CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Given that our desires often conflict, it would be impossible for us to live in a society which imposes no limits whatever on what we do. It would be absurd to argue that we should all have complete freedom to do whatever tickles our fancy, no matter who is affected by our actions. The opinions of people influence social changes in the world. These changes would be to the advancement of scientific knowledge, individual liberty and human happiness. But these could not be done in an 'unfreed' condition. This presupposes the 'state' where law or constitutions and government exist. Thus, we may say that political participation or sharing in the process of governance will enter into the meaning of "liberty" in society in at least two different ways. First, political activity and participation in government are an interest and mode of activity to which many people attach great importance, and thus the existence of the right and opportunity to engage in this form of activity is one of the liberties that some men cherish highly. Secondly, it is in addition to liberty that forms part of a wider structure of liberties because the extent to which this liberty is accorded and exercised will usually also affect the extent to which liberty is available in other areas of social life.

For John Stuart Mill, self is at the centre of liberty. Besides, man is fully recognised in his equality with others. In the thought of Jean Jacque Rousseau, man's participation in society must be consistent with his existence as a free and rational being. *"Men in their natural state are free, equal, enjoy idyllic happiness, but they are enslaved everywhere. Man is born free, and is everywhere in chain."*[1] Society is therefore unthinkable without a freedom which expresses man's most fundamental attribute. Liberty has its negative and positive sides; "Negative" refers to the absence of obstructions, coercion or indirect control; "positive", to the processes of choosing and acting on one's own initiative, and more concretely and less

formally to the general types of human interests or forms of activity for the expression and exercise of which liberty is claimed.

However, J. S. Mill asserts in his essay on Liberty that man is free regarding those actions that are for personal interest and do not constitute harm to others. For him, harm is done to a person if he is compelled to act as he would not otherwise act or if he is prevented from achieving his goal or if his interest is thwarted or hindered, either directly or indirectly with regard to matters that are for personal interest. On the other hand, the man, who has been so molded and manipulated that he always wants what his ruler or superior wants him to choose, is scarcely free. This case suggests that liberty will exist only where there exists the possibility of choice, by implication not only the absence of direct coercion and compulsion but also that the availability and the characteristics of alternatives must be capable of being known. There will be a large measure of individual liberty within a society when there exist what Mill calls ''a variety of conditions where a wide variety of beliefs are in fact expressed and where there are considerable diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conducts , ways and styles of living''[2]. And because of the connection between inequality of power and inequality with respect to the enjoyment of liberty, a society in which power is widely distributed is also likely to be the one characterised by the existence of wide possibilities for choice and individual initiative.

The interest of this dissertation lies on the quiddity of the self-immolation of the Tunisian, Mohammed Bouaziz; that sparked the revolution in the Arab world.This dissertation tends toward searching for paradigm of development against what happened in the Arab world. Arab Spring is their opportunity to air their views. Arab Spring is a revolution towards a new order.

1.2 Statement of Problem

The ultimate goal in life is for fulfillment and happiness. To achieve this, we must live in a civil society where liberty is granted by the state. However, a political system of government known as monarchy has been a serious hindrance in the Arab world; in the sense of denying the citizens their fundamental rights of liberty. Actually, monarchy is antithetical to democracy: liberty, equality, rights, and the rule of law. In fact, Arab Spring, as a reality, was caused by a perverted political system of government, which led to economic hardship, unemployment, corruption, and sit-tight character of leaders in the region. The consequences of Arab Spring are mass protests, uprisings, violent revolutions, and civil war. These have caused more damage and frustration in the lives of the Arab citizens. If nothing is done to curb the situation, it might lead to a more devastation as the implication is being felt around the world, and to the Arab citizens, life will have no meaning. This dissertation needs to do analysis of liberty, rights, liberal democracy, monarchy and "Islam".

1.3 Purpose of the Study

This dissertation focuses on Liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill: implication for Arab Spring. The main purpose of this study is to use the concept of Liberty in the philosophy of Mill, whose import lies on what he regards as *Liberty Principle* to address the revolution in the Arab region. Arab region is bedevilled with social, economic and political challenges, which have erupted into evolutionary crisis. Therefore, the objective of the study is geared towards analysing the origin, and philosophical causes and consequences of the Arab Spring and using the tool at 'liberty' in the philosophy of Mill as a panacea to the Arab revolution. Arab world lacks liberty: their system of government is antithetical to the tenets of democracy.Therefore, we shall use liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill as a tool to find solutions to the Arab menace. Furthermore, we propose a new political theory known as

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"Arabcracy" which may surpass the monarchical system of government by eliminating untold hardships, bring in effective and efficient government that will be proactive and see to the common good of the Arab citizens. From the foregoing, we shall fill the gap in this dissertation.

Actually, the goal of the study aims at searching for a particular political system that would be peculiar to the Arab region since they are tired of practising monarchical system of government. Mill succinctly writes, "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."[3] Mill holds that restriction of liberty of one citizen can be justify only in the circumstance of preventing harm to others. Mill maintains that his reason for protecting people's interest is that it prevents doing harm to others, and not for the gravity of the act or its moral position.

Mill believes that the individual is a *progressive being* who should be free in order to develop himself and therefore all constraints against his self-realisation should be suppressed. More so, the primary concern of the study is the recognition of the dignity, value and liberty of the human being that exist in the society. This society may not give him full liberty, but without society, the individual can have none at all.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This study covers Mill's classic essay on Liberty, Utilitarianism, Considerations on Representative Government, and Principles of Political Economy. Here, Mill thinks that civil liberty and representative democracy are ideal because they promote common good. However, for Mill, ''democracy plays an important epistemic role in identifying the common good and is the best form of government because of the constitutive effects of political participation on the improvement of the moral capacities of citizens"[4]. Arab Spring occurred

in many countries of the region, but we shall focus our analysis on the following: Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Yemen, and Syria and subsequently find its impacts on some West Africa countries like: Nigeria, Gambia, and Mali. The study will also extend to the historiography of the Arab Spring.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study highlights the importance, impact or contribution, benefits, implication and how the topic would inform policy-makers or political analysts, philosophers, theorists and thinkers for further research. This research centres on the origin of Arab Spring and cause and consequence of the Arab Spring. It will further the understanding of liberty and social action and revolution in the context of ISIS and ISIL. The Arab world comprises the Middle East and North African countries. They have been political uprising because of economic hardship, unemployment, sit-tight leadership character, corruption, and the practice of monarchical system of government. The Arab region lacks liberty (freedom), equality, the rule of law and human rights in their political system of government. Therefore, the dissertation intends to fill the gap by addressing the social, economic and political challenges of the Arab world using Mill's liberty as a tool to finding plausible solutions to the menace. Mill argues that the liberty of the individual is essential to the development of the human person. It is through liberty: free in thought and action, that man's originality is enhanced. Originality brings to fullness the potentialities and capabilities of a person. Thus, the development of the human being, by extension is the development of the society.

It aims at developing the individual to maturity by educating him on the concept of liberty. According to Mill liberty involves pursuing one's own good in his own way and the state (authority) must not interfere with one's actions unless what one does causes harm to others. The concept of liberty acts like a light in darkness; the Arab region has suffered from lack of

liberty. This study establishes a base level of intellectual, philosophical, political, social economic and cultural diversity that ensures free play of ideas in a society for the best solution to shine through.

1.6 Methodology

The research applies the method of philosophical and phenomenological analysis in dealing with the concept of liberty in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill: implication for Arab Spring. Late 19th-century English philosophy was dominated by British idealism, philosophers like F.H. Bradley and Thomas Hill Green. It was against this intellectual background that the founders of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, articulated the programme of early analytic philosophy. Since its beginning, ''a basic principle of analytic philosophy has been conceptual clarity''[5], in the name of which Moore and Russell rejected Hegelianism, which ''they accused of obscurity and idealism''[6]. Bertrand Russell adopted Frege's predicate logic as his primary philosophical method, a method Russell thought could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. Analytic philosophy underwent several internal micro-revolutions that divide its history into five phases: the quasi-Platonic form of realism, the analytic philosophy, the *logical positivism,* the *ordinary-language analysis and* the post-linguistic analytic philosophy. While the method of analysis is characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy, its status continues to be a source of great controversy even among analytic philosophers.

This research breaks into seven chapters: First Chapter dwells on the introduction, while the Second Chapter concentrates on the literature review; the Third Chapter is an elaborate exposition of the concept of liberty in the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. The Fourth Chapter focuses on the historiography of the Arab Spring. The Fifth Chapter analyses liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill in democracy of the Arab Spring. While the Sixth Chapter dwells on

the Influences of Arab Spring on Some West African Countries.This last chapter is followed by Chapter Seven which is Evaluation, and Conclusion.

1.7 Definition of Terms

The essence of setting of bound to the terms we shall come across in this work is for clarity and proper understanding of the concepts.

Concept of Liberty

Generally, liberty is the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. According to Simon Blackburn, ''The value of liberty is dependent upon that of rational self-legislation, or autonomy, in the Kantian tradition, and dependent upon the nature of the social context rather than on individual rights in collectivist political philosophies.''[7] However, Liberty could be seen as a state of freedom which is especially in contrast to political subjection, manipulation, imprisonment and slavery. Thus, Harold J. Lasky writes:

> By liberty I meant the eager maintenance of that atmosphere in which man have the opportunity to be their best selves. Liberty therefore is product of rights. A state built upon the conditions essential to the full development of our faculties will confer freedom upon its citizens. It will release their individuality[8].

The concept of liberty is an important part of juridical systems. A set of governing rules can impose duties on those who are subject to their authority. But when the rules remain silent about a given type of activity, x, or then they are said to leave the subjects at liberty to x or not x, however they see fit. To be at liberty to x is simply to have no duty not to x. These two terms, namely, 'liberty' and 'freedom' are often used interchangeably, but on those occasions when they are not taken to be synonyms, the basis of the distinction between the two is usually clear. 'Freedom', when applied to persons, and their actions, refers to the ability of a person in a given set of circumstances to act in some particular way. 'Liberty' refers to

authoritative permission to act in some particular way. The contrast is a basis for the grammatical distinction between 'can' and 'may', between the de facto and the de jure perspectives, or between (overall) ability and permission.

The two sides identified by Berlin disagree over which of two different concepts best deserves the name of 'liberty'. Does this fact not denote the presence of some more basic *agreement* between the two sides? How, after all, could they see their disagreement as one about the definition of liberty if they did not think of themselves as in some sense *talking about the same thing*? In an influential article, the American legal philosopher Gerald MacCallum put forward the following answer: there is in fact only one basic concept of liberty, on which both sides in the debate *converge*. What the so-called negative and positive theorists disagree about is how this single concept of liberty should be interpreted. Indeed, in MacCallum's view, there are a great many different possible interpretations of liberty, and it is only Berlin's artificial dichotomy that has led us to think in terms of their being two.

MacCallum defines the basic concept of liberty — the concept on which everyone agrees — as follows: a subject, or agent, is free from certain constraints, or preventing conditions, to do or become certain things. Liberty is therefore a triadic relation — that is, a relation between *three things*: an agent, certain preventing conditions and certain doings or becoming of the agent. The definition of liberty as a triadic relation was first put forward in the seminal work of Felix Oppenheim in the 1950s and 60s. Oppenheim saw that an important meaning of 'liberty' in the context of political and social philosophy was as a relation between two agents and a particular (impeded or unimpeded) action. This interpretation of liberty remained, however, what Berlin would call a negative one. What MacCallum did was to generalise this triadic structure so that it would cover all possible claims about liberty, whether of the negative or the positive variety. In MacCallum's framework, unlike in Oppenheim's, the

interpretation of each of the three variables is left open. In other words, MacCallum's position is a meta-theoretical one: his is a theory about the differences between theorists of liberty.

On MacCallum's analysis, then, there is no simple dichotomy between positive and negative liberty; rather, we should recognise that there is a whole range of possible interpretations or 'conceptions' of the single concept of liberty. Indeed, as MacCallum says and as Berlin seems implicitly to admit, a number of classic authors cannot be placed unequivocally in one or the other of the two camps. Locke, for example, is normally thought of as one of the fathers of classical liberalism and therefore as a staunch defender of the negative concept of liberty. He indeed states explicitly that '[to be at] liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others'. Liberty is neither defined nor justified relative to any felicific, sensory pleasure-pain calculus or greatest happiness estimate.Liberty is the concept of ideological and political philosophy that identifies the condition to which an individual has the right to behave according to one's own personal responsibility and free will. The conception of liberty is impacted by ideals concerning the social contract as well as arguments that are concerned with the state of nature.

Democracy

The history of the term democracy has long been in existence. It is found in the writings of Herodotus, in the works of Plato's Politics. Its central classical meaning could be found in the writings of Aristotle, especially in the book Politics. Political theorists agree that unlike all other constitutional types of government, democracy is government that is driven by the general will of the majority. According to Celestine Mbaegbu, "Democracy is antithetical to dictatorship or any form of government that stands against human freedom.As a social and political theory of mass mobilization, its basic tenets were worked out by John Locke, J. J. Rousseau, and Montesquieu etc."[9]

This system of government is characterised by individual equality and freedom and Esheya argues that:

> Accordingly, citizens in a democracy should be entitled to equal protection of their persons, possessions and rights of political participation. Added to these the people should enjoy freedom from undue interference and domination by government. They should be free within the framework of the law, to believe, behave and to express them as they wish. Democratic societies seek to guarantee their citizens certain freedoms including freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of press, etc. Citizens also should be guaranteed freedom of association and of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and the freedom to work and live where and how they choose. Democracy therefore aims at giving man, the opportunity to develop what is finest in him[10].

This definition is in consonance with the definition given by the early American President Abraham Lincoln. According to him, "democracy is government of the people by the people and for the people"[11]. What is implied in this definition is that it works on the basis of representation, and has a structuring that is carefully worked out. This is clearly evident, looking at some political theorists like John Locke, etc.

For Locke and Montesquieu, democracy is founded on the natural rights of man to self-expression, conscience, association, integrity and possession of property. It relies on the principle of representation, which is brought about by the people exercising their free will in choosing who they consider fit to represent them. In the way they structured it, such representation is at three levels of government; the legislative, judiciary and executive arms of government. These three arms are to work harmoniously together by way of mutual complementation, with the legislative arm functioning as law makers, laws which in turn must be binding on all. This three armed structuring functions by way of separation of powers, so unlike in the parliamentary constitution in which fusion of powers is recognised, the irreducible essence of democratic presidential system is to make for a more credible separation of powers among the three arms of government in a horizontal manner in such a

way that no arm unduly encroaches into the functions of the other. Democracy as understood by majority of political theorists is a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representations usually involving periodically held free elections and is the noblest form of government we have yet evolved.

Arab Spring

Etymologically, the term "Arab Spring' is an allusion to the Revolutions of 1848."[12] The first specific use of the term ''Arab Spring as used to denote these events may have started with the American political journal Foreign Policy"[13]. Marc Lynch, referring to his article in "*Foreign Policy*"[14], writes "Arab Spring—a term I may have unintentionally coined in a January 6, 2011 article"[15]. Joseph Massad on Al Jazeera said the term was "part of a US strategy of controlling [the movement's] aims and goals" and ''directing it towards western-style liberal democracy"[16]. Due to the electoral success of Islamist parties following the protests in many Arab countries, the events have also come to be known as "Islamist Spring or Islamist Winter."[17]

The series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa that commenced in 2010 became known as the "Arab Spring,"[18] and sometimes as the "Arab Spring and Winter"[19], "Arab Awakening"[20] or "Arab Uprisings"[21] even though not all the participants in the protests were Arab. It was sparked by the first protests that occurred in Tunisia on December 18, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, following ''Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of police corruption and ill treatment''[22]. With the success of the protests in Tunisia, ''a wave of unrest sparked by the Tunisian "Burning Man" struck Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen"[23], then spread to other countries. The largest, most organised

demonstrations often occurred on a "day of rage"[24], usually Friday afternoon prayers. The protests also triggered similar unrest outside the region.

Globalisation

Globalisation describes the process by which regional economies, societies, and cultures have become integrated through a global network of communication, transportation, and trade. The term is sometimes used to refer specifically to economic globalisation: "the integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration, and the spread of technology"[25]. However, globalisation is usually recognised as being driven by a combination of economic, technological, socio-cultural, political, and biological factors. The term can also refer to the transnational circulation of ideas, languages, or popular culture through acculturation.

An early description of globalisation was penned by the American entrepreneur-turned-minister Charles Taze Russell who coined the term "corporate giants"[26]. Definitions of globalisation on the Web: as a concept, refers both to the "shrinking" of the world and the increased consciousness of the world as a whole. "It is a term used to describe the changes in societies and the world economy as a result of dramatically increased cross-border trade, investment, and cultural exchange"[27].Tom J. Palmer of the Cato Institute defines globalisation as "the diminution or elimination of state-enforced restrictions on exchanges across borders and the increasingly integrated and complex global system of production and exchange that has emerged as a result"[28]. Noam Chomsky argues that the word globalisation is also used, in a doctrinal sense, to ''describe the neoliberal form of economic globalisation''[29]. This is a multi-faceted and irreversible phenomenon within the system of the market economy and it is expressed as: economic globalisation, namely, the opening and deregulation of commodity, capital and labour markets which led to the present form of

neoliberal globalisation; political globalisation, that is , the emergence of a transnational elite and the phasing out of the all-powerful-nation state of the statist period; cultural globalisation, that is, the worldwide homogenisation of culture, ideological globalisation, technological globalisation and social globalisation.

Some critics were of the opinion that Globalisation has its characteristic corollaries, these include: "Turbo-capitalism"[30], "McWorld", "Westernisation", "Americanisation", "Neo-Colonialism,"[31] cosmocorporationalism, and end of history etc. However, globalisation has a dynamic nature. The dynamism in the entire process plan of globalisation is its ability to homogenise and hegemonise at the same time. Globalisation proffers "unity and improvement on peoples, making them increasingly similar but paradoxically   generates a dominant culture – a hegemonic centre."[32]Globalisation seems to be leading inexorably to the homogenisation of the world, with the United States as the model. Be that as it may, contemporary globalisation has its antecedents far back in ancient history. What then is so new in modern globalisation? If in the past, the attempt to convert the world in part or whole to one cosmic polity took the form of military campaigns, conquests, hellenisation or colonialism; today the ideology has taken a new turn. It is patronised by the multi-national companies and their allies and enhanced by high technological discoveries and information exposition made possible via the computer and cybernetics.

Having captured the fancy and imagination of the people, globalisation with its diverse perceptions occasioned diverse definitions, which triggered different interpretations and reactions. Globalisation could be grouped under the following: economic, political, cultural and information perspectives. Having gone so far, may we move to the literature review.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review is divided into three parts, the first part dwells on the concept of liberty in John Stuart Mill, the second part is on the Arab Spring, while the third part centres on Liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill: the Implications on the Arab Spring. Many scholars have different views on liberty, especially as they review John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. For Laski, liberty is ''the absence of restraint upon the existence of those social conditions which in modern civilisation are the necessary guarantees of individual happiness''[1]. Laski enjoys repeating the truism that liberty in practice always means liberty within law. He further argues that the law always aims at "the conference of security upon a way of life which is deemed satisfactory by those who dominate the machinery of state"[2]. On the contrary, Oxford Dictionary of philosophy defines it thus:

> While the protection of the liberties of the subject is one of the main aims of almost all constitutions, there is less consensus about what those liberties include, or when liberty (good) becomes license (bad). The problem is to define a class of actions that lie outside the proper jurisdiction of law, - those which one has a right to perform[3].

But, suffice it to say that certain factors are vital in this contextual consideration, namely: there must be a balance of harmony of personality and absence of restraint. However, before we begin our study on the review, it is necessary to reiterate the scope of the review content: it includes the allied political ideologies of Mill's On Liberty, like Utilitarianism, Political Economy and Considerations on Representative Government. Besides, this dissertation shall review the literatures of different scholars who support Mill's ideas and those who criticise him. In order words, the work will also review these scholars in order to explore the areas of differences and similarities in their opinions. It is imperative that the rider- ''the Arab Spring'' should be reviewed too. Suppose it then, that its review comes after liberty.

Carlos Rodríguez Braun's review of On Liberty argues that Mill corroborates with drug legalisation, thus the state has no reason to prevent the citizens from taking the risk of

consuming any substance they choose. Braun is not in support of general public education; he describes it ''as little more than a ploy to make every citizen the same, molding them into whatever form pleases the government''[4]. Hence, he opposes bureaucracy, social rights, wage equality and tariff protectionism.

Braun continues by saying that Mill foresaw the risk of socialism and warned on its implications on economic development and most especially, individual liberty. He opposes the ''ideas brought by opponents of the free market and competition, attacked progressive taxation''[5] in particular taxes on salaries, defended capitalists' private property and greater freedom to buy and sell: the general rule must be *laissez faire*. According to Braun, "Mill believes democracy could become oppressive hence proposed harsh limits to keep it from restricting freedom; for example, he recommended that any refusal of payment of taxes is tantamount to non-representation and participatory in parliament''[6]. Mill's On Liberty is a radical defence of the freedom of thought, expression and action. Its main thesis could be summarised thus: "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant"[7]. However, one can now understand why Mill was thought to be a follower of the classical liberal Manchester School, or perhaps why Milton Friedman ranked ''*On Liberty* second among his favorite classical liberal books, behind only Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, or why Marx held a deep disdain for Mill''[8].

F.A Hayek argues that: Mill "probably led more intellectuals into socialism than any other single person"[9]. He warns of the dangers of socialism. As a philosopher of liberty, Mill could not find the logic in family, marriage, religion, tradition, morality, custom; he saw them as repressive obstacles to freedom, although he never mentioned that they might be the bulwarks of liberty. He upholds the theory of *laissez fair*. For Hayek, Mill appears standing ''between

liberty as a principle and the denial of non-legal rights in the trap between social romanticism and utilitarian rationalism''[10]. With his distinction between ''laws of production and of distribution''[11]. Mill introduced the doctrine of income redistribution that became ''predominant in almost every political position up to the present day''[12].

Furthermore, Mill postulates two classes of acceptable interventions: the necessary and the optional. For the necessary ones he relied on Adam Smith: there can be no market without respect for property rights and contract enforcement, meaning the state must intervene to establish a legal framework and provide justice, defence and security. Again, an exception: ''land''[13]. Mill proposes so many exceptions for free market that it is appropriate to view him as the ''founder of the theory of market failures and state interventionism''[14]. The idea of market failures would prove most successful as would be the economics of welfare: when politicians today defend the market "but with limits, because there are things the free market cannot provide" they are repeating, as Keynes said, the ideas of a defunct economist: John Stuart Mill. Ronald Coase showed that market failures are often failures of the institutional framework; for example, there might be problems in defining property rights. It is unclear, therefore, that the state should intervene in every instance of a seeming market failure and, by its action, rule out the possibility of negotiation among the affected parties. The idea that ''certain goods and services are, by their nature, public, in the sense that the market cannot adequately supply them, is a popular one''[15].

However, Baum Bruce in "The Principle of Liberty", *Rereading Power and Freedom in J.S. Mill*, reviews Mill's principle of liberty as the best-known component of his theory of freedom. For Baum the meaning of ''The Principle of Liberty'' lies in his conception of freedom and his theories of individual development, social power, and societal development, thus presenting it as 'one very simple principle' for determining "the nature and limits of power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual"[16]. It is epitomised

in the principle, that members of a society can rightfully interfere 'with the liberty of action of any of their number', individually or collectively, whether through the force of law 'or the moral coercion of public opinion'[17].

Kurt Messick review of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty argues that Mill was certainly influenced by the spirit of American liberty. 'On Liberty' is one of the primary political texts of the nineteenth century; 'On Liberty' relates as a political piece to his general Utilitarianism and political reform ideology. Mill and his writings as a laissez faire capitalist in political economy, has been described as 'improved Adam Smith' and 'popularized Ricardo'[18]. Perhaps it is in part the brevity of 'On Liberty' that gives it an enduring quality. Mill looks for a liberty that permits individualism; thus, while democracy is an important feature for Mill, there must be a system of checks and balances that ensures individual liberties over and against this kind of system. Mill presents a somewhat radical proposition that even should the government and people be in complete agreement with regard to coercive action, it would still be an illegitimate power. This is an important consideration in today's world, as government and people contemplate the curtailment of civil liberties in favour of increased security needs.

In 2013, Noam Chomsky gave a lecture on the Common Good, and he quoted the epigraph at the beginning of *On Liberty and Other Essays* as a good place to start: What follows is Mill's attempt to achieve a state worthy of the individuals who compose it. The alternative being a state which "dwarfs its men"[19] so that they become small, docile instruments incapable of any great tasks. Mill, perhaps influenced by his religious skepticism, questions the legitimacy of authority and only builds on those foundations which he believes are solid. He begins with the value of individuality in all its uniqueness, and then seeks to define limits as to when it must be constrained. Though dispensing with the idea of a "social contract", Mill nonetheless recognises that "everyone who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit"[20].

For Jeremiah Dahl, Mill's On Liberty lays emphasis on the role society should take in interfering with the liberty of an individual, that is, the amount of power that society may legitimately exercise over its people. The sphere of Mill's inquiry is the system of a democracy, where the main danger to individual liberty is that of the "tyranny of the majority," in which minorities is subjected to the whims of the majority such that the "weaker members of the community" are "preyed upon by innumerable vultures". Mill's argument is that "self-government" is not "the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest". Mill's main thesis is that society and the governing bodies have no right to interfere with the liberty of thought, action or individuality in any person save when those liberties may cause harm to others; that "over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign". Mill also believes that keeping away the "'tyranny of the majority' is good not only for the individuals and the minorities, but for society itself as well; that the argumentation/discussion which leads from freedom of thought is pivotal in the development of the society and truth"[21]. However, Len Hart argues that Mill's "On Liberty", deals with "civil liberties" -not the metaphysical issue of "free will". While most attacks on civil liberties have historically occurred from the right within the context of a tyrannical or an aristocratic rule, Mill deals with threats against liberty from within the institutions of democracy itself. The aim of early libertarians was to limit the power of the ruler over those governed; Mill, however, identifies a need to limit the power of elected governments and officials as well. He argues that those exerting the power of the government -elected officials, bureaucrats, the judiciary –'often develop their own interests'[22]. They are sometimes influenced by those constituencies in ways that are at odds with the interests and liberties of individuals or other groups. Mill makes no distinction between a tyranny of one and a tyranny of many. A tyrannical majority running roughshod over the rights of individuals and minorities is no less a tyrant because it is a majority, because it is elected, or because it is elected by a majority.

Furthermore, John Skorupski wrote on John Rawls review of J.S. Mill's Principle of Liberty. This review was drawn from the published Lectures given by John Rawls at Harvard on the History of Political Philosophy. One of the lectures is on Mill's Principle ofLiberty; an important contribution to the studies of *OnLiberty*.According to John Skorupski, Rawls begins by considering Mill's aims and the way these affect his choice of topic, his argument, and its virtues and defects. Mill's aim, in Rawls's view, ''was to formulate principles that would not only be normatively appropriate in their guidance for modern politics, but also be likely to find general acceptance''[23]. This, Rawls thinks, is what he saw as the function of the Liberty Principle. Rawls fears that ''the sway of prevailing and unreasoned opinion could be far worse in the new democratic society to come than it has been in the past''[24]. Mill, he says, intends the Liberty Principle to guide public policy by ruling out as inadmissible three kinds of reasons for compulsory (in any sense) interventions in people's actions: (i) paternalistic reasons (ii) perfectionist reasons (iii) "reasons of dislike or disgust, or of preference, where the disliking, disgust, or preference cannot be supported by reasons of right or wrong, as defined in *Utilitarianism*"[25].

For Mill the Principle should apply "absolutely;" Rawls takes him to mean that it should be applied without exception, on the grounds that it better serves the progressive development of human beings, and thus their good, that "the public political conception of the coming democratic society"[26] should adhere to this self-restraining principle unconditionally. This last remark goes too far, whatever present purposes may be. It has some plausibility as regards the Liberty Principle – but even there it is unhistorical. One very important difference is that:

> For Mill the Liberty Principle is not part of a larger view which holds that the liberal state must be 'ethically neutral' – whereas that requirement is a central feature of Rawls's liberalism. Still, it is not unreasonable to hold first, that Mill's principles of justice and liberty, as characterised by Rawls, can be defended on utilitarian grounds .[27]

The issue of public acceptance is important for Rawls because of the philosophical weight he puts on what he calls "overlapping consensus."[28]   Rawls believes his principles of justice as fairness can be justified from a variety of reasonable ethical positions, of which utilitarianism is one, though only one. This, if true, would greatly add to their stability. Rawls accepts that utilitarianism is a 'reasonable' ethical position, though he does not endorse it, and he accepts that utilitarianism could form part of an overlapping consensus on Mill's principles of justice and liberty. Subsequently, the most significant issue is how Mill's overall conception of the content and aim of a public principle of liberty in a democratic state differ from that of Rawls. Rawls's strong and evident inclination to bring Mill's ideas about liberty and justice close to his own does not arise simply from a strategic interest in finding an overlapping consensus. At a deeper level he feels affinity with Mill and thinks of him as belonging to his kind of liberal tradition. Somewhat surprising evidence for this can be found in Rawls's lectures on the history of moral philosophy. There he refers at several points to what he calls the "liberalism of freedom."[29] He characterises it as the view that civic and political freedoms are ends in themselves, and not merely means to something else, such as happiness – and he classes Mill along with Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and himself as a liberal of this kind. Mill denies that virtue and individuality are simply *means* to happiness. For a developed human being they become ends in themselves – but as parts of happiness, not in contradistinction to it. Whether or not this line of thought can be defended, it is crucial to Mill's liberal politics. It is an aspect of the Aristotelian principle that Rawls rightly attributes to Mill, according to which the most valuable forms of happiness are achieved through development of one's potentialities – the Millian assumption being that both virtue and individual spontaneity of character are such developments. While Rawls is right to place Mill apart from the other utilitarians, and John Skorupski would not in any way diminish the importance of this difference and Rawlsian conception of Mill, as someone seeking to achieve consensus on

institutions of liberty "from within the tradition of democratic constitutionalism" seems quite plausible. But it obscures crucial differences between Mill and Rawls.

Carlos Rodriguez Braun observes that Mill keeps the state also out of sight. The enemy of liberty is not power, but the weight of public opinion. Under this remarkable and now generalised doctrine, the state not only does not restrict liberty, but "can and must be the instrument for guaranteeing and extending individual liberties."[30] The seeds were planted long ago: classical liberalism retreated during the supposedly liberal nineteenth century, and politicians like Joseph Chamberlain argued that political criticism was justified only when there was no democracy. Echoes of this naivety are visible in the recent demand of republicanism theory to preserve the social-democratic (and Millian) contradiction of the state defending liberty and coercive redistribution at the same time: according to Pettit, "such action is acceptable as long as it is undertaken not by an arbitrary government, but one subject to an equitable rule of law."[31] As thinkers like Nisbet and Ortega y Gasset warned, ''democracy, a theory of political power, overtakes classical liberalism, a theory of immunity from power."[32] Mill does not accept this fully, but when time comes to defend liberty, he ignored private property and voluntary contracts. Instead, Mill used collective utilitarian categories and the idea of the separability of personal self-regarding conduct that does not affect others. However, Green emphasizes more on every aspect of current democratic socialism, with the anti-liberal key of the common citizenry and the state viewed not as coercive but as liberating. Green reproaches Mill "for not having been more emphatic in recommending the expansion of politics and legislation beyond education to the unlimited universe of rights that makes up today's Welfare State".[33] Mill blazed the trail, and was admired for doing so, although much later and by both socialists and those whose main goal was not the limiting of power —whether inhabiting the political centre or right. Such flabby

contemporary thought now hails him for being social or progressive, casuistically combining capitalism and socialism, and defending liberty until it needs to be attacked.

There are, in sum, reasons to doubt the classical liberalism of *On Liberty*, the most celebrated text ever written in favor of liberty. Two final remarks on this paradox. Contradictions follow easily from contradictions, and Mill contradicts himself often, among other reasons because, as Williams says: "a degree of circularity is an unavoidable element in the moral discourse of one who no longer derives everything from a fundamental or ultimate principle."[34] This is attractive in a democratic world that often appeals to fictions in order to make impossible ends meet, and it also highlights H. Cowell's error in predicting, in an early review of *OnLiberty*, that Mill's "evanescent"[35] theories would never take root. To appreciate it, the reader may reflect on the restrictions authorities now place on liberty, from the most blatant economic interventionism to the most meticulous and moralising social engineering of daily life, all with the apparent justification that democracy simply and automatically reflects citizens' interests, and in the name of progress none of its incursions should be opposed. *On Liberty* includes reasons for rejecting all of it.

More so, C. L. Ten argues that in on Liberty, Henry West provides an over-view of Mill's case for liberty in continuity with utilitarianism; West suggests that "agents (researchers) must be guided by secondary principles, other than aiming directly to utility."[36] David Brink and Jonathan Riley, each tackle the problem of free expression, which covers the second chapter of On Liberty. According to Ten, Brink projects a conventional view which led emphasis on the continuities between Mill's general arguments against paternalism and moralistic legalisation and his case for free speech though with restrictions. For instance, limits on political campaign spending, could be deliberation- enhancing, if equal opportunity is granted to all to be heard. On the other hand, Riley argues that speech is not protected by the liberty principle, because it is a social activity. Riley developing an interpretation offered

in his earlier work says that "expression like trade, should be left free as a matter of expediency, and not right."[37]

Donner also begins from Mill's thoughts on marriage, particularly his qualified endorsement of "Mormon polygamy"[38] but goes on to question the extent to which cultural groups should be allowed to enforce their traditions and conceptions of morality over their members. Coincidentally, Waldron's essay on Mill and multiculturalism continues this theme, arguing that Mill's defence of individuality is not necessarily hospitable to a politics of group identity, since minority ways of life may be equally as stifling as majority customs. If Waldron illustrates one way in which Mill's arguments can be extended to address contemporary problems, Justine Burley goes even further, exploring what Mill might have said about reproductive cloning or "genetic experiments in living."[39] This chapter at first appears something of an oddity, being primarily concerned with medical technologies that Mill could not even have imagined, but Burley does a good job of drawing on what Mill does say about reproduction and parenting to extrapolate a Millian approach to cloning. Her conclusion, somewhat predictably, is that Mill would not object to reproductive technology in principle, but would permit interference in order to prevent harm to the child. While it amply demonstrates both the applications to which Mill's doctrine can be put and its genuine relevance to modern issues, it is rather speculative in places and does little to defend the Millian approach.

Again, Robert Young, reconsiders the anti-paternalistic arguments offered by Mill and Ronald Dworkin, arguing that neither are decisive and thus that, if we value autonomy, we should be ready and willing to intervene in an individual's choices when they are of merely incidental significance, in order to protect their autonomy in more important matters. For example, we may legitimately compel people to wear seatbelts or to attend fire safety

courses, because they have little interest in not doing these things and this interference may better promote their autonomy overall.

Will Cartwright arguing in Mill on Freedom of Discussion says, in the West the freedom to say what you like, to criticise the authorities, and to discuss ideas openly and without fear, is agreed to be of fundamental importance. What there is less agreement about is when this freedom may be properly curtailed. It may seem surprising, then, that Mill devotes most of his famous account of these matters in *On Liberty* to explaining why freedom of discussion is important and very little of it to what may seem the more pressing matter of when this freedom may be limited. But there are reasons for this apparent imbalance in Mill's discussion which are worth noticing. Though freedom of discussion was widely accepted even in Mill's own day, he thinks that the arguments for it are not widely appreciated, something that is no doubt still true, and he holds, as he makes clear in chapter II, that one should not have beliefs without knowing the reasons for them. Moreover these arguments for free discussion have a wider relevance to issues of liberty, for Mill holds that "these arguments, suitably adapted, are also arguments for freedom of action."[40]

There is a third reason for Mill's emphasis on the arguments for free discussion and for freedom generally. He thinks that "freedom is increasingly threatened, not so much by the law as by an oppressive public opinion, in England at least."[41] Curbing this threat require a widespread appreciation of why freedom of discussion and other freedoms are important. On another note, Derek Jones, reviewing On Liberty asserts that Mill was a libertarian who chooses not to base his defence of liberty on natural rights but on his revised utilitarianism that stresses human development. Mill argues that freedom is required to allow men to explore all the avenues of human development. Mill distinguishes between self-regarding and other-regarding actions. The former should never be interfered with and the latter is subject to limitation only if they harm the legitimate rights of others.

Furthermore, Mill argues that free thought is a self-regarding action which should not be curtailed, and free thought is virtually useless without free speech. He was concerned not only about legal curtailment but also the pressure of social conformity, for he fears a "tyranny of the majority."[42] Mill then adds a utilitarian argument in favour of free speech: if an opinion, whether true or false, is silenced then mankind is necessarily the loser. He advances a number of arguments to support this, concluding with the claim that a climate of freedom is essential for "great thinkers" (intellectual elitism) and it is as much, and even more indispensable to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature they are capable of. Today there is much talk about whether people have the right not to be offended. Mill thought otherwise and hence his opposition to the blasphemy law.

Moreover, Mill uses an example to illustrate when "free speech may properly be curbed."[43] He says that one ought to be free to attack corn dealers in the press as starvers of the poor, but that one should not be free to make the same attack orally to an excited mob outside a corn dealer's house. Even though the words used may be identical, the alteration of the circumstances in which they are uttered make all the difference in Mill's view. For in front of the excited crowd the words constitute "a positive instigation to some mischievous act."[44] The principle embodied in this example is that one should be free to say what one likes unless one's saying it causes harm. This limitation on free speech, the only one acknowledged by Mill, commands very wide support, but only because the limitation as stated is so general. Once we get beyond this general formula into the more particular questions raised by it, agreement becomes much harder to reach.

However, Jeremy Waldron in attempt to define harm principle draws our attention to the visual impact of hate speech. Waldron argues that "the harm in hate speech compromises the dignity of those under attack."[45] A society where such images proliferate makes life exceedingly difficult for those targeted by hate speech. Waldron suggests that the people

engaged in hate speech are saying "the time for your degradation and your exclusion by the society that presently shelters you is fast approaching."[46] He claims that prohibiting such messages assures all people that they are welcome members of the community.

Waldron does not want to use hate speech legislation to punish those who hold hateful thoughts and attitudes. The goal is not to engage in thought control but to prevent harm to the social standing of certain groups in society. Liberal democratic societies are founded on ideas of equality and dignity and these are damaged by hate speech. Given this, Waldron wonders why we even need to debate the usefulness of hate speech. Mill, for example, argues that we should allow speech of this type so that our ideas do not fall into the "slumber of a decided opinion."[47] Waldron doubts that we require hate speech to prevent such an outcome. As we have seen, Waldron is making a harm based argument but his threshold for what counts as harm is lower than Mill's. He needs to convince us that an attack on a person's dignity constitutes a significant harm. My dignity might often be bruised by colleagues, for example, but this does not necessarily show that I have been harmed. Perhaps it is only when an attack on dignity is equivalent to threats of physical abuse that it counts as a reason for limiting speech. Waldron does not offer a lot of evidence that a permissive attitude to hate speech, at least in liberal democracies, does cause significant harm. There is no specific hate speech regulation in the United States, for example, but it is not clear that more harm occurs there than in other liberal democracies.

As a follow up, David Boonin is not convinced that there is a need for special hate speech legislation. He claims that hate speech does not fit within the regular categories of speech that can be prohibited. Even if he can be persuaded that it does fit, he still thinks special hate speech laws are not required because existing legislation will capture the offending speech. To examine one example he uses to make his point, Boonin argues that threatening speech already sits within the category of speech that is rightfully prohibited. He suggests, however,

that ''hate speech does not fall within this category because a significant amount of hate speech is not directly threatening.''[48]   A group of black men, for example, will not be threatened by a racially abusive elderly white woman. He argues that this example and others like it, shows why a blanket ban on all hate speech on the grounds that it is threatening cannot be justified. Nor is it likely, he suggests, that racist attacks by frail old ladies will contribute to an atmosphere of danger. This argument might be less persuasive. Mill's use of the corn dealer example demonstrates how the use of language can incite violence regardless of who is speaking. But Mill's example also shows that a blanket ban would still be unwarranted because it allows incendiary statements to be made about corn dealers under controlled conditions.

Furthermore, Boonin's argument does not rest here. If it really does turn out to be the case that all hate speech is threatening in the appropriate sense, this still does not justify special hate speech laws because there is already legislation in place prohibiting threatening language. Boonin is opposed to banning hate speech because it is hateful not because it is threatening. He claims that the argument for special hate speech legislation is: "Impaled on the horns of a dilemma: either the appeal is unconvincing because not all forms of hate speech are threatening, or it is unnecessary precisely because all forms of hate speech are threatening and are therefore already prohibited." [49] Boonin uses the same strategy with regard to other reasons, such as "fighting words", for banning hate speech; they all find themselves impaled on the horns of the same dilemma.

The arguments of Waldron and Boonin seem to be a long way apart and the latter suggests that anyone who argues for hate speech laws is taking an extreme position. There is, however, a lot of overlap between the two, particularly as both focus on harm, and neither wants to censor hate speech simply because it is offensive. This becomes clearer if we take a suggestion offered by Waldron. At one point in his book he ponders whether it might be

advantageous to abandon the term "hate speech" altogether. Such a move goes a long way to reconciling the arguments of Waldron and Boonin. Both authors agree that prohibition is acceptable when speech is threatening; they disagree on what counts as a harmful threat. Waldron thinks most forms of racial abuse qualify whereas Boonin is more circumspect. But the disagreement between the two is about what causes harm rather than any major philosophical difference about the appropriate limits on speech. If both agree that a threat constitutes a significant harm, then both will support censorship. This still leaves lots of room for disagreement, particularly as we are now more aware than was Mill of psychological as well as physical harm. We cannot delve into the topic here except to say that if we expand the harm principle from the physical to the mental realm, more options might become available for prohibiting hate speech and pornography. Besides, there are two basic responses to the harm principle. One is that it is too narrow; and the other is that it is too broad. This latter view is not often expressed because, as already noted, most people think that free speech should be limited if it causes illegitimate harm. However, George Kateb has made an interesting argument that runs as follows: if we want to limit speech because it causes harm, we will have to ban a lot of political speech. Most of it is useless, a lot of it is offensive, and some of it causes harm because it is deceitful and aimed at discrediting specific groups. It also undermines democratic citizenship and stirs up nationalism and jingoism, which results in harm to citizens of other countries. Even worse than political speech, according to Kateb, is religious speech. He claims that a lot of religious speech is hateful, useless, dishonest, and foments war, bigotry and fundamentalism. It also creates bad self-image and feelings of guilt that can haunt persons throughout their lives. Pornography and hate speech, he claims, cause nowhere near as much harm as political and religious speech. As we rightly do not want to ban political and religious speech, Kateb claims to have demonstrated that the harm principle casts the net too far. His solution is to ''abandon the principle in favor of almost unlimited

speech."[50] This is a powerful argument, but there seem to be at least two problems. The first is that the harm principle would actually allow religious and political speech for the same reasons that it allows most pornography and hate speech, namely that it is not possible to demonstrate that such speech does cause direct harm to rights. One could doubt that Mill would support using his arguments about harm to ban political and religious speech. The second problem for Kateb is that if he is right that such speech does cause harm by violating rights, we now have powerful reasons for limiting political and religious speech. If Kateb's argument is sound he has shown that harm is more extensive than we might have thought; he has not demonstrated that the harm principle is invalid.

The other response to the harm principle is that it does not reach far enough. One of the most impressive arguments for this position comes from Joel Feinberg who suggests that the harm principle cannot shoulder all of the work necessary for a principle of free speech. In some instances, Feinberg suggests, we also need an *offence principle* that can guide public censure. The basic idea is that the harm principle sets the bar too high and that we can legitimately prohibit some forms of expression because they are very offensive. Offending is less serious than harming so any penalties imposed should not be severe. As Feinberg notes, this has not always been the case and he cites a number of instances in the U.S. where penalties for "offensive" acts like sodomy and consensual incest have ranged from twenty years imprisonment to the death penalty. Feinberg's principle reads as follows:

> It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offence to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end. The principle asserts, in effect, that the prevention of offensive conduct is properly the state's business.[51]

Such a principle is hard to apply because many people take offence as a result of an overly sensitive disposition, or worse, because of bigotry and unjustified prejudice. A further difficulty is that some people can be deeply offended by statements that others find mildly

amusing. The furor over the Danish cartoons brings this starkly to the fore. Despite the difficulty of applying a standard of this kind, something like the offence principle operates widely in liberal democracies where citizens are penalised for a variety of activities, including speech that would escape prosecution under the harm principle. Wandering around the local shopping mall naked, or engaging in sexual acts in public places are two obvious examples. Given the specific nature of this essay, we will not delve into the issue of offensive behaviour in all its manifestations, and we will limit the discussion to offensive forms of speech. Feinberg suggests that many factors need to be taken into account when deciding whether speech can be limited by the offence principle. These include the extent, duration and social value of the speech, the ease with which it can be avoided, the motives of the speaker, the number of people offended, the intensity of the offence, and the general interest of the community.

However, not many liberal democracies are willing to support the Millian view that only speech causing direct harm to rights should be prohibited. Most support some form of the offence principle. Some liberal philosophers are willing to extend the realm of state interference further and argue that hate speech should be banned even if it does not cause harm or unavoidable offence. The reason it should be banned is that it is inconsistent with the underlying values of liberal democracy to brand some citizens as inferior on the grounds of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation. The same applies to pornography; it should be prevented because it is incompatible with democratic citizenship to portray women as submissive sexual objects, who seem to enjoy being violently mistreated. Rae Langton, for example, starts from the liberal premise of equal concern and respect and concludes that it is justifiable to remove certain speech protections for pornographers. Rae Langton avoids basing her argument on harm: "If, for example, there were conclusive evidence linking pornography to violence, one could simply justify a prohibitive strategy on the basis of the

harm principle. However, the prohibitive arguments advanced in this article do not require empirical premises as strong as this…they rely instead on the notion of equality."[52]

Working within the framework of arguments supplied by Ronald Dworkin, who is opposed to prohibitive measures, she tries to demonstrate that egalitarian liberals such as Dworkin should support the prohibition of pornography. Langton asserts that:

> Women as a group have rights against the producers and consumers of pornography, and thereby have rights that are trumps against the policy of permitting pornography the permissive policy is in conflict with the principle of equal concern and respect, and that women accordingly have rights against it.[53]

The fact remains that Langton is not basing her argument on the harm principle, but she does not have to show that women are harmed by pornography. For the argument to be persuasive, however, one has to accept that permitting pornography does mean that women are not treated with equal concern and respect. It also seems that the argument can be applied to non-pornographic material that portrays women in a demeaning way that undermines their status as equals. To argue the case above, one has to dilute one's support for freedom of expression in favor of other principles, such as equal respect for all citizens. This is a sensible approach according to Stanley Fish. He suggests that the task we face is not to arrive at hard and fast principles that prioritize all speech. Instead, we have to find a workable compromise that gives due weight to a variety of values. Supporters of this view will remind us that when we are discussing free speech, we are not dealing with it in isolation; what we are doing is comparing free speech with some other good. We have to decide whether it is better to place a higher value on speech than on the value of privacy, security, equality, or the prevention of harm. Fish suggests we need to find a balance in which "we must consider in every case what is at stake and what are the risks and gains of alternative courses of action."[54]

According to Fish, the boundaries of free speech cannot be set in stone by philosophical principles. It is the world of politics that decides what we can and cannot say guided, but not

hidebound, by the world of abstract philosophy. Fish suggests that free speech is about political victories and defeats. The very guidelines for marking off protected from unprotected speech are the result of this battle rather than truths in their own right: "No such thing as free (non-ideologically constrained) speech; no such thing as a public forum purged of ideological pressures of exclusion."[55] Speech always takes place in an environment of convictions, assumptions, and perceptions that is, within the confines of a structured world. According to Fish, one has to get out there and argue for one's position.

We should ask three questions according to Fish: "given that it is speech, what does it do, do we want it to be done, and is more to be gained or lost by moving to curtail it?"[56] He suggests that the answers we arrive at will vary according to the context. Free speech will be more limited in the military, where the underlying value is hierarchy and authority, than it will be at a university where one of the main values is the expression of ideas. Almost all places in which we interact are governed by underlying values and speech will have to fit in with these ideals: "regulation of free speech is a defining feature of everyday life."[57] Thinking of speech in this way removes a lot of its mystique. Whether we should ban hate speech is another problem, albeit more serious, similar to whether we should allow university professors to talk about football in lectures.

Liberals tend to justify freedom generally, and free speech in particular, for a variety of reasons. According to Mill, free speech fosters authenticity, genius, creativity, individuality and human flourishing. For Mill, if we ban free speech the silenced opinion may be true, or contain a portion of the truth, and that unchallenged opinions become mere prejudices and dead dogmas that are inherited rather than adopted. These are empirical claims that require evidence. Is it likely that we enhance the cause of truth by allowing hate speech or violent and degrading forms of pornography? It is worth pondering the relationship between speech and truth. If we had a graph where one axis is truth and the other is free speech, would we get

one extra unit of truth for every extra unit of free speech? How can such a thing even be measured? It is certainly questionable whether arguments degenerate into prejudice if they are not constantly challenged. Devil's advocates are often tedious rather than useful interlocutors. Sometimes supporters of free speech, like its detractors, have a tendency to make assertions without providing compelling evidence to back them up. None of this is meant to suggest that free speech is not vitally important: this is, in fact, precisely the reason we need to find arguments in its favour. But regardless of how good these arguments are, some limits will have to be placed on speech.

Consequently, it has certainly been the practice of most societies, even liberal-democratic ones, to impose some paternalistic restrictions on behaviour and to limit speech that causes avoidable offence. Hence the freedom of expression supported by the harm principle as outlined in Chapter One of *On Liberty* and by Feinberg's offense principle has yet to be realised. It is up to the reader to decide if such a society is an appealing possibility.

More so, Raafay Syed reviews Mill's On Liberty in his philosophical Opposition of Liberty and Utility; he first described the book (On Liberty) as an unwavering defence of individual liberty and freedom from limitations imposed by society. Mill's advocacy of the concepts of happiness, freedom, and individual liberty, serve as the groundwork for his Utilitarian theory of ethics; and the two works *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty* are perhaps the two most important essays which express his viewpoints.

However, when comparing the two texts, one cannot help noticing an inherent tension between them. Mill's discourse in *On Liberty,* is supposed to be written in a Utilitarian spirit. Mill's fundamental principle of utility presupposes that happiness is the only thing to be valued as a goal, and for its own sake. In order to remain consistent with Utilitarianism, the notions of individual liberty and freedom can only be valued as vehicles toward that same goal. In other words, "freedom can only be valued instrumentally, because it promotes

happiness."[58] It cannot be valued in and of itself as a natural right. This apparent tension between the two texts also manifests itself within *On Liberty* as Mill himself struggles with reconciling the two notions of freedom and utility. It will be necessary first to analyse the tension within *On Liberty,* before delving into the relation between *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty.*

From the foregoing, it is evident that Mill contradicts the principle of utility through his arguments for the protection of liberty, because he yields to the fact that liberty should be pursued for its own sake. There are several examples within *On Liberty*, which portray the concept of liberty as valuable only as a vehicle toward the end goal of promoting happiness. These examples prove Mill's consistency with Utilitarianism, because only happiness is valued in and of itself. In the first example of the instrumental value of liberty, Mill says:

> In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.[59]

In essence, this is an argument based on the principle of utility. According to the quote, individuality is valued because it promotes happiness for the individual, which, in turn, promotes happiness for society as a whole. Later in the text, Mill also points out that "originality is a valuable element in human affairs" and that "it is necessary further to show that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped."[60] He also supports "mental freedom"[61] on the grounds that it allows for the development of an intellectually active society. These quotes serve to illustrate that part of Mill's argument for the defence of liberty does seem to include extrinsic value, which is consistent with Utilitarianism. As long as liberty is valued as a means to the end of happiness, the principle of utility is not undermined.

On the other hand, there are also many instances where Mill appears to be accepting the inherent value of liberty as a goal in itself, rather than as a vehicle toward the end goal of happiness. In the first chapter of *On Liberty*, Mill begins by introducing "one very Simple Principle."[62] This is very dangerous for Mill, because according to Utilitarianism, the sole fundamental principle for human beings is the principle of utility. Furthermore, he goes on to describe this principle and states that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection."[63] This principle is regarded as the "harm principle" and serves as one of the major arguments within the text. An individual can act with absolute and complete liberty as long as he or she does not cause harm to another. With this statement, Mill seems to be placing liberty in a protected position, regardless of whether the recognition of liberty would promote utility. There are several examples in which Mill seems to express liberty as being inherently valuable. For instance, chapter three begins with the title, "Of Individuality, As One of The Elements of Well-Being."[64] This title is very important, because it does not define individuality as a *means* to well-being, or happiness, but as *part* of well-being. If the notion of individuality were included within the principle of utility *by definition* as part of happiness, then such a statement would not be contradictory. Since the principle of utility is defined as simply pleasure and absence of pain, there is no indication that individuality has any inherent good according to Utilitarianism.

At this point, it is noticeable that there is a clear internal contradiction within Mill's argument in *On Liberty*. He seems to be insisting that his "harm principle", is a protected principle distinct from utility, while at the same time insisting that liberty is only defended because of the principle of utility. The "harm principle" espoused in the text allows the individual to act with absolute freedom as long as no one else is affected by his actions. This seems to imply that the principle of utility has no jurisdiction within the personal sphere of the individual as

long as the individual's actions are "self-regarding."[65] However, if the individual's freedom was recognised only instrumentally, then even this personal "self-regarding" sphere could be interfered with in order to promote utility.

Although *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty* are not directly related or in dialogue with each other, Mill's ideas on "public utility" and "private utility" in his later work help explain the tension in his earlier work. Mill explains this distinction in *Utilitarianism*. He says private utility is "the interest or happiness of some few persons"[66] and public utility means to promote utility "on an extended scale." When viewing *On Liberty* through the lens of private versus public utility, it becomes clear what Mill is actually saying. He is arguing for the protection of liberty, for its own sake, only at the level of private utility. In contrast, liberty is valued instrumentally, in terms of public utility. For instance, Mill says an action "which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom."[67] Mill is saying that in cases where freedom and utility conflict, freedom will be valued regardless of the private utility that would be promoted by stripping away that freedom. However, by valuing freedom for its own sake, regardless of its private utility, the greater public utility will be promoted. In essence, Mill seems to insist on the inherent value of freedom, but uses the promotion of public utility at a larger scale in order to cover this flaw and remain consistent with Utilitarianism. This viewpoint is also made clear at the very beginning of the essay when Mill explains his intentions for *On Liberty*. In the introduction, he says "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being."[68] Mill must have anticipated the apparent tension that readers would recognise in his work, and with this statement explains that he will protect

liberty at the private level, but will also remain faithful to Utilitarianism by valuing liberty as a means of promoting utility on a larger scale.

The reconciliation of the two notions of freedom and utility is so difficult, that Mill's argument, an attempt to solve this tension, is bound to raise many questions. Is Mill entitled to make such a claim? Is it consistent to accept the principle of utility as fundamental at an extended scale, but place limits on it at the private level? Can liberty be valued intrinsically when viewed through one lens, but extrinsically in another? The response is to the objection that Utilitarianism is too demanding by asking an individual to promote happiness for an entire society. He says "private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to."[69] With this statement, Mill is making it clear that cases of public utility are only "exceptional", and in general, individuals should only be considered with private utility. If each individual is only concerned with private utility, the level at which liberty is protected and valued for its own sake, then the realm of public utility or the "greater good" seems irrelevant at a subjective level. If an individual's morality is defined strictly in terms of private utility, then it would make no difference whether liberty would be valued intrinsically or extrinsically at a larger scale, because the realm of public utility would not be a factor. In this sense, from the subjective standpoint of individuals, Mill accepts that liberty is inherently valuable, pursued for its own sake, and protected from the influence of utility. The instrumental value of liberty at the level of public utility cannot be argued for on Utilitarian grounds, because it has no practical significance for the individual in Utilitarianism.

In this sense, Mill ends up unintentionally yielding that liberty is inherently valuable in *On Liberty*. His argument for its value as a vehicle to promote happiness in terms of greater public utility, is inconsistent with Utilitarian principles and results in a principle of liberty that is protected and independent from the principle of utility. As a result, Mill cannot solve the apparent tension between *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism*, because his defence of liberty

leads to the undermining of the principle of utility. Furthermore, it would be necessarily impossible for him to reconcile both positions, because a true defence of liberty and freedom cannot rest on extrinsic value in the Utilitarian sense, but only on intrinsic value. If the notion of liberty is valued only as a means to an end, its very nature would be different depending on what the end may require. The very concept of liberty seems to escape this notion, and insists on being defended as a natural right to be recognised in and of itself. This is made evident through Mill's failure in his argument. Ultimately, Mill is placed in a position where he can either "defend liberty while renouncing the principle of utility, or he can maintain the principle of utility at the expense of a defence of true liberty."[70]

As part of their literature review on harm, which is part of the principle enshrined in On Liberty by J.S. Mill, Nigel Warburton and David Brink observed that, though J.S. Mill claims that all of his principles on liberty appeal to the ultimate authority of utilitarianism, according to Nigel Warburton, much of the essay can seem divorced from his supposed final court of appeals. Mill seems to idealise liberty and rights at the cost of utility. For instance, Mill writes: ''If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."[71] This claim seems to go against the principle of utilitarianism that it is permissible that one should be harmed so that the majority could benefit.

However, Warburton argues that Mill is likely ''optimistic about the outcome of free speech."[72] Warburton claims that there are situations in which it would cause more happiness to suppress truth than to permit it. For example, if a scientist discovered a comet about to kill the planet in a matter of weeks, it may cause more happiness to suppress the truth than to allow society to discover the impending danger. The harm principle is central to the principles in On Liberty. Nigel Warburton says that Mill appears unclear about what

constitutes harm. Early in the book, he claims that simply being offensive does not constitute harm. Later, he writes that certain acts which are permissible and harmless in private are worthy of being prohibited in public. This seems to contradict his earlier claim that merely offensive acts do not warrant prohibition because, presumably, the only harm done by a public act which is harmless in private is that it is offensive. Warburton notes that some people argue that morality is the basis of society, and that society is the basis of individual happiness. Therefore, if morality is undermined, so is individual happiness. Hence, since Mill claims that governments ought to protect the individual's ability to seek happiness, governments ought to intervene in the private realm to enforce moral codes.

In, Thinking from A to Z, Nigel Warburton reminds us that a Socratic Fallacy is: "The mistaken belief that if you cannot define general terms precisely you would not be in any position to identify particular instances of it."[73] The vagueness objection is a Socratic Fallacy, because whilst a concise definition of the word 'Harm' is not to be found in On Liberty the following argument is sound:

Premise 1. Minor objections should be set aside if an idea withstands the 'test of time'.
Premise 2. On Liberty has withstood the 'test of time'.
Premise 3.To insist that Mill's Harm Principle is specific at every eventuality is tantamount to asking for the impossible simply because the very concept of freedom (or liberty) carries within it an element of vagueness.

David Brink concedes that Mill's apparently categorical appeal to rights seems to contradict utilitarianism, he points out that Mill does not believe rights are truly categorical because Mill opposes unrestrained liberty (for example, offensive public exposure). Besides, David Brink tries to reconcile Mill's system of rights with utilitarianism in three ways:

a.   Rights are secondary principles to the Greatest Happiness Principle

b.   Rights are incomparable goods, justifying their categorical enforcement

c.   Liberty is a good. Thus, those who suppress it are worthy of punishment. Rights deal with the value of punishing/protecting others' interference with liberty, not the actual protection of liberty.

Warburton and David Brink assert that Mill fails to account for physical harm, solely concerning himself with spiritual wellbeing. They also argue that, while much of Mill's theory depends upon a distinction between private and public harm, "Mill seems not to have provided a clear focus on or distinction between the private and public realms."[74]

According to Murray Rothbard, Mill first applies these principles to the economy. He maintains that free markets are preferable to those controlled by governments. The libertarian political philosopher and free-market economist, Murray Rothbard, once neatly expressed Mill's point on this theme:

> If men were like ants, there would be no interest in human freedom. …The glory of the human race is the uniqueness of each individual, the fact that every person, though similar in many ways to others, possesses a completely individuated personality of his own…. these unique personalities need freedom for their full development that constitutes one of the major arguments for a free society.[75]

This is a universal truth asserted by De Soto following the Rothbardian conception of Anarchco-capitalism. This sentiment is essentially not different (in its fundamental thesis of "the one true system") than other political/religious ideologies that claim special knowledge of a universal truth.

Though, Rothbard in attempting to re-echo the two concepts of Liberty according to Isaiah Berlin, identified two different (and rival) conceptions of freedom. The first, negative liberty is the type of liberty championed by Mill and most liberals, and can be defined as freedom from external interference. Understood in this way, liberty demands strong limitations on the authority and activity of the state. The second is positive liberty, which may be defined as the freedom to actively and materially determine one's own life. Positive liberty requires the presence of something (resources, education, and self-mastery) which enables the agent to

control their own destiny. Negative liberty demands merely the absence of external constraints. Perhaps, there is in practice a considerable difference between what is required for negative freedom, and what is required for individuals to be free in a positive sense. Even if an individual is free from state interference and thus enjoys negative liberty, they may not enjoy positive freedom: they may lack resources, or education, or a moral compass, or the will to live a 'good life'. They may not be 'free' to make meaningful and effective choices about their lives – but with intervention from the state, they can become freer as their capacity to choose wisely develops. Intervention from the state, of course, means a lessening of negative freedom – and may sound a sinister note to modern ears. Mill was not directly concerned with how people choose to act, or their particular conception of the good life, but only with establishing a protected sphere of activity within which they are free to act as they see fit. Nevertheless, many criticisms of Mill's notion of liberty come from those who believe that the state can and should intervene to promote the positive liberty of its citizens (for instance, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx).

However, Berlin also draws attention to another aspect of negative freedom: Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source. There is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule. It is important to recognise that On Liberty is a work of utilitarian thinker: Mill advocates a broad negative liberty because that is the best means to his ultimate goal. Such liberty may be most often found in liberal democracies, but Berlin rightly notes that it is not incompatible with a benign autocracy: The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty meets with Mill's specification.

For Mill, freedom is an instrumental good. Its value lies in its utility: liberty is a means to an end, and that end is happiness – although by 'happiness' he means something broader than Bentham's hedonic identification of happiness with pleasure. Rothbard regards utility as the

ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. It is one of the most enduring questions of political philosophy whether those interests are in fact, as Mill claims, best served by negative freedom and non-interference by the state.

Nigel Warburton, in furtherance of the review of Mill's On Liberty, with reference to 'religion,' states that though Mill encourages religious tolerance, because he does not speak from the perspective of a specific religion, some claim that he does not account for what certain religious beliefs would entail when governing a society. Some religions believe that they have a God given duty to enforce religious norms. For them, it seems impossible for their religious beliefs to be wrong, that is, the beliefs are infallible. Therefore, according to Warburton, Mill's principle of total freedom of speech may not apply.

Hence, Domenico Losurdo and David Theo Goldberg remark that Mill is clear that his concern for liberty does not extend to all individuals and all societies. However, Mill states that "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians."[76] Contemporary philosophers Domenico Losurdo and David Theo Goldberg have strongly criticised Mill as a racist and an apologist for colonialism. Domenico Losurdo argues that from "the outset liberalism, as a philosophical position and ideology, has been bound up with the most illiberal of policies: slavery, colonialism, genocide, racism and snobbery."[77] According to Hamburger Joseph, Mill enjoys a reputation as an unequivocal defender of liberty and as one who asserts its claims against the restrictions imposed by society, including its customs, "received opinions," and expectations. Perhaps Mill wishes "to stamp out selfishness that the achievement of moral reform coexisted with and sometimes superseded individual liberty."[78]

Mill wrote less as one seeking to present the truth than as a practitioner of rhetoric seeking to shape beliefs. This dimension of Mill's writing was recognised by R. P. Anschutz: "As war is

sometimes said to be an extension of policy, so philosophy for Mill was an extension of politics.''[79] Kate, George reviews that Mill's on Liberty although it is a great work there is no reason to think that any account of the book will ever satisfy all who take the book seriously. The book is restless, and induces restlessness. The most important source of the book's power to compel commentary is its indefatigable intensity. Practically every sentence is freighted, invested by Mill with concentrated meaning. Waldron, Jeremy remarks in his review that Mill's insistence On Liberty should be understood as an argument about social and cultural coercion rather than as an argument about the limits of the criminal law. It forms much of the argument of Chapter I of the essay, a chapter in which Mill traces the dominant source of tyranny in society from rule by the few, through democratic rule by the many (the "tyranny of the majority"), to '' the informal tyranny of society."[80]

Richard M. Ebeling critically reviewed John Stuart Mill and the Dangers to Liberty. According to Richard, Mill's essay takes on particular significance and importance at the present time when governments around the world, including in the United States, are hell-bent on extending their power and control over the economic and social affairs of ordinary men and women. Everywhere we look, government is claiming the duty and responsibility to care for our old age; manage our health care; regulate our industry and the wages we earn through the presidential appointment of various political planning "czars." The government controls what we eat; oversees what we buy; paternalistically supervises with whom and how we interact with others in society. The government also educates our children and determines what they learn. And the government may soon "subsidise and therefore influence what we read in our local newspapers."[81]

John Stuart Mill focused on several dangers to our liberty. He started with the importance of freedom of thought, and went on to analyse the dangers from the tyranny of the minority, the tyranny of the majority, and the tyranny from rigid customs and traditions that stifle the

individual's ability for self-expression and action. Mill defended freedom of thought on several grounds. First, we should accept the fact that none of us can claim an infallibility of knowledge or a final and definite insight into ultimate truth. Thus, we should value and defend liberty of thought and argument because a dissenter or a critic of conventional and generally accepted views may offer reasons for disagreeing that correct our own errors of knowledge and mistakes in judgment about the truth of things. Second, sometimes the truth about things exists as half-truths held by different people, and through controversy the truth in the parts can be made into a great unified truth of the whole. And, third, even if we are really certain that we have the truth and a correct understanding of things, unless we are open to challenging and rethinking that which we take for granted, our ideas and beliefs can easily become atrophied dogmas. The people in each generation must be taught to think and reason for themselves. If ideas and beliefs are to remain living and meaningful, people must arrive at their own conclusions through reflection and thought. Mill not only defended freedom of thought but liberty of action as well. To make men conform to uniformity in their conduct would prevent that which is an inherent hallmark of each of us as a human being: our individuality.

Classical liberals have often pointed out that a weak link in Mill's argument is the vagueness or inconsistency in how he defines the arena within which the individual may claim protection from political infringements on his individual freedom of action. But in the broadest sense, Mill defines the range of a person's right to unrestrained liberty over his own choices as extending to that point at which his actions would infringe upon and violate the equal rights of other people to their freedom. And the weakest point in Mill's defence of individual liberty is "his failure to clearly align his case for human freedom with the right to private property and its use in all ways that do not violate the comparable individual rights of others."[82]

But within the context of his own premises, Mill was a fairly strong advocate of much of what today we usually call civil liberties. Thus, for example, he opposed the attempt by some to prohibit the consumption of alcohol by others, insisting that it was an inappropriate restraint on individual freedom of choice. Men of the most honest intentions and goodwill may reason with their fellow human beings and offer their own lives as examples of better ways of living. But it would be an unjustifiable violation of another's personal freedom to coercively attempt to prevent him from ingesting some substance that he — however wrong-headedly from the critic's perspective — finds desirable, useful, or pleasurable. But Mill, unfortunately, conceded to the government as necessary responsibilities far more powers of intervention into social and economic affairs than most modern classical liberals and libertarians consider justifiable, and this gets to the issue of what can stifle or prevent an individual from exercising his personal freedom in the manner he wants. Mill argued that there were, historically, three forms of tyranny that have endangered liberty through the ages. The oldest was the tyranny of the one or the few over the many. A single dictator or an oligarchy imposed prohibitions on or commanded certain forms of behavior over the majority of the society. The spontaneous individualism and individuality of each person was denied. The one or the few determined how others might live and what they might say and do and, therefore, in what forms their human potential would be allowed to develop. The newer form of tyranny, Mill said, was the rule of the many over the one. The revolt against the tyranny of the one or the few resulted in the growing idea that the people should rule themselves. And since the people, surely, could not tyrannise themselves, the unrestrained will of the people became the ideal of those who advocated unlimited democracy.

But in practice this inevitably became the rule of the majority over the minority. Individual freedom was denied purely on the basis of numbers, that is, on the basis of which group or coalition of groups formed that larger number of people dominating the political process.

Their ideas, ideals, and values were to be imposed on all those representing less than 50 percent of the electorate. But whether it was the tyranny of the few over the many or the many over the few, the source of their tyrannical power was the control and use of political coercion. State power is what enabled some to deny liberty to others. The threat or the use of force by government is what enabled freedom to be taken away from individuals who believed in ideas, ideals, or values different from those holding the reins of political power.

Mill also says that there is a third source of tyranny over the individual in society, and this is the tyranny of custom and tradition. He argues that the despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than the customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress . Custom is there, in all things, the final appeal, as justice and right mean conformity to custom. All deviations come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Hence, Mill argues with great passion that societal customs and traditions could, indeed, very often be the worst tyranny of all. They were binding rules on conduct and belief that owed their force not to coercion but to their being the shared ideas of the right held by the vast majority in the society. They represent what the ancient Greek Pericles referred to as "that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace."[83] Customs and traditions weigh down on the individual, they stifle his sense and desire to be different, to experiment with the new, to creatively design ways of doing things that have not been tried before, and to break out of the confinement of conformity. Custom and tradition can be the straitjacket that restricts a person's cry for his peaceful and nonviolent individuality. But while customs and traditions may hold such power over men, because of their fear of disgrace and ostracism by family, friends, and neighbors, they are still not coercion. No matter how strong a hold custom and tradition may have over men's minds and therefore their conduct in society, an individual can

still choose to go his own way and be the eccentric and outcast, if he is willing to pay the price in terms of the disapproval of others in his community. Political force is not the weapon that ensures obedience. The power of custom and tradition comes from social and psychological pressure and the human desire to avoid being shunned by those whose association is wanted.

What Mill does not give emphasis to or fully appreciate in his essay "On Liberty" is that what enables an individual to follow his own path even in the face of strong customs and traditions is the institution of private property and the free and voluntary relationships of the market economy. Private property gives an individual ownership and control of a portion of the means of production through which he may then choose how and for what purposes he will live his life. Private property gives him a "territory" that is under his own jurisdiction for a degree of "self-rule." In his home and on his property, in the free society he can design his one-person "country" to fit his values, ideals, and desires. What the customs of others consider eccentric can be lived as the norm and the normal on the territory of his private property.

It is true that no man is an island. Unless an individual wishes to attempt existence in self-sufficient isolation, he must participate in the interdependent social system of the division of labor. But the advantage of the market economy is that an individual can choose how and in what form he will find his niche in the nexus of voluntary exchange to acquire those things that will enable him to fulfill his own vision of the good life and its purposes. This will not come without a cost. To earn the income that permits him, as a consumer, to buy the things that will enable him to live that unconventional life may require him to work as a producer at tasks he finds irksome or unattractive. On the other hand, he can choose to earn a living doing something he enjoys more, but then he may have to forgo the higher income that he could

have earned if he had produced and supplied something that potential customers might have valued more highly.

The market economy also offers the individual a degree of anonymity that helps shield and guard him from prying eyes and the imposed values of others. Rarely do the consumers of multitudes of market-supplied goods and services know or care about the values, beliefs, or lifestyles of those in the production process who participate in bringing demanded commodities to the buying public. A person can earn a living making a product to finance his personal vision of the good life, even when many of the buyers of his product would, perhaps, radically disapprove of the way he leads his life with the income he has earned serving their wants. It is precisely this type of freedom that the market economy makes possible to all its participants that arouses the disapproval and anger of those who resent the ability of some to flaunt the customs and traditions believed in and practiced by many if not most of the other members of society. The danger to liberty arises when those who resent breaches of tradition cry for coercion to be used to impose obedience to custom. Only then does the tyranny of custom, as understood by Mill, become the coercion of the many over the few. Only then is freedom denied, indeed suffocated, by politically enforced conformity.

It is the misuse and abuse of political power — the threat or the application of legitimised force by a government within a geographical area — that always has been the greatest threat to liberty. All tyranny, whether it be the few over the many or the many over the few, results from the use of force to make others conform to the conduct desired by the rulers, even when those being coerced have done nothing to violate the rights of others. That John Stuart Mill failed to sufficiently see this and defend liberty on this basis does not detract from the fact that '"On Liberty' remains one of the greatest works that has been written on behalf of individual freedom during the last 150 years."[84] And with the continuing growth of "Big

Government" in our own time, his classic essay remains as fresh and relevant as when it first appeared in 1859.

James Fitzjames Stephen argues from utilitarian principles that the best outcome for society would be ensured by a degree of moral coercion and legal intervention. Mill's negative freedom could not guarantee a morally upright society: intervening to ensure a sober nation would produce less variety but more happiness than one in which half the citizens are drunkards. Stephen claims that Mill had elevated liberty to an absolute, rather than a merely instrumental good, and there are certainly passages in On Liberty that seem to support his claim. Another of Mill's arguments in On Liberty is that the state has no right to regulate an individual's behaviour for moralistic reasons that is to assert or defend a moral preference. This claim was challenged a century later by Lord Devlin in his commentary on the Wolfenden Report recommending the legalisation of homosexuality.

Moreover, Stephen further argues that civil or social liberty as distinguished from 'the so-called Liberty of the Will' is the expression, Mill originally meant for protection against the tyranny of political rulers. Their power was recognised as a necessary evil, and its limitation either by privilege or by constitutional checks is by implication what is meant by liberty. The tyranny of the majority has its root in "the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathises, would like them to act."[85]

He points out that "this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties, [and] we may leave out of account those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage."[86] He then disclaims any advantage which could be derived to his 'argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility.' He adds: "I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive

being."[87] He concludes by specifying the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.

Nevertheless, both Gerald F. Gaus and Robert Amdur in "State Neutrality and Controversial Values in On Liberty" and "Rawls's Critique of On Liberty" respectively, are concerned with the question of whether Mill's views are consistent with liberal neutrality toward reasonable comprehensive views of the good. Gaus begins with Charles Larmore's complaint that although the policies Mill endorses are largely neutral among competing conceptions of the good, Mill's justification for those policies is not neutral. Instead, it depends on a specific theory of what makes for a good life, which highlights the role of individuality. Gaus argues that this criticism overlooks the variety of arguments that Mill provides in defence of his principle of liberty and in particular the case Mill makes for the value of liberty for those who do not value individuality. Gaus' defence of Mill's neutrality is complemented by Amdur's critical evaluation of the contrasts Rawls draws between the neutral grounds for the priority of his first principle of justice (requiring maximal equal liberty) and Mill's non-neutral quasi-utilitarian argument for his principle of liberty.

However, Frank Lovett, Wendy Donner and Jeremy Waldron from their different works namely, "Mill on Consensual Domination", "Autonomy, Tradition and the Enforcement of Morality", and "Mill and Multiculturalism" respectively, are concern about the knotty problems posed for Mill by apparently consensual relationships that diminish the liberty of some of those who participate in them. The extreme case is voluntary slavery, which Mill judges to be impermissible on the grounds that permitting it in the name of freedom undermines rather than protects freedom. Lovett argues that if one takes freedom to be merely the absence of constraints, then relations involving domination such as traditional

marriage or even slavery do not inevitably limit freedom more than avoiding such relations. Mill would, Lovett maintains, have been better advised to adopt a view of freedom as the absence of domination.

Furthermore, Donner and Waldron are also concern about consensual domination, particularly as it arises within anti-liberal subcultures within liberal societies. Donner points out the tensions between Mill's critique of the contemporary institution of marriage, especially in On the Subjection of Women, and his insistence that Mormon polygamist marriages should be tolerated. Donner complains that: "He scourges his own society for inducing conformity, yet the conformist patterns of Mormon marriages, he thinks, should be protected from persecution by liberal outsiders."[88] Donner plausibly maintains that the nurturing of individuality and the protection of liberty require not only restraint on the part of the state and of majority public opinion but also protection from tyrannical subcultures and the provision of an educational regime that equips young adults to reflect on the cultures within which they have been raised. Donner argues that without such protections, Mill's view that women voluntarily choose to enter polygamous relations is naive and unjustified. In emphasizing the risks of excessive state control of education, Donner argues, Mill underestimates the risks of indoctrination by other social bodies.

Jeremy Waldron further develops these concerns. After sketching a superficial Millian case for multiculturalism, he reminds the reader that Mill is concerned with individual liberty, not with the liberty of groups, and that even vulnerable and oppressed subcultures can threaten individual liberty. As he puts it, "If there is any support in his [Mill's] work for cultural diversity, it is an aspect of individual liberty, and he would be uncomfortable about any application of his theory which permitted oppression in the name of a tolerated culture, sect, or creed."[89] The only difference between oppression by the state or majority opinion (which is the only kind that Mill directly addresses) and the abuses of multiculturalism "is that the

criteria of being 'irreligious or immoral' (or culturally inauthentic) are given now by an array of disparate cultural groups and by an overarching ethos intended to deflect or dissuade us from any genuine engagement between them."[90] However, the implications of Mill's liberalism for multiculturalism and the limitations on freedom posed by minority cultural groups find a great deal in the essays by Lovett, Donner, and Waldron.

Michael A. Neulander's Political Philosophy, accepts the work: *On Liberty* as Mill's most widely read and enduring work. It is an indispensable essay on political thought, which strenuously argues for individual liberty. He is defending what he calls the "liberty principle." It is a principle that guarantees individuals quite a bit of personal freedom. "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."[91] These quoted sentences in John Stuart Mill's book, "On Liberty," embody the crux of his argument; that the power of the state must intrude as little as possible on the liberty of its citizenry.

In essence, Mill was against using the power of the state through its lawmaking apparatus to compel citizens to conduct themselves in ways that society deems moral or appropriate. For Mill people have not only right, but also duty to develop their intellectual faculties, which is indispensable to maximise their happiness. Mill also postulates a theory that societies usually institute laws based primarily on "personal preference" of its citizenry instead of established principles. Actually, the lack of clarity of opinion often leads to government frequently interfering in the lives of its citizens unnecessarily. Hence, there are very few times according to Mill, when the state can infringe on the personal liberty of others. Firstly, the state has the right to promulgate laws that prevent a person's actions from harming others. Secondly, the state must protect those citizens who are not mature enough to protect themselves, such as children.

In Mill's view, immature societies need a benevolent leader to rule them until they have developed to a point where they have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion. Mill believes that forced morality by the state on its citizen's liberties was destructive to their inward development, and could even lead to a violent reaction by them against the government. Always in the background for Mill is the idea of human development, and making it possible for more people to enjoy these higher quality pleasures.

John Gray's *Triumph of the Individual* is a review on the major subjects of Mill's essays: On Liberty, Utilitarianism, Representative government, and Women's rights. These essays are interrelated. Meanwhile, Mill's basic concern is liberty, both social and civil. He identifies the difference between freedom and liberty - freedom is the state of being free, while liberty is the freedom that a government or governing body grants its people. According to Gray, Mill is influenced by Alexis de Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," whereby he Mill recognises that the most important function of a government is to protect the liberties of its citizens. However, people generally choose the form of government they deserve; often laws they allow to go unchecked become the tools of despotic powers, thereby having only their own ignorance or indolence to blame.

Mill is interested in freedom of the press and freedom of expression is essential rights of man. You do not have to accept as true what other people say, but let them say it because there is always the chance that they are right and you are wrong. Mill points out that even the Roman Catholic Church, most intolerant of religions, allows a "devil's advocate" to offer repudiative evidence before it canonises a new saint. He notes instances in which religious intolerance still rears its ugly head in the British Empire of his day. Next, Individuality should be fostered so that new ideas may flourish, but society, specifically the middle class, establishes the normative values that unfortunately tend to stifle individuality. You have an unlimited right

to your opinion, but you are free to act only so far as you do not harm or molest others. The state-sponsored education should restrict itself to teaching scientifically provable or reliably documented facts rather than push religious or political agenda. The utilitarian principle states that actions that promote happiness (in its most obvious form, pleasure) are "right" and those that reduce happiness are "wrong"--in other words, utilitarianism is the opposite of puritanism. Women deserve the same rights as men because the social and mental limitations attributed to women are for the most part a male-conceived artifice. Besides, chivalry is a fallacy. There is confusion on where to classify Mill, either as a libertarian in modern terms, but he was certainly concerned with the issues with which modern libertarians are concerned. Gray opines that Mill's discourse is relevant to today's world, even though he often draws upon the past for contrast in order to make his conclusions, the implication being that improvement comes with increased knowledge and experience.

Nils Holtug, observes that in *On Liberty,* the simple Principle: "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."[92] This principle, sometimes referred to as the Harm Principle, continues to attract much attention amongst contemporary liberals and to find able defenders. It explains the general liberal attitude both ordinary citizens and policy-makers in western democratic societies take towards the treatment of individuals. The Harm Principle expresses a deep concern for individual liberty and toleration.

According to the Harm Principle, roughly, the state may coerce a person only if it can thereby prevent harm to others. Clearly, this principle depends crucially on what we understand by 'harm'. Thus, if any sort of negative effect on a person may count as harm, the Harm Principle will fail to sufficiently protect individual liberty. Therefore, a more subtle concept of harm is needed. Nils Holtug considers various possible conceptions and argues that none gives rise to a plausible version of the Harm Principle. Whether we focus on

welfare, quantities of welfare or qualities of welfare, we do not arrive at a plausible version of this principle. Instead, the concept of harm may be moralised. He considers also various ways this may be done as well as possible rationales for the resulting versions of the Harm Principle. Again, no plausible version of the principle turns up. Therefore, he considers the prospect of including the Harm Principle in a decision-procedure rather than in a criterion of rightness.

Nanette Funk criticises "Mill and Censorship."[93] For Nanette Funk, Mill's argument against censorship in Chapter Two of *On Liberty* is one of the most well developed arguments for freedom of speech in the philosophy. Funk presents an interpretation of that argument which he calls the Good Reasons Argument and which differs from interpretations given by most commentators. D. H. Monro, H. J. McCloskey, James Fitz James Stephen, Wilmore Kendall, Joel Feinberg, and Patrick Devlin have all considered the Infallibility Argument to be Mill's central argument. On that argument − because it is always possible we are mistaken − censorship is never justified. McCloskey calls the Infallibility Argument "the most important of Mill's arguments."[94]

In the same vein, John Morley, a disciple of Mill, in his 'Compromise' correctly observes that:

> The radical fallacy of those who argue that people must use promises and threats in order to encourage opinions, thoughts, and feelings which they think good, and to prevent other which they think bad. Promises and threats can influence acts. Opinions and thoughts on morals, politics and the rest, after they have once grown in a man's mind, can no more be influenced by promises and threats than can my knowledge that snow is white or that ice is cold. One result of intolerance is to make hypocrites. On this, as on the rest of the grounds which vindicate the doctrine of liberty, a man who thought himself infallible either in particular or in general, from the Pope of Rome down to the editor of the daily newspaper, might still be inclined to abstain from any form of compulsion.[95]

Morley doubts that we can now be as confident as Locke was that only "light and evidence" can change men's opinions, and as a result the argument from the ineffectiveness of persecution and intolerance in changing men's beliefs rests on dubious foundations.

Hence if freedom of discussion is supported solely by Mill's Avoidance of Mistake Argument, it will cut no ice with those who believe that they have the truth from some infallible source, and who further believe that it is easier for them to share the truth with others if freedom is not accorded to opposing false beliefs. Although he tries to forge a strong link between freedom of discussion and the true beliefs which in turn lead to the progress that men value, it is clear that as far as Mill himself is concerned, the ultimate defence of freedom of discussion lies elsewhere -- in his Assumption of Infallibility and Necessity of Error Arguments. Though he thinks that in the end there would be a consensus of opinion on many currently contentious matters, he believes that this state of affairs is desirable only if it results from freedom of discussion. He does not regard peace and tranquility, to which the absence of conflicting and contentious views gives rise, as intrinsically desirable, irrespective of how they were attained. In this he differs from so many of his critics who share the views of Fitzjames Stephen that if all men could be made, without too great cost, to have true opinions, this would be "the greatest of all intellectual blessings."[96] Whereas Stephen merely wanted men to have true beliefs, Mill wishes them to know the truth.

Mill admires rational and intellectually active men, and freedom of discussion is necessary for raising "even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings."[97] For him thinking beings are those who seek to know the truth, and who are not afraid of pursuing a view to whatever conclusions it leads. They do not hold a view dogmatically. They adopt a certain attitude towards evidence and arguments which commits them to accept freedom of discussion so that all those who disagree with them will be

allowed to state opposing views. A free atmosphere is necessary if there are to be thinking men, and thinking men would want freedom both for themselves and for others.

In *Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits* by H. J. McCloskey**,** an argument issued between him and D.H. Monro on the subject-matter above. D. H. Monro, argues against McCloskey, first, that the restrictions on freedom of opinion which Mill is alleged to concede are not in fact departures from his general principle; second, that Mill's infallibility argument is not quite as McCloskey interprets it, but makes the point that it is possible to have rationally grounded opinions only in a society in which free enquiry is encouraged, and that McCloskey's counter- examples fail because they presuppose such a society; third, that Mill attaches more importance than McCloskey allows to the argument that opinions are valueless unless rationally held and that his conception of rationality and self-development differs from McCloskey's; Fourth, that there is a general principle, which McCloskey has not refuted, namely that an atmosphere of free enquiry is hard to maintain, and that any suppression, even one apparently justified, will have the indirect effect of helping to destroy that atmosphere, and is consequently likely to do more harm than good.

Having gone through the whole works on the review of scholars On Liberty, we could find divergent views and criticisms and at the same time points of agreement of ideas. But the whole arguments have left us to wonder and wander the gaps and limitations: thus, we have of necessity come to find preponderance and further research project. What are we talking about? J. S. Mill's On Liberty, concentrated on Individuality, Liberty (limits to the authority of society over the individual), Freedom of Discussion, and Representative Democracy; but Mill may not have the vision or rather he was philosophically myopic of the socio-economic, and political futuristic demands of the 21st century and beyond: which are the current issues like globalisation, liberal democracy, Arab Spring and terrorism. In this dissertation we tend

to tackle the Arab Spring using Liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill as a tool. Meanwhile, we turn to the next part of the literature review on the Arab Spring.

The Arab world has long been laden with tensions and instabilities. "Arab Spring" is generally believed to have been caused by the way and manner by which rulers ran the administrative affairs of governments, though others have attributed it to the general income inequality. Several antecedents have led to the protests, including factors like authoritarianism, violations of inalienable rights of citizens, economic downturn, unemployment, acute poverty, political mismanagement, nepotism and a number of demographic structural problems.

However, the recent Arab Uprisings, better known as the Arab Spring, have intensified volatility, turning this "hot-spot" into a veritable tinderbox whose potential for explosion has far-reaching national, regional and global implications. This review analyses and describes the events leading to the Arab Spring. It also examines the impacts and ramifications of the upheavals on the national, regional and international levels. Were these uprisings a deceptive and transient phase of popular anger, or were they a genuine harbinger leading to genuine democratic transition? We shall endeavour to answer later in this discourse.

In early 2011 came the seismic events of the Arab Spring. The Arab Awakening/Arab Spring is a concept denoting a revolutionary sweeping tide of demonstrations, protests and other forms of opposition to the authorities (both violent and non-violent), riot and protracted civil wars in the Arab territories which started on December 18, 2010. Up to this time, rulers in some parts of the Arab world such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have been dethroned from the mantle of leadership; civil rebellions have erupted in countries like Syria and Bahrain. The protests in Arab world have shown or shared similar methods.

Apart from Tariq Ramadan who in *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East* uses the term "Awakening" which conveys an Islamic connotation to the term, other

reviewers use the term Arab Spring. Ramadan emphasizes two main themes: the compatibility of Islam with democratic pluralism and religious diversity and the role of Islamist parties and societies after liberation from dictatorship. He refers to this process as "awakening"[98] and expounds a reformist Islamism, one that purports to respect democracy, women's rights and the rule of law. According to the Ramadan:

> The book is set against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and attempts to explain how Muslim states can harness political developments to usher in comprehensive social and cultural transformation. Again, the book discusses the contemporary situation in the Middle East, the empowerment of the general populace, and the future of the Muslim world.[99]

Ramadan further examines the political developments in MENA and their consequences drawn from these three questions: What actually took place in Tunisia and Egypt? What is happening in the region at large? And why now? However, in an attempt to answer these questions, the author embarks upon a study of the recent history, the central figures and the geopolitical and economic framework of the region. In conclusion, he gives details of the reactions of the U. S and European governments towards the Arab spring and the role of international media in covering the event. He strongly asserts that selective coverage and diplomatic backing contributed to the rise of opposition movements in some Arab countries. The author adopts a holistic approach in analysing the Arab uprising, recounting crosscurrents within the region thus providing relevant and critical context to his arguments. Ramadan reserves his core criticism for the present state of public discourse within the Arab world. On the one hand, this discourse polarises the secularists and Islamists, and on the other hand fuels the historic narrative of "us" (Muslims professed as sufferers) versus "them" (the West - held as responsible for all the troubles in the Muslim world). According to him, ''in mainstream Muslim and Arab societies, secularisation is associated with repression, colonialism and Islamophobia.''[100] The author challenges Arabs to regard a counter-

productive contest between old-fashioned theoretical categories and to triumph over rationalising colonialisation. He calls for persistent self-criticism and intellectual rebuilding and employing native histories, cultures, identities, and assurances to re-establish dignity. To this end Ramadan opines:

> A striving demand for social and cultural replenishment encompasses standard elements that include full rights; revamped educational systems; democratic political course; religious freedoms; and pluralism. Ramadan recognizes the changing realignment of global powers with decline of Western economies and the growing worth of China, Brazil, Russia, India and others, as a critically enabling aspect in the tumbling of Middle Eastern dictatorships.[101]

He observes the crises as a prospect for Arab and other Third World countries to push for supplementary and impartial economic relations, but without specifying how that will come about. In the center of his sanguinity about the future of the Muslim world, Ramadan downplays the potential threat of radical and militant Islam or the ongoing 'war on terror' that complicates relations with the West. He might be correct in stating that the style and substance of the Arab uprisings signal an end to earlier confrontational paradigms, but that assertion still merits a more careful examination.

Martin Beck and Simone Hüser in their article, *Political Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to Analyze the "Arab Spring,"* made contribution to the explanation and description of political changes in the Middle East. They suggest relevant social and political theories that could be of help in proffering solutions to the Arab Spring menace. The authors observe "Arab Spring as a regional phenomenon which demanded political reforms, leading to the destabilisation and overthrow of authoritarian regimes and political stagnation which has significantly impacted political diversity in the Arab region."[102] The authors in the bid to study the cause of the Arab Spring used the categories of demographic change, social media, human dignity, and economic liberalisation without political reforms. They argue that, the incidence of the Arab Spring was unavoidable due to

deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the monarchical states of the Middle East. They further assert that most of the facts that led to the uprisings against the authoritarian regime were population increase associated with rising unemployment, lack of prospects, rising cost of living, corruption among the leaders and repressive governments.

Among other views held by the authors as a precipitation for the Arab Spring was the access to digital media, including social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and text messages. The authors argue that the social media was the ultimate cause of mass protests against the authoritarian regime because they offered space for solidarity that was transferred from the virtual world to the real one. Furthermore, they argue that the nature of the Arab uprising was diverse, despite that, all protests were directly linked to the demands for freedom, social justice, and human dignity as the subjects of discourse around which the Arab Spring erupted. At the end they made a submission that economic liberalization without political reforms caused the Arab Spring as there was fundamental crisis of authoritarian social contract.

Using the rent theory for analysis, Martin Beck and Simon Huser critically attempt an inquiry on the political diversification of the Arab world as a consequence of the Arab uprising. Both resolve that the outcome of the Arab Spring may produce four results, namely: democracies, hybrid regimes, authoritarian rule and new forms of authoritarian systems. However, the resultant effect of Arab Spring in key countries' development will have a repercussion for other countries within and beyond the region. Actually, these suppositions from this article appear relevant to this dissertation as it highlights the political outcome of the Arab spring to be diverse. Nevertheless, the article lacks the focus on the exact type of political system that the Arab world could adopt; and if it is democracy then, we still need to know the type as democracy comes in different forms. We shall fill the gap. Many scholars are of the opinion that liberal democracy is the best type

of political system that would save the present and future political hullabaloo; but we shall find a plausible solution after making our findings. John R. Bradley, in *Inside Egypt: The Road to Revolution in the Land of Pharaohs* opines:

> Inside Egypt is essential reading for anyone wanting to understand what led to revolutionary upheaval in the Arab world's most important country. In a new introduction, the author explains how one of the most popular uprisings in history was quickly hijacked by Islamists and the military establishment.[103]

According to the author the work focuses on the Egyptian trajectory: prerevolutionary change; the social, religious, economic, and political forces in Egypt's revolution; and the recent history that led to a military coup in 1952. In this highly thoughtful volume, Bradley provides a devastating critique of Egypt's current political situation. The work presents ''an original, angry, brilliant, subtle, and highly readable expose of contemporary Egyptian politics and society.''[104] The author of ''Holy War Incorporated and The Osama bin Laden I Know", Peter Bergen remarks that Egypt is the next domino to fall; it did happen to Egypt and Middle East.

Raymond Ibrahim reviews that *Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution* by John R. Bradley is a good introduction to some of the problems rife in Egypt. The author asserts that "Mubarak's regime was full of corruption and oppression, to widespread poverty and discontent, to human rights abuses and the plight of Egypt's minorities, most of the important issues are here."[105] The reviewer observes that Bradley, provides useful insights, such as how the current regime exploits the West's fear of the Muslim Brotherhood to its advantage. The fact remains for Bradley that Mubarak's regime is responsible for numerous Egypt's woes, casting blames on all of the nation's problems on it is misleading. He further argues that by minimising the Islamisation of society and the influence of the Brotherhood, which the author claims "has made only limited inroads into the mainstream" since Egypt's Muslims are "intolerant of extremist Sunni

doctrine,"[106]Bradley moves from fact-based evidence to conjecture and, perhaps, wishful thinking. Bradley is convinced that, given a chance, through the elimination of Mubarak, Egyptians would create a liberal, egalitarian, and gender-neutral society. In short, while the book is a good primer for novices to Egypt's culture and politics, the author's own proclivities mar his objectivity. However, the author limits his vision or scope to Egypt only, regardless of other Arab countries. Secondly, he fails to identify other major factors militating on the political system and good governance of Egypt; however, it suffices to say that he might have a personal bias about Mubarak; even though Mubarak is not totally removed from the claims on the mismanagement of the country. The gap to fill here lies in liberty and education of the citizens on the type of political system that would grant them freedom and full expression of their human rights.

The *Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World,* by Rex Brynen et al. studies the trajectories of authoritarian rule and reformin the Arab world. The authors focus on the thematic and theoreticalissues in the study of Arab dictatorship, reform, democratisation, and political transition. They argue that:

> Whatever the ultimate outcome of the popular mobilization, uprisings, and regime transitions that shook the Arab World in 2011, there is little doubt that the upheavals marked a historic transformation in the political directions of the region. Authoritarian regimes that once seemed unchallengeable had been challenged and many of them found to be much less formidable than their citizens once feared. Dictators who once seemed to assume a lifetime hold on power had found themselves in exile, on trial, or dead at the hands of victorious rebels. Corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and injustice had been the targets of mass protests. [107]

The protesters have their popular slogans: as ''appeals for dignity, human rights, and democracy.''[108] Understanding how Arab authoritarianism has functioned from both a regional perspective and a broader comparative perspective remains no less important despite the events of 2011. At the same time, the events of the Arab Spring ought to prompt reflection and indeed self-reflection, since clearly many analysts got many things wrong, the

authors of this volume included. Clearly too, things have changed and new dynamics are being established across the region.

In Part 1 of the volume, we examine the trajectories of authoritarianism and reform in the Arab world through a consideration of recent developments in selected countries in North Africa, the Mashreq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Our focus here is on:

> Social structures, elite and institutional structures, and immediate subregional settings. Institutions are particularly important because they reflect and embed social realities, as well as enabling and constraining the social and political choices that actors have within political systems. And because they differ from country to country, the precise dynamics of politics—while authoritarian—can vary in fundamentally important ways.[109]

In Part 2 of the book we turn our attention to issues in the study of Arab authoritarianism, reform, democratisation, and political transition. These are framed more as a series of debates, inquiries, and conversations around our central questions of authoritarian stability and post authoritarian change, aimed at teasing out what we feel are the most promising sets of explanations for the trajectories of contemporary Arab politics. Specifically, we have chosen to focus on eight main areas: debates over the relationship between culture and politics; the particular role that Islamist movements might play in political liberalisation and democratisation; processes of electoral politics; the particular dynamics of Middle Eastern monarchies; the political effects of oil wealth in the entire economies; the effects of economic liberalisation; the importance of satellite television and other Arab media; and the regional and international context of Arab authoritarianism and post-authoritarianism.

Finally, in Part 3, which is the last chapter, a total resume of the work which highlights the complex and multidimensional ways in which various factors interacted to sustain Arab

authoritarianisms in the decades preceding the Arab Spring. Again, the authors revisit the myriad ways in which regimes used a range of institutionally embedded policy tools from repression to patronage, controlled electoral process, and cultural symbolism to foster social and political compliance, as well as the ways in which this matrix of control weakened or collapsed with the onset of Arab popular uprisings in 2011. Brynen et al, offer a limited interest to the challenges faced by transitional regimes, as well as to the social and political dynamics that will shape them; hitherto, the philosopher fills the gap by introducing dynamics of social and political philosophy which has its foundations in the principles of liberty and common good.

In *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolutionand the Making of a New Era*, Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren study the reasons, developments and effects of the Arab revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen and Syria, individually. The book dwells on far reaching analysis of the events. It explains ''the economic and political roots of the Arab Spring, assesses what has been accomplished so far, and considers the numerous stumbling blocks confronting the Arab nations as they try to shape their futures.''[110]

However, the authors through research, interviews and experience explain the obstacles that endanger stability in each country. They analyse and find resolutions on the challenges many Arab nations face in building democratic institutions, consensus on political Islam, and overcoming tribal problems. In an era of change and uncertainty, this insightful guide provides the first clear glimpse of the post-revolutionary future the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, the authors argue that the regional turmoil has not been restricted to nations of the Arab world but has had a domino effect elsewhere. The early uprisings in North Africa were encouraged by the 2009-2010 uprisings in Iran and then it swept through the Middle East and North African region; in the nations of the neighbouring South Caucasus -

specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - and a few nations in Europe. The October 15, 2011 worldwide dissents and the "Occupy Wall Street" development, which began in the United States and then spread to Asia and Europe, drew immediate spark from the Arab Spring, with coordinators asking US subjects "Are you prepared for a *Tahrir* moment?" The protesters had focused on utilising the "Arab Spring strategy" to accomplish their objectives of checking corporate power and control in Western governments. Likewise, the "Occupy Nigeria" riots started the day after Goodluck Jonathan reported the scrap of the fuel appropriation in oil-rich Nigeria on January 1, 2012, and this development was inspired by the Arab people revolt. The Tunisian upheaval also brought about critical changes to the intersection of art and politics in post-2011 Tunisia. The expansion of instability from north to south has pushed North Africa and the Sahel district into features as another front in the "Worldwide War on Terror".

In *The Dying Sahara: US Government and Terror in Africa,* Jeremy Keenan uncovers conspiracy between the US and Algeria to advocate US intervention in the Saharan region. Keenan, is lauded for analysing so perceptively how the US Empire misuses local outbursts to support military involvement. Western intervention against Islamist insurrection has pushed North Africa into the foray of another front in the "Worldwide War on Terror." [111]   According to Rob Prince, the reviewer of both *The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa*, and *The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa,* Jeremy Keenan exposed the collusion between the US and Algeria in fabricating terrorism to justify a new 'Saharan front' in Washington's War on Terror. Now, in *The Dying Sahara*, he reveals how the designation of the region as a 'Terror Zone' has destroyed the lives and livelihoods of thousands of innocent people. Beginning in 2004, with what local people called the US 'invasion' of the Sahel, *The Dying Sahara* shows how

repressive, authoritarian regimes - cashing in on US terrorism 'rents' - provoked Tuareg rebellions in both Niger and Mali.

Further, he argues that US activity has unleashed a new, narco-trafficking branch of Al-Qaeda. Keenan's detailed research shows that the US and its new combatant African command (AFRICOM) have created instability in a region the size of western Europe. This, the second volume, builds nicely on the first. Taken together they are a rather well-documented, well-reasoned and damning indictment of the U.S. Africa policy. The Obama Administration's softer linguistic approach will find it difficult to counter Keenan's arguments. Both books always return to the main theme: the whys and how of the decade-long U.S. strategic focuses to the region.

Keenan explains the rationale behind the U.S. Africa policy early on in *The Dying Sahara*, thus:

> Africa's strategic importance to the US over the last decade has undergone several significant shifts and reappraisals. In 1998, US dependency on foreign oil supplies surpassed the psychologically critical 50 per cent level and in 2000 became an election issue as George W. Bush pledged to make energy security a top priority of his presidency. True to his word, he established a National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group within two weeks of taking office. The Cheney Report, as it became known, set the direction of subsequent U.S. policy towards Africa by identifying the continent, especially West Africa, as a major new source of US oil imports. The report had estimated that Africa would provide 25% of US oil imports by 2015.[112]

The essence of Keenan's argument in both volumes is an effort to beef up the U.S. military presence in Africa, to provide the security network for oil and natural gas sources from North Africa to Nigeria. The United States needed to either dramatically amplify the 'terrorist threat' to the region or literally fabricate one. But with more than a little help from its new-found alliance with Algiers, the pretext was successfully enough shaped to provide the

necessary U.S. military buildup. The author fails to link up to the present predicaments in the Arab regions, but his ideas by implications suggest otherwise.

In *Islamist Radicalization in North Africa: Politics and Process,* George Joffe "shifts attention from contemporary issues and analyticalapproaches to the phenomenon of radicalisation in the Maghreb."[113] In its analysis, the book enshrines the concepts of radicalisationand extremism. The first is treated as the process of alienation from a hegemonic discourse which is usually associated with the legitimisationof the state but also those of dominant political elites within it - and thesecond as the active adoption of an ideology and associated proxies tochallenge the state and its elites, usually through violence. Againstthat backdrop, the contents of the book will be essential for a properunderstanding of the future of North Africa itself. This book focuses on processes that lead to radicalisation, rather than the often violent outcomes. At the same time, chapters expand the discussion historically and conceptually beyond the preoccupations of recent years, in order to develop a more holistic understanding of a complex individual and collective process that has represented a permanent challenge to dominant political, social and, on occasion, economic norms. With contributions from academics and policy-makers within and outside the region, the book is a comprehensive investigation of Islamist Radicalisation.

The author argues that one major impact of the Arab Spring is the ensuing instability created by a widening Islamist - secular divide. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya specifically, the general public is strongly divided into Islamist and secular camps that battled intensely over the role of Islam in governmental issues and society. Samer S. Shehata's *Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change* tackles a number of important questionsby examining some of the region's most important Islamist movements.There is expansive agreement on the imperativeness of political Islam,but far less consensus on its character, the explanations

behind Islamists' prosperity, the part of Islamist developments in household and universal undertakings, or what these developments predict for what's to come.

Eleven sections by distinguished researchers in the field inspect:

> The Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, Hamas, Hizbullah, Morocco's Equity and Generosity, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Uprising in Iraq and Islamist agendas in Turkey and Iran. The points of focus in this volume incorporate informal organizations and social welfare procurement, Islamist gatherings as resistance performers, Islamist appointive interests, the crossing point of Islam and national liberation battles, the part of religion in Islamist governmental issues, and Islam and state governmental issues in Iran, in addition to a number of different themes.[114]

The dramatic political events of the Arab Spring that took place in the Arab world in 2011 led some observers to mistakenly conclude that Islamist politics in the Middle East was in decline. After all, Islamist movements were not behind the mass uprising that brought down Zein Al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, who spent almost 23 years as president. Similarly, the organizers of the January 25, 2011 protests that led to Hosni Mubarak's ouster in Egypt were largely liberal, Internet savvy, youth activists, not the Muslim Brotherhood. The same can also be said of the uprisings that shook Libya, Yemen, Syria and other parts of the Arab world.

Five years after the beginning of the Arab uprisings, however, there can be no doubt about the importance of Islamist politics in the region. In sharp contrast to Shehata's book, Bassam Tibi in the *Sharia State:Arab Spring and Democratization* challenges the unchecked assumption that the seizure of leadership by Islamists (in Egypt and Tunisia) is part of the democratisation of the Arab world, providing a new perspective on the relationship between the Arab Spring and democratisation. In contrast to the prevailing view which sees the Arab Spring as a revolution, Tibi argues that the phenomenon has neither been a spring, nor a revolution. To him, the term "Arab Spring, connotes a just rebellion that led to toppling dictators and authoritarian rulers."[115]

On yet another note, in the *Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications,* Efraim Inbar analyses thepolitical, economic and strategic dimensions of the Arab Spring. TheEfraim argues that:

> While it is too early to offer a definitive analysis ofthe impact of what has happened, the trajectory of the events indicates regime changes in several states, containment of political unrest in moststates, increased Islamic tendencies, centrifugal tendencies in a numberof political units and deterioration of economic conditions.[116]

The volumepresents an initial assessment by a selected group of Israeli scholars ofthe implication of the Arab Spring. The chapters focus on importantissues such as democratisation, the role of economic factors in politicalchange and the explanation for variations in regime stability in theArab world. Taking an international relations perspective, the book notonly examines the evolving regional balance, but also explores the linkbetween external and internal politics and the implications of terrorismfor regional security. The chapters also address the implications of theArab Spring for Israel and its chances of existing peacefully in theregion.

Larbi Sadiki in *Rout ledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization* re-echoes the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia in December 2010 heralded the arrival of the 'Arab Spring,' a startling, yet not unprecedented, era of profound social and political upheaval. The Arab Spring is characterised by bottom-up change, and its effects are still unfurling today. The author provides a point of departure in the on-going debates and discussions on the plethora of themes, such as, ''contexts and contests of democratisation, the sweep of the ArabSpring, Egypt, women and the Arab Spring, agents of change and thetechnology of protest, impact of the Arab Spring in the wider Arab worldand further afield."[117] Nevertheless, despite a wide array of viewpoints, specialisms,biases, and degrees of proximity and distance from events that shookthe Arab world to its core, the *Handbook* is written with the readers in mind,to provide them with

contextualization and knowledge, and to set the stage forfurther discussion on the Arab Spring.

In *Will the Middle East Implode?* Mohammed Ayoob argues that the Arab Spring has added to existing tensions in the Middle East by introducing a high degree of uncertainty in key areas of regime-nature, intra-societal balances, and inter-state relationships throughout the region. This, he argues, has moved an already volatile Middle East towards not only greater instability but also towards a potentially combustible state of affairs. However, Ayoob sets the tone for the rest of the book, which is very much "marked by a realistic, if pessimistic, take on a post-Arab Spring Middle East in which an implosion capable of engulfing the region and in turn having destabilising effects on the international security and economy is a real prospect."[118]

As part of Ayoob's discussion on one key theme: the dance between Islamism and democracy, he asserts that the July 2013 coup that ousted Morsi from power was a catastrophe for Egyptian democracy, the Arab Spring's "most dramatic and possibly irreversible setback".[119]In the "The Islamist Challenge", Ayoob shows that the Arab Spring has prompted both mainstream and radical Islamism to play a larger role in regional politics and society. Indeed, given the repression against the Muslim Brotherhood since the coup, including massacres of peaceful demonstrators, it may not be too far-fetched to imagine the emergence of an al-Qaeda on the Nile. In bringing down a democratically elected president, "Egyptian liberals and the military have shown striking political immaturity and impatience. The coup was a short-cut, one that aborted Egypt's democratic transition."[120] Such a realisation is likely, Ayoob argues, to push moderate Islamists into the arms of radical Islamist groups who reject democracy and ideological compromises; a development that he deems will not be restricted to Islamists in Egypt, as their counterparts

throughout the Middle East will look to Egypt – the cradle of political Islam – and find that the lessons of that country apply to them.

Ayoob turns his attention to Iran's nuclear aspirations and the key question being debated by Western and Israeli powers, in that context: to bomb Iran or live with the Iranian bomb? Although this issue precedes the Arab Spring, it has only become more pressing as a result of the general straining of tensions in the region. Specifically, he traces U.S.-Iranian relations from the American-instigated overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953, through the hostage crisis in 1979, to more recent examples of U.S.-Iranian cooperation vis-a-viz the 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan. Ayoob argues that it would have disastrous implications for the instigators in the form of massive dips in regional public opinion and heightened prospects of violent backlash and regional conflict. Instead, he suggests, efforts should be made to establish a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (MENWFZ).

Ayoob's take on the destabilising and potentially implosive outcome of the Arab Spring, given the uncertainty that the latter has introduced and added to existing regional issues, is a far cry from existing analysis that celebrate the regional uprisings as heralds of a new democratic era in the Middle East. For that reason, perhaps, Ayoob's analysis invites the critique of being overly pessimistic in its examination of the region's current and future state of affairs. Such a critique,Magdalena C. Delgado would argue, is entirely unfounded. What Ayoob's analysis offers is an entirely realistic, if not highly probable, account of the direction in which the Middle East is headed, should the issues of combustion develop according to the plausible trajectories identified in the book. The analysis is made all the more valuable in light of Ayoob's nuanced understanding of the region's history and dynamics, in which it is clearly grounded.

Some analysts have blamed Western powers and media, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, of pretense in the way and manner in which they have

responded to the Arab Spring. Contemporary analysts, like Noam Chomsky, blamed the Obama administration for trying to suppress the revolutionary wave and prevent popular democratisation attempts in the Middle East and North Africa. However, in the article: ''Middle East and North Africa Unrest''? Noam Chomsky observes that "the US and its allies would want to prevent democracy in the Arab world which implies that the region will be less susceptible to western influences."[121] This raises a curious question: could it be that the US and the West are not interested in the Arab states becoming (liberal) democratic states? The author strongly suggests that the reason behind this could be that when the Arab states adopt liberal democracy then their eyes will open in all levels: national and international to discover the western tricks deviled with the evil of exploitation. Some scholars, notably Mohamed Ayoob, have contended that the range of international reactions to the events in the region demonstrate hypocrisy on the part of "the free world", charging that Western reactions to the uprisings, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia, were mere expressions of cynicisms. Ayoob was particularly critical of the attitude of Obama, who, when asked if he considered Hosni Mubarak to be an "authoritarian ruler", prior to the popular revolt in Egypt, replied that he tended "not to use labels for folks", calling Mubarak "a stalwart ally in many respects to the USA," adding that Mubarak "has been a force of stability and good in the region."[122]

Western powers were not the only targets of criticisms for their lukewarm reactions to the suppression of the Arab Spring. Shehata et al. observes that Hizbullah chief, Hassan Nasserallah's response to the revolts was hypocritical as he supported Shi'ite protesters in Egypt and Bahrain but he backed the "murderous shi'i government in Syria"[123] against peaceful demonstrators. The authors of the same volume criticise "the government of Iran for its harsh criticism of Egypt and Bahrain, but virtually ignoring Bashar al-Assad's violent suppression of Syrian protesters."[124]

Generally, international reactions to the Arab Spring were variable, including calls for restraint and more expanded civil liberties and human rights. While Western leaders criticised their regional foes in the Middle East and North African countries, they eschewed openly criticising their regional allies. However, was Arab Spring a reaction to the forces of globalisation? Efraim Inbar provided a cogent explanation which suggested that the Arab Spring was not a unified revolution on the model of East Europe in the late 1980s, but a series of national uprisings in response to national and regional-international socio-economic grievances. "Those events were fuelled by purely national concerns and did not reflect a pan-Arab or pan-Islamic character; and that they are devoid of any overarching ideology or global concerns."[125] But Efraim Inbar could not identify a specific concern that aggrieved and fuelled the revolt. Here, one could suggest, driving from his opinion that the events were not only fuelled by lack of national concern but the individual liberty and right cum dignity (human dignity) were deep-down affected by negligence and uncaring attitude of each countries' government. This is the gap we shall supposedly fill.

On the international economic front, international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, maintains that oil prices were possibly increased higher than the initial forecast because of the crisis in the Arab region. On the contrary, dramatic collapse in oil prices in early 2015 has added to the economic worries within the Arab world.

The role of the young people in the Arab Spring cannot be left out. Most of the Internet-savvy young users have persistently, over the years, been viewing dictatorial rulers and absolute monarchies as anachronisms. The simple reason is because of their role in the upheavals, of which Al-Najma Zidjaly of Oman University described the upheavals in the Arab world as "youthquake."[126] Al-Najma Zidjaly appeared myopic in his approach to the

issue; the protests which occurred in many Arab countries were carried out by the entire people and not the youth alone per se. Much as we could not remove the youth involvement in the Arab uproar, a more reasonable root cause of the problem ought to be exhumed. Could it be that they were tired of the political system of government practiced in their countries? Or they were agitating for change in the entire system of social, political and economic administration of the areas? They perceived absolute monarchy as anachronistic. This really entails change of the system of governance in this contemporary time. The idea here is that the people are clamoring for a change, but without an iota of knowledge of what they want.

In his article the *Roots and Causes of the 2011 Arab Uprising,* Kamal Eldine Osman Salih explains some of the factors which triggered the Arab uprising. He concedes that, "the repressive, violent nature of the Arab regimes and their suppression of individual liberties against the backdrop of on-going corruption and deterioration of their economies have been among the major factors leading to the revolt."[127] Salih puts economic pressures coupled with corruption at the hands of the leaders as the utmost catalyst for the uprising. He further asserts that, what turned the rage of the people against their governments were the monopoly of political power by a few and the routine use of instruments of physical violence against citizens to sustain the power. More so, Salih attributes the uprising to the massive violations of human rights such as the basic and fundamental individual liberties. The fundamental individual liberty comprises: freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of organisation and freedom of association, which are enunciated and enshrined in the human rights act; and are part of the tents of democracy. We appreciate the author in elaborating on some of the causes of the uprising. However, Salih lacks facts to prove the authenticity of rating the causes of revolt and fails to provide its empirical statistics.

Peter Jones in his article *The Arab Spring: Opportunities and Implications,* attempts to explain the motivation behind the Arab Spring, the major players and its implications for the West. Jones drawing on a survey to analyse the events, observes that "the Arab Spring to be the result of immediate grievances specific to each country as well as technological differences sweeping across the region."[128] Jones emphatically asserts that there were different circumstances surrounding the Arab Spring across the region which supposedly require a distinct approach of analysis by each country involved in the crisis. These approaches were lacking in his article.

Furthermore, the author holds that Arab Spring has significant implications on the foreign policy of the West; the nature of change makes it impossible for the West to steer events in the region. The outcome of the survey conducted, shows that the Western powers have seen their influence reduced and getting to the right side of the elite is unlikely to result in opportunities for them as before. It is a fact that Jones outlined the causes of the Arab Spring, but his predicament was evident in his failure to focus on a specific country which has resulted in generalisations. Again, on the opinion of the masses to make conclusions may result in misrepresentations as they may not be a true reflection of the views of the entire Arab region. On the contrary, J. S. Mill has a different understanding of what public opinion entails as against the backdrop. This we shall unravel in the course of this dissertation.

Lisa Anderson in her article *Demystisfying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya* attempts to use a comparative analysis of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to reveal the variations in the occurrence of the Arab Spring. For Anderson, the role of globalisation and technology are no new phenomenon in facilitating Arab Spring but what matters most is how and why these ambitions and techniques rebound in their local context. The author remarks that although the ''political upheaval was generally

about dignity and responsive government, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya reflected divergent economic grievances and social dynamics which present vastly distinct challenges to countries as they progress."[129] Finally, Anderson argues that it is very essential for United States first to understand these distinctions for it to achieve its goals in the region and not view the various uprisings as a form of united revolt.

In his article *American Democracy, Promotion and the Arab Spring*, Oz Hassan made an appraisal on the Arab Spring and its implication for United States foreign policy, specifically President Bush's Freedom Agenda declared in November 2003. Hassan opines "the 2011 revolution exposes the failure of the Freedom Agenda in the MENA region."[130] His submission brings to the lime light the fact that, contrary to the objective of the policy to gradually reform and transform the region through working with friends and partners in a stable manner compatible with American interests, the Arab Spring has introduced some level of uncertainty in the pursuit of these interests. Colin H. Kahl and Marc Lynch support this view in their article *U.S. Strategy after the Arab Uprisings: Toward Progressive Engagement*. According to them, "there is now a sense of drift overtaking American strategy for the Middle East and that the United States (U.S) must pursue their goals differently in order to strategically rebalance itself in the MENA region as the global hegemon."[131] They argue that, both on normative and strategic grounds, the U.S has to move from its old tactics of authoritarian bargain and strong military presence and adopt what they term as "Progress Engagement by encouraging the emergence of strong democratic partners and right sizing its military footprint in the region."[132]   The authors maintain how the United States' interest is affected by events of the Arab uprising; but failed to pay attention to the interest of the Arab region and how they might take advantage of policy instability.

In the book, *Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from around the Globe* by Laurel E. Miller et al, a comparative analysis of past democratisation experiences and the Arab uprising were drawn to make conclusions on the possible impact of the Arab Spring. They project ''daunting challenges to lie ahead of countries which experienced regime change during the uprising, as the phenomena induces areas of new uncertainties such as the future success of democratisation in the region, issues of dangerous forces of extremism or ethno-sectarian conflict, as political systems loosen and the possibility of new autocrats replace the old ones."[133]

However, the author further asserts that other democratisation experiences were enough lessons that Arab states can learn as they are likely to follow paths similar to Turkey and Indonesia, where Islamist parties have come to play active roles in electoral politics within democratic systems. They maintain that a gradual approach to shifting the balance of power from military to civilian authorities must be taken, especially in countries in which the military have the capability and potential incentives to thwart democratisation, to ensure stability during transitions. They suggest an all-inclusive government which will help to ensure smooth transitions and enhance the legitimacy of emerging new regimes, even where decisions to open the political playing ground seemed risky and democratic rules must be established.

From the foregoing, we have seen the contributions from different scholars, how they worked with great care and nicety of details the causes of the Arab Spring and its political diversifications. The literature review hitherto assesses the implication of the Arab Spring for the West. The authors further make comparative analysis of the Arab Spring with past democratisation experiences. They however failed to analyse the consequences and the implication of the Arab Spring on democracy in the region. For an appreciative intellectual contribution, therefore this dissertation seeks to fill this gap by using the tool liberty in the

philosophy of J. S. Mill to assess the Arab Spring and its implications, as to finding a more practicable political system which will suit the lifestyle of the Arab citizens.

The third arm of the literature review centres on the Liberty in the Philosophy of J. S. Mill: The Implications on Arab Spring. Sammy Levine asks the questions: What would the "On Liberty" author think of the uprisings in the Middle East and [North Africa]? Are freedom and democracy good things for the MENA? There are answers to these questions. In his landmark work "On Liberty," Mill meticulously delineates his ideas about liberty. He writes that liberty is good because of its "utility" and its ability to enable a better life for most people. He argues that people must have freedom of thought, opinion and expression, in order for society to prosper.

In his book, Mill discusses particular instances wherein the authorities can exert their will and control over an individual or society. For Mill, the individual is totally sovereign concerning his own body, and therefore, cannot be reprimanded for harming oneself. However, one's liberty can be restricted in order to "prevent harm to others." This is known as the harm principle. Also, according to Mill, children should not have sovereign control over their own faculties, and thus can be coerced and controlled, for their own betterment. And finally, Mill explains the last circumstance under which an individual does not deserve freedom:

> The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.[134]

Democracy, after all, may not be a bad thing for the Middle East. In the end, it is possible George Bush might be vindicated, and in fifty years, he might be considered among the best presidents in the history of America for catalysing the democratisation of the Middle East.

For that to happen, countries in the Middle East must marginalise, and eventually eliminate, the barbarians—such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in their midst. At the moment, that is not happening, as radical elements in the Palestinians territories, Egypt and Libya seem to be emboldened. Sammy strongly asserts that "It is important to remember that democracy is not a good end in itself. It is merely a means to a hopeful, and usually good end."[135] Nevertheless, we appreciate Sammy Levine's contributions in the literature review, where he argues that unless a society has the fundamentals of democracy that society may not be fit to practice it. However, the gap in this article being that Sammy concentrated on democracy as the only political system that could resolve the menace of Arab Spring. He fails to look beyond that. Therefore, before we shall strive to fill the gap, let us explore the concept of liberty in the philosophy of J. S. Mill.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL

Born in 1806, Mill's education began with Greek and arithmetic at the age of three. He was educated exclusively by his father. By his eighth year he had read in the original Greek Aesop's *Fables*, Xenophon's *Anabasis*, and the whole of the historian Herodotus. Also, at the age of eight he started to study Latin, the geometry of Euclid, and algebra and began to teach the younger children of the family. His main reading was still history, but he went through all the Latin and Greek authors commonly read in the schools and universities and, by the age of ten he could read Plato and the Athenian statesman Demosthenes with ease. About the age of twelve, he began a thorough study of Scholastic logic, at the same time reading Aristotle's logical treatises in the original. In the following year he was introduced to political economy and he studied the work of the Scottish political economist and philosopher, Adam Smith, and that of the English economist, David Ricardo.

From his earliest days he spent much time in his father's study and habitually accompanied him on his walks. He thus inevitably acquired many of his father's speculative opinions and his father's way of defending them. From May 1820 until July 1821, Mill was in France with the family of Sir Samuel Bentham, brother of Jeremy Bentham, the English Utilitarian philosopher, economist, and theoretical jurist. For twenty years, from 1836 (when his father died) to 1856, Mill had charge of the British East India Company's relations with the Indian states, and in 1856 he became chief of the examiner's office.

This intensive study however had injurious effects on Mill's mental health, and state of mind. ''At the age of twentyhe suffered a nervous breakdown. Mill had been engaged in a pen-friendship with Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism and sociology, since the two were both young men in the early 1820s''[1]. Comte's *sociologie* was more an early philosophy of

science than we perhaps know it today, and the "*positive* philosophy aided in Mill's broad rejection of Benthianism"[2].

In 1851, J. S. Mill married Harriet Taylor after 21 years of an intimate friendship. He cites her influence in his final revision of *On Liberty*, which was published shortly after her death. Taylor died in 1858 after developing severe lung congestion, only seven years into their marriage. Between the years 1865 and 1868 Mill served as Lord Rector of the University of St. Andrews. During the same period, 1865-8, he was a Member of Parliament for City and Westminster,and was often associated with the Liberal Party. During his time as MP, Mill advocated easing the burdens on Ireland and in 1866 he became the first person in Parliament to call for women to be given the right to vote. Mill became a strong advocate of women's rights and such social reforms as labour unions and farm cooperatives. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill called for various reforms of Parliament and voting, especially proportional representation, the Single Transferable Vote, and the extension of suffrage. He was godfather to Bertrand Russell. He died in Avignon, France, in 1873, where he is buried alongside his wife. Remarkably, Mill was intellectually following the global trends and changes in politics of his time.

The wind of political change across the globe following the collapse of the communist regimes in the 1980s, threatened the foundations of authoritarianism in the world. In spite of these growing trends of democratisation, ''the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained among the few who have been remarkably resilient towards democratic influences with autocracies being most robust"[3]. Rulers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region created political dynasties with family successions and longevity as their hallmark. ''Saudi Arabia for instance has been ruled by the Al-Saud family since 1932, Oman by the Sultan Qaboos since 1971, Morocco by the Alouite family since 1956, Syria by the Assads since 1970, Libya by Gaddafi since 1969, Egypt by Mubarak since 1981, Yemen by the Ali

Abdulah Saleh since 1981 and Tunisia by Ben Ali since 1987, just to mention a few"[4]. It is thus not surprising for democracy scholar, Oliver Schlumberger to conclude that ''no single Arab country has ever reached a state in which its polity could reasonably be considered democratic''[5]. The turnout of political events in the MENA region since the 2011 revolution has, however, been marked with protests from the masses against their ruling government amidst various demands. Beginning with Tunisia, these citizen-led protests spread to other parts of the region toppling authoritarian regimes notably in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya. These remarkable occurrences seem to have broken the illusion of regime invulnerability in the Arab world thus creating prospects for a more liberal political reform. Besides, the ''Arab Spring as coined by the West to describe the transnational wave of the protest is viewed as a significant historical moment of political transformation especially in the Arab world"[6]. Unprecedented as it was, the Arab spring drew the attention of many to the MENA region, which has sparked varying debates as to what might have instigated it. Despite the manifold conditions that set the stage for the Arab Spring, ''the significant similarity identified with all the uprisings was the desire for political reforms''[7]. From the onset, the common notion held, especially by the West and the media among other liberals was the idea that the MENA region was suddenly looking for a liberal democratic solution. Liberty as a term is commonly interchangeable in usage with freedom. This controversy between them could be resolved in freedom which ''is the ability to do as one wills and what one has the power to do; whereas the exercise of liberty is subject to capability and limited by the rights of others''.[8] In philosophy, liberty involves free will while in politics, liberty consists of the social and political freedoms that are entitled to members of a community. However, before we delve into the concept of liberty in J. S. Mill it is necessary to briskly reiterate different political philosophers' views on liberty.

Philosophers from antiquity have considered the question of liberty. Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius writes of "a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed."[9] According to Thomas Hobbes, "a free man is he that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do is not hindered to do what he hath the will to do."[10] John Locke rejected that definition of liberty. According to Locke:

> In the state of nature, liberty consists of being free from any superior power on Earth. In political society, liberty consists of being under no other lawmaking power except that established by consent in the commonwealth. Thus, freedom is not as Sir Robert Filmer defines it: 'A liberty for everyone to do what he likes, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws.' Freedom is constrained by laws in both the state of nature and political society. Freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature. Freedom of people under government is to be under no restraint apart from standing rules to live by that are common to everyone in the society and made by the lawmaking power established in it. Persons have a right or liberty to (1) follow their own will in all things that the law has not prohibited and (2) not be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, and arbitrary wills of others.[11]

John Stuart Mill would not accept wholly the Lockean conception of liberty. However, J. S. Mill, in his work, On Liberty, was the first to recognise ''the difference between liberty as the freedom to act and liberty as the absence of coercion''.[12] Mill's doctrine of civil liberty is meant to put check on political oppression and social control of the individual. This form of liberty exists in every free society, in which justice demands that the law protects the individual's freedom. According to Mill, ''a man must be allowed to pursue his own good in his own way and the law must not interfere with a man's actions unless what he does causes harm to others''.[13]

For J. S. Mill it is a gross inadequacy for the constitution to protect only specific freedoms. If not, what is the essence of the law? Hitherto, the law should be made to protect freedom in all aspect of human life. Hence, he elaborates the different nuances of his civil liberty.

According to him, the appropriate region of human liberty comprises of: first, liberty of conscience, of thought and feeling, of opinion and sentiment, of expressing and publishing opinions in so far as they do not harm others. Secondly, it concerns the liberty of tastes and pursuit; of framing a pattern of life that suits one; of doing as we like without impediment from fellow creatures. Thirdly, the liberty of combination among individuals for any purpose not involving harm to others. However, Mill emphasizes that the freedom which deserves the name is: ''that of pursuing our own good in our own way so long as we do not deprive others of their or impede their efforts to obtain it.''[14]

3.1 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL

John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* offers the classic defence of individual liberty against the potential abuse of the 'tyranny of the majority' to prevent this tyranny, what Mill often referred to as "Mill's Liberty Principle". Therefore, it is a principle that will define the proper scope of individual liberty, enshrined in *On Liberty*. This *principle of liberty* states that:

> The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others[15].

Mill regards the protection of individual liberty to be a necessary condition for the development of a human being in addition he presents four specific grounds for the principle of liberty:

1) we (individuals) should be in charge of our own affairs, as we are both the most interested in our own wellbeing and more knowledgeable about our own situation and values than others; 2) we are not accountable to others for self-respect of self-development since it is not for the good of mankind that [we] be held accountable; 3) society should attempt to make

people capable of rational conduct while they are children, not after they are adults; 4) when the public does interfere with personal conduct, "the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.

Mill asserts that the subject of his essay is not "liberty of the will" (the metaphysical problem of "free-will") but the political question of civil or social liberty which aims to determine the nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. Mill's essay however, focuses on the relationship between liberty and authority when does the state have the right to interfere in people's lives and liberties? between the extremes of anarchism where the state has no justified authority and totalitarianism - where the state has total authority as in Hobbes's social contract, where the individual has no real "rights" which the state has an obligation to protect where between these extremes is the proper balance of liberty and authority?

One question that burdens Mill is where should authority be constrained and liberty allowed? Mill considers the history of this struggle between liberty of the individual and authority of the state; how the struggle for liberty was waged against the tyranny of political rulers. Here Mill was referring to the conception of civil liberty as found in Locke and which found expression in the American and French revolutions. Mill observes that this struggle for liberty against the oppression of tyrannical rulers took two different paths:

1)   obtaining recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, nevertheless regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe (Locke and Rousseau);

2) and the institution of constitutional checks (Locke and Montesquieu), for Mill this defence of liberty did not go far enough, it was not enough that the rulers simply be identified with the people.

Mill further argues that this tyranny is more formidable than many kinds of political oppression. Now, the question is where do we place the limit and balance between individual

independence and social control? Mill proffers 'Liberty Principle' as a plausible solution. Again, Mill considers individual liberty as preeminent and indeed paramount in finding the balance. Thus, as long as one is not harming others one should be free to do what one wants to do. In the context of U.S. constitutional law, for example, they point out that the constitution twice listed "life, liberty, and property"[16] without making any distinctions within that phrase. The implementation of liberty involves ''opposing any governmental coercion, aside from that which is necessary to prevent individuals from coercing each other''.[17]

Much emphasis of man as unfinished 'work' in the thought of J. S. Mill, was as a result of the modification of his Utilitarianism by other influences like, Romanticism, Hegelism and Rousseau's idea that the human being is not complete but a work in progress. Mill's principle applies only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties and who are therefore members of a civilised community. Hence, children and barbarians are not included. In other words, liberty is valuable only under certain conditions; if those conditions are not met then liberty can cause a great deal of harm. For Mill certain members of the civilised society still show signs of immaturity and as such should be held back as children.

3.1.1 MILLIAN LIBERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE

Mill's liberalism is an ideology that is interested largely in civilised society or secular state, democratic political institutions in which the franchise is widespread, private property rights, market economies, equal social and economic opportunity, and a variety of personal and civic liberties. Millian liberalism has nothing to do with laissez-faire liberalism, and it justifies liberal essentials as a way of promoting the common good. The distinctiveness of Millian liberalism contrasts with two other conceptions of liberalism : the British Liberal Party and the sort of contemporary political liberalism, currently fashionable in Anglo-American

philosophical circles, that justifies liberal essentials as required if the state is to be neutral among rival conceptions of the good life that its citizens might hold.

What distinguishes Mill as a liberal from non-liberals? Maurice Cranston rightly points out, "a liberal is a man who believes in liberty."[18] In two different ways, liberals accord liberty primacy as a political value. (i) Liberals have typically maintained that humans are naturally in "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions as they think fit without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man."[19] Mill too argues that "the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition. The *a priori* assumption is in favour of freedom."[20.] Recent liberal thinkers such as Joel Feinberg, Stanley Benn and John Rawls are in agreement in this regard. This might be called the ''*Fundamental Liberal Principle:*''[21] freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would limit freedom, especially through coercive means. It follows from this that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit the liberty of citizens. Consequently, a central question of liberal political theory is whether political authority can be justified, and if so, how? It is for this reason that social contract theory, as developed by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, is usually viewed as liberal even though the actual political prescriptions of, say, Hobbes and Rousseau, have distinctly illiberal features. Insofar as they take as their starting point the state of nature in which humans are free and equal, and so argue that any limitation of this freedom and equality stands in need of justification (that is, by the social contract), the contractual tradition expresses the Fundamental Liberal Principle. This ideal of freedom as autonomy has its roots not only in Rousseau's and Kant's political theory, but also in John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty.* Against this backdrop, some republican theorists, such as Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli and Pettit, view republicanism as ''an alternative to liberalism. Insofar as republican liberty is seen as a basis for criticising market liberty and market society, this is plausible.''[22]

On another note, the seeds of a newer liberalism can be found in Mill's *On Liberty*. What has come to be known as '"new', 'revisionist', 'welfare state', or perhaps best, 'social justice', liberalism challenges this intimate connection between personal liberty and a private property based market order.''[23] Three factors help explain the rise of this revisionist theory. First, the new liberalism arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period in which the ability of a free market to sustain what Lord Beveridge called a 'prosperous equilibrium'[24] was being questioned. Believing that a private property based market tended to be unstable, or could, as Keynes argues, 'get stuck in an equilibrium with high unemployment,'[25] new liberals came to doubt that it was an adequate foundation for a stable, free society. Here the second factor comes into play: just as the new liberals were losing faith in the market, their faith in government as a means of supervising economic life was increasing.

However, this was partly due to the experiences of the First World War, in which "government attempts at economic planning seemed to succeed" [26] more importantly, this re-evaluation of the state was spurred by the democratisation of western states, and the conviction that, for the first time, elected officials could truly be, in J.A. Hobson's phrase 'representatives of the community.'[27] The third factor underlying the development of the new liberalism was probably the most fundamental: a growing conviction that, so far from being ''the guardian of every other right', property rights generated an unjust inequality of power that led to a less-than-equal liberty (typically, 'positive liberty') for the working class.''[28]

Although Mill insists that the so-called doctrine of 'Free Trade' rests on 'equally solid' grounds as did the 'principle of individual liberty,'[29] he nevertheless insists that the justifications of personal and economic liberty were distinct. And in his *Principles of Political Economy* Mill consistently emphasizes that ''it is an open question whether personal liberty can flourish without private property,''[30] a view that Rawls was to reassert over a century later. Following Wilhelm von Humboldt, in *On Liberty* Mill argues that *one* basis for

endorsing freedom (Mill believes that there are many), is the goodness of developing individuality and cultivating capacities:

> Individuality is the same thing with development, and…it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings…what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this.[31]

This moral ideal of human perfection and development dominated liberal thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth, and for most of the twentieth, century: not only Mill, but T.H. Green, L.T. Hob house, Bernard Bosanquet, John Dewey and even Rawls "show allegiance to variants of this perfectionist ethic and the claim that it provides a foundation for endorsing a regime of liberal rights"[32]. That the good life is necessarily a freely chosen one in which a person develops his unique capacities as part of a plan of life is probably the dominant liberal ethic of the past century.

The main challenge to Millian perfectionism as the distinctly liberal ethic came from moral contractualism, which can be divided into what might very roughly be labeled 'Kantian' and 'Hobbesian' versions. According to Kantian contractualism, "society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not *themselves* presuppose any particular conception of the good"[33] . On this view, respect for a person demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on him/her. In contrast, the Hobbesian version of contractualism supposes only that "individuals are self-interested, and correctly perceive that each person's ability to effectively pursue her interests is enhanced by a framework of norms that structure social life and divide the fruits of social cooperation"[34]. Morality, then, is a common framework that advances the self-interest of each.

In *On Liberty,* Mill argues that "Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free

and equal discussion"[35]. However, Mill asserts that, "Despotism is a legitimate form of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement…"[36] Nevertheless, it raised a question that still divided liberals: were liberal political principles justified for all political communities? In *The Law of Peoples* Rawls argues that they are not. According to Rawls there can be a 'decent hierarchical society' which is not based on the liberal conception of all persons as free and equal, but instead views persons as "responsible and cooperating members of their respective groups"[37] but not inherently equal . Given this, the full liberal conception of justice cannot be constructed out of shared ideas of this 'people', though basic human rights, implicit in the very idea of a social cooperative structure, apply to all peoples.

On an international level, liberal political theory fractures the appropriate response to groups (cultural, religious, etc.) which endorse illiberal policies and values. These groups may deny education to some of their members, advocate female genital mutilation, restrict religious freedom, and maintain an inequitable caste system, and so on. When, if ever, is it reasonable for a liberal group to interfere with the internal governance of an illiberal group? A good example is the case study of the Arab Spring. Suppose first that the illiberal group is another political community or state. Can liberals intervene in the affairs of non-liberal states? Mill provides a complicated answer in his 1859 essay 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention'. Reiterating his claim from *On Liberty* that civilised and non-civilised countries are to be treated differently, he insists that:

> Barbarians have no rights as a *nation*, except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one. The only moral laws for the relation between a civilised and a barbarous government, are the universal rules of morality between man and man[38].

Although this strikes us today as simply a case for an objectionable paternalistic imperialism (and it certainly was such a case), Mill's argument for the conclusion is more complex,

including a claim that, since international morality depends on reciprocity, 'barbarous' governments that cannot be counted on to engage in reciprocal behavior have no rights *qua* governments. In any event, when Mill turned to interventions among 'civilised' peoples he developed an altogether more sophisticated account as to when one state can intervene in the affairs of another to protect liberal principles. Here Mill was generally against intervention, when he correctly argues that:

> The reason is, that there can seldom be anything approaching to assurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the people themselves. The only test possessing any real value, of a people's having become fit for popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient proportion of them to prevail in the contest, are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation[39].

3.2 LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION

Mill believes that no governmental body or societal group has the right of dictating to the individual on what type of opinions to hold and what sort of discussion to hear. The liberty of thought and discussion is a fundamental right of every human being. Furthermore, he asserts that any opinion that is suppressed by authority may possibly be true, and therefore men were deprived of its truth. Hence, Mill claims that:

> The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.[40]

Those who suppress people's opinion deny its truth, for they were not infallible. No one person was able to decide the question for all mankind. To refuse a hearing to opinions because one claimed that one was sure they were false was to assume absolute certainty.

Thus, Mill succinctly writes: "There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life."[41]

For any authority to claim infallibility was, according to Mill, nonsensical, since no man was the right judge of all things, not considering the fact that other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes and parties had thought and even now think the exact reverse. Some epochs have held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false , but absurd ; and it was only possible that many opinions now greatly accepted will be rejected by future age, as many reject now some opinions generally held to be infallible in the past. There was no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error than in any other thing done by public authority in its judgment and responsibility. If men were never to act on their opinions because these opinions were wrong, they should leave all their interests uncared for and all duties unperformed. We must assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct. Little wonder Mill opines:

> The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. In the case of a person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. [42]

So also, if opinions assumed to be false are suppressed, how can they be corrected, for man was a fallible being who needed correction in order to be perfect. How could the uninstructed mind be instructed? People tend to suppress opinions they term to be critical; if there was no room for criticism, dynamism is seldom found. However, any truth that is accepted without discussion makes no impact on the receiver. Take, for instance, the traditional doctrines of prudence and knowledge of life, as well as morals and religion. People hear them, accept

them as truism and repeat them but it is hardly applied for practical life unless some misfortunes of personal experience drive them home.

Furthermore, it is not the feeling of surety of a belief or doctrine ,what Mill called ''an assumption of infallibility", [43] that matters, but the undertaking to decide that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side. Opinion is necessary in either sides, namely in the side of the government (or jurist) and on the side of the individual. When an individual refuses to provide evidence or make his opinion known he is liable to pernicious consequences; the same applies to the government. To buttress this point Mill observes in a well-articulated argument when he reasons as follows: "I denounce… the immorality and impiety of an opinion; yet if, in pursuance of that private judgement, though backed by the public judgement of the country, or his contemporaries, he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence, he assumes infallibility."[44]Mill illustrated instance memorable in history: such as Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision, due to accusation of 'impiety in denying the existence of the gods recognised by the state'.

Moreover, we have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the expression of opinion, on some distinct grounds, which we briefly recapitulate:

> First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct.[45]

Undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion.

3.3   LIBERTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Since the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of human wellbeing, Mill held that the individual should be allowed to live his life as he conceives so long as it does not constitute harm to others. This does not negate the fact that people could learn good attitudes from others and from the society. Rather, it implies that when one has reached the maturity of his faculties, one should be given the freedom to use and interpret experience in one's chosen way of life. This brings into focus the distinctive endowment of human beings – spontaneity. Man is improved by using his mental and moral powers to decide his actions:

> He who lets the world or his portion of it , choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employ all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. [46]

However, men sometimes tend to identify themselves with the customary way of life without considering what suits them. In identifying with the crowd, they lose their identity. They tend to forget that human life becomes more enriching, animating, strengthening and elevating when diversified. In proportion to the development of their individuality, people become

valuable to themselves, and in so doing become more valuable to themselves. Mill also observed that originality is something everyone admires. It stems from the fact of being free in thought and action. Originality is what produces geniuses of the day. If geniuses are compressed in the common place of the society they become of little value to the society; but if they are of strong character and resist compression, they break their fetters and become marks for the society . Originality brings to fullness the potentialities and capabilities of man. More so, it is important to give room for uncustomary modes of life, so that those of them fit to be converted to customs may be clearly seen. Nevertheless, independence of action and disregard of custom should be avoided lest good mode of action and customs be struck out. Individuality is opposed to the blind submission of oneself to the customs and traditions of one's society. Customs may have developed within too narrow a range of experience, and even within that range, what is embodied within customary practices may not be the best interpretation of that experience.

Again, the knowledge and wisdom contained in the traditions of one's society may be suited to the needs of ordinary men living in ordinary situations, but not all men are so placed. A particular person may be very different from others, and he may also find himself in highly untypical circumstances. For such a person customary styles of life may have little to offer. Human beings are not machines to be built after a model. They are more like trees which grow and develop from inward forces just as not all plants can survive in the same physical atmosphere, so too not all human beings will grow up healthily in the same social atmosphere. Some modes of life will cultivate the potentialities of some individuals, but they will at the same time crush those of others. Different persons require different conditions for their development, and there is no one pattern of life that will suit everybody. The attempt to force, by customary and other pressures, essentially different people into a uniform mould will stunt and warp them, thus preventing them from realising their different potentialities.

But Mill's central objection to blind conformity to custom is that if a man accepts custom simply because it is custom, then he does not make a choice (Isaiah Berlin stresses the importance Mill attaches to the freedom to choose). To that extent he is less of a human person, for he has failed to develop in himself "any of the distinctive endowments of a human being" [47]. These distinctive human faculties of "perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice" [48].Those who are unable or who refuse to exercise their human capacity for choice, Mill compares with apes, with cattle, with sheep, and with steam-engines. They have lost or surrendered that which is distinctively human, that which marks them out from the rest of nature and from the artifacts of human creation which cannot have aims and purposes of their own but are designed by human beings to serve the purposes of human beings. Once one has succeeded in building a good machine for a particular purpose, one can multiply it many times, and each additional machine, so long as it is a faithful copy of the original, will be just as good as the original. But with human beings the matter is different. Even with human beings who are very similar in potentialities, and who are similarly placed, it is not the case that they would all have the same human worth if they were all forced to copy a good model of their kind. It is possible that a person "might be guided in some good path, and kept out of harm's way" without his making choices of his own. "But what will be his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it."[49] What is lost in the forced imitation by human beings of good models of conduct is the conscious choice between alternatives, and all that this involves. The act of choice brings into play various faculties: seeing, reasoning, judgement, firmness and self-control. And these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one. Men who make choices develop what Mill calls a "character": their desires and feelings are the

products of their own conscious choices and are not the passively generated products of external factors. Mill argues at length for the importance of 'individuality' which he holds, comes from, or indeed is identical with, continued effort at self-development. However, he thinks that for individualism to survive, people must be made to feel its value to see that it is good there should be differences.The struggle that often springs up between the society and the individual caused Mill to offer this kind of insight into modern democracy:

> The 'people' who exercise the power , are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous, or the most active part of the people; the majority , or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority: the people, consequently, 'may' desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power.[50]

Worst still, in Mill's view, the tyranny of the majority is always a threat to the individual freedom, with government control on one side, and all sorts of social and psychological pressures on the other. To protect the liberty of the indivdual, Mill sounds another warning: "There is a limit to the legitimate intereference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against politcal despotism."[51]

This crisis is further confused by uncertainty as to where this limit of intereference should be. One of the crucial needs of the day is to establish a recognised principle to govern the relatioship between individual liberty and authority. For the struggle between the two is the most conspicuious problem in the history of man as a political animal; that is to say ,the struggle between the rulers and the ruled, the state and the individual. Little wonder, therefore, that Mill, in order to safeguard liberty of the individual holds that the purpose for

which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a given community against his will, is to prevent harm against others.His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant.In the above, Mill is stressing the importance of the individual in contributing to the common good, for the good of the individual should not be allowed to jeopardice the public good . Yet, Mill holds that since people differ by nature, they should be allowed to develop differently. This kind of liberty, according to him, engenders personal happiness and social progress . As a few may come up with improvements benefical to others thus, opening gate for future developments. But where this liberty is not allowed, the contrary result is always the case. It is only by the liberty, choice and its exercise that people develop their potentials and character. For the test of any civilisation is the quality of its people, an idea that finds noteable expresssion in Mill:

> It really is of importance not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do it. Among the works of man , which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance is surely man himself. Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendencies of the forces which make of a living thing. [52]

From this view, Mill asserts that the individual should not be forced to change his ways and should not be asked to, unless of course, his actions endanger the common good. For the individual is the monarch of his own realm: "*over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign*".[53] Clearly the principle so formulated is not in description of the past events, but a formula to guide civilised nations in the present and the future. Thus the claims of liberty have now become the vital questions of the present and the future.

3.4 LIMITS OF AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY

Mill attempts to delineate when the authority of society can rightly limit individuality and the "*sovereignty of the individual over himself.*" Mill's answer is that society and the individual should each receive control over that part of human life that it is particularly interested in. In proposing these three aspects of civil liberty, Mill intends to put a check on the powers exercised by the society on the individual person. He asks: "How much of human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested, to society, the part which chiefly interests the society*"*[54].

What Mill meant here is that so long as a person's action affects the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it; but in matters that pattern to the person himself, there should be perfect legal and social liberty. He cited an example that no one should be punished for drunkenness; but a soldier should be punished for being drunk on duty. This doctrine does not imply a selfish indifference of people to others, but there is the need for people to encourage one another to choose good and avoid evil. They should also stimulate one another to increase exercise of their higher faculties . He maintains that "consideration to aid one's judgment, exhortation to strengthen his will may be offered to him but he is the final judge".[55]   Even if a man errs, it is better than others constraining him to do as they please. People have right to caution others of their mis-behaviour without oppressing their individuality by being unruly. However, if a man's conduct lacks the qualities of human nature, it may affect other people's relationship with him. They may decide to avoid him, they may caution others against him if they think that his actions would have precarious effects on them. Guidance may be given him; but he should be allowed to make decisions for himself.

In Mill's own view, individuals should be allowed to pursue a way of life that pleases them. For this reason, parents should be allowed to obtain education for their children where and how they like. Although trade is a social act, people are free to choose the occupation that suits them; however, some prohibitions are made on some goods that are harmful to the society. People are also free to invent new ideas and new modes of thought in order to improve their life and that of the society at large. The same also applies to the realm of morality and religion, each individual is entitled to his own conscience.

Mill also emphasizes that in matters that affect the interests of others, social sanction should be weighed against the offence; and if the sanction outweighs the act, punishment should be suspended. He further says that if the harm is such that the society could bear, they should do so for the sake of human freedom. However, if there is a deliberate harm done to the society, punishment should be administered accordingly.   While rejecting the idea of a social contract, Mill writes that since people receive the protection of society, they owe certain conduct in return. Individuals must not injure those interests of other people that should be considered rights. Individuals must fairly share the burden of defending society and its members from injury. Finally, individuals may be censured by opinion, though not by law, for harming others while not violating their rights. Thus, society has jurisdiction over any aspect of human behaviour that "*affects prejudicially the interests of others*." However, society does not have an interest in those aspects of life that affect no one but the person acting, or only affects people by their consent. Mill writes that such behaviour should be both legally permitted and socially accepted. People should encourage others to make full use of their faculties. They should not, however, try to keep a person from doing with his life what he wishes. Mill justifies this position by observing that anybody else's interests in or knowledge about a particular person's wellbeing is "trifling" compared to the individual's own interest and knowledge. Mill says that he does not mean that people should not be

allowed to point out what they see as faults in other people's behaviour. In addition, he is not proscribing avoiding a person or warning others about that person. These "penalties" are acceptable because they are natural reactions to some behavior - they are not intended to punish a person. However, People do not have the right to express moral reprobation, and they should not try to make the person uncomfortable. He should not be treated with anger or resentment, or seen as an enemy if he engages in unpopular activities that only affect himself. Mill then addresses potential criticism of his argument. How "can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members?" No human is fully isolated, and actions can create bad examples, hurt those who depend on the person and diminish community resources. Furthermore, why can't society interfere on behalf of mature people incapable of "self- government?" Mill replies that he agrees that some behaviour may affect the "sympathies" and interests of others, and hurt the well-being of society at large. When an action violates a person's obligations then it does not only affect himself, and he can properly face moral reprobation for breaking those obligations. Mill gives the example of a person who is unable to pay debts because of extravagant living. He says that such behaviour is subject to punishment because the person fails to fulfill a duty to his creditors. However, the person should not be punished for the extravagance itself -that is a personal decision that must be respected. In contrast, if an action only indirectly affects society without violating any fixed obligation, then "the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom." Society has a person's entire childhood to nurture values; if the person fails to accept those values, or remains immature, it is society's own fault. No further influence is necessary. Also, if an action is harmful then people will see its negative effects, and this should be enough of an example to them of why they should not act in such a way. Mill says the strongest argument against interference, though, is that when society does interfere, it will likely do so wrongly. He writes, "There is no parity between the

feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it." Mill argues that there is a universal tendency of people to extend the bounds of "moral police" unjustly. He writes about how a Muslim majority might insist that pork not be eaten in their country, or that married clergy be punished in Spain. He writes, "We must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice in the application to ourselves." If people want to be able to impose their morality, they must be willing to accept the imposition by others. Mill complains about unjust violations of freedom such as the banning of alcohol, the banning of recreation on the Sabbath, and the persecution of Mormons for polygamy. People can preach against such activities, and try to change people's minds, but they should not be coercive.

3.5 SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TYRANNICAL EFFECTS OF LIBERTY

In classical politics, a tyrant (Greek τύραννος, *tyrannos*) is one who illegally seizes and controls a governmental power in a polis. Tyrants were a group of individuals who took over many Greek polis during the uprising of the middle classes in the sixth and seventh centuries BC, ousting the aristocratic governments. The term used in Classical and Hellenistic Greece for tyranny was value neutral and meant simply a non-hereditary king. The phrase "tyranny of the majority" originates with Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America and was further popularised by John Stuart Mill, who cites de Tocqueville, in On Liberty ; the Federalist Papers frequently refer to the concept, though usually under the name of "the violence of majority faction ".[56] Here's what Mill writes in the Introduction to *On Liberty* about the tyranny of the majority:

> The tyranny of the majority was at first, …chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, …it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression.[57]

Nevertheless, Mill continues, thus*:*

> Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough…There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as protection against political despotism.[58]

However, Mill hopes that ''the doctrines of On Liberty would both offer guidelines for legislation and help create a culture of tolerance.''[59] The concept itself was popular with Friedrich Nietzsche and the phrase (in translation) is used at least once in the first sequel to 'Human, All Too Human'.[60]Ayn Rand, Objectivist philosopher and novelist, wrote against such tyranny, saying that individual rights are not subject to a public vote, and that the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities (and that the smallest minority on earth is the individual). Similar arguments are made by a number of other philosophies that support individualism, including the Austrian movement, and libertarianism in general. The scope of Mill's anxieties is broader than our discussion so far suggests, however, he confines his work on the political dimension of the problem. Mill also thought that quite apart from the passage of bad law and the biased enforcement of law and quite independently of the conduct of political authorities altogether, democratic public opinion can exercise a social tyranny, especially when its prestige is enhanced by majoritarian political institutions and their ethos. Mill identified this threat of social tyranny with the domination of society by a single class of its citizens, and he identified the onset of socialism with the domination of society by the class of manual labourers, the numerical majority. In this possible future state of society Mill foresaw grave danger for liberty.What Mill has in mind under the heading of 'social tyranny' or 'the moral coercion of public opinion' he exhibits plainly in sections of his argument in *The Subjection of Women,* where he notices that even in the absence of overt political discrimination, widely-disseminated and staunchly-held beliefs about women's inferiority or the indecency of women assuming

masculine prerogatives could greatly reduce the liberty of independent-minded women. A person who challenges these entrenched beliefs is likely to find herself facing reduced opportunities of companionship and affection and other basic human goods. A person deterred from non-conformity by fear of social ostracism, at least in extreme cases, is suffering diminished liberty. The threat to liberty posed by social tyranny is tricky to handle, for the conforming majority too has the right to air its opinions and to avoid the company of individuals professing detested beliefs.Mill admonishes those who would seek to reform dissenting individuals by avoiding their company not to "parade the avoidance", but clearly a fearful ostracism can be spontaneous and unorganised, and in many circumstances at any rate individuals clearly do have a right to parade their avoidance and organise the public gesture of a snub. Hence, the emphasis throughout Mill's writings on the importance of encouraging diversity of belief and culture, and it is this diversity which the rise of democracy culminating in socialism threatens to destroy.It is difficult to estimate the seriousness of the threat that working-class domination of society will extend to the point of suppressing individuality. The homogeneity of the working-class perceived by Mill was largely a matter of class solidarity: homogeneity of interests against the interests of adversary social formations, particularly the class of employers. Since the introduction of socialism eliminates the class of employers it also dissolves whatever working-class homogeneity is bound up with the spirit of united resistance to employers. Racial pride depends for its existence on other and different races; class pride too only exists as long as there are opposing classes to strain against (either in reality or recent remembrance). Socialism implies the disappearance of the conditions that make the working-class a class or collective entity; one would suppose that with this disappearance the threat of class dictatorship vanishes also.These considerations do not wholly remove the source of Mill's fears. The class rule of manual labourers under a system of majority rule might issue in the oppression of social

groups other than the new vanished employers, or to put the point another way the working-class under socialism might dissolve not into happily associated individuals but into newly antagonistic social groups. Mill mentions the possibility that uneducated and unskilled workers might unfairly act to restrict the liberty of educated and skilled workers. Even supposing for the sake of argument a socialism so far advanced that all are workers, all workers are on the same economic footing, and so economic class distinctions as such have ceased to exist, the majority of the populace, being of one mind and cultural sensibility, might seek coercively to impose that sensibility on wayward, intellectually independent, or culturally unorthodox individuals.

Perhaps, this cultural tyranny of the majority is always a possibility. The only guarantee against it is minority rule, but since any minority rule carries with it the danger of tyranny of the minority, one must ask why Mill supposes there is an extra threat to liberty looming in the thorough-going majoritarian rule envisaged under socialism? To this question Mill has several answers. The most plausible answer that one can cull from Mill's writings is that the best safeguard against the excesses of class domination is class differentiation and a balance of social power among differentiated classes . In his review of Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Volume two, Mill proposes an agricultural class, a learned class, and a leisure class as counterweights to the power of the commercial classes; in later works similar proposals are advanced, but with a focus on curbing the advancing power of manual labourers. Suppose we concede to Mill that a culturally pluralistic society is more conducive to the preservation of individual liberty than a culturally monolithic society. Suppose we also concede that economic inequalities may sometimes contribute to a divergence of cultural outlooks and to a resultant pluralism. (But here the causal connection is bound to be complex. The removal of economic inequalities may stimulate diversities among persons formerly bound by poverty to homogeneous cultural squalor.) The question then becomes whether the absence of economic

inequalities – the aspiration of socialism- is compatible with wide-ranging cultural diversity. Will farmers cease to think and feel differently from city dwellers when there is parity in their wages? Will intellectuals develop a culture that is substantially identical to that of manual labourers when the material conditions of each group are made equal? These are empirical questions on which there is little hard evidence available, but intuitively there is little reason to expect that all cultural divergence will disappear as economic equality approaches. At the very least it may be noted that Mill cites no empirical evidence to support the pessimistic view his fears rest upon. Only if it is improbably assumed that economic inequality is a necessary condition of cultural diversity has Mill a reasonable argument for suspecting a threat to liberty in the coming of socialism.

The phrase 'tyranny of the majority' requires elucidation, for it can refer to two distinct kinds of situations. When the majority is of one mind and acts to impose its will on a dissenting minority, there may be majority tyranny. For example, the majority dislike dancing while the minority likes this pastime, and the majority succeeds in enacting a ban on dancing. But there is also the case in which each of the members of an assembly cares more for restricting the liberty of others than for preserving his own liberty. One would like to dance and one would also like others not to dance. If the second desire is stronger it may determine one's voting behavior, and if an entire assembly has this set of desire it may vote unanimously for a rule forbidding dancing, even though each individual would prefer to dance than not to dance. Under the heading of 'tyranny of the majority' Mill clearly recognises, and is disturbed by, the second possibility (tyranny of the majority over itself) as well as the first (tyranny of the majority over a minority).Although these threats to liberty are conceivable, Mill does not stress their likelihood, and it should be emphasized that even in the most centralised state socialism citizens collectively have the option of giving consumer sovereignty full sway over the production of goods. Of course they would be ill-advised to exercise this option,

according to Mill, for the simple reason that individual market choices may be expected to provide inadequate quantities of such goods as national defence and lighthouse beacons. If one believes that inadequate provision of what economists now call public goods may yield consequences including a diminution of liberty, one has yet another reason to doubt that there is any obvious threat to liberty posed by the onset of socialism. But perhaps it is in considering the issue of how production is to be organised, after it has been settled what goods to produce, that Mill discovers a more plausible threat. Under capitalism, owners of the means of production are free to dispose of these means in any way they choose, subject to familiar legal restraints and market pressures. Non-owners have the freedom to try to acquire the right to use the means of production on whatever terms they can negotiate. Under socialism, the major means of production are collectively owned, so no single individual is free to dispose of these means as he wishes. It suffices to argue that there is no ground to hold Mill veritable in this supposition that the transition from capitalism to democratic socialism will decrease production liberty. To be sure, a possible response here is to reject industrialism and large-scale production in the name of individual liberty. It is worthwhile noting that Mill explicitly rejects this nostalgic response. Besides making the obvious point that modern big industry is economically efficient, Mill argues:

> And in the moral aspect of the question, which is still more important than the economical, something better should be aimed at as the goal of industrial improvement, than to disperse mankind over the earth in single families, having scarcely any community of interest, or necessary mental communion, with other human beings.[61]

In words similar in tone to Marx's aspersions on "rural idiocy," Mill proposes mutual association as a more fitting industrial ideal than isolated independence. To summarise the most credible political threat to liberty under socialism which Mill has isolated, is the possibility of tyranny of the majority especially as it might emerge in the arena of production. Less plausible is Mill's claim that the possibility of this majority tyranny should have a

bearing on the choice between a capitalist and socialist arrangement of economic institutions. One can regard capitalist property rights as a device for removing certain production and distribution issues from the purview of majority rule. These issues are settled by individuals exercising private property rights which are broadly protected against legislative incursion. Since Mill himself denies that the production-sphere decisions made by the owners of the major means of production can be self-regarding decisions there simply is no case for associating the institution of private property rights with the entrenchment of liberty. The notion that, in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannise and exploit diverse smaller interests, has been criticised by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action, who argues instead that narrow and well organised minorities are more likely to assert their interests over those of the majority. Olson argues that when the benefits of political action (for instance, lobbying) are spread over fewer agents, there is a stronger individual incentive to contribute to that political activity. Narrow groups, especially those who can reward active participation to their group goals, might therefore be able to dominate or distort political process, a process studied in public choice theory.

Meanwhile, an American political theorist John C. Calhoun developed the theory of Concurrent majority to deal with the tyranny of the majority. It states that great decisions are not merely a matter of numerical majorities, but require agreement or acceptance by the major interest in society, each of which had the power to block federal laws that it feared would seriously infringe on their rights. That is, it is illegitimate for a temporary coalition that had a majority to gang up on and hurt a significant minority. The doctrine is one of limitations on democracy to prevent the tyranny. Such also were the case of Arab revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa regions; where the world watched the events of the Arab Spring unfold, "gripped by the narrative of a young generation peacefully rising up against oppressive authoritarianism to secure a more democratic political system and a brighter

economic future."[62] The Arab Spring is widely believed to have been ''instigated by dissatisfaction, particularly of youth and unions, with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide gaps in income levels and pressures caused by the Great Recession may have had a hand as well''.[63] Other sources confirm the ''US government's support of the uprisings, funded largely by the National Endowment for Democracy''.[64]However, the Arab spring connotes and implies a total disorder and tyrannical governance by the leaders of MENA. This tyranny led to the uprisings in different regions of the Arab world. What could be the possible ways-out-of-conflicts in these upheavals? Perhaps, the individual liberty suffers the upsurge in the social and political torture from the causes as mentioned above.

However, Roman historians like Suetonius, Tacitus, Plutarch, and Josephus often spoke of "tyranny" in opposition to "liberty". Tyranny was associated with imperial rule and those rulers who usurped too much authority from the Roman Senate. Those who were advocates of "liberty" tended to be pro-Republic and pro-Senate. For instance, regarding Julius Caesar and his assassins, Suetonius writes:

> Therefore the plots which had previously been formed separately, often by groups of two or three, were united in a general conspiracy, since even the populace no longer were pleased with present conditions, but both secretly and openly rebelled at his tyranny and cried out for defenders of their liberty.[65]

Niccolò Machiavelli, building on this opposition, conflates all rule by a single person (whom he generally refers to as a "prince") with "tyranny," regardless of the legitimacy of that rule, in his *Discourses on Livy*. He also identifies liberty with republican regimes; whether he would include so-called "crowned republics" (such as modern constitutional monarchies) is somewhat unclear from the text. When writing *Democracy in America*, French philosopher Alexis De Tocqueville coined the phrase Tyranny of the Majority referring to an idea from

Plato's Republic. Majority rule imposes the will of a mere half of the population, plus one vote, upon minorities in each issue. It is just as wrong to violate someone else's rights, even if you outnumber them and have a vote.The modern apologists for majority rule, who unfortunately have managed to get the word "democracy" spun into a positive thing in public schools, defend their tyranny over minorities. The political principle that underlies the market mechanism is unanimity. In an ideal free market resting on private property, no individual can coerce any other, all cooperation is voluntary, all parties to such cooperation benefit or they need not participate. J. S. Mill's solutions to majority tyranny were proportional representation and extra votes for the rich and the well-educated. Neither solution bears close examination. Proportional representation is a solution to a different problem. If there is a majority, it is a majority, and proportional representation will not make it less so (although it may correct some overrepresentation of the majority). The majority of voters in Northern Ireland since 1921 has always been Protestant; the population votes almost entirely along religious lines; therefore any fairly elected Northern Ireland assembly must have a Protestant majority. Mill's solution of 'fancy franchises' is open to objection. The main danger that worried Aristotle, and Mill alike was that the majority poor citizenry would vote for confiscatory legislation at the expense of the rich minority.

On Liberty contains a rational justification of the liberty of the individual in opposition to the claims of the state to impose unlimited control, and has become a classic of libertarian philosophy. In this essay Mill also warns of a second danger to liberty, which democracies are prone to, namely, the tyranny of the majority. In a representative democracy, if you can control the majority (and get them to vote for, and elect, your candidates) then you can control everyone (because your candidates, once "democratically elected", will pass whatever laws are needed for this, as was done by Hitler's agents in the 1930s in Nazi Germany and seems to be happening today in the U.S.A. and other parts of the world). It suffices to say that

Mill's on Liberty is a tool for social and political philosophical pedagogy; especially in this contemporary time the world faces numerous economic, social and political challenges like terrorism, Arab Spring and so on. But how far Mill's on Liberty will go on to proffering plausible solutions to the menace are another issue. One of the major areas of interest on the Arab uprising could be the demands of democracy or rather the best form of political system that will be peculiar to the Arabs as to alleviate their economic, social and political ills and thus, bring new life and common good for all. At this point, Mill makes his submission which culminates in common good of all citizens; he proposed the best form of government to be 'Proportional Representation' in representative democracy.

3.6 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

Mill believes in the concept of democracy with a clause. For him, there are two ways in which democracy is, under the right circumstances, best suited to promote the common good. First, he thinks that democracy plays an important *epistemic* role in identifying the common good. Proper deliberation about issues affecting the common good requires identifying how different policies would bear on the interests of affected parties and so requires the proper representation and articulation of the interests of citizens. But failure of imagination and the operation of personal bias present obstacles to the effective representation of the interests of others. Universal suffrage and political participation provide the best assurance that the interests of the governed will be properly appreciated by political decision-makers. In making this epistemic argument for democracy, Mill draws on some of his claims in his work *On Liberty* about the value of free inquiry and experimentation in lifestyle for developing our nature as progressive beings. But Mill thinks that democracy is also the best form of government because of the *constitutive* effects of political participation on the improvement of the moral capacities of citizens. To the extent that the governed can and do participate in

public debate and elections they exercise those very deliberative capacities that it is the aim of government to develop.In *Considerations on Representative Democracy,* Mill argues that a form of representative democracy is the best ideal form of government. It is not an invariant ideal, which holds regardless of historical or social circumstances. But he does think that it is the best form of government for societies with sufficient resources, security, and culture of self-reliance. In particular, Mill thinks that representative democracy has two criteria that make it the best form of good government: first, that government is good insofar as it promotes the common good, where this is conceived of as promoting the moral, intellectual, and active traits of its citizens, and second, that government is good insofar as it makes effective use of institutions and the resources of its citizens to promote the common good. Insofar as the second is really a component of first, we might conclude that Mill's ultimate political criterion is that good government should promote the common good of its citizens. Mill does not explicitly invoke his version of utilitarianism. Perhaps he wants his defence of representative democracy to rest on more ecumenical premises. But he clearly understands this political criterion of the common good in broadly consequentialist or result-oriented terms. Moreover, though he may not mention the higher pleasures doctrine explicitly, it is also clear that Mill understands the good of each in broadly perfectionist terms that emphasize the importance of an active and autonomous form of life that exercises intellectual, deliberative, and creative capacities.Yet majority rule cannot be the only expression of "supreme power" in a democracy. If so, as Tocqueville notes above, the majority would too easily tyrannise the minority. Thus, while it is clear that democracy must guarantee the expression of the popular will through majority rule, it is equally clear that it must guarantee that the majority will not use its power to violate the basic and inalienable rights of the minority. For one, a defining characteristic of democracy must be the people's right to change the majority through elections. This right is the people's "supreme authority."

The minority, therefore, must have the right to seek to become the majority and possess all the rights necessary to compete fairly in elections - speech, assembly, association, petition, since otherwise the majority would make itself permanent and become a dictatorship. For the majority, ensuring the minority's rights becomes a matter of self-interest, since it must utilise the same rights when it is in minority to seek to become a majority again. This holds equally true in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, where no party has a majority, since a government must still be formed in coalition by a majority of parliament members.

America's experience is unique in scope, but all democracies have witnessed "the tyranny of the majority" applied against different social groups. Nearly all democracies, for example, restricted voting to specific economic groups, most frequently to male property owners, and only slowly expanded the franchise to men generally. Women were systematically denied equal political and social rights. The first state to grant equal suffrage was Wyoming, then still a territory in 1869; the first country to do so was New Zealand, but only in 1893. British women over the age of thirty were given the vote in 1918, and in 1928 the age limit was lowered to twenty-one. Women in the United States gained suffrage in 1920, while France did not adopt universal suffrage until after liberation from the Nazi occupation in 1944. Despite having the right to vote in most countries today, women still suffers formal discrimination in many places of the world. Perhaps, part of our research work is to use liberty to find implications for Arab Spring, it is therefore necessary to know first the historiography of Arab Spring.

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CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORIGRAPHY OF ARAB SPRING

4.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITION OF HISTORIOGRAPHY OF ARAB SPRING

History can be formally defined as a study of the past events concerned in the development of any event, subject or discipline. Historiography is the study of the history and methodology of the discipline of history. The term historiography also denotes a body of historical work on any discipline. Historiography of Arab Spring is to be understood here as a philosophical and phenomenological analysis of the historical origin of the past events concerned with the development of Arab Spring that is to say, critical analysis andphenomenological investigation of the 'when' and the 'whys' of Arab Spring. Here we are therefore going to critically examine the origin, the when and all causes of the revolutions in the Arab world.

If the 'when' and causes of philosophy critically examines the historical origin and cause of philosophy, we recall the famous statement of Plato concerning the origin or beginning of all philosophies, irrespective of the type. He plainly asserts that 'the sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher…philosophy has no other origin''. Writing on the same origin of philosophy, Heidegger writes more insistently and correctly too that ''the pathos of astonishment thus does not simply stand at the beginning of philosophy… astonishment carries and pervades philosophy''. Summarily, wonder, astonishment, amazement, curiosity, surprise combined with admiration is the root causes of philosophy.If wonder is the origin of philosophy, what, then is the origin of Arab Spring, what gave rise to it, and when did it begin in the Arab world? Could the wonder that gave rise to the origin of philosophy be responsible for the origin of Arab Spring? How do we trace it? Cosmological Wonder: this type of wonder, that is wonder about the world, began with man's sense of wonder and curiosity expressed in the question: ''what are things really like'', and ''how can we explain the process of change in things''.   What prompted these questions was the gradual

recognition that things are not exactly what they seem to be, ''appearance'' often differs from ''reality''. The fact of death, growth and decay- coming into being and passing away- raise not only the questions about personal destiny but also the larger questions of how things and persons came into existence, can be different at different times, pass out of existence only to be followed by other things and persons.

Thales 624- 546 B. C. opened up a new era of thought for which he rightly earned the title of the first philosopher. His novel inquiry concerned the nature of things. What is everything made of? Or what kind of stuff goes into the composition of things? He argued that one single element, a stuff which contained its own principle of action or change, lay at the foundation of all physical reality. To him this ''One'' or this ''stuff'' was water. For Anaximander the primary substance out of which all things came is an indefinite or boundless realm. Pythagoras advanced the principles of mathematics (numbers) as the principles of all things, etc. All these ancient philosophers were struck by wonder or cosmological wonder, that is wonder about the seen realities in the world or wonder about the world and history records them as the first to make a systematic attempt to find out the original stuff of the universe, the ultimate principles of what we see around us. Hence, the early Greeks are known today as the world's first philosophers as far of course as Western philosophy is concerned.

Ontological Wonder: Aristotle and Parmenides call our mind to the switch the Greek philosophers made from cosmological wonder to the ontological one. They began the search for a central point of thought where there is a formula for all the realities in the universe; a point from where creation flows; the concept which all realities are. Hence, Metaphysics or Ontology was born and to wonder about such a concept being is ontological wonder about the meaning and essence of being.

However, many scholars trace the historical origin of Arab Spring to the non-philosophic wonder which later turned to ontological wonder is at the cause of Arab Spring. These include migration crisis which is also uppermost in the struggle or revolution in the Arab world. Again, a basic tenet of humanity is freedom, a natural yearning to be free. To be able to move, decide, act and strive, is as natural as the flow of water through the path of least resistance. When Europe formed a collective Union there were multiple political, and socio-economic factors which aligned to create an environment where the formation was constructed. Major part of the agenda of European Collective Union was to allow immigrants from Africa into their countries. Morocco, Tunisia and Libya were the primary migration gateways – the secondary Gateway was Turkey.   However, when the EU economy could no longer afford the assimilation the EU national anxiety fomented as civil unrest. Eventually the collapse of various EU currencies began an irreversible situation where socio-economic stresses created real pressure and violence erupted; moreover, this leads to political leaders beginning to outline the broad failure of multi-culturalism. Immigration had to be stopped – it was destroying the EU and worsening the civil unrest. So the EU governing body made a strategic decision to pay off the gatekeepers (Gaddafi, and Ben Ali) to shut-down the immigration. Later, Tunisia and Libya began to fill with the now displaced immigrants who became viewed as parasites not only by the EU, but also now by the host countries which had been paid off to detain them. The economies of the Gateway countries could not support the mass migration now bottlenecked in their geography. The economics of the situation just exacerbated the sociological situation as various religious and political factions began to fight.On another note, the term "spring" had European origins, conjuring up associations with the "Spring of Nations" in 1848, the "Prague Spring" of 1968, or the Eastern European Spring of the late 1980s after the fall of Communism, when popular uprisings in the name of secular democracy sought the overthrow of despotic regimes that had ruled for decades. The

"Arab Spring," according to this thinking, was analogous to the European experience. Indeed, Islamist movements were on the margins of events and an overrated force in Arab politics. However, the first specific use of the term *Arab Spring* as used to "denote these events may have started with the American political journal *Foreign Policy*".[1]Marc Lynch, referring to his article in "*Foreign Policy*,"[2] writes "Arab Spring—a term I may have unintentionally coined in a January 6, 2011 article".[3]

4.2 THE ARAB WORLD

The term "Arab world" is controversial as it may imply that the entire region is Bedouin in its identity, population, and origin, which is false. Many non-Arabic speaking groups who live in the region do not consider themselves Arab - such as Berbers and Kurds -and the original homeland of the Arabs is the Arabian Peninsula. The term "Arab world" is sometimes also used to refer to historic Arab empires. Arab nationalism arose in the second half of the 19th century along with other nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire. The Arab League was formed in 1945 to represent the interests of Arab people and especially to pursue the political unification of the Arab countries; a project known as ''Pan-Arabism''.[4] Although no globally accepted definition of the Arab world exists, ''all countries that are members of the Arab League are generally acknowledged as being part of the Arab world''[5] As an alternative to, or in combination with, the standard territorial definition, the Arab world may be defined as ''consisting of peoples and states united to at least some degree by Arabic language, culture or geographic contiguity'',[6] or those states or territories in which the majority of the population speaks Arabic, and thus may also include populations of the Arab diaspora. "Arab" is a cultural and linguistic term, referring to those who speak Arabic as their first language. Arabs are united by culture and by history. Arabs are not a race. Most Arabs are Muslims but there are also millions of Christian Arabs and thousands of Jewish Arabs,

just as there are Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Americans. The Middle East is a loose term, not always used to describe the same territory. It usually includes the Arab countries from Egypt east to the Persian Gulf, plus Israel and Iran. Turkey is sometimes considered part of the Middle East, sometimes part of Europe. There are Americans with roots in each Arab country, but most originate from Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. ''The first immigrants arrived in the late 19th century''[7]. Casey Kasem and the Arab American Institute Foundation publish an illustrated brochure on famous Arab Americans: Spencer Abraham - U.S. Secretary of Energy, Elias Corey - 1960 Nobel Prize Winner.

The ''cradle of civilisation,''[8] as it is fervently called, connotes the MENA region as the foundation of the transition of the nomadic man to ancient civilisation and the root of Western civilisation. The MENA region remains phenomenal to the world in terms of its impact on world cultures, religion, technology and politics. It is known to be the origin of the three great monotheistic religions of the world; Christianity, Islam and Judaism and the birthplace of most ancient empires. Physically shaped in the form of an arc which stretches from north to the west, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is bordered by Europe, Asia and Africa, thus literally being at the central location. The MENA region, also referred to as the Greater Middle East comprises all Middle Eastern and Maghreb countries. The Maghreb consists of the five North African nations of Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. Geographically, the region is made up of twenty-two countries namely Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, Algeria, Bahrain, and Yemen. It is sometimes defined to include Ethiopia and Sudan. Amongst these countries, Egypt is uniquely defined as a transcontinental country which has its larger land mass stretching along the Nile while the Sinai Peninsula stretches to Asia. It is informative to state that the region can be identified with crucial inland water bodies such as

the Black, and the Red Seas, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and boarded by the Arabian Sea to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the west.Furthermore, "its geopolitical significance remains unabated due to its strategic central location which keeps it interconnected with about 1.5 billion people of the world's population".[9] Thus in terms of economic revolution and resource endowment, each of the MENA countries varies internally whilst they share similar cultural heritage and common historical civilisation. The Asian part of the Arab world is called the Mashriq. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and often Mauritania are the Maghreb or *Maghrib*, while Egypt and Sudan are referred to as Nile Valley, Egypt is a transcontinental country by virtue of the Sinai Peninsula, which is in Asia, it has stronger cultural connections to the *Mashriq*. The Arab world straddles two continents, Africa and Asia. It is mainly oriented along an east-west axis. Arab Africa, that comprises the entire northern third of the continent. It is surrounded by water on three sides (west, north, and east) and desert or desert scrubland on the fourth (south).

Historically, the rise of European powers together with the British and French revolutions waned the powers of the Ottoman Empire leading to its total collapse by the late nineteenth century. Colonialism became the trend and the basis for struggle over control of resources by the colonial masters who were predominantly European powers from Britain, France, Portugal, Italy, and Spain among others. The erection of colonial regimes meant the importation of variedly new administrative systems and policies, as well as the demarcation of boarders leading to the creation of the system of nation –states on the basis of politics. These imperialist activities by the colonial regimes were considered to be in contrast and alien to the historical, social and cultural foundations of the region which became a source of fragmentation of societies and gave rise to nationalism. As nationalist movements became predominant and exposed to the democratic discourses of European powers, one would expect that democracy could easily thrive in the region. However, the reverse is true as the

region has been noted in modern political discourses for its democratic deficiency. The majority of people in the Arab world adhere to Islam and the religion has official status in most countries. Shariah law exists partially in the legal system in some countries, especially in the Arabian peninsula, while others are secular. The majority of the Arab countries adhere to Sunni Islam. According to UNESCO, "the average rate of adult literacy (ages 15 and older) in this region is 76.9%."[10] Literacy rate is higher among the youth than adults. Youth literacy rate (ages 15–24) in the Arab region increased from 63.9 to 76.3% from 1990 to 2002.Women in the Arab world are still "denied equality of opportunity, although their disenfranchisement is a critical factor crippling the Arab nations' quest to return to the first rank of global leaders in commerce, learning and culture, according to a United Nations-sponsored report in 2008".[11] The Arab League was formed in 1945 to represent the interests of the Arabs, and especially to "pursue the political unification of the Arab world, a project known as Pan-Arabism".[12] The Arab League's main goal is to unify politically the Arab populations so defined. Its permanent headquarters are located in Cairo. Pan-Arabism has mostly been abandoned as an ideology since the 1980s, and was replaced by Pan-Islamism on one hand, and individual nationalisms on the other.

While the Arab world had been of limited interest to the European colonial powers, the British Empire being mostly interested in the Suez Canal as a route to British India, the economic and geopolitical situation changed dramatically after the discovery of large petroleum deposits in the 1930s, coupled with the vastly increased demand for petroleum in the west as a result of the Second Industrial Revolution. Different forms of government are represented in the Arab World: Some of the countries are monarchies: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The other Arab countries are all republics; with the exception of Lebanon, Tunisia, Palestine, and recently Mauritania. As of 2006, the Arab World accounts for two-fifths of the gross domestic product

and three-fifths of the trade of the wider Muslim World. The Arab states are mostly, although not exclusively, developing economies and derive their export revenues from oil and gas, or the sale of other raw materials. The main economic organisation's in the Arab World are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprising the states in the Persian Gulf, and the Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA), made up of North African States. The GCC has achieved some success in financial and monetary terms, including plans to establish a common currency in the Persian Gulf region. As of August 2009 "it was reported that Saudi Arabia is the strongest Arab economy according to World Bank".[13] It is Asia's eleventh largest economy, followed by Egypt and Algeria, which were also the second and third largest economies in Africa (after South Africa), in 2006. By grouping all the latest GDP figures, ''the total Arab world GDP is estimated to be worth at least $2.8 trillion in 2011.''[14] This is only smaller than the GDP of US, China, Japan and Germany.

4.3 THE ACTUAL CAUSES OF THE ARAB SPRING

From its long history of struggle for political change from corrupt and aging dictators and their elite counterparts, the Arab region gradually develops a youth dominated population who, out of frustration from rising unemployment and low living standards, demanded for radical change towards political and economic development. These cocktail of factors combined as a motivational force to give an explosive effect which shook the political foundations of the MENA region regardless of its consequences being unique to each country. Attempts to explain what the root causes of the uprising might be has been a subject of contention among scholars and political analyst who hold varying view and interpretations. Ken Ahorsu, observes that ''the uprising was as a result of a call for social change, which is inevitable and there are people in the society who just want change.''[15] They believe that generally society is changing and thus the MENA region must respond to the change. The

lack of social mobility as a result of the insensitivity of the MENA region to globalising social activities or cultural globalisation, made it certain for an uprising to occur. Ahorsu further asserts Islamic Fundamentalism or the *Muslim Element* to be a trigger of the uprising. According to him, while there might be a minority of people looking for democracy, there is a more mobilised part of the society who wanted a change for theocracy or a religious change. They see the redemption of most of their grievances in a theocratic state. The Islamic Fundamentalist view that the challenges they faced to be a creation of the West —who to them have imposed secular state and corrupt leaders on them. Thus, believing that a change in autocratic and corrupt leadership will lead to a form of egalitarian society triggered the revolt.

Primoz Manfreda asserts that "though the population were deeply cynical about the legitimacy of the aging regimes but were kept aback due to the fear of security forces who were used as repressive tools by these regimes and also due to fear of Islamist takeover as a result of lack of a better alternative."[16] According to him by the end of the 20th century most Arab dictators were utterly bankrupt both ideologically and morally thus could not put policies in place to address the changing needs of the growing population but rather maintained their power through abusive and repressive means. Salih asserts that:

> The … causes of the Spring ranges from economic distortions and corruption in government, which was also entangled with the suppression of individual freedom in the Arab regimes. In the mid-1980s …The IMF and WB introduced the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to Arab governments to help rebuild the Arab economies.[17]

Again the Spring was caused by the long rule of autocratic governments. Salih opines that:

> The autocratic leaders had ruled their countries for over 20 years and were not ready to give up the power they had acquired over the years. There were a number of counts of human rights violations recorded in the Arab world. Human rights violations coupled with the suppression of freedoms such as freedom of speech, religion and joining of organizations, Arab citizens revolted against their governments. [18]

The social media according to some observers was not a direct cause of the Arab Spring but proved a powerful tool for organising, recruiting, communicating and raising awareness thus highly facilitated the success of the revolutions internally and globally. Frangonikolopoulos and Chapsos avidly state that:

> The social media played a powerful role to accelerate and facilitate event in ways which were crucial. In terms of its nature and character, the social media spread information among protestors very fast and in a widely distributed manner which helped mobilise protestors in a manner unprecedented. Its informal and unanimous nature enabled protesters to outwit security forces. Through the social media, public consciousness was revived on on-going events which facilitated consensus building towards mass protests which threatened the legitimacy of the ruling regimes….it was an important outlet for protestors' political and economic frustration. [19]

With explanations for the Arab Spring emerging as relentlessly as the protests themselves, several possible factors seem to have achieved particular prominence in the scholarly and not-so-scholarly literature. First, economic hardship and inequality are likely culprits in any outburst of civil strife, particularly in the context of rising food prices and a global economic crisis. Second, the engine of economic distress and alienation is itself fueled by intense population pressure throughout the region. It would, therefore, stand to reason that countries that are perceived to be more corrupt by their populations would face more intense and more persistent unrest.

Indeed, the "critical issue," argued Lisa Anderson in "Demystifying the Arab Spring," was not "how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics [but] how and why these techniques resonated in their various local contexts."[20] On the international scene or relations, after the Second World War, most countries that achieved independence, declared themselves to be non-aligned. They ran into the crisis espoused by the policy of non-alignment. Little wonder Tom Mboya decried in the struggle for Keyan's independence and freedom and [by extension the freedom of the Arab world], indeed in his stylish phrase, 'Crisis of

Confidence.'[21]What it means is that there is the difficulty of implementation and practicability of the non-alignment policy. In fact, there exist the danger of alliance and even bilateral relationships especially among developing nations and world powers, in terms of economy, politics and culture. Indeed, the antecedent danger, fear or disadvantage of globalisation. The recent historical developments, economic, cultural and political ideological changes which took place in Arab world clearly shows discontentment and dissatisfaction among the Arab people regarding whatever and whichever political system(s) that has brought them to this ugly end; thus the tendency for an emergency transformation is demanded! From this point of view of change, Arab world has shown interest in a system which ensues their rights, freedom and justice. In fact, a scepter the ghost that was haunting the Arab world of was that of democracy, and clash of civilisations are behind these uprisings.

Running down the cliff of involving nations of the Arab world, one could also suspect or rather suggest some root causes of the Arab Spring, for instance, in Egypt on 25th January, 2011, withthe second revolution which grounded on police brutality of the masses, electoral fraud, and political censorship, and wide- spread corruption, high rate of unemployment, food price inflation, low minimum wages and lack of freedom on the side of the masses. In Sudan, revolution kicked off on 30th January, 2011 and this singular protest resulted in President Omar al-Bashir announcing his intention not to seek re-election in 2015. The protest took the forms of demonstrations, strike actions, riots, online activism etc. The Algerian protest began on 20th February, 2011 because of high cost of staple goods like sugar and oil and also because of corruption in the government. In response to the earlier violence and demands of civil society groups, the Algerian President, immediately promised moves to lower the prices of the goods and also provide government help in housing and job creation, which he never fulfilled.

Libyan uprising started on 15th February, 2011 and ended on 23rd October, 2011. It was started because the masses were saturated with the dictatorial rule of Gaddafi and they want to exercise their freedom. The corruption of the Gaddafi administration had by the beginning of this 21st century become proverbial. Gaddafi and his children had run a thoroughly corrupt administration which had enriched their family and their cronies. There were, along with corruption, blatant human rights violations, the economy was in ruins, and unemployment was very high while the government treated all forms of opposition with an iron fist.

Some scholars believe that the MENA region faced demographic pressure as a challenge prior to the uprising and thus considers it to be a contributory factor. According to Imed Drine, ''the demonstration by the youth against existing political regimes in countries such Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen were a spillage of frustration among unemployed youth.''[22] He adds that lack of good jobs will continue to influence further social disruptions and conflicts in the region since a forecast on the population indicated a persistent increase. However, summarising the causes of the Arab Spring , Celestine Mbaegbu sharply observes and correctly, too, that:

> Critical study of these uprising which sprang up in Arab world reveals that their major causes are: extreme poverty, authoritarianism, government corruption, human rights violations, inflations, kleptocracy, sectarianism, unemployment etc. The roles of the Western allies or superpowers show a greater element of imperialism, Neo-colonialism and egoistic tendencies. It is also good to note that the super-rich capitalists' countries have extracted enormous profits from this region of Arab Spring...However, one can see that the role of the Western Superpowers in the Arab Spring is largely imperial in nature.[23]

In other words, one could notice external influences in the fight among themselves for freedom, rights and justice in the Arab region. These causes of violent revolutions evident in Arab spring are responsible force of wars in the region. Oyeshola, succinctly observes that ''It continues to cause famine and the mass displacement of people. It causes mass migration

and traumatises young and old, women and men and the impersonal environment.''[24] Other effects of the uprising according to Celestine Mbaegbu includes: disruption of production and rising of operating costs, close down of businesses or reduction of production and investments. Again, hundreds of innocent people are being massacred which is a crime against humanity. Millions of people are forced to live a life without hope as refugees and displaced people. Worse still, in the impending wars in Arab Spring unspeakable terror is unleashed on the civilian populace.

On a positive note, C. C. Mbaegbu observes that:

> The Arab Spring would bring about social, psychological, cultural, economic and political freedom in the Arab world. In fact, the uprising would usher in economic well-being, respect for human rights and dignity, elevation of liberal democracy and technological breakthrough and growth.[25]

4.3.1 ANALYSIS OF THE REVOLUTIONS IN TUNISIA

The present analysis took place in Tunisia beginning from 18th December, 2010 to 14th January, 2011. Tunisia is a descent of Berbers; however, when she got her independence in 1956, she retains close political, economic and cultural link with France. President Bourguiba declared Tunisia a Republic in 1957, thereby ending the nominal rule of the former Ottoman Bays. Tunisia adopted a constitution modeled on the French system-Presidential system of government; where the military were excluded in participatory politics. President Buorguiba stood unopposed in several elections that made and named him ''president for life'' in 1974 by a constitutional amendment. However, the entire democratic process in Tunisia has remained very slow and sluggish.

In 1987, when President Ben. Ali came on board; he pledged greater democratic openness and respect for human rights. But his entire regime became worse to the former because the welfare of the people and rule of law were stiffened. In fact, his regime had long decades of rules accumulated into sufferings of the people, this amounted to agitations and protests. The demonstrations were precipitated by high unemployment, food inflation, corruption, ''lack of political freedoms like freedom of speech, and poor living conditions.''[26] In fact, among other causes of the revolt were ''Government corruption and Social inequalities. The protests constituted the most dramatic wave of social and political unrest in Tunisia in three decades and resulted in scores of deaths and injuries, most of which were the result of action by police and security forces against demonstrators.''[27]

The methods of the revolution are self-immolations, civil resistance, demonstrations, general strikes, and spontaneous uprisings. The protests were sparked by ''the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17th December, 2010.''[28] The consequences of the uprising in Tunisia are as follows: overthrow of the Ben. Ali government, resignation of Prime Minister Ghannouchi, dissolution of the political police, dissolution of the former ruling party of Tunisia and liquidation of its assets , release of political prisoners, and ''elections to a Constituent Assembly on 23rd October, 2011.''[29] Nevertheless, government agrees to resign and engages in dialogue on the country's new transition. Besides, the protests led to the ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali; 28 days later he officially resigned after fleeing to Saudi Arabia, ending the 23 years in power. Labour unions were said to be an integral part of the protests. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quarter was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Tunisian Revolution of 2011. The protests inspired similar actions throughout the Arab world. In mid-February 2011, about 4,000 mostly Tunisian refugees landed on the Italian island of Lampedusa, causing the authorities to declare a state of emergency that

would allow for federal aid to the island. Interior Minister Roberto Maroni accused the EU of not doing enough to curb immigration and asked them to do more. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that "not everyone who does not want to be in Tunisia can come to Europe. Rather, we need to talk to each other how we can strengthen the rule of law in Tunisia again and whether Europe can be of help."[30] The protests and resultant political crisis have generally been called the '*Jasmine revolution*'[31] only in the foreign media. Tunisian philosopher Youssef Seddik deemed the term inappropriate because the violence that accompanied the event was "perhaps as deep as Bastille Day."[32] The revolt in Tunisia sparked off speculation that the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution would lead to protests against the multiple other autocratic regimes across the Arab world. This was most famously captured in the phrase asking whether "Tunisia is the Arab Gdańsk?" The allusion refers to the Polish Solidarity movement and Gdańsk's role as the birthplace of the movement that ousted Communism in Eastern Europe. The phrase appeared in outlets such as the BBC, as well as editorials by well-known columnist Roger Cohen.

From the foregoing, one could decipher the following: the Tunisian Revolution was the first popular uprising in the Arab Spring which began in the late 2010. It was the first of its kind for an uprising to result to the ousting of the dictator Zine el Abidine Ben Ali on 14th January, 2011, in the Arab world. It ignited and inspired other Revolutions in the MENA region. Again, we ought to respect the legitimacy underpinning the reactions of the citizens of Tunisia to rise to their feet to revolt against abuses in government. Even though, we may not know their political and intellectual aptitude and convictions to act or were they instigated or imposed or induced to act? If their actions were borne out of freedom, then, their uprising ought to be saluted! That notwithstanding, we shall appreciate all the more the courage and brevity of Ben. Ali to hand over the government. These have shown a little enlightenment in the entire Tunisian political system. The political soil could be fertile and docile for positive

enchantment of new course for action within the hemisphere of politics. But a lot needs to be done. What are the philosophical lessons to be down from the revolution? What about the Muslim brotherhood? What are their interests in the Tunisian polity? The entire political system requires total reforms. Thus, all hands must be on deck to play the music that all would dance for the human development and to achieve progress in Tunisia.

4.3.2 ANALYSIS OF THE UPRISINGS IN EGYPT

Before the advent of colonialism in Egypt, it was an autonomous ottoman colony with progressive political and economic systems managed and controlled by its native citizens. Beginning from 1882 through 1922, Egypt became a formal protractorate of the British Empire with dual government system made up of the colonial government of the Anglo-Egyptian officials and the native government of the native elites and Egyptian ruler. The colonial government however possessed and exercised the paramount authority. Egypt was however granted partial independence in 1922 and full autonomy by 1936. In 1952, a revolution was staged by the Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser to totally liberate Egypt from British occupation. This movement which aimed at creating a United Arab led to the emergence of the nationalist ideology. Egypt's experiences from Nasser's crackdown during the 1952 revolution to a larger extent eliminated liberal values and facilitated the consolidation of authoritarianism. Egyptian writer Tawfiq al-Hakim bluntly puts that the Nasserist political system was not democratic. Since then Egypt has continued to be ruled by autocratic governments as evident by the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser's predecessor, Anwar Sadat who remained in power until his death and subsequently Hosni Mubarak who ruled for thirty years until he was forced to resign during the 2011 uprising in Egypt.

This was the second revolution in Arab Spring which started in Egypt on 25th January, 2011. Millions of Egyptians took to the streets demanding change in government. This uprising was grounded on police brutality of the masses, electoral fraud, and political censorship, and wide- spread corruption, high rate of unemployment, food price inflation, low minimum wages and lack of freedom on the side of the masses, also Mubarak's policies were similar to those of his predecessor, including ''a commitment to the Camp David Accords; these negotiations are thought to be one of the reasons Egyptian Islamic Jihad members decided to assassinate President Sadat.''[33]The effects the revolution produced and the changes it brought about included huge and radical changes on Egyptian reality, the most important being the overthrow of the regime that ruled Egypt with increasing repression for thirty years; shook the regime to its roots. It was also a "white revolution": the only blood split was at the hands of the regime and its cohorts, including a number of loyalists, business tycoons. The consequences were catastrophic since many protesters paid the supreme price of death by shading their blood. In short, the Egyptian revolution bears the essence of a popular uprising or any popular movement since it is described that it succeeds in rallying huge numbers under its banner and produces effects and brings about changes that impact strongly on the reality on the ground. Egyptian economy is still suffering from a severe downturn following the 2011 revolution. Political and institutional uncertainty, a perception of rising insecurity and sporadic unrest continue to negatively affect economic growth. The economic slowdown contributed to a rise in unemployment, which stood at 13 percent at the end of the year -2012, with 3.5 million people out of work.

However, in 2011, Egypt suffered revolution, later there were transition to power, Sinai insurgency, Egyptian protests (in 2012-2013) and finally, post-coup unrest (2013- 2014). During this period it was evident that the Muslim Brotherhood played role in the entire protests, that saw one of their senior Brotherhood figure, Mohamed Mosri in power in 2012.

The Muslim Brotherhood is seen to protect the ideals and values enshrined in the sharia, rather than the national values. The Egyptian revolutions with its antecedents appear to prove a serious difficulty on the way forward on the progress chant of polity. Francis Fukuyama captures the situation thus: "In Egypt, the formerly banned Muslim Brotherhood was elected and dominated the new parliament and presidency for a year, until the military pushed its president, Mohamed Morsi, out of power in the summer of 2013."[34]

4.3.3 WHAT STIRS MOROCCO'S UPHEAVAL

Morocco was not totally immune to the social upheavals in the region in early 2011. In Morocco, the main trigger was the protest in Tunisia, combined with prevailing social, economic and political grievances. The Moroccan protest that began on 20th February, 2011 featured specific political demands but did not target the monarch himself. They were aimed at the overall unsatisfactory political and economic conditions and at the *Makhzen*, which is the informal Centre of power that stands behind the façade of the modern state – it is powerful and feared. The massive but peaceful demonstrations started in the capital city of Rabat, and were youth-led and inspired by social media. The protesters demanded an end to corruption, jobs for the unemployed youth, and constitutional reforms that curtailed the powers of the monarch and increased those of elected representative institutions, the lack of civil liberties and rights, high illiteracy, a wide gap between rich and poor, the failure of healthcare and the absence of legitimate elections. The activists created a Facebook page and a YouTube campaign video that went viral.

In Morocco, the street protests ended or died out slowly after the leaders addressed some of the immediate grievances, thereby avoiding an escalation of the situation. Morocco did not experience the kind of violent and sustained upheaval witnessed elsewhere, partly because the leadership reacted swiftly with proactive policies meant to appease people ahead of an

almost-certain storm. Another equally important reason as to why the region's winds of upheaval did not unsettle the country was that it had been engaged in gradual political reforms for more than a decade. These reforms did not affect the authoritarian nature of the regime, but it sets apart from the much harsher autocratic rule that existed in Libya and Tunisia before 2011. For example, in North Africa, only Algeria and Morocco had integrated opposition parties – both religious and secular – in the political process for a decade at least. Furthermore, Moroccan citizens have been enjoying relatively more political freedom than in most other Arab countries. However, high youth unemployment and wide- scale corruption made them disillusioned and resentful. Once social upheaval was underway in several countries, it inspired similar protest movements in the country, but it was short-lived and limited in its scope.The country quickly acted to limit the contagion effects on their respective populations by enacting some reforms and promising others, by preventing the rise of basic food prices, and by maintaining subsidies on essential products and services. Also, the security services were ordered to avoid any provocation that could trigger a social explosion. Moreover, the leader of the country often pointed to insecurity problems and disruptions caused by social unrest in the region (without specifically mentioning Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen) as things they and their people did not wish to see happen in the country. As the early utterances of protest in Morocco was quieted relatively easily and peacefully, the authoritarian regime – a monarch – continued to give the impression of being engaged in constant political liberalisation, while in fact maintaining the status quo on many fronts.The wave of upheavals across the region pushed the Moroccan monarch to accommodate the vocal protest movement through inconsequential constitutional changes, the promise of economic reforms and more co-optation. The king also allowed Benkirane's moderate, pro-monarchy, Islamist party to head the government, as a way to contain the Islamist sentiment and the protest movement, especially when the traditional secular

opposition – mainly of the left – saw its popularity decline steadily in recent years. Stringent, essential and necessary economic reforms are needed to maintain the momentum of change. Genuine political reforms are equally needed. Such reforms are crucial to relative stability in these trying moments.

4.3.4 THE REVOLUTION IN LIBYA

Libya had her independence declared on the 24th December, 1951, by King Mohammed Idris, who was elected by the then national assembly (representing three provinces). The king was a monarch. Through a military *coup d'etat* in 1969, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to power in Libya. He became increasingly centric on the teachings of his *Green Book*, *jamahiriya*, which he published as a foundation for a new form of government. This *jamahiriya*, was supposedly a form of direct democracy in which power was balanced between a General People's Congressand an executive General People's Committee, headed by a General Secretary, who relates in matters of government affairs with the Prime Minister and the President. However, Gaddafi was absolutely in control of power. The law of Libya is based on sharia. Political parties were banned in Libya from 1972 until the removal of the Gaddafi government, and all elections were nonpartisan under law.

The Tunisian uprising had ''ripple effects in the Arab region as it spread to Libya,''[35] which had been under a 41 year dictatorial rule under the leader Gaddafi. The mass uprisings in Libya began on 15th February, 2011, in the city of Benghazi, primarily due ''to human rights abuses, social program mismanagement, political corruption and finally demanding the end of rule of Muammar Gaddafi.''[36] Protests against the rule of Gaddafi spread through the cities in Libya. Unique to Libya from the rest of the Arab world was Gaddafi's counter attacks as retaliation to protesters. He also emphasized the fact that he was not going to resign. The angry protesters engaged the use of arms and fought Gaddafi's loyalists. There were attempts

made by the international community to ensure peace and stability in the uproar. The AU intervened with the AU roadmap to peace but was not successful because Libyans claimed they had lost trust in the AU. Again, ''the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians.''[37] NATO powers thereafter launched air strikes on government targets. After six months of fighting, the West and other Arab states assisted rebel groups with respect to the military. Gaddafi met his demise at the outskirts of Sirte in August, 2011. He had ruled for four decades prior to his demise. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which led the revolt, ''declared Libya officially 'liberated' and promised a pluralist, democratic state through the elections of an interim parliament.''[38] In July 2012, elections were held and the General National Congress (GNC) with liberal, secular and independent candidates beat the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Justice and Construction Party. After four years of the Arab Spring experienced in Libya, the country is plagued with instability in government. Libyans till date protest and complain of unemployment, corruption in government and uneven regional development. However, during the revolution, the National Transitional Council (NTC), a body formed on 27th February, 2011 by anti-Gaddafi forces to act as the "political face of the revolution," made the introduction of multiparty democracy a cornerstone of its agenda.

4.3.5   YEMEN REVOLUTION

Yemen is the second-largest country in the Arab peninsula, occupying 527,970 km^2. In 1918 the northern Kingdom of Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman Empire. North Yemen became a republic in 1962, but it was not until 1967 that the British Empire, withdrew from what became South Yemen. The two countries were formally united as the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990. The Yemen revolution followed other Arab Spring mass protests in early 2011. The uprising was initially against unemployment, economic conditions, and

corruption, as well as against the government's proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen so that Saleh's son (the president's son) could inherit the presidency. The conflict has its roots in the failure of the political transition that was supposed to bring stability to Yemen following an uprising that forced its long time authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to Mr. Hadi, his deputy, in November 2011.

Hadi took office for a two-year term upon winning the uncontested presidential elections in February 2012. However, Mr. Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by al-Qaeda, a separatist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of many military officers to Mr. Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity. Yemen has been devastated by revolution between forces loyal to the internationally-recognised government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and those allied to the Houthi rebel movement . Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and rival affiliates of so-called Islamic State (IS) have meanwhile taken advantage of the chaos by seizing territory in the south and stepping up their attacks, notably in government-controlled Aden. Many people were killed in the clashes. Under the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, ''Yemen was described as a kleptocracy.''[39]

4.3.6. THE SYRIAN UPRISING

Syria became an independent republic in 1946, although democratic rule ended with a coup in March 1949, followed by two more coups the same year. A popular uprising against military rule in 1954 saw the army transfer power to civilians. From 1958 to 1961, ''a brief union with Egypt replaced Syria's parliamentary system with a highly centralised presidential government''[40]. The secular Ba'ath Syrian Regional Branch government came to power through a successful coup d'état in 1963. For the next several years Syria went through additional coups and changes in leadership.In March 1971, Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite,

declared himself President, a position that he held until his death in 2000. On 31st January, 1973, Hafez al-Assad implemented a new constitution, which led to a national crisis. Unlike previous constitutions, this one did not require that the President of Syria must be a Muslim. The government survived a series of armed revolts by Sunni Islamists, mainly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, from 1976 until 1982. Upon Hafez al-Assad's death in 2000, his son Bashar al-Assad was elected as President of Syria. The Syrian uprising started from 15th March, 2011 to 28th July, 2011. The causes were not unconnected to the initial demands for democratic reforms, and later extended to government corruption, unemployment and Islamist uprising in Syria (Muslim Brotherhood).The human rights situation in Syria has long been the subject of harsh critique from global organisations. ''The rights of free expression, association and assembly were strictly controlled in Syria even before the uprising. The country was under emergency rule from 1963 until 2011 and public gatherings of more than five people were banned.''[41] The emergency law had been used to justify arbitrary arrests and detention, and to ban political opposition.The methods of Syrian revolt were civil resistance, demonstrations and army defections. While the goals of the Syrian uprising aimed at resignation of Bashar al-Assad, democratic reforms, regime change, expanded civil rights, abolition of the Supreme State Security Court, lifting of the emergency law and equal rights for Kurds. The uprising was marked by massive anti-government opposition demonstrations against the Ba'athist government of Bashar al-Assad, meeting with police and military violence, massive arrests and brutal crackdown, resulting in hundreds of casualties and tens of thousands killed and of wounded. Journalists were being attacked, detained, reportedly tortured and killed. Technical facilities (internet, telephone etc.) were being sabotaged by the Syrian government. Both sides in this conflict tried to disqualify their opponent by framing or referring to them with negative labels and terms, or by presenting false evidence.The Syrian uprising ''has fomented to civil war- part of a wider wave of 2011 Arab Spring which grew

out of discontent with the authoritarian government of President Bashar al-Assad and escalated to an armed conflict after protests calling for his removal were violently suppressed''.[42] The war is being fought by several factions: the Syrian government and its allies, a loose alliance of SunniArab rebel groups (including the Free Syrian Army), the majority-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Salafi jihadist groups (including al-Nusra Front) who cooperate with the Sunni rebel groups, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Syrian opposition groups formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and seized control of the area surrounding Aleppo and parts of southern Syria. Over time, some factions of the Syrian opposition split from their original moderate position to pursue an Islamist vision for Syria, joining groups such as ''al-Nusra Front and ISIL''.[43] In 2015, ''the YPG joined forces with Arab, Assyrian, Armenian, and some Turkmen groups, to form the Syrian Democratic Forces, while most Turkmen groups remained with the FSA''.[44]Russia and Hezbollah militarily engaged in support of the Syrian government, while beginning in 2014, ''a coalition of NATO countries began launching airstrikes against Islamic State of Iraqi and Levant (ISIL)''.[45] International organisations have accused the Syrian government, ISIL, and rebel groups of ''severe human rights violations and of many massacres.''[46]Kofi Annan acted as the UN–Arab LeagueJoint Special Representative for Syria. His peace plan provided for a ceasefire, but even as the negotiations for it were being conducted, the rebels and the Syrian army continued fighting even after the peace plan. Other attempts made toward peace talk and negotiations have proved abortive, including the March 2017 Geneva peace talks on Syria led by the United Nations, but fighting continues.This has led to many consequences, for instance, the Arab League, European Union, the United Nations, and many Western governments quickly condemned the Syrian government's violent response to the protests, and expressed support for the protesters' right to exercise free speech. Both ''the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation suspended Syria's membership.''[47]Russia and

China vetoed Western-drafted United Nations Security Council resolutions in 2011 and 2012, which would have threatened the Syrian government with targeted sanctions if it continued military actions against protestors. Migration crisis has escalated in the West. As of September 2016, the European Union has reported that ''there are 13.5 million refugees in need of assistance in the country.''[48]

4.4 CULTURE AND RELIGION IN ARAB POLITICS

The culture of a people as well as their traditional religion is factors that should be considered to maintain political peace and avoid future violence. The word culture is not an analogous term in so far as it does not refer to a single reality but to numerous items at divers' levels of generality, values, tendencies and ideas. Sir Edward B. Taylor defines it thus:

> Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, a mode of thought, behavior and attitude accumulated by the people both through and by virtue of their struggle for freedom and from the hold and domination of nature. This culture is not personal and all human society have a culture and civilization.[49]

This is a broad perception of the concept or definition of culture, as a way of life of people in which they live and come to terms with the environment. Every culture has its identifying way and approach to reality. All cultures have the same manner of observation of facts of life: good, evil, joy, sadness, and death, but the basic assumptions, the theories and standards of judgment and interpretation differ. As a follow up, Simon Blackburn, in Oxford dictionary of Philosophy, defines ''culture as the way of life of the people, including their attitudes, values, beliefs, arts, sciences, modes of perception, and habits of thoughts and activity.''[50]As a result, the imposition of one cultural value against the other ipso facto is tantamount to total destruction of the already achieved existential matrix. There are cases of repression caused as a result of introducing culture that is foreign to a people. We make bold to argue that

Islamic culture and religion belong to Saudi Arabia, the birth place of prophet Mohammed. Consequently Arab spring is (partly) a demonstration of the fact that every foreign culture is hostile to, and will someday be revolted against; as we have seen in some parts of the Arab world. The Arab spring took place everywhere in the Arab world except in Saudi Arabia as an indication that the Islamic culture and religion are natural to them. All Arabs share basic beliefs and values that cross national and social class boundaries. Social attitudes have remained constant because Arab society is more conservative and demands conformity from its members. It is important for Western observers to be able to identify and distinguish these cultural patterns from individual behaviours.

Arab culture is the culture of the Arabs. The Arab culture is divided into three main parts, the urban culture (Al-Mudun), the rural culture (Ar-Reef), and the nomad culture (Al-Badow). Typically, most of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, along with parts of Jordan and Iraq, are considered Badow (Bedouins). Other countries' country sides such as Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and Tunisia are considered rural cultures. Their cities are considered to be urban cultures. In fact, most of the Arab major cities are recognised with urban cultures, like Jaffa (pre-Israel), Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Alexandria, Damascus, etc. The Levant, particularly Palestine, Lebanon, Syria as well as Egypt are known to have a long urban culture history.Social loyalty is of great importance in Arab culture. Family is one of the most important aspects of the Arab society. While self-reliance, individuality, and responsibility are taught by Arabic parents to their children, family loyalty is the greatest lesson taught in Arab families. J. Esherick emphasizes on the vitality of group in Arab society, he opines: "Unlike the extreme individualism we see in North America, Arab society emphasizes the importance of the group. Arab culture teaches that the needs of the group are more important than the needs of one person".[51]

Culture could be perceived in a broader sense in relation to the nature of the society as well as its artistic expression. For instance, prior to the Islamic Era, poetry was regarded as the main means of communication on the Arabian Peninsula. After the arrival of Islam other forms of communication replaced poetry as the primary form of communication. Imams (preachers) played a role in disseminating information and relating news from the authorities to the people, etc. There is a belief that, Arab world is homogenous and maintain strong hegemony in the culture and religion .

On the other hand, throughout history, religion has been a central part of all known human societies. Religion is any cultural system of worship, including designated behaviors and practices, world views, texts, places, ethics, or organisations, that relate humanity to the supernatural or transcendental. Religion relates humanity to what anthropologist Clifford Geertz has referred to as a cosmic "order of existence".[52] On the contrary, Hegel defines religion as "the Divine Spirit becoming conscious of Himself through the finite spirit."[53] Be that as it may, scholars have different definitions of religion. But it suffices that we toe the line of Madu when he defines religion as ''man's recognition of the existence of a power or powers beyond himself, who as it were, created the universe, sustains, preserves and provides for this universe.''[54] In other words, religion elucidates the relationship between God and man.   There exists an interplay or interconnectivity between culture and religion. First, most of the religious values, norms and practices are derived from the culture of the people. For instance, the feast day of the Roman sun-god (25th December) was replaced with Christmas celebration when Christianity became a state religion. Often both culture and religion appear inseparable. Again, both are factors for ethnic identity; due to the fact that in ethnic identity members share common culture and religion. According to the MacMillan Encyclopedia of Religions, there is an experiential aspect to religion which can be found in almost every

culture: "Religion is the organisation of life around the depth dimensions of experience - varied in form, completeness, and clarity in accordance with the environing culture."[55]

We could associate MacMillan's definition of religion to the coming together of culture and religion in Arab politics. Some were of the opinion that Islam is the culture, religion and polity of the Arabs. But Arab identity is defined independently of religious identity, and pre-dates the spread of Islam, with historically attested Arab Christian kingdoms and Arab Jewish tribes. Whereas religion is a matter of personal identity, ideologies serve a political agenda. The line between religion and ethnicity, culture and tradition is not always clear. It is important, however, to distinguish between religions, such as Islam and Christianity, and faith-based political ideologies, such as Islamism and fundamentalist Christianity. According to Barah Mikaïl in 'Religion and Politics in Arab Transitions':

> The electoral victories of Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt suggest that the future of Arab politics will be dominated by decision-makers with faith-based political agendas. But the part that religion should play in the new political orders of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and how its involvement might be shaped in law and practice, remains the subject of controversy and debate.
> The role of religion in Arab politics will be determined by the people of the region. Religious parties and movements cannot be excluded from the political process. But the success of faith-based movements at the polls can exacerbate social tensions.[56]

Integrating religious principles into a genuinely democratic order will be among the greatest challenges for these societies in the decades to come.Long before the 'Arab Spring', religion was recognised as a major force in Arab politics. The electoral results of 2011 confirm that (relatively) free elections in the Arab world show strong public support for political Islam, as already seen in Algeria in 1990, Egypt in 2005 and the Palestinian territories in 2006. In 2011, new Islamist parties emerged and previously established ones consolidated their positions. In Tunisia, Ennahda won the greatest number of parliamentary seats. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers and several Salafist parties together accounted for two thirds of the

Legislative Assembly. The role of Islamist forces in Yemen remains uncertain, but their influence in Libya is clear. In Jordan and Morocco, Islamist political actors are gaining in importance. The victory of Morocco's Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the country's 2011 elections led to the appointment of the country's first Islamist prime minister. The fact that it has a Muslim majority does not mean that the Arab world must automatically embrace Islamist rule or reject secularism.

The search for strong alternatives to the old regime has encouraged people to support faith based parties. Islamist movements' history of opposition to and persecution by the recently toppled authoritarian regimes has given them credibility and legitimacy, which they used effectively during their electoral campaigns. For decades, leaders from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) controlled the religious sphere in their countries, either by influencing religious leaders, as in the case of al-Azhar in Egypt and the Muftis in Saudi Arabia and Syria, or by direct interference, as in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, as well as in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and Libya. But efforts to eradicate religious-based political parties and the instrumentalisation of religion did not diminish religion's popular appeal. In the public imagination, religion became the trademark of movements that challenged authoritarian rulers, who persecuted them out of fear. So, when the Arab Spring began to sweep through the region, Islamist parties could make a case that they were the only credible alternatives to authoritarian power. This image, combined with access to foreign funds mostly from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, gave the Islamists an advantage in the ensuing elections. The current Islamist momentum does not necessarily mean that religious precepts are set to dominate the Arab world.

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, tensions between secular and Islamist actors still exist. Many secularists and liberals doubt the Islamists' democratic commitment, while Islamist parties continue to try to reassure their domestic opponents and the international community of their

democratic credentials. In Tunisia, Ennahda insists on a fundamental role for religious rules in the country, even as secular parties reject this direction. But parliamentary debates on the future Tunisian Constitution must begin before concrete issues are decided. In Egypt, too, efforts to draft a new framework for governance are under way. The Muslim Brothers control the parliamentary committees for external affairs (diplomacy, defence and energy) and Salafis are at the head of the committees for economy, education and religious affairs. This suggests that Egypt will most likely evolve towards more conservative rules and an Islamisation of social life. With globalisation, economies have become interconnected and countries have had to minimise the impact religious considerations have on their political and economic decisions.

As Arab societies face the growing plurality of religious beliefs, one of the paramount social problems, the communities, and institutions in this era, might struggle over is determining whether and to what extent they should be tolerated. One of the hallmark treatises on this issue remains John Locke's *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Locke argues that :

> That it is futile to attempt to coerce belief because it does not fall to the will to accept or reject propositions; that it is wrong to restrict religious practice so long as it does not interfere with the rights of others, and; that allowing a wide range of religious groups will likely prevent any one of them from becoming so powerful as to threaten the peace. [57]

Still, Locke's *Letter* makes an important step forward toward a more tolerant and pluralistic world. In contrast to Locke, Thomas Hobbes regards religion and its divisiveness as a source of political instability, and so he argues that ''the sovereign has the right to determine which opinions may be publicly espoused and disseminated, a power necessary for maintaining civil peace.''[58]

Like the issue of establishment, the general issue of whether people should be allowed to decide for themselves which religion to believe in has not received much attention in recent times, again because of the wide consensus on the right of all people to liberty of conscience. However, despite this agreement on liberty of *belief*, modern states nevertheless face challenging questions of toleration and accommodation pertaining to religious *practice*, and these questions are made more difficult by the fact that they often involve multiple ideals which pull in different directions. Some of these questions concern actions which are inspired by religion and are either obviously or typically unjust. For example, violent fundamentalists feel justified in killing and persecuting infidels how should society respond to them? While no one seriously defends the right to repress other people, it is less clear to what extent, say, religious speech that calls for such actions should be tolerated in the name of a right to free speech. A similar challenge concerns religious objections to certain medical procedures that are necessary to save a life. In such a case, there are at least three values that ordinarily demand great respect and latitude: (a) the right to follow one's own religion, not simply in affirming its tenets but in living the lifestyle it prescribes; (b) the state's legitimate interest in protecting its citizens (especially vulnerable ones like children) from being harmed; and (c) the right of parents to raise their children as they see fit and in a way that expresses their values.

However, in Arab societies, a substantial education is necessary for citizens to be able to achieve a decent life for themselves. In addition, many Arab states see education as a process by which children can learn values that the states deem important for active citizenship and/or for social life. However, the pursuit of this latter goal raises certain issues for religious parents. According to Brighouse, Harry, ''many proposals for educational curricula are aimed at developing a measure of autonomy in children, which often involves having them achieve a certain critical distance from their family background, with its traditions, beliefs, and ways

of life.''[59] The idea is that only then can children autonomously choose a way of life for themselves, free of undue influence of upbringing and custom. A related argument holds that this critical distance will allow children to develop a sufficient sense of respect for different social groups, a respect that is necessary for the practice of democratic citizenship.

The conflation of the politics and religion by both governments and Islamist opposition groups lies at the very heart of the present Arab malaise, and constitutes one of the most significant barriers to overcoming the ongoing stagnation of Arab politics and culture. ''Political culture is defined as the citizen's belief about politics, its symbols and values and the citizen's own convictions and attitude about government and political organisations.''[60] A state's political culture is the product of its history manifested in both public events and private experiences. Mindful of these facts, it is imperative that the Arab states could effect changes in their political culture by controlling these events and experiences prevalent in their environments.More so, a religious citizen could feel an acute conflict between her identity *qua* citizen and *qua* religious adherent. One way of resolving the conflict is to argue that one aspect of her identity should take priority over the other. Witness the conflict experienced by the protagonist in Sophocles' *Antigone*, as she buries her brother in defiance of Creon's decree; in doing so, she acknowledges that her religious duties supersede her civic duties, at least in that context. For many religious citizens, political authority is subservient to—and perhaps even derived from divine authority, and therefore they see their religious commitments as taking precedence over their civic ones. On the other hand, civic republicanism has tended to view a person's civic role as paramount because it has seen participation in politics as partly constitutive of the human good. In contrast to these approaches, the liberal tradition has tended to refuse to prioritise one aspect of an individual's identity over any other, holding that it is the individual's task to determine which is most important or significant to her; this task is often seen as the reason for the importance of

personal autonomy. But this tendency makes it more challenging for liberals to adjudicate conflicts between religion and politics. One possibility is for the liberal to argue that the demands of justice are prior to the pursuit of the good (which would include religious practice). If so, and if the demands of justice require one to honour duties of citizenship, then one might argue that people should not allow their religious beliefs and practices to restrict or interfere with their roles as citizens. However, not even all liberals accept the claim that justice is prior to the good, nor is it a settled issue in the literature on political obligation that norms of justice can successfully ground universal duties of citizenship.

Real hope for a better political future in the Arab world demands and requires the de-coupling of religion and politics. Even though Islam is a religion, not a political program, the oldest Muslim Brotherhood organisation, the MB of Egypt, has never been able to come up with anything remotely resembling a program of governance, economic development or anything of the kind, yet its politically ludicrous slogan -Islam huwa al-haal? (Islam is the solution?). Islam will continue to be the source of authority to legitimate the political actions of the Arab world (even Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat, Qaddafi and other relatively secular leaders frequently invoked Islam whenever they became desperate). Obviously, it remains a puzzle how to resolve this quagmire of conflation of religion and politics in Arab regions amidst the cultural hegemony. Therefore to isolate religion from politics or a reconciliation of both require proper understanding and education. Hitherto, the political philosopher and theorists' expertise could be needful in this venture. A meticulous academic exercise that digs into the fabrics of Arab culture, religion and politics is explorable. In most Arab societies for most of the 20th century, there was a much healthier attitude about the relationship between religion and politics. There is no reason that the Arabs cannot regain and indeed improve upon previous widespread understandings that religion and politics may be related but they

are not, and cannot be allowed to become, synonymous. However, we turn to liberty in the philosophy of Mill in the dialogue of democracy of the Arab Spring.

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CHAPTER FIVE

LIBERTY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF J. S. MILL IN THE DIALOGUE OF DEMOCRACY OF THE ARAB SPRING

5.1 MILL'S LIBERTY A PANACEA FOR ARAB SPRING

We have come to the point of searching for the remedy, solution and panacea to the Arab Spring. How would Mill's On Liberty remedy the scourge of the Arab spring? In his work "On Liberty," Mill meticulously delineates his ideas about liberty. He writes that liberty is good because of its "utility" and its ability to enable a better life for the citizenry. He argues that people must have freedom of thought, opinion and expression, in order for society to prosper. In his book, Mill discusses particular instances wherein the authorities can exert their will and control over an individual or society. For Mill, the individual is totally sovereign concerning his own body, and therefore, cannot be reprimanded for harming oneself.

However, one's liberty can be restricted in order to "prevent harm to others." This is known as the harm principle. Although, some philosophers may disagree with Mill; for instance, Thomas Hobbes, who is a proponent of absolute monarchy, ''preferred the evils of absolute power to the evils of life in a society which did not contain such an authority.''[1] For Hobbes, the subject has certain liberties which he defines as ''those things the subject may justly refuse to do even though commanded by the sovereign''.[2] As such, the subject must refuse the monarch's command to kill or harm himself.

According to Mill, children should not have sovereign control over their own faculties, and thus can be coerced and controlled, for their own good. Besides, Mill explains the last circumstance under which an individual does not deserve freedom:

> For the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. [3]

Liberty, perhaps as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.Can we associate what comprised the MENA as backward states? Can the Arab world be improved by free and equal discussion? Amidst the heightened torture and tensions in the MENA, emanating from revolutions, are they likely or really capable of practising democracy or are they better off under despotism of the variety Mill describes? It is brilliant at this juncture to re-echo the voice of Rick Moran an American thinker:

> A Pew survey found wide streams of opinion in Egypt that seem at the very least inhospitable to democracy. When asked which side they would take in a struggle between "groups who want to modernize the country [and] Islamic fundamentalists," 59 percent of Egyptians picked the fundamentalists, while 27 percent picked the modernizers. In a country in which the army will likely play a deciding role in selecting the next political leadership, just 32 percent believe in civilian control of the military. And a majority, 54 percent, supports making segregation of men and women in the workplace the law throughout Egypt. There's more. When asked whether suicide bombing can ever be justified, 54 percent said yes (although most believe such occasions are "rare") Eighty-two percent supported stoning for those who commit adultery.[4]

Risk Moran particularises his research on Egypt as a case study of the MENA. The question then is does this seem like a country ready to elect its own representatives? Again, we have already witnessed the disaster of the Palstinians in their quest for democracy; wherein Hamas was elected to power, and has been at war with Israel ever since. The Hamas charter reads: ''Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it. Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious.''[5]
Palestinian Television constantly airs anti-Semitic vitriol, wherein Jews have been compared to the AIDS virus. In Lebanon, the terrorist organisation Hezbollah has received significant support from the electorate in recent elections. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah has stated, "If they [Jews] all gather in Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide"[6]. Is it really a good thing for members of Hamas and Hezbollah to have freedom

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of expression? Is it a good thing that Hamas is able to teach children that the killing of Jews is a noble act? Would Mill think it was a good idea for these people to publicise their opinions, in order to expedite a second Holocaust? Are Hamas, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and assorted other Islamists across the Muslim world, the "barbarians" Mill was referring to who would be better served -- they and others in their society -- under "despotism"[7].Plato warned against democracy because he feared the ascendancy of demagogues, who would whip up the passions of the people for nefarious causes. Of course, all societies, including America, face the problem of demagogues. Like in the West, democracy is a good thing for everybody. However, in order for democracy to prosper, a society must have as its foundation certain values, such as tolerance, liberty especially freedom of speech and religion, personal responsibility and the renouncement of violence. Like we just said, these are the basic fundamentals in form of values before one can begin to think of a possible political system like democracy, to be practiced in a society. If any of these values are missing, the society will crumble. Unfortunately, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa do not tolerate other religions apart from Islam. They preach violence against Israel and the Jews, and do not believe in freedom of religion. Should people in countries like these be given the opportunity to elect their own representatives? Is it in the interest of free, liberal societies and world peace to promote democracy in societies that are controlled by radical Islamists? George Bush may be seen as the catalyst in the process of democratisation of the Middle East and North Africa. We are not interested for now in evaluating the intention of his action. But was this democratisation movement seen from a vantage standpoint? Only history and time can vindicate the just.However, for a change to be visible in MENA, there must be marginalisation, and eventually elimination of the barbarians, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in their midst. It is imperative to note, that democracy as a political system is not a good end in itself

perhaps, a means to a hopeful, and usually, good end. If the conditions and the basics are fulfilled and there is enabling environment cum atmosphere for a good government that will be guided by principles of liberty, therefore, Mill's proportional representation in democracy will be effective and efficient. As such, there is a clarion call and demand for orientation for democracy (liberty) in the Middle East and North Africa region.

5.2 THE DEMANDS FOR DEMOCRACY IN MENA

Since the time of Plato and Aristotle till the present age of globalisation and terrorism (the evils of our time) man's inclination has been on good living, which stems from good governance. The world is interested in the Arab region. Thus, whatever affects any part of the region affects the whole wide world. It is on this note that the revolutions in the MENA were speculated to have been caused by the demand of democracy among other things (causes). However, that calls for a deeper reflection on how come 'the demands of democracy in MENA? It is on record that "President George Bush catalysed the process of democratisation of the Middle East and North Africa among others."[8] But what does it mean to say that Arab world demands democracy? Or rather, the question ought to have been, the demands of democracy in Arab world. This implies the necessity of others (America and West) to aid the Arab region by driving them out of authoritarianism. This pictures Platonic 'Allergy of the cave'; where external forces are needed to bring out a person from darkness to light. The same external force is needed for Arab world to perceive the light of decent living and the dignity of freedom and responsibility. No wonder John Dewey in his short essay, "Creative Democracy — The Task Before Us" writes:

> Democracy as a personal, an individual way of life involves nothing fundamentally new. But when applied, it puts a new practical meaning in old ideas. Put into effect it signifies that powerful present enemies of democracy can be successfully met only by the creation of personal attitudes in individual human beings.[9]

Dewey argues that democracy is a way of life and an experience built on faith in human nature, faith in human beings, and faith in working with others.For Dewey, Democracy is a moral ideal requiring actual effort and work by people; it is not an institutional concept that exists outside of us. "The task of democracy", Dewey asserts, "is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute.''[10] Dewey argues that democracy is a requirement of freedom in Dewey's sense of individuality. The collective exercise of the experimental ethos is an ethical demand of this conception of freedom. Exercised properly, this experimental ethos allows individuals to arrive at a common good. So, Dewey writes of democracy thus:

> From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups in which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common. [11]

Full liberation of an individual's potentialities can only be achieved in a democratic social order, one in which social conflicts are treated as the subject of social inquiry. Dewey's argument that the experimental character of democracy renders it desirable should not merely be interpreted instrumentally. His suggestion is also that individuality can only be properly expressed if the individual participates in democratic practices, since social inquiry is a constitutive part of the individual good. And this is a claim about "individuality in the specific ethical sense in which he develops the notion in his critique of classical liberalism."[12]Dunne, Michele and Oz Hassan write that ''MENA has been the subject of increasing interest on the part of the American government and democracy promoters, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with many viewing democratic transition as essential to regional stability and international security.''[13] American governments have made efforts to promote democracy in the region with democratisation

strategies. America was interested in the reforms of the regimes and funding international organs towards smooth gradual democratic transitions in the region which will involve a lot: formation of the basics and fundamentals and principles of democracy through education and mobilisation, and creation of government institutions and political competition. Diamond, Larry brings the message to the lime light, thus:

> The former top-down approach involves putting rhetorical and diplomatic pressure on regimes to reform and can go so far as to involve direct American military engagement installing democratic government (as is the case in Iraq following the 2003 invasion). The U.S. government generally pursues the latter bottom-up approach by funding international organisations that help strengthen the bases for gradual democratic transition (the rule of law, accountable government institutions and expanded political competition) in the MENA region by offering technical assistance and training to political parties and electoral management bodies, engaging with civil society, producing assessments and polls, and promoting female political participation.[14]

John Stuart Mill argues that democracy has an advantage because it forces decision-makers to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of most people in society. Since democracy gives some political power to each, more people are taken into account than under aristocracy or monarchy. Many have noted with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because "it makes collective decisions depend on them more than monarchy or aristocracy do."[15] Hence, in democratic society individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. In addition, democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference whether they do or not. More so, some have argued that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they come genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that "democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality and morality of participants."[16]

Some argue that the basic principles of democracy are founded in the idea that each individual has a right to liberty. First, each person's life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Second, only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have control over this larger environment. Carol Gould opines: "only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government. Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation."[17]

Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoning and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions. Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any obligation of citizens to obey the democratic decision. There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens' duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Consent theories of political authority and instrumentalist conceptions of political authority state general criteria of political authority that can be met by non-democratic as well as democratic states. Second, some have thought that there is a conceptual link between

democracy and authority such that if a decision is made democratically then it must therefore have authority. Third, some have thought that there are general principles of political authority that are uniquely realized by a democratic state under certain well defined conditions.The social contract theorists, particularly John Locke is of the opinion that the consent of all the citizens must be obtained before any person can govern them. Representative democracy as being practised today was developed largely by Locke. The citizens elect who governs them and have the right to withdraw their allegiance if the ruler goes contrary to their interest. Locke asserts: "Men being by nature all free, equal and independent, no one ought to be subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living".[18]Although democracy looks attractive and of later a more popular form of government appears which is known as liberal democracy, a political system founded on majority rule and guarantee the freedom and human rights of all citizens; which however, involves separation of power, people are free to choose and elect those that govern them periodically.

Nevertheless, Arab world still lacks the initial sense of liberty, not to talk of democracy. Their practice of monarchical system of government has led them to more challenges. In this way, it appears very difficult to convince these people on the contrary. But the Arab uprisings were partly alleged to have been caused by insinuations and instigations on the rights of the citizens to be free from these mess by both media and knowledge from internet and so on. Therefore, my submission is first to apply the Platonic 'Allergy of the Cave' in this situation. Secondly, we implore Mill's "On Liberty," where he stated that democracies like the United States were going to replace the absolute monarchies and tyrannies of the past. Like Mill, Francis Fukuyama postulated his doctrine: ''the end point of mankind's ideological

evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government''[19] and Fukuyama opines:

> As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potential universal validity, Liberal democracy. Two hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent.[20]

Fukuyama in this case uses the expression liberal democracy to explain historical political dialectics for which he said that history has ended since there was no thesis and anti-thesis anymore only thesis, thesis.The emergence of the authoritarian regimes on the contrary of democratic demands gives important clues about what is going on in the Arab world. According to Abul Ala Maududi , "Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of Allah and within the limits prescribed by Him."[21] Nevertheless, Josephat Obi Oguejiofor pointed out the fact "that Arab politics has been in existence before now and that for the fact that Islamic political authority presumed to be empowered directly by Allah Himself, thus , gave rise to none democratic state in the whole wide world of Arab league."[22]

Based on Mill's careful reading of *Democracy in America* by Alexis de Tocqueville, Mill feared that the "will of the people" would more often be the "will of the majority." This could threaten liberty and individual self-development if the majority acted to oppress minority viewpoints and lifestyles. A democracy, Mill argued, could easily become a "tyranny of the majority." Therefore, Mill identifies the specific liberties he had in mind:

> Liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion, liberty of expressing and publishing opinions (freedom of speech and press), freedom to unite, for any purpose (freedom of assembly), and liberty of forming the plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing what we like even if this appeared to be foolish, perverse, or wrong.[23]

Any society without these liberties, Mill declares it as not free. For him, "The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede [obstruct] their efforts to obtain it." [24] Mill further argues that truth is found through the "collision of adverse opinions." He writes, "He who knows only his side of the case, knows little of that."[25] When people listen only to one viewpoint, he explained, "errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood."[26] Mill recognises that individual liberty needed limits or else harm to others may result. He gives the example of an 'excited mob' outside the house of a grain dealer, shouting that he was starving the poor. In such circumstances, Mill agrees, the police were justified in arresting those whose angry words might easily inflame violence. He also says that the government had no business censoring those same words published in a newspaper article. Mill argues that 'an atmosphere of freedom' is necessary to assure all people the opportunity to develop their individuality.Later and finally, Mill turns and advocates political reform and expanding the right to vote to all adults, including women.

5.3 RESPECTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM

John Stuart Mill publishes 'The Subjection of Women,' which summarised his longstanding arguments for the equality of women in male dominated society. He stresses that women should have the same rights as men to develop their individuality. This included the right to own property, earn a college education, choose any occupation, and participate fully in politics. Mill disagrees sharply with his father on women's suffrage. James Mill always hold that a husband represented his wife when he voted, so she had no reason to exercise this right. John, however, argues that a wife's interests were often different from those of her husband, and thus she should have an equal right to vote for them.In Arab history, women have been practically outside the confines of political participation. This chain got revolutionised during

the course of Arab uprising, when women became part and parcel of the spring. But women involvement in Arab spring *ipso facto* does not make (in a simple sense) active partisan to Arab politics; it is just an emotional expression of their alienated franchise. The Islamic studies professor William Montgomery Watt states:

> It is true that Islam is still, in many ways, a man's religion. But I think I've found evidence in some of the early sources that seems to show that Muhammad made things better for women. Men were amassing considerable personal wealth and wanted to be sure that this would be inherited by their own actual sons, and not simply by an extended family of their sisters' sons. This led to deterioration in the rights of women. At the time Islam began, the conditions of women were terrible. By instituting rights of property ownership, inheritance, education and divorce, he gave women certain basic safeguards. Set in such historical context the Prophet can be seen as a figure who testified on behalf of women's rights. [27]

Women were granted the right to vote on a universal and equal basis in Syria (to vote) in 1949 (Restrictions or conditions lifted) in 1953, Egypt in 1956, Tunisia in 1959, Algeria in 1962, Morocco in 1963, Libya and Yemen in 1967 (full right) in 1970, Bahrain in 1973, Saudi Arabia announced that it would give women the right to vote in 2015. The precise meaning of the term right is controversial and is the subject of continued philosophical debate; while there is consensus that human rights encompasses a wide variety of rights such as the right to a fair trial, protection against enslavement, prohibition of genocide, free speech,or a right to education, there is disagreement about which of these particular rights should be included within the general framework of human rights. The human rights movement adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Paris by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. The true forerunner of human rights discourse was the concept of natural rights which became prominent during the European Enlightenment with such philosophers as John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui. It featured prominently in the political discourse of the American Revolution and the French Revolution. But J. S. Mill rejected the concept of natural rights. The modern human rights

arguments emerged over the latter half of the twentieth century,possibly as a reaction to slavery, torture, genocide, and war crimes,as a realisation of inherent human vulnerability and as being a precondition for the possibility of a "just society."[28] However, it is a fact that recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. -*The first sentence of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article one of the* United NationsUniversal Declaration of Human Rights *(UDHR) states:* All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. John Locke identifying natural rights, as being "life, liberty, and estate (property)", argued that such fundamental rights could not be surrendered in the social contract. These are self-evident truths that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. This is found in the United States Declaration of Independence, 1776. More so, in 18th and 19th centuries,Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill and G.W.F. Hegel developed the philosophy of human rights. The term *human rights* probably came into use some time between Paine's *The Rights of Man* and William Lloyd Garrison's 1831 writings in The Liberator, in which he stated that he was trying to enlist his readers in "the great cause of human rights". The philosophy of human rights attempts to examine the underlying basis of the concept of human rights and critically looks at its content and justification. The two theories that dominate contemporary human rights discussion are the interest theory and the will theory. "Interest theory argues that the principal function of human rights is to protect and promote certain essential human interests, while will theory attempts to establish the validity of human rights based on the unique human capacity for freedom."[29]The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHR) was signed by member states of the OIC in 1990 at the 19th Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Cairo, Egypt.

The object of the CDHR is to serve as a guide for member states on human rights issues. CDHR translates the Qur'anic teachings in the following way:

> All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity.[30]

The League of Nations was established in 1919, where it enshrined in its charter a mandate to promote many of the rights later included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Herein, we have been discussing on human rights. Let us turn to freedom. Freedom referred to the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants. It is an absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government; the state of being unrestricted and able to move easily. The "freedom from" meansthe state of not being subject to or affected by (something undesirable). The ''freedom of,'' means a special privilege or right of access, especially that of full citizenship of a city granted to a public figure as an honour.For Marx, ''the key to freedom lies in a rational system of production which can provide the means of such satisfaction and development.''[31] While for Kant, ''A man became really free when he subjected himself to the dictates of universal reason and when he did what he ought to do.''[32] This idea was further emphasized by Hegel, when he said: ''freedom must be understood as a social phenomenon. Freedom consisted in reconciling one's rights with duties imposed by the community.''[33] Using Egypt as a case study on women's rights, one finds out that, a poll conducted by Thomson Reuters in 2013 ranked "Egypt as the worst country among 22 Arab League States in terms of women's rights."[34] According to 2013 United Nations Equity for Gender Report ''ninety-three percent (99.3%) of women in Egypt for instance have suffered some form of sexual violence or harassment."[35] Most of these Islamists have a restrictive conception and a conservative view of the role and right of women declared in International

Human Right Treaties as they are viewed to defile Islamic morals and values. Thus the social attitudes within Egypt as an Islamic dominated country in itself is detrimental to a successful rise of women in political and public participation. Article 33 of the 2012 constitution for instance emphasizes on the equal right of all citizens without discrimination. However this article did not make any provision on the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex, ethnicity, and gender among others, which are persistent in Egypt thus making no explicit provision on gender equality.

5.4 LIBERALISATION OF ISLAM

Liberalisation is an ''act of allowing more freedom in laws, systems or opinions.''[36] Each religion has its laws, rules, ethics, and beliefs. Our interest here is to see the possibility of the influence of modernity on Islam. Major religions like Christianity, Hindu, and Buddhism have undergone series of changes. Why is Islam different? Tahir Aslam Gora in his work, *Toward a New Islam: Reformation and Liberalization,* asserts that: ''There is a disconnect between Islam, on the one hand, and the evolving realities of the universe and the modern world on the other. I therefore wish to suggest that Muslims need to rethink their religion and their worldview.''[37] In the bid to reform Islam in order to bring it into harmony with the modern world, Tahir Aslam Gora suggests the following outline for the "New Islam":

> The adoption of democratic values in every walk of life.Recognition of the right of every person to complete freedom of expression. Recognition and application of internationally recognized human rights.An end to the institutions of polygamy and jihad.A recognition of the equality of women in every walk of life. An end to the superiority complex that exists among Muslims with respect to all the other persons, groups, and nations in the world.A recognition that the ultimate object of the New Islam is peace for all human beings.[38]

The problem however is the basic premise of Islamic belief system seldom acknowledges this truth: that Islam is a unique amalgamation of Judaism and Pagan teachings? Will it offend someone if we say that the rituals like praying, pilgrimage to Ka'ba mimic age old Pagan

practices, while portions of the Islamic jurisprudence resemble ancient Judaic legal mores? It is true that the liberalisation process in Judaism or Christianity did not occur in a few short years. It is also true that it took hundreds of years of inner struggle to make the religions more pragmatic, humane, and open. But the inherent problem of Islam – the tendency of keeping it within the fold of a puritanical dogma - the assumed "finality" of the "one god" premise is more than merely rhetoric. The root cause of intolerance and violence is imbedded in Islamic polity.Islam embraced more than its share of mythology. Story surrounding Noah's arc, Zamzam fountain, or the Prophet Muhammad's miraculous *Miraj* journey, or even Adam and Eve story could be construed as nothing short of mythology or folklore. Muslims simply have to believe in those myths along with the historical epics of war, the rules of the Caliphs and the narratives of Prophet's disciples as depicted in *Ahadiths*. The dates and places of those events are interlaced with so much of history that many Muslims tend to feel proud as if they are following a rather modern religion, which is liberated from the mythological mumbo-jumbo and superstition. The amalgamation of mythology and history in Islamic thinking could be a serious weakness of the religion. Any effort to scrutinise Islam through the prism of history is not only discouraged, but is brutally suppressed, or jeopardises one's life. In essence, then, the religion is kept within a shade of dark ignorance. It is prohibited to touch the Holy Qur'an without ablution? It seems that the piousness can be found only in the tent of Islam. When any western media shows the innocent faces of *hijab*-clad Muslim girls with the comment "Islam is a religion of peace," any ignorant westerner might mistake the religion as just another innocuous conservative religion something closer to the Amish community. In liberalising Islam, the adherents especially women who make up half of the society are liberated and the effects are welcome with admiration as suggested by a twenty-first century author Mark A. Gabriel in *Journey into the Mind of an Islamic Terrorist*, when he

remarks:"In the twenty-first century, a woman can fulfill the duties of Islam while at the same time pursuing an education, working at a job, or participating in politics."[39]

In the light of modernity as against modernism, Gabriel tries to present in a lighter mood the change all were clamouring for when a total overhauling will take place in Islam. No wonder, he looks up to a day when the Quran will be interpreted to suit the contemporary situations of man. He asserts: ''the purpose of a new interpretation of the Quran is to show Muslims how to demonstrate full devotion while building up society instead of tearing it down.''[40] The basic tenet of Islam is based on facing the *Kiblah* and performing Hajj. If somebody forgoes those, he or she may not be considered a bonafide or *pucca* Muslim. How about the improbability of fasting during the Ramadan in a place outside the blue planet? Many Hadiths say to break the fast during the month of Ramadan somebody has to wait until the sun sets in the horizon. In Scandinavian countries and in Russia, the Sun hardly sets at night in some seasons. The so-called White Night is a common celestial phenomenon in polar region. In such circumstance, how many hours does someone have to starve to practice this "scientific religion"? Nevertheless, in *The End of Faith*, Sam Harris asserts thus: ''there is no authentic liberal Islam. As a result, while almost everyone acknowledges that some Christians or Jews take their religiosity to crazy extremes, craziness and extremism are often attributed *to Islam itself*.''[41] Liberal reform of Islam is something Americans simultaneously wish for and claim is impossible, because the heart of Islam is necessarily violent and intolerant. In Harris' controversial appearance on Bill Maher's TV show, he mapped the Muslim community as a set of concentric circles, with terrorist jihadist like the Taliban or ISIS at the Centre of the faith. So any effort to liberalise Islam comes from "nominal Muslims who do not take the faith seriously".[42]Mustafa Akyol is a Turkish writer, a liberal and a Muslim who seems passionate about both liberalism and Islam expresses, describes, and justifies in his

work,*Islam Without Extremes: a Muslim case for Liberty*, that there is nothing ''nominal'' about the faith. He came to certain conclusions:

> Islam will thrive best under a secular government that neither mandates Islam nor tries to suppress it, because an Islam of the heart cannot be forced. "Had God willed," says the Qur'an [3], "He would have made you a single community, but He wanted to test you regarding what has come to you." A society that suppresses either Islam or competing views is trying to invalidate that test, and so is doing what Allah refused to do. The best form of secular government for Muslims would be liberal democracy, where the majority rules but respects minority rights. People of all faiths should be free to practice their religion as they see fit, including the freedom to change or abandon their religious identification. Government should punish *crime* (offenses against the legitimate rights of others), not *sin* (disobedience of religious injunctions). Insults to Islam or its prophets should be met with reasoned arguments and non-violent responses like protests and boycotts. [43]

Akyol was of the opinion that certain ideas that Muslims dislike, should be tackled with reason and wisdom. He then attributes the failure of these liberalising movements to a series of historical circumstances, rather than to some inherent flaw in Islam as he asserts:

> The temptations of power politics corrupted Islam in much the same way that Christianity was corrupted after the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. In the medieval war of ideas between reason and tradition, reason became associated with the merchant class and tradition with the landlord class. When the landlords won the political/economic conflict, the Islam of the merchants was suppressed. When Europe reached a similar point centuries later, the merchants won. Ottoman liberalization came too late, and the Empire fell before it could finish reforming itself. The post-Ottoman nationalist movements identified liberal Islam with the bad old days, and distinguished themselves either by turning to conservative Islam (as in Wahhabist Arabia) or to an Islam-suppressing secularism (as in Ataturk's Turkey). [44]

He further continues: "Between the world wars, the British and French dominated the heart of the Muslim world. They propped up conservative extremist governments like the House of Saud, while lecturing Muslims about liberal values. As a result, any liberalizing Muslims seemed to be aping the hated West and denouncing their own culture."[45]"Arab" and

"Muslim" are often used interchangeably. The conflation of these two identities ignores the diverse religious beliefs of Arab people and also overlooks Muslims who are not Arabs. It, "also erases the historic and vast ethnic communities who are neither Arab nor Muslim but who live amid and interact with a majority of Arabs or Muslims."[46] This generalisation "enables the construction of Arabs and Muslims as backward, barbaric, misogynist, sexually savage, and sexually repressive."[47] This type of stereotyping leads to the orientalising of Arab women and depicts them as fragile, sexually oppressed individuals who cannot stand up for their beliefs.

5.5. THE IMPLICATION OF MILL'S LIBERTY FOR THE ARAB SPRING

The origin of liberal ideas is represented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. But these ideas are seriously flawed in Arab world, and while Rousseau, representing as he did the unsystematic vanguard of the Enlightenment can be excused, Mill's writings were rather dominated by Kant's 'Copernican Revolution.'[48] Hobbes explicitly would deny that Arab Spring or Arab revolution could ever be justified, holding instead that a subject could only rightly resist government authority as a matter of self-defence and then only when the perpetration of lethal harm against her was imminent.

However, in the classical liberal tradition, according to which individuals have rights prior to the institution of government and in which governments are viewed as trustees, the attitude toward revolution is generally more permissive. There is a right to revolt when government violates those natural rights for the protection of which it was created. Locke holds that the people at its own discretion may rightly revoke the trusteeship, that is, dissolve the government, even in the absence of the state's violation of natural rights or failure to protect them. But, it is a fallacy to hold that Hobbes was right and Locke was wrong or *vice versa* about the consequences for physical security of the destruction of government. The

conceptual version of Kant's denial that revolution can be justified is distinct from a different Kantian argument that is more akin to the Undue Risk Argument: (i) all human beings are indefeasibly obligated to contribute to getting out of and staying out of a condition in which universal right cannot be realized, (ii) universal right can only be realized where government exists and is recognised as authoritative, (iii) to revolt is both to try to destroy the existing government and to deny its authority, and therefore (iv) revolution can never be justified. This second interpretation of Kant's view holds that to engage in revolution is also to violate a fundamental obligation to contribute to the conditions for the realisation of universal right. For Karl Marx proletarian revolution is needed to destroy the conditions of alienation and create the conditions for the full realisation of man's nature as a creative, communal being, through processes of scientifically informed collective decision-making, bring the natural and social world fully under deliberate human control for the good of all. Mill's defence of liberty is basically and consistently utilitarian. This implies that his ultimate value lies in the maximising happiness or where necessary, minimising harm and pain. However, Mill's primary concern is on the individual liberty; perhaps there is no recognised principle which defines the exact limits of social intervention with the liberty of the individual. Mill perceives government as not a matter of natural rights or social contract; nevertheless, forms of government are assessed by its "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of man as a progressive being."[49]

However, in one of Mill's moralistic arguments, he appeals to those of 'decided mental superiority,' to save society from itself, and in particular from 'tradition' and 'custom'. The Arab society has remained adamant and vehement on these citadels of tradition and custom. But everything in life is subjected to change and motion. Heraclitus the famous ancient philosopher re-sounds the doctrine of change in the activities that happen in the cosmos. However, some see the Arab Spring as a repetition of the wave of democracy. For instance,

Kenan Engin, a German-Kurdish political scientist, identified the new uprising in Arab and Islamic countries as "the 'fifth wave of democracy' because of evident features qualitatively similar to the 'third wave of democracy' in Latin America that took place in the 1970s and 1980s."[50] While Donald Blinken, former US Ambassador to Hungary, attributed the failure to establish a functioning regime following "Arab uprisings to the lack of leadership with no respected or admired figure emerging from the mass protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq."[51]Base on the foregoing assertions, Arab Spring is most likely to be understood as resulting from a frame of mind of the citizens' perception of what is to be considered as improvement of their current status as against what it had been.

However, Agha and Malley observe in the *New York Book Review*, the outcome of these revolutions was contrary to what the original protesters intended:

> The Arab world's immediate future will very likely unfold in a complex tussle between the army, remnants of old regimes, and the Islamists, all of them with roots, resources, as well as the ability and willpower to shape events. There are many possible outcomes - from restoration of the old order to military takeover, from unruly fragmentation and civil war to creeping Islamisation.[52]

The aftermath of the Arab revolution which witnessed the overthrow of notable authoritarian regimes were met with applauds from the international community and other liberals as it ignited hopes of higher possibility for democratisation to occur in the region. However, as events unfolded in the MENA region, it instigated other unintended repercussions. A peaceful and stable environment and conditions are important for democracy building and consolidation thus it becomes imperative to analyse the security implication of the revolution in the region. The political upheaval which occurred in the MENA region and its resulting consequences seem to challenge regional security in varying ways. The aftermath of the Arab Spring has inspired insurrection of new security threats through increase rate of arms proliferation, creation of weak state capacity, reactivation of old conflict, increase in the

radicalisation of non-state actors among others. The overthrow of leaders as a result of the Arab upheaval has created power vacuum which present a new front of instability as power strife and in some countries total degeneration of law and order persist. The power vacuum has provided fertile ground and conditions for emergence and operations of radical and violent groups in the region. Among other things, the Arab Spring led to the downfall of strongmen in the region. Those strongmen had not built strong state institutions, and their failure led to the state failure and lawlessness.Locke argues that a government that devolved into tyranny was no longer the legitimate ruler of the governed and the governed were justified in resisting the authority of the government. The Arab leadership was found wanting in the following area: high unemployment, disenfranchisement of voters, government corruption, high food prices, and suppression of basic freedoms coupled with pre-existing rifts such as tribal and religious divisions (tribalism in Libya, Sunni-Shia division in Yemen) explain the Arab Spring. These causes show that the governed in the affected countries were justified in resisting their authorities. The governments of these countries strongly restricted the rights of the governed. Journalists were not free to report the news; the government censored the Internet and imposed penalties on citizens who chose a different religion other than Islam; it prohibited the governed from freely assembling and expressing their views and interfered with property rights; the government also refused to hold fair and democratic elections.

Unfortunately, these reasons and others are why Mill probably would agree that the citizens of the Arab Spring were justified in resisting their governing authorities. The individual liberty was violated and the governed is not under any obligation to submit to tyrannical authorities who govern with no regard to the individual liberties and rights of their subjects. Whether the Arab Spring will produce positive changes for the Arab world is yet to be seen.

However, looking at the Arab Spring through the eyes of J. S. Mill shows us that the citizens of the Arab Spring possess liberty and rights independent of the state and they have made this point known loud and clear. The real point is that, for Mill, the Arab world has their lifestyles, there are some which will arise in time and appear to us all as *glaringly self-evidently true*, as true Baconian style, experimentation over time will uncover it thus: "The truth of an opinion is part of its utility."[53] This is only possible if Arab region has reached the stage where it has become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion: "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end."[54] Leaving the improvement of 'barbarians' for the moment, we can say that the purpose of *On Liberty*, given that utility is truth, is basically to upend 'custom', therefore Mill writes:

> The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance
> to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that
> disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is
> called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that
> of progress or improvement.[55]

This is the most vaunted purpose of liberals: the fight against custom and tradition. This has become especially clear in the Muslim world in the context of the Arab revolts, where Islam is their enemy. But to what end upend custom? Where exactly are those 'geniuses' who are 'more individual' than the rest of the Arab region, supposed to lead the citizens? Well, they are supposed to lead the people to the truth, which means ultimately achieving a society of which Mill opines:

> Firm convictions as to right and wrong, useful and pernicious, deeply
> eng**r**aven on the feelings by early education and general unanimity of
> sentiment, and so well grounded in reason and in the real exigencies
> of life that they shall not, like all former and present creeds, religious,
> ethical and political, require to be periodically thrown off and
> replaced by others.[56]

Liberty presumably ends there and we get Millian despotism. Then, when it comes to 'barbarians', there can be no internal resources for any class within their societies to gauge what can be an improvement for them and what cannot. So, logically, it is up to those 'enlightened' societies, which have reached the final stage of development, to impose mores on them by imperial edict. Here presumably we get Millian imperialism. During this period of regional unrest, several leaders announced their intentions to step down at the end of their current terms. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir announced "that he would not seek re-election in 2015,"[57] as did Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose term was ending in 2014, although there were violent demonstrations demanding his immediate resignation in 2011. Protests in Jordan also caused the sacking of four successive governments by King Abdullah. The popular unrest in Kuwait also resulted in resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah cabinet. The geopolitical implications of the protests drew global attention. Besides, let us analyse the conditions of some seriously affected Arab countries.

5.5.1 TUNISIA

According to Mill, liberty as a principle "has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion."[58] One reason why history keeps repeating itself is because human beings hardly learn from it. For Mill, "History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution."[59] However, the fact remains that the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali took to his heels to Saudi Arabia on 14th January, 2011, following the Tunisian Revolution protests. It eventually led to a thorough democratisation of the country and to free and democratic elections. They saw the victory of a coalition of the Islamist Ennahda Movement with the

centre-left Congress for the Republic and the left-leaning Ettakatol as minority partners. This

exposes what an existentialist philosopher, Albert Camus meant when he said in his work,

The Rebel, thus:

> In every act of rebellion, the rebel simultaneously experiences a feeling of revulsion at the infringement of his rights and a complete loyalty to certain aspects of himself which implicitly brings a standard of values so far from being gratuitous, that he is prepared to support it no matter the risk.[60]

Liberty is meaningless without sound economic power. The ''Tunisia's aggregate economy:

per capita GDP was lower than that of Synthetic Tunisia by an estimated US$ 600 (5.5

percent of GDP) in 2011".[61]   In addition, the increased uncertainty about the political, legal

and economic environment which in turn may have induced investors to postpone investment

decisions affected the entire progress in the economy. Since the Tunisia uprising, Tunisia's

political transition experienced three distinct periods as documented by Kerrou. The first

phase stretched from 14th January, 2011, when the reign of President Ben Ali came to an end,

after 23 years in power, to 23rd October, 2011, when a new National Constituent Assembly

was elected. This period was characterised by the formation of a new government headed by

Beji Caid Essabi and the election of a National Constituent Assembly. The second phase,

from 2012 till the end of 2013, was "marred by a political crisis between the secular

opposition represented by the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the Islamic led government

dominated by El-Nahda party".[62] For example, in August 2012, thousands protested in Tunis

(Capital of Tunisia) against the cabinet's decision to reduce women's rights. Mill argues that

"If any one does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for punishing him, by law,

or where legal penalties are not safely applicable, by general disapprobation."[63] The third and

final period was characterised by the ending of the political crisis and building the

foundations of a sustainable democratic and inclusive political system. The transition to a

democratic system was finalised in December 2014 when presidential elections were held and Beji Caid Essebsi, the candidate of Nidaa Tunis, won the presidential elections against Mouncef Al-Marzouki. It is unquantifiable the political benefits Tunisians gained from moving from an autocratic to a democratic regime, drawn from the impact of the Arab Spring.

However, President Obama condemned and deplored the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia.In this way, there was US interference due to the Tunisian government repression on the populace.Sigmund Freud writes: "Unexpressed emotions will never die. They are buried alive and will come forth later in uglier ways".[64] It is unruly for the Tunisian government to cause her citizens the feelings of repression.

5.5.2 EGYPT

The attack on socialism by Mill as a former way of thinking, rest on his interest on Liberty principle which projects the values of human dignity, freedom and self-development. These qualities appear to be lacking in Egypt as citizens revolt in demand of good social welfare package. Egypt is the second affected country in the Arab Spring. Before this period it has enjoyed comparative peace though with incredible political tensions. However, the uprising made radical changes in the political life of Egypt. As a social reformer, Mill maintains that the state authority should be held responsible for the evils that befall the land and the patience of the citizens that dried up which led to the uprising against the government; this he called 'revolution'.

Moreover, Egypt is one of the oldest states in the world, the state system collapsed following the fall of PresidentHosni Mubarak who resigned on 11th February, 2011, after eighteen days of massive protests, ending his thirty years in office as the president. Mill argues that to allow the world choose one's plan of life for oneself is tantamount to call the person an animal: in

fact he describes it thus: "[He] has no need of any faculty than the ape-like one of imitation."[65] Mubarak's situational resignation could be likening to non-volition. Egypt's uprising was nick-named by C.C. Mbaegbu as "'white revolution': the only blood split was at the hands of the regime and its cohorts, including a number of loyalists, business tycoons.''[66] The effects were tragic due to the fact that protesters were killed in great numbers. A recorded number of deaths were about five thousand, five hundred and forty people during the crisis. Mill believes that a leader should possess 'tender heart'. He gave instance with Emperor Marcus Aurelius (Absolute Monarch) who had tender heart and which was evident in his decisions and dealings. As a principle of his political philosophy, Mill remarks that the state should not only respect the liberty of the citizens but must maintain a vigilant control over her exercise of any power which it allows her to possess over others.

Furthermore, the consequence of Egyptian revolution extended to the Christians minority in the country, who became an easy prey for radical Muslims and criminal gangs. There was total destruction of churches, displacement, kidnapping and assassination of people. Islamist militants attack both government and foreign facilities resulting to a massive crackdown. Thus, a new wave of terrorism emerged in Egypt since the 2013 transition. Other areas affected by the Egyptian spring were the socio-economic, political and psychological life of the people. The World Bank records that: "Egyptian economy is still suffering from a severe downturn following the 2011 revolution and the government faces numerous challenges as to how to restore growth, market and investor confidence. The economic slowdown contributed to a rise in unemployment."[67]Laski has the opinion that economic liberty can be secure by defining the economic rights of the people, recognising the status of the worker and providing scope for the development of his personality. More so, by shielding workers from the woes of unemployment, sickness and old age.

5.5.3 LIBYA

Libya under Gaddafi was under siege. His political attitude and might earned him the nick-name: "Mad-Dog". He denied Libyan citizens the rights of political participation. Heater opines: "Civil participation enhances autonomy and altruism: autonomy from self-government; altruism from judging the interests of the community."[68] For J. S. Mill political participation aims at developing the intellectual qualities of reason and judgment of the individuals. Thus, Mill was convinced that if this is put in place a good society would emerge which consists of happy people because of their self-reliance, rationality, tolerance, wide-ranging interests and a compassionate temper.

Mill therefore writes: "Coercion is logically at odds with the creation of such a character."[69] However, the Libyan uprising of 2011 became a turning point in the social and political history of Libya. At the time of the revolution, an anti-Gaddafi forces emerged, known as the National Transitional Council (NTC), on 27th February, 2011. NTC was known as the "political face of the revolution", which ushered in multiparty democracy as the major agenda. On 8th March, 2011 the NTC issued a statement in which it declared itself to be the "sole representative all over Libya."[70] On 3rd August, 2011, the NTC issued a Constitutional Declaration which declared the statehood of Libya as a democracy with Islam as its state religion, in which the state guarantees the rule of law and an independent judiciary as well as civic and human basic rights.

Election was held on 8th August, 2012; the NTC officially dissolved and transferred power to the General National Congress. Interpol security alert was issued concerning the "possible movement of dangerous individuals and assets" based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed a travel ban and asset freeze. The warning lists "Gaddafi himself and fifteen key members of his government."[71] The NTC has been in "negotiations with Algeria and Niger, neighboring countries to which members of the government and

defecting military commanders have fled, attempting to secure the arrest and extradition of Al-Saadi Gaddafi and others."[72]   Most of these officials were arrested,while others were killed by a NATO airstrike during the fall of Sirte.

The overthrow and killing of Muammar Gaddafi was a spillover of vices which has affected both Libyans and her neighboring countries. To this end, C.C. Mbaegbu observes that:

> Weapons proliferation, Islamic insurgency, sectarian violence, and lawlessness have been problems and the spillover has affected neighboring countries including Mali. The interim National Transitional Council (NTC) declared that the country has been liberated in October 2011; it began a process to form a new government, prepare for elections and prosecute former Gadhafi officials. Elections were held in July 2012 to a General National Congress (GNC), which took power a month later. The NTC was dissolved, and in November Ali Zidan was sworn in as Prime Minister. [73]

The aftermath of the entire process left many protesters dead and others seriously injured during the period of the awakening. Mill accepted the Industrial Revolution because it produced a class of energetic and acquisitive entrepreneurs whose aim were to maximise their profit. Though, Mill was not appreciative of the destruction unleashed by the French Revolution, but he was happy at the decimation of the monarchical system of government prevalent at that time. Hence, all nefarious actions of Gaddafi against the state welfarism were not coming from his strong desires or impulses but from weak conscience. Mill argues: "It is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill; it is because their consciences are weak."[74] The mismanagement of political power by Gaddafi is regarded by Mill as moral disapprobation. That notwithstanding, Mill was against murder as a punishment against one's actions. Mill's liberty applies to tolerance. Mill succinctly puts it: "If he [a leader] spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to spoil it still further… we shall not treat him as enemy of society: the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself."[75]

5.5.4 YEMEN

The Yemeni revolution involved clashes between troops and tribal fighters and police snipers who opened fire on the pro-democracy camp in Sana'a, killing people. J. S. Mills' On Liberty attacks all existing social arrangements with rival political theory to liberalism; by providing foundation laid down on values of human dignity, freedom and self-development. Mill would rather associate Yemeni political crisis with the persecution of truth theory where he writes:

> A theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths; but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them.[76]

Yemen citizens are suffering from political tussle among the elites. Mill believes that such elites have no character, they are mere steam engines. He observes: "One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam engine has a character."[77]

More so, Mill advocates the notion of progressive advancement of human civilisation. Yemen citizens had suffered from untimely and severe social, economic hardship and unstable government. They are experiencing war emanating from terrorist groups used by mischievous leaders. For Mill a state is a moral institution concerned with the promotion of virtue and excellence in the individual citizen. Therefore, Mill pleads for the removal of all obstacles in the way of the individual's self-development and the meaninglessness of life of citizens. However, the UN Security Council condemned the violence and called for a transfer of power.President Saleh stepped down and the powers of the presidency were transferred to Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was formally elected president on 21st February, 2012, in a one-man election. The transitional process was disrupted by conflicts between the Houthis and al-Islah, as well as the al-Qaeda insurgency.

The Shia insurgency intensified after Hadi took power, escalating in September 2014 as anti-government forces led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthiswept into the capital and forced Hadi to agree to a "unity government".[78] The Houthis later declaring themselves in control of the government in a coup d'état.When the pressure was much on Hadi, he resigned alongside with his ministers in January 2015. A cousin of the new acting president, Houthi, called the takeover a "glorious revolution". However, the "constitutional declaration" of 6th February, 2015 was widely rejected by opposition politicians and foreign governments, including the United Nations. For Mill the state is a constitution of human wills and not interests. He further maintains the principles of equality with individual freedom. Though all citizens are equal but only popular sovereignty could give legitimacy to the government.

On 26th March, 2015 Saudi Arabia announced operation al-Hazm Storm and began airstrikes and announced its intentions to lead a military coalition against the Houthis, whom they claimed were being aided by Iran, however, it could not stop the civil war. The Saudi-led intervention has caused massive damage to Yemeni infrastructure and has resulted in the bombing of hospitals and funeral processions among other civilian targets. The U.S had assisted Yemen (Hadi troops). Other neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt supported Hadi troops in ground operations. Consequently, Hadi troops took control of Aden from Houthis. The Yemeni government alleged that the Houthis were seeking to overthrow it and to implement *Shī'a*religious law. The rebels claimed that they are "defending their community against discrimination and government aggression."[79]

Western intelligence agencies consider AQAP the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda because of its technical expertise and global reach, and the emergence of IS affiliates in Yemen is a serious concern. The conflict between the Houthis and the government is also seen as part of a regional power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia. Gulf Arab states have accused Iran of backing the Houthis financially and militarily,

though Iran has denied this, and they are themselves backers of President Hadi. Yemen is strategically important because it sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow waterway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world's oil shipments pass. Actually, Yemen until now had experienced tragic and unstable political uncertainty.

At this juncture, I do not think that Mill would suggest democracy to be practiced in a place like Yemen if it were to be in his time. This is because Yemen is at the stage Mill calls "Backward civilisation". Thus, Mill argues that though democracy is good because it makes citizens happier and better, there are still conditions for a better appreciation for representative democracy: the citizens must possess qualities like, "active, self-helping character", and the ability and willingness to preserve institutions of representative democracy. These are yet to be found among the inhabitants of Yemen.

5.5.5 MOROCCO

Some thinkers of revolution approve of violence as an essential vehicle for bringing about radical change and assert its creative capacities; others advocate its unreserved exclusion from the realm of progressive politics and make recourse to right and law instead. The revolution in Morocco was not targeted on the monarch but was of political demands which were addressed immediately by the government. Mill strongly advocates synergy between law and liberty. Since the demands focused more on the constitutional reformation, Mill would make some efficient suggestions: there is the urgent need for proportional representation as a device to protect the rights of the minorities, thus giving them an opportunity to share power. He considers it sacrosanct the right to express one's opinion, no matter whether one is right or wrong, and articulation of contesting opinions. Mill opines: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of contrary opinion, and mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind."[80] Mill developed and polished Voltaire's

defence of free speech and tolerance in his famous dictum: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."[81]

Mill remarks that we do not extirpate the introducers of new opinions or ideas. He believes that:

> The real advantage which truth has, consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to discover it, until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it.[82]

The uprising in Morocco took the form of demonstrations and riots and started on the 20th February, 2011 and it aimed at Constitutional Reforms. As a matter of urgency, the Moroccan government has commenced the implementation of the Constitutional Reforms. In Morocco, the street protests ended slowly after the leaders addressed some of the immediate grievances, thereby avoiding an escalation of the situation. Morocco did not experience the kind of violence and sustained upheaval witnessed elsewhere, partly because the leadership reacted swiftly with proactive policies meant to appease people ahead of an almost-certain storm. Another equally important reason as to why the region's winds of upheaval did not unsettle it was that it had been engaged in gradual political reforms for more than a decade. These reforms did not affect the authoritarian nature of the regimes, but they set them apart from the much harsher autocratic rule that existed in Libya and Tunisia before 2011. For example, in North Africa, only Algeria and Morocco had integrated opposition parties – both religious and secular – in the political process for a decade at least.

Furthermore, Moroccan citizens have been enjoying relatively more political freedom than in most other Arab countries. The wave of upheavals across the region pushed the Moroccan monarch to accommodate the vocal protest movement through inconsequential constitutional changes, the promise of economic reforms and more co-optation. The king also allowed

Benkirane's moderate, pro-monarchy, Islamist party to head the government, as a way to contain the Islamist sentiment and the protest movement, especially when the traditional secular opposition – mainly of the left – saw its popularity decline steadily in recent years. As a matter of urgency, Saudi Arabia invites Morocco to join what has been termed the "club of kings", the Gulf Cooperation Council, which aimed at protecting the interests of monarchs against the "Arab Spring". While Morocco is a constitutional monarchy in principle, in practice, power is consolidated in the hands of the king, who can nominate and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet, dissolve parliament, and levy emergency powers.Muhammad VI has attracted praise from the Obama administration for his alleged moderation and embrace of democratic reforms.

Moreover, Mill like Rousseau advocates participation in public affairs as a means of counterbalancing selfishness and increase responsibility. He applied liberal principles both in the public sphere and private realm in areas like, fairness, equality, and independence within the family as well as the state. More so, his emphasis is on the state granting means of self-protection to the citizens. Other areas Mill advocates reformations are: women's enfranchisement, quality elementary education for the masses, land reforms for agricultural labourers, empowerment of the disadvantaged and the dispossessed. Indeed, Mill broadened and humanised the ambit of liberalism. In this way, Mill has attracted political theorists like Thomas Hill Green who revised his doctrine of common good.

5.6 PHILOSOPHY AND THE ARAB SPRING

We implore philosophy as an instrument to aid resolve the situation of the Arab Spring. The role of philosophy in the Arab region need not be over emphasized. Philosophy is love of knowledge or wisdom. It tends towards proper understanding of human experiences and the world. In the words of G. Azenabor, "wisdom is an affair of value and judgment; it involves the intelligent conduct of human affairs and interpretation of experience".[83] Wisdom has to

do with the proper application of human reason to human experience. In fact, philosophy aids citizens towards right reasoning. By its nature, Philosophy enables man to relate well with others in the society and beyond. As a pedagogical tool it makes for order and peace in the society and the world the large. The idea of human nature, liberty and rights from where the declaration of human rights came originated from philosophies of such people as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jacque Rousseau, J. S. Mill, Montesquieu and others. Ewelu argues that: "The relevance of philosophy is unquestionable in the face of the multifarious problems it enables man to solve in his life. Even when it does not actually solve the problems, it guides man on the best approach to adopt to avoid being weighed down when faced with such problems."[84]

Philosophy makes effort to rationally address human problems and does not claim to provide answers to all human problems. The understanding of philosophy in this regard, captures the individuals or group of individuals' fantasy, values and beliefs. It provides, irrespective of one's ethnic affiliation for an unbiased assessment of human behaviour. According to D. M. Hausman "philosophy enables the human person to change some fundamental beliefs."[85]

The main task of philosophy is to subject and scrutinise certain beliefs that are not in agreement with the rationality of the human person. When any belief is found guilty at the 'Court of Reason' it is rejected. When Francis Bacon said that knowledge is power, he was only trying to present that philosophy propels and sharpens human mental faculty. No wonder, Bertrand Russell argues that "the man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason."[86]Another role of philosophy is found in the political sphere of the Arab region which will be much more appreciated in the area of policy-making. Philosophers are better equipped to help Arab government to

articulate good polices that will touch the lives of the people positively. Perhaps Azenabor insists that:

> With their concern for values, goals, ends of human society, human activity and the means of achieving these, the philosophers are better qualified to play the role of helping to determine societal values, development and progress. Philosophy will go a long way towards helping politicians to desist from the politics of acrimony and bitterness.[87]

As a result, philosophy has a vital role to play in our contemporary society that is bedeviled with many scoundrels, mischievous and charlatans among political and religious leaders. In a broader sense, We could understand philosophy from the point of view of Okere when he argues :

> Philosophy is an effort to rearrange the world more geometric as Spinoza would teach, that is, logically and aesthetically to recreate the world, to impose a pattern on the chaos and tohuvobohu [turbulence] of life, of reality in the raw. It means humanizing our world i.e. rendering it reasonable, chasing away the impending chaos and tyranny of ignorance and of the absurd, [and] the unreasonable.[88]

The philosophy of positive thinking must be inculcated in the people of Arab world. As such, they can begin to appreciate themselves and others around them. The political elites of the Arab world must learn to respect liberty of the individual: human life, rights and property as enunciated by J. S. Mill and John Locke. For Mill "liberty entails the idea of plurality, diversity of character and culture."[89]

More so, the platform led by industrialisation going on in the Arab region is uprooting the sense of human dignity and the best person to understand the situation in Arab world is the philosopher who has the capability to come out with the possibilities and opportunities that will assist in the positive growth of the region. It is a well-known fact that many people of this region do not understand what it means to be a human being. However, in Arab world today much emphasis is placed on the process of development and democratisation. Mill

quoting Wilhelm von Humboldt said there are two "necessary conditions for human development… namely, freedom and variety of situations."[90]In the line of thought of Anjov as regards the way forward for African leaders, we implore the same thought on the Arab leaders to imbibe and to be:

> Stimulated to conceive and implement planned economies, adapt democratic processes and appreciate the benefits of living in a pluralistic society. Emphatically, more light should be thrown on the choice of democracy that can work in the Arab world, the philosopher must challenge its people to resist the temptation to plant liberal or participatory democracy on their soil as these are planned for the Americans and Britons in their different situations. [91]

The Arab region should do away with what Mill called "despotism of custom" because it is an enemy of progress, advancement, improvement and the spirit of liberty. Mill opines:

> The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement….This is the case over the whole East.[92]

There are numerous ways philosophers could resolve current uprisings in the Arab world. A suggestive way according to Wiredu is through "comparative analysis" involving three stages of analysis:

> First, a critical analysis of traditional Arab culture with a view to identifying and separating the undesirable elements of culture from those that are desirable and worth keeping. Second, a critical assessment of Western culture and techniques, which is done with a view to identifying the aspects that are desirable and those that are suitable for social development in contemporary Arab society… The third level of analysis consists in the comparism of the Western traditional culture and the Arab traditional culture. This would reveal the features that are genuinely Western and those that are particularly Arabian.[93]

In the same vein, C. C. Mbaegbu asserts:

> The wisdom that philosophy seeks is one that tries to understand, to clear ignorance, to clarify obscurities, to establish reasonable mutually acceptable roles of conduct among individuals and peoples, minimizing the areas of friction and, where it cannot be completely eliminated, to promote mutual tolerance and avoid the reign of terror, violence and war among peoples.[94]

In essence, there is a need for philosophy of education which is a *conditio sine qua non* programme to inculcate the spirit of self-identity and on the contrary, dispels the ignorance, low-esteem and poor mental self-appreciation on the part of Arab citizens.

It is imperative that philosophers concerned with the Arab Spring should probe deeper into the root causes and nature of these crises and arrange some power packed or action oriented programme to forcefully but diplomatically address the issues. On a more pragmatic level, there is urgent need for an organised multi-disciplinary study of the Arab Spring phenomenon mindful of the facts that underpin it and possible platforms which must gear toward bringing out positive results which include planned strategies and schema for conflict resolutions "which has its origin in the ideological differences and civilisations in Arab world and beyond."[95] We recommend also dialogue as an instrument of peace in resolving the crisis in Arab region. Plato was the first who perfected the Socratic dialogue, where the interlocutors had plain ground in search for agreement. Dialogue is an exercise of good reasoning whose goal is geared toward in mutual truth seeking. A great philosopher, Martin Buber is a promoter of dialogue. In his line of thought, he encourages '"true dialogue," which is characterised by openness, honesty, and mutual commitment."[96]The Second Vatican Council had interest and emphasis on dialogue with the World. The Second Vatican Council uses some kind of dialogue in approach   (this is evident in the Council's documents): "dialogue with other religions (Nostra aetate), dialogue with modern society (Gaudium et spes) and dialogue with political authorities (Dignitatis Humanae)."[97]

Dialogue is necessary component of peace-building. By its nature, dialogue tends to foster an attitude of developing joint approaches to conflict situations, as a result of improving relationships, understanding, and trust between conflicting individuals or groups. Dialogue involves not for its own sake but is initiated in a mediation process, where two or more parties recognise each other in a conversation environment. One major component of dialogue process is the confidence building measure. The confidence building measure is aimed at "providing enabling ground that grants safety and neutrality for parties to converse on conflicting issues; this is done to reduce tensions, create trust and mutual understanding and finally identify points of arrival for each group."[98] According to H. Saunders "the outcome of dialogue is to create new human and political capacities to solve problems."[99] Dialogue involves:

> A process of genuine interaction through which human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn. Each makes a serious effort to take the others' concerns into her or his own picture, even when disagreement persists. No participant gives up her or his identity, but each recognizes enough of the others' valid human claims that he or she will act differently toward the other.[100]

Actually, the effects of dialogue among common people could also produce the same effects for countries in conflicts more especially when mediation process and principles are coordinated by qualified personels or philosophers. Therefore, we implore dialogue as a tool for the resolution of the Arab Spring because of its efficacy and human strategy. In the art of dialogue between nations, each retains its integrity and sovereignty while discussing on matters of great importance and legitimacy. Consequently, there exists in the Arab Spring clashes of civilisations and ideologies which have necessitated an interactive method known as dialogue.

On a positive note, the numerous transformations taking place in the Arab region ought to make them chant a 'nunc dimittis' to the 'wahalaism' (problems) by engaging in a dialogue of rhetoric-persuasion thus, producing new original ideology that replaces the old ones. Emphatically, dialogue becomes necessary to resolve their indifferences even as U. S. and EU countries struggle for their economic initiatives and motives. It becomes imperative that the Arab leaders need to change their *sit-tight-zone* mentality and attitude that has characterised their leadership in a dialogue of rhetoric-persuasion "to imbibe the culture of leaving the stage on the due date."[101]According to Mill, for political life of a state to be healthy, it requires order or stability, and progress or reform; an appeal to Arab world especially in this period of political crisis, is that the people's agitations need to be met. Therefore, Mill made a clarion call to the Arab leaders to reform the political system. The increase in diplomacy and engagement is now essential to ensure that the Western countries can continue to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in the Arab region. The vitality of this warning note is in case of a crisis moment or continued crisis in the region when every other suggestion has failed. In fact, there should be a declaration of state of emergence. Nations closest to the problem with the capacity to bring liberty, security, and stability to MENA and has interest in doing so should be encouraged to do as much as possible to accomplish these goals. Other Arab League members, NATO allies, and European Union friends should be encouraged to provide financial backing for the intervention, if not military forces. According to Nayef Al-Rodhan in Sustainable History and the Dignity of Man: A Philosophy of History and Civilisational Triumph: "Whether from the West or from Arab states, the effectiveness of support for transition processes will depend on how it is delivered. Successful support from external actors must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each state and target domestically driven processes."[102] As a matter of fact, a coherent, constructive assistance programme will not happen without effective leadership. Perhaps the

most important contribution the U.S. can make is in this regard. However, the U. S. should not leave the burden or outsource the real heavy lifting to the "international community." For instance:

> The Obama Administration [U. S] should abandon its wishful thinking about the supposed benefits of good bilateral relations with the predatory Assad regime and mobilize stronger international pressure on Damascus to respect the human rights of its own citizens, stop its support for terrorism, and halt its dangerous nuclear collusion with Iran and North Korea.[103]

On the contrary, in May, 2017, Donald Trump paid a visit to the Saudi capital and addressed 55 Muslim leaders in a landmark speech urging them "to double down on efforts to combat terrorism."[104] (CNN) "One is that Saudi Arabia felt emboldened after Donald Trump's visit, and Trump's administration has had a strong stance on Iran, which is backed by Qatar."[105] Nevertheless, we recommend social, economic, political, and emotional encouragement and supports from among foreign leaders at a moment of crisis as the Arab region is still experiencing the spring. These encouragements go a long way to strengthening them in their resolve to make a better society tomorrow while trying to sort out their differences. But an ancient axiom says: charity begins at home. The member states of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been generous in funding and supporting the local initiatives and intervention scheme. Nayef Al-Rodhan states:

> The difficulties facing Western actors, especially in terms of legitimacy, only underscore and advance the importance of Arab states in transforming their own region. Indeed, the Gulf Cooperation Council states have a key role to play as engines of growth in a changing region.[106]

One of the major challenges of the Arab Spring is terrorism. The act of terrorism should be treated as with stance and millstone. Therefore, an Arab coalition like GCC should be enforced and supported by not only the body but allied groups like NATO, U.S., EU and AU especially in its military interventions and initiatives. And any member states found

cooperating with the terrorist groups should be sanctioned immediately. Take for example, on the 5th June, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have broken diplomatic relations with Qatar, rattling a powerful 36-year-old Gulf States union, known as the Gulf Cooperation Council, over what they say is the country's support of terrorism. A statement on Saudi Arabia's state news agency announced the move Monday morning, in order to "protect national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism."[107]

Human dignity should be mindfully accord respect. Human dignity does not only mean the absence of humiliation, rather a comprehensive and holistic notion that includes a set of criteria that must be part of any governance paradigm, such as: reason, security, human rights, accountability, transparency, justice, opportunity, innovation, and inclusiveness. According to Nayef Al-Rodhan:"The Arab Spring has provided a valuable lesson for foreign governments: encouraging a policy of status quo for mere geopolitical considerations while ignoring despotic domestic practices is eventually unsustainable." [108]

In the same vein, actors within the region have a critical role to play in charting the way forward in what has been a truly critical turning point for the Arab world. This requires valuing the lessons of the revolutions and what they were predicated on: a quest for dignity for all citizens regardless of background, along with accountable governments and public institutions. Nayef Al-Rodhan suggested that "the sustainability of any political order is premised on the guarantee of individual and collective human dignity for all, at all times, and under all circumstances."[109]

Political participation is among the fundamental human rights of the citizens. This is an inalienable right that should not be compromised. Conversely, the first Arab Human Development Report (AHDR), prepared by a distinguished group of Arab intellectuals and published by the United Nations Development Programme in 2002, described a "deficit of freedom" and lamented that political systems "have not been opened up to all citizens," and

that "political participation is less advanced in the Arab world than in other developing regions."[110] The world had experienced revolutions in different forms over the centuries: Trojan War, Caesar Garlic War, French and American Revolutions, World War I and II, and now, the new phenomenon of Arab Spring. We do not need more. Pope John Paul II, wrote and called for world peace, which is a total elimination of coercion, violence and war. All these revolutions serve as lessons to the entire globe. More especially in the Arab world we must imbibe the culture and lessons of non-violent revolutionary innovations and philosophies of people like Martin Luther King (Jr) and the Negroes in a new world, and Mahatma Gandhi and the Indians, in their pursuit of independence from their colonial Masters.

The abuse of Power leads to tragic end, as evident in the cases of monarchs and leaders of various Arab region .When the elastic limit of power is exceeded the remaining pieces of result is a total collapse and break of the entire edifice: the power that be and the remnants of the people. We recognise that there is a political vacuum in the Arab region. This lack needs to be filled. However, we have made recommendations to that effect. Thus, we suggest a possible political system – 'Arabcracy' in which the culture, Islam, and Arab politics could homogenised. Therefore, the Arab world needs to come together; re-examine the pit-falls of the spring. There is work to be done herein by political philosophers in driving home the course of action of the Arabcracy which must have as the basis: liberty and freedom, rights, equality and the rule of law as political foundation. We need a political system that will safeguard liberty of the individual: widespread social justice, the spirit of tolerance and cooperation among the people, economic security, and political education that will remold the conscience of the people to desire to preserve liberty. According to Lord Bryce, "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty".[111] While supporting him, Thomas Jefferson writes, "What country can preserve its liberties if the rulers are not warned from time to time that this

people preserve the spirit of resistance".[112] Therefore, Arab region needs to move forward in their pursuit of social, economic, and political well-being, good life for the citizenry and peace in the region. Nevertheless, the menace of Arab Spring has extended to the world at large; besides, let us look into the consequence of the spring on some West African countries.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON SOME WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

6.1 THE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON NIGERIA

Most social and political philosophers, theorists and thinkers advocate good life in their philosophical ideologies. Plato, for instance, was confronted with Greek city-states situation like Arab Spring of today. Plato asks: What would an ideal society be like? However, Mill, like Locke, asks: what happens when the individual's life, liberty and property are threatened by the state or authority? Suppose the individuals live under socio-economic hardships and could not know how to express their feelings against the government, what could be their resolve? How are the poor, the neglected and unpaid social workers react towards the non-payment of their remunerations? On 1st May, 2017, (Workers' Day) in Nigeria (Abuja) workers for the first time expressed their grievances against the government manipulations of their social welfare packages. This could not have come except this period of Arab uprisings' influences. In most parts of the West Africa, people have started to express their internal despondency which is psychological. Mill cherishes self-assertion.

Unfortunately, the Arab uprisings were difficult if not impossible to predict. This spurs one to believe in the influence of the Arab Spring on other countries like Nigeria. Although, Nigeria had experienced most of the events which were antecedents of the Arab Spring situation, there is seemingly a necessity to study the influence the Arab Spring could exert on Nigeria. The state of the nation has progressively oscillated between harmony and anarchy leaving the events leading to civil war in the past. The bickering arising from previous electoral exercise in 2015 is part of the reasons that fuelled a lot of reactions between the two major political parties (APC and PDP) thus causing chaos in Nigeria and the manner of appointments of ministers and other major key players in government. It is on record that this present government (APC) has appointed only northerners at key positions in the country, hence causing feelings of marginalisation as is the case among the Arab countries. It is a

reoccurrence of the ills of past administration, which led the *Times of London* in editorial to advice the President: "to grasp the urgency of Nigeria's situation and save a failing state before he is swept away by violence, despair or another coup."[1]

The events of Revolutions are contagious and often history is repeated with such influences. James Davis is of the view that the rationalist currents from France gradually influenced the intellectuals in Russia in the reign of Catherine the Great, a hundred years before the Russian revolution were necessary lineal antecedents of the 1917 Revolution. The American Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton during her maiden visit to Nigeria doubted the possibility of the survival of the country as an entity by the year 2015. What could have inspired her thought? Certain conditions of the country like the state of corruption among the high and mighty of Nigerian politics, the warring militants of Niger Delta and the Boko Haram Terrorists of north eastern Nigeria, coupled with the wide speculation that a clause in the amalgamation chatter in 1914 states that the merging units will have to consent to the continuation of the union after 100 years, may have been part of the baggage that informed the Secretary's pronouncement.

Time and time again, the dormant question of Nigeria's uncertain future was raised like that of the late Libyan leader, Colonel Muamar Gaddafi, when he openly called for the division of Nigeria into a Northern Muslim entity and a corresponding Southern Christian entity restating as it were what Lindsay Barrett feared a decade earlier and stated that "it would not be pessimistic to conclude that theintolerance espoused by many of these fringe organisations could lead to a major breakdownof law and order in the near future."[2] In any revolutionary analysis, the application of J-curve theory of unfulfilled rising expectation triggers rebellion. The fundamental basis of Revolution in our opinion already exists in Nigeria as well as the Arab Countries of the "Arab Spring." Retrospectively, both Arab world and Nigeria (case study herein) share some semblances like, both were under colonial rule, struggled for many

years for independence and when they secured it the same pattern of elite take-over of the seat of power; besides, the socio-economic conditions of the people were not bettered.

In continuation of the search in both regions, populations consist of an admixture of different peoples and diverse religions. Arab region consists of a melee of Arabs, Berbers bedions with Islam as main religion amidst others like Animism, Christianity and members of the Coptic faith. Nigeria is made up of over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups with over five hundred dialects. Three main religions are Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion. One of the major causes of rebellion is not division of religion but fundamentalism and extremism in Islamic religion. That has bred division and discord which is fertile for rebellion. O E. Agbogu is of the opinion that extremism in Islam breeds seed of discord when he asserts: "Particularly among Muslims who believe strongly in martyrdom for anything they dislike particularly pertaining to their faith and freedom to propagate it, and in the case of Nigeria, determination to abide by Islamic law or sharia."[3]

However, other factors of similarity among Arab region and Nigeria are post-colonial era political cum social crisis, such as social unrest and military coups and government can be characterised as leadership *"sit-tight-in-zone".* More so, both regions have encountered inequality and oppression unleashed by the governing elite. In Nigeria, the consequence of unemployment, uncared general wellbeing of the people, lack of state infrastructure, poverty, and remuneration differentials between the political class and the masses, social conditions raising crisis in the state, strikes, kidnapping, (armed) robberies, terrorism, corruption, worse still, armed terrorists and tribal militias have embarked on monumental movement to disrupt political and social life in Nigeria. Since it raised its ugly face in the Niger Delta, it has now become internationalised when the Boko Haram cult incorporated elements of Al-Qaeda and invaded states in the North Eastern part of Nigeria, in a civil war that the Government refuses to accept exists. Since then, their reign of terror has engulfed the entire Northern Nigeria

spreading fear and destruction at which ever area they strike. The dangerous influence of the Arab Spring is that it opened the door for the appearance of many new radical Islamist groups in the region thereby extending their operational levels to West Africa and particularly Nigeria. These groups, including the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Houthis, and others have spread radicalism and terror throughout the regions. The United States and many other European countries intervened in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries intervened in Bahrain and Yemen. This intervention, however, and the support for the uprisings resulted in continuous chaos and civil wars in these countries.

As a follow up of the evils of Arab Spring and influences, religious threat to West African sub-region is a ripple out of the Arab Spring. In the Arab region, the Sunni and Shia religious sects are the two major players. The Saudi Arabia and the Iran are the two godfathers of the sects respectively who are the stakeholders of their intra-religious conflicts. Religious threat to the security of West African states is plausible. For instance, in Nigeria, using Sokoto and Zamfara States as examples of ethno-religious conflicts essentially derive from intra-religious conflicts as opposed to inter-religious conflicts. Although it is still of importance to Nigerian national security but it would be of a sectional, albeit of a regional dimension. It will not play out in Nigeria as a Sunni or Shia conflict but will be rooted in the cultural practice of religion. In the first week of February, 2011, the sect, Boko Haram also has threatened the Nigerian government that it would carry out a "full scale war."

Also, there is the problem of enduring cultural differences. Citing the instance of the Fulani-herdsmen controversy, that became a launch pad on the flesh of the Nigeria citizens. But what has been the government contribution on these matters? The fact remains that because of the exploitation, the ruling class have succeeded in wiping out the middle class who naturally would have been the brain of any revolution. According to Francis Fukuyama,

> The middle classes were the key actors in organizing the revolution
> and pressing for political change. The Tunisian uprising against Ben

Ali and the Tahrir Square demonstrations against Mubarak were led by urban, middle class individuals who felt that their chances for social and economic advancement were being thwarted by the authoritarian regime.[4]

The middle class makes a country balance in its socio-economic and political sphere. The implication is that without the middle class, a country will suffer in driving its political agenda, economic plans and social projects will not be properly enhanced. Fukuyama expressing this idea from Huntington Samuel, described the Middle class as " the most likely experienced rapid increases in their social status and therefore face the sharpest disappointment if their subsequent mobility is blocked."[5] And he went further to say that, "It is the gap between their expectations and reality that creates political instability."[6] Hence, middle classes play major roles in the political mobilisation. The middle class in the Arab world were responsible for organising and executing Arab revolutions, though with difficulties, like government interventions and restrictions. Fukuyama captures it:

The middle class groups that led the Arab revolutions had similar problems in organising themselves on a long-term basis to contest elections in the first couple of years after the uprising, being internally divided and centered on individual leaders rather than mass political followings. Now they face a revitalised military government that will actively restrict their ability to organize.[7]

Some agencies were responsible for the disorganisation of the middle class like the police force. A. E Agbogu, states:

The Nigerian Police itself originated as a colonial police whose main assignment was to aid the colonial masters in the pacification of the people and getting them ready to receive the pax-britanica plan of Her Majesty the Queen of England. The absence of true rule of law and the weakness and corruption that has crippled the judiciary has left the political class and the Nigerian Police total freedom to do as they wish. This means that the brutality that would be unleashed on acts of revolution can only be imagined.[8]

In 2011 during labour peaceful demonstration, police shot two people in Abuja and four in Lagos. At the end of the strike nothing was heard about the dead nor were there any

conclusive investigation. The outcome of these years of brutality was the mental and physical retreat of ordinary Nigerians from all acts that can be termed rebellious.

By implication Nigerians are now used to tolerating all acts of oppression and brutality with utmost submission. Recently, there have been signs of movement away from passivity, as was exemplified during fuel hike strike by Nigeria Labour Union in 2011 for three days it appeared that Nigeria was going to be destroyed. But the Government read the handwriting on the wall correctly, and accepted the demands not to increase fuel prices and thus doused the inferno that was about to consume Nigeria. During the May Day celebration at Abuja in 2017, the Nigeria Labour union workers agitated against the government because of poor Minimum wage as the country has been whittled down by hyperinflation, covert devaluation, exchange control issues and finally plunged into economic recess. The union workers revolted as never been before. Now, the government has started to discuss on improvement on the minimum wage. The government approach to issues in Nigeria suggests sensitivity of fear of a repeat of Arab spring and its consequences in our country. Similar situations that portray public expression of agitation had occurred in Nigeria in recent times, for instance, May 10, 2016, Irate youth burnt down the houses of a serving Senator and that of a member of the House of Representatives in Kano allegedly for failing to fulfill their campaign promises. New Telegraph Newspaper, May 11, 2016. Awake government! Awake Nigeria, revolution is real!

Nigeria's ministry of interior, and information, national security managers, policy makers and implementers, must work on how to contain and control certain information and communication infrastructure which were the frameworks that the demonstrators in the Arab Spring used and still use. It has been reasoned that if there was anything revolutionary about the Arab Spring it was the revolution in the use of the social media and information technology. If this digital technology were used effectively in conflict situation in Nigeria it

would be almost insurmountable to control. The countries of the Arab Spring collectively hold the majority of crude oil and gas deposits of the world. In the initial months of the Arab Spring, it affected the stability of the oil and gas markets and their national incomes. However, it attracted the attention of the international community. Most recently, the militants from the Niger Delta disrupted the oil production. Their agitations and grievances have never been pragmatically resolved or addressed by the government. Thereby, there is short falls on the national revenue and income from oil and gas. People are beginning to understand their rights and liberty; and therefore they are asserting their fundamental human rights. Citizens learn from the events of the Arab spring that their rights cannot be infringed by the government; hence they are now ready to fight and even to stake their lives.

More so, Nigeria should make efforts to properly manage demonstrations or social outbursts, so that the conjectured case in Egypt where the military used social demonstrators to execute a *coup d'etat* that have found them back in power may not replay itself in Nigeria. Even though AU and ECOWAS have established regulations on issues concerning military take-over of power in *coup d'etat*.Many countries of the Arab Spring share with Nigeria, littoral credentials. There is dare need to dismember any armed group that has threats of terrorism due to sheer scattered nature of the Terrorists networks. A. E. Agbogu rightly observes:

> A plausible implication of the Arab Spring is the dismantling of armed groups that employ terror tactics in their operations. Terror mercenaries displaced from Yemen, Bahrain and Libya or even those not attracting "good funds" from countries associated with state terrorism, such as Libya, Iran and Syria would utilize the poorly manned Nigeria's border with the Sahel to infiltrate into Nigeria and enhance the capacity of disaffected group or groups. It would have and perhaps it is already having grave implications for Nigeria's national security .[9]

In 2013, *This Day Newspaper* commented that corruption, Nigeria's bane, has found a comfortable home amongst the personnel of the Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta. The one combustible element in the Arab Spring is the utilisation of the youth, largely educated and

unemployed. With an approximate population of 170 million, of which about 67 million are unemployed; 80 percent of the unemployed are uneducated and tertiary institutions turning out about 4.5 million graduates without a job yearly, a copy of the Arab Spring processes will have serious implications for Nigeria. The potency of the youth population bulge in the Arab Spring underscores the grave implications for Nigeria's national security.

However, Nigeria's infant mortality rate is 88.4% while her life expectancy is 51 years and "Nigeria is ranked 27th out of 100 in the list of the most corrupt countries in the world"[10]. Nigeria Index Indicators for many years have remained negative. According to World Bank report 2016, Nigeria was ranked among the poorest nations of the world, despite the fact that Nigeria is an oil exporting country. Corruption in Nigeria pervades all strata of society such that no day passes without incidents of corruption being reported in the Daily Press. The Guardian, on April 11, 2017, reported two specific cases of corruption: namely, the SGF who spent above two hundred million naira for grass cutting and the Director General, Nigerian Intelligence Agency's link in the thirteen billion naira found in an apartment in Osborn Tower, Ikoyi, Lagos. Both have been suspended by the government while their cases are under investigations.

6.2 THE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON GAMBIA

We perceive the Gambian situation as a replica of the Arab Spring in its own right. For the situations that forced the people of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia to rise up against their leaders are alive in Gambia. That is, high unemployment rate, rising costs of living while income levels remain unacceptably low, the outcome being hunger and poverty, restrictions on the fundamental rights of citizens, seeming self-perpetuating rule and corruption. This country has never witnessed a peaceful transfer of executive power through the ballot box. The

political situation of Gambia is in complete jeopardy. Actually, President Yahya Jammeh came into power through coup d'état, and has retained office despite numerous accounts of journalist murder, rigged elections, and voter bribery, as is similar in other West African states. These situations leave citizens vulnerable to the enticements of political subversion and easy manipulation by their leaders. In fact, Gambia is among the countries that their leaders are characterised as leadership "sit-tight- zone". Jammeh as a despot perpetuated evils of every kind on his citizens.

However, J. S. Mill's political philosophy is interested in the state from the perspective of its guaranteeing a good life to the individuals, but Thomas Hobbes' notion of a state is in terms of the security and safety it provides. The Gambian President Jammeh's actions were motivated by selfish-interest and egoism. " For two centuries after him[Hobbes] self-interest seemed to most thinkers a more obvious motive than disinterestedness, and enlightened self-interest a more applicable remedy for social ills than any form of collective action".[11] Paradoxically, Hobbes emphasized that human beings without a government would be in a permanent state of insecurity, viewing war and conflict as permanent and normal conditions. Where are the semantics of governance if its negation propels eternal discomforts? With the democratic revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries, struggle for power has been replaced with struggle for recognition, thereby modifying the role of authoritarianism. Parson remarks that power in modern civil society is more like money. Hitherto, Gambian President Jammeh has in different times mishandled and subjected his citizens to Machiavellian brutality that one could easily liken his political thought of a state as one that is compatible with insecurity, conflict and war.

In retrospection, five years ago, it was unheard of for anyone to dream of going out in the street of Banjul and demand justice for an imprisoned political prisoner. One could not imagine how many Gambians disappeared or were killed by Yahya Jammeh or are

incarcerated at unknown locations and nothing came out of it? Should the present situation of Arab Spring not send signal to Yahya Jammeh that the Gambian people are ready to take back their country?   One major instance, where Solo Sandeng led a peaceful opposition march for political reform on April 14, 2016, but died in detention shortly after his arrest by state security agents, unleashing a wave of anger among many in the country who voted out Jammeh eight months later. Sandeng's death sparked protests by his party, the United Democratic Party, and is seen as a key factor in the formation of an unprecedented coalition of opposition parties that ousted Jammeh from power. Jammeh, who ruled Gambia for twenty-two years, is widely accused of human rights violations, including torture and arbitrary arrests. The former president caused weeks of political impasse by refusing to accept the result of a December 2016 presidential election which saw him lose power to Adama Barrow. After weeks of regional pressure and the threat of arrest by West African troops that had entered the Gambia, Jammeh eventually conceded defeat and went into exile in Equatorial Guinea. Barrow took power on January 19, 2017.

In 2011, Gambia's President, Yahya Jammeh, told the BBC that "I will deliver to the Gambian people and if I have to rule this country for one billion years, I will, if Allah says so, critics who accused me of winning last month's elections through intimidation and fraud could 'go to hell.'"[12] The United Kingdom has raised concerns over reports of excessive violence and ill treatment of those in custody in the Gambia on a number of occasions, Ambassador Colin Crorkin further remarks: "The United Kingdom calls on the Gambian authorities to release all political prisoners and ensure that claims of mistreatment are investigated in a credible and transparent way in line with international human rights obligations."[13]

Likewise in Tunisia, Gambian's economy is poised to be a major contributing factor to the conflict. In the Arab Spring, the issue was as much about "bad governance as it was about the

economy."[14] The EU and its member states have also played a supportive role in increasing the pressure on Jammeh and slimming down his chances of staying in power. Whether we can see this pattern reproducing elsewhere remains questionable. This is because Europe's current dominant interest in Africa does not always favour regime change. With more European governments succumbing to populist demands, cooperation with Africa is increasingly framed around reducing the number of refugees crossing the Mediterranean. The Gambia is a home with less than two million people. Yet, it accounts for around 5% of African refugees getting on a boat to Europe. Many of these people were fleeing Jammeh's despotic rule. According to R. Nisbet the state protects the individuals from the "torments, insecurities and dissensions of ordinary society".[15]The post-election turmoil further fuelled this exodus. The M. V. Aquarius search and rescue vessel operated by MSF and SOS Mediterranean picked up 183 male and 10 female migrants, thought to have originated from African countries including Nigeria, Gambia and Senegal. Barrow's return and a successful transition to democracy is a favourable outcome for [Gambia] and Europe.

There has been a lot of attention on the role of Ecowas and the AU in supporting the transition in the Gambia. We easily forget who the main driver for political change remains. It's the Gambians who overcame their fears and reclaimed their dignity by ousting a dictator. If Barrow never live up to expectations of democracy, he too is likely to face popular resistance. To this end, Rousseau like Locke and Montesquieu believes in the nobility and benevolent despots who upheld the rule of law. "Sovereignty, for Rousseau, is not a mere legal thing; it is the sum total of all virtues and even freedoms".[16]

6.3 THE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON MALI

In 2012, before the Malian crisis began, President Amadou Toumani Touré had expressed concerns about the potential danger the Libyan crisis would pose to the north of Mali and even further field. The dangers include the insurgency of Islamic militant groups, drug and

human trafficking, and the influx of weapons from Libya which belonged to the Tuareg from the north of Mali. According to C.C.Mbaegbu, "Libya after the overthrow and killing of Muammar Gaddafi, weapons proliferation, Islamic insurgency, sectarian violence, and lawlessness have been problems and the spillover has affected neighboring countries including Mali."[17] Nevertheless, President Toure's government was alarmed because of the rekindled grievances of joblessness, environmental security threats and marginalisation of the Tuareg when they returned from Libya. Other issues which led to the exacerbation of the conflict ranged from corruption, poverty, governance, porosity of the Malian borders in the North and proliferation of arms.Perhaps the 20th -century U.S. philosopher Donald Davidson philosophical principle of charity has to be applied here. This is an injunction to give others the benefit of the doubt. But to what limit could one justify an act of terrorism? The arrival of Tuareg "returnees" advanced a new rebellion that sought to declare the north of Mali as an independent state. The Tuareg, who formerly fought alongside Gaddafi, had returned to Mali following his demise. "The Tuareg had acquired skills as trained military officials and fought the government over the northern region of Mali. In the first half of 2012, Tuareg rebels and militant Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched attacks on Mali and captured the northern half of Mali."[18] Above all, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) appeared to be better equipped than their predecessors, boasting of 'the most impressive arsenal'[19] ever witnessed in the north of Mali. The transfer of arms across the Sahel belt made the Tuareg better equipped to defeat the Malian Army and conquer the North. It was these armed and well-trained MNLA (political organisation) fighters that routed the government forces in March 2012 and declared northern Mali an independent state. The January rebel attack saw high rate of death.With the defeat of Gaddafi, the Tuareg especially those from Mali were faced with a veritable dilemma, in the sense that the emerging Libya after the Arab Spring posed a threat to them. This was because the

Tuareg were seen as the forces which stabilised the rule of Gaddafi in Libya. As a result, the Tuareg became targets of Libya militias. As such, the Tuareg could no longer stay in Libya since the future was bleak; as their security was threatened. In this ensuing milieu, the Tuareg returned to Mali to fight for a separate homeland. With the turmoil and insecurity in Libya, the Tuareg were able to smuggle sophisticated military weapons into Mali through the porous borders of the country. This compounded the uncertain future of their livelihood.

Arab Spring and its dynamics pose security threats to Mali as in West African sub-region. At present Mali is a secular state but Islamic religion and organisations play vital roles in the life of the country. In 2013, jihadists including Asnar Dine and AQIM tried to introduce Sharia Law in the northern part of Mali but were stopped by the Malian army and forces from the international community during the 2012 Malian crisis. The increased violence in Mali by AQIM and Ansar Dine depicts how these fundamentalist want to declare the country a Caliphate. As a policy, the Malian state frowns at the formation of political parties along religious lines. The Tuareg, a segmented group of multiple political units originated from Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Libya, and Chad. In West Africa, they can also be found in Senegal, Nigeria and Burkina Faso. The use of the word "Tuareg" was first heard among the Arabs to denote "different groups living in the region".[20]This implies that Tuareg is the main umbrella under which other groups can be placed. The rebellion and coup have been described as "fallout" from the Arab Spring, as the success of the Tuareg rebellion where it had failed in previous efforts throughout the 20th century has been attributed largely to heavy weaponry carted out of Libya by Tuareg fighters on either side of the Libyan Civil War in 2011. Thinkers have long pondered on the moral justification of war, but modern theories of just war are little more than amendments to those set down by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. The morality of a war demands the following, the reasons for starting it and its conduct once begun; the cause of justification, with legitimate authorisation; it must be

fought for the right intentions, there must be a good probability of success, the response must be proportionate, and it must be the last resort. The military must use proportionate force and discriminate between combatants and innocent civilians.

6.4 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON WEST AFRICAN

Arab Spring was acclaimed as a social movement demanding an end to human rights violations, government corruption and poverty. Actually, Arab Spring as a global concept has brought positive and negative influences to the West Africa sub-region (as our reflection in perspective). Let us analyse the positive and negative influences of Arab Spring on the West Africa region.

6.4.1 POSITIVE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON WEST AFRICA

Herein, we shall attempt to navigate these influences towards different purviews, namely: political impact, economic change, social effect, and psychological influence. The discovery of revolution as a relevant political category is reflected and supported by political and moral philosophy. John Locke, in his *Second Treatise on Civil Government*, develops an influential defence of the right of resistance, and revolution. Perhaps, going beyond Thomas Hobbes's considerations on a subject's right to defend herself against the sovereign if her life is under threat, his social contract theory presents this protective right against stately coercion and oppression as a necessary political concretization of the individuals' inalienable natural right to life, liberty, and property. Following the same trend of discussion C. C. Mbaegbu enunciates:

> On a positive note, the North African [Arab spring] revolutions would
> usher in psychological, cultural, economic and political freedom in

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that region. Indeed the revolution would bring about economic well-being, respect for human rights and dignity, enthronement of democracy and technological advancement. [21]

Politically, Arab Spring brought about regime change. The outcome of the spring was applauded by the international community and other liberals as it ignited hopes of higher possibility for democratisation and technological advancement breakthrough in the region. The uprising would bring about respect for human rights and dignity, and political freedom and liberty in MENA region. The Arab revolution brought strong agitation or demands for liberation. The Arab citizens hitherto have enjoyed a sense of purpose and "sense of political belonging", that is to say, they experienced for the first time what it means to have a political consent; now, they have the right to choose who to govern them and to participate in politics. Again, it has fostered a necessity for constitutional reform more especially among the monarchical system of government. The Arab Spring exposed to the world the tactful evils of terrorism that emanated and were organised within the MENA region especially in Yemen and Arabia Peninsula (Saudi Arabia and Libya). It is of interest to political analysts and philosophers to make in-depth study on salient concept of political demands of the Arab world: the democratisation of Arab world and the liberalisation of Islam. All this are found in the Arab/Islam politics. It raised a political challenge for philosophers and political scientists to research further on how to curb this emergent contemporary issue. On the other side, these political influences of Arab Spring could serve also as further influences to the West African region. The African search for the sense of identity has characterised the African Thought; and this identity crisis was interpreted as part of the issues that triggered Arab Spring. The political demands of the Arab world serve as deterrents and lessons for the West African political class.

Furthermore, a key finding of this analysis is that the influence of the Arab Spring on Africa must be understood in the much larger and longer-term context of West Africa's democratic

evolution. While highly varied and at different stages of progress, democracy in the Sub-region of Africa is not starting from scratch, unlike in most of the Arab world. Considered from this broader and more heterogeneous perspective, the direct influences of the Arab Spring on West Africa's democratic development are muted. There are few linear relationships linking events in MENA to specific shifts in democratisation on the sub-region. The Arab Spring is thus serving as a trigger, rather than a driver, for further democratic reforms in the West African region. There have been protests in more than a dozen African capitals demanding greater political pluralism, transparency, and accountability following the launch of the Arab Spring. Some countries of the West Africa have explicitly referenced Arab world as a model. Likewise, a number of West African governments are so fearful of the Arab Spring's influence that they have banned mention of the term on the Internet or public media. Hence, it serves as a caution to their leaders. The democratic protests in Arab region, have influenced and shaped the debate on the future of democracy in West Africa. They are also teaching important lessons that democracy is not bestowed on but earned by its citizens. Once initiated, it is not a passive or self-perpetuating governance model, but one that requires the active engagement of citizens. Perhaps most meaningfully, then, the Arab Spring is instigating changes in expectations that West African citizens have of their governments.

However, Arab Spring has inspired thoughts which have global political importance. For instance, The *Occupy Movement*, an International protest movement that started in New York City on September 17, 2011, basically aimed at the socioeconomic inequities in human society, came at the hills of Arab Spring; in essence, it sought to globalise the essence of Arab Spring. The movement was initiated by Ad busters, a Canadian activist group, and was partly inspired by the Cairo's Tahrir Square protests, and the Spanish Indignants. The name

Occupy Movement was derived from Occupy Wall Street commonly used the slogan *we are the 99%* and was organised through websites such as "Occupy Together."

On the economical level, we re-echo Karl Marx's "economic forces" which propel all activities of men and shape the history of mankind. Besides, Marx's economic critique of capitalism focuses on the inherent contradictions of capitalism through the lens of a process which is today called dialectical materialism. In fact, Marx argues that economic forces presuppose class conflicts which inevitably lead to revolution.On another note, Arab Spring had its own influences which may be judged as positive for various regional economies such as hiking oil prices. Arab region is noted for her contribution in the world economy, especially in the area of natural resources like oil among others. The Arab League is rich in resources, with enormous oil and natural gas reserves. The region's instability has not affected its tourism industry, which is considered the fastest growing sector in the region. Western Union shows how the GCC's economy and investments in other MENA countries were affected during this period of unrest in the Arab region; and by extension some other countries of the world. Jean Claude Farah, at Western Union and MENA, says:

> Despite the uprisings, the Middle East and North Africa region is still witnessing moderate economic growth. The evolution and changes in the political and economic structures of various countries have given rise to certain opportunities. Last year, economic prospects in the entire MENA region have nevertheless improved, with the resumption of capital inflows, rising crude oil prices and the resurgence in domestic consumption. The GCC countries have been preferred destinations for recent migrants and we have started to witness an increase in Arab migrants from countries like Yemen and Egypt. The GCC countries sailed through the period of regional unrest nearly unscathed while also experiencing robust economic activity.[22]

However, the slowing down of oil production in Libya caused the increase in the global prices of oil. Thus, most West African states benefited from the increase in the oil price; which has expanded the infrastructural development in the various countries of the sub-

region.Moreover, there were notable social and cultural influences of Arab Spring on the West African region. Aristotle asserted that man is a social being who lives in the world with others. Heidegger perfected it by arguing that "*Dasein* is defined [as] mode of Being-in-the-world, in opposition to Rationalist thinkers like René Descartes who located the essence of man in our thinking abilities."[23] Man as a social animal has to interact with others in an environment of freedom, and liberty which necessitated socialisation among one another in the world. The social and cultural influences drawn from the Arab Spring breeds enabling ground to appreciate the goals and objectives of globalisation and information, communication technology (ICT). Some commentators hold that the social media was a catalyst in the Arab Spring saga. "It fanned the flames of revolutions"[24] as it shaped the environment; we salute the courage of individuals who lit the sparks. Social media aids the upcoming political demands of democratic values and desires and policies dialectics. Therefore, social media becomes soft weapon of democracy.

The media played a great role in Arab Spring. It's a new stage in revolution. New technologies gave new opportunities for people to fight for their freedom, solved different organisational and broadcasting issues. People have opportunity to communicate, share feelings, thoughts and issues. The Arab Spring brought a lot of frustrations. Social networks were real organiser services for future uprisings. They used Face book and twitter and so on to organise a lot of protests, strikes, riots, and demonstrations. Social networks gave them opportunity to unite their forces, attract attention of plenty of people. Besides, this is part of their human rights expression. "People made video and photos all the time, took memory sticks to another parts of the country to share it in Internet, and also, to upload it on YouTube."[25] Therefore, this serves as an 'eye opener' for governments in West Africa. This is because the citizens are conscious of these facts and could use them as route for protests. The psychological influences of the Arab Spring lie in its prominence in lifting up the

dampened political spirit of courage in the Arab citizenry. This is evident in the fight for freedom and other agitations for a good life. Francis Fukuyama's idea of man's struggle for recognition culminated when he opines that: "This man wants not only to be recognised by other men, but to be recognised as a man. And what constitutes man's identity as man, the most fundamental and uniquely human characteristic, is man's ability to risk his own life."[26] The protest in Tunisia has exposed that the recognition of individual political rights and liberty were possible; that extended to other Arab regions' uprisings. Thus, psychologically people were liberated from a closed mindedness out of fear of the authoritarian government and military junta. Now everyone in the West African region has come to believe that their opinions could be expressed in diversified form. In the course of our discussion above concerning some West African countries like Nigeria, Gambia and Mali, we articulated these points concerning the influences. One instance that took place in Nigeria was the reaction of workers on Independence Day celebration in Abuja; where workers agitated against the ruling government concerning their non-payment of their salaries and poor social welfare packages. This would not have been possible if not for the influence of Arab Spring.

6.4.2 NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF ARAB SPRING ON WEST AFRICA

On the contrary, it is imperative that having discussed the positive influences of the recent revolution in the Arab region, it suffices to balance the discourse by presenting the negative effects of Arab Spring. The political upheaval which occurred in the MENA region and its resulting consequences seem to challenge security locally, regionally and internationally in varying ways. The aftermath of the Arab Spring has inspired insurrection of new security threats through increased rate of arms proliferation, creation of weak state capacity, reactivation of old conflict, increase in the radicalisation of non-state actors among others.

The overthrow of leaders as a result of the Arab upheaval has created power vacuum which present a new front of instability as power strife and in some countries total degeneration of law and order persist. The power vacuum has provided fertile ground and conditions for emergence and operations of radical and violent groups in the region.

A vivid example can be given of the West Africa sub-region of the African continent. As a region which is already prone to criminal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal migrant activities, the political instability as a result of the Arab Spring has further ignited the interest of criminals and terrorists to perpetuate more of such activities in the region due to lack of effective governmental control. It has facilitated the formation of dangerous alliance between terrorist groups and drug traffickers. Drug traffickers in recent times have taken advantage of the terrorising effect that these terrorist groups have on security in countries in which they operate. They turn to finance the operations of these terrorist groups. Some of these terrorist groups apply conventional means such as robbery and extortion from humanitarian workers in order to fund their activities. The Libyan crisis for instance created chaos within the area which offered an unanticipated opportunity which served as an incentive for the emergence of the ―Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) noted for activities such as the suicide bombing against police officers and the kidnapping of humanitarian workers from Polisario refugee camp in Rabbani.

With a more diffused front, the Arab Spring has contributed to transporting the civil wars and conflicts to other countries which are away from the fulcrum of the uprisings thus creating several foci of conflict in the region. This has expanded the area of instability to some countries in West Africa. Mention can be made of countries such as Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Gambia and Nigeria among others. This has been as a result of increased movement and flow of terrorist groups and agents to countries where their activities can flourish and have further expanded their tentacles by forming affiliate groups and bonding

with other international jihadist and terrorist groups. These include Al-Qaeda affiliate groups such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram among others. Through the formation of these affiliate groups, members collaborate in their operation through the sharing of logistics and training and recruitment.

Khan attempts to analyse the economic developments in the Arab region which fell under the following: social unrest, slower global growth, and regional spill over resulted in sharp declines in gross domestic products and rising unemployment. In order to avert another round of political unrest, governments will need to balance policies to achieve macroeconomic stability and higher economic growth. There is need for aid from the International Monetary Fund and other international donors which would stabilise the economies, nevertheless, only market-oriented reforms that give a leading role to private sector will bring the necessary growth rates to generate sufficient job opportunity and improve living standards. There was decrease in economic growth recorded in 2011 remittance flows to countries in the MENA region due to the uncertainties and civil unrest triggered by the Arab Spring. Jean Claude Farah, at Western Union, asserts that "those regional economies that never had social and political unrest did not escape the negative effects of the Arab Spring. They experienced increase in oil prices, inflationary pressures and widening budget deficits as a cause of higher social spending."[27] The Arab transition countries, excluding Libya for which reliable date is as yet unavailable since the uprising began, represent about 16 percent of total MENA GDP of $2.7 trillion. These five countries were hit hard by both domestic and external shocks. Although they face dramatic political changes and widespread social unrest at home, they were simultaneously confronted with high oil prices, the European crisis, and spillover effects from their neighbors. Consequently, all the Arab Spring countries grew less than the average growth rate of the MENA region of 4.2 percent during 2011-12. Only Morocco that is

generally the best performer of the group grew at a rate just below that of the region as a whole. Two of the countries, Tunisia and Yemen in fact experienced negative growth rates in 2011.

Arab Spring led to displacement of people from their homes and also created opportunity for asylum seekers from other countries across the world. A lot of crisis has erupted due to migration cases in Libya; while Tunisia and Egypt recorded a huge number of refugees which has caused pandemonium in the form of overpopulation, health hazards and pressure on social amenities. Increased number of refugees in Libya had intention to migrate into Europe by sea.   Actually, this development was devastating, showing frustration and desperation as such, it exposes them to risk and threats of life of the refugees and the receiving states are also in danger for quite a lot of reasons. The Norwegian Refugee Council reported that "over 830,000 have been confirmed to be internally displaced due to the Arab spring."[28]

The tendency of refugees being recruited by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates could be possible whereby their lives would be at risk. No wonder, as the conflict in Libya erupted; countries in the Sahel region had to "contend with the influx of hundreds of thousands of traumatised and impoverished returnees, as well as the inflow of unspecified and unquantifiable numbers of arms and ammunition from Libya."[29] However, the number of migrants were unimaginable and incredible, UN and governments faced serious challenge of food shortages. As a result migrants appeared vulnerable as they could yield to the dictates of AQIM and cooperate with the groups' demands and will.   These situations of influx of people from other countries as refugees and migrants spill over socio-economic quagmire in the region which in turn suffers near chronic food insecurity. Consequently, the returnees of Mali were confronted with uncertainty and hardship which led to the emergence 2012 Mali crisis. Other migrants from West Africa suffered same horrible situation that brought social and political challenges to their respectable countries of origin. Notable among the countries

were: Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal and many others. The demise of Libyan leader in the course of Arab Spring affected the African continent and West Africa in particular especially in matters of economic support and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

In the past West African region was notoriously known as a home for expatriate drug lords mostly from Latin America, who perpetuate their drug transit via other parts of the globe. In 2013, UN declared West Africa a major consumer of hard drugs. This tarnished the territorial integrity of the region, due to emergence ofevidence that drug money is being used in financing the sub-regions fledgling democracy. With the political uprising in MENA and in particular the influence and the demise of Gaddafi, the drug trafficking and its related problems will most probably worsen. Since the year 2017, many migrants were repatriated from Libya back to their home countries; for instance, "many Nigerian citizens living in Libya are flown back home because of the crisis. It was reported that a plane, Boeing 727, suspected to have been loaded with about five to nine tons of cocaine crashed after the traffickers unloaded the cocaine."[30] Most of the returnees were drug traffickers. Now, their presence has high tendency of creating enabling environment for harbouring terrorists. It has been reported that some government officials from Senegal, Guinea and Guinea Bissau have been involved in drug trafficking. Notable is the fact that drug traffickers were major sources of funding for terrorism. In the case of Mali, President Amadou Toumani Toure's government was accused of their involvement in narco-trafficking. In the north of Mali, as a result of the permeable borders, Islamic militant collaborate and collude with drug trafficking. In an interview with Dr. Kwasi Anning, it was revealed that drug-trafficking is bringing serious corruption into the body politick. He indicated that drug money is used for funding politics which in turn has brought about money laundering in most countries. These are the effects of Arab revolution in West Africa, even though most of these evils may have started before this time but they are aggravated by the political chaos in MENA.

Actually, terrorism is an old phenomenon in history; besides, since the Arab Spring began, the world peace has been in shambles. The September 11, 2001, has remained in memory and saddened with tragedy. Often some commentators associate the rise of terrorism and Islamic militancy with the demise of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. The experience of the attack at World Trade Centre brought the idea of terrorism to bare. In fact, terrorism is tough reality and concept in philosophy. One thing leads to another; at the international scene, the world experienced in 20th century two World Wars; while in the beginning of the 21st century, the world experiencedwhat is today known as "September 11 attack" which took place in the United States in 2001. Ten years after the attack, another upsurge phenomenon took place in the name of Arab Spring. The velocity and acceleration in the operations of terrorists have increased since the Arab revolutions began. Many groups have emerged making it more difficult to be tackled. But the Arab Spring extended its tentacles to West Africa in this regard. Although the UN and governments made concerted efforts in curbing the menace of terrorism, the terrorist groups continue to re-strategise in their targets, tactfulness, logistics, recruitment and expansions.

On another note, "President Gaddafi appeared a strong defender against terrorism and joined the Global War on Terror (GWOT)."[31] Since the death of Gaddafi, Islamic militants affiliated to Al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) have gained foothold and established training camps in Libya and the Sahel. Training camps of Islamic militants could be found in places such as the Sirte, Mali, Sahara Desert of Mauritania, Benghazi and Sudan. It has extended its training camps to Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria, with the emergence of Boko Haram. The menace and threats posed by terrorism in West Africa today has never be imagined because of the absence of the strong "Mad dog" of Libya, Gaddafi and the uprising in Libya. The Tuareg, a terrorist group in Libya has left the country since the death of Gaddafi to Northern Mali. Tuareg inception into Mali brought in secession and usurpation in

Northern Mali. Tuareg is a combination of terrorists and Islamic militants. Indeed where is the end of the road?

Armed violence since the Arab Spring began assumed an endemic proportion in many countries that constitute the West African sub-region. The nature of the devastation that typically accompanied these conflicts plunged the sub-region into depths of despondency and stunted socio-economic and political growth. No single country within the Arab region and its neighbouring states is in absolute terms speared in the plight of this menace. The degree of this conflagration however varies within the various nation-states of the sub-region. The spill over from the Arab Spring, in particular from Libyan crisis had significant effects on the West African region, as regards the threats of proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Mirkin Barry observes that: there are "increased arms proliferation from Libyan territory to other parts of the region, especially the spread of advanced anti-aircraft rockets throughout the Sahel expanse."[32] For instance, it was after the demise of Gaddafi, that "some advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles (SA-24, SA-7) in Libya were purportedly lost."[33] The threats with SA-24 and SA-7 missiles are that, they have the capacity to bring down low-flying aircraft. The missing missiles have been reported to be in the hands of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This poses threats to the forces fighting the rebels as well as threats to civil aviation. For instance in 2011, the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched armed attacks on Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Tunisia which caused panic in the region. The AQIM were able to launch attacks because arms were easily accessible to the rebels as a result of the proliferation of arms across the Sahel and sub-Saharan region.The spill over of arms from Libya into Mali exacerbated the 2012 conflict in Mali. Also, the security of West Africa could be at stake since there could be further spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW) from Mali into neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad. The Casamance rebels of Senegal, the dissident group in Nigeria's Niger Delta and the Boko

Haram insurgency and the Tuareg militia in Mali all represent the security quagmire that plague even these nations in the sub-regions that ostensibly appear to be at peace. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel communal conflict, political instability and pose a threat, not only to regional or national security, but also to sustainable development.

Any credible discourse on security in West Africa is therefore one that broadens the concept to embody economic development. Former World Bank President, Robert McNamara in his remark buttresses this argument thus:

> In a modernising society, security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it: Security is development and, without development there can be no security. A developing nation that does not in fact develop, simply cannot remain secure for the intractable reason that its citizenry cannot shed its human nature.[34]

McNamara's position appears to conform to the experience in West Africa where all forms of violence from street side banditry to international wars belie an economic expression. The resultant threats of proliferation of small Arms and light weapons at the fallout of the Arab Spring on the West African sub-region were in the form of further insurgency, terrorism, kidnapping, subversion, religious crisis, economic crisis, insecurity, revolts, ethnic tensions, communal conflicts, , micro nationalism, , privatisation of security, riots, militancy, sabotage, electoral violence, crime, political violence, poverty, porous borders, social agitations, insurrection , mass unemployment, and cross border smuggling, among others.On December 1999, the ECOWAS member states adopted a code of conduct for implementation of the Moratorium. The Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) was established with assistance from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Nigerian government has also entered into bilateral cooperation with its neighbours, Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. They have taken a number of

measures to boost cross-border cooperation and enhance security at the borders. These measures include the establishment of joint commissions like Chad-Nigeria Joint Commission, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission, Benin-Nigeria Joint Commission, Cameroon-Nigeria Joint Commission, Lake Chad Basin Commission and joint border patrols between Nigeria and Republic of Benin. Nigeria is a signatory to a number of international measures to curb SALW proliferation. It supported the adoption in 2005 of the international instrument to enable states to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons, and argues that political document needs to be transformed into a legally binding instrument in order to control effectively and criminalise the illicit movement of SALW. At the regional level, Nigeria has supported ECOWAS measures aimed at reducing the proliferation of SALW. "At the global level, Nigeria is a signatory to the United Nations (UN) Firearms Protocol on November 13, 2001; which it ratified on July 15, 2004".[35] At this juncture, it is important to make appraisal and conclude the dissertation.

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35. J. M. Hazen, and J. Horner, "Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective" *The Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper* (2007), p. 20.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

7.1 EVALUATION

Having gone this far in exposing the concepts of our discourse, implications of Mill's on Liberty on Arab Spring, it is therefore pertinent to critically appraise the entire dissertation. Mill rejects the concepts of the natural rights and social contract, in which people agree to be a part of society and recognise that society can offer certain forms of protection while asking for certain forms of obligations. He suggests that because society offers protection, people are obliged to behave in a certain way, and each member of society must defend and protect society and all its members from harm. In brief, society must be given power to curtail behaviour that harms others, and nothing more or less.

However, philosophers like John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau popularised the conception of the individual as having certain natural rights that could not be denied by society, rights that Thomas Jefferson spoke of in the Declaration of Independence as unalienable and that were embodied in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Rousseau especially thought of them as the rights possessed by people living in a state of nature and not surrendered, only modified, in the social contract by which they agreed to live together in society.[1]

The theory of natural right is rationalistic in its method, individualistic in its foundations, universal in its scope, and hypercritical in its politics. It draws these elements together in its regard for reason as the touchstone of individual dignity and in its refusal to countenance support for political arrangements that denigrate the rationality or insult the dignity of the ordinary person. It is, as this formulation suggests, a fundamentally egalitarian theory, refusing to accept that there are different ranks of person, refusing indeed to recognise anything other than general utility as a ground for empowering some at the expense of others. It may not be a theory that calls for equality in the sense of economic leveling – it imagines that ordinary people, left to their own devices, may use their freedom in various ways with varying degrees of success – but itis committed to a fundamental leveling so far as politics is

concerned. The popular sovereignty embodied in social contract theory, together with the universal suffrage that increasingly became the demand of political liberals in the nineteenth century, represent the natural tendency of this sort of egalitarianism. We are so familiar with this – at least as doctrine – that it is difficult for us to grasp how incendiary the natural equality idea seemed at the end of the eighteenth century as a premise on which to build a theory of government.

By the same token, natural right is an emancipatory theory: it regards freedom, choice, and self-determination as the natural condition of human beings and the customs and structures that hobble individual liberty as aberrations. While some critics of natural rights, such as Edmund Burke, attacked it for its excessive rationalism, others, like Bentham, saw natural right as an attack on reason. The discourse of natural rights, said Bentham, is just "so much flat assertion," for it "lays down as a fundamental and inviolable principle whatever is in dispute."[2] Mill writes in *On Liberty* that he prefers to bypass natural right and deal directly:

> It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.[3]

One could phrase the conclusions of an argument like that of *On Liberty* in the language of rights, but "as I said at the beginning of Section 2, the theory of natural right was about premises, not just conclusions."[4] Mill wanted to make it clear that he did not need natural right premises even for what appeared to be an argument for individual rights. The very considerable success of the utilitarians in pursuing a sometimes quite radical agenda in this form helped reinforce the impression among progressive thinkers that natural right was not only a dangerous associate, but an unnecessary one.

Besides, something similar was true of radical democrats. In principle, the demand for democracy could be phrased in terms of natural right. Democracy is a credible expression of

fundamental equality and of respect for individual thought and liberty in the circumstances of collective decision. The idea of distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term 'liberty' goes back at least to Kant, and was examined and defended in depth by Isaiah Berlin.For Berlin, negative and positive liberty are rivals, incompatible interpretations of a single political ideal. Political liberalism tends to presuppose a negative definition of liberty: liberals generally claim that if one favours individual liberty one should place strong limitations on the activities of the state. Critics of liberalism often contest this implication by contesting the negative definition of liberty: they argue that the pursuit of liberty understood as self-realisation or as self-determination (whether of the individual or of the collectivity) can require state intervention of a kind not normally allowed by liberals.

However, Berlin writes that the main purpose of Mill's on Liberty was to defend the idea of negative liberty. However, B. Barry contended that though Mill understood liberty as absence of restraints, self-mastery that involves the exercise of choice, besides, he (Mill) advanced the notion of positive liberty in which he recognised and valued choice and individuality as ends in themselves even though they did not promote general happiness.[5]However, the theorists of negative liberty are primarily interested in the degree to which individuals or groups suffer interference from external bodies, theorists of positive liberty are more attentive to the internal factors affecting the degree to which individuals or groups act autonomously. Can individuals or groups achieve positive liberty through political action? Is it possible for the state to promote the positive liberty of citizens on their behalf? And if so, is it desirable for the state to do so? Theorists in the classical liberal tradition, like Constant, Humboldt, Spencer and Mill, are typically classed as answering 'no' and therefore as defending a negative concept of political freedom; theorists that are critical of this tradition, like Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and T.H. Green, are typically classed as answering 'yes' and as defending a positive concept of political liberty.

Nevertheless, in its political form, positive freedom has often been thought of as necessarily achieved through a collectivity. Rousseau's theory of freedom, according to which individual freedom is achieved through participation in the process whereby one's community exercises collective control over its own affairs in accordance with the 'general will'. Put in the simplest terms, one might say that a democratic society is a free society because it is a self-determined society, and that a member of that society is free to the extent that he or she participates in its democratic process.

In fact, many thinkers, theorists and political philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, De Tocqueville, Jefferson, Burke, Paine, Adam Smith, Bentham, Spencer, Isaiah Berlin, M. Friedman and J.S. Mill shared the same view on the concept of liberty. J.S. Mill supports the negative concept of liberty and at the same time with the positive view of the state. Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one's life and realise one's fundamental purposes. While negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive liberty is sometimes attributed to collectivities, or to individuals considered primarily as members of given collectivities.

Consequently, J.S. Mill argues that liberty of the individual ought to be protected against interferences of democratic states. Therefore, Mill was not comfortable of the restraints of the democratic state and society on the liberty of the individual. This made him to come up with the assumption that there were duo sphere of action of the individual, namely: self-regarding and others regarding. In self-regarding neither the state nor the society or any member could interfere with the individual action. This implies that everyone must have the liberty to do whatever pleases him. Intervention occurs when they is infringement on the part of the individual. However, any contrary to this position is tantamount to losing of opportunity of

choice which is fundamental for the development of the personality; however this could cause the danger of either majority or minority or a dictator. Mill in a resume enlists the essential liberties of the individual as liberty of thought and expression, belief, faith and worship and liberty of forming associations having any trade or profession.

Furthermore, Mill's views have attracted criticisms from many scholars. Ernest Barker in criticising Mill argues "that Mill separated the inseparable." Barker further stated that "The conduct of any man is a single whole and there can be nothing in it that concerns himself only and not others." [6] In other words, man is not an island. He must exist with others in his dealings. Another pitfalls Barker pointed out is that "Mill failed to separate the separable. We cannot separate two different compartments of individual conduct, but we can separate the sphere of society from that of the state. The state acts by the method of compulsory enforcement but society acts by the method of free cooperation."[7] Actually, Barker ignored a point and that is the tension that emerged in Mill which was unavoidable consequence of the tendency to create a realistic political theory which attempted to extend the frontiers of liberty as much as possible. Patrick Delvin differs from Mill, in the sense that harm to individual directly is harm to society indirectly, for instance, sexual immorality. Since the society is a moral agent, it holds the entire community together by a shared morality. Therefore, any cause for destruction of any kind weakens and harms the bonds of society. Delvin faults Mill by saying that the condition at which an individual needs the community for his development entails that his freedom has no meaning without others in society. Hence, "society is a continuous partnership"[8] with the individual.

Moreover, many scholars point out two other difficulties in the views of Mill. First, there should not be any line of demarcation between the interests of an individual and those of the society. As a liberal, Mill accepts the assumption of the individual as an isolated being; but this position does not countenance the logic of social theory in relation to the view of man

and society. Pragmatically, it becomes difficult to separate the person and social sphere of man. Secondly, the other difficulty is a moral one. For Mill, the individual is totally free to do as he wants or wishes. This implies that man is free to drink, eat whatever he likes, gamble, take drugs, view or read pornographic literature or movie, and commit suicide due to the fact that they are his personal concern. This position weakens the Mill's postulation and puts the entire idea in a state of jeopardy. Little wonder then, Barker nick name Mill as a "prophet of empty liberty."[9]

Nonetheless, the import Mill has made in his liberty project needs not be over emphasized. The importance of his idea of individual liberty is found in the projection of the individual social and political progress. Mill made great stride in his contention that social and political progress depends on the originality, vitality of the individual and his free choice. Personal liberty is of supreme importance in the complete development of the beingness of the individual. In essence, the individual needs encouragement as to be able to assert himself in his own particularity. Any missing link therein, finds the thought of Mill on the general progress of the society impossible. Mill rejected state education as it kills originality by its framework of forming people alike. He rightly and objectively asserted "that democracy may transform itself into the tyranny of the majority over the minority." [10]

Mill 's on Liberty expounds his concept of individual liberty within the context of his ideas on history and the state; which depends on the idea that society progresses from lower to higher stages and that this progress culminates in the emergence of a system of representative democracy. It is within the context of this form of government that Mill envisions the growth and development of liberty. Liberty is essential to ensure subsequent progress, both of the individual and society, particularly when society becomes more important than the state. This state of affairs would be attained in a representative democracy in which the opposition between the rulers and the ruled disappears, in that the rulers only represent the interests of

the ruled. Such a democracy would make the liberty of the individual possible, but it would not guarantee it. Social progress can only take place if limits are placed on individual liberty, but it also necessitates the freeing of the individual from such limits.

Mill sidesteps this dilemma by delving into moral theory, where the only important thing is the happiness of the individual, and such happiness may only be attained in a civilised society, in which people are free to engage in their own interests, with all their skills and capabilities, which they have developed and honed in a good system of education.Jeremy Waldron was interested in Mill's concerned with individual liberty, not with the liberty of groups, and that even vulnerable and oppressed subcultures can threaten individual liberty. As he puts it, "If there is any support in his [Mill's] work for cultural diversity, it is an aspect of *individual* liberty, and he would be uncomfortable about any application of his theory which permitted oppression in the name of a tolerated culture, sect, or creed"[11] . The only difference between oppression by the state or majority opinion (which is the only kind that Mill directly addresses) and the abuses of multiculturalism "is that the criteria of being 'irreligious or immoral' (or culturally inauthentic) are given now by an array of disparate cultural groups and by an overarching ethos intended to deflect or dissuade us from any genuine engagement between them"[12]

Stephen recognises liberty to be an instrumental value, not a value in and of itself; and the ultimate value that liberty principally serves is the well-being of society. It is rather, as Stephen would see it, an admission that liberty, along with all of the other social elements of human life, has its advantages and disadvantages; and, if we are primarily concerned with the well-being of society, then we should not blindly support any given liberty in those circumstances in which its disadvantages outweigh its advantages. Stephen opines that:

> The human condition is too complicated for Mill's "simple principle
> of liberty" which holds that coercion is justified only to prevent harm
> to others; the distinction that provides the ground for Mill's principle

of liberty, the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions, cannot be articulated in a clear-cut fashion; Mill's principle of liberty is at loggerheads with his utilitarianism; Mill's principle of liberty requires the absence of almost all restraint in human affairs, a circumstance that will lead to idleness and wretchedness, and not the self-development that Mill imagines.[13]

In comparism between Stephen and Mill concerning the subject-matter, one could decipher the former as standing for liberty while the later stands for licence; furthermore Stephen stands for equality under law and Mill stands for a morose egalitarianism. Again, Stephen stands for a sober understanding of the conflicts in human affairs and Mill for a great illusion. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes liberty as licence from liberty as independence. "A person has liberty in the sense of licence to the degree that she may do as she wishes, without legal or social constraint while independent insofar as she is treated a distinct person of equal worth. These two are justifiable foundation for liberalism."[14] Human nature needs the opportunity to flourish without interference, to which successful ideas are the natural reward; with flawed and ugly occurrences, like racism, dying-out due to an overriding rationality. Here, Mill is certainly optimistic about humanity's capacity to be 'rational'. As 'rationality' is subjective, other thinkers argue for involvement to prohibit abhorrent practices. Swift indicates "freedom is one value among many" [15], and Mill's single-mindedness neglects the wider idea that society should direct its citizens toward a paradigm. Marx believes that people, outside of society, do not exist as individuals; famously declaring: "Working men of all countries unite!"[16] However, Mill argues that people should at least have the choice to be irrational; individuality being paramount. One entity imposing 'what is best for individuals' freedoms' is actually antithetical to its self-declared purpose; and, echoed by Swift, would contribute to a "totalitarian state."[17]Using the policy example of de-criminalising homosexuality, regardless of his personal approval or disapproval, according to his Liberty Principle, Mill would have been wholeheartedly in favour. Some, particularly of religion, may brand it as an amoral act, and would support its illegality; despite it not explicitly affecting them.

Nevertheless, as it inflicts no harm, other entities have no right to physically tyrannise such minorities. Interestingly, also legitimated by Mill, are homophobia and other types of hate speech. Therefore, to prevent majority dictating to a minority, or vice versa, Mill has no particular opinion on any specific issues; other than the individual can do as he pleases, so long as no physical harm is realised. Importantly, Singer states "In matters concerning only myself, morality is not involved"[18]; therefore, two practices that are hostile to each other can survive due to Mill's principle: homosexuals would be aggrieved at homophobia, and homophobes would be aggrieved at homosexuals kissing. However, for Mill, as offence does not equate to 'harm', both practices persist.

Initially, Mill's on Liberty seems like a conflict between individualists and interventionists, of which it is then simply a matter of seeing both sides of the issue; however there is more to this excerpt than that. For all Mill's rhetoric of allowing the individual to prosper, he neglects to recognise any societal edge to the question. Identifying the individual as supreme is too logical a thing and, as Woody Allen's character in 'Love and Death' declares, "the world is not logical."[19] Things like harm are far from clear-cut, and our actions go wider than our own bodies; whether on ecology or other peoples' psychologies. Stephen argues that "the attempt to distinguish between self-regarding acts and acts which regard others is like an attempt to distinguish between acts which happen in time and acts which happen in space"[20] ; and, this, Stephen argues that Mill jejunely glosses over. For all the imperfections, it is important to consider that Mill's 'the individual as sovereign' has crystallised into an ideal that Western civilisation fundamentally subscribes to. As Kendall alluded to, however, it is Mill's understanding of society that requires adjustment.

On Liberty featured themes, of which toleration is a recurring one. Mill suggests that Muslims must tolerate non-Muslims eating pork; the Spanish must tolerate non-Catholics living in Spain; and the Puritans must tolerate the public and private amusements of their

fellow citizens. "Neither the intensity of the distress, nor the number of people who share it seems to affect the conclusion that it is illegitimate for the majority to impose its values on the rest of society."[21]The history of political philosophy can fruitfully be looked at in terms of the question, 'who should rule?' Plato, Thomas Hobbes, even most political theorists up to John Locke, argue that individuals or special groups should rule; Locke on the other hand, gives powerful arguments in favour of the rule 'by the people', where this is interpreted as rule by the majority. Thus, Mill, like Locke, believes that the majority should rule because on the whole, they will be less threatening to the freedom of mankind than any single ruler or group; but even within democracy, checks must be put upon the rule of the majority to safeguard personal liberty. For no government can be a democracy without allowing for the protection of minorities. And here, once more Mill championed the cause of the individual liberty by emphasizing the above point.

A good society will pursue other goals apart from the promotion of each person's individuality. But the ideal of individuality guides the manner in which these other goals are to be reached. The framework of political life is set by this ideal, and the pursuit of other goals is to be carried out within this framework. Mill's liberalism does not seek to provide solutions to every contemporary political problem. Mill defends individual liberties by appeal to deliberative values; he can distinguish the importance of different liberties in terms of their role in practical deliberation. A central part of practical deliberation is forming ideals and regulating one's actions and plans in accordance with these ideals. But some liberties seem more central than others to the selection of personal ideals. For instance, it seems plausible that liberties of speech, association, worship, and choice of profession are more important than liberties to drive in either direction on streets designated as one-way, liberties not to wear seat belts. If so, Millian principles arguably defend rights to certain *basic liberties*, rather than a right to liberty per se. If so, Mill's liberalism should not be confused with

traditional libertarianism, which does recognise a right to liberty per se. Second, even the exercise of basic liberties is limited by the harm principle, which justifies restricting liberty to engage in actions that cause harm or threaten imminent harm to others.

John Locke set down the main elements of democracy, such as government by promulgated law, the doctrine of 'natural rights' and most important of all, the rule by the majority of the people. Mill added to this framework the proviso that the minority must be protected against possible tyranny by the majority. Since Mill did not accept the doctrine of natural rights, he attempted to justify limitations on the power of the majority on utilitarian grounds. Roughly, his argument is that interference in personal matters will, in the long run, prove harmful to a modern democratic society. The development of individual initiative will be prevented if the likes and dislikes of the majority are allowed to become so powerful that they act as unwritten laws. This doctrine, since the publication of the essay On Liberty has been accepted by most democratic theorists; but it has also been attacked by many critics on the grounds that it is impossible to put into practice.

Mill held that the majority could legitimately interfere in the affairs of the minority only when minority behaviour proved harmful to the fabrics of the society. But this raises the difficult problem: how can we tell when such behaviour will or will not be harmful to the society? Ultimately, these critics assert, the choice will rest with a majority decision, expressed through the framing of laws by an elected legislature. Thus, in the last analysis, minority safeguards will always crumble under attack by the majority. From a standpoint of realistic politics, the minority is only as safe as the majority will let them be; and if so, there is no area of human conduct which is (or even ought to be) immune from such interference.Had Mill lived to answer this objection, he might have agreed with it in part. If the majority feels that an individual or a group of individuals is behaving in a way harmful to society, it can pass laws which will restrict such behaviour. Mill does not mean to deny the

rightful authority of the majority in a modern democratic society. For example, it is necessary for the protection of the majority that we pass laws against the sale of adulterated drugs and food. But even in such cases, he would argue, the burden of proof is upon the majority to show that their interference is legitimate. They cannot justly interfere simply because they do not approve of an individual's conduct; they must show further that it is harmful to the society. If this cannot be shown, the minority ought to be allowed to behave as it wishes. In practical terms, what Mill's philosophy reduces to is that in any legal issue between an individual and the state , the burden of proof for showing that an individual's behaviour is undesirable, always rests upon the state, not upon the individual. This assumption, once accepted, (as it has been in the Great Britain and the United States of America), for example, will provide the individual with considerable security against majority interference, even if it does not guarantee him complete immunity. On the contrary, Montesquieu observes that: "Political liberty," is the tranquility of mind that results from the conviction that everybody has his security; but this liberty is not a liberty to do what one wants to do. In essence, Montesquieu's political liberty is "the exercise of one's will or the opinion that one exercises onone's will."[22]

More so, Mill advocates for representative democracy under which the individual liberty will developed fully. If Mill had lived to witness the historical, epoch-making events of the Arab Spring and its attendants social, economic, cultural and ideological transformation which are taking place in the region, hitherto, has shown clearly that citizens are dissatisfied with the monarchical and authoritarian regime, but are clamouring for a system that ensures their freedom, rights, justice, his answer might be to their interest and favour. Rex Brynen et al. writing on the political situation of Arab region argue that:

> There is little doubt that the upheavals marked a historic transformation in the political directions of the region. Authoritarian regimes that once seemed unchallengeable had been challenged and many of them found to be much less formidable than their citizens

once feared. Dictators who once seemed to assume a lifetime hold on power had found themselves in exile, on trial, or dead at the hands of victorious rebels. Corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and injustice had been the targets of mass protests. [23]

The general believe about "Arab Spring" is that it was caused by the way and manner by which leaders ran the administrative affairs of governments. The antecedents that led to the protests, were generally inequality of income, authoritarianism, violations of inalienable rights of citizens, economic hardship, unemployment, acute poverty, political mismanagement, nepotism and a number of demographic structural problems and many more.

Basically, Berlin would see the lack of civic engagement as a betrayal of liberty. "The betrayal of liberty is not only through authoritarian regimes,"[24] he says. Remin Jahanbegloo asserts,

> What the Arab Spring teaches us is, although we have democracies in the west, we need to democratize those democracies. And the only way to do that is through civic intervention. The financial crisis that is still going on, pushing people toward poverty, it's mainly because we are talking about the failure of liberal states that somehow betrayed their own principles.[25]

Michael Ignatieff observes that "Economic progress is dependent on equality of opportunity, and Berlin was a very strong egalitarian in that sense."[26] For the revolution to take hold in the Middle East and North Africa, the civic actors involved will have to become politically engaged, organising their democracy and defining their future. Mark Kingwell notes that while democracy is "breaking out all over, democracy closer to home seems increasingly pathological and dysfunctional and one of the ways in which that is obviously true is the dominance of democracy by the moneyed interests."[27]

The history of liberty in the later middle Ages is that of numerous corporate groups, such as guilds of artisans and merchants, winning immunity from external control. By agreements with their feudal overlords these groups obtained release from certain feudal dues and bonds,

gaining a limited freedom to carry on trade and manufacture, which formed the nucleus of the liberties extended to the bourgeoisie in the 19th century. The acquired nature of rights - their dependence on conditions of time and place - also makes them peculiarly subject to danger of loss. Liberties have had to be defended against encroachment, and sometimes populations have had their liberties curtailed. In times of national danger some rights may be suspended, as was the right of habeas corpus by President Abraham Lincoln in the American Civil War, and the struggle for rights not yet acquired.

The idea of equality, emphasized by the philosophers of the French Revolution, came to be closely associated with the idea of liberty in democratic societies—not equality based on a supposed equality of ability but equality of opportunity. Therefore it was proposed that the state should seek to equalise as far as possible the conditions in such areas as education, health, and housing, thereby establishing economic and social security, and freedom from want and fear, so that every individual might have equal opportunity for self-realisation. The right of national groups to be independent and sovereign has also come to be regarded as a principle of liberty. Since 1945, more than 50 former colonial areas have become independent states. The UN Commission on Human Rights has sought to promote the extension of political and cultural liberty throughout the world through treaties and covenants, the most important of which has been the Declaration of Human Rights.

Based on Mill's postulation of his type of government- Representative democracy an antithetical to the type of government ran in the Arab region, many scholars have criticised the entire events of the revolutions. But the major aspect of our interest herein is the type of political system of government that are being practised in the Arab region and consequently, the individual that had suffered many negligence and abuses concerning his liberty and rights. Many political philosophers are in support of democracy for several reasons. Since antiquity, monarchy and the like has contrasted with forms of democracy. The Divine Right of Kings,

were often criticised during the Age of Enlightenment, which notably paved the way to the French Revolution and the proclamation of the abolition of the monarchy in France. Earlier, the American Revolution had seen the Patriots suppress the Loyalists and expel all royal officials. The twentieth century, beginning with the February 1917 Revolution in Russia and accelerated by two world wars, saw many European countries replace their monarchies by republics, while others replaced their absolute monarchy with constitutional monarchy. Some countries that still practise absolute monarchies are Brunei, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, and the United Arab Emirates among others.

Traditionally and in most cases, the monarch's post is inherited and lasts until death, but there are also "elective monarchies where the monarch is elected."[28] Each of these has variations: in some elected monarchies only those of certain pedigrees are, whereas many hereditary monarchies impose requirements regarding religion, age, gender, mental capacity, etc. Aristotle asserts: "Men think that what is just is equal; and that equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he pleases, or in the words of Euripides, 'according to his fancy.' But this is all wrong." [29] In support of him, John Adams writes that "democracy soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide."[30] We are in the Information Age, yet we live in a time of mass disorientation. Stress and depression are said to be at record levels. Archbishop Charles Chaput recently notes that "at least a quarter of millennials are disaffected. Posts about various socio-political ideas float around the blogosphere, all promising answers. Whatever their defects, they all recognise the same truth: something is wrong."[31] The gist of Arab Spring lies in the control of affairs of the countries of Arab world which is in the hands of the monarchs. Hitherto, the challenge of the spring draws strength in the aggressiveness of the poor people who were misled by their

governments. The causes of the spring are known already (as written above) but the major focus on the mess was on the absolute monarchs.

Some critics held the position that under monarchy, you must only convince *one;* under democracy, you must convince *millions.* Complete equality will never come, we are limited by biology, time, space, and providence, but a monarch can push back against unbridled oligarchs. Democracy replaces an objective *person* with a subjective *system.* Democracy requires not just pluralism but also indifferentism. In practice, the burden of proof is put on traditionalists, rather than the change agents. An ancient Greek historian, Polybius states that there are three forms of government in our world: monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; each form of government has positive and negative points. In the beginning, man was uncivilised and barbarous. He was not at all disciplined. Therefore, monarchy was the only form of government which could make the people disciplined and law- abiding. In absolute monarchy the property is protected, industries are encouraged and art is developed. The monarch is like the parent of his subjects. Hobbes has also supported this view. India's unity was strengthened and she attained all-sided development during the regimes of Chandra Gupta Maurya, Ashoka and so on. Frederick the Great in Prussia (Germany), Napoleon Bonaparte in France, and Peter the Great and Catherine in Russia rendered valuable services in the development of their subjects. In monarchy, the supreme power of the state is in the hands of a single individual and he can take prompt decisions after consulting   ministers during emergency. A wise monarch can prove a successful leader during war and can protect the country from the aggressor. For example, Chandra Gupta Maurya protected India from Seleucus' invasion.

On the contrary, some political philosophers and theorists think that the kind of government ran in the Arab region might lead to poor leadership.J.S. Mill has rightly said, "despotism is a legitimate mode of government for dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their

improvement and the means; be justified by actually affecting that end".[32]   In such government, a single person rules the entire country as long as he or she lives. It does not allow democratic legitimacy. It lacks democratic accountability and liability.The ruler is recognised as a supreme legislator, judicator and executor. Its structure is very difficult to change internally.In the event that the ruler becomes irresponsible and ineffective, it can be quite difficult for the people to force out or replace him/her with another they think is more effective. Power corrupts, but absolute power corrupts absolutely. Often, rulers of this kind might degrade themselves and exploit the people, bringing into the administration tyranny. However, some countries that are still under monarchy like the UK, Andorra, Belgium, Cambodia, Bhutan, Denmark, Brunei, Luxembourg, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Jordan, Japan, Monaco and Malaysia as we can see, these countries have managed to become successful under monarchy. These countries practise constitutional monarchy. But the Arab region are practising absolute monarchy; based in the aforementioned disadvantages of this kind of government and the consequences as discussed above which has caused the rampage and uprising among the MENA, most especially, that which has to do with the liberty and rights of the people, therefore we suggest for a change of political system of government which the citizens already are clamouring for.

Consequently, J.S. Mill proffers a solution: (propositional) representative democracy. The interest of Mill is in safeguarding individual liberty; hence, a democratic government appears a better option for safeguarding liberty. This view of Mill has been criticised by some scholars. The critics believe that there is no liberty under a dictatorship and liberty is possible in a democratic government, but there are certain tendencies in democratic state which are a menace to liberty. For instance, in the name of welfare state, democratic governments rapidly extend their functions which increase the power of the state that now prove inconsistent to the liberty of the individual. Again, when there is increase in the functions of

the state, laws have to be passed dealing with those functions. Thus, the existence of many laws and their enforcement by the government result in the proportionate loss of individual liberty. Also, tyranny of the majority is another danger of liberty. "The refusal of government to respond to public opinion causes great harm to liberty."[33]

Marx states that "the key to freedom lies in a rational system of production which can provide the means of such satisfaction and development."[34] Again, Engels is of the opinion "that only the socialisation of the means of production can help society to tide over the crisis and usher in new era of freedom."[35] What accounts for this variation in the intensity of the Arab uprising across the countries of the Middle East? Why did some regimes experience massive and destabilising unrest, while others experienced only demonstrations and sporadic protests? However, this situation was described by the poet Lamartine as a "revolution of contempt" [36] against a fairly sordid example of kleptocapitalism. Perhaps, liberal democracy is beginning to gain support across the globe so that the prediction of Francis Fukuyama appears indubitable, that liberal democracy will become the end of history, as to say that there would be no further antithesis and synthesis (going by the Hegelian Historical Dialectics) even while he is still alive. But to upshot this dilemma, we must come to terms with the situation by going to the drawing board to make our conclusion.

7.2 CONCLUSION

Mill's work is of enduring interest because it reflects how a fine mind struggles with and attempts to synthesise important intellectual and cultural movements. He stands at the intersections of conflicts between enlightenment and romanticism, liberalism and conservatism, and historicism and rationalism. In each case, as someone interested in

conversation rather than pronouncement, he makes sincere efforts to move beyond polemic into sustained and thoughtful analysis. The analysis produces challenging answers to problems that still remain. Whether or not one agrees with his answers, Mill serves as a model for thinking about human problems in a serious and civilised way.

For Mill government is not a matter of natural rights or social contract, as in many forms of liberalism. Forms of government are, rather, to be judged according to "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interest of man as a progressive being."[37] By this he means that forms of government are to be evaluated in terms of their capacity to enable each person to exercise and develop in his or her own way their capacities for higher forms of human happiness. Such development will be an end for each individual, but also a means for society as whole to develop and to make life better for all.

Given the centrality of self-development, Mill argues that liberty is the fundamental human right. "The sole end," he proposes, "for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection."[38] This will enable each to seek his or her own best; it will liberate a diversity of interests to the benefit of the individual and of all; and it will nurture moral liberty and rationality. Mill's *On Liberty* remains the strongest and most eloquent defence of liberalism that we have. He argues in particular for freedom of thought and discussion. "We can never be sure," he writes, "that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion, and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still."[39]   The best sort of person is one who individually is responsible for his or her beliefs and actions. Democracy and representative government also contribute to the development of the individual, for much the same reason that free speech so contributes, and so these too are social institutions that are justified on utilitarian grounds. On Liberty of Mill is still current and contemporary with the of Arab Spring panorama. The Arab region satisfies the first requirement of Mill, that is,

representative democracy was only possible in small and homogenous states. Mill's on Liberty addresses the Arab Spring's social and political stance. The liberty principle of Mill is antithetical to the tenets of monarchism and its attendants 'absolutism' and 'authoritarianism'. This is evident in Mill's theories of representative democracy and individuality. He suggests proportional representative government (under democracy) as the best political system that is enshrined with values and ideals that aid in the development of the individual and as such ushers in development in the society. Mill regards "representative democracy as vital for progress and the promotion of virtue, intelligence and excellence."[40] He further asserts: "Democracy was good because it made people happier and better."[41] Mill suggests conditions for representative democracy: a government that functions with citizens of "active, self-helping character". He underscores the situation where citizens live in passivity; primarily, de facto backwardness of civilisations negates the possibility of such type of government. This is one of the major reasons of the nonexistence of democracy in the Arab world.

Next, it is necessary for citizens to show their readiness, ability, and willingness to preserve institutions of representative democracy. Although Mill is an advocate of liberal democracy, but the present political stance of the Arab world has no *locus operandi.* Therefore, Mill recommends education of citizens under the control of the state. This will provide "an efficient forum for conducting the collective affairs of the community."[42] However, Mill emphatically argues that equal voting rights, universal suffrage, democracy, and liberty were conditionally good environment for a better society. On the contrary, Arab Spring was triggered by lack of all these fundamentals. From the forgoing, one would decipher the line of thought of Mill regarding liberating the Arab region from the political jinx. Notably, Mill does not proffer liberal democracy to Arab world as a solution as he remarks: "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to

read, write, I will add, perform the operations of arithmetic."[43] Monarchy as a system of government, by implication rejects political participation of the citizens. Mill believes that political participation is necessary for the development of intellectual qualities of reason and judgment. Therefore, "Civil participation enhances autonomy and altruism: autonomy from self-government; altruism from judging the interests of the community."[44] Moreover, it is imperative to note that political action enables a participant to attain moral maturity which exposes one to political obligation. According to Mill "participation maximizes responsibility."[45] Liberty becomes a *conditiosine qua non* for participation in the political system of government in a state. The feeling of belonging to a community could only come about if all were granted the right to political participation. Mill advocates for representative democracy as a device to protect the rights of the minorities, thereby, granting them an opportunity to share power. He underpins the relationship which exists between law and liberty; in other words law as an organised system maximises liberty in self-development.

In on *Liberty* Mill offers the classic defence of individual liberty against the potential abuse of the 'tyranny of the majority' to prevent this tyranny, he sets out *principle of liberty*. Mill regards the protection of individual liberty to be a necessary condition for the development of a human being in addition he presents four specific grounds for the workability of principle of liberty:first, the individual should be in charge of his affairs, the reason being that the individual is the most interested in his well-being and being more knowledgeable about his situation and values than others; secondly, the individual is not accountable to others for self-respect or self-development since it is not "for the good of mankind that [the individual] be held accountable"; thirdly, society should attempt to make people capable of rational conduct while they are children, not after they are adults; fourth, when the public does interfere with personal conduct, "the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place." Mill develops Voltaire's defence of free speech and tolerance in his famous

dictum: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."[46] He championed the right to express one's opinion. Mill was the only philosopher who laid serious emphasis and importance on both family and state in terms of fairness, equality and independence. Therefore, he approves welfarism and the doctrine of common good in the ambit of liberalism. The welfare and other social–political needs of the Arab citizens were not met by the government; thereby triggering Arab Spring. Mill asserts that the conception of good life remains more important than the pursuit of pleasure. Following the spirit of optimism of the Enlightenment era, he supports the notion of progressive advancement of human civilisation. No wonder then, Mill, a critic of the complacency and conventions of Victorian English society crystallised his thoughts in On Liberty, Representative government and The Subjection of Women.

Mill accepts the Industrial Revolution because of its resultant effects on the citizens and reformatory impacts on the political system; in the same way he would accept Arab revolution due to its outcome: the toppling of leaders and monarchs whose leadership characteristics were benchmarked as *sit-tight-zone;* who have no regard for liberty and individual rights. Mill was not comfortable with the destruction unleashed by the French Revolution, but he was appreciative of the decimation of the monarchy and nobility. Mill saw transitional period as a special assignment to the intellectual elites to articulate ways of reshaping and making attitudes and beliefs in a society. He insists that political institutions must correlate with society. As we could see, had Mill lived to see the present political predicaments of the Arab world, we do not need to predicate his reaction as enshrined in his political thought. Actually, Mill absolutely abhors and indeed rejects monarchy. He states clearly what should constitute a good state. The expectations of the individuals in the state were grossly laid down, in summary: everything is geared towards the well-being, progress and development of the individual, so that a good citizen depicts a good society. Mill detests

mediocrity and accepts a society base on just meritocracy. Individuals must not injure those interests of other people that should be considered rights. Again, individuals must fairly share the burden of defending society and its members from injury.

Mill's political theory accentuates the harmony that should exist between the leaders and the governed, in order to achieve progress in the state. The Arab Spring and its attendant consequences such as ousted leaders has paved way in the Arab region for democratic demands or change in the political system of the respective states in the region, while the need arises for political reforms which Mill gives credence as a necessity for political transition. But would Mill's suggestion of democracy work out for the Arab region? Or is there any other political system better to curb the political menace of the Arab Spring? Actually, Mill is interested in the liberty of the individual and the protection of the minorities in a democratic state. The implication hitherto appears that the fundamentals of a democratic state have never been met or rather found in the Arab region, and our main interest lies on the question of how to liberate the citizens from their political jinx which must culminate in a government that enshrines the tenets of liberalism. One major obstacle preventing the emergence of democracy in Arab region is political Islam. According to Fukuyama, "The spread of political Islam can be seen as a form of identity politics very comparable to its nationalist variant in Europe."[47] Arab Spring ushers in a new political era in the Arab region. The practice of passivity is gone. The era of self-expression of citizens of the Arab region is dawned. These are breeding ground in a "political-fallopian-tube" of political newness. Foreign interventions and influences from political system of the super-powers may not wield in this regard. Therefore, the middle-class and youth of the Arab hemisphere should rise to uphold a political nomenclature where Millian principles of liberty are enunciated. But Arab region must get to their political homeland (destination). Fukuyama therefore, opines: "Getting there, however, depends on the creation of a complex set of interlocking

institutions, which in turn are facilitated by changes in the nature of underlying economic and social conditions."[48]

However, at this juncture, it is pertinent to remark that in this dissertation we attempt to resolve the teaming challenges of the Arab Spring using J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*, to fill the gap by proposing 'Arabcracy' as a possible political system for the Arab region. Arabcracy is peculiar to the Arab world, in the sense that the religion(s), cultures and politics are in conflation and the tenets of Arabcracy are liberty (freedom), rights, rule of law and equality.

The term 'Arabcracy' is derived from two words, Arab, meaning the citizens of Arab states or the Arabia (Arab world) and cracy, which means the rule. In order words, Arabcracy is the government of the Arab world. It is peculiar to the Arab region and it is bore out of social, economic and political circumstance of the Arab world. The nature and structure of Arabcracy slightly differs from that of democracy. Democracy appears to be Western in nature and conception while Arabcracy is particularly for the Arab world.

However, Arabcracy synergizes the trio-partite arms of Arab world, namely, religion, culture and politics in order to achieve a homogenous and stable polity. Thus, the wielding of democracy and its hegemony should not be a threat to the Arab politics. It is imperative that political systems should develop from within without disregarding the experiences of others. According to Professor Abdul Sattar Kassem, "The Arabs need to develop systems that stem basically from their social and religious traditions; otherwise they will experience more hard turbulent times"[49]. Kassem asserts that Arabcracy is an alternative to democracy for the Arab world. He further argues that:

> Instead of democracy, Arabcracy is the Arab alternative that has been in effect in several Arab areas. It is the Arab version of appreciating democratic values that the Western countries have been propagating over the years, and means that the Arabs don't accept the results of elections although they are conducted according to democratic standards[50].

Meanwhile, in the general international mood at this moment of history, Arabs of all walks of life have been verbally appreciating democracy, and calling for the establishment of democratic political systems. Pragmatically, these calls have not been serious, and it is unfortunate that Arab civil societies have been deeply involved in abusing the democratic process. The question that always arises: is it possible for democracy to be cultured in a tribal society? Democracy is the outcome of the Western experience over the centuries, and it is not that easy to be digested overnight in societies with different experiences and cultures. Fukuyama argues that in the nineteenth century the force of nationalism hijacked democracy in Europe. However, he states thus:

> The Third Wave transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America are thus misleading precedents for the Arab Spring. It is really Europe's long and tortured journey from autocracy through nationalism to democracy that provides the better model. This line of analysis does not offer comfort to those hoping for the emergence of liberal democracy anytime soon in the Arab world[51].

Nevertheless, Europe in the 19th century had no prior experience of democracy and therefore no clear institutional models to follow. Actually, there is a cultural factor that has gravely hindered democracy in the Middle East and North Africa which is Islam. "A number of observers have suggested that Islam itself constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the emergence of democracy, since it has never accepted the principle of the separation of church and state, and harbours a long tradition of violent religious militancy"[52]. Therefore, the spread of political Islam could be seen as a form of identity politics which is comparable to the nationalist variant of Europe. This argument was posited by Ernest Gellner's theory of the origins of nationalism. Gellner argues that nationalism is a response to the identity dislocation that occurs as societies modernise and transit from the small village to the large city.

Moreover, the tribal mentality is still prevailing in the Arab countries particularly in the wide

and populated areas where awareness of modernity and the necessities of progress are at a low level. However, it is not abnormal to see highly educated people behaving in a tribal manner, and practicing dictatorship. This is true for most of those educated people who are financed by Western countries to run non-governmental organizations in their countries to educate their people on democratic values. Tribal mentality is too narrow to accept others, and too self-centred to allow for the domination of local competitors. Elections are fair only if we win, and policies are great if we are their masters.

How does the Arab world get to their political destination? However, this may depend on the creation of a complex set of interlocking institutions, which in turn are facilitated by changes in the nature of underlying economic and social conditions. These institutions will be under Arabcratic government. The tenets of Arabcracy are liberty, (freedom), rights, and equality; but these tenets must be defined by the citizens and the elites. This nomenclature – Arabcracy, as a new ideology (a set of principles, especially one on which a politicalsystem is based) needs to be fine toned by law-makers, policy- makers and political philosophers. On this proposal, scholars and elites have work to do, to harness and actualise this deep dream. Both politicians and scholars of the Arab region need not be told of the present political hoopla. They are the first to be politically 'delivered'; hence, the entire citizens are called to political education where the issue of identity crisis of the Arab world will be addressed; also there is a need to create the consciousness and awareness of the present predicaments that need urgent attention, because the world is experiencing a new *millennium consciousness*. Therefore, they must be schooled in the political academy of philosophers like J.S. Mill, J. Locke, J. J. Rousseau and others. According to Judge Learned Hand, "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it, no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it." [53] Hence, a stitch in time saves nine.

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