welfare and cooperation. This was because capitalism, even with the incentive of self-interest, had not been able to eliminate parasitism, for those unwilling to work were able to develop ways to shirk work. Socialism with communal ownership had superior methods, which forced lazy members to produce and work. The difference was that in a capitalist society an employer could dismiss a lazy worker, but in a socialist society he could be reformed by public opinion, which to Mill was the 'most universal and one of the strongest methods of control'. However, he was aware of potential tyranny within a socialist society, for he rejected all forms of paternalism as anti-progressive.⁷⁸

He championed the idea of and formation of trade unions and cooperatives to enhance the bargaining powers of workers, and as well add to their economic development. His position was that working with or for one another would improve their individual judgment and consideration of common good of citizens. But in all, it was the duty of the state to guarantee the maximum freedom and self-realization of its citizens. For this reason, the powerful institution of the government should be used to protect individuals from strong economic forces over which they have no control. Hence, Mill argued that government was responsible for liberating citizens not only politically, but economically and socially. This would, ultimately, enhance their identification with the state.

4.7 Morality of Nationalism

Nationalism is an abstract concept that finds expression through people's sentiments and feelings of identification. That is, "rather than giving loyalty to a person such as a noble or a king, people are asked to commit to an idea, to a tradition, to a history, to a notion of fraternity. Nationalism represents the union of a political phenomenon with the identity of the human being".⁷⁹ Usually the state through its institutions take very assertive steps to inculcate this feeling and emotion into its citizens to strengthen its authority; talk of varied state education policies, national heroic stories and influences from socio-cultural structures. This is done to a point that the state becomes a frame of reference to its individuals. In other words, these steps are taken to subordinate the loyalty of the individuals to the state by cultivating in them values which in the state's perception strengthens unity and national interests alone; there is always a possibility that such values and national interests could contradict an individual's moral beliefs. However, these values, if truly absorbed, exhibit an uncommon degree of individual's personal identification with the state, for there are few other things, for instance, family and religion, which people would openly support even with the reality of moral contradiction. The individual who attains such uncommon identification with the state's interests is said to be patriotic. "Patriotism is to nationalism what religious worship is to theology. Patriotism is a form of secular worship of the nation-state, and, as such, it is generally considered a noble thing".⁸⁰

But the problem with such devotion to the state is that it is a manifestation of the dominance of the individual by the state authority, as we have pointed out. Consequently, the government tends to usurp the individual, exclusively, for its good; solely for national self-interests. The good of the self is expected to identify with that of the nation-state, and become one with it; this is collectivist, and reflects as a manifestation of family symbolism (action on the basis of ethnic sentiments) in the citizen. Equally, this selfishness of the nation-state manifests in the exclusivist nature of nationalism. Patriotic expression, apart from its demands that the individual

completely identifies with the interests of the state, also prompts him to champion these interests above that of any other ethnic nationality. Usually, governments fuel this emotion in the individuals by ascribing all its policies, ‘for the national self-interest’ just to satisfy their compatriots. Baradat identifies the possibilities in this position thus:

If a nation-state policy is primarily established and justified by national self-interest, especially in a world confronted with dwindling resources, conflict among nation-states becomes almost inevitable. National self-interest raises selfishness among societies in the world to a level of acceptability that it would never achieve among individuals within a society. If each nation-state’s policy is determined primarily by what is best for that nation-state, then surely, many such policies will be opposed by other nation-states on the grounds of their own national self-interest. In such an environment, the interests of the world as a whole are not considered, and international conflict over parochial policy becomes unavoidable.⁸¹

The troubling national clashes witnessed in Rwanda, Nigeria, and former Yugoslavia, and the recent national awakening depicted by the recent clashes of civilization, are instances to this. In fact, placing the interests of any national group over another would, invariably, reproduce the state of nature in global affair. That is, the feasibility of Kant’s idea of perpetual peace would still be far-fetched; the world, might even, degenerate to a state of perpetual war. It is more certain that the globe is headed to this direction, driven as it seems, by the growing parochial assertiveness of different nationalities for their separate national goods. At the moment, there is the North Korean military assertiveness which the United States of America feels threatens its own political dominance as the world’s police and military heavy weight. Most of the world super powers still entertain ideas of re-colonization of the weaker nations, even if it is in its most subtle forms of ideological imposition, political manipulations and economic exploitation. The last but not the least, is the recent rise in xenophobic expressions in different parts of the globe. These are sentiments of cultural patriotism

which emanates from the universe of familial emotions and loyalties; what is regarded as family symbolism. In other words, this is unguarded nationalism, a supreme manifestation of ethnic or race consciousness; it is a re-manifestation of primitive mentality of ancestor worship in recent times. In this regard, therefore, “patriotism is itself one of the great political consequences of the forces of reproductive symbolism”.⁸²

The argument is that the forces of nationalism expressed in patriotism, in part, contradicts the Aristotlian position that man is a social animal, and will always act according to this primary nature. It, rather, agrees with the game theorists that man is essentially moved by self-interests, in this regard, the needs of his own socio-political group. And if this is the case, Darwinism in social life is inevitable. This was the basis of the rise of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, Apartheid in South Africa and, at the present, elitism insome democratic states. The idea is that the state alone can define and determine the needs of all its individuals, and works through the mind of certain individual or individuals, as instruments, to achieve this objectives. In other words, this implies that “people...are quite obviously unequal: some are more intelligent, some are stronger, some are more talented, some are more attractive. To act as though people are equal is to ignore the obvious and to fatally deny a basic fact of nature”.⁸³ Thus, the select or the leader deserves unquestioned obedience from the citizens, since he alone could determine and bring to reality the will of the almighty state. This high social stratification extends to all citizens, as the best are encouraged to thrive while the weak are systematically removed from the association. Apart from denying that man is a rational animal, capable of self-determination, this ideology gives moral basis for heinous crimes against humanity in the name of the state or national self-interests. In which case, patriotism becomes the refuge of the ignoble. History is replete with instances of this and characters behind them.

But, there is no denying the nobility of patriotic emotions inspite of these obvious tendencies that could ensue from it. It is natural to take pride in one's identity and even, make a show of it. Nationalism represents a platform from which the individual could view himself, and measure his activities along the line of a tradition which transcends his person. Usually, it is a stage for one to express and secure political rights and recognition, meet own his needs even as he contributes to collective common good. Morality of nationalism ought to be the recognition of man as the supreme end of all patriotic sentiments. This reflects the oneness of humanity and sameness of purpose irrespective of state or origin.

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CHAPTER FIVE

AFRICA AND MODERN STATEHOOD

5.1 Socio-Political Philosophy of African Society

The central problem of political philosophy is how to harmonize the social forces of authority with the individual's rights and freedom. "In other words, it means in effect, how the exercise of power and authority should conform to the moral standard of justice to avoid tyranny and dictatorship, on one hand. And on the other hand, how the expression of human freedom ought to be controlled to avoid anarchy".¹ In African philosophy, this seeming tension between the society and the individual in social relations, is assumed to be resolved in the idea of hierarchy and interaction of forces in African universe. In this society, generally, "the individual is never defined as some isolated monad, for he is in constant relations with other individuals in the community and with the community at large".² Therefore, "the African as an individual self is a being with-others in a community. The community makes him and he makes the community as well".³ This, in the words of John Mbiti, reads; "I am because we are, and since we are, I am".⁴ Consequently, the individual is essentially an interacting being by virtue of always being identified in a network of relationships; that is, a social being. The society or community in this regard comprises other individuals, groups, the visible world and the invisible world (gods and the ancestors). However, this does not suggest that conflict may not arise between the individual and the community. But, whenever problems arise, this is sorted out by responding to the basic idea that "the life of the individual is the life of the whole society because what each life-force does affects that whole web of social, moral and ontological lives".⁵ The individual has to identify with the community in all his aspirations and action. This is through sharing in common beliefs and tasks which is what it implies to

manifest the community. It is such that the individual has no separate life or existence outside the community. The community, therefore, is a product of common faith.

The family or family spirit is central to African conception of existence. This expresses a primordial structure that binds the living, the dead and the unborn. There is basic belief in a common descent from an ancestor and that the dead have interest in what is done by their living descendants. This belief acts as a moral force that guides acts in the family, and commits members to the service of one another. In this regard, religion plays a prominent role in the African family; it is a social force that binds the entire realities in Africa together. As a force of cohesion, it pervades all aspect of the African world such that scholars have variously described the African as being religiously incurable. Relating this to politics Makumba avers:

Consequently, political life was so permeated with religion that political leaders were also religious leaders in many communities. The authority of the leader was not just to promote individual-individual and individual-community relationships but also to keep the community in rapport with the other world, especially the ancestors, who were perceived to be living-dead members of society, consequently with the supreme Being.⁶

In other words, there is no demarcation between religion and politics in African world view; rather, religion gives strong moral basis to politics. In most cases, the political office holder doubles as a tribal leader and the chief priest. As such, political authority derives from African religion. This is why a political leader dares not make arbitrary use of his position nor abuse his powers, instead, as Anyanwu opines, embraces it with joy and fear; “joy for having been elevated to an office that will confer on him, if he performs his duty successfully, the title of ancestor, and fear of weakening the bond between God, spirit, man and the whole universe should he grossly abuse his office or be found unworthy”.⁷ That is why he ought to legislate for the common good of all the forces in a relationship in the community.

Deriving common good for the community requires a lot of sacrifice from individuals to uphold human dignity. “The community of people, through its awareness (intuitive awareness) and insight into the nature of things knows what kind of sacrifice that collective living demands. It knows that this sacrifice has to be freely chosen and executed or else fate would impose it on the people involuntarily”.⁸ Thus, the individual sees it as obligation and duty to take on some discomfort for the collective good. The collectivity, in this sense, is not some abstraction or an imposition, but, a reality in whose life the individual shares. Because of this, he is willing to accept some self-discipline and self-sacrifice, the kind which differs from that of arbitrary dictates of some elected officials. This is adjudged just and right. Justice consists in the willingness to do right, to accommodate and to conform to the general principles guiding the harmonious relationship of forces in the community. African socio-political philosophy and structure is an expression of interpenetration and integration of forces in the African universe.

5.2 Question of Self in African Ontology

From the preceding discussion, it is obvious that the status of the individual or self as an independent being, constitute a serious question, in a social sense, in African philosophy. This question arises when we consider C.B. Okolo’s assertion, and which aligns with our exposition, that “individuals only become real in their relationship with others, in a community or a group. It is the community which makes the individual to the extent that without the community, the individual has no existence”.⁹ This assertion, no doubt, follows from Placid Tempels understanding of the self in his study of the Bantu basic ontology. According to Tempels;

just as Bantu (Black African) ontology is opposed to the European concept of individuated things existing in themselves, isolated from others, so Bantu psychology cannot conceive of man as an individual, as a force existing by itself and apart from its ontological relationship

with other living beings and from its connection with animals or inanimate forces around it.¹⁰

In other words, existence, for the African, is essentially socialized, since we cannot conceive him as existing outside this community environment. Thus, the self or individual suffers loss of status as an independent subject or discrete being in African system; since the tendency is just to define him only as a product of social integration. This definition tends to contradict common understanding of humanity; the principle of autonomy and freedom of the individual. This means that, “even though individual human beings belong to a class, yet experience shows that they cling to their own individualities as marks of distinct selves which they cannot part with nor allow to be merged with others”.¹¹ And the recognition and respect of this basic fact by social institutions, defines the society as truly dynamic and dedicated to securing the common good of all. Therefore, the African definition of the individual only in terms of we-existence, have certain implications for the African society. In the first place, it implies that the African is essentially bound to his tribal affiliations and cannot define himself separately apart from the tribe. That is, the tribe is superimposing, pushing the self almost to the verge of total disappearance as subject and discrete entity. Hence, the African world assumes a collectivist structure, the same posture inherent in Hegelian and Marxist ideologies. Here, still, another problem arises; the question of the individual’s natural and social rights. “In the collectivist community of meaning what claims one has do not derive from one’s ontological constitution as an irreplaceable and incommunicable being but from the label placed on one as constituting a part in the whole”.¹² Consequently, the self is merely a social label.

But, there are scholars who believe that there is certain sense in which the self cannot be entirely interpreted in terms of relationship or seen as a social label. J.O. Eneh posits this succinctly in observing that “the autonomy of the African is respected as an individual composed of body and mind. He is unique, though he is a being in relation

to others”.¹³ In other words the individuality of the African lies in his intrinsic psycho-physical composition. This idea arises from the seeming duality in the African conception of reality; the existence of material and immaterial worlds. With regard to the self, while as a material subject he relates to with the physical world, he is, at the same time, in constant relationship with the spiritual world with his immaterial being. The individual, for the African, is composed of body and soul. This position, equally, makes obvious another point that supports the autonomy of the self; that is, the fact that the individual is responsible and answerable for his conduct. This is as shown in the fact that in the community “individual talents and contributions were held in high esteem and promoted”.¹⁴ Just as the individual’s recklessness and irresponsibility were highly condemnable. In a sense, what the individual does or fails to do, affects the community, but in the end, it is the individual that bears the blunt of his or her actions. The strong emphasis on reward and punishment or attainment of the revered status of ancestorship in the afterlife and the denial of it, is to this regard. Lastly, scholars argue that the uniqueness of the self, in African thought, is established through the names that the individual bears. Tempels makes this explicit; “the name expresses the individual character of the being. The name is not a simple external courtesy; it is the very reality of the individual”.¹⁵ Okolo further adds that:

African names are not just mere labels of distinction, to differentiate, for instance, “James” from “John”.... Many African names point for instance to the circumstances and conditions of particular individuals, their family background, social status etc. An African name, in short, points to the self as an individual particular person; indeed who the particular person is.¹⁶

Names given to an individual by the community depicts both his attachment to the primordial family structure of the community and his distinction as an individual. That is, his names show that he has responsibility to the entire community on one hand, and on the other hand, that there are circumstances in his life which constitute his being as

an individual. These are proof that the self, as such, has double status in African thought; as being in relationship with others, and as a unique discrete entity.

The fore-going notwithstanding, however, the fact is, in African ontology, the self or the individual lacks the claim to assert himself as a rational and undivided person outside the community. That is, self-assertion as a demand of natural justice, rooted in the nature of man, as such, seems to completely disappear with the strong emphasis of the African on communal existence. Eneh assents to this whenever that, “because of the community feeling, the African man lacks the hallmarks of liberty and autonomy such as initiative, spontaneity, responsibility, auto-decision, auto-determination (which humans cherish so much)”.¹⁷ Okolo accepts that this constitutes a serious problem in African philosophy, as it underlies the basis to properly determining what or who the African is. In as much as the claim that the African is essentially communalistic and that his will is determined by the community, is put forward to depict that he is predisposed to care for others, yet this has serious consequences for human subjectivity, autonomy and freedom. “Much emphasis on the community devalues the person standing as an incommunicable entity in-charge of his own conscience and author of his co-operation as an existential personality”.¹⁸ The continued insistence on this basic ideology constitutes greater problem, most specially, in the realm of larger group formation or tribal integration in nation-states. By implication, strong emphasis on the ontological bounds tends to diminish the attraction to the state structure, hence, the tendency for national cooperation and consciousness.

5.3 Dialectics of Rights in the State

There are two primary competing forces in modern African nation-states; cultural or ethnic rights and civic rights. This is evident when one considers the history of modern African states or the processes that guided nationalism in Africa. The dialectic of these principal rights is obvious in the level of influences they exercise on the self in modern

African society, and the degree of loyalty they elicit from individuals. Basically, the individual belongs to an ethnic group; ethnic derives from the Greek-root, *ethno*, which translates as nation, this itself being derived from the Latin-root, *natus*, which literally means birth or descent. Hence, ethnicity defines the self's natural affiliations and identifications; Mazrui calls this reproductive forces. According to him;

The reproductive forces emanate from concepts of family and obligations that are presumed to exist from both marriage and consanguinity. Filial and parental love, matrimonial loyalties, fraternity, and the wider circles of kinship are all part of the social implications of human reproduction, and among the major forces behind human behavior.¹⁹

Thus, human behavior determined on this basis is ascribed ethnic nationalism. "For it is the feeling for one's nation which flows so because one is born so; the feeling of devotion which flows naturally from the heart of the person because he found himself feeling so by birth, from birth and from early socialization".²⁰ In this regard, and as earlier shown, the self, in Africa, is born into a community or network of relationships, such that he acts essentially from this basic consciousness. That is, the horizon of the self is culturally determined. But, on the other hand, the colonial forceful delineation, and imposition of a new social entity on the continent introduced a new state of consciousness, the state; the state represents the inauguration of the self into a civil society. This effort to force unity on different tribes in terms of the state meant that the emergent civil society was not a product of free consent or will, nor was there inherent idea or understanding of contract between the parties in the association. This is to the fact that the idea of the state in Africa was conceived purely for European exploitation. Thus, this explains the fact that while in the cultural environment, the self operates on familiar grounds, and social feelings are elicited naturally; in the civil society, the self is more or less, driven by forces which are beyond his comprehension and control, and, yet he cannot avoid because of the modern state of affairs. In other words, while he fully understands the workings of the natural community, in the civil community,

he is, more or less, an alien in his supposed inheritance. Consequently, the self is, basically, torn between two worlds.

Laski admits that the community is a will organization, and acts based on its ability to secure the consent of its members. That is, “man accepts its dictate either because their own will finds part expression there, or because, assuming the goodness of intention which lies behind it, they are content, usually, not to resist its imposition”.²¹ This, by implication, means that the community ought to, exclusively, pursue rights, this being the basis which would enable it to secure citizens’ loyalty. It is in accord with this that the cultural environment was essentially welfarist; hence, the self was usually defined in terms of intricate relationship, outside which the individual had no actual existence. In Okolo’s assessment, this implies that, “life for the African is a participatory activity of self with-and-for-others”²² and for Ekei, “man-is-a-chain”.²³ The basis of this participatory existence was to promote, as far as possible, human happiness. The fact that “man ought to be assisted independent of other considerations to achieve whatever promotes his life”²⁴; for this is what his essence implies. Apart from this, there is, equally, the fact that evil exists, and, that man has tendency towards bad actions. This necessitates collective action and responsibility in terms of checking evil or life limiting factors, so that life may continually flourish. “It is rational to foresee that when an evil occurs it spreads far reaching consequences not only to the direct victim but to a larger community sooner or later. This tendency is morally justified on the principle of man-with-others”.²⁵ Hence, as earlier pointed out, the basis of African stress on we-existence was care, essentially channeled towards others, which in the long run was reciprocatory; we care for the community and the community, in turn, cares for us. This interplay of the community and individual obtained on the basis of giving and expectation, which was, also, a reflection of the fact that the life of the individual was the life of the community and vice versa. This relational life style, and operation of forces in the cultural environment was governed by justice; justice

ensured harmonious interaction of forces, consistency in care for the community, and that harm to the entire network of forces was reduced, as far as possible. This, Ekei describes as justice in communalism, which, he posits, operates in four existential instances in Igbo, nay African life; justice as co-existence, justice as acceptance, justice as care and justice as concern. Justice as co-existence expresses the basic idea that the African is not a lone being in the world. As such, “co-existence (or the fact of belongingness) gives a person the grounds for just claims, for complaints against interference, for denial of attention, of rights, of marginalization, especially in communal settings”.²⁶ In other words, co-existence legitimizes an individual’s claim to communal rights based on being part of the community. Justice as acceptance describes a positive disposition to willingly accept responsibility on behalf of the community. An individual’s claim to right in the community, based on co-existence, is only possible if there exists proportionate consent to responsibilities, and the willingness to carry out obligations by others in the community. African ontology implies this reciprocal commitment of members. Justice as care is practical expression or manifestation of consent or the positive disposition expressed in concern. That is, while in acceptance there is a positive disposition by a moral agent to act, in care, this willingness to act comes out in fruitful activities. Ekei shows how this manifests in Igbo life thus:

In caring, the traditional Igbo organize themselves to wrestle with the problems which ordinarily are beyond individual capacities. For instance, there is a collective efforts in building (mud) houses, and in erecting thatches upon them. Such collective ventures spread in other departments of life as constructing pathways, building bridges, and clearing farmlands, and market places. The ethical implication of this is that without such concerted efforts of the individuals, through co-existence, co-operations, and caring, human life is likely to be highly precarious. Thus, it is an activity that tends to promote human survival and flourishing in the communal setting. It is as it were, a corresponding disposition towards the

human predicament ethically fraught with limitation, scarcity, powerlessness and contingencies.²⁷

Lastly, justice as concern depicts a disposition to alleviate the plight of the less advantaged members of the community or to supplement the lacks of others in times of greater need. That is, the tendency to come to the aid of those who are greatly challenged due to natural or social circumstance. Therefore, justice as concern, specifically, targets the unfortunate members of the community; “a different concern is expressed during various rites of passage, as during birth, rite of puberty, marriage, fatherhood, acceptance of higher social status, growth, and the rite of death”.²⁸ The aggregate of these rights and their expression in the community, ensured that the self was, essentially, committed to the tribe or ethnic group. This is in a manner analogous to the natural feeling and commitment of a son to the dictates of a loving and caring father.

On the other hand, is the contemporary society; its existence supposes that there is presumed contractual agreement between individuals which resulted in the emergent of the civil society, which then generated the state institution to legislate for the common good of all in the society. “Under normal circumstances civil society emerges and agitate for democracy and democratic change particularly in the area of democratic culture. This is because civil society and democratic culture is congregant”.²⁹ Consequently, the state, as an agent of the civil society, is created to distribute royalties and responsibilities, and by such doing, performs the role of *apatia* to its individuals. In this setting, the self is supposed to be attracted to a relationship which transcends his immediate family, community and tribal affiliations in terms of its provision of welfare. As such, there is, usually, the reciprocal expectation of the social evolution of civic spirit which would have to commit the self to the promotion and service of the adopted fatherland. However, nature seems to have ordained father-son relations in such a way that the son should have rights before

responsibilities, just as in the other way round, the father ought to have responsibilities before rights. And, it is on this depends the level of the son's commitment to the father, or individual's to the state. That is, people would support the state to the extent that it takes care of the needs and rights of these people in that state. In most western states, the individual's allegiance to the society is hardly solicited; it seems to flow, almost, effortlessly, because of the degree of rights and identification the state accords its citizens. For instance, an American, from any of the states of America, would readily identify himself as an American first before mentioning whichever state in America that he hails from. But modern Africa depicts the direct opposite of this situation. Fayemi Kazeem shows how in description of how democracy seems to have failed in contemporary Africa. He writes:

The major challenge facing democracy in Africa are the tasks of delivering the democratic dividends in order to improve the quality of life of the citizens, and the challenge of providing sustainable social order where humanity can flourish. The reality on ground in many African states is the lack of basic infrastructure of existence, poor roads, and transportation facilities (land and water), lack of portable water, electricity, housing, employment, health and educational facilities. The people's plight is compounded by the failure of the state to perform the most elementary functions of governance...the prevalence of violence and social disruption in Africa is the problem of the failure of the post-colonial states in Africa to fulfil their mandates by serving as facilitators of development.³⁰

Such is the bleak reality that confronts the individual with regard to rights in the civil society; that is, he feels betrayed and abandoned. Odimegwu gives an instance of this dismal situation in the case of a Nigerian;

He looks around for the father only to see a serial failure and/or a band of marauding wolves parading as shepherds. But he easily sees through their camouflage for their origins and present comportment expose their

ravenous intentions.... This already arouses in him a feeling of revulsion and repulsion.³¹

Consequently, it is so easy to see why and where his utmost loyalty would revert to. The state was established on the promises of enhanced level of existence over the tribe, however, the failure of the state to properly provide individual's civic rights results in conflict and dislocation of his duties to the state. Since loyalty should appropriately stem from the foundation of the state, as an appreciation of its fatherly duties to the individual, this failure makes more obvious, why the individual is drawn more to his cultural environment, away from his civil promises and engagements. For the African, then narrow bounds of ethnicity or tribalism seems to provide more soothing comfort than the broad confines of the nation-state, hence, he easily recurses to it.

5.4 Crisis of Nationhood and State Control in Africa

Western philosophy prides itself in its strong emphasis on individual freedom, liberty and autonomy; this aided the ease with which individuals, within this environment, embraced larger group associations. That is, the westerner counts his individuality first, irrespective of group affiliations, hence, he easily sees his place in, therefore, embraced the state institution in spite of individual family ties. Consequently, he sees in the constitution of the state association his or her implicit will; and, his actions are determined and proceed, as if they were part to the contract that established the state, in the first place. But, in Africa, the stress of the basic ontology on we-existence entailed that consciousness, social identification and loyalty failed to progress beyond the tribe. The tribe or ethnic group symbolizes birth attachments, as such, the African's affiliation to this symbol is, essentially, natural and spontaneous. This is why it operates subconsciously and persistently. Even till the present, the African remained attached, and felt greater affinity to the tribe or race instinct than to any larger association, like the state. Ali A. Mazrui shows the dilemma this introduces in the history of modern Africa thus:

A basic dialectic to understand in Africa is that while the greatest friend of African nationalism is race-consciousness, the greatest enemy of African nationhood is ethnic-consciousness. Modern African nationalism was born and prospered under the stimulation of racial solidarity and shared blackness. On the other hand, the struggle for viable modern nations within Africa is considerably hampered by acute ethnic cleavages, often separating Bantu from Nilotes, Ibo from Hausa, and the like.³²

Consequently, as Okolo points out that “the foremost burden of an African leader ever since independence has been to make one nation of these many conglomerations, at times, contiguous tribal groupings”.³³ Giving instance of this with Nigeria, Achebe, also points out that “nothing in Nigeria’s history captures her problem of national integration more graphically than the chequered fortune of the word tribe in her vocabulary. Tribe has been accepted at one time as a friend, rejected as an enemy at another, and finally smuggled in through the back-door as an accomplice”.³⁴ Tribalism, as has been shown, implies family symbolism and its expression. Therefore, family symbolism and its expression constitutes one of the greatest challenge to the existence of modern society in Africa, with regard to fostering national unity and consciousness.

Mazrui argues that there are two principal factors that direct human behavior; kinship and economy. With reference to Africa, he believes that it was the reproductive factor that had always taken precedence, and, even, had directed the economic forces. He bases this on, as has been noted, on the fact that the individual in African society defined their being through their identification in the life of the community. The communal structure “is aimed at incarnating and manifesting the commonness of origin, of history and of general destiny of all the members of the community”.³⁵ Hence, kinship or tribal bonds were very much emphasized over personal needs and interests; one was a person because of his clan or family, and was identified by this. In

this situation, social stratification was almost non-existent or less emphasized; but even this was determined by kinship or family descent rather than one's economic status, the reason the traditional economy remained relatively simple. While in the West, economy played significant role in social stratification and in status determination, in Africa, it was family symbolism or lineage that formed the basis for this. Consequently, "people were high or low in the social structure either directly because they came from a particular clan or family or indirectly because they had been given honorary kinship status by such a clan or family".³⁶ In any homogenous society, such as the African, descent or reproductive factor exercised decisive influence; the sense of bloodline or tribal affinity would always remain very high.

With the coming of colonialism, this factor and its influence on the individual did not decline. Instead, it spiraled into greater tribal antagonism and conflicts. In fact, Tom Mboya observes that Europe exploited this opportunity, greatly, to establish itself firmly on the continent. He writes:

The European colonial powers and even missionaries for a long time tended to build up tribal antagonism. It made it easier to influence the people, if they could find an amenable tribe to use against another tribe which was hostile. This was the straightforward tactic of divide and rule, and it cannot be excused as part of the British school attitude of administrators backing my team against the other chaps.³⁷

With the grouping of various ethnic groups together under an imposed national boundaries, by the colonial masters, as states, tribal or ethnic antagonism was given even more impetus. With this idea came increased individual's tendency to identify with his tribal affiliation, and pursue its interests, exclusively, above that of the newly founded nation-state, given "that (the idea of nation-state) was originally inaugurated as an instrument of exploitation for the benefits of external interests inimical to his existence and wellbeing".³⁸ Colonialism created new modern states on the basis of enlarged economic base; this in turn, deepened ethnic pluralism, as different ethnic

groups fought over the available resources for the satisfaction of their individuals alone. Consequently, the emerging post-colonial African states were characterized by heightened competition based on reproductive affinity and tribal identification. Mazrui theorized that the modernization and enlargement of African economy through colonial imposition should have initiated pure economic rivalry, reducing emphasis on tribal affiliations or family symbolism. “But this has not happened. The modernization of African economies has not as yet served to neutralize the heightened sense of ethnic affinity that has come with ethnic pluralism in the new African nation-states”.³⁹ Rather, economic opportunities and job positions, in the modern state, have come to be defined on the basis of which ethnic group that has the higher advantage in a national setting. Thus, members of such ethnic group usually gain easier access to certain opportunities than members of other ethnic groups; depicting that ethnicity has assumed the basis of stratification in Africa. Mazrui makes this clearer with the tribal situation in Kenya. Thus:

The Kikuyu in Kenya in the colonial period were virtually among the “untouchables” of the colonial society. The people who emptied latrine buckets and cleaned lavatories in parts of Kenya were disproportionately Kikuyu. By the time of independence, on the other hand, this whole ethnic category was reclassified by political history and political realities. Instead of being among the untouchables, the Kikuyu moved up to become relative Brahmins.... The Kikuyu as a total group have easier access to certain opportunities, especially in the main cities and government, than most other ethnic communities. But there are of course poor Kikuyu as well as powerful ones. The foreign company in Nairobi or Mombasa that employs a Kikuyu clerk as an exercise in public relations is, on the one hand, merely absorbing one indigent proletarian into an alien economy, but is also, on the other hand, paying tribute to the special status of the whole Kikuyu community.⁴⁰

In this case, equally, the individual would, probably, identify himself or herself, first as a Kikuyu, before recognizing his or her status as a Kenyan. Also, it is common that

ethnic group members would identify their interest in the survival of their ethnic group more than in their shared unity with other ethnic groups as members of the state. That is, a Fulani-Hausa in Nigeria, for instance, would readily see his future in the survival of the Fulani-Hausa group than in the shared union with the other ethnic groups, called Nigeria. This was the basis of the Nigerian civil war, and, at the present, constitutes the greater part of the state's political woes. This trend spreads across the different nation-states on the continent, consequently, makes national or political integration in Africa very difficult.

Okolo affirms that the African continent is in dire need of creating a new self-image, after the devastating experience of colonial occupation. But the lack of integration in most of its states counteracts and weakens this effort. Consider, for instance, "when these tribal practices (ethnic prejudice, discrimination, segregation) extend to the army, the police, the civil service, politics, different arms of the government, sports, academic institutions, et.c., as they often do in many African nations, they paralyze progress and ultimately ground the nations themselves".⁴¹ In this regard, "the greatest sufferer is the nation itself which has to contain the legitimate grievance of a wronged citizen; accommodate the incompetence of a favoured citizen and, more important and of greater scope, endure a general decline of morale and subversion of efficiency caused by an erratic system of performance and reward".⁴² And by extension, the continent, as a whole is subjected to more division and retrogression. Kinship or ethnic factor, reinforced by African basic ontology, exerts predominant influence on the political and economic state of African societies, and for Mazrui, only a partial decline in the power of its force, in terms of modernization of social conflicts in the direction of new economic classes, would bring about national integration. To this we add that this modernization process would require the enhancement of the individual's political opportunities and gains by the state institution. This would, in part, help counter the potency and effects of ethnic affinity on the individual.

The same situation obtains on the level of the continental integration, with various African states finding it very difficult to come together to harness their political and economic powers as regional forces. “Even those countries that started with a substantial level of regional integration later experienced acute tensions, and the level of integration declined”.⁴³ Mazrui maintains that continental unity had always constituted serious problem for Africa right from the outset of Pan-Africanism, as a movement for African liberation. Culturally, there existed, at the time, the tendency for Africans north of the Sahara desert, to cling exclusively to the ancient civilizations of Egypt and the historic legacies of Ethiopia, therefore, distanced themselves from the black part of the continent. However, it is at the level of Pan-Africanism as a movement of political and economic integration that this lack of solidarity between African states is most obvious. African states prefer their separate political arrangements, or maintained their inherited cultural legacies rather than submit to greater regional integration. This was the reason behind the collapse of East African Community, French-speaking African Community and the West African Community, respectively. Even the formation of Organization of African Unity in 1963, or African Union, as it is presently known, has not diminished this reality in any respect. Instead, independent states, especially the economically viable ones, tend to cling and act from their exclusivity. In this regard then, the prospect of greater cohesiveness on the African continent, most important, the level of national integration and consciousness, seems to be hard and long.

5.5 On Detribalised Co-Existence

Detribalizing African continent constitutes one of the major tasks of philosophy in Africa, considering as noted, the ills tribalism introduces; its overall effect is destructive to Africa’s quest for continental power, stability and unity. Hence, Okolo, ruminating on Africa beyond tribalism, remarks:

We now take up what has remained the foremost challenge to post-independence Africa, namely, constructing a nation free from tribalism and its ill-effects, ultimately, to create unified nations out of many tribes. This is the arduous task of detribalizing the African mind, not of course, in the sense of the African ignoring the positive contributions of his particular tribe (which is not tribalism) but in the destructive meaning of tribal consciousness....⁴⁴

This remark makes obvious that tribalism, in the sense discussed in the preceding section, is essentially narrow, what Tom Mboya calls negative tribalism; a factor that ensures that national or continental integration remains far-fetched, if not impossible. Mboya explains more:

The man who tries to live so completely within the confines of his tribe, not so much revering its customs as discriminating against other tribes, represents the kind of tribalism of which Africa must beware. The Luo who thinks nothing good can come from other tribes or continuously protects a person merely because he is a fellow Luo; the Kikuyu who thinks it only suitable to meet other Kikuyu and disregards merit and ability in other people because and only because they do not belong to his tribe; this is negative tribalism which cannot allow for unity.⁴⁵

Consequently, this basis advocates retrogression from the state arrangement to the primitive tribal arrangement, which according to Aristotle, is insufficient to the fulfilment of good life for man. However, the above remark, equally, makes obvious that there is a sense in which tribalism does not constitute harm to national integration, consequently, could enhance orderly state control and development. The pointing out of negative tribalism, by implication, suggests a positive sense of the concept. This is what Colin Turnbull had in mind as he argues that “everyone agrees that there are manifestations of tribal culture which we cannot condemn.... In fact, many of these manifestations are positive and desirable and confer richness on our national culture”.⁴⁶ Therefore, there are inherent positive values to the concept, tribalism; that

is, its principles, if tribalism is taken as an outlook on the state. In other words, tribalism could become the spirit from which the Africa looks on, understands and operates in the state, which is his main colonial heritage. Most scholars accept that to make any meaningful progress in solving the problem of modern nationhood in Africa, one has to understand its relationship to tribalism; and, on the other hand, any tendency to divorce the concept of tribe from the political reconstruction of contemporary Africa would be both unrealistic and misconceived. In this regard they opine that “there are in tribal systems many values, institutional and personal, that can play a significant role in the developing of a new political and social systems and, indeed, might prove a major contribution in the realm of international relations”.⁴⁷ Consequently, the need to re-examine, and, possibly, re-structure the concept, tribalism, in contemporary Africa becomes a necessity, else, we might be found holding tenaciously to what, for Turnbull, are misconceptions about tribalism. These misconceptions, according to him, consist in the belief that tribalism is a major force that is always working against African nationalism and internal unity; and to accept that tribalism is something backward and incompatible with the modern world. To avoid this prompts the insistence on trying to determine the role tribalism could play in political re-construction in Africa. This would, importantly, give African basis to African politics; for “the construction of a strong political doctrine valid for Africa cannot ignore these important features”.⁴⁸ Equally, “every nation grows richer and more powerful to the extent that it harnesses the full potentials of its peoples and cultures. These add richness and adornment to the whole nation and consequently, should be promoted, not looked down upon”.⁴⁹ Tribalism is an important life-line to African humane community.

In the first place, tribal expression is not particular to Africa. Tribalism is a basis for collective unity around which culture and people gravitate. To underscore this Elechi Amadi opines therefore that “it is futile to blame this tribe or that. The herd instinct is

powerful and was, and probably still is, vital to the survival of any race or tribe”.⁵⁰ Thus, tribal antagonism in Africa has to be understood, in part, as a result of the reckless incitement of the different ethnic groupings on the continent to tribal sentiments, by the European, without their consent. This is evident, as has been put forward earlier, in the fact that the idea of the state in Africa was a forceful attempt to impose unity, on disparate groups, by the Europeans, to satisfy their own greed. Understood in this form, even colonialism becomes an expression of tribal selfishness and exploitative tendencies on the part of Europe; consequently, the problem of integration in Africa is an outgrowth from the greed of European nationalism. Therefore, no individual is free from such basic emotion or sentiment, as both tribalism and nationalism are theories of identification to a national group. In this regard, tribalism could be seen as a positive force in as much as it has constituted basis for division and conflict over limited resources on the globe, but more in Africa. It could be a mark of social cohesion and civilization.

Implicitly, far from being opposed to unity, the concept of tribe could be translated into a great force towards ethnic co-existence on the continent; that is, tribalism could be basis for national integration in Africa. But, for this to happen, in the first place, the concept has to be broad-minded, expansive and adaptable; sort of spiritual force reflecting in the will of a people to accept a common future deriving from sharing in a common political history and heritage. In the traditional setting, the tribe reflected descent from a common ancestor; family spirit was at the heart of all tribal expression, and this spirit bound members or families who recognize their allegiance to the *pater-familia*. This structure was essentially that of extended family-hood, in which constituent families were able to trace their lineage back to a common ancestor, whose name the clan bears; this father figure was essential to tribal unity and activities. This is why, “the tribe actually consists not only of the living (the baseline) but also the dead and, by extension in the other direction, the unborn. This is vital to our

understanding of any tribal system, for from this derived an intricate system of mutual obligations and responsibilities, rights and privileges".⁵¹ Rights and privileges of members derive from this sense of sharing in a history depicted in descent from common lineage. The modern concept of statehood conveys the same idea of common history and heritage to which member groups ought to gravitate; that is, the spirit of a family unit. This feeling is ought to arise from the supposed fatherhood position of the state to its tribal groupings. Even as a political organization, there is a continuation of vital link from the founding fathers of the state down to its constituting ethnic groups, which ought to extend to its future generations. Though this link is broader than that which obtains in an ordinary tribal setting, yet, the supposed concord between these founding fathers ought to connect all the members within this political organization. It is from this sense of common heritage, in which lies group rights and obligation, that the will to live, share and participate together, should arise for all groups-members. Here, the state is conceived as an extended family unit from which springs different ethnic groups as constituent family units or sons and daughters; loyalties ought to flow in this direction back to the state, even as rights flow back from the state to its children, and between the children themselves. In this regard, the government, in the fatherhood position and, as the center of unity, should ensure balance and equitable relationship. K.C. Anyanwu refers to the manifestation of this political situation as the operation of the community spirit. According to him:

The spirit is the vital force that creates a community of people. The community is not the number of individuals in a society. To be a man is to be born into a community or a spirit. Every individual has to manifest the community in him or her by sharing from and in collective beliefs and tasks. So, a community is the product of common faith, not common fact. Only through the spirit can solidarity between the past, present and future generations be achieved.⁵²

From this spirit should derive morality; the will to uphold good conduct, knowing that every action has implication, both for the established tradition and common good of

all. This implies a strong sense of responsibility and loyalty to the supposed community. C.S. Momoh depicts this in his idea of moralism, as the tendency to “put the other before or alongside the self”.⁵³ The objective here is that honesty, service and concern for the interest of the other ought to be the basis and measure of all actions and decisions. In which case, the question of the majority overruling the interests of the minority would not arise at all; for the minority, as much as the majority, is an important member of the political entity. A narrow conception of the tribe manifests in the opposite, a rampaging greed, the tendency to free the self from a constraining sense of another and of fair-play. This is antithetical to national integration. Thus, Okolo is of the opinion that “different tribes should endeavor to count on what unites, not divides them and on maximum contributions of the tribes to national interests and goals. In working for the common good, the good of the whole nation, the African achieves and enhances his own tribal good and objectives, the state being more perfect than the tribe”.⁵⁴ In the indigenous tribal system, community spirit was implicit in all institutions and activities: social, legal, economics and politics. Its significance today ought to find expression in common allegiance to inherited tradition and shared history of the state, and in working together for common good.

The indigenous tribal system was not collective nor autocratic, as individuals freely contributed to common good; the tribe made it possible for individuals to enhance themselves while, at the same time, contributing to the growth of the tribe. Its political principle was democratic, as the constituting family units were accorded their place, recognition and representation in decision making processes; power was not centralized, so social identification was coerced through recognition. In this regard, the idea of state implies even a more active democracy, since based on the colonial delineation of the continent, states imply federation of ethnic groupings or nationalities. A democratic setting which gives room for different ethnic groups to express themselves while remaining part of, and contributing to the whole. In other

words, it is a situation whereby groups subordinate their independence and interests to form a higher national group or association, in order to possess an enhanced freedom and right therein; what Kant refers to in his idea of original contract. This enhanced structure should be instituted on the promises of equal recognition, representation, rights and obligations; the possession of these is primary to instituting the custom of loyalty to the state. To have this, therefore, the state has to come up with a framework that would enhance unimpeded individual self-expression and contribution; in African states, this should come through enabling each group the ability to develop itself while contributing to the general good of the state. The problem of integration constituted by ethnic antagonism, in Africa, arises, in part, due to the denial of this basic principles implicit in the idea of original contract. Or the enhancement of privileges to the advantage of one group over the others in the state association. The colonial system rode on this structure to establish its culture of exploitation, and has supported its continuation to maintain its hegemony in African affairs. Mbaegbu argues that this is the root of the nationality question in Nigeria, nay, Africa in general; the reason why democracy, the dominant political system in the contemporary era, has, relatively, failed to achieve much success on the continent. His submission is that “democracy encourages the liberating equal opportunity for the fulfilment of personal potentials. It is opposed to the raising of artificial barriers to prevent a class of people from attaining what they can inherently attain”.⁵⁵ To this regard, it becomes pertinent, to understand that equal recognition, equal distribution of privileges and rights, and fairness to the opportunities of different tribes to subsist and take part in the administration of the state institution is significant to de-emphasizing the high attachment to reproductive symbolism expressed in ethnic antagonism and conflict in modern African states. The indigenous tribe recognized the basic equality of its families or clans, just as it provided the enabling environment for its individuals to enhance themselves. For instance, members or families could rise to prominence or attain economic wealth relying on the community support. The tribe formed the pedestal for members to thrive and grow; therefore, the state apparatus ought to

pursue, vigorously, liberating philosophy for equal potential's development and fulfilment. Equality is a basic principle to securing true democratic rights or values. And this, by necessity, underlies nationhood, national consciousness and development.

Consequently, it follows that enhancing political gains and opportunities of groups would help defuse the high emphasis the African places on reproductive symbolism or ethnicity. This would translate to increasing the civil rights of citizens in order to de-emphasize personal attachment to cultural values. Scholars, from the early Greeks, argue that the state exists, exclusively, to pursue citizens' wellbeing; this is its fundamental practical purpose. Aristotle, as has been pointed out earlier, calls this happiness. And for John Stuart Mill, the state's purpose is to enable the individual achieve as much liberty as is possible for his or her development; development meaning situation that makes access to public rights possible. Laski adds that this situation is possible "only if the state provides rights (in the first place)".⁵⁶ Rights are social conditions by which the individual can be at his or her best, and which ensures that hindrances to an individual's realization of his or her best are removed. They are basic conditions of human lives; their contents may be dependent on time and place, but they still remain basic necessities of life. Appadorai makes detailed illustration:

The citizen has a right to work. Society owes the citizen the occasion to perform his function, for to leave him without access to the means of existence is to deprive him of that which makes possible the realization of personality. The right to work involves the right to maintenance in the absence of work. The right to an adequate wage, the right to reasonable hours of labour, and the right to be concerned in the government of industry are other economic rights which are necessary to provide decent condition of life and work. The citizen has a right to such education as will fit him for the tasks of citizenship. A group of other rights is necessary to enable the citizen to have a share in the government of the state....⁵⁷

Scholars do not mince words on the importance of education to social enlightenment. As such, educating the African is essential to expanding his consciousness, and understanding of his present socio-political structure.

There is of course no doubt that ignorance is at work in Africa. Educating the masses on the nature of the society, the common good, the distinction between private and common good, the end of society; and to uphold and respect other peoples' (tribes) rights, et.c., becomes important in expanding people's tribal horizons.⁵⁸

The state ought to employ education as one of its strategy of coercion. In all, state's exclusive pursuit of rights would bind the wills of citizen to its interests and values; state-citizens relationship is akin to father-son relationship. The father's obligation towards the son and how it is performed, which is usually prior to the son's duties to the father, "determines, to a large extent, the nature, orientation and development of the entire universe of this relationship".⁵⁹ In the indigenous society, there were practical realization of social benefits of members; through this way, their commitment and loyalty to the tribe was cultivated and maintained. Equally, since the state represents higher purpose than the tribe or clan, according to Aristotle, it follows that it should necessitate welfare to a greater level than that which citizens find in ethnic affiliations. The realization of this by modern African society would necessarily shift the balance of loyalty and attachment away from the ethnic groupings towards highernationalconsciousness, integration and unity. Just as in the indigenous society, tribal affiliation was the culmination of the family spirit because of the extent of benefit and solidarity at the level of the tribe; so could national integration become utmost aspiration in modern African society should the state dedicate itself seriously to the realization of citizens' rights, since its institutions and goals are by far, larger than those of the tribe.

The search for social integration in Africa should find root in African social practices and structure. Tribalism in this regard ought to be expanded and restructured to reflect the political status quo appropriate for modern Africa. Thus, “far from being incompatible with any modern process of social evolution, tribalism, properly understood, could help it on and, at the same time, bring to it all the richness of the past”.⁶⁰ In other words, African states contain within themselves the very seed of unity which they are seriously searching for, in order to solve the enormous task of reconciling the diverse tribal systems within them. The dynamism implicit in the operation of the tribal system, and in the understanding of the concept could be exploited to this regard.

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CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

6.1. Evaluation

Nationalism has assumed global prominence since its beginning in the 17th century enlightenment. Its emphasis on popular sovereignty and organization, most especially, has raised the level of its general acceptance world over. That is why, in this era, people easily rally around the idea of nation-state to define themselves and their activities. That is, nowadays, national interests or goals seem to determine and propel all human actions or events; the slogan tends to be nations first. Leon Baradat lays more emphasis on this by observing that;

Nationalism is among the oldest, and unquestionably the most virulent, of all ideologies. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this concept in

contemporary politics. Nationalism is the most powerful political idea of the 200 years. It has had great impact on every person in every modern society. People who have applauded policies pursued in the name of country would have condemned their use for any other reason. Millions of people have been sacrificed and died, property has been destroyed, and resources have been plundered in the name of the state. Yet, individuals have also risen to noble heights and made great contributions to humanity for the sake of the nation-state.¹

Thus, the greatest appeal of nationalism is its demand for greater identification with, and determination on the basis of the state. At the moment, individuals, groups and organization are continually seeking for recognition, and each regard the other as citizens and co-inhabitants of the earth. To this regard, popular state control and government has become a general demand of people across the globe; nationalism has made democracy, at the present, a universal cult. This is obvious as nations that had for long practiced other forms of governance, have, so readily, reverted to democratic governance; and new states see it as the only veritable path to greater harmony and development. “It is patronized and widely acclaimed as the political messiah for many of the seeming by unending socio-economic and political problems facing humanity in the 21st century”.² Consequently, we see the multiplication of democracies as there are states in the world. In other words, there are different shades and colours of popular government or universal acceptance of the concept showing differing understanding and adaptation to peculiar social situations. This, of course, adds to the difficulty in fully defining the concept of popular government and its interpretation that would suffice for this variation. Therefore, at the moment, people could talk of European, American, Asian and African democracies.

But, in as much as scholars accept the variation in interpreting the concept, they, however, concede that popular sovereignty has some basic defining qualities. Kazim puts it thus; “the attempts by scholars at encapsulating some set of principles and

elements of democracy are more instructive in overcoming the various problems in explaining and understanding the concept of democracy”.³ As such, the common features of democracy include; rule of law, supremacy of the law, majority rule, periodic elections, free and fair elections, independence of the judiciary, existence of viable opposition parties, fundamental human rights, freedom of the press, open and responsible government. Here again, Kazim, summarily argues:

For a state to be democratic, there must be a free, fair and uninfluenced election carried out by an Independent Electoral body. Open and accountable government involves openness to information relating to government policies, and the need for the government to be responsive to the citizens both at the level of policies formation and implementation. Democratic society involves strengthening democratic institutions, rule of law, judicial autonomy and public spheres. Fundamentally, in any of the models of democracy, lie the respect, recognition and observance of liberty, equality, equity at all levels and justice, in all aspects of humanity.⁴

And anything less than this, he concludes, is, more or less, a pseudo democracy; that is, pretended, immature and impotent democracy, which cannot guarantee social emancipation, human development, security and human rights.

The dawn of independence on African continent had seen individual African states, massively, embrace democracy. “Not less than 70 percent of states in Africa have embraced democracy”.⁵ As, mentioned earlier, this overwhelming patronage is not unconnected with the perception that this political reality is best suited to tackling the vagaries of problems of humanity in this era, and Africa has a fair share of these problems. However, with the political trend across the face of the continent, it seems that democracy in Africa has run into problems or is, itself, probably, the political problem in Africa. In fact, the reality is that democracy in Africa is defined differently,

and is carried out separately from its common trend in the world; the leadership in different African states seem to interpret the operation of democracy to reflect peculiar self-perceptions and dispositions. As a result, politics on the continent brandish the ideals and values of democracy, even though, it contradicts this in practice. This semblance stems from the seeming fundamental belief that the political reality in Africa is quite different from politics in any other part of the globe, judging from her past socio-political experiences. Kaunda is forthright in this admission. He believes that the democratic heritage which Britain bequeathed on Africa entertains much freedom and divergent opinions, especially in the parliaments, hence, does not suit the modern African terrain, being as it is, a conglomeration of disparate tribes. Consequently, he argues that;

If we are to make sense of contemporary Africa, we must escape from the strait-jacket of our preconceptions and have the charity to assume that where the political systems of African states diverge from those of the ex-metropolitan power this is not necessarily due to pique or hunger for novelty; it may be that we have our own ideas about what is best for our people”.⁶

Hence, he proposes that one party political structure suits Africa better than the prevailing multi-party system, which the concept, democracy, as such, implies. And it is, probably owing to this, that an obvious contradiction obtains in African politics; that is, many African states overwhelmingly adopt strong unitary governments and collectivist control, although, they vociferously chant the principles of representative democracy and separation of power. Prompting Zaato Matthew Knor to conclude that “representative democracy in practice in Africa is very porous. It has inherent seeds of impediments and dissolutions such that it overtly contradicts its own ideals and values in practice”.⁷ Independent Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda was a foremost instance of this fundamental contradiction in practice of democracy in Africa.

Because of the very active role he played in the securing of Zambia's independence, Kaunda considers that the leaders of various African states should occupy a father's position, and ought to exercise paternal authorities in these states. This is because, as he argues, the leader "is the people's mouth-piece. He suffers with them and on their behalf. They speak through his voice and he leads them where they have trusted him to take them".⁸ Consequently, his position assumes an intense centre of focus and unity, hence, the drive towards national integration and evolution of patriotic spirit falls squarely on the leader. He, equally, makes this explicit; "in one sentence, the nub of the nationalist leader's problem is *how can we transform nationalism into patriotism?*".⁹ This is more so, as he accepts that the multi-party structure deepens tribal antagonism and raises its conflict level, a basic problem, which the institution of the state in modern Africa has to contend with. Political cleavages in Africa, at independence, had followed ethnic particularisms, and the ensuing conflicts, raised the question of nationality and patriotism on the continent. There is also the fact that Kaunda considers that in Africa;

The function of a responsible opposition is not always understood; rejection of a government measure can easily degenerate into a conspiracy to remove the government. The very solidarity of the support enjoyed by a national leader can become an invitation to opposition groups to go beyond the law and use violence, assassination and sedition to destroy him.¹⁰

Hence, to avoid this, and the fact that for him, "national survival is the basic good; all other qualities such as unlimited freedom of expression are contingent upon it"¹¹ Kaunda grants unchallenged executive power to the president or political leader in a state. This psychology has been shown earlier to reflect the colonial system, which, as it were, had tutored Kaunda and other African nationalist leaders in the art of governance, before the granting of independence. Here again, we restate Chipondoh Musingeh representation of this situation:

The colonial system in Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, sacrificed democracy at the altar of 'law and order'. Colonial rule was by nature very authoritarian; it systematically suppressed freedom of expression and association, including the tolerance of dissent. When the nationalist parties eventually emerged, they functioned as mirror images of the colonial system which they were meant to fight. For instance, these parties emphasized loyalty or obedience of the membership to the top leadership. Any dissenting views were ruthlessly suppressed and labelled as counter-revolutionary and unpatriotic.¹²

On a cursory look, this falls in line with other positions that suggest that the White settler destabilized the African. But, be this as it may, it, equally, depicts a psychological problem in the African; an inability to let go of the colonialist or colonial institutions. This arises, partly, from a seeming fear or perpetual foreboding in the African to that the Whiteman is always lurking around, seeking to take advantage of his short comings or to further destabilize the Africa. In which case, he tries to limit, as far as possible, all forms of expression, a factor he considers, essentially, western, through dictatorial control. The other aspect of this, is obvious in the inability of the African to come to self-realization, hence, accept his contribution to his present social condition. Consequently, the fact that he continually replays the abysmal application of democratic principles, prevalent during colonialism, in himself, and, on his land. As a result, he fails to see, in the words of Okolo, that "the African condition is created by the African himself. He (has become) his own enemy".¹³

Nigeria, at the present, is, equally, another clear instance to this seeming contradiction in the practice of democratic heritage. On independence, the country inherited a federating system which reposed a lot of power in her different regions than in the central government. However, subsequent events in the life of the state, especially, intermittent intervention of the military in the government, has launched in a strong

central structure that dominates and controls the entire polity. Mbaegbu captures it thus:

One more blow and even the worst effect of excessive military intervention in the government of this nation was the forging of a constitution for the country, which imposed a unilateral instead of a federal system of government, which could have taken care of the multi-ethnic and religious dimensions of Nigeria. Till today this unilateral system of government prevails even though nominally Nigeria is said to be a nation of federating states.¹⁴

This point is glaring when one considers that the president, in Nigeria, usually is the Chief Executive of his party, head of state and sole commander of all the state's security apparatus. As such, his person and influence is so superimposing, to the extent that the entire democratic network in the state, serve his every whim and caprices. This socio-political set-up makes nonsense of the idea federal constitution, multi-party democracy and, also, the belief in the operation of separation of power. Mbaegbu believes that in here lies the stumbling block to the evolution of a truly national spirit in Nigeria. In most other African states, this situation has ensured the degeneration to, purely, one-party political status quo, with the respective presidents assuming, essentially, an autocratic control over the state. Kaunda seems to have envisaged this, hence, in support of this he had argued; "whilst I am alive to the dangers of combining the offices of Chief Executive and Head of State, I see no realistic alternative in Africa.... In my view, if the leader is to direct the people's loyalty to the state over a period of time, he must, first be in undisputed possession of it".¹⁵ In this case, therefore, democracy in Africa has become, essentially, the wielding of power over the populace by whatever person or party that is able to secure the central authority; in Nigerian case, such controlling power is exercised not just by the president, but, also, a certain group within the government called the cabal or the king makers.

The penchant for power, occasioned, perhaps, by this paternal sentiments, seems to have translated to a sit-tight attitude of leaders in most African states. In Africa, it has become a common feature of democratic politics, for leaders of some the states to hold onto power for a very long time, irrespective of all odds. Thus, instead of applying the democratic process that stipulates periodic elections, African states are known to have leaders who rule for a very long number of years; this includes the fact that some states have, since gaining independence, had only one ruler till the present. Kaunda accepted this condition as necessary if it would aid the process of translating the disparate loyalties of the populace to national consciousness; this aligning with his consideration that the leader “is the lynch pin of unity”.¹⁶ It is from this basis that he justifies his 27 years presidency in Zambia, and the fact that he would have continued in this position for a long time had his policies not been massively discredited, such that he lost to the opposition, in the first multi-party election conducted in 1991, after the parliamentary amendment to his one-party policy in that state. A survey across the continent would reveal that long-term dictatorial politics in the semblance of democracy has been a common feature of governance in independent African states. Starting from the North of the continent, there was Muamar Gadhafi of Libya, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, who would have been ruling these states till now had their leadership not been cut short by the Arab spring that introduced spate of changes in the Muslim world. In the African states south of the Sahara desert, the case is relatively different with the likes of Robert Mugabe, who has been the president of Zimbabwe almost from its independence till the present; Jose Eduardo dos Santos has ruled Angola for 38 years now; Yoweri Museveni has been in charge of Uganda for 31 years now; Paul Biya has been in charge of Cameroun for 35 years now; and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has been in charge of Equatorial Guinea for 38 years now. There is another dimension to this trend, a seeming tendency to convert democratic states to dynasties; that is, the trend in which a son takes over the leadership of state directly after his father. Jerry Ogonnaya calls this trend “familiocracy or heridatoracy”.¹⁶ Here, there is Faure Gnassingbe who replaced his

father, Gnassingbe Eyadema, as the president of Togo, after he had ruled for more than four decades; the same situation obtains in Gabon, where Ali Bongo took over leadership in 2009, at the death of his father, Omar Bongo, who had ruled that state for 41 years. Nigeria could have, probably, been mentioned alongside these other nations, had the upper chamber of the federal house not thrown out, in 2006, a controversial Constitutional Amendment Bill which sought to elongate the tenure of Olusegun Obasanjo, whose presidential tenure was due to end then. But, even at this, the Nigerian state, since its return to democratic politics, seem to be at the mercy of a domineering cabal who maintain aristocratic position over her. Thus, given these prevailing reality, it implies that the supposed democratic governance on the continent is quickly short-changed by authoritarian leadership and regimentation of political institutions. Or as Albert Ogoko captures it; “most governments in Africa are dictatorial even when they brandish democracy”.¹⁷

The essence of politics lies in the evolution of a community; hence, the import of the political reality, thus far, presented, would be properly understood when measured against the extent it has led away from the evolution of community, nay, citizens’ identification with the state in contemporary Africa. It is, also, in this regard that one would understand why Chinua Achebe, alongside other scholars on African social issues, heap blames on leadership for the fact that while the world celebrates the triumph of democracy, politics in Africa wallows in various crisis. Elechi Amadi captures the feelings of these scholars like this: “our leaders were too parochial and uneducated: parochial in that they were only conscious of the needs of their immediate families, uneducated in that their sense of values was grievously warped”.¹⁸ This is most obviously seen from the fact that political leadership in Africa follow the ideals of the game theorists; it serves only the interests and demands of certain persons instead of the collective communal good. As such, there arises the challenges of providing the democratic dividends that would improve the life of the citizenry in the

state, hence the myriad of failure by the state to provide basic amenities of existence such as good roads and transportation facilities, portable water, electricity, basic housing, employment, health and educational facilities, begin to surface. The situation is still made worse by the inability of the state to carry out the most elementary obligations of governance that reflect vision, purpose, truthfulness, fairness and equity-invariably, the social frustrations of the citizens peak. At this stage, it is common that the state populace could resort to acts reflective of animal instincts. In other words, according to Sogolo, this bleak situation “makes beasts out of men, and are largely responsible for the quick inclination to violence, conflict and war as the means of making grievances known and achieving desired ends”.¹⁹ From this perspective, it is easily understood how most states come to the conclusion that ethnic wrangling and tribal conflicts constitute the inability to maintain social order and national unity in the state. By implication, then, most African states have relied on ethnic repression, manipulation and dictatorial control to maintain semblance of unity among the disparate people that usually constitute states in Africa. This state of affairs, instead of improving social order, degenerates further to greater antagonism, conflicts and ethnic or regional divide. It is in this respect that the world witnessed the Rwandan genocide, Nigerian/Biafran war and other forms of violent reverberations on the continent. Consequently, Maurice Izunwa avers:

Notice that conflicts are contingent upon the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the form of government and the fidelity to the type of its stakeholders. This is not unconnected with the fact that governance is about the management and organization of human and material resources of a state. These too, (human and material resources) are the sources of conflicts, such that where there is proper governance under a workable form of government, conflicts are likely to be on the low scale, if at all.²⁰

Therefore, the argument that Africa is a multi-ethnic society, and that these differences along tribal lines make it almost impossible to evolve, national consciousness, hence, a

patriotic spirit does not hold much ground. Ethnic identities threaten national survival only when the socio-political conditions, necessary for the evolution of national identity, social order and development of national loyalty, are nonexistent. In this regard, Kazeem points out the necessity of putting in place “socio-political framework for the enhancement of the autonomy of the different ethnic groups of which many African states are composed”.²¹

The inability to provide fundamental socio-political framework for the enhancement of the different groups in the state is explained by the regimentation of power that exists in the state. Dukor posits that this is so because, the state, in the first place, does not conceive its people as citizens, deserving of these as rights. He argues that this perception flows from the colonial administration of the different African colonies. He writes:

The colonial wastes did not rule African people as citizens of independent countries with dignity and respect but as colonial states and colonial people who were at various times described by western anthropologists as sub humans without intelligence and philosophies. They ruled the colonial people through warrant chiefs without regard to whether these chiefs supervised the people of their various domains with respect or dignity. The chiefs treated their people as slaves and this was upheld by the colonial officers as the colonial people languish under the burden and leadership imposed upon them by the chiefs. The violence and stress they suffer bastorically deprived them of their rights, their citizenship and the social responsibility owed to them.... Even with the amalgamation of ethnic nationalities, the problem of citizenship worsened as the subjugation of the concept of citizen's right under warrant chiefs became re-subjugated under a central foreign and self-imposed government of the amalgamated nation-states that is not only alien but is also distant from the people of ethnic nationalities.²²

Consequently, and as noted earlier, the individual prefers the comfort provided by his tribal setting to the lacks and harsh realities implicit in the state. This is as he felt at home with the structure and workings of his ethnic background than in the state environment which treated him as an alien. Thus, the deepening of the tribal divide in the state, and the tendency towards expressing national consciousness and sentiment, evaporates completely. Kazeem explains this failure to depict that the states in Africa lack the legitimacy to exercise political control. And, “because the state lacks legitimacy, it has to rely on force and manipulation to secure the support and loyalty of the people. In doing this, it denies the people the opportunity of freely participating in the determination of the events that affect or shape their lives”.²³ In this case, autocracy instead of democratic governance becomes the order of the day. This has become a common feature in Africa, hence, nationality question has come to assume prominence in political deliberations on the continent.

True democracy relies heavily on a strong vibrant civil society with a common front, to take strong footing in any society. The model is that the civil society emerges first, and, then, agitates for a democratic terrain and culture. As such, it, equally, falls on the civil society to ensure the maintenance and sustenance of the democratic principles and values in the state. “This is because civil society and democratic culture are congregant”.²⁴ Part of this is that the civil society is expected to serve the course of human rights, which, in the first place, underlies the agitation for democratic governance. But, as it is, in African political life, this obtains differently. Democracy in African states develops and advances independent of the civil society. This is because the idea of civil society in Africa is fragmentary, hence, states operate a democratic structure that thrives without the civil society. This situation arises due to the strong central political control the states maintain, which, invariably, translates to ethnic cleavages and strong tribal emphasis. That is;

The people or groups tend to move away from the predatory state and seek refuge in the kinship based groups and religious organizations. This is the reason why in attempt at each of the republic to democratize, there is always violence; that is the process of democratization is always accompanied with violence along ethnic and religious divide.²⁵

Hence, instead of a civil society with a unified demand, African democratic polity presents disparate groups with varied interests. In states like Nigeria, “the differences in the interests of these cultural groups make it difficult to have a common front. This, itself, has affected the process of democratization since 1999, especially as with the herald of democracy violence has tripled in Nigerian polity”.²⁶ Here, there are disparate groups like MASSOB, IPOB, OPC, Arewa Council of Nigeria, MEND; each with interests and demands that are always at variance with the others’ at different times. This depicts the level of democracy enjoyed in the different African states. there is, as an aspect of this, the fact that the penchant for power and the regimentation of authority in the central government, has permeated the entire body politic and democratic institutions, such that the associational life of the civil society has, itself, degenerated to competing interests and tussle for control of positions. This is such that the government, using its overbearing influence, is able to manipulate or even coerce the various civil society groups into submission most of the time. This has further divided the power of the civil society, even in its fragmentary tribal definitions and affiliations; thus, adding to the inability to evolve a viable civil group that would give adequate support to the development of a truly democratic state in Africa, hence, project or protect the rights of the citizens.

Lastly, nationalism which ushered in the democratic governance had at its basis the equalization of opportunity for all; at least, fair participation of the citizens in the socio-political life of the society. In other words, the penchant for democracy is because “it encourages the liberating equal opportunity for the fulfilment of personal

potentials. It is opposed to the raising of artificial barriers to prevent a class of people from attaining what they can inherently attain”.²⁷ Sadly, the democratic polity in Africa is a reversal of this order. It has, rather, thrown up a group of elites who dominate the franchise; and on the other hand, given basis for the championing or propagation of the interests of one regional or social group over the others. Mbaegbu gives a classic instance, when he notes that the colonial British regime that conceived the idea of Nigerian state, skewed democratic principles in the conduct of the very first population census in the country. He writes:

In that exercise, the British mischievously skewed the figures to favour the Northern region which, incidentally was not opposed to the continued rule of Nigeria by the British. The British apparently took their revenge on the southern region. The 1958 census broke all known demographic theories. While commercial districts had fewer population, deserts and semi-arid regions were teeming with people. In continuance of this unholy tradition, the 2006 census saw Kano having more population than Lagos. Subsequent to the skewed census figure was political gerrymandering which ensured that the delineation of the nation into constituencies were heavily skewed in favour of the north. With this, the British effectively imposed the mantra of Northern domination on the whole of Nigeria. The rest of the country’s beleaguered history is the history of the reaction of the other ethnic nationalities to this singular fact.²⁸

Consequently, the nationality question, which has since featured prominently in all political discussions and activities that defined all aspects of the life of the Nigerian state up till this era. Presently, this has translated to the incessant clamour for restructuring, which threatens to engulf the state, and which is, equally, considered a way to reversing this pseudo-democratic trend bequeathed on the nation, in the first place. However, the amount or level of consideration that this public outcry has received, so far, from the people, the overbearing central government of the country, has shown its peculiar perception of popular mandate and its commitment to play along with the democratic principles and values it understands.

Africa is a multi-ethnic society. If she would transit properly to modern statehood, hence, evolve true national consciousness and identification, the different states that compose her would have to introduce a socio-political structure which would enable each of the ethnic groupings to enhance themselves, and from this contribute to the development of the respective states. For instance, Nigeria is one of the African states with the most variegated ethnic groups. Consequently, if the multi-party majoritarian democracy which she projects to abide by is to make any sense, at all, the state ought to provide a social framework which makes it possible for the different groups to realize themselves and, yet, contribute to the collective national welfare and image. This would be a form of decentralization of authority; that is, through shifting the political focus from the all-powerful central leadership and re-focusing on the comprising regions or states in the country. This is, a process of power devolution and it would ensure that each people play active role in their own development, from where attention would, then, be channeled to the coordinating center. As it is now, this center is too strong, thus, alien to any of the groups who do not, at a time, have access to its corridors. This is why Nigeria is constantly held at ransom by any of the groups who happen to feel, at any time, that its interests is not represented by the all-powerful central government, hence, most alienated. Presently, there is Boko Haram in the North, IPOB in the East, Niger Delta militants in the South-South and Oduduwa group in the West. With this trend, it is hard to imagine that national consciousness would ever arise among the citizenry; it is even possible that the Nigerian nationhood may not stand the test of time, as well as the other African states.

6.2 Conclusion

Nationalism is a theory of recognition and identification. Through it, humanity tries to project itself as an indispensable factor in the shaping of the globe. This is why democracy, the authentic vehicle of nationalism, has come to assume a global force in this era. "It is patronized and widely acclaimed as the political messiah for many of

the seeming by unending socio, economic and political problems facing humanity in the 21st century”.²⁹ But, in Africa, there seem to be a reversal in this trend; hence, the continent seem to be caught in democratic impasse. For instance, the reality in most African states is social disorder, tribal antagonism and conflicts, failure in the delivery of social amenities resulting in poor health care and high mortality rate, economic chaos and chronic poverty. With this, scholars have variously described the trend in Africa as a seeming democracy, a pseudo-democracy or a travesty of democracy. For this reason, democracy, and, indeed, nationalism is called into question in Africa; this regards counteracting the above mentioned problems and establishing a condition of rights, which, as it is, underlies the evolution of true national consciousness, and the expression of patriotic sentiments by individuals towards the state. Kaunda believes that the cause of the degeneration of patriotic spirit among Africans, expressed in the inability to have a detribalized state or union, on the continent, is to be found in the multi-party majoritarian democratic culture which the Blackman inherited from the colonialists. He understands that the freedom of expression implicit in this political structure, generates lots of antagonism of opinions and clashes of interests, which in the end degenerate to greater conflict and division, instead of bringing about a consensus. He believes that for the independent African states, with their peculiar experience of colonialism, such a situation constituted more harm than a boost to the idea of statehood, national consciousness and patriotism. He expresses this thus:

On the African continent, however, the historical causes of division tend to be so deep-seated that the very foundations of the state could be torn out if an opposition group were given too much latitude to inflame opinion. Hard though it may sound, in my view survival is more important than freedom of expression. The situation of near anarchy created in the recent past in such territories as the Congo, the Sudan and Pakistan through a multiplicity of weak political parties is a moral to us all. For a nation can flourish and its people benefit under strong government but anarchy is the basic denial of freedom because every aspect of the nation's life is paralyzed. National survival is the basic good; all other

qualities such as unlimited freedom of expression are contingent upon it. The great enemy of freedom is not totalitarianism but chaos.³⁰

Consequently, he describes the multi-party democratic structure as a beautiful anachronism, which suits the western environment, more, than it is of value to Africa. This understanding formed basis to his mutilation of the basic principles of democratic governance to derive a one-party government and subsequent autocratic administration in Zambia. This attempt, more or less, represents a transition from the abysmal democracy of the apartheid-colonial regime to a more abysmal democratic structure in the name of one-party democracy. Consequently, we noted that this tendency to invest unlimited power on the central body representing the government, in the different African states, has crippled more than sustained nation-building, statehood and patriotism. In fact, the African continent has had, more or less, increased number of disparate groups or interests existing side by side in a supposed modern state, ever since, with the implementation of this political structure. Starting from the inter-tribal war in the present Libya, initiated by the autocracy of Gadhafi down to the ethnic antagonism in Nigeria, and continuing to the civil unrest and disturbances in Southern Africa; the instances are uncountable. Therefore, the seeming perennial problem of nationalism in Africa.

But, if the continent would arise from this, therefore, attain a new recognition and political identity, there should, of necessity, be a devolution of the power of the central government in the different states. This, in the first place, would reduce the seeming tension between the state and its various parts or groups; between these groups, themselves and, even, within the groups. It is the autocracy of leadership in the African states which aggravates ethnicity and group conflicts, since people, by necessity, seek refuge in the tribes in a bid to run away from the predatory state. Consequently, such reduction would entail the recognition of the parts as

indispensable to the constitution of the whole, which is the state. It would invest a renewed sense of responsibility and identity on these various groups since it would bring to their realization that the promotion of their wellbeing and development depends on their efforts, their reasonableness and their communion as members bound in a contract in terms of the state. On another level, this would, invariably, generate a feeling of recognition in the individuals that compose the groups, hence, the realization that their success or failure, as a people, depends on them. Each state is better off to the extent it tries to endow its citizenry with responsibilities that help them see their part in the determination of its political processes; this helps defuse tension crisis and conflicts, resulting in patriotic reactions. Equally, this could be the basis to strengthening and recognition of the civil society as the foundation of the democratic process. "It is generally believed that the existence of civil society implies that it will serve the cause of democracy and human rights".³¹ However, the inability of the civil society to fully evolve in Africa, and that its neophyte nature is accompanied by difference in interests expressed, usually, in the multiplication of splinter cultural groups, is a major problem to the rise of true democratic culture on the continent. In Nigeria, for instance, the decimation of the civil society is blamed on the long military interference in the state's political life. As such, power devolution from the center would aid the revival of associational life, which, in turn, would play down on ethnic cleavages and tribal sentiments, hence, impart on democracy and patriotic expressions.

Nigeria proves to be a good instance to understanding the question of national unity and patriotic spirit among the state's citizenry, being, herself a multi-ethnic nation, and which, at the present, is assailed by tribal agitations, highlighting, as it is, the demand for the disintegration of the state. To this regard, the on-going calls from different quarters of the nation for restructuring, with basis on decentralization of authority, seems the best option to resuscitating national consciousness among the citizens. This is bearing in mind, as has been shown, that it is the distortion of democratic principles

not the principles themselves that is the precipitator of ethnic antagonism, conflicts, and, ultimately, crisis of nationalism depicted by unpatriotic actions and reaction across the face of the continent. In other words, making governance the people's, which is implicit in the process of power devolution process, reflects the spirit that propelled the rise of nationalism, in the first place, than the usurping collectivist control represented by the centralization of power in the state. Consequently, we might even discover that the demand for different regions or groups, in the country, to take charge of their resources, thereby, create a development pattern at their own pace while contributing to the overall growth of the state, is a suitable political ideal for Africa. We know that this would elicit much contention from those open to a more centralized political control, however, the reality is that this has not done much to tilt individuals' allegiance away from ethnic engagements in favour of the state. The nature and level of one's allegiance to the state depends on the much the individual feels himself as part of the state in question. Besides, to instigate such contention between centralization and decentralization of political power falls within the purview of the study.

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