CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

What motivated this work to explore into the field of "Just war theory" is the rapid-spread of wars across the global stage. This work has seen different kinds of political violence such as riot, revolution, war and terrorist attacks. Thus, the questions are: What triggers the violence? Can there be rules about war so that fair play is possible? Has there ever been a war with a just cause? Is there any international body, either 'Federative State[1], as affirmed by Immanuel Kant or 'Super –Leviathan[2]' as affirmed by Thomas Hobbes which will look into the global politics and come up with a better global response in terms of security, peace and stability? If such international organization exists, why is it that some modern wars could not respect the rules of United Nation Organization?

The above questions already pointed out will help us to solve our problems in a realistic manner. This work was influenced by the recent Arab-uprising that started in 2011 of which began officially with the Tunisia State. What was the goal of Arab revolution? The goal of Arab revolution was to eradicate absolute monarchy in order to introduce state of freedom. The Arabs were yearning for freedom of speech and press. They agitated that Arab's human rights and dignities must be respected while constitution is a necessity. Through Arab uprising, this work learnt

from the writings of John Locke's idea of democracy that monarchy is not a divine institution as Robert Filmier affirmed in his book called Appodarrai; rather the consent comes from the people and not from God.

After the episode of Arab revolution, my mind went back to First World War, Second World War, Cold War, French Revolution, England Revolution, American Civil War, Colonial conquest in Africa, Israel's War in 1967, Iraq and Kuwait War, terrorists act in America 2011 (September) and recent American war of word with North Korea, Syria, Yemen, ISIL, Al-Qaida and Boko-Haram terrorist groups and Zimbabwean revolution and recent Iran unrest. From the above sequence of political violence, it means that "war is a continuation of political policies by the other means" as affirmed by Carl Von Clausewitz. What Clausewitz meant here is that it is every state's interest to maintain security, peace and prosperity. Therefore, when either external or internal force tries to thwart the above national interests, the state authority could use self-defense as a legitimate force to protect its national interests. These series of political violence are of great concern to this work. Nevertheless, after going through them, the work discovered that most of the above political violence were fought on illegitimate assumptions while the rest were fought on legitimate assumptions.

Therefore, there is the need to adopt the idea of morality in order to checkmate further political violence if actually the universal law of justice must be respected.

The essence is to affirm through the United Nation Organization wars that are legitimate and wars that are not legitimate.

Another concern I have in this work is the current situation of the United Nation Organization's influence on the global politics. The way United Nation Organization is handling the international issues in many states is not quite satisfactory. For instance the on- going Syria civil war between the government and the rebels, Russia's annexation of Crimea which resulted into a sovereign encroachment of the Ukraine territorial integrity, Israel's war with Palestine and President Trump's controversial declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Korean tensions between North Korea and South Korea , Japan and United State of America, Iran's support of the militant's operation in the middle East, and Turkey's encroachment into Syria boarder in name of fighting the Kurdish rebels.

With the exposition of the above political struggles, the argument is: What are the significant efforts of the United Nation Organization in trying to solve the above political struggles. In most of the states where political struggles are going on, one could notice world power's (U.S.A, Russia, China, France and Britain) interests. The United Nation Organization's Security Council is dominated by the World Powers. If the United Nation Organization is the political body to ensure peace, stability and security, why is it that its efforts to stop most states that engage in irrational war are not significant? For instance, the Syrian civil war; the Syrian

government has committed a genocide which means according to series of previous United Nation Organization's resolutions that Assad's government must go. The reason Assad should go is because his legitimacy has been lost and Syrian people needed democracy that will reflect the "will of the people[3] as John Locke affirmed. To my dismay, Russia and China knowing that Assad government was responsible for the killing of the Syrian's civilians went ahead and vetoed the above resolutions. The reason Russia and China vetoed such resolutions is because of their interests in Syria and other Middle East states. My suggestion is that, despite Russian and China 's insistence that Assad must stay, United Nation Organization should go ahead in making a rational decisions that will stop the Syrian government from killing its own people by giving Syria tougher sanctions as they acted on North Korea.

From the above political scenario, it means that Immanuel Kant is right in saying that only federative body could handle the affairs of the global states but will not use force agency to enforce its objectives. Thomas Hobbes, at the same hand, is right in saying that every state is headed by a Leviathan; therefore, on international level, there cannot be a Super- Leviathan because each state headed by a Leviathan is a Sovereign State which has the natural and moral rights to protect its citizens. The implication of the above statement is that since each state has sovereign rights, it means that United Nation Organization has no right of interference. The reason

is because a state cannot exist within a state. United Nation Organization is not a government of its own. It has no sovereign right over other nations.

The problem of every state must be resolved by the citizens and the government of that state, except a situation whereby a leader of a state is killing his own people, the evil action of such tyrant leader may attract the presence of the peace-keeping force under unilateral agreement in the United Nation Organization. The aim of the military intervention is to save human lives in imminent danger. TheUnited State of America, Britain and France'sstrikes (14/04/2018) on Syrian territory for being responsible for the chemical attack on its citizens is morally justified because of the immunity of the Syrian civilians is the utmost priority.

1.2 Statement of Problem

The work states its problems as follows: (1) is political violence evil or good? (2) How does morality relates to law (and how does morality influences war)? (3) How could the doctrine of double effect be morally justified in the arena of war? (4) With the doctrine of 'necessity', when, if ever, is it right to go to war?

The first problem stated is: is political violence evil or good? Here we are going to see the nature of violence, the nature of politics and the nature of political violence. Let us begin with the nature of violence. Some people think that violence is evil because ofthe horrific and perilous nature of war. "Violence, according to St

Augustine is not intrinsically evil[4]. The message Augustine is passing across is that violence in itself is not evil except when it moves towards destruction of human lives while it is considered good when it promotes values of humanity, social and fundamental change. Therefore, violence for Augustine means a natural reality.

According to Thomas Hobbes "the state of nature was brutish, nasty, short, solitary, violent death and fear of violent death; no industry, army, market and government[5]. The implication of Hobbes' statement is that in the state of nature there was an indiscriminate violence of which resulted into state of civility. This is a credit to Hobbes because there was a serious reason to leave the state of nature to the state of civility where government will subject the violence under conscious and rational control.

For Karl Marx, "violence is a social phenomenon and not a manifestation of any super-natural power outside human society[6]. What Marx had in mind is that war arises from basic social needs and social arrangement of production, a general truth of which the latter day expression has been the slogan. For Marx, "capitalism means war". Marxism does not reject war in general as inherently evil or irrational; it approves of some wars, example those fought to liberate suppressed classes and races, while disapproving of others that have an opposite purpose.

In Kant's view, 'all wars alike stand condemned by Reason for their manifest anti-legality[7]. Here Kant may well seem dogmatic and unrealistic when compared with Vattel, who argued so persuasively for limited wars, at the end of which relatively lasting settlements could be expected. It should be remembered, however, that Kant was proposing perpetual peace, first between a few like –minded nation, as a new political ideal, comparable in importance to recent declaration of the right of man. It is in this light that his unqualified condemnation of war must be understood.

For Tolsty, "war is only last climax of an infection that runs through every political society, liable to poison even the strongest and the healthiest, the happiest and most kindly of its members[8]. This is a truth which every human being must learn to see behind all political clichés. Then and only then could there be that peace, the promised kingdom of God, towards which the heart of every man aspires". What Tolsty had in mind is that the endpoint of war is peace despite the facts that there are 'just wars' and 'unjust wars'. He went on saying that, what one could do would be to point to particular instances of the evil of wars, and let these speak for themselves, so clearly and indeed so shockingly, that no further comment or explanation is possible[9].

The summary point of the above philosopher's statement is that there are 'just wars' and 'unjust wars'. Just wars are wars under rational control while unjust

wars are wars under irrational control. “Failure in war, according to Von Carl Clausewitz, is the failure of policy[10]. The goals of the war and the policies that drove it were unrealistic, inappropriate and blind to other factors. The implication of Clausewitz statement is that one’s interest in war is not the violence, brutality, the waste of lives and resources, but the rationality, and pragmatism it forces on us and ideal of promoting human lives without bloodshed. Clausewitz is right in saying that a war that doesn’t correspond to realities of life definitely must fall. What Clausewitz had in mind is that when an action goes wrong whether in politics, business or life, one should trace it back to the policy that inspired it in the first place? The goal was misguided[11]. Every violence must be subjected to conscious and rational control. What we need are not the impractical and inhuman ideals of peace and cooperation to live up to, and the confusion it brings to us but rather practical knowledge on how to deal with conflict and the daily battles we face. And this knowledge is not about how to be more forceful in getting what we want or defending ourselves but rather how to be more rational and strategic when it comes to conflict, channeling our aggressive impulses instead of denying or repressing them. Our successes and failures in life can be traced to how well or how badly we deal with the inevitable conflict that confronts us in the society.

In the concluding part of this nature of violence, the work affirms that violence reflects the trends of society. Violence is not a separate realm divorced from the

rest of the society. It is an eminently human arena full of the best and worst of our nature.

Let us see the nature of politics. Politics means promotion and projection of national interests of a state. Peace and security are the priorities of every state. Therefore, according to realists, “there is no morality on international level; the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality which attaches a positive value to caution, piety, and the greater good of mankind as a whole[12]. Master’s morality is the only morality obtainable on this level. Peace for them means strength or action.

At this moment, this work shall examine the nature of political violence. According to Clausewitz, "war is continuation of politics by other means"[13], which means political violence is the continuation of political policies. He meant that every nation has goals of security, wellbeing and prosperity that are ordinarily pursued through politics, but when another nation or internal force thwarts their achievements through politics, war is the natural result. War is never merely about victory on the battlefield or the simple conquest of land, it is about pursuit of policy that cannot be realized in any other way than through force. Natural law theory shall be used to address the nature of political violence.

The second problem stated is: How does morality relates to law and how does it influences war? In attempting the question we must begin by knowing what is law and morality. “Law, according to St. Thomas Aquinas is an ordinance of reason for the common good of persons in a society which must be promulgated[14]. Further explanation will help us to identify the kinds of law. The community of all things in the universe is governed by divine reason. Since divine reason is eternal being identified with God himself, this law is the eternal law.

All things are subjected to eternal law; it directs all things to their proper ends. But it is, in a special way, the law which governs rational creatures. Human beings share the divine reason by becoming aware of an order in things according to which man is to attain his last end, his true purpose in existing. The eternal law, thus manifest to human reason, is called the natural law. The natural law is the eternal moral law as knowable by sound human reason without the aid of supernatural revelation.

From the precepts of the natural law, human reason derives details of direction and order for conducting the affairs of life .Human reason interprets or applies the natural law for particular cases. Each enactment and application of the natural law for particular cases is a human law.

One of the effects of law is to make men good. For law is an ordinance of the reason; it is the function of such ordinance to direct men, through virtue, to their true end. If, however, the intension of the law-giver is not to direct men to their true goal, the law does not tend to make men good simply; it tends to make men good only in the sense that they conform well with the intention of the law. Hence, a tyrannous law that aims at herding men into servile obedience tends to make men good slaves, but after all, a tyrannous law is not a true law, for it is not in line with reason; it is not truly an ordinance of reason.

Second effect of law is that law seeks to obtain its effect by directing those bound by it, and its requirements are expressed in four ways; permission, command, prohibition and penalty.

Now let us look at the nature of morality. The question is; what is morality? Morality is "a set of rules or precepts which bears divine reason, binding all rational creatures[15]. The principle is ascertainable through human reason. Culture is the product of the mind. And the mind is the starting point of every war. Therefore, in almost all cultures, morality-the definition of good and evil- originates as a way to differentiate one class of people from another. Ethics evolved to keep society orderly by separating the antisocial and "evil" from the social and "good". Societies use ideas about what is and what is not moral to create values that serve them well. When these values fall behind the times or otherwise cease to fit,

morality slowly shifts and evolves. There are individuals and group, however, who use morality for much different purpose –not to maintain social order but to exact an advantage in a competitive situation, such as war, politics or business. In their hands morality becomes a weapon they wield to attract attention to their causes while distracting attention from the nastier, less noble actions inevitable in any power struggle.

At this point the work will go further to explore the 'moral good' and 'evil' in human acts. Human acts that measure up to what sound reason sees as what ought to be are good acts. Human acts that fall short of what they ought to be are, to the extent of their failure to measure up evil acts. The object, when we speak of human acts is the human act itself and whatever is necessarily involves. Now, the object is the primary determinant of the moral good or evil of human act. If the object, the act itself considered as a deed done, does not manifest the good or evil of the act, then we look at the secondary determinants of morality, that is, to the circumstances. Hence object and circumstances are determinants of morality of human act. In determining the moral character of a human act by circumstances, the circumstance of end of the agent is most important. This circumstance most often ceases to be merely a circumstance, and enters into the objects itself. The end intended by the author of a human act, is so important a determinant of the morality of his act that we give it special mention; therefore we usually list the

determinants of the morality of human acts in this way: object, end and circumstances.

These are the consequences of good and evil acts (1). Since the eternal law is the ultimate norm of good or evil in human acts, it follows that moral evil is sinful and moral goodness is righteous. (2). It also follows that morally good acts are praiseworthy, and morally evil acts are blameworthy. (3). The praise or blame due to human acts by reason of their moral goodness or badness is not a mere matter of words or opinions, but of retribution according to their goodness or evil. (4) The merit and demerit of human acts are not a matter of human justice merely, but of divine justice; for human acts have merit or demerit in the sight of God.

With clear analysis of law and morality, we shall see how morality relates to law. Natural law theory is a legal theory that recognizes law and morality as deeply connected, if not one and the same. Morality relates to what is right and wrong (good and bad). Natural law theorists believe that human laws are defined by morality, and not by an authority figure, like a king or a government. Therefore, we humans are guided by our human nature to figure out what the laws are, and to act in conformity with those laws.

The term ‘natural’ law is derived from the belief that human morality comes from nature. Everything in nature has a purpose, including humans. Our purpose is,

according to natural law theorists, is to live good and happy life. Therefore, action that work against that purpose, that is, action that would prevent a fellow human from living a good happy life, are considered ‘unnatural’ or ‘immoral’

Laws have a purpose: to provide justice .From a natural law perspective, a law that does not provide justice (unjust law) is considered ‘not a law at all’. Therefore, a law that is flawed is one that no one should follow. In short, any law that is good is moral, and any moral law is good.

The concept of morality under the natural law is not subjective. This means that the definition of what is ‘right and what is ‘wrong’ is the same for everyone and everywhere.

The work will address the problem: How does morality influences war? This issimply because the natural law approach to solve ethical dilemmas begins with the basic belief that individuals have the right to live their life. Consequently, natural law theorists draw a line between an innocent life and the life of an ‘unjust aggressor’. The natural law theory recognizes the legal and moral concept of self-defense, which is often used to justify acts of war.

Furthermore, “war being a product of the mind does not take place in the mechanical art” as Clausewitz affirmed, but in the living entity”. The implication of the above statement is that mind is the starting point of every war. Therefore,

morality regulates the human mind and not mechanical art. Morality maintains that war must be waged under rational control. Every war must obey the conditions of "just war theory" both "ius ad bellum", "ius in bello" and "ius post bellum".

The third problem stated is: How could doctrine of double effect be morally justified in the arena of war? Doctrine of double effect is the collateral damages which might be intentional, accidental or incidental. Let us examine them one after the other.

Accidental damage is an action that was not foreseen and un-intended. In every war, the immunity of the non-combatants is the priority while the combatants and the military facilities are the legitimate targets according to "just war theory". For instance, if state A drops a bomb on state B's military's facility, the inescapable action ofthe bombresults to both the destruction of the military facility and the death of the civilians living around the barracks. It means that there are two effects and this work shall morally examine them. The action of dropping a bomb on state B's military facility was intended and the effect on the military facility was foreseen,therefore, State A cannot be blamed because "just war theory" authorizes that the soldiers and military facilities are the legitimate targets in every war. Again, State A cannot be blamed for the civilian's death because the second effect was not foreseen and not intended (it is called accident of war). The logical reason why state A cannot be blamed on the civilian's death is because anything that lies

outside the scope of a man's intention in terms of acting does not belong to his action. That man cannot be subjected to moral judgment.

Though, there are mistakes that could be avoided and demonstrating that some effects of one's actions are accident does not automatically excuse or eliminate the need to justify it. The death of the civilians would have been unjust when the accident or the mistake of state A on State B could be reasonably avoided.

Incidental damage is a situation whereby an action is foreseen and not intended. In terms of moral justification, doctrine of double effect does not hold that incidental damage is accepted merely because it is incidental intent. The usual conditions are: (1) The action in question must not in itself be morally bad nor should any intended effect of it be morally bad ((2) The anticipated bad effect must be genuinely un-intended and not merely secondarily intended (intended as a means to further end). (3) The harm involved in the unintended outcome must not be disproportionate to the moral benefit aimed at in the act[16].

Intentional damage is a situation whereby the action is foreseeable and intended. The action and the intention that brought about the mistake are blamable and must be subjected to moral judgment.

The fourth stated problem is: With the doctrine of 'necessity', when, if ever, is it legitimate to go to war? In the broader interpretation of morality, this is a moral

question. It is only necessary to go to war when the human lives are in imminent danger. The meaning of this statement is that when peace fails to remove the great evil, suffering or fail to redeem the human rights already violated, war becomes the last resort. The aim of the military intervention is to save human lives in imminent danger. Before a war begins, these are conditions a war must observe ('ius ad bellum') :(1.)It (war) must be declared by a legitimate authority. It is not a group or an individual's affair but a state affair. (2.) It (war) must arise from a just cause. (3.) It (war) must be a last resort. (4.) In war, the violence used must be proportional to the wrong resisted. (5.) There must be a reasoned prospect of military success. (6.) It (war) must be fought with right intention.

The above conditions, according to Tony Coady, could be called "rules of war" and these rules of war are reflected in United Nation Organization and International Legal Codes for dealing with the regulation of war[17].

When a war has started, these are the conditions a war ('ius in bello') must observe. The conditions are :(1.)The immunity of the non-combatants is the utmost priority while combatants are the legitimate target. The principle of discrimination is basically concerned with the legitimacy of target and targeting plans.[18.] (2.) There are exceptions on the side of the soldiers, for instance, no state should use biological substance on enemy state. (3.) When the warship is ship-wrecking, one does not target enemy soldiers till the atmosphere is normal. (4.)

When the soldiers are parachuting either because the plane is about to crash, no one should target the enemy soldiers, till they landed safely. (5.) When soldiers are captured, no one should abuse them.

1.3 Purpose of Study

The purpose of this work is to let everyone understand that every political crisis must be met by political solutions. For Clausewitz, “war could not be understood at all- could not; in strictness function at all except under political direction and control. The more serious the motives, Clausewitz continued, the higher the stakes, the more vital the issues, the greater degree of popular involvement on either side, the bloodier and more destructive the resulting war must be."[19]What Clausewitz had in mind was that all wars are fought to advance or defend the interests of the governments and the governing classes of the states concerned. Thus, every political aim in war is determined by the amount of military action that will be poured in.

Lenin, in his own time, maintained that “every capitalist war must be considered simply as an opportunity for advancing the cause of international socialism"[20]. In his polemics, he affirmed: “Had they never heard that war was simply a continuation of politics by other means; and that the first duty of every state-man,

in face of any war, was to determine its political character, that is, what it was intended to achieve"[21].

For Karl Marx, "human values arise from pressure for social change which rest, ultimately, on new possibilities of production, and it is only so far as war helps to expedite such changes, that it can be regarded as a progressive agency in human affairs"[22].

From the above sequence of philosophers' ideas of the purpose of political violence, the work will proceed to show its audience its purpose. The first purpose of this workis to show that in every atmosphere of war, there should be machinery required for inaugurating and extending peace: There should be a constructive political philosophy that is programmatic according to Kant. Philosophy should offer not only theory but practical or detailed solutions to political problems. Its job is to reveal the logical layout, the geometry and the contours of the main area within which political problems arise, so that we can at least agree about the kinds of solutions that they admit of. Philosophy should equip the political thinkers and theorists with the political realities on how to manage violence; Soldiers should be armed with self-discipline and courage in order to face any external aggression as affirmed by Plato; while the citizens should be connected with social realities in order to be rational in any re-approachment towards violence. "A unique amalgamation of philosophical, economical, sociological and political theory

inspired by a vision of humanity will help as a revolutionary means to liberate man from age oppression" as Karl Marx opted. The objective of this work is to help humanity manage violence in a way such that violence will bring social and fundamental change as affirmed by Heraclitus, who stated that "war is the father of all and the king of all". Heraclitus believed that the world has violence in its blood,just as it also contains a principle of auto-balance, one that enables the world transform violence into good. Violence must not be used to crack down humanity but must be used as a self- defense in order to protect the human rights in imminent danger.

The second purpose of this work is to show the world the importance of philosophical concepts such as peace, justice, freedom, happiness, love, unity, division, economic reform and the need for morality in regulating the human mind which is the starting point of every war. It is the prerogative of the state to use the methods at its disposal –including war to establish order. Justice is the mechanism by which the universe is ordered. It is also the tool employed by well –ordered states to ensure both domestic and international order. Justice is sought when war has officially ended, which results into reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Peace without justice is an illusion. Therefore, peace is the only pivotal instrument to diffuse the war tension. The kind of peace that will solve the world problems is not peace through strength (action) as affirmed by the Realists

but peace that passes all misunderstandings as affirmed by the Idealists (Pacifists). For St Augustine, 'Ideal Peace' is the ultimate peace that will solve the world problem while for Kant it is 'Perpetual Peace'. At sensible 'peace settlement', the defeated parties to the peace may have legitimate grievances remaining, but in genuine peace, there is settling of dispositions into a certain tranquility so that the recurrence of violent conflict is not imminent and the maintenance of order does not require inordinate violence. Ideal peace should stimulate efforts to maintain peace in the face of the threat to it, and to reestablish peace when it has been destroyed by war. To end war, negotiation is a necessary tool for dialogue and it must be on terms of surrender and settlement. All these things constitute the essential ingredient of a philosophy that will bring germane to peace building in our world today

The third purpose of this work is that men shall form political society-states and shall obey the law that is enforcing within their own particular state by its generally recognized government. A just war is the means of procuring the common good of preserving the state in the area where law could not be enforced-that is, in its external relations with other rulers and state. Self-defense is a natural reality essential in life as affirmed by Kant.

The final purpose of this work is to bring to the platform of people's understanding that it is only the universal political body called the 'Federative State' as affirmed

by Kant that could handle the world problems by ensuring that there is peace, stability and security. Nevertheless, the above body will not use force as an 'enforcement agency' in order to achieve its objective. The decisions of the United Nation Organization will depend on the 'unilateral agreement' generated by the representative members of every state. The objective of this United Nation Organization is to protect the individuals' human rights. Self- defense is a necessarily tool for protection of human rights as affirmed by John Locke in his statement "revolution is legitimate when the government is killing his own citizens". The meaning of John Locke's statement is that every government must reflect the will of his own people.

Therefore, the work concludes that "every political violence bears a political goal".

1.4 Significance of Study

The significance of this work is that war should be subjected to conscious and rational control. For Kant, ''Reason is as much the source of all practical, as of all theoretical, principles. Just as Reason requires that men shall form states and obey their laws-since only under the protection of effectively enforced laws can men live and develop together as, rational and moral equals –so it demands that states shall desist from using their enforcement powers (armies) to damage and destroy each other, under the pretence of obtaining justice from or pursuing each other''.

The implication of Kant's statement is that men should do everything necessary to avoid war and when war is avoided peace is achieved. St. Augustine sees the desire for peace as an essential ingredient of human nature, much like the desire for enjoyment. In his discussion of war, Augustine argues that even war making is essentially oriented towards peace; it is not only that rulers and warriors ought to be concerned with peace, but that they inevitably are: Indeed, even when choose war, their only wish is for victory; which shows that their desire in fighting is for peace and glory. For what is victory but the conquest of the opposing side? Thus, when this is achieved, there will be peace…. Hence it is an established fact that peace is the desired end of war. For every man is in quest of peace even in wagging war, whereas no one is in quest of war when making peace.[7]

The pragmatic implication of the above statement is that if a state must go for war, that state must have peace in mind. The reason according to Aristotle is because no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war. A man would, continued Aristotle, be thought an utterly blood thirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres.[8] The stand of Aristotle is that a state should not resort to war in the first place but such state could use dialogue to resolve the issues.

St. Thomas Aquinas maintains that just war must be waged by properly instituted authority (state). War must occur for a good and just purpose rather than self-gain.

Peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence.[9]Furthermore, Aquinas used the authority of Augustine's argument as a laid down condition under which a war could be just. It was in the same sense that Heraclitus affirmed that "war could serve as a means of winning peace." There may be tension between opposing forces, this conflict is necessary for peace. It even helps them to mutually respect themselves. This type of tension is ironically 'a peaceful one'. Heraclitusmeant thatstrife is a necessity for fundamental and social change. War elicits unity and resolve group differences.

Besides, the peace which war brings, there are other positive significance which war brings such as using war to explore different solutions to a problem and stimulate creativity by bringing emotive and non-rational arguments into the open while deconstructing long-standing tension. The requirement to defeat the opponent forces may lead to advances in technologies such as transportation, food manufacture and storage, communications and so on, that have applications well beyond the military sphere. The above are the positive impacts of war, the work will not hesitate to show the negative impacts of war: violence is used mainly to inflict injuries on the opponent. As such, it can hinder progress in the society, encourage unfriendly behaviors, and enhance win-by-all means necessary attitudes. This work attests from its personal experience, war forces people to leave their

home and in the same direction forces them to face or adapt to new situations or challenges. War brings deluge of miseries and misfortune to people.

From the thread of the work's argument, the readers could see the significance of the study which is both positive and negative. Therefore, the work concludes that war is a natural phenomenon which needs natural solution. The implication of this statement is that war must be regulated by the rules and regulations emanated from human reason, of which must correspond with natural reason. This natural reason bears the mark of divine mind.

1.5 Scope of Study

This study aims to show the area to cover in the writings of Coady and those areas are the origin of violence, what is political violence, the types of political violence, the forms of political violence, the positive and negative effects of political violence, meaning of morality and theories of morality; just war theory: "ius ad bellum" and "ius in bello", doctrine of double effects, innocent shields, dual purpose target, morality of terrorism, morality of revolution, the ideology of realism and idealism and conditions for ending the war and ideal peace.

The above stated purview is to let the world know that violence is not intrinsically evil but inherent in nature which means that violence is an inescapable phenomenon in the society. Therefore, this study offers as a new outlook in which

we could approach violence and that re-approachment is on how we could manage violence and at the same time becoming free in a society surrounded by impediments and obstacles. Violence should not be treated as a force to crack down the humanity. The aim of "ius ad bellum" and "ius in bello" is to make sure that all modern wars are rational in order to avoid injustice. The objectives of realism and idealism are to show that only ideal peace is the pivotal tool to diffuse the war tension. The reason being that war is horrific and perilous while peace brings unity and perpetual stability and security.

1.6 Methodology

This work uses the philosophical method of critical analysis which focuses on breaking complex words into simpler words. The work makes use of both primary and secondary sources. My primary source is the writings of Tony Coady while my secondary sources are the works of other philosophers such as St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx and Engel, Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes,John Locke, Carl von Clausewitz and Montesquieu, Vattel, Lenin and Tolsty.

The first chapter will give the background of political violence, problem of study, purpose of study, scope of work, significance of study, methodology, and definition of terms.

In the chapter two, the study will engage in literature review of this essay.

In chapter three, the work will comment on idea of political violence, the positive and negative effects on the society, forms and types of political violence and the philosophical meaning of morality with the theories of morality such as natural law theory, consequentialism, intuitionism and ontology.

In chapter four, the work will expose the tenets of Coady's writings beginning with "Just war theory" and doctrine of double effects and morality of revolution, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

In chapter five, the work will comment on the stand of realism and idealism on war and peace at global stage. And will move on to expose the tenets of peace as the only option to diffuse the war tension in the human world.

Chapter six which is the concluding part of the work will evaluate Coady's theory and his position.

1.7 Definition of Terms.

'Jus Ad Bellum': The right conditions to observe before declaring a war. The conditions are: war must be declared from a competent authority; War must be a last resort; War must have right intention; There must be a just cause in war; There must be a reasoned prospect of military success; The violence used must be

proportional to wrong one is resisting, that is the benefits must be higher than the loss.

‘Jus in Bello’: The right conditions to observe when war has started. When war is declared the immunity of the non-combatants is the utmost priority. According to the principle of discrimination and proportionality, the legitimate targets are those in the chain of agency directing the aggression such as Head of state, Ministers and House of law and uniform soldiers.

‘Post ad Bellum’: The right conditions to observe in order to end a war. “Just Post Bellum” concerns justice after war, including peace treatises, reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation, war crime trials, and war reparations. The conditions are: just cause for termination, right intention to terminate war (revenge is not permitted), there must be public declaration and authority, punitive measures are to be limited to those directly responsible for the conflict (truth and reconciliation may sometimes be more important than punishing war crimes) and finally, terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated.

ENDNOTES

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3. John Locke, Treatise of Civil Government (New York: Penguin 1890). P. 9.

4. St. Augustine, The Theory of Just war ed John Mark Mattox (London: British Library Publication, 2006). P. 121.

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6. Marxist, "War and Peace", www.wcom.//karel kara (1/3/1968).

7. Gallie, W.B. Philosophers of Peace and War (New York: Cambridge University Press) p. 30.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 138.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Robert Green, The Thirty Three Strategies of War (New York: Penguin Group, 2006). P. 163.

11. *Ibid.*

12. John Baylis, The Globalization of the World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). P. 92.

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15. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (London: Chicago University Press, 1970). P. 6.

[16.] C.A.J. Coady, Morality and Political Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p. 137.

[17.] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[18.] *Ibid.*

[19.] Gallie, W.B., Philosophers of Peace and War, Ibid., p. 63.

[20.] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

[21.] *Ibid.*

[22.] Hal Draper, Karl Marx Theory of Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977) p. 12.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review

This work reviews the Philosophers' ideas on the "Just War Theory". Philosophers like Augustine, Aquinas, Carl Von Clausewitz, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Marx and Engel, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes. This work shall begin with St. Augustine's world view on war.

Traditionally, Augustine is regarded as the father of what has developed as the western theory of "Just War".[1] That fantastic title should be bestowed upon the man who, in Christian philosophical literature, also is widely known as the great 'Doctor of the West,[2] the Doctor of the Church[3], or the Great African Doctor,[4] was designated by the medieval as Doctor Gratiae, and has been heralded as the second founder of the faith[6] is, perhaps, something that one familiar with Augustinian literature would not find surprising.

Augustine certainly is not the first person in the west to attend philosophical significance either to 'justice' or to war. A significant number of pre-Augustinian philosophers discuss war in a moral-philosopher's context. For example, Plato argues that "the state must be organized for violent survival in an unruly world', [7] and he assigns specific wartime roles to the state and its citizens. Plato's Athenian

in the law observes that waging war is the prerogative of the state, and never that of its individual citizens – a theme that Augustine will emphasize repeatedly.[8] In the Republic, Plato represents Socrates as holding that neither Greek civilians nor their habitations should be regarded as targets of wanton destruction (even if similar restraint was not deemed necessary when fighting non-Greeks).[9] At war ends, Greeks among the vanquished could not be reduced to slavery.[10]These limitations thus accorded a special status to non-combatants – another theme Augustine will highlight. Xenophon, in his Cyropaedia, chronicles the measures response of Cyrus to an Egyptian division, which had lost all means to resist but continued fighting.[11]

Euripides, in the Heracleidae, notes constraints on the treatment of enemy prisoners of war.[12]Polybus offers a commentary on the 'law of war'[13] that bears strong resemblance to the kind one encounters in Augustine's expositions.[14] These examples, among others that could be cited, plainly attest that many well before Augustine's time-philosophers, historians, play wrights, and warriors– concerned themselves with the way in which wars justifiably could be initiated or prosecuted, neither can one claim for Augustine the distinction of having been the first person to use the words 'Just' (or 'unjust') and 'war' in tandem (that distinction may well belong to Aristotle[15].

Moreover, the idea of a just war is not an exclusively western Innovation. The ancient Chinese, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Hindu of India and others discussed the moral dimensions of war in writings that antedate anything in the Latin West.[16] For example, Laotse, Chinese Philosopher and founder of the Tao religion, writing in the sixth century BC, argues that war should be undertaken only with the utmost reluctance; and even then, it should never be continued beyond the point minimally required to achieve the purpose for which it was initiated.[17] The ancient Egyptians observed a surprising array of humanitarian practices in war.[18] The ancient Babylonians distinguished those responsible for initiating the war from those soldiers who fought in it[19]in terms of the moral burden of responsibility that each should bear; the great Babylonian leader Sennacherib observed just such a distinction after the campaign against Jerusalem in 690 B.C.[20] The Hindu Book of Manu (c. fourth century BC) contains detailed regulations regarding the humane conduct of warfare.[21]

Antedating all of these writings is one non-western source to which Augustine had access: Deuteronomy Chapter 20, which sets forth the laws of war revealed to Moses for the Israelite's conquest of Canaan.

Some are content to designate Augustine by the title of 'father of Christian just war doctrine'[22]rather than by the more general title of 'father of just war theory in the

west'. However, this designation seems not to take account of the fact that just-war issues receive attention in the writings of earlier church fathers.[23]

However, the aim of Augustine in Just-war writings is that Augustine does not seek to formulate 'legal rules' for regulating war and that this doctrine does not pretend to lay down principles for the law of nations-rather, that his doctrine is intended merely to be a workable ethical guide for the practicing Christian who also had to render unto Caesar his services as a soldier.[23] Certainly, Augustine does not seek to do anything that could be construed as an attempt to lay the foundations for international law.

At this moment, let us see St. Augustine's conception of war. In as much as the history of human society is largely the history of warfare, it seems quite natural for Augustine to attempt an explanation of the place of war in the unfolding plan for human history. Over the course of the centuries, Augustine risks in one of his letters, [24] have we over had a time when the world was not scourged by war in one place or another? And in the city of God, he provides an answer by arguing that, human nature being what they are, no people can claim ever to have enjoyed a condition of peace and tranquility such that all anxiety associated with the thought they might fall prey to life-threatening hostile action was altogether done away with. Enduring peace and tranquility is a state from the only among eternal beings in the heavenly city.[25]

War is as inevitable for Augustine as it is for Heraclitus, Hobbes and Marx, albeit for different reasons. For Augustine, anything that exists as so inextricable a feature of human existence as war seems to owe its existence at least to the permission, and more likely to the design of God. Man enjoys the power of individual agency, but only as a divinely bestowed endowment. Neither man nor men's freedom exists independently of the will of God who; according to Augustine, created all things ex nihilo.[26] Hence, it is that, in order for even the possibility-even the idea, and certainly the realization-of war to exist in the first place, God must have ordained either that wars exists, or that man, through the exercise of hi agency, be able to engage in war. The God who is the object of Augustine worship controls or allows all things according to His pleasure, to include "the beginning, the progress and end even of wars[27] which He ordains when mankind needs to be corrected and chastised by such means. Hence, for Augustine, wars owe their existence to the will of God, just as everything that does exists in the universe, and just like everything else that exist in cosmic order, wars too serve a divinely appointed purpose. Even the duration of wars is divinely dictated: in accordance with His justice and mercy, God choose either to afflict or console mankind, so that some wars come to an end more speedily, others more slowly.[29]

Augustine, in terms of war as a means to reward the righteous and to punish the wicked, affirmed that; God's entire act, including wars, is manifestations of His love for His human creatures. Accordingly, it follows for Augustine that all men and particularly righteous men stand to benefit from war. God, in His providence, constantly uses war to correct and chasten human wrongdoing, but also to train people in a more righteous and laudable way of life[30]. Some of the righteous either chastened or trained are permitted to escape death so that they can be of further service[31] in this present state. Others are removed to a better state[32] as a reward for their labors. Hence, Augustine's comment comes as a response to those who would ask how a just God can permit war to be visited upon the righteous. Those righteous who taste of death as the result of war are removed to a better state and the righteous who are spared home at least the satisfaction of knowing that in the divine economy, they were deemed fit instruments for continued use on earth in the hands of Almighty. On the other hand, Augustine's words would suggest that the wicked who are chastened by war have no right to complain, for they received nothing more than their due.

At this juncture, we are going to see the philosophical understanding on the 'Neo-Platonism' and Augustinian 'just war'. Augustine did not merely Christianized it as well; in fact, he followed Plato as far as the Christian faith allowed[33] which in terms of the application he makes of Neo-Platonism to the theory of just war, is

often times a considerable distance. One still can gain a useful perspective on Augustine's just war thinking by noting, in particular, his reasons for rejecting the Manichean view on war. Manichaeism embraced a doctrine pacifism[34] and considered war to be: A diabolical phenomenon which revived on earth the customs and the methods of the demands: the beings that from the beginning of creation had fostered persecution and slaughter. The believer was required to refrain from water, since the killing of living beings (including animals) was forbidden. In as much as the soul was nothing other than the continuation of the eternal substance of the further, whoever struck his neighbor was guilty of aggression on against God. Consequently, the profession of arms was completely prohibited[35].

From the trend of the above argument, this work could observed that the Manicheans rejected portions of the Old testament where violent actions are presented as having been divinely directed. They believed it was manifestly impossible that the all good God would command the inflicting of suffering, which they held, in all circumstances, to be evil. To this claim, Augustine responds that such a command can be rightly given by no other than the true and good God, who alone knows the suitable command in every case, and who alone is incapable of inflicting unmerited suffering on any one.[36] he addresses the specific case of Moses spoiling the Egyptian's prior to the departure of the children of Israel from Egypt:If

Moses had originated this order to spoil the Egyptians, or if the people had done it spontaneously, undoubtedly it would have been sinful; and perhaps the people did sin, not in doing what God commanded or permitted, but in some desire of their own for what they took. The permission given to this action by divine authority was in accordance with the just and good counsel of Him who uses punishments both to restrain the wicked and to educate His own people, who knows also how to give more advanced precepts to those able to bear them, while He begins on a lower scale in the treatment of the feeble. As for Moses, he can be blamed neither for covering the property, nor for disputing, in any instance, the divine authority.[37]

Augustine argues that one can receive divine authorization to perform acts which would otherwise be forbidden, and that when such an authorization is given, the acts cannot be regarded as evil. Augustine reflects the idea that acts are evil in and of themselves. Rather, acts which men generally would consider evil are, in the infinite wisdom of God, justifiable and good under some circumstances. Because God directed in the case of Moses, that a war be fought. It must be that war is not intrinsically evil; otherwise, God would not have directed it. Note that implicit in this later point is the threshold claim of just-war-theory: even if not all wars are just, it is still possible to claim that some wars are just. One might rightly argue that this passage merely supports the claim that some wars are just. One might argue that this passage merely supports the claim that wars fought at divine

direction are just, and not necessarily wars which have been adjudicated to be first through the application of some set of just war criteria. Even so, Augustine's argument is sufficient to establish his rejection not only of the fundamental Manichean metaphysics, but also of Manichean pacifism, which prescribed just war as a logical possibility. Having eliminated Manichaeism as a possible source for Augustine's just war theory, we can now turn our intention to 'Neo-Platonism'.

'Neo-Platonism' not only always colored Augustine's teaching, but also actually made it possible for him to accept Christianity.[38]

Plotinus appears to be the principle source for Augustine understands of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus is to Augustine a second plato[39] and if we are to believe Augustine himself, there can be no doubt that he used Plotinus because he says and seems always to have thought, that he owned, among other things, his whole theory of knowledge to him.[40]

This work will expose the moral - scenario of war, that is, "the evil of war to its viewers. Augustine holds that the one Omni- beneficent God, in whom, all good and only good dwells, created all things ex nihilo. His creative act and the creatures which resulted from it are good by virtue of the fact that they exist; for He who imparted existence to them is altogether good. Hence, the more some created things partake of the being, the unity, the perfection of God, the more it can

be said to be ‘good’. However, in Augustinian terms, it is not the case that the greater the separation of something from God, either in terms of being, or unity, or any of the divine perfections, the more it can be said to be ‘evil’. According to Augustine, evil consists not merely in a distinction or separation from God, but in an unwarranted distinction or separation from God- a privation of good.[41] hence, good could exist without evil, but evil could not exist without a good of which it is the privation. When, then does evil fit into the hierarchy of reality? It does not. It is not an entity on the hierarchy at all; rather; it is an arrangement of things on that hierarchy otherwise than they ought to be arranged.[42] it is a manifestation of misplaced human priorities. It is ‘to love what should be loved, to love unequally what should be loved equally, to love equally what should be loved unequally.[43] as this applies to war, Augustine says; What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the loss of power, and such like; and it is generally to punish these things, when force is required to inflict the punishment, that, in obedience to God or some lawful authority, good men undertake wars, when they find themselves in such a positionas regards the conduct of human affairs, that right conduct of human affairs, that right conduct requires them to act or to make others act in this ways.[44]

According to Augustine, moral qualities like justice or injustice, righteousness or weakness, supervene upon the faultless natural state that gives them expression. Augustine includes in his concept of 'evil' all that is contrary to nature, and it is in this opposite that evil acquires its ability to harm'.[46] indeed, it may be said that evil choices such as, are reflected in unjust motives or action, make a wrong use of good natures.[47]invariably, then wars fought as the result of evil choices, as evidence by their injustice, will be regardless of the relative position in the hierarchy of those engaged in fighting the wars, further removed from God, from his approbation of them, and from goodness than will those wars which are just.

That some wars can appropriately be called just is evident to Augustine on Neo-Platonism ground. Consider the following: As documented in the Old Testament, God on occasion, gave being to war by commanding wars to be fought; Anything which exists is, to extent which it exists, a partake of the being imparted to it by God; To the extent that something exists, it must be good[48]; so, we can argue, in Augustine's fashion, that if war exists, war must, in some sense, be good. All war contain some evil components; However, if war was entirely evil, it would not exist at all; Hence, war also must contain some good components; But if war is even partly good, that part which is good should attract the attention of the Just person and that good part is the just war.

The above just war scenario points at St. Augustine's idea of the general 'just war tradition' of which every state must respect. But the clear message of Augustine is that peace can never be obtained without order. Order is the fundamental condition without which peace is only provisional and apparent.[49] The 'Neo-Platonism' concept of order imposes upon Augustine the necessity to view war as a phenomenon which, when unjustly pursued, tends to promote cosmic disorder, and when justly pursued, tends to promote the order lines of the universe. This is the fundamental neo-platonic principle which provides the basic distinction between just and unjust wars in Augustinian thought.

In this regard, the state can be viewed as an ordering mechanism, one which enforces order. If so, then, it is the prerogatives of the state to use the methods at its disposal-including war-to establish order. Justice is the mechanism by which the universe is ordered, [50] it is also the tool employed by well-ordered states to ensure both domestic and international order.

On the concluding part of Augustine's review, this work critically affirms that the one of the most fascinating aspects of the Augustinian complex of doctrines is the fact that, it is just that a complex. Grant just a few of Augustine's premises, and all the rest follows, enveloped in a theological-metaphysical-eschatological wrapping that renders it impervious to countervailing evidence and argument.[51] Considering that Augustine himself does not present his views on 'just war' as a unified theory,

the systematic presentation attempted in this study reveals an amazing degree of consistency among the various aspects of his 'just-war' discourse even among those passages written decades apart. Nevertheless, this reconstruction of his theory still suggests several points of internal inconsistency, which have legitimate claim on our attention. These inconsistencies appear in the form of two kinds of problems: those which are characteristic of Augustinism in general but which additionally bear upon his 'just war theory', and those which pertain more or less exclusively to his theory of 'just war'. An examination of the former is valuable in that it identifies problems which occur at the axiomatic level of Augustinian discourse and, hence, serve to illuminate the nature of the most fundamental challenges that Augustine confronts in his role as the first Christian philosopher. An examination of the latter is valuable in that highlights a certain fluidity which Augustine allows himself in the treatment of what the just war tradition subsequently labeled as 'ius ad bellum' and 'ius in bello' issues. At times, Augustine seems to distinguish carefully between the two and at other times he seems to conflate them. This would not be so critical a problem were it not for the fact that much of Augustine's 'Just-war' argumentation rests on the assumption that the respective roles of the state and of the individual are separate and distinct as pertaining to what constitutes a morally acceptable application of violence.

However, this work on the issues "free will and predestination" will go on to examine Augustine. The problem of free will is one whose implications affect the whole of Augustinianism. As such, it likewise has implications for his 'just-war theory'. Whether Augustine succeeds at solving the problem is a matter for debate. Augustine states: God willeth not that thou shouldest sin; for He forbideth it: yet if thou has sinned, imagine not that the man hath done that which He willed not. For as He would that man would not sin, so would He spare the sinner that he may return and live; him so willeth finally to punish him who persisteth in his sin, that the rebellious cannot escape the power of Justice? Thus, whatever choices thou hast made, the Almighty will not be at a loss to fulfill His will concerning thee.[52]

This perplexing passage reveals the challenging Augustinian position that, while God never wills for one to sin, nothing happens that is contrary to God's will; so if one does sin, it cannot be that the act or omission involved occurred contrary to God's will. On the face of it, this appears to embody an outright contradiction which leaves open the question of freedom of the will of course, the problem is not lost on Augustine, who devotes considerable energy to its resolution.[53] Nevertheless, passages such as the foregoing precipitate some significant problems for the theory of 'just war': (I) If God orders all things and everything that God orders is just, how could an unjust war ever occur? (2) If God ordains an unjust war, what makes an unjust war? (3) If God merely permits an unjust to occur

without explicitly ordaining it, what does its occurrence imply about the Augustinian premise that nothing happens without God's having ordained it? (4) If unjust wars do not occur at all, what philosophical sense does it make to distinguish between 'just and unjust wars'?

Augustine's solution seems to be hold that injustice merely implies disorder but not necessarily evil. Hence, to say that God permits disorder is not the same thing as to say that God orders evil. Such a solution may be fine for the case of God's ordering disorder, but in the case of His permitting disorder, unless man is capable of acting contrary to God's will one is left to wonder, on the basis of Augustinian premises, what power or influence other than God permits disorder but never ordains it, then, in the Augustinian scheme, action in the universe apart from that willed by God is possible, as evidenced by the fact that disordered exists.

Augustine's likely response to all of this is that God's ways are ultimately inscrutable to man. While that response is probably adequate in the theological terms, it also signals, for better or for worse, the possibility that a strictly rational account (that is, devoid of theological considerations) of either free will or just war is difficult if not impossible for Augustinism to produce. At this moment this work is done with Augustine's idea on war.

Thomas Aquinas' own treatment of the 'Just War Theory' was also primarily Augustinian. He did not innovate anything new, but produced an easily memorable formula for the assessment of whether a war was just: For some wars to be just, three things are required. Firstly, the authority of the ruler at whose command the war is to be waged… secondly, there is required a just cause; that is, that those who are attacked for some offence should merit the attack…. Thirdly, there is required, on the part of the belligerents, a right intention, by which it is intended that good may be accomplished or evil avoided.[54]

The implication of the above statement is that a 'Just war' was to be waged by public authority, that is, by rulers who had responsibility for the affairs of the state; no private wars were licit. According to Aquinas, there was no place for war where recourse could be had to a superior authority for resolution of disputes. Just causes included defense and the Augustinian motion of avenging injuries done. (Aquinas also noted on the kingship) that 'the king is responsible for ensuring that the multitude subject to him remains safe against its enemies). Right intention was also defined by reference to Augustine: the aim of war was peace and a war that was culled by legitimate authority and for a just cause could be made illicit by vices such as cruelty and the desire for domination.

Aquinas 'just war theory' articulated a common good argument, with the Augustinian element of the punishment of sin added. A 'Just war' was the means

of procuring the common good of preserving the state in the area where law could not be enforced- that is, in its external relations with other rulers and states.

The next veritable figure this work is going to re-view is Von Carl Clausewitz. This work is going to expose Clausewitz's main contributions to philosophy. He was a Prussian military theorecian. According to Clausewitz, theory exists and operates, where ever a set of general rules or maxims manifestly and judgment or decision, even if it lacks that logical sufficiency for the solution of problems which all pure scene aspires to[55]. This brings us to two of Clausewitz's most impressive philosophical achievements,' his accounts of the logical character or status of the principles of war, and of the stance or style of thought which the realities of war demand of commanders at any level. On both these issues what he has to say has important implications for human life for beyond the military field.

For Clausewitz, it would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to business competition, which is also a conflict of human interest and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again may be looked upon as a kind of business competition on a ground scale. The essential difference consists in this, that war is not an activity of the will exerted upon inanimate matter like the mechanical arts, or upon a living but passive and yielding subject like the human mind and the human feelings as in the case of the fine arts but against a living and re-acting force.[56]

Clausewitz rejects all attempts to assimilate war either to the mechanical arts, example. Engineering, which are based on objective laws that have been found to hold for all physical systems, or to the fine art for which, in his opinion, no firm principles can ever be established, despite general agreement about master pieces they produce. As against these views, he insists that war belongs to the province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests, which is settled by bloodshed, only in that is it different from others. In other words, the conflicting interests, aims, means and moves in which war consists continually affect each other reciprocally, and most importantly through the continual attempts of either side to conceal its intentions, to deceive surprise and out-maneuver its opponent, and at the crucial point to out match him in strength. And taking these facts in conjunction with the inevitable shortages and imperfection of true information in war, Clausewitz concludes- against certain theorists of outrage that the ideal of a logically complete or sufficient 'answer' to any problem in warfare is a shear delusion. But this does not mean that there can be no theory, and no theory based rules, of warfare.

Clausewitz affirms that militancy principle have to be simple in the sense of suggesting the advisability or inadvisability of certain possible moves for certain quite familiar reasons; for nothing that is inherently complex, nothing that is conditional upon the co-operation of a wide variety of factors is ever worth attempting in war what Clausewitz had in mind is that military principle have to be

highly adaptable, so that they can assist the commander to take account of any number of changes and developments which may turn out to be significant. This explains why the logical character, and in particular the relationship, of the principle of war are at first sight so curiously loose. Another important fact follows from the need of adaptability: a commander must carry his principles live in his mind, for their method of application on a given occasion may be such as could not possibly have been foreseen. This work shall take us into the full scenario of Clausewitz initial and his final definitions of war:

1. War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.
2. In its "element or essence" war is nothing but an extended duel, example, between two wrestlers, in which each tries to throw his adversary and thus render him incapable of further resistance.
3. As the use of physical violence by no means excludes the use of intelligence, it comes about that whoever uses force unsparingly, finds that he has the advantage over him who uses it with less vigor.
4. Hence, as much side in war tries to dominate the other, there arises a reciprocal action which must escalate to an extreme, and for this reasoning.
5. The discerning or destruction of the enemy or the threat of this… must always be the aim in warfare. This Clausewitz introduced this idea of absolute time. Moving on to the second group statement we have.

6. War is a political act. Also an effective political instrument, a continuation of political commerce and a carrying of by other means.
7. Under no circumstances is war to be considered as an independent thing … policy is interwoven with the action of war and must exercise a continuous influence upon it.
8. War must differ in character according to the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.
9. The first greatest and most decisive act of the statement or general is to understand the kind of war in which he is engaging, and not to take it for something else, or to wish it was something else which in the nature of the case, it cannot possibly be.
10. War is a wonderful enmity, composed of the original violence of its elements of the play of probabilities and chance which make it a free activity of the soul and of its subordinate nature as a political instrument in which respect it belongs to the province of reason… Thus Clausewitz, introducing his idea of real war or of war concerned as a political instrument.

All commentators have agreed that Clausewitz's greatest difficulty was to explain the relationship between these two ideas of war (Real war or war as political instrument and almost all commentators have assumed that his logical apparatus was adequate to the task of showing whether our two groups of statement are as

contradictory, or at least as contrary, as they appear to be, or whether perhaps they are in some sense complementary, or stand in some relation of subordination one to another. On this score there is evidence of at least four different positions held at different times by Clausewitz, at different stages of the writing "on war".

The first position, which dates from his essay strategy of 1804, is that the only proper military aim being the destruction or disablement of the enemy (as in statement 3-5 above) any political considerations which would act as a brake on the must by definition hinder effective military action.[58]

The second position is more moderate. Every commander must take into account both the essential military aim-destruction and disablement of the enemy and the political aims and conditions which lie behind and indeed motivate any actual war. Somehow, Clausewitz could produce no formation to explain exactly how the commander must endeavor to reconcile these two aims wherever they conflict.

The third position is that in every such conflict primacy must be given to political considerations. Military existences may sometimes briefly obscure this truth; but war could not be understand at all- could not, in strictness, function at all – except under political direction and control[59].This meant that every political violence must bear political goal.

The fourth position carries this last line of thought much further. The conflict between military and political aims, as so far granted, is more apparent than real. Behind every war of whatever degree of intensity and destructiveness, lie political conditions and decisions which match with and explain that degree of intensity and destructiveness. Despite appearances, no war is any more or any less politically directed than other. If policy is well calculated, so will be the military moves which it requires. On the other hand, if policy is grand and powerful, so always will be the war, which army thus approaches its absolute firm.[60?]

This work will usher us into the field of absolute war according to Clausewitz. The absolute war in the theory according to Clausewitz contains five stages:

1. To fight means to try to inflect physically hurtful or disabling physical changes – most obviously blows, but also twists, fall and all manners of other incapacitations – upon an active opponent.
2. The move intensively we deliver, for instance, our blows, the less tolerable the situation becomes for our opponent, and if delivered with sufficient intensity at the right places, they will break either his power or his will to fight on. (An extreme case of the former – he is killed, of the latter – he surrenders unconditionally.
3. The prospect or fear of such a result may induce our opponent to stop fighting long before the result itself is reached; but this possibility cannot

affect the way- the only logical way in which we should conduct and for as necessary all the force that we can command.

4. Everything that has been said so far from our side holds true equally from our opponent's side; either party, if logical, must therefore fight in the manner and with the means that maximize his chance of winning completely, even if that goes beyond his actual interest and in knowledge that his opponent, if logical, will do the same.
5. This is the principle of Absolute war. How its logic can be reconciled with or subordinated to, the calculating, often compromising logic of statecraft is Clausewitz's central problem.

According to Clausewitz, there are two types of war; absolute war which could be regarded as 'knockout war" and advantage war. Absolute war is the war in which the aim is the complete 'disablement of the enemy, so that we can impose upon him whatever terms we choose. As absolute war being regarded as knockout war, blows are kept up constantly, and in the main direction with a view to disabling an enemy at his weakest point.

Advantage war is the kind of war in which the aim is to gain certain advantages (particular territorial) over the enemy which can later be used as bargaining counters at the peace table. Clausewitz remarks that transitions from one kind of war to the other will always occur, but that, nevertheless, the dominant tendencies

of war from such different ends will always be apparent. In the later which (shall from now on call advantage wars-blows are struck wherever the enemy is vulnerable, with a view to damaging and disadvantaging-and discouraging him in a general way[61]. The former way of fighting may be rarer and move costly; but its success, if achieved, are incomparably greater. The latter way of fighting on the other hand, would appear to admit of much finer adjustments and thus to be a more sensitive tool of state policy. At the beginning of a war of advantage each contestant will set his probable gains against their probable and tolerance cost. If, in the event, the latter becomes too high for him, he can cool off or call off the war, and accept his disappointing losses in preference to even more intolerable losses. Clausewitz warns commanders and governments who favor advantage wars in the belief that they are safe from the worst or costliest disasters, that this belief may deceive them.

The accepted view of Clausewitz's philosophy of war is that its core lies in his conception of war as the condition of policy by the addition of other means, or, more simply of war as a political instrument. But this view, although advocated by genuine admirers of Clausewitz is liable to mislead. It suggests that his real interest, even if it is focused in many of his chapters on specifically military questions, was of a wider kind; it was in politics, and more particularly in the relations, tensions and struggles between different political units. This suggestion

makes Clausewitz more respectable; for it is widely felt today that except when it is studied within the under horizon of politics and sociology, war is a topic as abhorrent in its content as it is weak in theoretical interest. But the simple and obvious truth is that Clausewitz ideology and he became the mouth-piece of his age. The book "on war" is emphatically about war and was primarily written for military men. War is its subject and different qualities, relations and dependences which Clausewitz attributes to war in the course of his book are connected by a single aim; to make clear what this terrible and tragic aspect of human life is about and how it operates. On war as many of its expositions have observed, offer us not an apology for what but something much more rendered necessarily by the fact that it is a difficult to hold up the idea of war, clearly and completely, before consciousness, as it is to perform the same operation with such equally central and elusive idea as peace, Justice, freedom, happiness and love. By contrast, Clausewitz remarks on politics are curiously abstract brilliant insight, which none of his expositors seems to have noticed namely that the state is the representation, or agent of a given community's general interests, towards other states. The apparent circulating of the statement in fact expresses Clausewitz's recognition of the all-important truth that to talk of the state per se is always misleading: no state would be a state if it did not exist as one of a polarity of other and rival states. And this is a thought which giving the established tradition of western political

philosophy, could hardly have occurred to a thinker who was not preoccupied, principally, with the nature of war.

But the suggestion that Clausewitz was essentially a political theorist is to be rejected on a second count. It would rob him of his uniqueness and originality. Others before him had recognized the crucial role of war in politics –Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau to mention only the greatest. But Clausewitz's main interest differed radically from theirs "on war" gave out of his discontent with certain specifically military doctrines, about how to wage and win wars, not about how to use wars in order to achieve each political ends as national security, strength, liberty or whatever. Admittedly, in his more generally discussions of the nature of war, Clausewitz calls our attention to aspects of it which are of the first importance for politics, so that "on war" is a work of considerable educative value for political practitioners and theorists alike. But to this we must add that these educative bonuses are always expressed in the most general terms: the last thing Clausewitz would have claimed to be doing in "on war" was to teach politicians their proper business, so true is this, that a common ground of criticism of Clausewitz, especially among his more sociologically minded readers, is that he take war so entirely for granted as a growing concern, that he shows no positive interest in the particular kinds of social and political situation that are reliable to give rise to or prolong or intensify it, still less does he

ask how war might be contained or limited or eventually removed from the human scene. In sum, Clausewitz can be criticized for being provided an enlightening anatomy of war of its action as a whole and of the possible movements of the separate parts but without adding anything to our understanding of its physiology the vital forces that call it out and keep it in operation.

These claims and counter-claims, criticism and rebuttals, regarding Clausewitz's main interests and intentions compel us to attempt something which it never occurred to him to provide; a general characterization of what might be called his historical vision of war. First, then, he has no political or sociological theory of the main cause or causes of war. Instead, he based all his general discussions upon the extraordinary variety in the aims, means, intensities and levels of sophistication of the wars which history records. The implication is that every war must be studied within its own particular social context, and likewise that, in so far as we must look for permanence causes, elements or principles of war, these must be kept fluid in our thoughts just as they are in the minds of all great commanders and must never be allowed to enter into dogmas. Secondarily, as regards the future of war, it simply does not occur to Clausewitz to consider the possibility of war's removal from the human scene. This need not surprise us; he shares the attitude of his pears such as philosophies and politicians' as much as military men with only

one serious exception, his philosophical master, Kant. Let us see the view of Thomas Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes with his mechanical and geometrical analysis of the body motion asserted in his "Leviathan" that the life of man in the state of nature was: "Poor, nasty, brutish, solitary, and short, fear of death and dangers of violent death, no industries, government, market and army[62]. The ideological implication of Hobbes statement is that in the state of nature, man was a wolf to follow man (homo homini lupus) and this led to an indiscriminate violence, which brought a serious reason to enter into a civil society. This is a credit to Hobbes, because the main reason for leaving state of nature into another state of civility is because of the indiscriminate war against one another. This new government forms a rule of a centralize authority that lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Though Hobbes' nature of government is authoritarian, that is, a government that never tolerated a civil disobedience let alone revolution. Why? Because the king has the absolute power which is a divine authority as affirmed by Robert Filmier in his book called 'Appodarrai'. But on the international level the state has the natural and moral right to defend its citizen from any external aggression.

John Locke disagree with Hobbes that the state of nature was a chaotic and lawless state which means state of nature was peaceful[63]. This is a discredit to Locke

because if the state of nature was peaceful, then there was no need to enter into another society since the former society was peaceful and innocent. Revolution according to Locke is allowed when the king abuses the human rights of the citizens. John Locke is regarded as the father of liberal democracy which says that "every government must reflect the will of his people".

The next philosopher this work is going to explore is Kant whose celebrated pamphlet; 'Perpetual Peace'[64] was published in Konigsberg, East Prussia, late in 1795. Historically, Prussia had taken a leading part in the war of intervention against the French revolutionary regime. But by the end of 1794 it had become clear that the French would not easily be conquered, and the Prussian government prepared to withdraw from the war, a decision which was ratified by the treaty of Bale, Signed in January 1795. This event greatly impressed and delighted Kant. The new and more hopeful political climate encouraged Him to make public his own revolutionary idea of a revised international law, which he believed to be a necessary condition of any lasting peace. But not all the results of the treaty of Bale were to Kant's liking.

Kant, like Rousseau and Vattel before him, wrote of international relations almost entirely in terms of the eighteenth-century European scene. This conformed to the age-old view of life of men and nations as an endless alteration between war and peace from which there appeared to be no possible escape. Most eighteenth-

century political theorist, however, believed that Europe, as they knew it, differed from most if not all previous state systems in two important respects. First, all European states were agreed to be the heirs of a great common civilization and equally to be likely participators in a great common future, artistic, scientific and commercial. Secondly, it was widely believed that, although wars continued to rage almost incessantly, their greatest threat to civilization, the overthrow and destruction of established political units within natural boarders was now considerably mitigated by principles of equilibrium inherent in the eighteenth century state system. This principle ensured that, whenever an ambitious European power threatened to conquer and absorb its neighbors, its actions would eventually produce an alliance of other power to resist it, since a serious threat to any one state (by ambitious, rising power) could quickly develop into a threat to all war, therefore, was not simply a necessary evil within the European system, it was also an indispensable safeguard of the survival and independence of the different European states. And as such, in spite of its destructiveness and wastefulness, it was a fact of life which men must continue to tolerate.

Both Rousseau and Vattel were dissatisfied with this over-complacent picture; in particular despite other sharp differences, both rightly distrusted its assumption of a permanent equilibrium between the main European states, maintained by the use or threat of war. Contrary to most of his contemporaries, Rousseau argued that war

between the European states was an inherently ever increasing evil; that it was the main obstacle to the progress of domestic reforms; that reason demanded its elimination and that this could be achieved without the tyranny involved in all great empires only by the formation of a strong federation of European states. However, he then tempered his conclusion by admitting that he saw no possibility of the different European states submitting to effective federal rule; so that in effect, he abandoned the international problem as insoluble[65].Vattel's position was at first sight much more positive and practical.[66] He agreed with Rousseau that war was at once inherent in the punitive war in itself being inherently 'anti-law', even when inescapable and certainly no way for rational men to try to secure their rights. He was also in something like agreement with Vattel in recognition that the task of coping with the evil of war would inevitably be a long, slow and arduous one. On the other hand, he bitterly repudiated Vattel's concession that all states have a right to go to war to secure what they take to be their interests, and his consequent claim that the best one can do about war is to moderate and limit it, without hoping vainly to eliminate it from the international scene. As against this, Kant was to maintain that recognition of the aim of 'Perpetual Peace' between nations was necessary as a first step in any assured progress towards a lawful international order and consequently that to believe in the possibility of a

progressive moderation and limitation of wars, without acceptance of that aim, was a most dangerous delusion.

The work is in a position to appreciate the entirely new indeed revolutionary conception of international law which Kant was to create from those elements in Rousseau's and Vattel's views with which he agreed, combining them in such a way, however, that the aspects of their theories with which he disagreed disappear completely from the picture. The resulting conception was far too original to be fully appreciated when Kant first gave it to the world. It is only in the last four decades that its boldness, its moderation, it's apparent practically and at the very least its permanent pertinence to international problem have become plain. Here, by way of signposts to the exposition which follows, is what seems to me to be its four most salient features.

First, Kant was not a pacifist, but rather a passionate legalizer in international relations. Secondly, despite his constant emphasis on the necessity of coercion to sustain the law within any established state, he was equally emphatic that the idea of coercion, to sustain an international order, is both logically and practically an absurdity. An international order could be initiated only when certain governments freely abjured their rights to make war on each other; and it would expand only as other governments, observing the benefits (in the way of greater economy and governments observing the benefits (in the way of greater economy and security)

which accrued from this initiative, sought membership within the band of mutual non-aggression. Thirdly, Kant believed paradoxically and some might think fanatically that in order for European State system and a grave obstacle to advance its commercial and cultural development, the best one could do with war, however, was to limit or moderate it. But this required that men and states first recognized war's true character and the results that can reasonably be expected from it. To begin from the better point: the less destructive a war, and the less vindictive the peace terms imposed by the victor, the longer and more secured the resulting peace could be expected to be; and a secure advantageous and relatively lasting is the only rational aim in any war. But Vattel insisted that, moderation in war and at peace table required that men should first discard the idea that some wars, or some party in every year, are peculiarly 'just' or that either side in any war in ever entitled to regard its action as punitive in the legal sense. On the contrary, every sovereign state having the right to make war for what it regards as its own interests, all wars and both sides in every war are equally just. Victory and defeat are purely factual matters, the results of a quite arbitrary method of settling those differences between states which defy the rational methods of bargaining and arbitration. We must, however, accept some method of settling such differences. And at a sensible peace-settlement, victor and vanquished begin by recognizing the new state of the facts, brought about by the war; and in the light of this and not of

sham judicial claims they then strike the best bargain possible, one which evidently favors the victor, but not to such an extent as to drive the vanquished to repudiate it at the first opportunity. In sum, war was for Vattel an inescapable fact and tool of political life, but one which governments should be persuaded to use with ever greater moderation, even more rarely although not in the credulous hope that it could be entirely dispensed with.

In his international theory, Kant owe less to Rousseau than he imagined, and more to Vattel than he was ready to admit. He agreed with Rousseau that war was an intolerable evil and steps ought to be taken forthwith towards ending the use of war by states for the enforcement of what they took to be their rights; and he agreed again with Rousseau that the establishment of a strong European federation, even if theoretically capable of putting an end to wars between its members was a practical impossibility. But he also came to see that Rousseau had hoped for too easy and too immediate a solution for so deep rooted a political evil as war. Kant agreed with Vattel on one important point; namely that nothing but confusion and harm resulted from regarding any war as just, an international order must be confined to the one paramount task of keeping the peace between such like-minded states as a choose to sign a non-aggression treaty. Complete non-interference in the internal affairs of every signatory state seemed to him an essential precondition of faithful adherence, by any sovereign state, to the treaty which he proposed. Kant, the first

systematic internationalist was thus also one of the most steadfast of "statists" in the history of political thought.

Fourth, Kant saw the task of creating a world-wide international order within a very long historical perspective. It would be a task subject to all manner of attacks, setbacks and disappointments. But these could be lightened by two considerations. Kant was convinced that there was no other way forward, in international relations, than the one which he presented towards the fulfillment of the cosmopolitan duty and calling. And more generally, men should always remember that as species, they are distinguished by their capacity to learn by trial and error and by a sense of their ideal goal – to live justly and in harmony with one another. Here as elsewhere, therefore, we must do what we see to be right, hoping that even our errors, failures and disappointments may be of service in the long run.

Although not a pacifist, Kant regarded war as the greatest evil besetting human society, and in one passage he goes so far as to describe war as the source of all evils and of all moral corruption.[67]But he did not see war as an evil which admits of any one complete and immediate cure. It was extreme form of the general evil. The natural egoism in human nature which had, first to be tamed by the enforcement of laws no matter how harsh and imperfectly rational and which only thereafter could be directed towards the political ideal of lawful freedom within which pure social morality were treating each as ends, never as means would be at

least partially realized. But while insisting on the inherent evil of war, Kant acknowledged that every citizen should be prepared to defend his country from foreign invasion.[68] Indeed he seems to have regarded self-defense as a natural reaction, essential in life. On the other hand, it is the voluntary decision of one government to attack another which Kant identifies and condemns as wholly unjust or wildly anti -law as war.

The strength of Kant ‘s legalist attitude, which echoes his account of the citizens allegiance to the state is for him to value a human personality or any basic human right entails community oneself to secure for that person or right, a legally protected status, so far as one’s circumstances and other commitments allow.[69] This commitment requires before anything else that men shall form political societies – states and shall obey the laws that are enforced within their own particular state by its generally recognized government.

Kant recognized that new tasks of government are always liable to arise as circumstances, needs and the level of public enlightenment change. And among such political changes, one of paramount importance seemed to him to have merged in eighteenth century European governments. This was the task of replacing their natural lawlessness by a legal relationship in which their differences would be settled by mediation and arbitration rather than by armed force. For Kant,

governments had an immediate duty to inaugurate peace.[70] Kant's legalist approach to politics was to prove a liberating force in the field of foreign relations.

On the idea of legalism and coercion, philosophers and sometimes governments have sought an escape from constant war by either of two means: by imagining or creating vast empires within which all hostilities have been beaten down or by imagining or engaging in strong federations of independent sovereign states, united only for mutual defense and for such common services as mutual defense requires. The latter alternative was of particular interest to Kant since it had recently been advertised by his Rousseau; but Kant rejected it as firmly as he rejected the suggestion of peace through empire.[71] Vast empires do not solve the problem of inter-state relations, they merely replace it by a situation of large scale tyranny within which by definition specifically inter-state conflicts do not arise.

In order to be realistic, Kant came up with a positive proposal in which states should form a confederation for a strictly limited purpose. His alternative descriptions for what he has in mind are federative association, partnership or confederation and permanent congress of states.[72] But what do Kant's confederation bind its members to do and not to do?

Here his view varies, and varies much more than he himself can have realized, in his different writings on peace. In 'Perpetual Peace' the primary aim is the ending

of all aggression between such powers as would sign his treaty of permanent mutual non-aggression.

A number of Kant's teaching whether in the form of maxims, arguments or criticisms make it abundantly clear that, for him, peace intended to be perpetual is something that must spread from a positive example of pledge non-aggression successfully sustained in the first instance by a few like-minded states. First, there is his strenuous denunciation of those early international lawyers Grotius, Puffendorf and most particularly Vattel who had sought to persuade European states to content themselves with strictly limited wars as a necessary condition of peace settlements that could be expected to endure. Kant will have none of this insidiously comforting approach to the problem of peace[73] and not as one might expect because of the great difficulty of keeping any war within proposed limits once it has begun, but because in Kant's reconstructed international law everything depends upon and also points towards the thought that war is no way in which to pursue one's right since it amounts to the irrational acceptance of the rules of the stronger and is an affront to Reason's demand that interstate relations shall be put on a legal footing. When this is the governing principle, it is clear that a peace voluntarily sought and sustained by both sides is a much better starting point than a peace which depends on the power of a defensive alliance to beat back aggressors who may well not accept the lesson of defeat. This argument is given further

support by a point which Kant makes very forcibly in part 1 of his ‘‘Metaphysics of Morals”. If an effective defensive alliance were the core of his proposal, it would be difficult to deny his confederates the rights (a) to force other powers to join them (b) to force any of their members that wanted to secede to remain within the alliance.

But Kant strongly inclined to deny the first of these rights to his confederation and he expressly denies the second; [74] since both would lead from the paradoxical attempts to enforce peace to the self-contradictory attempt to maintain or strengthen peace keeping machinery by threatening or engaging in war.

Equally impressive, from this point of view, is Kant’s account of what effective international law would require of its adherents, over and above their decision to abandon war for arbitration in the settlement of their disputes. For this makes it clear that his vision of ‘Perpetual Peace’ is not of a world kept at peace by a central confederate power, but of a world in which every state manifests its own independence in fulfilling one job of enforcement which Kant’s conception of international law requires.[75] Kant looks forward to a world in which it would be legally permissible for any citizens of any state to visit the territory of any other state with a view to do business there. Therefore, for Kant, as much as for Adam Smith and his disciples, free movement of men and goods was an essential facet of

a peaceful and civilized world but subject always to the law and the powers of enforcement of existing states.

Kant's repeated insistence that his proposed confederation would not be an international state, that it would have its members as sovereign as before, and that it expressly excludes the idea of peace enforcement (particularly with regard to would be secedes from its membership) naturally gives rise to the question; but what else, over and above their recognition of the moral unacceptability of war, will hold its members together when inevitably different rivalries and suspicions arise between them? This brings us to Kant's so called guarantee of 'perpetual 'peace which has two very surprising features. First as Kant makes clear in a number of passages, he is not offering a fool proof guarantee that his confederation will not break down and incidentally he offers no guarantee that it may not be overwhelmed at the outset by militaristic powers which detests any idea or project for perpetual peace. On the contrary, a most important part of Kant's idea is that such assurance of success for his confederation as can be offered must depend at all stages of its development, upon the persistently remembered possibility, if not the actual danger or threat, of its members lapsing back into the habit of irresponsible war. But secondary and this is something which Kant fails to bring out; his so called guarantee would have been far better described as or at least introduced as, a rebuttal of the natural objection that has confederation being aimed

at the gradual and difficult expansion of peace, is bound to collapse given then ineradicable and over powering egoism, meanness, deceitfulness and distrustfulness of human nature.

The rational human will, as Kant bitterly observed is as admirable in itself as it is impotent in practice.[76]Only as war becomes patently more destructive and more costly, will men be moved to take the first difficult steps towards a permanent peace. But Kant fully recognized that the task of bringing the different nations of mankind to make the necessary initiatives and concessions and to sustain them would be a long and arduous one, would be one of the last problems to be solved by the human race.[77] And even when it may appear to be solved ,that is, when Kant's free confederation comes to embrace all existing states and nations - there would always remain the possibility of misunderstandings and backslidings into ruthless, irresponsible, egoism and war. And yet, paradoxically, it is only the recognition of this persistent danger that can sustain Reason's demand that states' rights must be secured by legal means which necessarily excludes the use of war.

Kant writes as if all wars were struggles for local advantage between eighteenth century European states, motivated by the greed of governments rather than of peoples. It is as if Kant had never heard of mass invasions, of wars of whole peoples or cities driven to exterminate or enslave one another by economic, demographic, religious or ethnic causes. Again, he makes no mention of social

civil wars, although he does write with undisguised distaste of the wars of colonial conquest fought by European powers in the less developed parts of the world. And Kant is equally blind to the ways in which wars (by providing an excuse) for armies who have served to secure many regimes from popular revolt. Wars for Kant are always a matter of morally bad governments ordering their troops to attack and occupy the lands of their morally indifferent foes who probably have engaged in similar aggression if they had had the chance. The first weakness in Kant's treatment of our topic is undeniable. To admit it means recognizing that the problems of inaugurating and extending peaceful relations between states is a much more complicated business than a quick reading of 'Perpetual Peace' might lead one to behave.

Secondly, while allowing that wars of self-defense against aggression must be condoned until such time as his federation embraces all nations, Kant makes no distinction between wars of a moderate or limited character, such as might well result in an unacceptable and lasting peace and wars of outrage which either pass into massacre and enslavement or give rise to endless international blood feuds. In Kant's views, all wars alike stand condemned by Reason for their manifest anti-legality. Here he may well seem dogmatic and unrealistic when compared with Vattel, who argued so persuasively for limited wars, at the end of which relatively lasting settlements could be expected. It should be remembered, however, that

Kant was proposing perpetual peace, first between a few like-minded nations and only ultimately between all nations, as a new political ideal, comparable in importance to recent declarations of the Rights of man. It is in this light that his unqualified condemnation of war must be understood.

Thirdly, Kant's account of the machinery required for inaugurating and extending peace is skimpy in the extreme. From one point of view this is natural enough. All constructive political philosophy is necessarily programmatic. Philosophy does not offer practical or detailed solutions to political problems. Its job to reveal the logical lay-out, the geometry and the contours of the main areas within which political problems arise, so that we can at least agree about the kinds of solution that they may admit of. But this answer cannot wholly excuse Kant on the present issue, within which problems of principle also arise. Kant's reliance upon mediation and arbitration for the settlement of inter-state conflicts rest upon a far too easy assumption of the feasibility of legal and acceptable settlements in such cases. Are legal settlements or judgments in this area or indeed in any area likely to be respected unless they are backed by force or threat of force? For Kant, human life would have been the last man to suggest that it could ever be entirely freed from rivalries, claims and counter-claims alliances of powerful interests, party and partisan pressures and in consequence, all manner of particular misfortunes and injustices. His case, however, is against one intolerable form of misfortune and

injustice – war and more expressly against the claim that war can be regarded as a lawful method of settling disputes between stakes. In this connection, there are two things that we must bear in mind. First, international relations, in Kant's day, were at once much less developed and also much more consistently ruthless and bloody than they are today. Less ruthless and bloody forms of inter-state pressure-economic boycott, for instance the mobilization of world opinions were as yet untried; so that war and the threat of war were the main methods of advancing and defending state interests. To reject war or rather to brand it as wholly unjust or anti-law was therefore to expose the current conception of the international order as intolerable in principle. It involved new start, a new dispensation; the beginnings of a lawful relation between states in place of a war system dress up in a few legalistic trappings.

Secondly, we must remember that Kant's reliance on arbitration presupposed a general recognition of the ever-increasing cost and destructiveness of war. Kant thought if these disincentives to war in less horrific terms that we have come to do. But his presence in picking them out as necessary preconditions of 'Perpetual Peace' is all more to his credit. He believed that men would be forced to accept a new international order, but forced by nature by the natural consequences of ever-intensifying wars not by the wills and weapons of men. Kant's moralistic legalism corresponds to the first stroke of the engine of politics; his weirdly worded but

perceptive notion of nature's secret plan or how mankind's unsocial sociability can serve to stimulate its rational powers and advance its rational destiny.

Kant has, however, no clear consistent account of the specific role or roles of Reason within nature's secret plan. His thought moves between the following positions; first that practical Reason by itself is impotent in the field of politics, that is, although setting the goals of rational human endeavor, it must wait for the roundabout workings of nature's plan to realize them.[78] Secondly, that to assist in realizing nature's plan, not only are all mankind's inventive skills required but great human steadfastness and wisdom also[79] and finally that in certain special circumstances the precepts of practical Reason may act like a self-fulfilling prophesy and display an independent capacity to strengthen their usually feeble hold upon human imagination and conduit. Kant's uncertainty as between these positions reflects deeper difficulties and weaknesses at the heart of his philosophical system. But no one, except a fool or a committed metaphysician would expect a clear cut answer to a question so central to all human life and action. There are times too when we should recognize it as indispensable and times when we may rightly look to it for our salvation.

Kant and Bentham insist that improvements in international relations cannot be made or be maintained by force but must rely on the development of a civilized public opinion. And both combine this position with a strenuous emphasis upon the

necessity of force to institute a legal order within particular states. Marxism is the next ideology to be reviewed.

Marxism, a unique amalgam of philosophical, economic, sociological and political theory, inspired by a vision of humanity liberated from age-old oppression by revolutionary means into existence in the mid-1840s. They were one and all, very recent intellectual achievements certainly their influence did not become widespread until after 1815 and taken together they strongly suggested that with the collapse of the Napoleonic adventure, and an entirely new chapter in European history had begun. Despite their prodigious differences, Hegel's 'Doctrine of the State', 'The Analyses' of Malthus and Ricardo, and the 'Industrial sociology' of St. Simon and his disciples were alike in pointing mankind or at least European men back to their proper business after the twenty five years. And that business was with social problems, that is, with problems that were bound to arise within any European state, and were also likely to spread across the borders of states, irrespective of their power or political traditions. To be sure, the so called age of peace in which Marx and Engels grew up, contained foretastes of bitter, irreconcilable social divisions: new frenetic nationalisms and in some countries, class hatreds such as Europe had not known since the sixteenth century. But these dangers were beginning to be recognized as essentially social problems in the just described and more specifically as results of the social phenomenon of

industrialization. It was, therefore, not unnatural that within three decades of Napoleon's fall, Marx and Engels should have been writing that all history is the history of class struggles and that during the same period Kant's deep concern with the problem of peace between nation states should have seemed to most of his philosophical followers to have been a misplaced obsession. It was the triumph of Bismarck's militarism, and the suppression of the commune by French government troops, which convinced the founders of Marxism that war and the preparation for war between the great European powers had become a subject of the first important for the planners of the working class revolutionary movement.

Marx and his immediate followers, however, armed with their overall theory of world development and with what they believed to be their theoretically complete insight into the development and decline of capitalist society, were able to produce confidently sweeping interpretations and assessments of every major diplomatic and military move on the European chessboard. Just as they were the first to treat capitalist crises and booms as signals of social and political unrest, so they were the first to present war or threats of war now as causes or catalysts of revolutionary activity, now as skillfully continued moves by reactionary governments to forestall revolutionary unrest, now as desperate gambles between rival capitalist powers, now as tests which the revolutionary movements had to survive and now as supplying the very agency in the form of a mass citizen army through which alone

the existing order could be overthrown. And the fact that their revolutionary vision included, as one facet of its ultimate goal, the final achievement of a secure and genuine, peace within and between cooperating socialist states, naturally added an investible attraction to their apparent all knowingness, and the often remarkable shrewdness of their diagnoses and predictions. For the Marxists, as for Clausewitz before them, wars in different economic, technological and cultural epochs have meant very different things, and have produced profoundly different effects upon human history. And for this reasons Marxism does not reject war in general as inherently and or irrational: it approves of some wars, example, those fought to liberate suppressed classes and races, while disapproving of others that have an opposite purpose. Marxism finds nothing creative or positive human value in war itself; according to Marxist theory, "human values arise from pressures for social change which rest, ultimately on new possibilities of production, and it is only in so far as war helps to expedite such changes that it can be regarded as progressive agency in human affairs". In other words Marxism claims to explain war and peace are vulgarly regarded as ultimate opposites and alternatives, as calculable and gradable effects of deep-lying changes in the ways in which sometimes organize their productive power.

There are strong reasons for doubting whether this can be true of all wars: more positively and specifically there are strong reasons for maintaining that even if all

wars were caused in the way just indicated, once begun, a good many wars develop in ways that cannot be explained by reference to deep, underlying economic conflicts and possibilities of change. (As we saw, in our discussion of Clausewitz, wars are liable to change in respect of their aims, methods and intensity as they proceed; and it is by their results no matter how surprisingly or accidently achieved rather than by the causes or pretexts, that wars have left their main marks on history. But this is not the point immediately at issue. What this work wants to discuss is whether Marx and Engels in fact held anything like the general Marxist position in war as this work has just outlined it and whether they adhered to that position consistently. In trying to decide this question, the work could of course refer to countless arguments, dicta, slogans, and asides from the corpus of their writings. But the work thinks it will be both fair and sufficient to refer to three passages which have an unmistakably direct bearing up on it. The passages are from Engel's 'Anti-Duhring' and the origin of the family and from Marx's 'Grundrisse'. All three passages are concerned with the fact that in most known historical epochs and in particular in the earliest chapters of European history, the political order has been determined to all appearance less by considerations of property and production than by considerations of a military nature prevailing military needs and opportunities, military formations and command structures, together with the fruits of successful military campaigns. And

to a superficial reading, all three passages seem to be written to correct this impression and to prove that despite the appearances, military factors have in fact been in all cases functionally subordinate to more basic, ultimately productive factors in social life. Therefore, in the course of part 2 of 'Anti-Duhring' (subtitled "The Force Theory") Engels considers the social significance of war among in particular the earliest slave-based states of Ancient Greece.[80] The fundamental fact about these states, he maintains, is that in them human productive power had reached a crucial point of development, it was clear that considerable surpluses could be accumulated if only the labor force could be drastically increased. The most readily available source of such now highly valued labor was through the enslavement of conquered foes. Hence, the honored position of war in the city States of Greece; but hence equally the easily neglected truth that force in this age (and contrary to the thesis of 'Herr Eugen Duhring'), far from controlling society, was in fact pressed into the service of the social order. The argument is exactly on the lines that popular interpretation of Maxims would lead us to expect: war arises from basic social needs, and social arrangements of production, a general truth of which the later day expression has been the slogan "capitalism means war". But in the course of Marx argument, Engel's remarks surprisingly that war was as old as the simultaneous existence alongside each other several groups of communities. War helps towards Engels explanation of the economic development of the city

states, but is not itself explained by that development. Or to be more exact, we are shown how war was used to advance certain economic purposes; but this presupposes its existence as a permanent inter-societal possibility, independent of this or any other use of it.

The relevant passage from the origin of the family repeats and expands the pattern of argument which the work has just expanded. Engel is here discussing the breakdown of the gem's system of social organization, which, following the American anthropologist L.H. Morgan, he believed to be the key to 'Mankind's Pre-Political History'. Pressure of population drove tribes to merge their separate territories into the aggregate territory of the nation, that is, a social unit defined by the territory in its permanent possession. "Thereupon, war and the organization for war became a regular function of national life… the wealth of neighbors excited the greed of nations… pillage seemed easier and even more honorable than acquisition of wealth by labor. War previously waged only in the revenge for attacks or to extend territory which had become insufficient was now carried on for the sake of pure pillage and became a permanent branch of industry.[81] Here again we should notice that the initial aim of the argument is to show the subordination of war to other more basic social needs and pressures. But the work notices that not only is its independent existence, or permanent possibility of its being activated, hinted at (war) but, what is even more important, the inherent dynamism of war

and its overwhelming attractiveness for large classes of men are now freely admitted (it was now carried on for the sake of pure pillage … and became a permanent branch of industry). Now to admit the inherent dynamism of war or with Clausewitz, to recognize its inherently two-edged character is in effect to abandon hope of explaining its development and effects within limits set by other more basic and productive social interests. Once again, war appears to be as much explanans? As an explanadum? In these far-off but crucial periods of human history.

Let us see how Marx deals with a closely connected question in the now well-known passage from 'Grundrisse' referred to above. Here, he discusses the rise of the early Mediterranean city-states of antiquity in which he finds the clue to all later western forms of society. He puts forward an interesting sociological explanation of their incomparably high civil spirit and their equally unrivalled bellicosity; and he argues that it was their success in war, resulting in a constant flow of slave labor, that eventually led to their replacement by the much less attractive slave based societies of the Roman empire and serf-based economy of Europe in the feudal age.[82]Marx's presentation of this thesis appears, at first, to conform entirely to the popular Marxist thesis that war, as an agent of social direction and change is always subordinate to prevailing economic arrangements. At the dawn of Greek history, he tells us; we find over the main Mediterranean

area, tribes whose land holdings had been in the past entirely communal now coming together to form a new kind of polity.

In regard to the early city-state set up, Marx affirms that its difficulties could only arise from other communities which have either previously occupied its land or which now wish to replace it as occupants.[83] War, therefore, was not, so to speak simply chosen as a way of life that would help to maintain civic unity. It was already there, at least, potentially from the onset, in the fact that the existence of one city state means almost inevitably the existence of a number, an ever growing number of rival and probably hostile and warring states. Again when Marx writes of the early cities that 'war' is the great common task, the great common labour which is required to perpetuate the occupation of the land which is the necessary condition of their livelihood together, [84]the greatness ascribed to this task is evidence of the fact that it is forced upon the citizens, it is not simply a fortunate prop to their civic unity, it is an independent factor in the situation, successful coping with which is necessary to secure that form of life, at once individual and intensely communal which the citizens share and price together. And the point comes out in the brilliant, better than Hegelian twist with which Marx ends this part of his argument. He claims that it was the very success of the socio-economic and military set-up just described which led dialectically, to its replacement by the social order of later antiquity. The independent farmer – warriors of the early city

states possessed an incomparable and irresistible civic and military morale: their successes in battle brought wealth of kinds-tribute, slaves and vast new territories to the most successful states. But this led, first in Athens in the fifth century and more significantly in Rome from the third century BC onwards, to socio-economic revolution, the arrival of a money economy, leading ultimately to the social fragmentation of the Roman empire, with the greater part of production undertaken by slave labor, on the vast plantation like Latefundiae, with professionally enlisted arms defending and enforcing the peace and with idle municipal rabbles replacing the independent farmers who had been held together by the great common task of war.

The conclusion is that in all three passages which we have examined, Marx and Engels, while paying lip service to something very close to what the work called the general Marxist position on war, are forced in the course of their analyses of concrete historical cases, to treat war and the permanent danger of war, in a much more commonsensical and indeed a much more illuminating way. They show us war and methods of war being profoundly influenced by other more constructive and creative forms of activity, but they also show us war conditioning and supporting these in the most surprising and lasting ways. In other words, they show us war as a relatively independent variable in the ever-changing human scene. And this view seems to me to be presupposed in many other passages in which Marx

and Engels recognized the reality and indeed the positive economic significance of the main national divisions of modern Europe, and admit that such divisions are to be explained, not as the results of general economic forces, but as the results of particular wars through which the sense of nationhood has been cemented through the centuries.[85] To be sure, all intelligent Marxists knew that ruling classes will fight to hold on to their power after its economic basis has been cut from under them; but Marxism, as popularized in 'Anti-Duhring' had spread the belief that ultimate victory for the revolution was assured in advance and that capitalism was destined to collapse from causes of its own creation. Engels was by no means the only political thinker of the period to be alarmed by these developments. But this work claim that no one else in his time envisaged as he did the totality of what we have come to call "total war". Here are a few specimen passages from his later notes, letters, newspapers and articles: First, on the arms race, a note from the 1880s: peace continues only because the technique of armaments is constantly developing, consequently no one is ever prepared; all parties tremble at the thought of world war which is in fact the only possibility with its absolutely in calculable results.[86] Engels when confronted with a live historic issue was forced to recognize that war is a social force having an inherent dynamism of its own; a force which, whenever its causes, can produce effects which show no definite relation of dependence upon the main pattern of mankind's economic advance. This being so,

the existence and permanent possibility of war calls for political treatment which while evidently not independent of the economic changes upon which Marxist theory is centered, certainly cannot be derived from or prescribed as a necessary part or aspect of the core of Marxist teaching. But rather than re-argue this point of abstract doctrine, it will be more useful here to consider the specific practical proposals through Engels strive to articulate and communicate his concern with the menace of general European War. The work will evaluate the world view of Tolstoy on war.

The work observes that in some of Tolstoy anti-war polemics, he appears to subscribe namely that war at all levels is nothing but a confused and sordid mess, entirely lacking in intelligently coordinated direction of any kind. He lent particular support to this view when in 1901 he told A.M. Paul Boyer that he had learnt everything he knew about war from Stendhal's description of the battle of waterloo in chapter 3 of 'La Chartrense de Parme', adding that he himself had verified Stendhal's claim that every great battle is a meaningless and undirected chaos, during his own military service in the Crimean war.[87] It is important to distinguish what is suggestive and interesting from what is evidently exaggerated and foolish in this claim on Tolstoy's part. In the first place, we must emphasize, Stendhal's account consists entirely in recalling the experiences especially the bewilderment of one participant in a battle, a participant incidentally who had no

proper task to perform in it since he is an Italian boy, who had only just arrived on the scene, having come of his own volition to fight for his hero the Emperor and whose French is so imperfect that he lapses into Italian when questioned about his presence on the battle field.

But, however, common sense insists, we all manage, nevertheless to think of a battle or a war by means of a list of factors or facets which none of us would ever dream of denying, and which collectively keep the idea of its unity effectively if somewhat hazily before our minds. Among such factors are the following. Soldiers of any army have been recruited or press-ganged to fight for one causal country or leader. Soldiers, while trained to their particular tasks are also trained to give and to expect support, not indeed from their army as a whole, but from the units in immediate contact with them; and similarly, and over a wider field with commanders at all levels as we ascend the ladder of command; performance of one's own task involves some appreciation of the wider tasks of the regiment, brigade or division one belongs to. Let us see, first, what he tells us on the latter score. A truly scientific understanding of any large-scale military engagement, Tolstoy insists, would require a total transformation of the common sense view, in respect of terminology, interest, presupposition and expectation. Instead of regarding war as a somewhat loose form of purposive, rationally directed activity, we should have to think of it as a phase in the unplanned movements,

convergences and classes of human societies, operating in accordance with the as yet undiscovered laws of 'social dynamics'. Nations or groups of nations in interaction will never be understood, he continues until their moves are analyzed down to what he calls the 'human differential[88]and are represented as being in continuous motion by methods akin to Newtonian Calculus. Evidently what he has in mind is a version of what has since come to be known as the 'Physicalist Programme' for the explanation of human behavior. No doubt Tolstoy's acute sense of feeling and action in small groups of men in the face of horrifying danger, offers a clue to what he meant by the 'human differential' – a possible unit of socially significant changes of bodily motion and feeling. But he nowhere offers us even a sketch of how his imagined 'social dynamics' would work, of what he supposes its principal variables must be or of nature of determining relations between them. This is why one cannot but regard this part of his thought as both preventions and trivial. And it is worth noting that Tolstoy never returned and tried to develop, his idea of a Newton like explanation of human conduct in any of his letter writings. Indeed, this work could go farther and say that Tolstoy's attempts to sketch a scientific approach to the understanding of war was nothing but a very ill-chosen way of expressing a much more important truth which, although in outwardly very different forms, dominates his thought about war from war and peace to the pacifist essays of his old age.

Most wars and in particular great wars have been wholly misunderstood by even the most intelligent of those who have taken part in them. And if this is so, it must follow that questions of the use, the necessity and still more the justification of wars have never been properly posed, still less satisfactorily answered. How and to what extent does Tolstoy try to answer them in war and peace? In view of his obsessive concern with the truth or war, it is surely an astonishing fact that in all the philosophical passages of war and peace, the question of in particular the justification of war is hardly raised at all. Why this? One reason is that the strictly determinist – almost 'Physicalist' standpoint from which these philosophical passages are written make it difficult to formulate and apply strong and searching moral judgments and distinctions. When all parties are seen as pawns in a game, whose main moves and dominant forces are as yet incomprehensible, praise and blame, and condemnation are unlikely to be applied confidentially and illuminatingly. A second reason is that war has usually been condemned by moralists for combining a number of general human vices in a particular intense and horrifying way. But suppose one takes the view as Tolstoy did like Kant before him that war is at once the supreme exemplar and the main source of all human wickedness, then any condemnation of it or any explanation of its necessity, resting on more general grounds would evidently be Otiose. All that one could do would be to point to particular instances of the evil of war, and let these speak for

themselves so clearly and indeed so shockingly that no further comment or explanation is possible. And this is in effect what Tolstoy does. It is one of the greatest proofs of like artistic wisdom that he presents his condemnation of war and his account of the only conditions under which men are justified in resorting to it, not in a labored philosophical digression, but in one of the most movingly and tragically terrifying scenes in the whole of war and peace.

Moreover, Tolstoy was quite as much concerned with the political, in the sense of domestic and bureaucratic manipulations of militarism as with its more obvious expression in war. Indeed, the employment and continuous build-up of centrally controlled armed forces to preserve the existing social order in all Europe and countries but most especially in backward Russia seemed to him to have been the main cause of the ever intensifying wars of modern Europe. Again, we should notice that while war seemed to Tolstoy to be the peak of the wickedness of the modern world, masses of men of different nations being driven to slay each other to preserve the privilege of their respective oppressors; it was not the sheer act of killing that most horrified him. The act of killing was indeed for him a terrible thing but when committed by a boarder thief like Hadji Murad, the hero of his last and in some ways most wonderful story, or by a young conscript ordered to fire, it was understandable and forgivable. What could not be forgiven and excused was the progressive domination of life by the anonymous, irresistible, seemingly

irreversible-bureaucratic state machines. Tolstoy writes best about these in “the kingdom of God is within you” where he writes most simply, as in the following sentences:

The most cruel and terrible band of robbers is not so much to be dreaded as such a state organization. The authority of a robber chief is to a certain degree limited by members of his band who retain some degree of human liberty and can refuse to commit actions contrary to their conscience. But there are no limits for men who form part of a regularly organized government with an army under such discipline as prevails today. There are no crimes so revolting that men forming part of a government will not commit them at the wish of the man (Bouglanger, Pugacher or Napoleon) who may chance to stand at its head.[90]

What Tolstoy has in mind from the above statement are crimes committed at home in cities and villages, not in wars on the frontier or abroad. War is presented indeed, throughout the “Kingdom of God is within you” as only the ultimate expression, the finally degrading madness of the anonymous organized violence inherent in all state government. And it is notable that whereas the essay contains not a single live description of the degradation and injustices of war, it abounds in unforgettable descriptions of the debasing process of conscription (Tsarist style) and of the use of conscripted troops to terrorize, to flog and if necessary to fire on

defenseless peasants who have dared to protest against the depredations of their landlords.

Tolstoy, as all his readers must know, cared nothing for politics as a profession or way of life or set of party attitudes to social problems. But as a result of a strange mixture of intellectual interests and psychological compulsions, he had been pressed into living and struggling with a political problem which most of us today would recognize as crucial to the survival of our civilization. At what point, or under what specific forms does the existence of centrally controlled armed forces traditionally regarded as safeguards of every nation from attacks whether from without or within tend instead both to corrupt the national life those forces are meant to guard and also to provoke the attacks which they are intended to deter? Once he had recognized that this was his question, Tolstoy felt its implication too keenly, intimately and shamingly to weigh carefully the different answers that might be given to it. To recognize it was, for him, to answer it in the simplest, most sweeping, most utopians terms. Whatever useful functions the state as the controller of armed force and the guardian of public order may once have played in creating sizeable economic and social units, once that tasks was done, it was inevitable that the state should deteriorate into an instrument of oppression at home and plunder abroad. Tolstoy presents this conclusion as a general political truth. But it is evident that in reaching and expressing it, he had in mind his own nation,

country and society: Under capitalism, we have a state in the proper sense of the word that is special machinery for the suppression of one class by another and of the majority by the minority. And here is Tolstoy's view on state (from his article "The Kingdom of God is within you": Governments in our time, all of them, the most despotic and the liberal alike have become organization of violence employing four methods. The first and oldest is intimidation, the second is corruption, the third is hypnotization of the people, and the fourth is military enforcement. Or, more succinctly: Armies are needed by governments to keep their subjects in submission and to exploit their labour.[90]

It is important to notice that Tolstoy's individual pacifism is not motivated simply by the purist's wish to have no part in and to be unsullied by the workings of an evilly force based regime. He seems to have believed that his own protests combined with those of others whose beliefs he could not share or whose violent actions he deplored, would help to bring amend to Tsarist autocracy. He scornfully rejects the changes that he has disregarded the necessity of some method of maintaining public order, his point being that no method could be more intolerable than that which obtained in his own country.

Tolstoy's accusations of political militarism remain distressingly weak on the practical side. Political or domestic or bureaucratic militarism is presented as always and wherever in whatever social and economic conditions, an appallingly

insidious evil. It is evil not simply because it is liable to be unjustly and irresponsible applied, but because under the cloak of patriotism and defense, it tends to be applied arrogantly, hypocritically and brutally and to brutalize both those who use it and those whom it coerces. The means, the checks, the safeguards and the sacrifices needed to reserve a society that has fallen under militarist domination may well be more various, complex and indeed more violent than Tolstoy realized; but at least he deserves credit for having recognized the main moral symptoms of the disease. He does not simply pelt war and oppression with ugly epithets; he points to their roots in the very center of social life as we know it. But secondly, as we should expect, he has left us in the kingdom of God is within you, as in a number of his late essays and tales, some incomparably telling sketches, almost snapshots of political militarism in practice, sketches are more telling because they contain elements, not simply the echoes of that universal affection for humanity even at its worst, which is characteristic of the great Russian novelists.

Tolstoy affirmed that this is what war comes out of: war is only the last climax of an infection that runs through every political society, liable to poison even the strongest and healthiest, the happiest and most kindly of its members. This is the truth which every human being must learn to see behind all political appearances and learn to say to himself in the face of all political clichés. Then and only then

country could there be that peace, the promised kingdom of God, towards which the heart of every man aspires.

At this juncture this work by its conclusion gives critical remarks on the reviews of all the philosophers and scholars already examined. Kant, in terms of philosophical system rests on a notable extension, or at least reapplication of his claim that Reason is as much the source of all practical, as of all theoretical principles. Just as Reason requires that men shall form states and obey their laws since under the protection of effectively enforced laws can men live and develop together as free, rational and moral equals, so it demands that states shall desist from using their enforcement powers (their armies) to damage and destroy each other under the pretense of obtaining justice from or punishing each other. In propounding and defending the belief Kant was assured as the most 'statist' of his disciples, that the state is an indispensable prerequisite of any moral improvement of mankind, whether personal or professional, local, national or cosmopolitan. This assumption has often been regarded as characteristically German; but with Kant, as later with, for example, both Clausewitz and Hegel, it is to be attributed rather to that strand in Enlightenment thinking which maintained that all moral movement must spread from the top downward from the state and the classes which most directly supported it to the broad popular masses. Tolstoy and the Marxist, from their very different first principles repudiated this assumption entirely. For them the essential

business of the state was oppression, for which war, or so called defense of the fatherland, provided the best possible excuse in the way of men and weapons. With the Marxists, this doctrine was complicated in various ways by their class analyses of all social tensions and conflicts. With Tolstoy, who was faced by a society stratified in an extremely simple way for expressly military purposes, this account of the state takes on a corresponding simplicity? So far from the state being a necessary precondition of all moral progress, as Kant and his followers supposed, it is rather the cause of the grossest evil of the most corrupting falsity, the loathsome hypocrisy among the rulers and degrading hypnotization of the masses in all modern nations. The state is a means of mass oppression. Its main instrument is armed force; and the stock excuse for maintaining armed force – the existence of other highly armed rival states terminates in the supreme evil; the mindless murder that is war.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz contributed through his objective analyses much that has a bearing on both Kant's and Tolstoy's philosophies of peace and war. In the first place, he pointed to the immense variety of ways in which and causes for which wars have been fought and urged that the key to the character of any particular war must be sought in the political situation, aims and decisions which give rise to it. Moreover, he stressed that the weightier, the more popularly backed the relevant political aims, and decisions are the more extreme, the more audacious, bloody,

destructive and costly, the resulting war will tend to be. For this reason, it is impossible to treat war as a relatively simple exercise, subject to certain fixed rules, laws and used for relatively simple ends. It is inconceivable that war can ever be made into or ever be based upon a science. On the contrary, it is run apparently permanent aspect of political and life closely connected with the competitive life of peoples, so that every particular war must be prepared for planned and executed as an element in a highly complex social context. No doubt both Kant and Tolstoy would have admitted that this was true: but they did not recognize, or did not sufficiently emphasize how much it will affect their conclusion.

While Clausewitz pointed out in general and mostly negative terms that there could be no such thing as sheer state of war between two adversaries, the Marxists discovered an unexpectedly positive sting in the tail of this important truism. Applying their class analysis of all political interests, movements and conflicts, Engels, and following him Lenin, argued in effect as follows. All wars are fought to advance or defend the interest of the governments and governing classes of the state concerned.

Nevermind, this work will go further to give the general traditional Idea of "Just War Theory". The great Roman Philosopher, Marcus Tullius Cicero is father of the theory of "Just war" but Cicero s' version differs substantially from those of

Augustine, Aquinas, Hugo Grotius. For Cicero, war has a clear purpose which determines when to fight and how each enemy should be fought .In the case of a state with regards to external relations, the rights of war must be strictly observed .For since there are two ways of settling a dispute; first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the later of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion. In Cicero s' content of 'just war theory', he suggested three things:

(a) There must be a just cause; (b) there must be a formal declaration of the king or emperor; (c) war must be conducted justly.

Ambrose, Bishop of Milan borrowed Cicero idea of 'just war and made it part of Christian thinking. One of Ambrose's students was Augustine who developed idea of just war thinking further. One of the additional rules which he added to the above was that 'a just war' must respect conscientious objectors. What Augustine meant here is that those who say no to war either because war is horrific should not be threatened, intimidated, arrested, exiled, or killed. The reason is that everybody has freedom of speech.

According to general notion of traditional 'just war theory', "war' tradition" tells us not to engage in war unless peace cannot solve the situation. "Just war theory" has two sets of criteria; the first establishment is called "ius ad Bellum" (the right

way to declare war) and second establishment is called “Ius in Bello” (right conduct within war).

‘‘Ius ad bellum’’ is about the right way to declare a war; what justifies waging a war; what makes it right to go to war. Under “ius ad bellum”, he prescribed the right way to fight a war, such as:

a. War must be declared by a legitimate or competent authority. Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. War cannot be waged by individuals or groups but by a state.

b. War must arise from a just cause. The reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot be, therefore, solely for recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong. Innocent life must be in imminent danger and intervention must be to protect life.

c. War must be as a last resort. Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted or clear that the other side is using negotiations as delaying tactics and will not make meaning for concessions.

d. In war the violence used must be proportional to the wrong being resisted. The anticipated benefits of waging a war must outweigh loss.

e. There must be a reasoned prospect of military success. A state should check her military capacity. And military equipment of every state must be up- dated.

f. War must be fought with right intention. Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose. Correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while a material gain or maintaining economies is not.

The above conditions are the requirement when they are complete; one has legal right to go to war. Such conditions according to Coady could be called "rules of war" and these rules of war are reflected in United Nation and International Legal codes for dealing with the regulation of war.

"Ius in Bello" is crucially concerned with characterizing the sort of targets that may be legitimately attacked. And this could be regarded as the principles of discrimination (including the rule of non-combatant Immunity). The principle of discrimination is basically concerned with the legitimacy of target and targeting plans.

However, some applications of the discrimination principle concern such things as the requirement of surrender and the treatment of captured prisoners, but a major role for the principle is the support it provides for the immunity of noncombatants from direct attack.

For Coady, this is the point behind distinguishing combatants from noncombatants, or in another terminology, wrong doers from innocents. In this context when we classify people as noncombatants or innocents we do not mean that they have no evil in their hearts, or that they totally lack enthusiasm for their country's policies, nor do we mean that the combatants have such evil or enthusiasm. The classification is principally concerned with the roles individuals play in the chain of agency directing the aggression or wrong doing. And it is agency that is important not mere cause. Coady thinks of combatants as those involved in the chain of agency directing the perceived aggression or wrong doing. This involvement needs not require wearing uniforms or carrying weapons. Some civilians will be legitimate targets (and hence" combatant in my sense) if they are actively directing or promoting unjust violence. The fact that political leaders and senior public servants who are planning and controlling war are not themselves in uniform or bearing arms is no barrier to their being legitimate targets .

There is nonetheless a broad pragmatic justification for the common tendency to treat most civilians as non-combatants and most soldiers as combatants. There may well be soldiers who are pacifist conscripts determined not to shoot when the battle begins; just as there may be elderly civilian women who are dedicated political agents are taking some very active part in the war campaign.

According to Coady, “the following categories of people are candidates for the status of legitimate target, that is, those who should be arrested for causing war:

1. Those who are on any account totally innocent of knowing and freely intending harm or indeed of harming at all. They have no malice towards the other side and exhibit none. These include babies and small children as well as objectors to the war who take no part in its conduct (they may be in prison or gone underground.) Call them “perfect bystanders”.
2. Those who support the war in their heart but do little or nothing to exhibit their support. They take no serious part in the war effort, perhaps because they are too infirm or too timid or too young (older children, for example).call them ‘‘imperfect bystanders”.
3. Those who like imperfect bystanders support the war , but who go further and do such things as writing letters to the press supporting the war , march in demonstration in support of it, urge others to do their “ patriotic duty,” buy war bonds or otherwise give money to the cause . However, they do not bear arms and don’t have an executive role in the war effort (as minister for defense or a defense scientist would, nor do they work directly in war – related industry (like a munitions’ factory). Call them “cheerleaders”.

4. Those who resemble cheerleaders but who go further still and volunteer to work (or are cheerfully conscripted to work) in explicitly and significantly war related industries. They do no fighting, but they are willing parts of the chain of agency directed to prosecuting the war. Call them "willing ancillaries''.
5. Those who are coerced into playing an important (enough) role in the war effort , such as captured [enemy] soldiers forced to work in building military installations or military roads. We might call them "coerced ancillaries''.
6. Those who are coerced fighting such as conscripted solders that would not have fought had they not been subjected to conscription. Call them "coerced fighters''.
7. Those who are not coerced into fighting or into playing an important role in the prosecution of the war, but who fight or assist because they are none culpably ignorant of the justice or injustice of the war. Call them deluded fighters "and deluded ancillaries".
8. Those who freely chose to fight and understand pretty well the nature of the war. Call them "outright fighters''.

The above lists clearly present a range of very different potential target for lethal violence. As we are moving from (1) to (8], it becomes clearer that we are moving

from the clearly illegitimate at one end to the clearly legitimate at the other. Leaving aside, for now, issues of double effect," it is evident that the reasoning that licenses resort to armed violence in certain cases gives no license to attack perfect bystanders (catergory1) in the circumstances. Nor should it licenses to attacks upon imperfect bystanders, since they really do nothing substantial, to advance the evil against which the violence is (presumptively legitimately employed). Attacking them for their thoughts or feelings is indefeasible and unjustifiable. Cheerleaders are getting more to the status of legitimate targets in that they are doing something to further the national war effort, but what they do is sometimes susceptible to different interpretations (those buying war bonds may just be finding a place to park their money in unsettled times , a motive that may not be very praise worthy , but is hardly warlike in itself, and in any event it will usually be practically impossible for an adversary to pick them out for attack .They will normally be side by side with perfect and imperfect bystanders whom it is illegitimate to attack. This leaves coerced deluded and willing ancillaries, and coerced deluded outright fighters.

Willing ancillaries are directly contributing to the war effort by making weapons, building military bridges, or assessing military intelligence. They wear civilian clothing, but their willing roles are military ones. This granted, the status of coerced ancillaries turns on whether their being coerced into the role is a condition

that makes targeting them illegitimate. This question also arises in a slightly different way for the category of coerced fighters. Coercion is generally treated in law and morals as an excusing condition, it does not render agents incapable of acting otherwise, but it puts such pressure on them to act in a particular way that it may be deemed difficult or even unreasonable for them to resist the pressure. There may indeed be extremes of coercion that make the agents wrong doing almost impossible to avoid, as when instant execution or extreme torture is the penalty for disobedience. Even here, especially when the wrong doing is grave, there is still the room for agency, since the person coerced can choose to endure the penalty in conformity with the Socratic dictum that ‘’doing wrong is worse than suffering wrong”.

In other cases, the coerced may be considerable but less extreme, less excusing, so that the coerced actor retains a more substantial degree of agency even though acting under pressure. But if heavily coerced persons, such as slave laborers have only very minimal agency, then it is primarily their role plus the agency of those who control them that could make them legitimate targets. Where that role is significant enough, it seems that lethal violence may be directed at them, though with great regret. The facts of that regret make it imperative that ways of eliminating the dangerous activity without eliminating the coerced people themselves should be explored. Certainly, where possible, attacks upon those who

are doing the coercing have moral priority over attacking the coerced. Something similar applies to the categories of coerced fighters , though ,here, the fact that the fighters are directing violence against you or your compatriots or allies, or standing ready to do so , makes their agency more palpable , and usually makes their role more immediately threatening .

It will be clear that my use of the combatant and non-combatant distinction departs from those of some writers in the just war tradition and in much discussion in international law, where the distinction is equivalent to soldier and civilian or something very close to it.

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CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND MORALITY

3.1 The Nature of Political Violence and Morality

Here, we are going to see the meaning of political violence, its forms and types, its importance. Then the work will go on to expose the meaning of morality and moral theories.

3.1.1 What Is Political Violence?

Political violence is defined as hostile or aggressive acts motivated by a desire to affect change in the government. Such violence is used as a relevant "Instrument" to achieve certain goals such as discipline, attention and learning etc. In other words, political violence is armed revolution that can result in injury or loss of property.

However, a political violence is a broad term used to describe violence perpetrated by either persons or governments to achieve political goals. Many groups and individuals believe that their political systems will never respond to their demands. As a result, they believe that violence is not only justified but also necessary in order to achieve the political objective. At other times, government uses force in order to defend their country from outside invasion or other threats of force and to coerce other government or conquered territory.

For Clausewitz in his classic treatise “On War”, war is the resort by an organized group to a relatively large scale act of violence for political purposes to compel an enemy to do the group’s will.

The reference to “relatively” is to allow for small wars that are nonetheless large scale compared, for instance, to an individual or small group sniper attack on a hated political figure. There will also be grey areas created by the definition, such as bloodless wars where one side is overwhelmed war without bloodletting. Then there is the category of violence short of or as Michael Walzer calls it “force short of war”, a description that embodies the un-satisfactory softening of issue that he has already discussed. The short of war “description” meant to cover interventions such as rocket strikes and bombing raids intended to punish, rescue or deter. Harris is not interested only in extending the notion of violence, more generally, he does not want to include any reference to the manner in which harm or injury is done, other than its being done knowingly. His definition is as follows: “An act of violence occurs when injury or suffering is inflicted upon a person or persons by an agent who knows (or ought reasonably to have known”, that his actions would result in the harm in question. He adds that we are so much interested in the particular methods men use to inflict injury, suffering, or death, but in the fact they cause each other such harms.

For Hedley Bull, “It is an organized violence carried on by political units against each other”. Bull goes on to insist that violence is not war unless it is both carried out by a political unit and directed against another political unit.

In some ways, wars have changed little over the ages, 2,500 years ago, the Greek historian Thucydides observe; War is evil, is something we all know, and it would be pointless to go on cataloguing all the disadvantage involved in it. No one is force into war by ignorance, nor if he thinks he will gain by it, did he keep out of it by fear. The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risk to be incurred, and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss. (Thucydides [1954] 1972; Book iv): war always involves violence, but not all violence can be described as war. Violence is necessary, but not a sufficient requirement for a conflict to be defined as a war. Wars are fought for reasons. The Western understanding of war, following Clausewitz, sees it as instrumental, a means to an end. Wars in this perspective are not random violence; they reflect a conscious decision to engage in them for a rational political purpose. They are rationalized by those who initiate them by appeal to belief and value systems.

War is a form of social and political behavior. The political nature of war has been evolving in recent decades under the impact of globalization, which has increasingly eroded the economic, political and cultural autonomy of the state.

Contemporary warfare takes place in a local context, but it is also played out in wider fields and influenced by non-government Organizations, inter-governmental organizations, regional and global media, and users of the internet. In many ways, contemporary wars are partly fought on television, and the media, therefore, have a powerful role in providing a frame work of understanding for the viewers of the conflict. One effect of the constant coverage of international violence by the global media may be to gradually weaken the legal, moral and political constraints against the use of force by making it appear routine, and thereby, reverse the moral questioning of war that was a feature of the second half of the twentieth century. The advent of such war 'fatigue' might make recourse to war appear a normal feature of international relations.

War is an extremely paradoxical activity. Human beings have the capacity for intense violence, but are also capable of complex cooperation. In one sense, war is very clearly 'made up of acts of enmity rather than cooperation, of imposition rather than negotiation, of killing rather than due process, of destruction rather than creation", or as Robert. A. Heinlein put it: "The army is a permanent organization for the destruction of life and property". Yet in another sense, war is profoundly a social activity, an example of humanity's enormous capacity for friendly cooperation. Michael Foucault called the institution of war "the military dimension of society. This is because the conduct of war requires a society in performing

complex tasks on a large scale. Societies can fight wars because they are able to cooperate at the internal level. On the other hand, they feel themselves competed to fight other societies because they often find it difficult to cooperate at the external level. The very act of fighting outsiders may make it easier to cooperate internally. Unless a war is highly unpopular domestically, there is a sense in which a state at war is also a state at peace.

War is both highly organized and a highly organizing phenomenon. In the words of the sociologist, Charles Tilly, "War made the state, and the state made war. The machinery of the state derived historically formed the organizational demands of warfare, and modern states owe their origins and development to a large degree to the effects of earlier wars. The modern state was born during the renaissance, a time of unprecedented violence. The intensity of armed conflict during this period triggered an early revolution in military affairs, in which the size of armies, their associated fire power, and the costs of warfare all increased dramatically. The need to survive in such a competitive and violent era favored larger, more centralized political units that were able to control extensive tracts of territory, master complex military technologies, and mobilize the immense human resources required for succors in battle.

Nevertheless, war both in terms of preparation for it and its actual conducts, may be a powerful catalyst for change but technological or even political modernization

does not necessarily imply moral progress. Evolution in war, including its contemporary forms, may involve change that is morally problematic, as indeed is the case with the force of globalization more generally. War is a profound agent of historical change, but it is not the fundamental driving force of history. There are wide varieties of factors that can contribute to the outbreak of war such as nationalism, class conflict, human nature, and so on. These are the main drivers of change rather than war itself. War is not something imposed by an outside force. The willingness to go to war comes from within states and societies.

For many analyst of war, war's nature, as the use of organized violence in pursuit of political goals, always remain the same, and is unaltered even by radical changes in political forms in the motives leading to conflict, or technological advances. For Colin Gray, "if war's nature were to change it would become something else, so he, like Clausewitz, insists that all wars have the same political nature, one fundamentally based on the idea that war is a political act, the use of force for conscious political end. This work is going to expose the effects of political violence on the world.

3.1.2 The Corollaries (Effects) of Political Violence

Violence is often seen as a threat to peace and depicted as if it is totally negative. The truth, nonetheless, is that depending on how it is handled; conflict can either be constructive or destructive.

On the constructive part of violence, conflicts can be used to explore different solutions to a problem and stimulate creativity by bringing emotive and non-rational arguments into the open while deconstructing long-standing tension. The intensity of war often unleashes or accelerates numerous forces for change, transforming industry, society, and government in ways that are fundamental and permanent. By weakening or destroying traditional structures or by compelling internal reforms, war may create conditions conducive to social change and political modernization. The requirement to defeat the opponent forces may lead to advances in technologies such as transportation, food manufacture and storage, communications and so on, that have applications well beyond the military sphere. It was in this sense that for the ancient Greek thinker Heraclitus, "war was the father of all and the king of all". War could serve as a means of winning peace. There may be tension between opposing forces, this conflict is necessary for peace. It even helps them to mutually respect themselves .This type of tension is ironically a peaceful one. This type of tension no doubt will be necessary in

democracy to enable participants beware of their deeds. Heraclitus believed the world has violence in its blood, so to say, just as it also contains a principle of auto-balance, one that enables the world transform violence into good. For him strife is necessary for social and political progress. Wars have helped to elicit unity and resolve group differences.

Historically, during the period of modernity, the conduct of war compelled governments to centralize power in order to mobilize the resources necessary for victory. Bureaucracies and tax burdens increased in size to support the war effort. But the strains involved in preparing for and engaging in war can also lead to the weakening or disintegration of the states, as happened with South Vietnam in 1975 and to some extents the Soviet Union in 1991.

As destructive, on the other hand, conflicts are used mainly to inflict injuries on neutralize or subvert the aspirations of opponent. As such, it can hinder progress in the society, encourage unfriendly behaviors, and enhance win-by-all means-necessary attitudes. As Erasmus put it: “war on sudden, and at one stroke, overwhelms, extinguishes and abolishes whatever is cheerful, whatever is happy and beautiful and pours a foul torrent of disasters on the life of mortals - no sooner does the storm of war begins to lower, than what a deluge of misery and misfortune seizes, inundates, and overwhelms all things within the sphere of the action. The flocks are scattered, the harvest trampled, the husbandman butchered,

villas and villages burnt cities and states that have been ages raising to their flourishing state, subverted by the fury of one tempest, the storm of war. So much easier is the task of doing harm than of doing good or destroying than of building".

These broad effects of war have hardly decreased since Erasmus's day and we now know much more about the cultural and social psychological damage that continual warfare produces. And in addition to physical, psychological, and cultural harms, we need to take into account the moral degeneration, even madness that often seems to afflict ordinary soldiers in warfare".

Michael Walzer exposes the horror of war with this aphorist comment, but in fact it does not go nearly far enough. "War kills sure enough, but it also mains, distorts and injuries in many complex enduring ways. It transforms people both warriors and those caught up in the violence, and radically alters the normal conditions of their existence".

As Glenn Gray observes in his moving account of their experience of combat, "the warriors, it turns into a common place and creates a stupefaction of consciousness (that) is doubtless a function of the total environment of war". Let us at this moment see the forms of political violence.

3.1.3 Forms of Political Violence

1. **Terrorism**: This is pre-mediated and political motivated violence by non-state actors targeting a non-combatant in order to achieve political goal.

2. **Genocide:** This is a group of political violence resulting in the murder of many members of one ethnic group by its rival.

3. **Riots:** This is spontaneous and relatively disorganized group violence against property agents of the political system, perceived opponents in the society.

4. **Revolution:** This is a violent resistance or demonstration against the existing regime or government. Revolution brings new forms of government and economic systems. It can result in increased state power and dictatorship. The public plays the role of overthrowing the corrupt regime.

5. **Civil War:** This is an arm struggle between a state and a particular community or ethnic group in that state, example Nigeria and Biafra civil war.

6. **Coup D Etat:** This is a violent assault or offensive against existing regime. The elites play the role of overthrowing the government

7. **War:** This is an armed conflict between a state and another state which is on a larger scale (it involves armor and missiles etc.).

8 **Class Conflict:** This is a violence linked to an ethnic or irreligious cleavage.

3.1.4 Types of Political Violence

1. **Establishment violence:** This is whereby the state organizes the campaign against an ethnic group or a state sponsored terrorism (genocide, war crimes and torture) perpetrated by a state as an instrument of foreign policy.

2. **Domestic violence:** This is violence mostly against women and children. For instance sex abuse, human trafficking, rape, and recruiting under aged children into army and other child's labor.

3. **Structural violence:** This kind of violence could be referred to social injustice such as exclusion (outcast - osu, slave - ohu), and inequality precisely racism by sex, language, nationalism and religion. Poverty, intimidation, oppression, fear and all sundry types of psychological pressure still constitute the psycho-social mainstay.

4. **Psychological violence:** This is a violence committed by the colonial conquest and missionary indoctrination. The above system of colonialism and indoctrination brought about the indigenous people losing their spiritual

and cultural heritage of which brought about creation of a stupefaction of consciousness and psychological trauma. Slavery could as well contribute to above effects.

5. **Physical violence:** This is a violence generated through torture especially to the prisoners of war such as sexual assault, starvation to death and infliction of injuries.

6 **Metaphysical violence:** This is a violence that is the stuff of which all things are made.

3.2 What is Morality?

Morality is a generally accepted norm of individual conduct; a set of rules or precepts that bind the rational creatures and this process could be ascertainable through human reason. According to Nietzsche, "moralities are symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity of failure," towards which an inquirer who had not fallen under the spell of one of them would take the attitude of a psychological diagnostician. They are two ideal types of moralities; the master moralities with which the healthy instinct defends itself against incipient decadence"; and the slave moralities" with which this very decadence defines and justifies itself. The morality that is accepted under international level is master's morality.

In the intellectual tradition, the first reasonably clear conception of morality as a standard for judging systems of mores seems to have been formed by the stoics. The stoic ideal, as described by Diogenes Laertius, was: To be in accordance with Nature, that is, in accordance with the nature of man and that of the universe, doing nothing which the universal law is wont to forbid, that is, the right reason which pervades all things and is coexistence with Zeus.[2]

Cicero's doctrine that, whether or not there was a written law against rape when Tarquin was king, Tarquin's rape of Lucretia was illegal, as violating eternal law, was thoroughly stoic. His argument for it even echoes Diogenes Laertius: Before there was a written law, reason existed having sprung from the nature of things, impelling men to right action, and summoning them from wrong doing. This reason began to be law, not when it was written down, but when it originated, and it originated simultaneously with the divine mind. Hence, the true and supreme law having to do with commanding and forbidding is the right reason of Jupiter the highest.

In Stoic theory, the relation between Nature and reason is hand to disentangle, and Nature, as a principle distinct from reason because less and less important to the later Stoics, and to philosophers influenced by Stoicism. What mattered was that the "true and supreme Law" was held to be willed by the highest of the gods and enjoined by reason. These two characteristics are inseparable because the divine

law expresses the divine mind which is necessarily rational. Yet, although inseparable, they are distinct, and, from the point of view of moral philosophy, the one that is fundamental is rationality. In addition to Stoic theory, this work affirms that a divine command expresses divine Law if and only if it expresses divine reason. And if it be assumed, as it was by the Stoics, that human reason is in principle adequate for the direction of human life, it follows that, so far as it has to do with the regulation of human life, the content of the divine law can be ascertained by natural human reason, and its force appreciated without any direct reference to the gods at all. By contrast, divine commands that do not express divine law can only be known by revelation, whether from the mouth of the god himself, or through intermediaries.

The Stoics, rather than Aristotle or Plato are to be credited with forming the first reasonably clear conception of morality; not because they had a theory of divine law, but because they concerned the divine law as valid for all men in virtue of their common rationality. Had Aristotle thought of ‘ethnical virtue’ as something which all men could share, he would have essentially anticipated the Stoic conception, even though he made little of the connection between virtue and a law of reason. But he did not. Although, he acknowledged that artisans, women, children, and slaves each had their appropriate virtues, the dispositions by which each might be good of their kind, he thought of ethical virtue proper as the virtue

of a freeze citizen. The practical wisdom which determine the means in which ethical virtue consists is directed to the good of the respective cities of which a strong moral element in Aristotle's theory of ethical virtue; but he did not succeed in distinguishing moral virtue as such, the virtue of a man as a man, from political virtue, the virtue of a citizen of a good city. Aristotle did indeed distinguished between a good citizen and a good man; for good citizens of an oppressive or predatory city will be a bad man. But it did not occur to him that the good to which a man's virtue as a rational being is directed many not be that of city.[3]

Although it is less obvious in them, both Jews and Christianity also distinguish between a divine law that is binding upon all men by virtue of their rationality and special divine commandments addressed to particular individuals and groups. Stoics, Jewish, and Christians though are, therefore, substantially agreed in this; that there is a set of rules or precepts of conduct, constituting divine law, which is binding upon all rational creatures as such and which in principle can be ascertained by human reason. This universal or common code is what Jews and Christians came to refer to as "morality" or "the moral law (Lex Moralis). They also called it "the Law of nature" (Lex nature) and "natural law" (Lexnaturalis), because they believed that the moral law applies to man by virtue of his nature as a rational being, and is known to him primarily by the exercise of a natural human reason.

Aquinas described the natural law as a certain "participation in the eternal law by rational creatures" (participation legis aeternae in rationali creatura), and observed; a propos the mosaic law or Lex vetus, that "since moral precepts have to do with what pertains to good moves, which is what conforms with reason and since every judgment of human reason derives in some way from natural reason, it is necessary that all moral precepts belong to the law of nature[4]. This conception of the moral law is not sectarian. If it was held by Aquinas, it was also held by the Reformer John Calvin, who, although he made more than Aquinas did of a point on which they were agreed, that because of his "dullness and obstinacy" a man needs a written law "to declare with greater certainty what in the law of nature is too obscure", nevertheless did not question that the moral law is the law of nature[5].

The work makes it clear that the conception of morality as a law common to all rational creatures by virtue of their rationality, although endorsed by the Stoic, Jewish and Christian religious traditions are not itself religious. Judaism and Christianity have nevertheless bequeathed us a definite general conception of what the theory of morality is; it is a theory of a system of laws or precepts, binding upon rational creatures as such, the content of which is ascertainable by the human reason. Jews and Christians not only affirm the existence of such a system, they also identify it with part of the code of conduct they take to be binding on themselves by virtue of religious truth. These doctrines raise two philosophical

questions, which a theory of morality must answer. First, is there such a system of laws or precepts, or is it a Chimaera? And second, if there is such a system, is it the one with which Judaism and Christianity identify it, or some other? The first of these questions cannot be affirmatively answered independently of answering the second; for it must remain in doubt whether any system of specific precepts is binding on rational creatures as such until such a system is produced and shown to be binding, on them. However, in the great ages of religious philosophy, even those who did not question the philosophical demonstrability of the moral system contained in the mosaic Torah, nevertheless, considered that system to have been far more solidly established by divine revelation than it could ever be by philosophical reasoning. And so not only Maimonides, in "Mishneh Torah", but even Aquinas in "Summa Theological" preferred to treat the investigation of philosophical ones. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the ages of faith brought forth the idea of a pure moral philosophy but not the thing.

Morality concerned as a law binding upon all rational creatures by virtues of their rationality was identified both by Kant and Hegel with the pure unconditional self-determination of a rational will. But Hegel argued that although such self-determination accounts for "an infinite autonomy" of ethical life, it must ultimately reduce it to an "empty formalism". It provides moral duty with identity but not with content, and so cannot rise above preaching an empty duty for duty" sake[6].

If the pure self-determination of a rational will is abstract and empty, where is a specific content for ethical life to be sought? Hegel's answer was; in the moves of an actual ethical community. In such a community, he declares, "it is easy to say what man must do, what are the duties he has to fulfill in order to be virtuous; he has simply to follow the well-known and explicit rules of his own situation. Rectitude is the general character which may be demanded of him by law or custom[7] outside the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of willing conformity to the moves of an actual ethical community, morality is an empty form; a devotion to duty for duty 's sake, which lacks a rational ground by which anybody' s specific duties may be determined. As one of the common features of history," Hegel remarked," for example, in Socrates, Stoics, and others, the tendency to look deeper into oneself and to know and determined from within oneself what is right and good appears in ages when what is recognized as right and good in contemporary moves cannot satisfy the will of better men[8]. But although better men may divine that something is wrong with contemporary mores, Hegel contended that they can provide no specific alternative that is rationally grounded. Their withdrawal into an inner life is, therefore, an "evaporation" of actual life into abstract "subjectivity into virtuousness without grounded virtues[9].

The moral point of view … is defective because it is purely abstract": that is the core of Hegel's case against morality[10]. It is 'sittlichkeit' evaporated into

subjectivity; and although, as a stage in philosophical inquiry, "it is right enough to evaporate right and duty into subjectivity, it is wrong if this abstract groundwork is not condensed out again[11]. It follows that the proper subject of philosophical ethics is not morality but 'Sittlichkeit'; and that a well-constructed ethical system will not be a theory of morality, but a theory of what fills the empty form of morality with content. However, they differ from him and from one another, philosophers who have accepted Hegel's doctrine of the emptiness of the moral point of view have, like him, inevitably become critics of morality. They are not immoralist; that is, they do not acknowledge any precepts of morality and flout them. Rather, they assert that the priori principles of morality, being abstract, cannot generate any specific precepts at all.

Hegel's observation on morality contains much that is true. A moral life cannot solely be conscious following of explicit moral precepts. Since good morals, are characteristically displayed in emergencies, which deny opportunity for reflection, they must in some measures consists in what Michael Oakeshott has called "a habit of an affection and conduct"[12]. Oakeshott's analogy of language is useful here. The grammar of a language is ascertained from the usage of those who speak and unite that language well. Its authority is that of the speech and writing which exemplifies it. But speaking or writing well is more than doing so grammatically: being grammatical is a necessary condition of it, but not a sufficient one. And so it is

with the relation of morality to act well; nobody can act well unless he acts morally. A life, the sole object of which was to obey the moral law would be aimless and empty.

A morality largely confirmed to restrictions on how one may pursue legitimate ends, which lays down only the most general conditions on what ends may be legitimately chosen, has sometimes been thought to be incomplete, if not mutilated. The moral virtues are those without which you cannot, conformably to your rationality, pursue any goal whatever.

Neither of the two truths we have identified in Hegel's criticism of morality need be denied by traditional moralists. In religious traditions such as Judaism and Christianity, moral education, as the transmission of dispositions of conducts, is a matter of initiation; and in civilized pagan cultures, it is a matter of initiation into the life of those cultures. Morality is characteristically learned as one learns to speak one's mother tongue grammatically not by formal instruction, in times set aside for it, but by conversation and by participation in a common life. And one learns it incidentally in learning how to act well.

Nor did Kant deny that characteristically the capability of acting morally consists in dispositions of action and affection, and not of deliberation, or that such dispositions are usually found only in members of ethical communities. Kant

described his fundamental principle of morality as being purely formal, like all principles of reason. And his first formula for that principle, "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law[13], helped to create an impression that he took it to be empty. But that impression cannot be sustained in Kant's terminology "formal" principles are contrasted with material" ones, that is, with principles grounded in experiences and interest[14]. There is no implication that they are comparable with any content whatever. Moreover, he went on to maintain that his fundamental principle presuppose that action has an end prescribed by reason and not by interest or whim, to wit, rational nature itself; and that accordingly, it has a second formula, equivalent to the first, namely, "act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only[15]. It is therefore, evident that, he did not think of the formal first principle of morality as devoid of content[16].

This work in reference to "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral" affirms that Kant wrote that the purpose of his work was" nothing more than seeking out and establishing the supreme principle of morality[17]. This supreme principle he calls the categorical imperative. Although, Kant describes the imperative with three different, yet equivalent formulations, the first formulation is the one on which the work shall focus. This is "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the

same time will that it should become a universal law[19]. Essentially, this means that for an act to be moral, it must be one which everyone could perform without generating a contradiction. For example, if everyone lied all the time, then the entire concept of trust would be destroyed. No one would believe anyone, so your lie would be ineffective.

The key word in this formulation is universal. The general understanding of a universal law is that it holds for all circumstances and is independent of any particular set of circumstances. This understanding is reinforced by several pieces of Kant‘s writings, particularly his 1897 essay “On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives”, also known as “Constant’s Reply”, criticized Kant’s first formulation as it applied to lying, stating that “the moral principle that it is one’s duty to speak the truth, if it were taken singly and unconditionally would make all society impossible[19]. In this essay, Kant argued that “truth in utterances that cannot be avoided is the formal duty of a man to everyone, however, grants the disadvantage that may arise from it to him or any other[20]. And further that “to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is, therefore, a sacred unconditional commend of reason, and not be limited by any expediency[21]. Also in this essay, we find the often cited science of the murderer at the door. Kant describes a situation in which a man is determined to murder another who has taken refuge in your home. The murderer comes to your door and asks you if his intended victim is in your house.

This is where Kant is often interpreted as saying that one may not lie to the murderer, even if his lie would save someone life. Many scholars point to the instance of the categorical imperative to support the argument that Kant's moral theory is absolutist in nature.

However, in the "Metaphysics of Morals'' he again clearly holds that there ought be no expectations to the rule against lying in the chapter entitled, "Fragment of a Moral Catechism" the pupil's responds to the question of what does reason say about lying? "That I ought not to lie, no matter how great the benefits to myself and my friend might lying means and makes immorality of happiness. Here is an unconditional necessitation through a command (on publication) of reason, which must obey; and in the face of it all my inclinations must be silent[22]. In his lectures on ethics, Kant specifically accounts for white lies which he defines as a lie enforced upon us by necessity and describes as a difficult point for moral philosophers[23]. As if to reply to the question of lying to someone bent on doing harm, Kant writes; "if necessity is urged as an excuse, it might be urged to justify stealing, cheating, and killing, and the whole basis of morality goes by the board".

Based on the passages noted above, Kant has been criticized as having fallen "into the rigorism with which he is so often charged, a view that has now become the standard opinion[24]. It can be interpreted from the passages, as well as other, that Kant believed that there ought to be exception to one's maxim. It would seem that

it is from Kant's position on lying, generalized to all moral misconduct, that many interpret that there ought to be no exceptions to the first formula.

3.3 Theories of Moralities

The theories of morality are the natural law theory, consequential theory, intuitionism and ontology.

3.4 Natural law theory

Natural law holds that law and morality are connected. Law is not simply what is enacted in statues and if legislation is not moral, then it is not law and has no authority.

In order for man-made law to be valid, it must accord with the higher law. Natural law theory holds that, man-made law is a lower form of law. Before the Christian philosophers, the classical Greek philosophers considered man-made law to be inferior to the laws of nature. The laws of nature decreed that people should live in communities, the rules people created to regulate those communities were man-made and subservient to the laws of nature. According to Cicero, "True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions …. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And

there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times…"

Thomas Aquinas called such, (without moral content) a "perversion of law". Natural law theory asserts that there is an essential connection between law and morality. This view is frequently summarized by the maxim; "an unjust law is not a true law". It follows that if it is not true law we need not obey it.

Natural law theory is a legal theory that recognizes law and morality as deeply connected, if not one and the same. Morality relates to what is right and wrong and what is good and bad. Natural law theorists believe that human laws are defined by morality, and not by an authority figure, like a king or a government. Therefore, we humans are guided by our nature to figure out what the laws are and to act in conformity with those laws.

The term natural law is derived from the belief that human morality comes from nature. Everything in nature has a purpose including humans. Our purpose according to natural law theorists is to live a good and happy life. Therefore, actions that work against that purpose, that is, actions that would prevent a fellow human from living a good and happy life are considered 'unnatural or immoral".

Laws have a purpose too: to provide justice from a natural law perspective, a law that doesn't provide justice (an unjust law) is considered 'not a law at all'.

Therefore, a law that is flawed is one that no one should follow. In short, any law that is good is moral and any moral law is good. Legal positivism is a legal theory that is the opposite of the natural law theory. Legal positivists believe that a law can be deeply flawed, and yet still be considered a law.

Ethically, the concept of morality under the natural law theory is not subjective. This means that the definition of what is ‘right and what is wrong’ is the same for everyone and everywhere.

The natural law approach to solving ethical dilemmas begins with the basic belief that everyone has the right to live his life. From there, natural law theorists draw a line between an innocent life and the life of an ‘unjust aggressor’. The natural law theory recognizes the legal and moral concept of self-defense which is often used to justify ‘acts of war’.

Natural law theory is not always a simple school of thought. It should come as no surprise school of thought. It should come as no surprise that the ethics associated with natural law are equally complicated. The idea that the definition of what is “right” and what is “wrong” is the same for every person is sometimes difficult to apply to complex ethical dilemmas.

3.5 Consequential theory

Consequentialism is a moral theory that holds that the consequences of one's condition are the ultimate basis for any judgment above the rightness or wrongness of that conduct. Two examples of consequentialism are utilitarianism which is that species of consequentialism in which better consequences are held to be consequences involving more happiness. Accordingly, the principle of utilitarianism is that actions are right if and only if their consequences involve greater happiness than those of any other actions that could be done instead.

From the beginning, utilitarians have guaranteed about the nature of happiness. Bentham understood it hedonistically as a favorable balance of pleasurable feeling over un-pleasurable feeling. John Stuart Mill parted from him on this; and the ultimate tendency of Mill understands if happiness is Aristotelian that it is a favorable balance of human wellbeing over human ill being.

The effects of utilitarianism is that some portion of the evil in the world is a consequence of human wrong doing and culpable folly; of that portion, least some does not fall upon the blameless but returns to pledge its inventors. Utilitarianism pays little attention to this. The task it lays upon the benevolent is to maximize good; and it will not relieve them of that task even if it may happen largely to consist in rescuing the idle, the headstrong, and the wicked from the ill

consequences of their conduct. William has denounced utilitarianism as an attack on human integrity, because it reduces each individual to a channel between the inputs of everyone's projects, including his own and output of optimistic decision[25]. That is perhaps extreme. Nobody's integrity is attacked by requiring him to defer his own projects in order to shield some innocent from violence or fraud. But at bottom it is an unanswerable criticism of the utilitarian concept of benevolence. Genuine benevolence, or willing the wellbeing of others, is willing that they have a decent human life, and so being prepared to help them in their efforts to do so; it is not an interminable bondage to alleviating the woes brought upon themselves by those who make little or no effort to live well.

If, its theory is sound, strict adherence to traditional common morality will never, except by unforeseeable accident, have calamitous consequences, although it may now and then have tragic ones. Yet it does not follow that the general acceptance of any other system in preference to it would have better consequences; but, either way, we cannot know. That is why attempting to choose a moral system by its consequence is not only a mistake in moral theory but also futile[26].

Consequentialism is sometimes, according to this work criticized because it can be difficult, or even impossible, to know what the result of an action will be ahead of time. Indeed, no one can know the future with certainty. Also, in certain situations, consequentialism can lead to decisions that are objectionable, even though the

consequences are arguably good. For example, let suppose economists could pave that the world economy would be stronger, and that most people would be happier, healthier and wealthier, if we just ensured 2% of the population. Although the majority of people would benefit from the idea most would never agree to it. However, when judging the idea solely on its results as classic consequentialism does, than "the end justifies the means".

Still others argued that consequentialism fails to appropriately take into account the people affected by a particular action, example. A consequentialist cannot really criticize human rights abuses in a war if they ultimately results in a better state of affairs.

For utilitarians, no action is intrinsically right or wrong. No person's preferences or interests (including your own, your relatives, friends, neighbors, etc.) earning a greater weight than any other reasons. Usually we cannot make the required utilitarian calculation before acting. So, in most situations, following rules of thumb will produce the best consequences. Democratic and economic principle reflects utilitarianism.

ENDNOTES

1. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Dr. Kaufmann and Holingdale, pp.148-149.
2. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum VII, 88, Dr. Long (1970), p.104.
3. Aristotle, Politics, III Chap.4; and CF. III, 1278a40, 1288a40, 1288a40, 1288a39, IV, 1293b5, VII, 1333a11.
4. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1-11, 91-1; Cf.1-11, 100, 1.
5. John Calvin, InstitutioChristianae Religions, ed. Postrema, 1559, 11, VII (Brunswick: Schwetschke, 1864), p.267.
6. Hegel, Phil. Des Rechts, (P403-405).
7. Hegel, Phil.des, Rechts (150 (p.187).
8. *Ibid.*, 138(p.92).
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 138A (p.255).
11. *Ibid.*
12. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, p.61.
13. Kant, Grundlegung, p.52(p.421).
14. Beck Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, pp.95-96, Paton, categorical imperative, pp.61-62.
15. Kant, Grundlegung, pp. 66-67(p.429).
16. Back, Early German Philosophy, p.491, Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp.251055.

17. Hegel, Phil des Rechts, 138(p.92).

18. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p253.

19. Immanuel Kant, "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives" in works on theory of Ethics, trans: T.K. Abbot (New York: Longman, Green, and Co.LTD, 1927), p.361.

20. *Ibid.*, p362.

21. *Ibid.*, p.363.

22. Michael Walzer, P.481.

23. Immanuel Kant, Lecturers on Ethics, trans. Lous Infield (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing co., 1930), p.228.

24. Roger Sullivan, Immanuel Kant Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.174.

25. Williams, Critique, p.16.

26. The argument of the concluding paragraphs of this chapter owes much to criticism by Gertrude Ezorsky.

CHAPTER FOUR

TONY COADY'S BACKGROUND AND WRITINGS

Tony Coady was born in Australia. He is an Australian philosopher with an international reputation for research in epistemology, political and applied philosophy. A professor of philosophy at the University of Melbourne, he has served as the founding director of the center for applied philosophy and public Ethics and Head of its University of Melbourne division in 2005, he gave the Uehiro lectures on practical ethics at Oxford University.

Having seen the profile of Coady, this work will x –ray his objective for writing his treatise "Morality and political violence"

4.1 Moral attitude behind the different approaches to doctrine of double effect

Here we are going to study collateral damages and its types, dual purpose targets, innocent shield, morality of terrorism and revolution.

Collateral damage according to Coady is "a malicious damage with intent". He stated further: "but their contention, even if all I have argued about the immunity of non-combatants is accepted. This area is that often covered by the military euphemism "collateral damage"[1].

What Coady is trying to expose here is that this phrase (collateral damage) is one of those catchwords that help to sanitize the horrible reality of war and other employments of political violence. He analyzed the deep-rootedness of collateral damage by saying that non-combatants are often killed or injured in warfare even when such harms are not intended. This is sometimes accidental and sometimes incidental[2]. He carefully gave a clear differentiation between accidental, incidental and intentional damage. For him, collateral damage is accidental when the deaths or injuries are un-foreseen and the striking moral question is basically whether they should have been foreseen. Negligent and reckless acts are common in war and deserve even more censure than in peace time, though the fact is that they seldom get it. In other way, collateral damage is incidental when they are foreseen but not intended while it is intentional when the action is foreseen and intended.

The idea of collateral damage has been a contentious issue because it has puzzled many people, including philosophers, the reason being that it requires the idea that an agent can know that his primary action will have a particular consequence, and still goes ahead with the action not intending the consequence. Coady is of the opinion that the verb "knows" should be interpreted flexibly here to include the strong and reasonably grounded belief that the consequence will follow. Some philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham, and some legal systems hold that the agent must be held to intend the known consequences of his or her action even here, it is

noteworthy that Bentham acknowledges some need for a destination by talking of "oblique intention," where as those he opposes want to talk of "foreseen but un-intended consequences."

4.1.1 Accidental Damage

Coady at this moment pointed at those moral problems associated with accidental damage. Demonstrating that some effects of one's actions are "accidental" does not automatically excuse or eliminate the need to justify it[3]. The implication of the above statement is that it shows that the effect was not intended, and moreover that it was not aimed at under any description available to the agent at the time. As far as your intentional control is concerned, the effect was the product of chance. As J, L. Austin pointed out long ago; there is a distinction between "mistake" and "accident". Like all distinctions, this has blurred edges, Austin doesn't bother to give an account of it, but it is, roughly speaking, the distinction between going astray because of something wrong with one's thought processes or perceptions and getting it wrong because of some mishap in the "outside world."[4]

In reference to Austin's distinction between mistake and accident, Coady got the morale to treat mistaken damage under the same heading as genuinely accidental reasons; the agent does not know that the damaging effect will occur, at least under the relevant description. Again he affirmed that the general point behind the

morality of accidental damage is that unintended actions that accidentally or mistakenly kill people you are not entitled to kill have done great harm to those people (and a real but less harm when it is not a matter of killing but of damaging their property). This harm becomes wrong when the accident or mistake could reasonably have been avoided. Hence we have a place for the moral and legal categories of negligence, recklessness, and due care. It is incumbent upon people not to put themselves in position when accident and mistake are liable to eventuate in the death or injury of others or in damage to their property. Coady made it clear that this point can be obscured, especially in war by the otherwise perfectly legitimate concentration upon preventing intentional killing of the innocent. Murder, he said, is a dreadful thing. But we cannot congratulate ourselves on avoiding it if we are causal about man-slaughter and negligent homicide[5].

It would be too much to insist that war may proceed only where all possibilities of accident on mistake have been eliminated. Any large scale undertaking will involve unavoidable accidents and mistakes, or accidents and mistakes may be regrettable accompaniment to their successful prosecution. Even here, however, the 'just war' requirement of proportionality may be in play. If in the course of a war, it becomes clear that the weapon systems are heartily prone to accident or mistake, then the verdict may have to be that the harm done may well outweigh the

good that the war is expected to achieve. But at this point the awareness so created moves us into the category of incidental rather than accidental damage.

4.1.2 Incidental Damage

Coady made it clear that incidental killing of non-combatants has always been a problem in 'just war theory', often solved by resort to some form of the principle of double effect. This allows for the harming of non-combatants in some circumstances as a foreseen but unintended side effect of an otherwise legitimate act of war. The circumstances" include the proportionality of the side effect to the intended outcome. Not everybody agrees with the principle, but the conduct of war in contemporary circumstances is morally impossible unless warriors are allowed knowingly to put non-combatants at risk in certain circumstances. Some modification to the immunity principle to allow in direct harming seems to be in line with commonsense morality in other area of life and to be necessitated by the circumstances of war. If it is not available, said Coady, then pacifism, as Robert Holmes has argued, seems the only moral option, at least for anyone un-committed to some strong version of direct utilitarianism (or consequentialism)[6].

On the concluding part of this incidental damage, Coady made it clear that it is important to distinguish different types of foresight. Sometimes, the agent can see that there is some chance of non-combatants being killed. Sometimes, he or she has

reason to believe that their deaths are probable or highly probable, sometimes that they are practically certain. These varying degrees of epistemic judgment raise the moral stakes considerably, since they changed the issue from being one of entitlement to put the innocent at risk to one of confidently envisaging their death.

At this point, let us see the intricacies of "Double Effect" in Coady's philosophy. It is worth stressing in this connection (and in others) that the doctrine of double effect (DDE) does not hold that incidental damage is acceptable merely because it is incidental to intent. The usual conditions are:

1. The action at issue must not itself be morally bad, nor should any intended effect of it be morally bad;

2. The anticipated bad effect must be genuinely un-intended and not merely secondarily intended (e.g. intended as a mean to a further end);

3. The harm involved in the unintended outcome must not be disproportionate to the moral benefit aimed at in the act.[7]

In reference to the above conditions, what Coady meant is that the first simply specifies that the moral utility of the doctrine of double effect arises only when what is intended by the agent (the outcome that has the un-intended but foreseen bad consequence) is a benefit that is either morally neutral or morally good. The second condition is aimed at precluding what Elizabeth Anscombe once called

"double think about double effect[8].As we saw earlier, people failed with the difficult choices about what tactics to use in their war efforts will often adopt a simple utilitarian or consequentiality stance; there is a strong temptation to stretch the do fewer or less grave such effects, the agent should choose them. And this holds even where the alternatives involve somewhat higher costs to the agent. I call this a precondition because the spirit of the doctrine of double effect remains restrictive, even where it has a permissive form.[9] In the case of war or political violence more generally the protection of the innocent remains a primary value of the "jus in bello" and hence dictates that incidental injury or killing of the innocent is to be entirely avoided where possible. Of course, the "where possible" needs un-packing in the particular setting; it will include such things as the degree of risk to one's troops and to one's prospects of success, but a serious commitment to the protection of innocent people requires giving their safety a high priority.

The pre- condition is very important because it reinstates the value of avoiding the death of innocent people, a value that can be obscured by the doctrine of double effect. It can be obscured because, if the legitimate goal can be too lightly discounted by the idea of proportionality.

4.1.3 Dual-Purpose Targets

For Coady, there are other ways in which the idea of "Collateral damage" can be abused in either its accidental or incidental forms; one is by loudly proclaiming a commitment to non-combatant immunity as a way of disguising once contempt or marginal respect, for it in practice. Another is the expansion of the permissible scope of the category of collateral damage by expansion of the scope legitimate military targets.

However, the doctrine of double effect requires that we think in common sense ways about what people intend and foresee. This means that there are various disentanglements of the part of an action that we cannot really allow. It is, however, worth repeating that unless the doctrine of "double effect", or some other principle that serves a similar purpose, is allowed, then the possibility of waging a modern war that respects the immunity of non-combatants is vastly reduce. This is because there will be many situations in which non-combatant's deaths and injuries can be foreseen with certainty or probability as a result of attacking important military objectives and without something that acknowledges a moral difference between intended outcomes and unintended but foreseen outcomes, these attacks will be ruled out by the immunity of non-combatants. Whether acknowledgement of this and abandonment of the doctrine of double effect (or some similar

principle) would lead to less restrained warfare or to pacifism depends on many other factors, but, should think that the former is more likely[10].

On the other aspects of the doctrine of double effect, Coady stressed on a precondition for the application of the doctrine of double effect. This precondition is that where there are other feasible ways of achieving the good end that do not involve the harmful side effects or involve another is the expansion of the permissible scope of the category of collateral damage by expansion of the scope of legitimate military targets.

According to Coady, "enemy soldiers often use the same water supply as civilians, but this will hardly license the destruction of water supplies and the deaths from thirst and disease that will ensue[11].

The point Coady is making here is that sometimes the enemy soldiers disguised their aim instead of attacking a military facility, they seize or hijack the natural means of livelihood of the civilians, the aim being to reduce the strong resistance of the civilian state authority. A clear instance is the destruction of a central telephone exchange, which in the modern age, a massive blow to civilian well-being, given all the service in a contemporary city that depend upon modern communications. There may indeed be many cases in which an institution or facility principally serving noncombatant purposes may also serve some subsidiary

military purpose. Other examples would be bridges, electricity grids and other power supplies, dams, communications facilities, and many features of daily civic life that we might call "infrastructural." Another point from the above statement is that a particular problem with the current vogue for dual-purpose targets is the idea that it is sufficient to determine that some proposed target has some value for the enemy is military purpose in order to legitimize an attack upon it. This is defective in ignoring the proportionality requirement by focusing wholly on the military advantage, no matter how minor, and disregarding the harm to non-combatants, no matter how great. Even international law is currently too permissive in this respect, since it rules dual purpose targets only where the objects proposed for destruction cause incidental damage (in my sense) that may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.

Coady echoed that the soldiers make use of doctrine of dual-purpose targets as a pivotal instrument to demoralize the enemy populations so that their pain or suffering will weaken the leadership's will to continue resistance. He went further, "when the bombing of bridges, water supplies, electricity generators, and even media quarters is openly justified in terms of their military significance, and when this is done in the broad context of inducing "shock and awe" or of crushing the enemy's will to resist, then dual purpose nature of the targets will often reflect a

dual-intention strategy in the attackers. The fact that one intention is licit does not sanctify the other illegitimate purpose. There is indeed a double effect, but both effects are, intended and desired. Indeed, in many cases it is hard to resist the conclusion that the military justification for the targeting is spurious and incidental. The primary purpose is to harm civilians.[12]

Never mind, there are other harms, damages, and sufferings according to Coady that can be inflicted that do not result in immediate death. The dual purpose strategy tends to involve viewing the infrastructural features of an enemy population as connected with short term military gain and short term civilian discomfort, but the moral gaze needs to be broader than that because, especially in modern societies, the infrastructures are increasingly crucial to well-being, survival and sometimes even to life itself. Something like this point can be extended to the problems raised by directing incidental damage to the natural and human environment of the enemy's country. Forests, rivers, architectural and artistic creations and the like can be viewed both as valuable in themselves and as part of the significant life of the enemy's civilian population, or indeed as part of the broader human heritage (hence the outrage at the Taliban's destruction of ancient statues of another faith).

With a clear mention of human heritage by Coady, this work is affirming that the protection of such cultural and environmental values from the ravages of war has

been recognized in various international legal instruments such as the 1954 Hague convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, later incorporated into the humanitarian laws of the Geneva conventions. Of course, such destruction is often more direct than collateral. Robert Bevan added his own that "there is a said history of international destruction of enemy's cultural and environmental values dating back to ancient times. From the razing of Carthage by the Romans to the destruction of mosques and churches during Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, the deliberate attempts to obliterate the memories and cultural identities of enemy peoples has been a persistent features of war[13]. This work suggests that disallowing international targeting of civilians is an important step forward. Producing a frame of mind that will limit collateral damage is a good next step.

4.1.4 Innocent Shield

The issue of the innocent shield is an old one in war fighting and indeed in other contexts and it raises another set of acute and complex questions about incident and direct killing of non-combatant. Just as criminals use innocent people as hostage or shields in attempting to escape capture, so soldiers have always been tempted to resort to the same device[14]. The implication of the above statement is that Coady was convinced that both criminals and soldiers use innocent shields, but they are wrong, though in desperate situations of self-defense their behavior is at

least understandable. But Thomas Hobbes would presumably have regarded it as justified in extremis as an act of self-preservation, but this seemed to be a point at which his exaltation of the primacy of self-preservation loses its moral, as opposed to psychological plausibility. What is philosophically interesting about the case, and about others we will consider, is that those who use innocent shield are relying upon the moral prohibition against killing the innocent. The innocent shield problems represent the inescapable aspect of moral prohibitions: namely, the way in which the unscrupulous can exploit the adherence of the scrupulous to moral stands. This aspect is particularly alarming in war where the stakes are so high, but it is present in other moral contexts.

The argument Coady poses is that there remains the question whether one is justified in killing an innocent shield? [15]. The shield according to him is like the coerced ancillary discussed in political violence being involved unwillingly in the aggressors' acts, but usually dissimilar in lacking any form of agency no matter how tenuous. What agency the shield might have would be geared towards frustrating, rather than advancing the cause of the aggressor. There is no far parallel to this in the case of coerced fighters or ancillaries, except for those rare cases where they try to sabotage the war effort in which they are engaged. So the innocent shield is even more problematic a target. Clearly, ones hope is to kill or

disable the aggressor without harming the innocent shield, and every effort should be towards that direction. Then Coady asks, but what if this is impossible?

One consideration that is important is the probable eventual fate of the shield at the enemy's hand. Sometimes we will have no way of knowing this, but occasionally we will have good reason to believe that the shield is doomed whatever we do. Absent such knowledge (or reasonable belief) about the fate of the shield, it seems wrong to kill the shield to get at the enemy. This judgment may be readily defensible that the cases, but what if you can be certain that the enemy being shielded will kill a number of innocent people? Perhaps you know that the enemy is grabbing the shield precisely so that he can attack other innocent people. Obviously, you should do everything possible to kill or disable the enemy without harming the shield, and you are entitled to risk injury to the shield when aiming at some exposed part of the enemy but there may be little time or scope for such option.

This is an agonizing situation, and it raises several important, though rather opaque, moral considerations that seem to blunt the force of the prohibition on killing the innocent. One is that you may know that the shield would prefer to be killed rather than being used as an instrument of destruction against the innocent. Indeed, the shield may call upon you to shoot regardless of his or her fate. Another is that there is an argument to say that the responsibility for the shields

predicament is the enemy' s and that if you kill the shield to prevent the enemy is evil purpose, the shield's innocent blood should be laid at the enemy's door. As for the first point according to Coady, the consent of the shield seems to me to make a significant difference, since it brings the case closer to such categories as assisted suicide, or more accurately in this case, assisted self-sacrifice. The shield would sacrifice his or her life to frustrate the enemy's purposes if that were possible, but outside assistance is required. Some (those who are totally opposed to euthanasia in any form, for instance) would say that consent can never make a difference to the permissibility of killing the innocent; others might allow that individuals themselves can make the sacrifice but that no one can presume to assist intuitions are likely to vary on this, but my own view (Coady) is that such consent makes an important difference. As for the second point about responsibility, this is more difficult. We do not want to open the gates to absolving agents of responsibility for morally dubious actions simply on the grounds that others have created the situation in which the action seems necessary. Japanese warmongers were responsible for the Asia/ pacific part of World War II, but this doesn't mean that it would be right to shift the responsibility for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki solely onto them. Nonetheless, the innocent shield cases do seem to belong to a category in which responsibility for the outcome must lie heavily with those who force a choice between bad out-comes onto others.

4.2 The Morality of Terrorism

Terrorism intrigues and disturbs policy makers, the media, and the public even more in the infancy of the new millennium than it did in the last quarter of the twenty century. For Coady, terror is a form of violence, and violence is primarily a means. It must of course be conceded that just as there are those who treat the violence of warfare generally as almost an end in itself, so there are those who do the same with terrorism [16]. Similarly, with some terrorist's operations it may be that the terror itself has assumed something like the status of an end, so that terrorism has become a sort of ideology like the status of ideology, the wreaking of havoc itself, a value that needs little or no justifying purpose beyond it. And again I shall acknowledge, then that there are warriors who treat war as self-justifying and terrorists who treat terror as self-justifying, but I shall ignore them as aberrational [17]. Coady argues that those who begin by treating war or terror as means inheritably finish up treating them as ends, this is an important line of moral criticism, but it contains the implicit concession that the activities can seem justifiable as means, and since this is how they are usually defended, this is how they should, in the first instance be examined. Terrorism according to Coady: "a political act, ordinarily committed by an organized group, which involves the intentional killing or other several harming of non-combatants or the threat of the

same or intentional severe damage to the property of non-combatants or the threat of the same[18].

As so defined, Coady acclaimed, terrorism stands condemned under the moral principle of discrimination enunciated as part of the 'war theory'. Note that my definition does not struggle such condemnation into the terms of the definition. If one rejects the principle of discrimination, then there is room for accepting terrorism. A further point about the terms of the definition concerns the reading that should be given to the intention specified in it. Terrorism must intend to harm non-combatants, but of course some terrorists do not believe that their targets are genuinely non-combatants or innocents.

Coady poses a serious argument where an attacker mistakenly believes his targets to be somehow combatants; does this mean that he or she is not a terrorist? In response to the above argument, this work is of the opinion that this argument is not the same as asking whether the attack is justified or excusable, though there are connections between the two questions. Here, as elsewhere in the discussions of intention, the nature of the mistake is important. In short, this work would hold that if the mistake is factual then the attack is not terrorism, but if it is conceptual then the attack is terrorism. If a soldier shoots an innocent civilian who has been forcibly dressed in an enemy's uniform and showed into the line of fire as a decoy, the soldier's action should not be called terrorist; but someone who shoots babies

because he regards all the enemies as collectively guilty is palpably a terrorist. In the former case, the agent's action involves an ordinary (if tragic) factual mistake, in the latter case the agent (if sincere) is conceptually confused and the confusion should not be allowed to infect our characterization of the type of action. There will of course be grey areas in the application of the factual and conceptual destination, but it provides sufficient guidance for clarifying the tactical definition on this point.

Another issue connected with intention according to Coady has to be whether attack that are not intended to kill or injure non-combatants or their property but are negligent, reckless or insufficiently concerned about damage to non-combatants should be classified as terrorist. What is true is that attacks that cause unacceptable collateral damage share something of the spirit of terrorist's attacks, but their forms and effects are very different. To capture what is similar we might refer to them as neo-terrorist.

According to Coady, there are grades of terrorism such as silent and public terrorism. For him: "The emergence of what was often called silent terrorism" in the 1990s presented the curious phenomenon of terrorists who would not claim responsibility for their deeds.[19]

When terrorists make no effort to claim their deeds, it is hard to see publicity for their cause as part of the motivation for their acts. It remains puzzling that silent terrorists avoid this sort of publicity, simply because of the opacity of motivation this seems to engender. Though Coady is not totally sure, but he went further saying that the failure of the silent terrorist to claim personal or group responsibility may be aimed at adding to the target country's nervousness by creating some uncertainty about which of their enemies is responsible with the additional bonus that retaliatory responses by the target country will be enmeshed in problems created by that uncertainty. Deniability may also help your relations with your host nation when you belong to an organization that is domiciled in a foreign country. As to publicity, you get publicity for your cause anyway, because your group will probably be one of the usual suspects". Another possibility is that silent terrorists are interested not in publicity, in demoralizing their opponent and causing the opponent to engage in counterproductive retaliation that tarnishes the opponent s image while public terrorism is the group that voice out what they have done by claiming responsibility. They take pride in it. And when violence has been orchestrated, and they know that they didn't cause that, they will say openly that they are not responsible. Such public announcement concerning the violence they caused is the patent of their pride.

It might, however, claimed, Coady that there is one general effect of terror tactics that deserves to be written into the definition, namely the intended effect of fear[20].The distinctive point of terrorism as a tactic, is that it aims to terrorize, to spread fear and so destabilizes social relations. This is as true of silent terrorism as of acknowledged terrorism. Another point is that some terrorist's attacks are aimed at creating anger rather than fear, since anger may lead to the sort of escalated response that can help to alienate neutral groups caught up in the conflict and drive them into the terrorist camp, as well as to enlist international support in the face of such escalation.

This work is going to meet a final definitional clarification concerning the phrase "for political purposes''. To this it has been objected that some, terrorism is conducted for religious or ideological rather than political purposes. Here, Coady says that the reference to the political is aimed at demarcating the scope of terrorism so that it does not encompass areas such as ordinary criminal violence, no matter how reprehensible and no matter how damaging, to innocent people. Such a distinction seems plausible as an extrapolation from ordinary talk about terrorism. But my (Coady) reference to political motivations is not meant to be so narrow as to include only secular or pragmatic outlooks. When religion with ideology employs violent means to undermine, reconstitute, or maintain political structures for the further transcendent ends of the religion or ideology, then that

counts as “political purpose.” War is a paradigm political activity, despite its ugliness, and it would be strange to say that the medieval crusaders, for example, were not involved in politics when they invaded the Holy lands. Modern counterparts of the crusades and their enemies struggle for political supremacy even when their motives involve religious or idealistic commitments to theocracy or Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, and democracy, free markets or Christian fundamentalism on the other hand.

At the final phase of morality of terrorism, Coady concludes that if a revolutionary group adopted the immoral but not un-common military policy of taking no prisoners (yielding no quarter) or even of killing their prisoner after interrogation, then although the behavior deserves moral condemnation, it does seem to require somewhat different treatment than a direct attack upon the un-involved. Notwithstanding, Coady condemned terrorism as immoral even wherever and whenever it is used or proposed.

4.2.1 The Morality of Revolution

According to Coady: “armed revolutions, violent demonstrations or attacks by citizens aimed at overthrowing of their government unjustly are unacceptable[21].

The implication of Coady’s statement is that the use of violent tactics is not allowed in the pursuit of political reform within the state. Coady went further

warning, “Those contemplating revolutionary or insurrectional violence need to be aware of the great evils that efforts at violent disruption of state order commonly unleash even when the order is repressive and unjust. Anyway, this writing is of the opinion that this is, of course, a central insight of Hobbes, the evils of rebellion may sometimes, outweigh by those inflicted by the repression, humiliation and persecution that malignant state power can inflict.

The summary point of Coady’s idea of morality of revolution is that a revolution can be justified morally but the citizens can never be morally justified in bringing violence against their rulers. And again, a moral case for revolution against a dictatorship can exist, but never against a democracy.

The romantic implication of the above statement is that the citizens according to Coady could stage a revolution against any anomaly that poses as a threat to them, but the same citizens cannot use a violent demonstration to dethrone a government.

At this moment, this work is experiencing a philosophical perplexity because we don’t know the actual context Coady is pointing at, whether a context where a leader possessing absolute power inflicts violence on his own people, or in the democratic environment. If Coady meant that the citizens could use arm struggle to remove a tyrant leader and no arm demonstration against democracy, then Coady is right. But if he meant that no arm demonstration should be made against a tyrant

leader either because such leader possesses a divine authority, then Coady is suffering from malignant schizophrenia because no society in this era of globalization can tolerate intrinsic evil, suffering or any kind of exploitation and violation of human rights from any head of state. Why this work mentioned no arm relation or violent demonstration against democracy is that democracy contains no contradiction though it has its own domestic problems, but if the values of democracy begin to corrode in terms of legitimacy, then democracy as an ideology has a way of solving that, that is, through the order of impeachment. Democracy, according to Francis Fukuyama is the "best ideology because it answers the questions of human freedom with higher degree".

ENDNOTES

1. Tony Coady, Morality and political violence (New york: Cambridge University press 2008),P. 132.
2. *Ibid.*, P. 133.
3. *Ibid.*, P. 134.
4. J.L Austin, "A Plea for Excuse [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 133.
5. Coady Ibid., p. 136.
6. Robert. L Holmes, "On War and Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989],p. 1.
7. Coady Ibid., p. 137.
8. G.E.M Anscombe, "War and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wardsworth, 1970), p. 50.
9. Coady Ibid., p. 142.
10. *Ibid.*, p., 143.
11. *Ibid.*, p.,146.
12. *Ibid.*, p., 147.
13. Robert Bevan, The Destruction of Memory: Architecture at War (London: Reaktion Books 2006), p.1.
14. Coady Ibid., p. 149.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
17. *Op cit.* p. 157.

18. C.A.J Coady, Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues ("Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 3-14.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

CHAPTER FIVE

PEACE AS A JUST MEANS OF ENDING A WAR

5.1 The Impact of Realism and Idealism on Morality of War

Both the persistence of war and extreme nature have led some to conclude that war is either beyond the reach of moral judgment or that it is outright immoral. The former direction is the path of what is called "Realism" and the later of "Pacifism". According to Coady, there are two schools of thought, 'Realist' school and 'Idealist' school. This work shall expose the ideology of each school one after the other.

5.1.1 Realism

Realism is an intellectual tradition much at home in schools of international relations and politics especially in the United States. It is often cited in philosophical writings about war, usually as the view that morality has no place in the discussion of war, in which role it is then cheerfully, and effectively criticized.

According to Coady, the first problem is in understanding precisely what realism is asserting. Realists have often been their own worst enemies. Although their slogans are dramatically amoral, their arguments and occasional qualifications suggest more nuanced positions[2]. In addition, there is considerable diversity within the realist's (and neo-realist) camp. It is with much justice that Stanley Hoffman

declared of realism as having its first problem, its essential elasticity and indeterminateness[3.]

John Baylis in his book, "The globalization of the world politics said that "Realism taught American leaders to focus on interest rather than ideology, to seek peace through strength and to recognize that great powers can exist even if they have antithetical values and beliefs[4].

However, Coady is of the opinion that we may better succeed in understanding what is significant in realism if we treat it less as a sharply defined theory and more as a loose tradition or even an intellectual mood. In some respects, it is even more like a religion, and its litany of saints is a long and venerable one, dating back at last to Thucydides and St Augustine, and including along the way Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Von Carl Clausewitz, Max Weber, F.H Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennam, Dean Acheson, and Henry Kissinger. Indeed, some realists, like some religious, have a very expansive ecumenical sense of their saintly antecedents, one list includes as well as St Augustine, John Calvin, Edmund Burke, James Madison and most other classical Western thinkers. E.H. Carr, one of the few non-American writers in the modern realist's canon, of the resort to morality in foreign affairs, and characterizes a basic conflict, therein, as that between realism and utopianism. Nonetheless, he is unequivocal in his belief that there is a foreign policy, saying, utopia and reality

are thus the two facts of political science. Sound political thought and political life will be found where both have their place[6.] Later, he states as "the realist view" that no ethical standards are applicable to relations between states[7.]

Later still, he refers to "that un-easy compromise between power and morality which is foundation of all political life[8]. And in spite of his intermittent task for a fairly simple version of moral relativism, he gives a significant and positive role to the operation of an understanding of grounds of justice "In international relations[9.] Hans Morgenthau roundly asserts that the individual may say for himself, "fiat justitia, pereat mundus", but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care [10.] Yet Morgenthau describes as a "misconception the idea that "international politics is so thoroughly evil that it is no use looking for moral limitations on the aspiration for power on the international scene.

According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke, raison d' etat is the fundamental principle of conduct; the state is first law of motion. It tells the state man what he must do to preserve the health and strength of the state. Most importantly the state which is identified as the key actor in the international politics must pursue power, and it is the duty of the state person to calculate rationally the most appropriate steps that should be taken so as to perpetuate the life of the state in a hostile and threatening environment.

For realists of all stripes, the survival of the state can never be guaranteed, because the use of force culminating in war is a legitimate instrument of state craft. As we will see, the assumption that the state is the principle actor, coupled with the view that the environment which states inhabit is a perilous place helps to define the essential core of realism. There is, however, one issue in particular that theorists associated with raison d' etat, and classical realism more generally, were concerned with, that is, the role, if any, that morals and ethics occupy in international politics.

From the above line of enquiry, this work could affirm that Realists are skeptical of the idea that universal moral principle exist and therefore, warn state leaders against sacrificing their own self-interests in order to adhere to some indeterminate motion of ethical conduct. Moreover, realists argue that the need for survival requires state leaders to distance themselves from traditional morality which attaches a positive value to caution, piety and the greater good of humankind as a whole. Machiavelli argued that these principles were positively harmful if adhered to by state leaders. It was imperative that state leaders learn a different kind of morality which accorded not to traditional Christian virtues but to political necessity and prudence. Proponents of raison d' etat often speak of a dual moral standard, one moral standard for individual citizens living inside the state and a different standard for the state in its external relations with other states.

Justification for the two moral standards stems from the fact that the condition of international politics to act in a manner (for example, cheating, lying, killing) that would be entirely unacceptable for the individual.

In another line of response, Coady suggested that "realism is misunderstood, and sometimes misunderstands itself, as involving total opposition to morality or ethics in international affairs.

The realist's target is or should be not morality but certain distortions of morality, distortions that desire the name "moralism". This work wants to clear the ground based on the criticism Coady laid against realism, that is, "realists are amoral". Before Coady concludes that Realism is completely amoral, it is important to add that proponents of raison d' etat argue that the state itself represents a 'moral force', for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist domestically. Preserving the life of the state and the ethical community it envelops, becomes a moral duty of the state person. Therefore, it is not the case that realists are un-ethical; rather, they find that sometimes it is kind to be cruel. The implication of the last line of the above statement is that state should not always heed to traditional morality because it destroys the security and the interest of the state, rather they (realists) suggest that "for the security and the interest of the state to be intact, the state should make use of mask, lies, deception and cruelty. The state could make use of the above

paragon of vices only on international levels, but must be avoided at individual level[12]. From all indication, we could see that power is crucial to the realist lexicon and traditionally, has been defined narrowly in military strategic terms. Yet irrespective of how much power a state may possess, the core national interest of all states must be survival like the pursuit of power, the promotion of the national interest is according to realist an iron law of necessity.

In the concluding part of this realist's opinion, this work helps Coady to affirm that realism is the dominant theory of international relations. Why? It provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war which is a regular condition of life in the international system. Let us see the other side of idealism (pacifism).

5.1.2 Idealism

This brings us to the issue of pacifism, philosophers who discuss issues having to do with war have on the whole, been very unsympathetic to pacifism. Jan Narveson' s well- known essay which alleges pacifism is incoherent is the most dismissive and, I think (Coady) the least philosophically plausible, but Elizabeth Anscombe speaks for many philosophers when she says that pacifism is an "illusion" that has corrupted enormous numbers of people[13]. These comments are made in spite of Anscombe's belief that wars "have mostly been mere wickedness on both sides [14].

Narveson's muddled argument for some kind of logical self-contradiction in pacifism has been successfully dismantled by others, so all I shall say here is that it relies crucially upon the premise that if one has a right, it then follows logically that one has a further right to do whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of the original right [15]. In the case of pacifism, the application of this idea is that if you have a right not to have violence done to you, then you may do "whatever is necessary to prevent violence being done to you. But surely it is sometimes necessary to deploy violence to prevent violence being done, and hence the pacifist is allegedly involved in absurdity in holding both that you have the right not to have violence done to you. And that it is impermissible to use violence to prevent infringement of your right. But the absurdity is in Narveson's premise. What you can morally do to prevent violations of your right is never determined by mere efficacy of means. If someone is about to violate your property rights by stealing a battery from your open motor car and the only way you can prevent him is by shooting him then the efficacy of the means is at odds with its morality.

And this is true of more substantial right consider the idea that we are entitled to engage in rape if it is necessary to prevent rape. As we saw earlier, if the most effective (or even only) way of defeating an enemy is by attacking innocent people, then it is at least not obvious that this is morally allowable. Certainly, its permissibility is not entailed by what it means to have a right.

There is another feature of Narveson's critique that is more important for our present purpose, and that is his narrow definition of pacifism. Like many others, he treats pacifism as a personal doctrine about the use of any form of violence. No doubt some pacifists held that it is always wrong to use violence, and others that it is always wrong to use extreme or lethal violence, but pacifism is (as many writers including some philosophers are increasingly insisting) primarily advancing a thesis about war. In its simplest terms, the thesis is that war is a very bad thing and that we should do our utmost to avoid it.

Although realism is regarded as the dominant theory of international relations, liberalism has a strong claim to being the historic alternative. In the twentieth century, liberal thinking influenced policy making elites and public opinion in a number of western states after the 'first world war', an era often referred as idealistic.

The striking argument is "How do we explain the divergent fortunes of liberalism in the domestic and international domains? While liberal values and institutions have become deeply embedded in Europe and North America, the same values and institutions lack legitimacy worldwide. To invoke the famous phrase of Stanley Hoffman, "international affairs have been the nemesis of liberalism. The essence of liberalism, Hoffman continues, is self-restraint, moderation, compromise and peace, whereas, the essence of international politics is exactly the opposite troubled

peace, at best or the state of war. This explanation comes as no surprise to realists, who argue that there can be no progress, no law, and no justice, where there is no common power. Despite the weight of this realist's argument, those who believe in the liberal project have not conceded defeat. Liberals argue that power politics itself is the product of ideas, and crucially, ideas can change. Therefore, even if the world has been inhospitable to liberalism, this does not mean that it cannot be re-made in its image.

In their concluding part idealism the contribution made by this work is that the idealist's tradition in political thought goes back at least as far as the thinking of John Locke in the late seventeenth century. From then on, liberal ideas have profoundly shaped governments and citizens. Idealism or liberalism is a theory of both government within states and good governance between states and peoples worldwide. Unlike realism, which regards the international as an anarchic realm, liberals seek to project values of order, liberty, justice and toleration into international relations. The high water mark of liberal thinking in international relations was reached in the inter-war period in the work of idealists whose belief that warfare was an unnecessary and outmoded way of settling disputes between states. Domestic and international institutions are required to protect and nurture these values. But note that these values and institutions allow for significant variations which accounts for the fact that there are heated debates within

liberalism. The liberals disagree on fundamental issues such as the census of war and what kind of institutions are required to deliver liberal values in a decentralized multicultural international system. An important charge within liberalism or idealism, which has become more pronounced in our globalized world, is between those operating with a positive conception of liberalism, who advocates interventionist foreign policies and stronger international institutions, and those who decline towards a negative conception, which places a priority on toleration and neo-international. Pacifists are devoted to peace. This work will go straight to x-ray the content of Coady's notion on ideal peace.

5.2 Ideal Peace: A Pivotal Instrument to Diffuse the War Tension

There can be no doubt that the value of peace has served as a significant inspiration for theorists and activists over the centuries. Thomas Hobbes made the pursuit of peace as a foundation stone of his laws of nature and a reiterated theme in his discussion and elaboration of them, and they in turn supported his whole ethics and political philosophy. His first and fundamental law of nature is to seek peace and fellow it [16]. Pacifists of course, are devoted to peace, but many non-pacifists claim an equal dedication, even if it lacks the same consequence.

Hugo Grotius called his famous treatise on the law of war "The Right of War and Peace" (de jure bell, ac pacis) and declared "the unabated desire and invariable

prospect of peace "to be the only end for which hostilities can be lawfully begun [17]. The Liber code says of many nations and great governments related to one another in choosing intercourse in "modern times". Peace is their normal condition, war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace [18]

It is clear, then that the value of peace has traditionally had a place in 'just war theory', though it has sometimes been positioned so far in the background as to obscure its real significance. Since St. Augustine is more explicit than most about what is meant by reference to peace, let us begin with his account. Standing on the sources of just war theorizing, Augustine gives peace a pivotal role in his thinking about both war and politics and his complex legacy needs more unpacking than it seems so far to have received. Augustine's emphasis upon the role of peace goes so far as to affirm the ubiquitous nature of the devotion to peace. He sees the desire for peace as an essential ingredient of human nature, much like the desire for enjoyment. In his discussion of war, Augustine argues that even war making is essentially oriented to peace; it is not only that the rulers and warriors ought to be concerned with peace, but they inevitably are: Indeed, even when man chooses war, their only wish is for victory; which shows that their desire in fighting is for peace with glory. For what is victory but the conquest of the opposing side? And when this is achieved, there will be peace. Even wars, then, are waged with peace as their object, even when they are waged by those who are concerned to exercise

their warlike prowess, either in command or in the actual fighting. Hence it is an established fact that peace is the desire end of war. For every man, in quest of peace, even in waging war, whereas no one is in quest of war when making peace[19].

Augustine's position is a very significant one, especially in a writer who has some claim to be a founder of the just war tradition. Its first significance lies in the important insight that war is primarily instrumental, so that even the most blood thirsty warriors and ruler's resort to war in order to further some other, broadly political purposes. This is an insight anticipated by Aristotle, who says: "no one desires to be at war for the sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to causing a war: a man would be thought an utterly blood thirsty character if he declared war on a friendly state for the sake of censing battles and massacres [20]

The most contrast with the thin conception is the rich conception of peace employed by Augustine when he discusses the life and inner dynamic of the heavenly city. "We see then, he says" that the supreme good of the city of God is everlasting and perfect peace, which is not the peace through which men pass in their morality of their journey from birth to death, but that peace in which they remain in their immortal state, experiencing no adversity at all.[21] This thick conception is thus implicated with the joys of salvation ("for those who are saved) and with ultimate justice: It is the perfectly ordered and completely harmonious

fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and of each other in God [22.] The summary point of Augustine's above illustration on heavenly perfect peace depicts the kind of the ideological peace of which if the world of politics borrows it then there will be a perpetual stability. In line with these views, Rousseau regards peace as the original state of human existence in which man has no desires being naturally good, free and a gentle savage. It was only later that this tranquil state became corrupted and depraved by human desire and greed, which state of affair Rousseau blames on drive for private property.

However, the above pre-corruption thesis of the divine source of peace came under severe attack in the socio-political philosophy of Hobbes. Hobbes had argued that the primeval state of nature was agog with conflict and violence. Man was regarded as wolf to fellow man (homo homini lupus) and life seen as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". This Hobbesian theory is, perhaps, a recapitulation of the consequences of the divine abandonment of the intrinsically wicked and finite man as articulated in the dramas of Sophocles. In these dramas, a paradigm shift was inaugurated in the attitude of the goods towards man and his activities. As man became forlorn and abandoned, his wretchedness and responsibilities were cast unto his shoulders. Certainly, this attitudinal shift portrays a tragic figure of a suffering man who stands before a now distant and tyrannical Zeus who in conjunction with other gods became insensitive to the prayers and pleas of

mankind, lacking in pity and above all possessing a quality of maliciousness. In this scheme of things, Oedipus rex was constrained by fate to be the slayer of his own father and the husband of his own mother. No doubt, his sophoclean tragedy became the precursor of the Hobbesian cosmology in which state of nature a great man could be murderer in sleep or overwhelmed by a mob. It was only as men resolved to create, according to Hobbes, a social contract by which each donated his or her right to a 'Leviathan' enjoying, as it were, absolute power as Zeus that a peace and orderly life was created.

But because the above religious-philosophical account hardly addresses the social context of peace beyond the state of nature, various sociological explanations rear their heads. Sociologically, peace refers to a condition of social harmony in which there are no social antagonisms and where individuals and groups are able to meet their needs and expectations. Two theories emerged from this interpretation, namely, structural –functionalist and dialectical materialist.

According to the former, peace is achieved where existing social structures perform their functions adequately as supported by the requisite culture, norms and values. In the latter, Marxian perspective, peace is realized only in a society where there are no classes. Be that as it may, peace as seen by the sociological school remains only an aspiration in modern times. The gradual collapse of communism today is perhaps a show-case of the unreliability of this aspiration.

It is probably the failure of the above sociological thesis that led to the political definition of peace which consists in identifying peace with order. As political order, peace entails that government employs the coercive apparatus of the state to deal with citizens in order to maintain law and order. It can equally be seen as contractual pact denoting that parties there to mutually respect the agreement and recognize each other. However, merely identifying peace with way of perpetrating and perpetuating oppression of the under-privileged by privileged classes whose worldview, as congealed in the dominant ideology, is thorough - going and pervasive.

But the above conception of peace as they may, yet despite their not being necessarily wrong, they are not adequate in understanding the entire reality of peace. Each creates the impression that one can synchronically find peace as an absolute, once -and for - all condition or frozen state of rest. It therefore, seems that the earthly peace is a process rather than a condition, involving activities that are directly or indirectly linked to increasing development and reducing conflict, both within and between societies. It is a continuous process involving not only peace keeping and peace enforcement but also peacemaking and peace building. Integral peace, rather than understood synchronically, is diachronic connoting, according to Mill, both the negative aspect of peace as the absence of war and the positive aspect as including justice and development, respect and tolerance

between people, harmony or balance in the ecosphere, tranquility of inner peace, and wholeness.

For Kant, "only as war becomes patently more destructive and more costly, will men be moved to take the first difficult step towards a permanent peace" In Kant's "Perpetual Peace" the primary aim is, quite explicitly and unquestionly, the ending of all mutual and aggression. What Kant is saying is that for 'a long-lasting peace' to occur, all federative states must unilaterally agree 'on mutual non-aggression treaty. For me, Kant's idea for perpetual peace is unrealistic because his idea of 'mutual non-aggression treaty' will not guarantee an absence of war. The only possible thing that may happen optimistically is that Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' may bring stability, but the argument is how long will the stability last? The truth on "Perpetual Peace" is that it is a way Kant was trying to urge against those who find in human nature certain immovable barriers to political progress, that these barriers can always also be regarded as necessary challenges or springboards to rational human effort; and that this way of regarding them is in fact the only way in which we can make sense of what little we know of mankind's political development.

Now let us see Coady's notion on ideal peace. A peace according to him must have something in it that at least quiets the dispositions to violence, hostility, and aggression that are typical of war, even if it does not eliminate them entirely.[23] The defeated or disadvantaged parties to the peace may have legitimate grievances

remaining, but, in a genuine peace there is a settling of dispositions into a certain tranquility so that the recurrence of violent conflict is not imminent and the maintenance of order does not require inordinate violence. The "ordered harmony" of earthly peace demands some degree of coordination of interests amongst previously warring or violently disposed hostile parties that, like all compromise, involve losses and gains. Yet in its offering a serious measure of respect to the interests of those who are defeated, or to those who are disadvantaged by the cessation of hostilities, it helps ensure the endurance of calm rather than foul weather.

In terms of an ideal, then, the pursuit of peace can be distinguished from the goal of the mere cessation of hostilities on any terms. There has to be something involved in the cessation or absence of hostilities that has an inherent stability about it that can be enjoyed. It may not be what either party to the conflict originally sought they took up arms, but it cannot be so totally crushing as to keep alive and potent the dispositions to war that preceded the victory/defeat itself may have been crushing, in the sense of overwhelming and devastating, but the settlement must offer something hopeful to the conquered if it is to count as peace. Again, it must be stressed that what it offers may be less than full justice.

If peace is understood in this way, what attractions would it have as an ideal? Well, one attraction is that a world or a geographical region that is at peace is a world or

region that lacks various conspicuous evils associated with warfare and similar forms of violence. Those are often calamitous evils, even though they are not the only evils in the world. Moreover, they are evils that human beings are prone to inflict on one another, so that the likelihood of their occurrence is alarmingly high, and yet they are within human control, in principle at least, subject to human prevention.

In the light of this, an ideal peace should stimulate efforts to maintain peace in the face of threats to it, and to reestablish peace when it has been destroyed by war. Central to the pursuit of such an ideal peace is an ability to negotiate some kind of "compromise between human needs about the things relevant to moral life [24] It was such an ability that Augustine praised a year before he died in what was his last letter on the subject of peace, written to the soldier Darius, who had just concluded peace negotiations with the vandals. After praising warriors who, bravely defended the state and its interests, achieve peace by force of arms, Augustine says: but it is a higher glory still to slay war itself with words, than men with the sword, and to procure or maintain peace by peace, not by war for those who fight, if they are good men, doubtless seek for peace, nevertheless, it is through blood. Your mission, however, is to prevent the shedding of blood. Yours, therefore, is the privilege of averting that calamity which others are under the necessity of producing.[25]

This comment shows the way in which Augustine thinks of the ideal of peace as showing that peaceful means of settling political disputes are superior to violent solutions (in line with the last resort" condition of the war theory). He, thereby, places the ideal of peace as a governing, indeed inhibiting, factor in the thinking that considers the resort to war for solving political problems. Augustine's comment also suggests towards two other things. The first is the role of the ideal in guiding our attitudes towards the ending of violent conflicts, even on the part of the justified side (if there is one and the second is the relation of the ideal to the outlook of pacifism. This work will look into Coady's last stage of "morality and political violence".

4.3 A Just Ending of War

In a just ending of war, it is a curiosity of the 'just war tradition' that far more attention is paid to the ethical (including prudential) considerations having to do with beginning and conducting war than ending it. The very names "ius ad bellum" and "ius in bello" testify to this emphasis.[26] Yet a just ending to warfare, "ius post bellum" calls for more than cursory attention, both because the closing stages of war can be the occasion for tremendous but possibly avoidable suffering and because the way in which a war is ended can determine much about the subsequent[27.]

Coady affirmed that, one crucial element in achieving a just end to hostilities is negotiation, especially negotiation on terms of surrender or settlement. But there is much in modern war that militates against negotiation. Because so many modern wars have been passionately ideological (as indeed have quite a few in the past), the very idea of negotiating with enemies prior to crushing them can seem preposterous or even immoral.

Negotiation does not require that one's negotiating partners be morally or politically respectable (though that might help in certain circumstances), but rather that their motivations are such that they can recognize opportunities as to be truthful and faithful enough to promote the desired outcome. What is required of a negotiating partner, especially in the context of seeking to end armed hostilities, is not a highly moral version of "good faith" but a minimally rational one. Good faith and character would be better, but where it isn't available, lesser coinage may have to do so we do not need to have or express a high opinion of our partner's moral standing. Negotiating does not per se amount to condoning. And there are ways of avoiding the effect of condoning or excusing past conduct.

Here, Coady lamented, a word is in order about demonization. The tendency to portray one's enemy as so evil as to be demonic has several bad effects. One is that of treating the whole enemy population-or, less drastically, the whole of the enemy civil and political apparatus-as tainted with the same satanic brush as the

leadership itself. But no matter how evil a particular leader or the group immediately associated with direct power may be, it is usually a mistake to imagine this evil as pervasive of the whole enemy society. It is even a mistake to think of all the associates or ruling party members in the same way.

Another bad effect of demonization is its tendency to reduce the demonized figure to a malevolent force with no other motivation than the promotion of pure evil. Vice- Leaders like Hitler and Stalin come close to fitting this caricature, but even they had more intelligible and human motives for some of their misdeeds than this picture suggests. Opponents of demonization sometimes think that their opposition to it commits them to the view that the idea of evil cannot be applied at all, and, in particular, that there are no evil people in the world. Though Coady screamed that "I think this is not my position". I think that evil is real and that there are plenty of evil people fairly evenly distributed throughout the earth. The problem with demonization is more a matter of focus. It localizes the evil and sees nothing but evil in that location, and usually nothing but good in other locations, notably in the vicinity of home. This makes for deficient understanding of the enemy and of oneself.

In the context of concluding hostilities, the demonization of the enemy can clearly work as a factor that removes negotiation from consideration. Another factor is the effect of existing loses. There comes a point in a campaign or war where the

expenditure of the lives of one's own troops has been so great that anything short of total crushing of the enemy can seem a betrayal of those who have already died. If we add to this the enemy record (real or imagined) of perpetrating war crimes against your civilian population, then anything like negotiation or compromise on terms of surrender will seem repugnant. Though this is humanly understandable, it is surely irrational. There must be loyalty to those who have sacrificed their lives in the past. The meaning of their deaths can be sustained in other ways, including, a just end to the conflict.

Coady has put considerable emphasis on the possibilities of negotiation, but he does not mean to imply that the ideal of peace requires a rush to the negotiating table or that any settlement that ends a war is, thereby, a morally welcome outcome. Just as the need to negotiate the selling of a house does not entail the acceptance of any offer at all, so negotiating an end to warfare will be constrained by ideas of desirable outcomes. These will include the governing concerns related to legitimate war aims, the respective strengths of the parties at the time, reasonable predictions of the trend of the conflict, and the like role of negotiations "with these people at this time, in these circumstances) in establishing the sort of peace sketched earlier in the discussion of a "medium" motion of peace, namely one that is likely to embody an enduring concord between the former enemies and

within the defeated nation. This may mean that it is sometimes important to fight on when there is realistic chance of ultimately gaining a better negotiating position.

A central aim according to Coady in the ending of a war for those who are fighting a just war should be that of learning the population of the surrendering enemy nation in a position to contribute to an independent political life for themselves. After the war such a political life may have to be very different from that which they experienced before and during the war, especially where its forms contributed to the waging of unjust war. There are many ways of achieving such a fresh political existence depending upon such a fresh political existence depending upon such matters as how much the current leader of the enemy nation group have contributed to war crimes or been driven by ideologies the persistence of which is likely to seriously inhabit prospect for enduring peace. But legitimate war aims should not include an occupation or domination of the defeated enemy that would amount to ongoing colonization. This in turn means that what Kecskemeti calls a "vacuum" policy must be highly dubious[28.] This is policy that accompanied the unconditional surrender doctrine in World War II and involved the refusal of any recognition of even temporary political authority on the losing side, even if it were allowed to reside in those who were opposed to the existing war leadership. Nothing can guarantee that leaving indigenous leaders in place will not be risky, but even the total occupation of an enemy nation and political colonization for a

time must face similar risks while the reconstruction "of the loosing country is under way (witness the large number of Nazi officials who remerged in positions of power after democratization and de-nazification), and it faces the additional burden of having to handle the chaos, suffering, and a military occupation commonly created. In addition to the merit in preserving some indigenous political authority and structures, it is also important to try to preserve elementary civilian infrastructures in the defeated enemy territory. Destruction of communication facilities, electricity grids, and other sources of power is likely to make the transition to a peaceful world more difficult.

There are several different scenarios for negotiated settlements that complicate how we should think of them in moral terms. Let us consider abstracted versions of some of them. One scenario is that of a side that (for the most part) is engaged justly in the fighting of a war and has achieved sufficient dominance to make negotiations feasible on terms that respect its legitimate cause and the associated war aims. This is basically the scenario I have most commonly had in view in the comments made so far. Here, the negotiations of the superior power are informed by prudential considerations of the sort mentioned earlier. As for its enemy, its war aims are illegitimate and should play no part in the outcome of the settlement. Given the scenario, they are unlikely to do so. But there will be other prudential and political considerations that will inevitably be in play, such as ensuring the

continuation of the enemy‘s nation-state, or of some of its significant structures and economic resources, and so on. Here, the resolution of these issues is largely a matter of bargaining, though and outcome that, for instance, proposed slavery or destitution for the enemy populace would clearly be immoral. An opposite scenario is that in which the unjust side in the war has become dominant to the point where the just side cannot achieve its legitimate war aims, but may do better by negotiating for much less than by awaiting total defeat. Sometimes a policy of “fight to the death” may be morally and rationally defensible, as when the alternative is slaughter or brutal enslavement, but the odds are not always stacked that way. The case of France, surrender to the Nazi in world war II is an interesting one.

The striking argument Coady put forward is “can we draw some principles relating to the justice of unending armed conflict from this discussion? In the nature of the case, they will have the sort of generality and openness to interpretation associated with the rules of the war theory. There should also be continuity between the dictates of the war theory: the just aims of the war should dictate the limits of what can be done to the defeated enemy, just as the rationality for the principle of discrimination will dictate respect for enemy non-combatants after war’s end. Moreover, it would be good to frame the rules so that they not only reflected the appropriate advice and constraints on victorious just warriors, but also had force

with unjust conquerors. Here there is an echo of the dichotomy between the basic moral orientation of the war theory in addressing justified war, and the legal/political imperatives of what Vattel called "regular war" in other words, the principles should apply not only to just warriors but also to unjust warriors who regard their cause as just, thereby, under some pressure to abide the restraints of the war theory and the legal rules it supports. Here are some suggestions.

1. War aims should never be framed in such a way that they leave no room for negotiated surrender on terms short of a total capitulation that leaves a population at the mercy of the conqueror.
2. Terms of surrender or settlement should seek the establishment of peace in the medium" sense we extracted from the discussion of Augustine.
3. Punishment for enemy war crimes should be referred to the international criminal court, to which allegations of victor crimes should also be referred.
4. The conduct of war should look towards the optimal conditions for postwar peace. The destruction of enemy infrastructure and civilian capacity should be kept to a minimum, even where it is not directly forbidden by the war theory.

Conclusively, war for which nuclear weapons are manufactured cannot guarantee peace in the world. Besides, peace is not just absence of war. Peace cannot be reduced to the equilibrium of power between opposing forces, nor does it arise out

of despotic dominion. Peace is not derivable from any sort of conquest by any superior person or group of persons. True peace cannot be associated with individualism and modernism. Peace on earth will be certainly delusive unless the welfare of man is safeguarded and people freely and trustingly share in another's riches and talents. Again, a strong determination to respect the dignity of man in conjunction with the deliberate practice of dialogue and brotherly love is keenly necessary for the achievement of peace. Peace is really the fruit of love, for love goes beyond what justice can ensure. Thus, to achieve peace, a rejection has to be made of all anti-charitable tendencies inherent in modernism. All these constitute the essential ingredients of a philosophy that will be germane to peace building in our world today.

ENDNOTES

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23. Coady, Ibid., p. 269.

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25. John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (Washngton, DC: Catholic Association for International Peace, 1935) p.79.

26. Coady *Ibid.*, p.270.

27. Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical illustrations, Third edition (NewYork: Basic Books, 2000), Chapter7.P. I.
28. Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender, p.219.

CHAPTER SIX

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Evaluation and Conclusion

6.2 Evaluation

6.3 Conclusion

We have two schools of thought, Realists and Idealists. Coady criticized in depth realism but failed to say anything on idealism because he is a pacifist .Coady called the realists "amoral" because they affirmed strongly that morality does not exist on international level. For me, before Coady concludes that realism is completely immoral, it is important to add that proponents of raison d'état argue that the state itself represents "a moral force", for it is the existence of state that creates the possibility for an ethical political community to exist domestically. Preserving the life of the state and the ethical community it envelops becomes a moral duty of the statesperson. Thus, it is not the case that the realists are unethical, rather they find that sometimes it is kind to be cruel. Coady is biased about realism and he is suffering from perfectionism in the sense that only the ideas of 'pacifists' , that is, "war cannot be used to solve human problems" could be accepted.

Coady condemned 'violent revolution' especially the one that encourages the over throw of any government. He insisted with Hobbes that "violent demonstration is not allowed to dethrone a regime". Coady should clarify which kind of regime

does not tolerate the spirit of violent demonstration. Is it a tyrant regime or democratic regime? If Coady meant democratic regime, he is right, if meant monarchical regime, he is wrong. For me, Coady is naïve in understanding the prospect of change. Change is an only in-built mechanism in man and also as a process of globalization. If one does not change, change will change one. Change as a process is constant; the era of monarchy is gone. This is era of freedom, in reference to recent Arab uprising. If Coady had observed the trend of Arab revolution (20018) he would have realized his mistake for condemning 'violent revolution' because Arab spring was full of violent revolution (such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen) which resulted into democratic states. It means 'violent revolution' created democratic states. Those tyrant leaders were removed and democracy was allowed to stabilize in the atmosphere of Arab world. Therefore, violent revolution is legitimate only when the existing government is killing its own people, destroying their properties and violating human rights as affirmed by John Locke.

Coady supported incidental killing of civilians; that is, "the foreseen death of the civilians though not intended but with licit military action could go on if there is no alternative". But I'm saying that foreseen death of the civilians can never be morally accepted. There is no moral value behind the neighborhood where there is a suspected suicide bomber and the action was allowed at the end resulted

thousands of civilians death. The above deaths are not morally accepted. There must be a clear difference between state of nature and state of civility.

On the positive side, Coady defends ‘just war theory’ as an analytical frame work that is conceptually adequate for addressing the relevant problems and is general in the sense of not being confined to theorists who subscribe to a Catholic tradition in ethics.

By focusing on violent conflict, Coady goes beyond the traditional considerations of ‘just war theory’ that concern interstates war and reflects on such issues as revolution, terrorism and humanitarian intervention. In addition, Coady’s discussion of warfare addresses not only traditional concerns, such as the status of non-combatants and requirements of proportionality, but also issues that are specific to twentieth century warfare, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction, mass bombardment and the use of air forces as well as mercenarianisim, which is an old topic of new relevance that has been hardly explored.

With the line of the above argument, I still believe firmly that Coady’s idea of the principle of discrimination and proportionality”, the right way to declare war, the right conditions to observe when war is going on and the right way to end war and the idea of ideal peace are the solutions to the problems of human conflicts and struggles.

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