CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Niccolo Machiavelli is one of the most controversial and famous political theorists the world has ever known. Since his works were published in the early sixteenth century, this bold thinker has been decried by many as a scoundrel who taught evil, and embraced by others as a brilliant, political thinker.[1] Given that much of his work has been a major influence to contemporary political thought and therefore the systems that govern us today, it is important to understand Machiavelli's true ideological inclinations. This work examines whether the political models set out in *The Discourses on the first ten books of Livy* are an accurate representation of a Machiavellian ideal, or if a separate agenda renders it inadequate to express his true view of politics. By approaching the book itself and other Machiavellian works, the historical context they were written in and other relevant factors, this work will ultimately conclude that *The Discourses* do in fact represent his true view of politics.

Having said this, Perhaps, a brief look into the historical background that nurtured the philosophic content of Machiavelli, will aid our understanding and appreciation of Machiavelli's political philosophy. In Machiavelli's time Italy was a divided country. Machiavelli was born in a tumultuous era (1469–1527). Bertrand Russell observed that: "Few rulers were legitimate; even the Popes, in many cases, secured election by corrupt means."[2] Many parties battled for regional influence and control: for instance, the Pope, the major cities like Venice and Florence, foreign powers such as France and Spain. Political military alliances continually changed. Machiavelli's time experienced the rise and fall of many short-lived governments. Corruption was the order of the day, not only amongst secular, but also amongst religious rulers.[3]

The instability in Italy, a subject that disturbed Machiavelli, was famously summarized by him in *The Prince*, "Italy has been overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, violated by

Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss…with the result that they turned Italy into a place of slavery and infamy."[4] Thus, as a consequence, this was the Italy he had to suffer, like a father suffers from the failures of his sons, "more slave than the Hebrews, more servant than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians, without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, lacerated, and devastated, subject to any sort of ruination."[5]

In view of the above, Machiavelli wanted to answer key political and moral dilemmas: Why do cities flourish and decay? Why do people take wrong political decisions? What makes a good and effective political leader? What is the role of destiny in all these events? What is the relationship between means and ends? Is a Prince allowed to commit a crime to save his people? How to choose between two evils? What is the best form of government that can guarantee stability and progress? And how do you establish such governments? Consequently, he confined his attention to the means best suited to the acquisition, retention and expansion of power, with the hope of liberating Florence and Italy from anarchy, and to reposition her on the path of glory. One of such means as Machiavelli claimed to have discovered, is through the humoural (*Umori*) constitution of a republic.[6]

The republican ethos of politics had been in Machiavelli's bloodlines for over two centuries and was successfully passed down to him.[7] Busini, an anti-Medici republican, wrote in the middle of the sixteenth century that he "was a most extraordinary lover of liberty."[8] The linage of Machiavelli produced twelve *gonfalonieri* and fifty-four priors to the Florentine government and they were devoted to preserving liberty. For example, Machiavelli's great grandfather Girolamo was imprisoned, tortured, exiled, and eventually put to death in the defence of freedom.[9]

Machiavelli's education coalesced with the strong republican beliefs of his family and helped embed the characteristics of liberty. His philosophy was budding and his advocacy of a republican form of government was beginning to materialize. Moreover, he

was taught by the great Florentine humanists of the late fifteenth century, Paolo da Ronciglione and Mercello Adriani.[10] Machiavelli was so enveloped in history and politics that he believed it was possible to solve any problem by simply referring to the ancients.[11] He relied heavily on antiquity, especially in the composition of the Discourses. In fact, Machiavelli was almost apologetic whenever he used a contemporary example because he was determined to draw on the lessons of antiquity in order to create a masterful political treatise.[12]

The great Introduction to Book 2 of the Discourses on Livy contains the best statement of Machiavelli's view of antiquity and a good statement of his theory of *imitatio* as the thing most necessary to present success:

> … [Today], whoever is born in Italy and Greece, and has not become either an Ultramontane in Italy or a Turk in Greece, has good reason to find fault with his own and to praise the olden times; for in their past there are many things worthy of the highest admiration, whilst the present has nothing that compensates for all the extreme misery, infamy, and degradation of a period where there is neither observance of religion, law, or military discipline, and which is stained by every species of the lowest brutality; and these vices are the more detestable as they exist amongst those who sit in the tribunals as judges, and hold all power in their hands, and claim to be adored. I know not, then, whether I deserve to be classed with those who deceive themselves, if in these Discourses I shall laud too much the times of ancient Rome and censure those of our own day. And truly, if the virtues that ruled then and the vices that prevail now were not as clear as the sun, I should be more reticent in my expressions, lest I should fall into the very error for which I reproach others. But the matter being so manifest that everybody sees it, I shall boldly and openly say what I think of the former times and of the present, so as to excite in the minds of the young men who may read my writings the desire to avoid the evils of the latter, and to prepare themselves to imitate the virtues of the former, whenever fortune presents them the occasion. For it is the duty of an honest man to teach others that good which the malignity of the times and of fortune has prevented his doing himself; so that amongst the many capable ones whom he has instructed, someone perhaps, more favoured by Heaven, may perform it.[13]

Even in *The Prince* there is mention of the importance of emulating the ancients: "I point to the greatest of men as examples to follow. For men almost always walk along the beaten

path, and what they do is almost always an imitation of what others have done before."[14] Machiavelli is adamant in stressing that history will repeat itself and that rulers must heed to the best examples of the past.[15]

Given the Introduction to *Discourses*, (Book 1 and 2), it is perhaps permissible to follow an analysis of Machiavelli's political philosophy which accounts for the Romanizing "idealism" of the *Discourses* and the relative toughness and hardness of *The Prince*. The *Discourses* is a glowing description of Rome at her zenith: an ideal polity which strength lies in her diversity of humours, calm, prosperous, and law abiding, untroubled by an extra-worldly, transcendental religion that wedges between duties and virtues. Machiavelli's heart was clearly vested in the spirit of liberty. He was intent on contributing to a republican work through the use of antiquity and yearned for the Discourses to have an inspiring influence on the conduct of leaders.

Its main axes were determined by what he himself lived in his life, coupled with his political experiences at the Florentine republic were enriched and analysed with what he learned from historical events, especially the history of Rome narrated by Titus Livius, known as Livy. In history, Machiavelli found parallels and patterns, based on historical facts, to elaborate and give life to his true political ideas (depicted in *The Discourses*) in order to restore, and strengthen the glories of the Florentine republic after its liberation from his new Prince.

Although, the interpretation of Machiavelli's legacy as being republican in nature is far from commonly accepted and uncontested, Machiavelli's theoretical legacy is inherently controversial and complex, eliciting different and even mutually contrasting interpretations of his works. His best known treatise of *The Prince* has long associated Machiavelli's name and work with the unscrupulous struggle for political power, giving rise to the term of 'Machiavellianism' used in this respect[16].

In the 16th century, immediately following the publication of *The Prince*, Machiavellianism was seen as a foreign plague infecting northern European politics, originating in Italy. In the 16th century Machiavelli was called an organum Satanae, a diabolical writer.[17]. Also in the 20th century some political philosophers, amongst others, Leo Straus, called Machiavelli diabolic. Bertrand Russell called *The Prince* "a handbook for gangsters"[18].

We will see that these explanations of Machiavelli are based on a Straw Man Fallacy (Straw Man Fallacy means: ascribing particular ideas to somebody which the relevant person does not really adhere to). Machiavelli does not advocate deception and manipulation 'for personal advantage' but for the common good, and only if they cannot be avoided, if 'necessity' requires it, and only if the common good (rather than the personal good) is really threatened.[19] Therefore, paradoxically, Machiavelli himself is not a Machiavellian; at least not in the current meaning of this word. Unfortunately, in the world today, many writers and scholars still utilized *The Prince* and 'Machiavellianism' as a prism through which to interpret Machiavelli's legacy.

Machiavelli's republicanism draws on an ideal of republican liberty which can be traced back to the republican writers of antiquity, whereby the self-governing republic, its civic greatness and its members' liberty, were seen as the result of its citizens' willingness to cultivate an enduring form of civic *virtù*. In the *Discourses,* Machiavelli examined and analysed the structure and nature of ancient republics, (specifically the Roman model). According to his new perspective on the Roman history, the tension between the humours; the people and the nobility brings about liberty, '*virtu*' good laws, and institutions. This perspective would guide Machiavelli's idea of a 'perfect republic', or what he constantly referred to as 'this republic of mine'.[20]

1.2 Statement of Problem.

There is evidently something peculiarly disturbing about what Machiavelli said or implied, something that has caused profound and lasting uneasiness. Modern scholars have pointed out certain real or apparent inconsistencies between the (for the most part) republican sentiment of *The Discourses* (and *The Histories*) and the advice to absolute rulers in *The Prince*.[21] Indeed there is a difference of tone between the two treatises, this raises problems about Machiavelli's character, motives and convictions which for five hundred years and more have formed a rich field of investigation and speculation for literary and linguistic scholars, philosophers and historians. What then was Machiavelli's real political agenda? Was he really an autocrat or a republican? Or was he just an eclectic and incoherent political theorist?

The Prince has evidently excited the interest and admiration of some of the most formidable men of action of the last four centuries, men not normally addicted to reading classical texts. A similar negative estimate of Machiavelli has continually persisted in the academic world, as well as in everyday speech and popular consideration. There has been little change in Machiavelli's reputation with time, and the words 'Machiavellian' and 'Machiavellianism' still carry such implications in ordinary and often in academic discourse today. More, encyclopaedias and dictionaries almost by rule use the aforementioned clouded prism for explaining Machiavelli's legacy[22]. Is Machiavelli's political thought Machiavellian? How does *The Prince* fit within the context of Machiavelli's *Discourses*?

There are so many interpretations and scholarly opinions on the true nature of his works that it seems improbable that his political doctrine can be unveiled by a curious student. What can be challenged is the notion that the definition of Machiavellian, and the ideas Machiavelli espoused are concurrent.

However, is Machiavelli's lasting reputation as the philosopher-king of political manipulation really justified? This study re-examines Machiavelli's work and legacy and comes to some surprising conclusions. It also suggests a number of different ways to interpret Machiavelli's political ideas.

1.3 Purpose of Study

The motivation for this study comes from the estimation that Machiavelli's name and work have been massively degraded throughout history by the so-called name and legacy of 'Machiavellianism'; its inspiration comes from the republican arguments represented in his *Discourses.* However, this study still does not attempt to ignore the fact that elements of the philosophical justification of the 'power politics', e.g. of so-called 'Machiavellianism', do indeed exist in *The Prince* and in *The Discourses*.

The purpose of this study includes the following:

- To understand and situate Machiavelli in the general light of his political ideas.
- To make explicit some implicit connotations of his argument.
- To utilized the *Discourses* as a prism through which to interpret Machiavelli's legacy
- To demonstrate the fact that Machiavelli himself is not a Machiavellian; at least not in its current meaning.
- To draw attention to some of the interesting, potentially enlightening republican thoughts as depicted mostly in the *Discourses* and in *his* other works that are relevant today in republican governments.

1.4 Scope of the Study

This study revolves round Machiavelli's main argument for republicanism as developed in *The Discourses* and his other books and writings which are illustrative of this argument including *The Prince*.

In order to reach conclusions on Machiavelli's political thoughts that will be unbiased and devoid of sentimental or intellectual prejudices, we must first of all grapple with the historical background, intellectual and environmental influences and the personal and social idiosyncrasies under which Machiavelli averred his thoughts. It is the evaluative analysis of these preconditions as well as Machiavelli's political thought in general, that shall form the scope of this study.

1.5 Significance of Study

Engaging with Machiavelli's philosophy requires a shift in perspective, a shift away from our understanding of Machiavelli induced by the negative import of Machiavellianism. It is a shift which many of Machiavelli's less sympathetic readers fail to make. Today, Machiavelli's pretended excuses for power politics are found everywhere. Machiavellianism runs through popular culture, film, TV series, spy dramas, books, and even news reporting infecting public attitudes towards power, governments, business, education, politics, economy and otherwise. Unfortunately, this is generated due to totally vague and wrong conception of the Italian Diplomat. Hence, the import of this study, as it will go a long way in helping to address this problem in the following ways:

- To change that mind set as it presents a perspective of Machiavelli in the entirety of his works. A perspective different from the one embedded in Machiavellianism and despotism.
- It will benefit governments and politicians in the sense that it admonishes against the kind of political behavior, according to which rulers and politicians de facto act out of expediency, disregarding moral rules and conscience, or with a devilish and manipulative tendencies for their selfish interest.
- The study leads the reader to re-evaluate the way in which he thinks about Machiavelli as a teacher of evil and an exponent of autocracy, to a preacher of

freedom, liberty and republicanism. In order words, the reader will come to appreciate *The Prince* in the light of the *Discourses*.

- This study presents a true Machiavellian philosophy that discourages the vulgar Machiavellianism that pervades the social circle, courtesy of the likes of: *The 48 Laws of Power* by Robert Green, and *The Mafia Manager: A Guide to the Corporate Machiavelli*, by V. A Capo, just to mention a few.
- Moreover, defending Machiavelli from 'Machiavellianism' is important for the sake of intellectual scrutiny. Still, it is even more important to emphasize the republican legacy of Machiavelli's thought, especially in its modern, pluralist implications. Long before political modernity, Machiavelli closely and deeply anticipated with his theory of *Umori* (humours) the contemporary liberal/civic republicanism, constitutionalism and deliberative democracy.

Nevertheless, there is much to be gained from engaging with Machiavelli's political theory in its entirety. Hopefully this discussion will enhance the appreciation of some of the more attractive features of Machiavelli's political philosophy that are relevant today in the world politics, features that help our understanding of liberty and republicanism.

1.6 Methodology

This study adopts the method of analysis. It presents us with a generic analysis, in-depth philosophical description, interpretation and explanations of Machiavelli's view on the topic in question, as we try to make explicit some implicit connotations of his arguments.

Elements of traditional republicanism, as well as significant anticipation of modern pluralist/liberal republicanism, are present in Machiavelli's theoretical legacy. It could be added that Machiavelli's world-view was influenced by the commonly shared Renaissance cosmology/astrology of his lifetime.[23] Moreover, his legacy also anticipates a modern way of political thinking in a methodological and epistemological sense. This study will first

consider these innovations in Machiavelli's conception of knowledge. After reviewing traditionalist elements related to how Renaissance cosmology is to be found inherited in Machiavelli's thought, the study's analysis will focus on Machiavelli's republicanism, both in its dimensions of supporting the legacy of the Roman republic and that of the Italian self-governed city-republics of the Renaissance, and also that of anticipating modern pluralist ideas.

Moreover, conceptual clarifications are to be offered for 'old' traditional republicanism and 'new' republicanism in this context; the latter of which shall be further divided into communitarian/traditionalist/collectivist and pluralist/liberal republicanism. A conceptual clarification of Machiavelli's theory of the humours will also be given; this was the prism through which he understood the legacy of the Roman republic and the city-republics of the Renaissance, and it could be considered to be the source of his pluralist ideas. A comparative analysis of *The Prince* and *The Discourse* will also be given to enlighten us further on Machiavelli's arguments for republicanism.

Machiavelli recognised the value of Law as a method of rule. It underlines his application and use of such concepts like; *umori*, liberty, conflict, common good, politics, sovereignty, checks and balances. In order to make explicit the general assumptions underlying my dissertation, I will thus analyse Machiavelli's republicanism within the context of these concepts to validate its relevance in our understanding of republicanism today.

In line with our methodology, Chapter One presents an overview of the entire study, highlighting the basic concepts, nature and goal of the study. Chapter Two presents us with a dialectical review of interested literatures that have bearing on the subject of our question. Our literature review began with Machiavelli's contemporaries down to later thinkers. Chapter Three, discusses Machiavelli's republicanism depicted in *The Discourses* and in

other related materials which are illustrative of this argument. Chapter Four furthers this discussion in the light of the analysis of the underlying principles of Machiavelli's republicanism that pervades our understanding of republican governments today. Chapter Five presents us with a philosophical engagement and evaluation of Machiavelli's political philosophy, as we revealed Machiavelli's relevance and concluded with a republican note on Machiavelli.

1.7 Definition of Terms

Some of the key concepts used in this work were considered and explained. They are: Republicanism/Republic, Machiavellianism, Humours and The Rule of Law.

Machiavellianism

In the Concise Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Current English, 3rd edition, 'Machiavellianism is linked to Niccolo Machiavelli, Florentine statesman, author of work Del Principe, in which unscrupulous statecraft is advocated' 'Machiavellian – pertaining to Machiavelli, or to the unscrupulous doctrines of political opportunism associated with his name'. The word has a similar use in modern psychology where it describes one of the dark triad personalities, characterized by a duplicitous interpersonal style associated with cynical beliefs and pragmatic morality[24].

The adjective Machiavellian became a pejorative term (a term with an unfavourable meaning) describing someone who aims to deceive and manipulate others for personal advantage

The first fundamental tenet of Machiavellianism is political power and deception. This political tenet holds that power in politics acquired through force and deceit were political ideals which a politician who aspires to be successful should apply. Hence, this political tenet glorified the application of deception, craft and shrewdness as essential tenets in the running of a state. Another prominent tenet of Machiavellianism is that he advocates that moral

principles should be eschewed in politics and even warned rulers not to encourage what he called "Christian virtues", in line with their political activities. It rather holds that rulers should be fierce and cunning in their political conduct.

Anthony Parel clarifies the relationship between Machiavelli and Machiavellianism; he differentiates between 'popular' or 'vulgar' Machiavellianism and 'philosophic' Machiavellianism. Popular or vulgar Machiavellianism is related to the type of political behaviour that existed before Machiavelli and continues to exist independently of him. As Parel asserts: By a quirk of history, Machiavelli's name has come to be associated with a certain kind of political behaviour, according to which rulers and politicians de facto act out of expediency, disregarding moral rules and conscience, or with a devilish and manipulative cunning.[25]

On the other hand, Parel clarifies that philosophical Machiavellianism is related to Machiavelli's philosophical explanation and justification for resorting to culpable evil and injustice as legitimate means of achieving and defending certain political ends:

In other words, with Machiavelli, we pass from the so-called vulgar Machiavellianism to philosophic Machiavellianism. Thus, in Machiavelli's Machiavellianism we can find not only an explanation of but also a justification for culpable evil and injustice.[26]

Republic

This is a country that is governed by a president and politicians, elected by the people and where there is no king or queen. According to Webster's Encyclopaedic Dictionary, republic is defined as an affair, interest, a state or nation in which the supreme power is rested in the whole voting community which elects indirectly or directly, representative to exercise the

power; a group whose number are regarded as having a certain equality or common aims, pursuits, etc. In other words, republicanism is a system with clear pattern of organization and a mode of behaviour. Here we find that the republican idea recognizes individual worth and input. It also emphasizes a situation where people deliberate and take decisions that are of common interests. Machiavelli saw the republic as a civil way of life in which power is not absolute within any regime.[27]

Republicanism is rooted in the political and civic ideas of classical antiquity, as they were expressed and practiced in the city-communities of Greece and in the Republic of Rome. These ideas were revived during the Renaissance era in Western Europe, particularly in the city-based republics of northern Italy, such as Florence, Genoa, and Venice. Republicanism in this traditional sense (the heredity of Aristotle, Cicero, Italian cities of the Renaissance) denotes a theoretical and practical orientation towards a mixed government, as well as devotion to a well-ordered political body of the city-state, to the public good, civic virtue and self-government as a sign of liberty. It also denotes the priority of the common good, over the well-being of the individual.[28] It offers a distinctive political and social programme deriving from the notion of freedom as non-domination.[29] In particular, it offers a justification for a more participatory and egalitarian society one that is democratic in the widest sense that escapes the standard criticisms of such policies when they are tied to a theory of 'positive liberty'.[30] It also offers a way of integrating social and political theory in that it emphasises how political and social relations interact, most particularly through its emphasis on power and status.

Republicanism in the modern sense means the intrusion of certain republican institutions and features into the liberal-democratic order. Modern republicanism itself has been part of constitutional democracy and the modern liberal-political order. Moreover, the modern political combination of republicanism and liberalism has possibly created a better

equilibrium of individual well-being and common good in the framework of constitutional democracy and the rule of law[31].

Ideologically and theoretically, the contemporary revival of republicanism has had a twofold effect: the first is its communitarian interpretation (for instance, Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor), which follows the traditional concept of the active citizen in favour of the common good, in the context of a particular collectivity; the second is liberal republicanism/republican liberalism, which maintains liberal individualism and focuses on the value of individual rights, while still insisting on the value of citizen participation in decision-making (e.g. public autonomy as conceived as freedom), as well as on the value of civic virtues and the devotion of citizens to public matters and the common good[32]. In other words, the commitment to collective self-determination based on deliberation and the mutual accommodation of plural interests among the free members of a political collectivity is at stake. Collective political identity is founded on the free will and autonomous intention of individual citizens.

Public autonomy necessitates freedom conceived as non-domination inside a restrained government. Whereas the modern republican state is based on constitutionalism, constitutional democracy itself presupposes constitutional guarantees of individual rights, restraint upon the part of the government, division of power, resistance to majoritarian will, and a counter-majoritarian condition in which laws can be legitimately altered.[33]

The Rule of Law

From the beginning of philosophy in ancient times up to the late Middle Ages, great emphasis was laid on quite specific and demanding aims in order to distinguish politics, and especially law, from other phenomena. For Plato and Aristotle, the aim of law and politics was the good, explained as justice, and, specifically for Aristotle, *eudaimonia* and the common good.[34] The means played no great role. Cicero, too, stressed justice as the aim of the law.[35] Thomas

Aquinas then defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated".[36] So the necessary aim is the common good. Aquinas still mentions justice though, especially in respect of the positive law.[37]

In the seventeenth century, this emphasis on the specific aim of law and politics vanished. The good, justice, eudemonia and common welfare were no longer considered to be the main aim of law and politics. The means became a primary consideration. Thomas Hobbes proposed a reduced but still quite specific aim of law and politics: self-preservation.[38] Furthermore, he stated that law in general consists of commands,[39] which were later interpreted by Austin as orders accompanied by sanctions for lack of compliance.[40]

This aspect of the rule of law was famously identified by A. V. Dicey in the following formulation: "We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land."[41] Normative individualism also explains why Dicey states the right to personal freedom as the first and foremost application of the rule of law that is the core of the individual human rights.[42] This justifies Dicey's second part of the rule of law: "We mean in the second place, when we speak of the rule of law as a characteristic of our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals."[43]

While Dicey largely neglected the separation of powers and saw all sovereignty vested in parliament, nearly all modern interpreters have emphasized that the rule of law includes the principle of the separation of powers. If politics and law are two different social forms, they have to be also distinguished institutionally. And, if law has to include general norms, one should distinguish the production of these general norms and their application. So we get the classical triads of executive, legislative and judiciary.[44]

Therefore, the principle of the rule of law embraces the general principle or right that nobody is above the law and everybody is subject to the ordinary law. That means it also includes such human rights as the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and forced labor, The supremacy of the constitution, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private and family life, the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly and association, free and fair elections as the bases for assuming power in government, the right to marry and the protection of property etc. And to mediate between possibly conflicting interests well and so take into account all individuals concerned, the formality of the law must include some additional requirements, such as accessibility/promulgation, consistency, clarity, and definiteness.[45]

The above analysis of the rule of law is very important for this study as we come to see the semblance it shares with Machiavelli's understanding of the rule of law. Machiavelli regards the rule of law as the basic feature of civil and political life. In the *Discourses*, he in fact contrasts political life ('vivere politico') with tyranny, understood as authority unbound by laws ('autorità assoluta'), It is the law that makes men good,[46] it is the law that makes men transcend their selfishness to desire the common good, it is the law that unites the conflicts of humours by checkmating their actions and it is the law that enables liberty and freedom to flourish.[47]

All his political considerations refer to positive laws, particularly to statutes or constitutional laws, the "orders" ("ordini") as he calls them.[48] Politics is ascribed a pre-eminent position in social life as the chief constitutive element of society.'[49]In short, politics based on 'The rule of law' not on 'power politics' (as *The Prince* seems to suggests) is that which is singularly able to create virtuous citizens instead of indolent and selfish individuals; For instance, in the *Draft of Law*, Machiavelli states,

> Considering, our Magnificent and Excellent Lords, as no law and no order is more praiseworthy among men or more acceptable to God than those by which a true, united and holy republic is established, in which advice is freely given, deliberations prudently undertaken, and orders faithfully carried out...[with the satisfaction] the people and [the provision of] security to any good and honest citizen.[50]

Humours/*Umori*

The theoretical nature of the humoral system merged perfectly into a period of intense logical, theological and philosophical debate and exploration. It fitted in with the divine order of things, with its underlying concepts of balance and imbalance, harmony and discord, health and disease, as basic linked concepts. For centuries, Greek, Roman and later Muslim and Western European medical philosophers and pioneers took to it readily, and philosophers like Augustine of Hippo, Thomas Aquinas and Ibn Sina fully supported it.[51]

The concept of the humours had originated from pre-modern medical science and the cosmology/astrology/natural philosophy of the Renaissance. The humours were originally considered to be the constituent elements of the human body, human health and temperament. The four humours: blood, phlegm, black bile and yellow bile according to ancient medicine were thought to be the constitutive elements of the human body. Each humour possessed a quality opposed to that of every other humour. But when they were mixed according to a due proportion, as in the human body, they produced health. Sickness, in turn, was understood as an imbalance in the humoural relationship, i.e. a state in which one humour as it were sought to dominate all the other humours.[52] The science of medicine was the science of treating the humoural imbalance, of keeping the due proportion of each humour in the body. Machiavelli viewed this science of medicine as an exemplary science for politics: "In the illnesses that men suffer from, they ever have recourse to the judgments or to the remedies that have been pronounced or prescribed by the ancients . . . and medicine is nothing other than the experiments made by the ancient physicians."[53]

Umori were also thought of as being constituent elements of the heavens and nature (elemental matter divided into heat and coldness, dryness and wetness). Machiavelli also accepted an astrological view on the interrelation of the heavens, e.g. causality in the 'things of the world'/'human things' and fortune (the personified intervention of the human use of the humours as effectual in changing causality). Early Renaissance political thought had even accepted these ideas prior to Machiavelli.[54] Machiavelli appropriated the notion of the humours from the Renaissance's worldview, as well as from early political theory, and innovatively used their notion in a significant political manner. In his writings he uses umori in two senses: as applying to the understanding of the health and the temperament of the individual, and as applying to the health and structure of political society or body politic.

The theory of the humours, the plurality of mutually conflicting humours and the issue of how essential conflicts are resolved in a political order was of great concern to Machiavelli. Machiavelli designated the humours as relevant social groups of the given body politic. Political humours in Machiavelli's usage refer to different social groups and to their particular, and mutually conflicting, aspirations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Literature Review

The vast and divergent interpretation of Machiavelli's political legacy speaks volumes of the character of Machiavelli as a Political philosopher. There are many leading theories of how to interpret *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, however, apart from a cloud of subsidiary views and glosses the bibliography of this is vast and growing faster than ever.

In celebration of Machiavelli's five-hundredth birthday in 1969, Oxford scholar and Philosopher, Prof. Isaiah Berlin published a lengthy article in 1972 titled "The Originality of Machiavelli" that examines dozens of interpretations. He notes that the bibliography on Machiavelli is immense and ever growing, as it contained over 3,000 items at the time,[55] which was an immense leap from the 2,113 that were listed in a 1936 study.[56] In addition, over 500 more pieces have emerged since 1969.[57] .

However, while there may exist no more than the normal extent of disagreement about the meaning of particular terms or thesis contained in these works, there is a startling degree of divergence about the central view of the basic political attitude of Machiavelli. This phenomenon is easier to understand in the case of other thinkers whose opinions have continued to puzzle or agitate mankind. Plato for example, or Rousseau, or Hegel, or Marx. But then it might be said that "Plato wrote in a world and in a language that we cannot be sure we understand; that Rousseau, Hegel, Marx were prolific theorists, whose works are scarcely models of clarity or consistency".[58] But *The Prince* is a short book: its style is usually described as being singularly lucid, succinct and pungent a model of clear Renaissance prose.[59] *The Discourses* is equally clear and definite. Yet there is no consensus about the significance of either; they have not been absorbed into the texture of traditional political theory; they continue to arouse passionate feelings.

Interpretations of Machiavelli's works from the 16th century to the 18th considered Machiavelli to be a 'teacher of evil' and often simply reduced his theories to this idea of 'Machiavellianism'.[60] Indeed, even five years after his death, *The Prince* was published in Rome and provoked sharp reactions from the Roman Catholic Church; it was put on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1559. The Inquisition decreed the utter destruction of all his works, which was confirmed by the Council of Trent in 1564[61] and they were to remain in this proscribed status until 1890.[62]

Cardinal Reginald Pole was among the first to harshly rebuke Machiavelli in 1536; in his book *Apologia ad Carolum V. Caesarum* (Apologia to the Emperor Charles V), he qualified his method as 'satanic', Machiavelli himself as 'an enemy of humanity' and his book The Prince as the devil's Bible which had been written by the devil's hand.[63]

In some ways Machiavelli was at odds with the spirit of his time, and was not even spared by his own very good friend Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), a historian and aphorist who criticised him for having an excessive belief in the power of human intelligence to fathom the complexity of events and for conceiving Rome as the perfect model for his conception of the state.[64] In two of his books; *Considerations of the Discourses of Niccolò Machiavelli* and *Maxims and Reflections*, Guicciardini condemned Machiavelli's use of the Roman republican experience as a universal model and standard for republics. "How wrong it is to cite the Romans at every turn (a reference to Machiavelli's Discourses). For any comparison to be valid, it would be necessary to govern it according to their example. In the case of a city with different qualities, the comparison is as much out of order as it would be to expect a jackass to race like a horse".[65]

Indeed, one of the features that most astonished Guicciardini was Machiavelli's defence of the quarrels between two contrasting groups, the few and the many, the grandi and

the plebs, whose sense of identity and behaviour underpins a large part of the arguments developed in the early sections of book I of the *Discourses* and in *The Prince,* as well (elaborated in the next chapter).[66] For Machiavelli, these quarrels demonstrate the strength and diversity of humours in a republic because they gave birth to laws in favour of liberty.[67] Guicciardini observes however that; "praising [civil] discord is like praising a sick man's illness…"[68]

Francis Bacon reflected more on *The Prince,* in his book, *De augmentis*, book 7, he saw Machiavelli as the supreme realist and avoider of Utopian fantasies. Bacon is shocked by him, but cannot deny the accuracy or importance of his observations; 'We are much beholden to Machiavelli and other writers of that class, who openly and unfeignedly declare and describe what men do, and not what they ought to do.' Bacon goes on to qualify this by explaining that to know the good one must investigate the evil, and ends by calling such approaches 'corrupt wisdom'[69]

In his essay "Of Goodness and Goodness of Nature" (in which he refers emphatically to Machiavelli's concept of human nature),[70] Francis Bacon observes that while there exists in man a natural inclination to goodness and benevolence, there exists also a natural malignity, and that "while malignant dispositions are the very errors of human nature . . . yet they are the fittest timber to make great politics [politicians] of; like to knee-timber [timber grown crooked], that is good for ships that are ordained to be tossed, but not for building houses that shall stand firm.[71] Bacon reflects here on Machiavelli's argument in the *Discourses*, that The malignity of the *grandi* (the aristocrats or nobles), far from being an objection to their participation in political life, is an argument in favour of it. The *grandi* are incorrigibly cruel, domineering and selfish: Machiavelli argues that these very qualities can, under the right circumstances, contribute to the benefit of the republic.[72]

According to Spinoza, in his book; *Tractatus politicus*, *The Prince* is a "cautionary tale; for whatever else he was, Machiavelli was a passionate patriot, a democrat, a believer in liberty"[73]. *The Princ*e must have been intended (Spinoza is particularly clear on this) "…to warn men of what tyrants could be and do, the better to resist them. Perhaps the author could not write openly with two rival powers - those of the church and of the Medici - eyeing him with equal (and not unjustified) suspicion. *The Prince* is therefore a satire (though no work seems to me to read less like one)".[74]

Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his book *The Social Contract*, puts forth the theory that in the *Discourses* Machiavelli presents his true, republican view, while *The Prince* is a satirical work.[75] Rousseau isolates the primary interpretive error common to readers of Machiavelli's *The Prince*, noting that, "…this profound political thinker has so far had only superficial or corrupted readers"[76]. Rousseau gives Machiavelli adoring praise in his *Social Contract*: "While appearing to instruct kings he has done much to educate people. Machiavelli's *Prince* is the book of republicans."[77] Rousseau's statement occurs in the context of the following argument by Machiavelli in the *Discourses*: where there is a "Prince, much of the time what he does for himself harms the City, and what is done for the City harms him. So that soon there arises a Tyranny over a free society, the least evil which results to that City is for it not to progress further, nor to grow further in power or wealth, but most of the times it rather happens that it turns backward"[78] The interest of a prince is naturally opposed to that of the people. There is, then, no harmony between the private interest of the prince and the common good, and this is precisely what Machiavelli, between the lines, has demonstrated in the Principe. Rousseau charges that, "No nation has broken its own laws less frequently than the Romans, and no nation has ever had such excellent laws"[79]. Rousseau points to idea that by showing what a prince must do if he wishes to maintain his rule namely,

ignore justice, inspire fear, practice cruelty, and so on, Machiavelli delivers, in fact, a powerful warning against princely government.

For Benedetto Croce in his book; *Elementi di politica,* Machiavelli asserts the necessity of a politics that is beyond morality, and yet bitterly regrets that necessity; he longs for a society of good men which he knows all too well to be unattainable; he sometimes experiences moral nausea at his own hard hearted recommendations.[80] Croce saw Machiavelli is an anguished humanist, and one who, so far from seeking to soften the impression made by the crimes that he describes, laments the vices of men which make such wicked courses politically unavoidable. A moralist who 'occasionally experiences moral nausea' in contemplating a world in which political ends can be achieved only by means that are morally evil, and thereby the man who divorced the province of politics from that of ethics. He lamented the flaws in man that made the course of action outlined in the Prince politically unavoidable in order to live in a secure state.[81]

Fichte published his text on Machiavelli in the Journal *Vesta* in Konigsberg, where he had taken refuge after the defeat of the Prussian army at Jena. In conceiving the article as an attempt to vindicate an honest and honourable man, he recalls Herder, who in 1795 presented Machiavelli as a figure exemplary of his age, and his work as that of a careful observer, frankly describing the political practices of the Renaissance.[82] He thus takes Machiavelli seriously and at his word unlike other late eighteenth century writers such as Rousseau, who tended to see in Machiavelli a disguised republican, ironically unmasking the criminal methods of princes, the better to unseat them[83]. Unlike Herder, however, Fichte envisages the extension of Machiavellian principles to the contemporary era, while at the same time he stresses the distinct character of the *Discourses*.

For Fichte, Machiavelli is a man of deep insight into the real historical (or super historical) forces that mould men and transform their morality in particular, a man who rejected Christian principles for those of reason, political unity and centralisation. This view is common to Hegel and Herder.[84]

For Hegel, in his book; *The German Constitution*, from The Political writings, Machiavelli is the man of genius who saw the need for uniting a chaotic collection of small and feeble principalities into a coherent whole. However obsolete his precepts, he understood something more important; the demands of his own age that the hour had struck for the birth of the modern, centralised, political state, for the formation of which he 'established the truly necessary fundamental principles.[85] Hegel also defends Machiavelli from criticisms, and argues that you have to read Machiavelli in his correct context by looking at the history of Italy, as Hegel outlined:

> You must come to the reading of The Prince immediately after being impressed by the history of the centuries before Machiavelli and the history of his own times. Then indeed it will appear as not merely justified but as an extremely great and true conception produced by a genuinely political head with an intellect of the noblest kind.[86]

Hegel defends Machiavelli from the criticism that his methods are described as abhorrent by saying that what one person does to another may be abhorrent, but if done from one state to another it can be just and that the worst crime against the state is anarchy. Hegel goes on to say that if a state fighting anarchists is abhorrent, then every death penalty or prison sentence must be called abhorrent as well.[87]

The way Hegel comments on this, suggests to me that Hegel strongly agrees with Machiavelli and thinks a similar kind of Prince would be needed to form a strong central state in Germany the way Richelieu had done with France. He uses the example of Italy, which

experienced the same things Germany has during Hegel's time, but It happened much early in Italy. Hegel sees Machiavelli as writing solutions to the problems Germany is currently facing.

The thesis that Machiavelli was above all an Italian and a patriot, speaking above all to his own generation, and if not solely to Florentines, at any rate only to Italians, and must be judged solely, or at least mainly, in terms of his historical context, is a position common to Herder and Hegel, Macaulay and Burd, De Sanctis and Oreste Tommasini.[88]

To value or justify Machiavelli's opinions solely as a mirror of his times is one thing; to maintain that he was himself consciously addressing only his own countrymen is a very different one, and entails a false view of him and the civilization to which he belonged. The Renaissance did not view itself in historical perspective. Machiavelli was looking for and thought that he had found timeless, universal truths about social behavior. Machiavelli's goal was the discovery of the permanent principles of a political philosophy that would correct the defects the Florentine republic and eventually become a model for all republics. The introductory passages of the *Discourses* are very explicit in this regard.

Marx and Engels in *The Dialectics of Nature*, speak of Machiavelli as one of the 'giants' of the Enlightenment, a man free from petit-bourgeois outlook. A political pragmatist and a patriot who cared most of all for the independence of Florence, and acclaimed any form of rule that would ensure it. Marx called '*The Discourses*' 'a republican masterpiece'[89]

George Sabine in his well known text- book, *A History of Political Theory*; views him as an anti-metaphysical empiricist, a Hume or Popper before his time, free from obscurantist, theological and meta- physical preconceptions.

The contribution of Jacques Maritain to the ongoing reflections on Machiavelli is a noteworthy one, even though Maritain's specific remarks on Machiavelli consisted in one

medium sized essay, "The End of Machiavellianism," and several other incisive paragraphs in other works, notably *Man and the State*.

Jacques Maritain opined that before Machiavelli, rulers often got a "bad conscience" from violating morality. After him, they saw it as "a matter of right." Maritain argued that radical pessimism regarding human nature was at the basis of Machiavelli's thought." Statesmen must therefore "abandon *what ought to be done for what is done."* Machiavelli thus set up "…an illusory but deadly antinomy between what people call *idealism* (wrongly confused with ethics) and what they call realism (wrongly confused with politics)." Machiavelli "simply denies to moral values … any application in the political field." Here was, Maritain thought, a "purely artistic conception of politics."[90]

Machiavelli's virtue (*virtù*) was thus a "brilliant, well balanced and skilled strength." It entailed a state centric religion and the "artistic use of evil." The resulting system differed completely from any real (and Christian) notion of the common good, in which "constructive peace … is the health of the state"; whereas, if "the aim of politics is power, war is the health of the state."[91]

Positivism and Hegelianism for Maritain fostered "absolute Machiavellianism" and allowed statesmen to draw on "endless reserves of evil." Maritain counters that it "is never allowed to do evil for any good whatsoever." Politics severed from ethics becomes one of "those demoniacal principalities of which St. Paul spoke." Machiavellianism could produce only "the misfortune of men, which is the exact opposite of any genuinely political end." Its "successes" benefited particular rulers in the short run; its attendant evils long outlasted them. Thus Machiavellianism cannot succeed, even on its own terms, but breeds "ruin and bankruptcy."[92]

It would be far better, Maritain wrote, to cultivate "justice and moral virtues," and forego finding "necessary" exceptions outside all law and morality. That was because "justice tends by itself toward the welfare and survival of the community" and also because "the political whole is not a substantial or personal subject, but a community of human persons," whose rights and duties (I would add) may not be set aside by rulers temporarily acting in the name of the political whole. "Machiavellianism devours itself," leaving behind "ruins, war memorials, and glorious stories for the credulous"[93].

At the same time as he denies Machiavellianism, Maritain also denies hypermoralism. Hypermoralism is the failure of a leader to take a just action due to the fear that it might taint his conscience. Maritain acknowledges that the use of force is sometimes necessary, because evil is a fact of life[94]. It is necessary sometimes for a leader to choose the lesser of evil choices, such as the decision in World War II to fight and kill German soldiers in order to save Europe. So, do ends then justify the means for Maritain? Only in extremely limited circumstances in which leaders are required to make hard choices to use measures that they would not use normally. These exceptional situations do not eliminate the normal morality that leaders ought to follow; they are exceptions, and are still driven by principles of morality. Some corrupt measures should never be used, specifically those that undermine the mission of peace and justice of a nation.

The fact is that (as demonstrated in this work), Machiavelli presents the same argument for political necessity when addressing greater evils that threatens the common good. Thus Maritain is equally guilty of 'Machiavellianism' Maritain further argues that, *The Discourses* offers no new reality different from the power politics depicted in *The Prince.*

According to Gauss in his book; *'Intro.', in Machiavelli, The Prince*, the prohibition of Machiavelli's works was understood to be a signal for numerous attacks against him; therein,

both political writers and dramatists from the 16th century and onward (including Shakespeare) used his name in the sense of the negative syntagma of 'Machiavellianism'. However Gauss remarks that *The Prince* especially Machiavelli's nationalistic ideas, i.e. his pledge for the unification of Italy, and his 'exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians' as well as his scientific ideas (his divorcing of the study of politics from the study of ethics) attained a certain kind of positive connotation (accompanied by Hegel's conception of the state) in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, upon the Romantic rise of nationalism and first attempts of building nation-states in Europe[95]. Gauss writes:

> To him the Italians, above all other peoples, deserved to have a nation state of their own, and the increasing momentum to nationalize institutions and to create nation states in the rest of Europe did bring his own nationalism again into the foreground and bring this trend in his thinking back into the main current of the nineteenth century ... Both of these conceptions, that of the nation as a mystic entity rooted in the Folk, and Hegel's notion of the state as a divinity ordained force and ultimate power in shaping civilization were steadily to gather momentum and to merge into the notion of the nation state. This paved a way for a far more favourable attitude toward the nationalistic ideas of The Prince. The ban that had been laid upon Machiavelli was to be lifted. In Italy the achievement of national unity of which he was so clearly the prophet would make him a hero. Italians made of the 400th anniversary of his birth in 1869 a national celebration.[96]

According to Gauss, the scientific and patriotic/nationalistic quality of *The Prince* does not contradict the concept of unlimited state-power proposed therein. Gauss notes a revival of interest in Machiavelli's work especially in *The Prince*, in the second half of the 20th century, due to the 'modern' implications of Machiavelli's real-political/'scientific' approach in regard to attributing unlimited power to the state: "... Machiavelli would have had the right to conclude that the core of the state was power. In regarding the state as a dynamic expansive force, Machiavelli was closer to reality and Realpolitik than much nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thinking, and in this respect is modern"[97].

Conversely, Gauss also assumes Machiavelli's praising of the Roman republic in *The Discourses* not to be 'modern'. He simply does not see any modern implications in Machiavelli's republican ideas in *The Discourses*.[98] As has been already mentioned, he notes certain 'modern' implications of *The Prince*; however, he still does not acknowledge any 'modern' implications either in *The Discourses* or in *The Prince*, which would be related to the issue of limiting state power.[99]

Similar to Gauss and a few years after him, Leo Strauss utilized *The Prince* and 'Machiavellianism' as a prism through which to interpret Machiavelli's legacy. Contrary to Gauss, Strauss in his book *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, maintains that the main connotation of *The Prince* has been diabolic and not patriotic or scientific. Strauss remarks that 'even if we were forced to grant that Machiavelli was essentially a patriot or a scientist, we would not be forced to deny that he was a teacher of evil'[100]. He considers Machiavelli to be a 'devil teacher' of a 'devil theory':

> We shall not shock anyone, we shall merely expose ourselves to good-natured or at any rate harmless ridicule, if we profess ourselves inclined to the old-fashioned and simple opinion according to which Machiavelli was a teacher of evil. Indeed, what other description would fit a man who teaches lessons like these: princes ought to exterminate the families of rulers whose territory they wish to possess securely; princes ought to murder their opponents rather than to confiscate their property since those who have been robbed, but not those who are dead, can think of revenge; men forget the murder of their fathers sooner than the loss of their patrimony ... If it is true that only evil man will stoop to teach maxims of public and private gangsterism, we are forced to say that Machiavelli was an evil man. Machiavelli was indeed not the first man to express opinions like those mentioned ... But Machiavelli is the only philosopher who has lent the weight of his name to any way of political thinking and political acting which is as old as political society itself, so much that his name is commonly used for designating such a way. He is notorious as the classic of the evil way of political thinking and political acting ... Machiavelli proclaims openly and triumphantly a corrupting doctrine which ancient writers had thought covertly or with all signs of repugnance.[101]

Strauss asserts that his interpretation of Machiavelli, based upon *The Prince* and upon what is meant by 'Machiavellianism', is old-fashioned and simple, though appropriate. He opposes

the view, which he claims 'is more characteristic of our age' and is 'altogether misleading', according to which we find the full presentation of Machiavelli's teaching in *The Discourses*, so much so that we must always read *The Prince* in the light of *The Discourses* and never by itself. However, although assuming *The Prince* and 'Machiavellianism' to be the main framework to understand Machiavelli, he is of the opinion that it is still not exhaustive, that *The Prince* is in that respect 'insufficient'.[102] Namely, he acknowledges an importance of *The Discourses* and recognizes that Machiavelli wrote them in order to encourage imitation of ancient republics, and with a hope for the rebirth, in the near or distant future, of the spirit of ancient republicanisms.[103]

Contrary to the aforementioned statement about a specific connotation of *The Discourses*, Strauss concludes that there is no essential difference between *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, as both books deal with rules of action that merely aim to seize and maintain power either by the 'actual prince' or the 'potential princes';

> To summarize, Machiavelli presents in each of his two books substantially the same teaching from two different points of view, which may be described provisionally as the points of view of the actual prince and of potential princes. The difference of points of view shows itself most clearly in the fact that in the Prince he fails to distinguish between princes and tyrants and he never speaks of the common good nor of the conscience, whereas in the Discourses he does distinguish between princes and tyrants and does speak of the common good and the conscience.[104]

Given these views by Gauss and Strauss, as well as many other authors, it can be surmised that interpretations that reduce Machiavelli's legacy to 'Machiavellianism' are found to remain dominant throughout the history of political and theoretical thought. Isaiah Berlin observes accordingly that;

> ... the commonest view of him, at least as a political thinker, is still that of most Elizabethans, dramatists and scholars alike, for whom he is a man

> inspired by the Devil to lead men to their doom, the great subverter, the teacher of evil, le docteur de la sce ´le ´ratesse, the inspirer of St. Bartholomew's Eve, the original of Iago. This is the 'murderous Machiavel' of the famous four-hundred-odd references in Elizabethan literature.[105]

Notwithstanding, trends of a more balanced and less reductionist interpretation have also emerged. Twentieth-century interpretations recognize elements of 'Machiavellianism', even if they do not establish it within the core of Machiavelli's political ideas and messages. For instance, Bernard Crick, the editor of *The Discourses* and the writer of the Introduction to them[106] assumes that 'Machiavellianism' is present in both *The Prince* and *The Discourses.* Namely, in 'states of emergency' republics may also make use of absolute power; in addition, Machiavelli does not prioritize republican rule over princely rule when stability and peace are endangered, while he attributes the highest value to political stability. When elaborating on Machiavelli's republican ideas, Crick notes the absence of monistic, transcendental truth, and the existence of thinking in alternatives, of contextual truths, different value systems 'Pagan standards' and 'Christian standards', conflicts of values and interests.

> There is something far more profound in Machiavelli than simply a distinction between what is right and what is possible, or a reminder of 'the price' we may have to pay for 'seeming good' actions. Two standards are at work simultaneously. He implicitly challenges the whole traditional view that morality must be of one piece. He is not, strictly speaking, a relativist: he only recognizes two views, but then he only really recognizes two circumstances: historically, the ancient and the modern world, and politically, the republic and the principality[107].29

In addition, Crick also notes Machiavelli's normative political approach, e.g. the fact that Machiavelli prioritizes republican rule over princely rule. He highlights Machiavelli's ideas in which well-managed republics are, in fact, stronger than principalities are, which stems from the fact that republics are more adaptable to diverse circumstances, have a diversity found among their citizens, are able to mobilize the power of their people and integrate their

populations into public life, and endure better while nurturing and satisfying the needs of different factions.

In his book entitled *Machiavelli*, Kosta Cˇavosˇki also extensively analyses the existence of 'Machiavellianism' in *The Prince* and even in *The Discourses*. However, he considers Machiavelli to be a republican thinker:

> Without any attempt to negate the contestable advice Machiavelli gives to princes and all others who strive towards the heights of power, it is intended for this book to demonstrate that Machiavelli possessed firm knowledge as to how the state is to be founded or how a ruined and corrupt state is to be improved ... and to demonstrate that he was a supporter of freedom, republicanism and the rule of law, and that he had been much less a teacher of evil and much more a teacher of virtue conceived as a creative force of history[108].

David Held, in his book *Models of Democracy*, also considers Machiavelli to be a republican thinker, and concentrates more upon Machiavelli's *The Discourses*. However, just as the aforementioned authors have done, he systematically takes into consideration elements of 'Machiavellianism' which exist in *The Prince* as well as in *The Discourses*. He differentiates the two models of politics which seem to appear according to Machiavelli's conception as 'power politics' and 'politics based on just laws':

> His judgement moved uneasily between admiration of a free, self-governing people and admiration of a powerful leader able to create and defend the law. He tentatively sought to reconcile these preferences by distinguishing between, on the one hand, the kind of politics necessary for the inauguration of a state or for the liberation of a state from corruption and, on the other hand, the kind of politics necessary for the maintenance of a state once it had been properly established. An element of democracy was essential to the latter, but quite inappropriate to the former[109].

Friedrich Meinecke, in his book '*Machiavellism': The Doctrine of Raison d'état and Its Place in Modern History*, famously opined that:

> Machiavelli's theory was a sword which was plunged into the flank of the body politic of Western humanity, causing it to shriek and rear up. This was bound to happen; for not only had genuine moral feeling been seriously wounded, but death had also been threatened to the Christian views of all churches and sects, and therefore to the strongest bond uniting men and nations, the highest spiritual power that reigned over them. Of course one should not fail to notice that (as Ernst Troeltsch has shown in his Soziallehren der christliehen Kirchen) religious morality, not only in the old Catholic Church, but also in the new Protestant religion, did provide certain outlets and scope for a secular type of statecraft. Catholic morality did this by recognizing a Natural Law which had a certain relative value, and therefore recognizing too the existence of genuine duties and obligations in this world. But these spheres of action, within which the politician was permitted to move more freely, were narrowly restricted and bound to remain so, because in the last resort all political action was intended to serve the highest religious aims. And now this state of subjection was very seriously threatened by Machiavellism.[110]

The subject of investigation to which Meinecke turned his attention after his philosophical disillusionment was the great theme of power politics, of Machiavellism. He insists and tries to demonstrate that, in Machiavelli, we are confronted with an all human, and all too human phenomenon. Machiavelli's system of thought was brought into being by an absolutely special and sublime, and at the same time extraordinary, conjunction of events: the coinciding of a political collapse with a spiritual and intellectual renaissance[111].

Meinecke famously credits Machiavelli as "…the man with whom the history of the idea of raison d'état in the modern Western world begins." Moreover, Meinecke maintains that while Machiavelli's German critics "…have noticed that he fails to express any opinion about the real final purpose of the State," he nonetheless reflected on the subject. In fact, Meinecke claims "…his whole life was bound up with a definite supreme purpose of the State," and "his whole political way of thought is nothing else but a continual process of thinking about raison d'état."[112]

The general practice of the principle of raison d'état; the pursuit of political, especially power-politics, ends by all necessary means, if need be, even the most immoral ones seemed to Meinecke a typical phenomenon of the middle sphere, the sphere between causalities and values, Nature and Spirit, Is and Ought. Machiavellism is usually described as the maxim that the end justifies the means; Meinecke emphasizes that it is also the doctrine according to which the end controls the means.

Isaiah Berlin, in his book *Against the Current* ('The Originality of Machiavelli') demonstrated a moderate understanding of Machiavelli in the light of the divergent negative interpretations. In his opinion, once you embark on a plan for the transformation of a society you must carry it through no matter the cost: to fumble, to retreat, and to be overcome by scruples is to betray your chosen cause. To be a physician is to be a professional, ready to burn, to cauterize, to amputate; if that is what the disease requires, then to stop halfway because of personal qualms, or some rule unrelated to your art and its technique, is a sign of muddle and weakness, and will always give you the worst of both worlds.[113]

The well-being of the state is not the same as the well-being of the individual "they cannot be governed in the same way." politics has its own morality; it does not require perpetual terror, but it approves, or at least permits, the use of force where it is needed to promote the ends of political society[114].

> In killing, deceiving, betraying, Machiavelli's princes and republicans are doing evil things, not condonable in terms of common morality. It is Machiavelli's great merit that he does not deny this. Marsilio, Hobbes, Spinoza, and, in their own fashion, Hegel and Marx, did try to deny it. So did many a defender of the raison d'état, imperialist and populist, Catholic and Protestant. These thinkers argue for a single moral system: and seek to show that the morality which justifies, and indeed demands, such deeds, is continuous with, and a more rational form of, the confused ethical beliefs of the uninstructed morality which forbids them absolutely.[115]

However, he criticized Machiavelli saying that; He assumes that different societies must always be at war with each other, since they have conflicting purposes. He sees history as one endless process of cutthroat competition, in which the only goal that rational men can have is to succeed in the eyes of their contemporaries and of posterity. He is good at bringing fantasies down to earth, but he assumes, as Mill was to complain about Bentham, that this is enough. He allows too little to the ideal impulses of men. He has no historical sense and little sense of economics. He has no inkling of the technological progress that is about to transform political and social life, and in particular the art of war. He does not understand how individuals, communities, or cultures develop and transform themselves. Like Hobbes, he assumes that the argument or motive for self-preservation automatically outweighs all others.

For Mathew. I. Nwoko, in his book *Basic World Political Theories,* Machiavelli's *Discourses* portrayed an egalitarian and meritocratic society. Machiavelli does not see the need for the Aristotelian type of the division of government into the tree good forms and three bad forms. A good form of government for him should constitute the mixture of aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy. This mixture supported by adequate representation will give various classes in the society opportunity to influence the power of each other and thereby assure wider scope of freedom for all.[116]

Nwoko pointed out a very important aspect of Machiavelli's republicanism; that political dissention and opposition are necessary elements to preserve liberty in the state.[117] But the rule of law supersedes factions and private vengeance. Thus a constitution should defend against usurpation of power. Power rather should be distributed giving good opportunity to impeach any person in the service of the state, no matter the position, when necessary. Thus, the difference between Machiavelli's *Prince* and *Discourses*.

In the *Discourses,* Machiavelli explains that republics are Free states as different from principalities which are not Free states. The republics rank higher than the organization and structuring than the principalities. They bear higher disadvantages also. Only a people with higher degree of *Virtu* can form a true republic. This is because, it implies a constitution, a self-government (not merely representative democracy) unlike a principality where a prince or tyrant must subjugate the people because they lack *virtu* and cannot govern themselves. In the republics, the people have the freedom to rule themselves. Actually the people, according to Machiavelli, are more prudent and stable than the princes. The people can judge better; they are less influenced by external forces to corrupt judgment than the princes. In their election they make better choice than princes who would be easily lured to choose dubious characters. Even on the question of law, although the princes could make better laws, institution, statutes etc, but the people would keep them better. Thus the *virtu* of a good people is always higher than that of the prince. They are free.[118] Another characteristic that differentiates the Republics from the Principalities is that of the *common good*. The common good is only respected in the republics not in the principalities, because the prince is prone to protect the private interest of the few when it conflicts with that of the generality of the people. And this makes the principalities less prosperous in wealth and power.

However, having acknowledged the distinctive characteristics of the *Discourses* and the *Prince*, Nwoko failed to establish Machiavelli as a true republican whose political ideology rests on republicanism. But presented Machiavelli as a political philosopher with two different political theories.

Quentin Skinner in many of his books which includes; *Machiavelli's Discoursi, and the Pre-humanist Origins of Republican Ideas, Visions of Politics* and *Liberty Before Liberalism*

promote more traditionalist republican approaches in his scholarship on Machiavelli. Skinner argued that the view elaborated in the Discourses is not only relevant to contemporary concerns, but is even superior to the prevailing contemporary view. For Skinner, Machiavelli is the classic modern representative of what may be described as the republican tradition, a tradition Skinner aims to revive and defend over against the liberal one.[119] Skinner notes the positive resemblances between the republican arguments of *The Discourses* and the earliest traditions of Italian republicanism which emerge from the 12th century and continue until the Renaissance. Skinner also underscores the axiomatic relevance of Machiavelli's theory of the humours. Skinner focuses on his three major works, *The Prince*, *Discourses*, and *The History of Florence*. He discusses the influence of Roman moral thought on Machiavelli, concentrating on the extent to which Machiavelli's teachings represent a reaction against this tradition. Placing Machiavelli in the proper social and intellectual context, Skinner reveals the extraordinary originality of his attack on the prevailing moral and political assumptions of his age.

Skinner gives an example drawn from Machiavelli's work, which highlights the importance he attributes to the terms liberty, republic and the common good in the Florentine's ideological vocabulary. In his *Discourses* Machiavelli affirms that liberty is possible only under a *repubblica*.[120] But he also affirms that Rome lived *in libertà* under her early kings. What then does he believe? Does he or does he not think that liberty and monarchy are incompatible? Skinner asked the question and has this to say:

> If we investigate the full range of contexts in which the term *repubblica* occurs, we discover that in Machiavelli the term is used to denote any form of government under which the laws may be said to foster the common good. It follows that for Machiavelli the question of whether a monarchy can be a *repubblica* is not an empty paradox, as it would be for us, but a deep question of statecraft. The question is whether kings can ever

> be relied upon to pass only such laws as will serve the common good. This gives us an alternative reading: Machiavelli is telling us that, under Romulus and his successors, the laws of Rome served the common good, so that the government, although monarchical in form, was an instance of a *repubblica*. Since this has the effect of resolving the contradiction, I am suggesting that this is also the interpretation we ought to prefer.[121]

One alternative possibility that deserves reconsideration, according to Skinner, is that which finds classic expression in Machiavelli's Discourses. The teaching of the Discourses, he argues, represents a forgotten third way between Aristotelianism and liberalism. In common with liberalism, the *Discourses* defends a liberty that is, in the language of Isaiah Berlin, negative rather than positive.[122] It is a 'freedom from' rather than a 'freedom for'. There is nothing Aristotelian about this liberty, nothing teleological. Liberty in the Discourses means simply, in Skinner's formulation, the absence of constraint, or to keep closer to Machiavelli's own language, the absence of dependence.[123] Yet Machiavelli's liberty is not the individualistic, egoistic liberty of liberalism, for it proves to be inseparable from public service and civic virtue. This is simply because public service and civic virtue "prove upon examination to be instrumentally necessary to the avoidance of coercion and servitude".[124] Liberty is the end, virtue merely the indispensable means. It is on this ground that he proposes a return to Machiavelli.

Maurizio Viroli's distinctive contribution to Machiavelli's republican theory is the central importance he accords to patriotism. In two of his books; *Machiavelli* and *Repubblicanesimo*, he argued that while the republican tradition is full of approving references to patriotism, contemporary republicans, according to Viroli, have mostly ignored it.[125] Viroli aims to repair this grave omission. The omission, he believes, is grave because patriotism is the principal spring of civic virtue and therefore of liberty.[126] Of Machiavelli he writes approvingly: "Patriotism was for him the soul of politics. When love of country does not

inform it, political action turns into the mean pursuit of personal or particular interest, or into vain search for fame. Only patriotism gives the motivation, the strength, the wisdom, and the restraint that true politics requires."[127]

The republican patriot like Machiavelli is loyal above all else to the republic. Not even religious loyalties have a prior claim: Machiavelli famously said that he loved his patria more than his own soul.[128] A sign of the priority of the political over the cultural and national is that in the extreme case, the republican patriot will even be willing to make war against his native land and his fellow countrymen in order to save or restore the republic and a vivere libero.[129]

For Viroli, Machiavelli's patriotism depends on the ability to distinguish not only between us and them, but between a vivere libero and its corruption. It is therefore a patriotism which can never be thoughtless or uncritical. Still, it always remains the love of one patria over others; it always remains the love of my country rather than of the whole human race. Viroli makes no apologies for this particularism. "For even in an epoch of globalization, the patria remains the indispensable medium between the individual and humanity as a whole: to help humanity, the best way to begin is by helping one's own country."[130] For Viroli there is no necessary conflict between patriotism, or the interest of one's own country, and the interest of all countries. Hence, Machiavelli's, patriotism is so important because it is the passion which drives citizens to put the common good before personal and particular interests. It is a charitable love of the common good of the republic. Without it, the common good cannot be achieved.[131]

We shall have to examine in the course of this work how far Machiavelli relies upon patriotism or love of the common good, and how far he relies upon other motives. Certainly he emphasizes that even the Roman republic in its prime, at a great crisis of its fate, could not count on the patriotism of its citizens but had to make use of religion (fear of God).[132]

The distinctive contribution of Philip Pettit to Machiavelli's republican theory lies in his agreement with Machiavelli's concept of liberty as non-domination. And with this Pettit takes his case with liberals as distorting Machiavelli's republican liberty.[133] In his book; *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* Pettit elaborates at length on this concept, but its basic meaning is simple. One is dominated insofar as one has a master (dominus); one enjoys non-domination insofar as one has no such master. To have a master or to be a slave means to be subject to the arbitrary will of someone or something else (i.e. of an individual or a collectivity); arbitrary means operating without consideration of one's interests and pinions. Not to have a master means to have protection for instance, the protection of the law against such an arbitrary will or against arbitrary interference in one's affairs.[134]

Pettit believes that liberty as non-domination has in our time been eclipsed by liberty as non-interference. These two definitions are not identical, for there can be interference without domination and there can be domination without interference. Interference can be practiced in a way that is non-arbitrary and therefore non-dominating. Domination can exist without any actual interference: a master can choose to leave his slaves alone. Pettit argues that whereas non-domination was the traditional republican definition of liberty, non-interference is the liberal one. Liberals seek to reduce interference; they are not necessarily concerned with reducing subjection to arbitrary power. They are satisfied if interference is very unlikely if the master, presumably from enlightened self-interest, is very likely to leave his slaves alone.[135]

Pettit's claim that liberals reject the principle of liberty as non-domination appears to be directed mainly against liberal utilitarianism rooted in the thought of William Paley and Jeremy Bentham and ultimately in the thought of Hobbes.[136] Whatever may be true of Hobbes and the utilitarian, however, it is surely going too far to say that liberalism as a whole

does not define liberty as non-domination. Surely there has been from the beginning a strong current of liberal thought which holds that the primary purpose of civil society is to protect certain rights (especially life, liberty and property) not only against interference, but precisely against arbitrary interference, i.e. domination. Pettit (correctly) refers to Locke as an exponent of liberty as non-domination;[137] yet Locke is commonly regarded as a founder of the philosophy which came to be called liberalism.[138]

Regardless of whether liberty as non-domination is really more a republican principle than a liberal one, Pettit's reaffirmation of this principle is helpful for the cause of this study. Particularly noteworthy is his emphasis on the psychological benefits of non-domination. Pettit appropriately cites Machiavelli's remark that "The common utility that is drawn from a free way of life is not recognised by anyone while it is possessed: This is being able to enjoy one's things freely, without any suspicion, not fearing for the honour of wives and that of children, not to be afraid of oneself. For no one ever confesses that he has an obligation to one who does not offend him."[139]

The concept, non-domination captures something essential about what Machiavelli means by a *vivere libero*. It is, however, insufficient as the course of this work will show. Machiavelli, like Pettit, aims to satisfy the desire for non-domination. But unlike Pettit, he also has a use for the opposite desire, the desire to dominate. For Machiavelli, a well-ordered republic is one in which these two desires or humours are in active tension and conflict with one another.[140] What Machiavelli means by this strange assertion accounts for the subject of this study.

The import of this study comes to light when we consider the fact that majority of these interpretations utilized *The Prince* and 'Machiavellianism' as a prism through which to interpret Machiavelli's legacy. In Machiavelli's political thought there are a number of

tensions. There is the obvious tension between the defender of republicanism and the advocate of dictatorship. But it might be argued that allied to this is the tension between different forms of political rationality. First, there is the rationality of seizing and consolidating power, the rationality of survival, where all the stratagems of politics as warfare have to be deployed. But Machiavelli made the point that, this cannot be a system of permanent governance. If continued too long this will provide the basis for anarchy and tyranny.[141] A second rationality is necessary, that of orderly government. The scholars reviewed here tend to focus on the first aspect of his thought, overlooking the way in which he qualifies this rationality in the *Discourses*.[142]

Although in acknowledging the fact that while Skinner, Viroli, Pettit and a few others have made an admirable contribution by asserting the continued relevance of Machiavelli‘s republicanism over Machiavellianism, their account of that republicanism may be inadequate in some important respects. Firstly, they failed to explore the uniqueness of Machiavelli’s usage of the humoural theory which is the bases of his political analyses. Secondly, they failed to emphasize the republican legacy of Machiavelli’s thought, especially in its modern, pluralist implications. Long before political modernity, Machiavelli closely and deeply anticipated with his analyses of the integral character of conflict, the contemporary liberal/civic republicanism, constitutionalism and deliberative democracy.

Consequently, one must undertake a fresh study of his thought. At a minimum, one needs an adequate interpretation of the *Discourses*, and must view the *Prince* with the eyes of the *Discourses*. At most we hope to shed light on these fundamental principles of this work that make Machiavelli a bonafide republican (Machiavelli’s use of the homoural theory). To this end, a certain amount of close textual analysis will be required. The reader should bear in mind that such analysis is always undertaken with a view to the larger question of the meaning and relevance of Machiavelli for us today.

CHAPTER THREE

REPUBLICANISM IN MACHIAVELLI'S POLITICAL THOUGHT

To fully grasp the implicit connotations of Machiavelli's republican literature, it is important we highlight Machiavelli's epistemic approach to political knowledge in relation to his conception of reality as it puts us on a proper footing with his thoughts and the logic of his republicanism.

3.1 Machiavelli's Approach to Political Knowledge.

In *The Discourses*, Machiavelli presents his political theory in more detail and with more philosophical reasoning. From the dedication of *The Discourses*, Machiavelli states that in the book "I have set out all I know and all I have learned in the course of my own experience and steady reading in the affairs of the world."[143] From the beginning, he is clear he is exploring a new land "I have determined to enter upon a path not yet trodden by anyone,"[144] meaning that he has discovered, like Columbus, a new world, something which can be applied to founding a perfect republic, and that he intended to do that regardless of the consequences, as he believed it to be for the common benefit of all[145].

Machiavelli's 'new way' in fact demanded a real break with traditional political philosophy as an introduction into modern political theory. This 'new way' of political thinking actually meant breaking away from Christian political thought, as well as from the ancient Greek ideal of the unity of politics and ethics in the polis.[146] Furthermore, his 'new way' also suggested utilizing ancient Roman republican thought and experience in order for its imitation; e.g. for the sake of establishing a republic in Florence and Italy, instead of the rule of the *lizenzia* (institutionally, a republic, but effectively, an imbalanced quasi-aristocratic rule).[147]

Machiavelli's idea is not only to go back to the past and learn what worked and what not; that would be a mere academic exercise. Machiavelli makes the case that the ancient modes can be and should be imitated by contemporaries. For him, the reason modern man does not learn from the past is because people do not have a "true understanding of books on history."[148] And this misunderstanding arises from the presumption that imitation is impossible, thinking that the past is radically different from the present. But the reality is not only that the heavens, the sun and the elements are the same, but man is the same as well.[149]

For Machiavelli, the man before Christ is exactly the same man after Christ. Nothing has changed. The men from Rome and Greece are the same as those from Florence and Italy. And if that is the case, why not imitate the past, especially when that virtuous past brought glorious empires like the Roman and the Greek?[150] The historian of Rome's glory is Livy,[151] and what Machiavelli did in *The Discourses* is to describe Livy's lessons and reduce them to rules readily available to his contemporaries. Rome is the ideal that needs to be imitated and lessons from Rome's histories are the way to do it.

This imitation of history for Machiavelli should happen in politics the same way that it happens in other areas of knowledge. It happens in art: people always want an old sculpture and are willing to pay a lot of money to bring one home. Artists try to imitate classical work. It happens in law: most of the laws are based on the opinion of ancient jurists and classical codes.[152] It happens in medicine: physicians base their knowledge on experiments and remedies discovered and practiced in the past. But politics is different: "in ordering republics, in maintaining governments, in ruling kingdoms, in organizing armies and managing war, in executing laws among subjects, in expanding an empire, not a single prince or republic now resorts to the examples of the ancients."[153]

'Imitating' implied a technical or engineering understanding of political action, which is 'modern' in the (contemporary) sense of applicable knowledge (which has empirical

roots/approval and which may be used to create new experiences/new social reality).[154] Machiavelli's own use of the terms 'ancient' and 'modern' must be contextually understood; by 'ancient', he meant things, events, ideas, or persons belonging to pre Christian classical culture, and by 'modern' he meant things, events, ideas, or persons belonging to Christian culture. As Anthony Parel remarked in this regard:

> ... the overall purpose of his new teaching is to persuade his readers to reject the present, i.e. modern, i.e. Christian understanding of things, and to imitate the ancients – but only those among the ancients who stress *vita activa*, and this only insofar as such imitation will enable them to reject the 'present' and bring out something 'new'[155].

Machiavelli believed in the power of knowledge, in the power of a theory about a proper model of republican political order. In the Preface to his book *The Discourses*, he also elaborates on the erroneous ways of reading historical texts and the misunderstanding of history, in the sense of hearing about various incidents, yet never thinking about the possibility of imitating relevant historical events[156]. According to him, one should seek to obtain practical lessons from the study of history.

The practical orientation and intention of his thinking anticipated the political thought of the New Age and modernity, in which citizens/individuals instead of God would be considered the real creators of their political and social lives.[157] While Machiavelli himself neither anticipated nor accepted the modern theory of natural law and the social contract, he did believe that politics create society and (political) order, that individuals are neither good nor bad, rather that they can be modelled by good laws and state institutions, that different humours as well as their conflicts might contribute to the enactment of good laws, and that successful historical experiences should be imitated. This resonates with the secular and pragmatic orientation of modern social and political sciences.[158]

Nevertheless, Strauss remarks that this secular and pragmatic orientation is not linked to positivist descriptive or analytical political science for Machiavelli. Instead, since it aims to be useful, scientific knowledge must be based on the comprehensive analysis of practice or the experience of contemporary items ('particular knowledge'), as well as on the continuous readings of what is ancient, e.g. on relevant 'general knowledge' which should be imitated according to its best results. Therefore, useful scientific knowledge also contains a normative dimension; it must be applicable, but what is meant to be applied is the 'imitation' of a certain ideal or model:

> The firm science' or the 'general knowledge' which is meant to be useful is for this reason at least partly perceptive or normative. Machiavelli does not oppose to the normative political philosophy of the classics a merely descriptive or analytical political science, he rather opposes to a wrong normative teaching the true normative teaching. From his point of view, a true analysis of political 'facts' is not possible without the lights supplied by knowledge of what constitutes a well-ordered commonwealth.[159]

Habermas notes that the technical or engineering sense of the concept of praxis entered political thought with Machiavelli and Thomas More[160]. Similarly, Held asserts in Machiavelli's case that politics creates society and, moreover, that it plays a creative role. In this respect, he states that 'there was no natural or God-given framework to order political life. Rather it was the task of politics to create order in the world ... Politics is thus ascribed a pre-eminent position in social life as the chief constitutive element of society.'[161]

In short, politics based on the rule of law not on 'power politics' is that which is singularly able to create virtuous citizens instead of indolent and selfish individuals; mixed government secures public freedom and 'makes citizens good' as this manner of government is most likely to balance the interests of rival social groupings. The creative role of politics in building a social reality presupposes the 'technical/engineering,' and practical/applicable meaning of Machiavelli's conception of political knowledge conceived as the proposed 'imitation' of the best historical role model of the Roman republic. Machiavelli illustrates

both the virtues and the vices of Rome and from that moral learning shows how to build a republic similar to or even better than that one.

3.2 The Traditional Worldview; Impacts of Renaissance Cosmology on Machiavelli

The traditionalist world-view of Machiavelli, his following of Renaissance cosmology, physics and astrological natural philosophy, which all propose the unity of the heavens, nature, 'things of the world' and 'human things' provided Machiavelli as an exemplary science for the state.

Regarding the theme of the heavens, Machiavelli appeared to accept the contemporary position of astrological natural philosophy that the heavens are the general cause of all particular motions, human, elemental and natural occurring in the sublunary world. That is to say, the motions of history as well as of states are subject to the motions of the heavens.[162]

In correspondence with the popular thought of his day, the heavens and fortune were often equated, and fortune itself symbolized the power of the heavens and their divinity. However, the natural philosophy of his time considered the heavens to be the source of unchanging determinism, fate, or the necessity of the universe, while fortune referred to chance events that occur in a universe determined as such.

Machiavelli thought that the restraints of human autonomy and freedom originate not only from the heavens and from fortune, but from individual humours/character as well. He also utilized the (astrological) notion of 'the quality of times', which refers to the dependence of virtue on certain cosmological factors. In both *The Prince* and *The Discourses*, he noted the importance of conforming the modes of behaviour of politicians and innovators to the 'quality of times' (given conditions) in order that they be successful in their own innovative intentions.[163] In spite of all the restraints that originate from the heavens, fortune and 'quality of time', Machiavelli's cosmology does allow some space for human autonomy, for the *vita*

activa, for *virtu* (virtue) conceived as the political activism of individuals, public-spiritedness and devotion to the common good, instead of for only private interests'.[164].

3.3 Machiavelli's Republicanism

Elements of traditional republicanism, as well as significant anticipation of modern pluralist/liberal republicanism, are present in Machiavelli's theoretical legacy. It could be added that Machiavelli's world-view was influenced by the commonly shared Renaissance cosmology/astrology of his lifetime. We begin our discussion with the differentiating elements of both traditional and pluralist/modern republicanism in his political philosophy.

3.4 Machiavelli's Republican Tradition

Machiavelli followed the mood and content of the republican thought that had been born in Italian cities from the closing of the 12th until the 15th century. At the beginning of this period, a distinctive system of republican government had come to be well established in most major cities of the region (the Regnum Italicum). At that time, chief magistrates called podesta were elected for a period of 6 or 12 months, and executive councils including the podesta itself enjoyed a status no higher than that of public servants of the commune, which elected them.[165] However, only after the recovery of Aristotle's moral and political philosophy in the latter part of the 13th century was the theoretical articulation of this new form of urban politics possible. Without touching upon ancient Greek philosophy, yet inspired by the practice of the communes and by Roman authors and historians (especially Cicero and Sallust), Florence had a unique role at the start of the 15th century in giving rise to the development of ideas more appropriate for urban life: the ideology of self-governing republicanism. Therein, the revival of Aristotle and the rise of Florentine humanism were both of vital importance in the evolution of republican thought in Machiavelli's time.[166]

Machiavelli followed pre-humanist literature and Renaissance republicanism. In *The Discourses*, Machiavelli actually presented his defence of republican values in traditional terms. Machiavelli's inspiration stemmed from pre-humanist treaties on city government, model speeches designed for praising the glory and honour of incoming podesta,[167] and praising the greatness, peace and equality of citizens before the law (legal equality), all of which linked liberty with elective forms of government in the practice of communes.

In *The Discourses* Machiavelli fully endorsed the idea that the highest ends for which any city can strive are civic glory and greatness (a free state internally and externally). He praised the practice of cities being founded by their own citizens, and regarded cities established by princes as not having free beginnings and, hence, as not being able to attain greatness. He also recommended traditional beliefs in the importance of the common good (the behaviour of each citizen in accordance with virtue and public-spiritedness), as well as civic greatness (as opposed to corrupt behaviour in which factions or individuals give priority to their own personal ambitions and factional allegiances).[168]

Machiavelli's constitutional proposals were largely dependent on the traditional arguments; namely, the rule of a prince instigates the harmful behaviour of the prince to the city and the harmful behaviour of the city to the prince. Only a republican form of governance (an elective system of government) is capable of ensuring the promotion of the common good. Machiavelli adheres to the idea of all pre humanists and of latter Renaissance apologists, that of the communes, where only under such elective constitutions the goal of civic greatness can ever be achieved.

Machiavelli connects liberty with greatness, and states that it is only possible to live 'in a free state' when it is under a self-governing republic, and that only the republic can achieve greatness. He noted that the Romans' free manner of living began when they first elected two consuls in place of a king.[169] A self-governing republic can be preserved only if its citizens

cultivate civic virtue and public-spiritedness, which are the capacities that enable one willingly to serve the common good (expressed as courage and prudence).

> It is easy to see how this affection of peoples for self-government comes about, for experience shows that cities have never increased either in domain or wealth, unless they have been independent. It is truly remarkable to observe the greatness which Athens attained but most marvellous of all is to observe the greatness which Rome attained after freeing itself from its kings. The reason is easy to understand; for it is not the well-being of the individuals that makes cities great, but the well-being of the community; and it is beyond question that it is only in republics that the common good is looked to properly in that all that promotes it is carried out"[170]

Although, Machiavelli accepted ancient and Renaissance traditions, however, he observed that internal discord was not at all lethal for civic greatness as the Romans thought; given his humoural theory. His awareness of the importance that the theory of humours plays in ordering republics creates an opening to understand how this theory of the humours leads far beyond traditional political ideas and practice.

3.5 The Use of the Humoural Theory in Machiavelli's Republicanism

3.5.1 Conflicts as the Source of Good Laws and Liberty

As has been hitherto mentioned, Machiavelli's republicanism contained all the elements of traditional republicanism. However, with his theory of the humours, Machiavelli also anticipated some elements of modern pluralist, liberal republicanism.

Machiavelli draws on the ancient medical language by speaking of the 'humours' that constitute a mixed body. He makes use of this language in order to demolish the universally shared opinion of historians that condemned the conflictual life of the Roman republic, including his beloved Livy: "…those who damn the tumults between the nobles and the plebs', he writes in *Discourses*, "do not consider that in every republic are two diverse

humours, that of the people and that of the great, and that all the laws that are made in favour of liberty arise from their disunion".[171]

There are important ideas in Machiavelli's republicanism which are discordant with traditional republican thought. Machiavelli did not follow one particular idea that was central to the Italian republicanism of his time and of the ancient Roman period, namely, that internal discord is invariably fatal to civic greatness,[172] and that the common good and greatness of a city republic require the preservation of concordance, as well as the avoidance of internal strife. Machiavelli also did not accept the traditional republican idea that political actions need be judged primarily by their intrinsic rightness; quite on the contrary, he gave priority to the effects of political actions.

In relation to Machiavelli's first point of departure from Italian republicanism, Skinner asserts:

> Everyone had treated the preservation of concord, the avoidance of internal strife, as indispensable to upholding the common good and thereby attaining greatness. By insisting that tumults represent a prime cause of freedom and greatness, Machiavelli is placing a question-mark against this entire tradition of thought. What he is repudiating is nothing less than the Ciceronian vision of the concordia ordinum, a vision hitherto endorsed by the defenders of self-governing republics in an almost uncritical way.[173]

Machiavelli repudiates Cicero's *concordia ordinum*,[174] affirming to his core ideas the existence of the different humours (umori), as well as their conflicting and pluralist mutual relation.

Machiavelli utilized this concept of the humours in a multidimensional manner. The theory of the humours guided Machiavelli's thought in a direction that was both traditionalist and anticipated modernity. This theory designated his entrenchment in the astrological world-view of the Renaissance, while his specific political interpretation of the humours shifted into envisaging a more modern political world-view.[175]

Machiavelli designated the humours as relevant social groups of the given body politic. Political humours in Machiavelli's usage refer to different social groups and to their particular, and mutually conflicting, aspirations. Machiavelli believed that different necessary factions existed in each political body, e.g. that each body politic consists of different humours (people and the nobles). He believed that the quality of political order can be measured only by the quality of the institutional regulation of the interrelations of the humours themselves, and that the 'regimes are the ''effects'' of the conflicts between political humours.[176]

Machiavelli also believed the constitutional/legal balancing of different humours/ classes/social groups (i.e. satisfying the interests of all social strata/estates/factions; for instance, the poor and the rich) to be the main purpose of a well-ordered body politic.[177] In this respect, he regarded republican Rome as being the best governmental form and was of the opinion that the sharing authority among the royal estate, aristocracy and the populace 'made it a perfect commonwealth'.[178]

According to Machiavelli, creating good laws was possible only in a free republic,[179] due to the fact that the laws in this system are created by all mutually conflicting social groups and can be accepted by every group; tumults have been solved in the republic on the common benefit of all social strata. Only a free republic can manage to overcome the particular interests of each and all estates and represent a common interest.[180]

In book one, discourse 4, of *The Discourses*, subtitled 'That Discord between the Plebs and the Senate of Rome Made the Republic both Free and Powerful', Machiavelli described those who condemned the quarrels between the nobles and the plebs as having not understood that the primary cause of Rome's retaining its freedom lay in these conflicts. They incorrectly paid no attention to the positive effects that these quarrels produced, nor did they 'realize that in every republic there are two different humours, that of the populace and that of the upper

class and that all legislation favourable to liberty is brought about by the clash between them'.[181] In the same discourse, Machiavelli asserts the necessity of a mutual humoural balance for enacting good laws:

> One cannot, therefore, regard such tumults as harmful, nor such a republic as divided, seeing that during so long a period it did not on account of its discords send into exile more than eight or ten citizens, put very few to death, and did not on many impose fines. Nor can a republic reasonably be stigmatized in any way as disordered in which there occur such striking examples of virtue, since good examples proceeded from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws in this case from those very tumults which many so inconsiderately condemn; for anyone who studies carefully their result, will not find that they occasioned any banishment or act of violence inimical to the common good, but that they led to laws and institutions whereby the liberties of the public benefited.[182]

In book one, discourse 2, Machiavelli elaborates on how exactly Rome became a republic. Originally, Romulus and other kings had established good laws, quite compatible with freedom. However, since they intended to establish a kingdom instead of a republic, many institutions lacked any preservation of liberty when the city became free. Therefore the kings were expelled and two consuls were appointed at once; yet only the title of the king was expelled, not the royal power itself. Subsequently, the consuls and the Roman senate represented the principality and aristocracy, but a place of democracy was to be established. Machiavelli remarked on how the Roman nobility, with its overbearing behaviour, provoked the populace to rise against it, and on how the nobility stemming from the fear of losing it all granted the populace a share in the government:

> It was in this way that tribunes of the plebs came to be appointed, and their appointment did much to stabilize the form of government in this republic, for in its government all three estates now had a share ... The blending of these humours made a perfect commonwealth; and ... it was friction between plebs and the senate that brought this perfection about.[183]

In book one; discourse 3, Machiavelli reiterates the importance of introducing the institution of tribunes for securing/completing republican constitutional order in Rome. In this

discourse, he switched from his previous historical explanation to a normative proposition about an importance and a productivity of social struggles and conflicts among the humours, so as to improve the institutional order of the republic. The title of that discourse implies his statement: 'What Kind of Events Gave Rise in Rome to the Creation of Tribunes of the Plebs, Whereby that Republic Was Made More Perfect'.[184]

In the already mentioned book one, discourse 4, Machiavelli also commented on the situation in which dissatisfactions of the common people resulted in introducing an institution of tribunes: Hence if tumults led to the creation of the tribunes, tumults deserve the highest praise, since, besides giving the populace a share in the administration, they served as the guardian of Roman liberties.[185]

According to Machiavelli, the institutions of the senate, consuls and tribunes of the Roman republic during this flourishing period of the Roman state had successfully balanced differences and tensions in the humours. Nevertheless, the corruption in the balance of the humours led towards the decline of Roman republic itself. With his interpretation of the humours, Machiavelli set aside any ethical differentiation of regimes, and used the humours and satisfaction of their needs as a merit of differentiation between them. Thus, to Machiavelli republican regimes were preferable, as they succeeded in establishing a balance among the existent humours and their internal conflicts; accordingly, they possessed 'positive effects' and represented a healthy and acceptable body politic.[186]

He further ethically differentiated the aspirations of the different political humours, in the sense that the aspirations of the oppressed are more honourable: "For the aim of the people is more honest than that of the nobility, the latter desiring to oppress, and the former merely to avoid oppression."[187] However, this differentiation is not that of the traditional republican meaning where ethical behaviour is linked to virtue. The oppressed are more honourable and eager to defend liberty, but this is not due to the fact that they are more

virtuous, rather that they cannot seize power themselves and will therefore not permit others to do so.[188] Machiavelli used the notion of the 'humours' to define the results of the interactions among social groups; for instance, he termed the 'humours of Florence' the 'factional conflicts of Florence'. Sometimes Machiavelli also utilized this notion for conflicts among states. In addition, he used this term in order to describe the political meaning of 'good' and 'bad', in the sense of healthy and malignant humours, depending on whether they contributed to the health or the sickness of the body politic.

In order to live freely, the people search for a guard to protect against the nobility, who have much more power. These tension and conflict enable the laws to be enacted. All the laws that are made in favour of freedom arise from their (the people and the great) disunion.[189] To safeguard people's right and freedom from the nobility, the tribunes are created and play a role as 'a guard of Roman freedom'. Not the Roman nobility, but the Roman people are the guard of freedom, and this leads to a state in which more people can participate in politics. In addition to the enactment of laws, the conflict between the people and the nobility makes the public accusation possible.[190] This helps the nobility and the people not to answer their tension and struggle privately, but to solve them publicly. The people and the nobility carry a tense relationship. This tension can be a medicine or a poison. If there is no room for solving or diminishing the tension, the people and the nobility will make their own factions and fight each other on the street or even act illegally. The accusation serves as a vent to prevent conflict of interest between the people and the nobility from colliding directly. Furthermore, the laws and orders resulting from the disunion of the people and the nobility allow this tension-laden relationship not to cause civil war, but to aim for the growth of the Republic.

Liberty played an integral role within Machiavelli's republic. For Machiavelli, "…among the most necessary things established by those who have founded a republic in a

prudent fashion is a safeguard for liberty."[191] Liberty described the relations among equals, being "compromise, restraint, and settling for one's dues." Liberty strengthened and excited the plebeians while compelling the nobility to direct their energy towards conquest. Thus, liberty demonstrated its own value, being the republic's secret to "increased dominion and riches." However, liberty rested on laws, which are the moral cores of integrity and responsibility. Therefore, liberty, when accompanied with equality (laws), consisted of free will, or free way of life, private rights to citizens, and free suffrage. The republic, guarded by liberty among "the most necessary of things," and maintained a republican constitution, created a lasting free life, which everybody can enjoy.[192]

Furthermore, and most importantly, Machiavelli used the term of the 'humours' to reconsider political regimes. 'Regimes are the ''effects'' of the conflicts between political humours: how they combine or fail to combine them is the key issue.'[193].

3.5.2 The Theory of the Humours and the Classification of Political Regimes.

As has already been noted, a regime can be classified as being a principality, a republic, or a lizenzia, according to the institutional merit of satisfying the humours relevant to them. In this regard, Parel asserts:

> Surprisingly, in Machiavelli's hands umori becomes a means of classifying political regimes, in my view, this is surely one of the most original achievements of Machiavelli's political thought. That he uses this concept to distinguish princedoms, republics and lizenzie permits us to wonder whether The Prince, the Discourses, the Florentine Histories, and the 'Discourse on Remodelling the Government of Florence' could be read from a new perspective.[194]

For Machiavelli, the Aristotelian difference between monarchy and tyranny lost its meaning. Monarchy no longer sought the common good, since it was only important that the prince

maintained his own power by aligning himself with the strongest political humour and satisfying the needs of this dominant humour.

Machiavelli uses this theory of the humours to demonstrate the superiority (better fortune and endurance) of republics over monarchies. According to him, social groups in a republic are better capable of resolving their differences through the mediums of its constitution and laws. They are capable of self-government and do not need the mediation of a prince.[195] In a republic, there is a share in the division of power between groups, and while group conflict does remain, it does not degenerate into a struggle in which one group seeks the total elimination of the other. A republic encourages the flourishing of citizens of different humours and temperament, whereas a monarchy does not. Because of this, republics are livelier, more flexible, and more successful in their foreign relations than are monarchies.[196]

In contrast to a republic, social groups in a lizenzia are always at odds with one another. Consequently, the possibility of a stable government is low in this form of government as antagonism among the humours is strong; each group pursues only its own interest, often at the expense of its rivals, and always without any due regard for the interest of the whole. In this manner, 'groups become factions, and the constitution and the law become instruments of factional conflicts'.[197]

The republic can be divided into two parts: a governo largo, broadly based republic, or a governo stretto, narrowly based republic.[198] The former is a popular republic, the latter an aristocratic one. Machiavelli prefers the popular republic to the aristocratic one because it provides the best conditions for vitalizing *virtù*. This difference between the two republics stems from their respective modes of proceeding according to their different constitutions. Machiavelli designates Sparta and Venice as governo stretto and Rome as governo largo.[199]Those aristocratic republics were ruled by small nobility that excluded the people. The nobility distrusted the people and did not let them participate in politics. Therefore,

Venice did not recruit their army from the common people, but hired the mercenary. Sparta did not open their gates to foreigners. Sparta took up this exclusionism to maintain its aristocracy.

Machiavelli points out, however, the weakness of these constitutions in a variable world. For him, the expansion is a sort of necessity. Even a country, which has no intention to expand, must do so when being invaded in war. If the country is not defeated, the country has won the war and must conquer the other state. This victory leads to an expansion. In this case, if a state has no sufficient army to expand because of its exclusion of people, it will collapse. The aristocratic republic cannot manage the necessity of expansion via these international relations. On the other hand, in Rome the people and the nobility shared authority and weapons, which results in the popular republic.[200]

According to Machiavelli, variances between principalities, republics and lizenzie do not stem from the classical notion of a regime's form, but from the notion of the humours and their satisfaction. A republican regime best satisfies the needs of all the humours and does so in the common interest.

3.6 The lizenzia vs Republic: Machiavelli's Constitutional Draft.

As has been explained above, the Renaissance theory of the humours served Machiavelli in his particular anti-traditionalist, pluralist interpretation of the republican order. According to Machiavelli's idea about maintaining well balanced interrelations among the humours (the populace and the upper class) as had occurred in the healthy times of the Roman republic was to be imitated in the Florence of his time. For him, the malignant conditions of the misbalance among the existent humours in the lizenzia of Florence needed to be replaced by new institutional arrangements as proposed in order to become a real republic.[201]

According to this interpretative framework, Machiavelli's 'Discourse on *Remodeling the Government of Florence*' would demonstrate his own attempts to provide a constitutional

draft to replace the lizenzia in Florence with a real republic and to establish a new healthy body politic in the city: one based on well-balanced humours.

The form of government in the Florence of Machiavelli's time was corrupted; it was a lizenzia that did not satisfy the interests of its general citizenry. Possessing subsequent dominant antagonisms, the lizenzia did not bode well for Florence, a city that knew how to produce wealth and yet did not know how to produce free institutions. With the creation of such institutions, these antagonisms between the different humours would have been better kept under control. Therein, with the introduction of the proposed republican constitution and with the establishment of a controlled humoural, plural character, i.e. through the satisfaction of the competing interests of all its constitutive groups, Florence would have a healthy and dynamic body politic.[202]

In his constitutional draft for Florence, which aimed to establish an actual republic in the city instead of its corrupted lizenzia, Machiavelli observed that; "Those who organize republics ought to provide for the three different sorts of men [qualità di umori] that exist in all cities, that is, the most important, those in the middle and the lowest (primi, mezzani e ultimo)".[203] Machiavelli proposes the introduction of the following institutions: a body of Colleagues numbering sixty five (to satisfy the primi), from which a chief magistrate was to be chosen; a Council of Two Hundred (to satisfy the mezzani); and a Council of One Thousand or at least of Six Hundred (to satisfy all citizens).[204]

According to him, all societal groups necessitated their own respective satisfaction, as no 'perfect republic would be possible without satisfying the citizens in general. He also proposes a further body of sixteen *gofalonieri*, among whom four would be chosen to sit with the highest administrative bodies. In addition to these three 'assemblies', he recommends a Court of Appeal that would consist of thirty citizens. Such an institution would guarantee the independence of the judiciary, as well as the security of the life, liberty and property of all

citizens. Although these institutions would safeguard republican liberty, Machiavelli also thought that Florence would require a head [capo] in order to be a genuine republic, and that this leader needed to be a constitutional or 'public' one.[205] Thus, Machiavelli concludes:

> There is no other way of escaping these ills than to give the city the laws that can by themselves stand firm. And they always will stand firm when everybody has a hand in them, and when everybody knows what he needs to do, and in whom he can trust, and no citizen, whatever his rank, either through fear for itself or through ambition, will need to desire further innovation[206]

Having established the order and constitution of his humoral body polity, Machiavelli turns his attention to the republic's best mode of proceeding that would guarantee the maintenance and flourishing of the republic taking a cue from the Roman experience.

3.7 *Virtù* and Common Good

Machiavelli locates the strategic weaknesses plaguing Italy and Florence, which, for example, he observes, had become the battlefields of neighbouring countries, in their lack of *virtù*[207] (Virtue). Only by restoring certain modes of action, Machiavelli says, which themselves are the vital carriers of *virtù* can Florence and Italy revitalize their politics, overcome their internal weaknesses and expel their foreign occupiers.

virtù is constrained by umori, the nearly unchangeable human nature[208] that varies among individuals and is differently able to solve different kinds of problems. This, Machiavelli argues, explains why political constitutions that appropriately govern the state's *umori* are important: only through good constitutions are different men with their different abilities properly deployed to overcome different sorts of political problems.[209] When a state experiences different crises, Machiavelli says that different modes of action may be appropriate for each. *Virtù* is the ability to cope with different circumstances, and therefore signifies proper modes of action; for Machiavelli, political crisis stems from its absence.[210]

The most important thing for *virtù* is the priority of the public good over private interest. In this respect, a circumstantial amorality or immorality can be approved. Not the morality itself, but its usefulness for *virtù* and success comes into consideration.

> But above all, it is a more marvellous thing to consider to what greatness Rome arrived after it liberated itself from its Kings. The cause is easy to understand, for not the individual good, but the common good is what makes Cities great. And, without doubt, this common good is not observed except in Republics, because everything is done which makes for their benefit, and if it should turn to harm this or that individual, those for whom the said good is done are so many, that they can carry on against the interests of those few who should be harmed.[211]

Virtù conflicts with private resources, such as family legacy and property rights. Secondly, *virtù* designates a power of well organized people, such as 'virtue of the collectivity'[212], 'virtue of the army'[213] and 'virtue of the Roman people'[214]. Good order and discipline make it possible for various people to abstain from pursuing private interest and show their civic virtue. Thirdly, *virtù* signifies something generating great power of a state in the world.[215]

In his *Prince* and *Discourses*, Machiavelli respectively alludes to Rome's *virtù*, which was transferred to the Goths and to the world's *virtù* during *translatio imperii*.[216] In these cases, *virtù* means something closely related to the power of a hegemonic state.

To sum up, despite its various uses, *virtù* in Machiavelli indicates political agents' own abilities to accomplish purposes and solve problems. However, ability does not reveal itself until it solves a problem. Therefore, the interpretation of *virtù* as a character catches only one side of it. So long as a virtuous action does not result in success, *virtù* is of no use. *Virtù* is tangible only through the success of an action. This makes us pay attention to how to act. *Virtù* is connected to a situation. It is not a divine ability to create 'something' from 'nothing', but the ability to solve a problem in a certain circumstance.

This relatedness of *virtù* to a situation finds expression in a letter to Giovan Battista Soderini in the year 1506, Machiavelli made this point clear. After having raised questions,

such as why a man succeeded in a situation, but later failed in another, or how two entirely different people can score success alike, he gives the following answer:

> I believe that just as Nature has created men with different faces, so she has created them with different intellects and imaginations. As a result, each man behaves according to his own intellect and imagination. And, on the other hand, because times change and the pattern of events differs, one man's hopes may turn out as he prayed they would. The man who matches his way of doing things [modo del procedere] with the conditions of the times is successful; the man whose actions are at odds with the times and the pattern of events is unsuccessful. Hence, it can well be that two men can achieve the same goal by acting differently: because each one of them matches his actions to what he encounters and because there are as many patterns of events as there are regions and government. But because times and affairs often change – both in general and particular – and because men change neither their imaginations nor their ways of doing things [modo di procedere] accordingly, it turns out that a man has good fortune at one time and bad fortune at another. And truly, anyone wise enough to adapt to and understand the times and the pattern of events would always have good fortune or would always keep himself from bad fortune; and it would come to be true that the wise man could control the stars and the Fates. But such wise men do not exist: in the first place, men are short-sighted; in the second place, they are unable to master their own umori; thus it follows that Fortune is fickle, controlling men and keeping them under her yoke.[217]

In his *Discourses*, Machiavelli investigates the different modes of actions of each state. Contrasting with the Florentine and Venetian modes of action that lead to a state's breakdown, Machiavelli praises the Roman way which generates a state's prosperity.

> For if there has never been a republic that has made the profits that Rome did, this arose from there never having been a republic that has been ordered so as to be able to acquire as did Rome. For the armies' virtue [virtù degli eserciti] made them acquire the empire; and the order of proceeding and its own mode [l'ordine del procedere, ed il modo suo proprio] found by its first lawgiver made them maintain what was acquired, as will be narrated extensively below in several discourses.[218]

According to Machiavelli, the Roman free constitution brings up the *virtù* in her citizens. "First of all, the Romans do not hesitate to serve a lowly position even if they served the country in a high position before. On the other side, in Venice, the citizens with high post

refuse to carry out lowly ones. They look upon it as dishonour". Machiavelli thinks that this Venetians' action is honourable to the individuals, but harmful to the common good[219].

A republic with many excellent and talented people will be of no use unless they are put in the right place. The free way of life in Rome pays high regard to the individual's ability or *virtù*, on the basis of which a man can serve the country and attain honour. The Venetian constitution, however, divides the nobility from the people and gives no room in politics for the latter. Romans have the opportunity to display their talents, to compete with each other, to demonstrate their abilities, and then to accumulate such experiences.

The Carthaginian's experience comes to place here:

> After Hannibal had defeated the Romans at Cannae, he sent his spokesmen to Carthage to announce the victory and request assistance. What had to be done was disputed in the Senate there. Hanno, an old prudent Carthaginian citizen counselled that this victory should be used wisely to make peace with the Romans, since they, having won, could have it with honourable conditions, and one should not wait to have to make one after a loss. For the intention of the Carthaginians should have been to show the Romans that they were enough to combat them, and having had victory over them, one should not seek to lose it though the hope of a greater. This policy was not taken up, but it was known well by the Carthaginian Senate to have been wise later when the opportunity was lost[220]

Competence and potentiality are able to flourish only under a certain condition. In the aforementioned cases with Fabius and Scipio, Machiavelli portrays Rome's appropriate reaction to different circumstances. A human being's mode of proceeding can barely change; success comes to him only if his mode of action corresponds with a given circumstance. In this sense, it naturally follows that Hannibal's cruelty resulting in a series of victories in Italy would have failed in Scipio's Spain, where the latter's human kindness brought about a success.

A virtuous citizen and his talent are indispensible for a state's survival and prosperity. His great achievement and popularity, however, can bring him excessive fame and power and thereby generate a tyranny. In order to manage this risk, the way of pursuing a reputation must be public. The private method promotes partisanship, undermines the rule of laws, and degenerates the citizens.

> The public modes are when one individual by counselling well, by working better in the common benefit, acquires reputation. One ought to open to citizens the way to this honour and to put up rewards both for counsel and for works so that they have to be honoured and satisfied with them. If these reputations, gained by these ways, are clear and simple, they will never be dangerous. …. The private ways encourage favours that make men partisans to oneself and give spirit to whoever is so favoured to be able to corrupt the public and to breach the laws[221]

Rome's constitution encourages the public mode of action, but discourages the private mode of action from encroaching on its citizens. This results in a prosperous Rome that defends liberty and serves the common good. Rome's powerful, decisive, and prudent policies, including foreign ones, are based on its strong and trustworthy citizens and civil army who promote the public good. This is the basis of the Roman model, which Machiavelli emphasizes in contrast with the Florentine indecisive and imprudent mode of proceeding[222].

> The grave and natural enmities that exist between the men of the people and the nobles, caused by the wish of the latter to command and the former not to obey, are the cause of all evils that arise in cities. This kept Rome disunited, and…has kept Florence divided…For the enmities between the people and the nobles at the beginning of Rome that were resolved by disputing were resolved in Florence by fighting. Those in Rome ended with a law, those in Florence with the exile and death of many citizens; those in Rome always increased military virtue, those in Florence eliminated it altogether; ...This diversity of effects may have been caused by the diverse ends these two peoples had, for the people of Rome desired to enjoy the highest honors together with the nobles, while the people of Florence fought to be alone in the government without the participation of the nobles. And because the desire of the Roman people was more reasonable, offenses to the nobles came to be more bearable, so that the nobility would yield easily and without resorting to arms.… On the other side the desire of the Florentine people was injurious and unjust, so that the nobility readied greater forces for its own defense...[223]

The "diversity of humors" kept the Romans "disunited" and the Florentines "divided," and since "diverse effects" may result from similar causes "…the enmities between the people and the nobles at the beginning of Rome's republic that were resolved by disputing were resolved in Florence by fighting."[224] While the conflicts between the Roman nobles and plebs "ended with laws" and moderation, those between Florentine nobles and the people resulted in violence and "the exile and death of many citizens."[225] The "moderate" form of civil conflict that Machiavelli had referred to in his Discourses led the Romans to "military virtue," while the civil quarrels of Florence "eliminated it altogether."[226]

To sum up, Machiavelli laments the fact that while the diversity of humours enabled Rome to achieve greatness, the opposite was the case in his beloved Florence. "And there is no doubt that had Florence enjoyed such prosperity after it had freed itself from the Empire as to have obtained a form of government to maintain it united, I know no republic either modern or ancient that would have been its superior, so full of virtue, of arms, and of industry would it have been"[227]

An army or a people arising from passion, not from order, cannot sustain virtù since it lacks "ordered virtue". This leads to Machiavelli's crucial concern about the role of law and religion in the republic.

3.8 Law and Religion.

All of Machiavelli's political philosophy revolved around the simple theory that all men are bad. He said, "…it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it."[228] Machiavelli believed that "…men never work any good unless through necessity."[229] The only reason men ever do good is because it will benefit them personally or because they are afraid of the consequences of not doing good. Machiavelli admits that at times natural consequences make it so that men do good,

however, there are many times that only through the introduction of good laws can a republic, or any ruling body, make the people be good, or to act in a way that will benefit the ruling body and society as a whole.[230] "Therefore it is said that hunger and poverty make men industrious, and the laws make them good."[231] The proper introduction of new laws and orders becomes the key to success for republics.

There are great difficulties in introducing good laws into a society. Laws and orders alone, no matter how good they may be, are not enough to bring success to an empire. Machiavelli had great respect for Rome's first orderer Romulus,[232] but even with such great respect Machiavelli concluded that "…the orders of Romulus would not suffice for such an empire as Rome".[233] According to Machiavelli "…a prudent individual knows many goods that do not have in themselves evident reasons with which one can persuade others."[234] Not only this, but many times people do not fear the recourse of men, and no matter the law, and no matter the consequence associated with the law, men will always break those laws. There is no enforcement structure strong enough to make men do good for absolute fear that their actions will have a specific consequence because with the laws of man there is always a way to elude enforcement.[235]

Empires that depend solely on the orders of strong rulers also run into problems when that ruler is dead. Machiavelli said, "it arises that kingdoms that depend solely on the virtue of one man are hardly durable, because that virtue fails with the life of that one; and it rarely happens that it is restored by succession."[236] No kingdom that depends solely on good laws and orders can survive. These orders depend on the virtue of the ruler and the life of the ruler is finite.[237] Something more infinite is needed.

Orders from rulers lacked longevity, could not instil proper fear of consequences, and were hard to sell to the public, so there was the need of a different tool to keep a republic good. This is why Machiavelli says that religion is "altogether necessary" to the formation of

a successful Republic[238]. Religion took care of all the problems of placing good orders in society. Religion put God in place of man. If the rulers could not set up good laws on their own, the religion could have the public make oaths with God. According to Machiavelli "the citizens feared to break an oath much more than the laws, like those who esteemed the power of God more than man."[239] If man does not fear the consequences of another man because that man cannot enforce his laws completely, an oath with God can remedy the problem because God can see all, and God has an unlimited power to enforce his oaths.

Machiavelli goes further to say that "…there was never any orderer of extraordinary laws for a people who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise they would not have been accepted."[240] When the "great men" of society want to impose new laws and orders that won't be understood or accepted they can use God as a means of giving their new and "extraordinary" laws legitimacy. Men do not so easily believe the logic of other men. They do however, trust the logic of an omnipotent, or at least wiser, God.

Since religion becomes entrenched in a culture and has a shelf life of more than one generation it solves the third problem as well. Laws sold with the power of religious oaths do not die with the rulers who introduced them. As long as people hold to the religion under which they make the oaths the oaths will have the same amount of legitimacy, and will keep men good even after the death of the rulers who introduced the oaths.[241]

Machiavelli said, "Those Princes or those republics that wish to maintain themselves uncorrupt have above everything else to maintain the ceremonies of their religion uncorrupt and hold them always in veneration; for one can have no greater indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine cult disdained."[242] This is because without the religion in place all the problems of implementing laws previously mentioned become prevalent.

It is obvious that according to Machiavelli the introduction and upholding of religion is one of the most important responsibilities of the rulers of republics and kingdoms. Though

Machiavelli had great respect for Romulus he gave perhaps more credit to Rome's second ruler Numa. Numa "…found a very ferocious people and wished to reduce it to civil obedience with the arts of peace, he turned to religion … and he constituted it so that for many centuries there was never so much fear of God as in that republic."[243] Machiavelli considered Numa so important that he even said, "if one had to dispute over which prince Rome was more obligated to, Romulus or Numa, I believe rather that Numa would obtain first rank." Without the introduction of religion by Numa even the Roman Empire would have soon fell apart due to the evil nature of the "ferocious people"[244].

Machiavelli goes on to give various examples of how the Romans used religion and oaths to keep the people good, or in other words, to keep them in obedience to the current ruler, even in times of duress. A review of the examples Machiavelli uses will illustrate how religion has been manipulated to persuade the people.

> There were many of these miracles in Rome, and among others was that (which occurred) when the Roman soldiers were sacking the City of Veienti, some of whom entered the Temple of Juno, and, standing in front of her statue, and saying "WILL YOU COME TO ROME?", it appeared to some that she had made a sign (of assent), and to others that she had said yes. For these men, being full of Religion, (which T. Livius demonstrated) when they entered the Temple went in without tumult and completely devoted and full of reverence, seemed to hear that response to their question which perhaps they had presupposed: which opinion and belief was favored and magnified by Camillus and by the other Princes of the City.[245]

The people were so ready to believe that they even imagined things which confirmed their belief. This, Machiavelli believes, was because "…that opinion and credulity were altogether favored and magnified" by the princes of Rome. The Princes had kept the religion and ceremonies uncorrupt creating a prime environment to manipulate the people to act against their ferocious nature, and to do the will of the ruler.

Religion also functioned in the republic's military as a preservation tool. Religion instilled courage and a willingness to fight enemies of the state in the republic.[246] Romans understood that a key way to make people risk their lives for the state was to require them to take an oath. This oath was taken under the gods, and could not be broken. Therefore, if a person did break the oath, he would have to face the gods' ultimate punishment. Romans would rather risk their lives than risk angering the gods.[247] Religion also acted as an effort to instil motivation in the soldiers.[248]

It is obvious from these examples that Machiavelli placed an emphasis on religion's role as a political and moral tool in a republic taking a cue from the Romans. To the Romans, religion functioned as a moral compass for the republic. Religion promoted national unity, in which all citizens were united by the civil obedience it created. Religion instilled fear of the gods into Roman citizens, which in turn created civil obedience. The gods' punishments were not visible or immediate like the punishments of the law, thus implanting the idea to be virtuous. Roman citizens needed to fear the gods, because it replaced the fear of a tyrant. The gods and their punishments were far more frightening than the immediate punishment from the ruler. Due to this fear, Roman citizens were habitually willing to obey authority.[249] Thus, religion created good citizens and good customs: "the religion introduced by Numa was among the principal reasons for the happiness of that city, because it produced good institutions, good institutions created good fortunes, and from good fortune arose the happy successes of their undertakings."[250] Therefore, there can be no greater indication of the ruin of the state than to see a disregard for its religious humours.[251]

3.9 Renewing the Republic.

Despite the glorification of the republic, Machiavelli acknowledged that with government came corruption, and that the republic was not immune. Once corruption has been overcome and a *vivere civile* has been introduced, that way of life must be preserved. Machiavelli does

not, however, contemplate this necessity with resignation or with tragic pathos. He introduces the natural law of decay only in order to show how it may be successfully counteracted, and how the life of a republic may be extended, if not eternally, at any rate indefinitely His solution: return to the original constitution and first principles. He stated, "The republics that have the best organization and the longest lives are, however, those that can renew themselves often" and that "nothing is more necessary in a community, whether it be religion, kingdom, or republic, than to restore to it the reputation it enjoyed at its beginnings and strive to ensure that either good institutions or good men achieve this effect."[252]

This renewal included the reawakening of the moral forces of the citizen body, meaning "…the method of renewing them is, as was stated, to bring them back to their beginnings, because the beginnings of religions, republics, and kingdoms must always contain in themselves some goodness through which they may regain their early prestige and their early expansion."[253]

Machiavelli suggested that the republics renew themselves every ten years, which could be brought on by two forces: "some extrinsic accident," as in the Gauls overtaking Rome, or "intrinsic prudence," through the rise of a man from within the republic.[254] Machiavelli exemplified intrinsic prudence with Romans such as Horatius Cocles, Scaevola, and Fabricius.[255] However, Machiavelli admired the Kingdom of France for its intrinsic prudence, because "…the parliaments maintain their laws and institutions, especially the one in Paris; which renews them every time it takes an action against a prince of that kingdom and condemns the king in its judgment."[256] Machiavelli continued in saying that the goodness in the state was preserved by "a combination of legalized violence striking dread into hearts of citizens and patriotic heroism inspiring citizens with the love of the nobles," meaning that the renewal should demonstrate the awesome power of the state's ability to execute; the more awesome the execution, the better the results[257].

In contrast, if the state did not renew itself every ten years (or more), the republic would not last. Returning to past morals and glory allowed for change, which in turn removed the sources of corruption. Machiavelli claimed, "…that if they do not renew themselves, these bodies will not endure," because "in the course of time that goodness is corrupted, if something does not come about to bring it back to its proper limits, it will, of necessity kill that body."[258] Therefore, the longer the republic went without change, the greater the chance for corruption.

We may summarizes what Machiavelli intends to introduce to his contemporary world after the Roman model as follows: To honour and reward excellence (virtù),[259] not to despise poverty,[260] to esteem the methods and regulations of military discipline,[261] to oblige the citizens to love one another,[262] to live without factions,[263] to esteem private less than public good.[264] The ancient Roman constitution made these possible. The Roman constitution canalizes the tensions between *umori*; the people and the nobility within the political institution. The institutions like the Senate and the Tribunes enable them to share authority and to be satisfied. Such a constitution generates political liberty.[265] The fair opportunity to display *virtù* and to be successful accompanies the citizens' devotion to the common good instead of private interest. In those situations, the virtuous mode of action is taught and pursued. Machiavelli describes all these things concisely: "…for good examples (of virtue) arise from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those tumults that many inconsiderately damn".[266]

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF MACHIAVELLI'S REPUBLICANISM.

4.1 The Integral Character of Conflicts

Machiavelli and Modern/contemporary political theorists, share one integral point of commonality: the discussion of liberty as embedded in an analysis of what it means to live in a "free state." The affirmation of classical republicanism has something which is humanist about it; it entails the affirmation that "homo is naturally a citizen and most fully himself when living in a vivere civile…"[267]

The thesis in question is that political liberty derives from a certain kind of conflict. In every republic, as we have noted, Machiavelli asserts that, there are two basic classes or humours, the people and the grandi, and liberty is the product of the disunion between them.[268] This assertion is generally held to be one of Machiavelli's most original contributions to political philosophy. What was original in the 16th century, however, may now appear to be a mere truism: practically everyone now associates a free society with disunion, i.e. with dissent, competition, pluralism and the like.

For Machiavelli, the aim of politics is that the needs of different social groupings be met as they arise from different humours. Social struggles are therefore unavoidable, since different humours are by definition in mutual conflicts. Machiavellian polity requires a humoural unity, a unity of opposites, and a balance among conflicting humours. Quite unconventional conclusion was reached: the basis of liberty may not just be a self governing regime and a willingness to participate in politics, but may also be conflict and disagreement through which citizens can promote and defend their interests.[269]

In Machiavelli's *Discourses*, the chapter on "What Accidents Made the Tribunes of the Plebs Be created in Rome, Which Made the Republic More Perfect," begins with an overly

pessimistic assertion concerning the nature of human acts. "As all those who demonstrate who reason on a civil way of life, and as every history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever disposes a republic and orders laws in it to presuppose that all men are bad, and that they always have to use the malignity of their spirit whenever they have a free opportunity for it".[270] Machiavelli observes that selfishness, the relentless pursuit of individual interests (against the common good) and deception, is a systematic human trait that ought to be considered by any statesman.[271] Indeed, Machiavelli mentions in the following lines, it is as a consequence of human selfishness that "necessity [necessità]," and its relationship to human agency as procurer of good things [acquistare], turns out to be one of the quintessential lessons to be learnt by statesmen.[272] Political founding is thus to be conceived, not simply as the result of human struggles against adversity and the changing nature of things, but also as a consequence of the capacity to acknowledge, and even embrace, the selfish quality of human beings as an immutable factor.

In this regard, the "path as yet untrodden by anyone" that Machiavelli suggests to have undertaken in the Preface to the first book is in large part shaped by his revolutionary analysis of the social basis of politics both domestic and foreign as well as the integral character of conflict, social classification and class interests.[273] Machiavelli's analysis of the dynamics of conflict is intended to emphasize the political capacity of the people, and to identify a point of equilibrium between the two parties that make up a republic. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this clarification. Machiavelli reaffirms the virtuous effect of conflict, the idea that laws in defence of liberty are born from the juxtaposition of passions that need to be balanced one against the other. It seems in this perspective that the aim of Machiavelli's republicanism is not necessarily to increase participation of the people in government but to fully exploit their diversity through their diverse individualities so as to protect their freedom

Given that this notion of conflicts of humours is not peculiar to Rome alone but it is also what characterises the nature and structure of all states.[274] Men share the same passions, either in Rome sixteen centuries before or in Florence sixteen centuries after. And the world has always been inhabited by men who share the same passions.[275] Additionally to being evil and selfish, men live in permanent conflict. There are the rich and the poor, the noble and the *grandi*, the majority and the minority etc. And one group is always against the other. One principality is in war with the others. This is the human condition analysed by Machiavelli that needs to be worked out in founding a state. Hence, the need for a republican system of government vis-a vis The rule of law. Because for Machiavelli; "Good government is one in which the universal interest prevails over civil discord and factionalism, where public action does not rest on "the friendship of the wicked and the enmities of the good."[276]

4.2 The rule of Law

The institution of the law becomes a necessity in Machiavelli's republicanism given his views on human condition. It is the law that makes men good,[277] it is the law that makes men transcend their selfishness to desire the common good, it is the law that unites the conflicts of humours by checkmating their actions and it is the law that enables liberty and freedom to flourish.[278] Machiavelli recognised the value of Law as a method of rule. It underlines his application and use of the humoural theory to reflect the principles of his republicanism.

It is evident as we have noted from the introductory passages of the *Discourses*, Machiavelli makes the case that politics creates society and, moreover, that it plays a creative role. In this respect, he states that "…there was no natural or God-given framework to order political life. Rather it was the task of politics to create order in the world."[279] All his political considerations refer to positive laws, particularly to statutes or constitutional laws, the "orders" ("ordini") as he calls them.[280] Politics is thus ascribed a pre-eminent position in social life as the chief constitutive element of society.'[281] In short, politics based on 'The rule

of law' not on 'power politics' (as *The Prince* seems to suggests) is that which is singularly able to create virtuous citizens instead of indolent and selfish individuals; mixed government secures public freedom and 'makes citizens good' as this manner of government is most likely to balance the interests of diverse humours.[282]

For instance, in the *Draft of Law*, Machiavelli states,

> Considering, our Magnificent and Excellent Lords, as no law and no order is more praiseworthy among men or more acceptable to God than those by which a true, united and holy republic is established, in which advice is freely given, deliberations prudently undertaken, and orders faithfully carried out...[with the satisfaction] the people and [the provision of] security to any good and honest citizen.[283]

The rule of law underlines the creative role of politics in building a social reality, as means of engaging the conflicts of humours.[284] It presupposes the 'technical/engineering,' and practical/applicable meaning of Machiavelli's conception of political knowledge conceived as the proposed 'imitation' of the best historical role model of the Roman republic.

To appreciate Machiavelli's republicanism, a distinction between the rule of law and the rule by law becomes necessary. In Military rule for instance, decrees are enacted (promulgated) which become binding on the people. The decrees are laws guiding the conduct of the citizens at that point in time. For instance, the decree 1 of Ironsi's administration in 1966 and the decree 107 of Abacha's administration in the 1990's etc.[285]

In political situations, rule of man shows a situation where the leaders rule from the pool of their imaginations and desires, relegating freedom to the background and tries doggedly with tricks to promote peace and prosperity. According to Ogugua; "This is highly subjective and cannot be banked on; it is flexible, dependent on who is ruling".[286] In Machiavelli's own words; "…we cannot call a state well-established in which things are done according to the will of one man".[287] Rule of law is an objective effort to ensure peace, order

and prosperity, based on justice as law is a reasonable expression. It is a political system organized according to law."[288] These distinctions will be appreciated more in the section that talks about 'liberty and the common good' as it reflects on Machiavelli's connection of liberty with the rule of law.

Machiavelli's analyses of the rule of law, further expands on, the prescriptive philosophical considerations of the rule of law. That is, the public awareness of the law before it is enacted. Since the very idea of obedience presupposes knowledge of that which is to be obeyed, the promulgation of the law becomes essential to the law. Machiavelli illustrated this notion with the case of the decemvirate in Rome.[289] On a certain occasion the Romans decided to elect, for one year, a decemvirate (a committee of ten men), led by Appius Claudius for the purpose of framing a new code of law for Rome. So that the Ten could do their work sanza alcun rispetto (i.e. without fear of the envious),[290] they were given sole authority in the republic, becoming a kind of super-dictatorship. The Ten wrote the new laws by themselves, but before these laws were enacted they were laid before the public. Once acknowledged, and approved by the people, these laws remained the foundation of Roman jurisprudence for centuries.[291]

On our reading, Machiavelli admires the achievement of the decemvirate and has no objection to the dominating role exercised by Appius.[292] He approves in particular of the method whereby fundamental laws are written by one or a few sanza alcun rispetto, and then made available for public comment and amendment.[293] In stressing the fact that the laws written by the decemvirate were presented to the public for comment and amendment prior to being enacted, Machiavelli implicitly underscores the promulgation of the law.

Having said this, in analysing Machiavelli's republicanism, the first point that needs to be stressed is that Machiavelli's republicanism is above all else a commitment to the *vivere civile* (a free way of life).[294] Any form of government, including republican or popular

government, which does not fulfil the requirements of civil and political life is either a tyranny or a corrupt republic, which is the two worst calamities that can befall a people. The base line of his republicanism echoes a commitment to the ideal of a well-ordered republic that is, a republic which is kept in order by the rule of law and by constitutional arrangements that ensure that the diverse humours of the polity has its proper place; it is a commitment to the principles of the political and civil life (*vivere politico*; *vivere civile*) and to a conception of political liberty understood as an absence of personal dependence, which he inherited from the jurists, the theorists of communal self-government, and the civic humanists of the Trecento and the Quattrocento.[295]

Machiavelli's understanding of 'the law' was resounding because he was familiar with legal language and its classical sources. "Civil laws," he wrote, "are nothing other than verdicts given by ancient jurists, which, reduced to order, teach our present jurists to judge."[296] He also stressed the value of civil law as a necessary guide for human actions: "men never work any good unless through necessity, but where choice abounds and one can make use of license, at once everything is full of confusion and disorder. Therefore it is said that hunger and poverty make men industrious, and the laws make them good."[297] A wise legislator, he warns, as we noted above, must frame the laws assuming that "all men are wicked," and that they will always behave with malignity of their spirit,[298] if they have the opportunity.

Machiavelli regards the rule of law as the basic feature of civil and political life. In the *Discourses*, he in fact contrasts political life ('vivere politico') with tyranny, understood as authority unbound by laws ('autorità assoluta'), and opposes armed violence to 'civil modes and customs'.[299] In the *Florentine Histories* he contrasts civil life ('vivere civile') with 'sole authority' ('unica autorità').[300] and opposes political life to corruption. A corrupt city, he explains, is precisely one where laws are disobeyed ('le leggi bene ordinate non giovano'),

where 'are found neither laws nor institutions which will suffice to check widespread corruption'.[301]

In Adams analysis, when Machiavelli speaks of the rule of law, he means, first of all, observance of the principle of legality - that is, the principle which prescribes that men's actions are to be judged on the basis of general rules which apply equally to all actions of the same type and to all individuals of the group concerned.[302] John Adams was unique among the American founding fathers in that he took seriously Machiavelli's ideas.[303] Not only did Adams read Machiavelli but he also openly acknowledged his intellectual debt to the Florentine to the extreme that he claimed to be "a student of Machiavelli."[304] Being a jurist and a political theorist, he agreed with Machiavelli that the generality and the impartiality of the law as the basis of civil life. The laws, he says, 'make [men] good' - that is, compel them to serve the common good and refrain from barring their fellow citizens, as civil and political life demands.[305]

The law is therefore necessary, and, once it is in place, it must be obeyed without allowing for privileges or discriminations. As Machiavelli strongly asserts, crimes have to be punished regardless of the personal and public merits of the criminal.

> No well ordered republic ('republica bene ordinata'), allows the demerits of its citizens to be cancelled out by their merits; but, having prescribed rewards for a good deed and punishments for a bad one and having rewarded someone for doing well, if the same person afterwards does wrong, it punishes him, regardless of any of the good deeds be has done'. Should this principle of legal justice be disregarded, he concludes, and the wording is important, 'civil life will soon disappear' ('si resolvera ogni civiltà').[306]

In order words, the law is no respecter of persons or statues. This echoes the basis of the rule of law in democracies; which limits the power of the government and provides the platform that ensures the preservation of the liberties of the citizens and coordination of the resources available in order to ensure full development of the citizens.

Machiavelli's commitment to the principle of legality is apparent also in his strong admonition that to remain well ordered, and to prevent corruption, a republic must be sure that punishments are always inflicted according to the law by legitimate public authorities, never by private citizens acting outside the law. In other words, in Machiavelli's analysis, what today we call 'jungle justice' in Nigeria is a pervasion of republican government and can only happen when the republic is corrupt. Machiavelli illustrated this point with the example of Coriolanus,

> ...who commanded not to distribute corn to the people in order to diminish their political power, was saved from popular fury by the tribunes, who summoned him to appear in court. ...Had the mob lynched him, his death would have been a wrong inflicted by private citizens on a private citizen ('offesa da privati a privati'). This violation of legality would have caused fear and mistrust in the efficacy of the law to provide for adequate protection. As a result, citizens would have formed factions to protect themselves, thereby causing the downfall of the republic. But, since the whole matter was settled by public authorities in full respect of the law - that is, in an orderly way ('ordinariamente'), the Roman Republic did not suffer serious consequences.[307]

In his defence of the rule of law, Machiavelli asserts that republics must be capable of facing even extraordinary situations by legal means. As an example he cites the Roman dictatorship and stresses that without that institution that republic would have survived "extraordinary accidents" only with difficulty.[308] Even more praiseworthy was the example of the Republic of Venice, "excellent among modern republics," that "has reserved authority to a few citizens who in urgent needs can decide, all in accord, without further consultation."[309] What makes this institution excellent is precisely that it permits a republic to face situations of emergency without breaking the statutes. Even though extraordinary measures may do good in some cases, yet, Machiavelli warns, "…the precedent thus established is bad, since it sanctions the usage of dispensing with constitutional orders for a good purpose, and thereby makes it possible, on some plausible pretext, to dispense with them for a bad purpose."[310] Therefore

"no republic is ever perfect, unless by its laws ("*con le leggi sue*") it has provided a remedy for all contingencies and for every eventuality, and determined the method of applying it."[311]

This is one other interesting aspect of Machiavelli's republicanism that demonstrates his strategic and pragmatist approach to politics. Machiavelli addresses here the question of the complex and irregular rhythms characterising the political life of a republic and its development over time. Law itself, must foresee the recourse to exceptional tools that will help it face those exceptional events that might threaten freedom and prejudice or even destroy republican institutions. Legal and constitutional tools with which the republic recognises its own incapacity to face the extraordinary with ordinary means. It therefore makes preparations and sets mechanisms legally ordered and determined for urgent and necessary intervention. Given this framework, Machiavelli concludes; "…the dictatorship never harmed the republics, because its authority was limited and circumscribed by other powers."[312]

The rule of law in Machiavelli provides the institutional framework for conflict to take place in virtuous forms. Within this framework, conflict has a feedback effect on the institutional framework, and is expressed in the "laws and orders" that favour liberty and the good of the republic.[313] For that very reason, conflict under the rule of law is not a degenerative factor but rather acts to counteract the tendency of the republic toward corruption. The next section is explicit on this argument.

4.3 Liberty and Common good

Considering the premises that; "all men are wicked, and that they will always behave with malignity of their spirit, if they have the opportunity"[314], the blind pursuit of one's private good over the public good becomes inevitable. Blind because it ignores the extent to which one's private good depends on the public good. It is doubtful whether this blindness can be

overcome by even the best education, whether the truly enlightened citizen, who reliably acts upon the principle that public service is in his own best interest, can be produced on a large scale. The question, therefore, is no longer how to induce citizens to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the common good, which now appears to be impossible, but how to devise some mechanism for preventing their inescapably corrupt motives from having their natural but self-destructive effects. To answer this question will be to uncover the deepest secret of state craft.[315]

The mechanism which produces the common good will be a kind that checkmates the conflict. The most basic conflict in every republic, as we have seen, is that between the grandi and the people. Liberty is possible as long as this conflict continues and as long as neither of these corrupt parties is able to dominate the other.[316] Each party must therefore be empowered to resist the other‘s encroachments; this is achieved by the right kind of laws and orders (ordini).[317] In Rome, for instance, the grandi defended their interests through the senate; the people, through the tribunes. The skilful construction of *ordini*, more than the formation of good citizens, is the key to the perpetuation of a free society. For such *ordini*, affirms Skinner in the language of Machiavelli, have the power of converting private vices into public benefits.[318] This, then, is the central political problem: how to get a good result from bad motives.

Talking about the defects of the Florentine republic, Machiavelli argued that; “to restore a 'free and civil life' ('vero vivere libero e civile'), Florence needs new laws and statutes that will protect the common good and replace the rule of factions, which imposes 'orders and laws made not for the public but for personal utility', 'not in accordance with free life' but by the ambition of that party which is in power”.[319] In the *Discourses* he stresses that, when the Roman Republic became corrupt, 'only the powerful proposed laws, not for the common liberty, but to augment their own power'.[320] And explicitly restates the fundamental

connection between law and liberty by remarking that the dissolution of the republic initiates when "one begins to corrupt a law which is the nerve and the life of the free way of living"[321].

Machiavelli literally identifies republic with liberty and opposes it not only to tyranny but to monarchy or principality as well. Most scholars like Meinecke (discussed in chapter two), described Machiavelli's republicanism as a republicanism with a monarchical or even tyrannical bent.[322] Machiavelli maintains that principality, or monarchy, and liberty are antithetical, and liberty in its fullest expression can be enjoyed only in a republic. The much quoted opening of his well known work, *The Prince* is explicit in this regard: "All the states, all the dominions that have held sway over men, have been either republics or principalities"[323]; and a few lines later he reiterates the same distinction but replaces the word 'republic' with 'being free': 'states thus acquired are either used to living under a prince or used to being free ('usi a essere liberi').[324] In Chapter 5, he writes that "when cities or countries are accustomed to living under a prince ... the inhabitants are used to obey ... and they do not know how to embrace a free way of life (vivere liberi)"[325]; and in the chapter on 'Civil Principality', he mentions three mutually exclusive possibilities: 'a principality, a republic or licence' ('o principato o libertà o licenzia').

In the *Discourses* the examples of the identification between republican government and liberty are, of course, more abundant. A few references will do. In Book I, Chapter 16, he distinguishes between to govern a multitude 'through freedom' ('per via di libertà') or 'through a principality' ('per via di principato'). And in Book II, Chapter 2, he remarks that in ancient times the peoples of Italy 'were all of them free', and among them 'one never hears of there being any kings'; Tuscany, in particular, was free, and it enjoyed its freedom very much, and very much hated the very name 'prince'. Lastly, in Book III, Chapter 12, speaking of the towns around Venice, be remarks that 'they are accustomed to living under a prince (use

a *vivere sotto uno principe*) and are not free (*e non libere*)'. Little wonder why for Scholars like Quentin Skinner, the *Discourses* is the work of a theorist of liberty.[326]

However, the aspect of Machiavelli's republicanism which shows the greatest debt to the Roman legacy and the Florentine civic humanists is his analysis of political liberty. Like the civic humanists, and in a language similar to that of the jurists' and of the Roman republican authorities, he defines free men ('uomini liberi') as men who do not depend on others ('dependono da altri'),"[327] and contrasts the status of a free citizen with that of a serf ('nascono liberi e non schiavi').[328] Accordingly, he defines free states as states 'accustomed to living under their own laws and in freedom' ('consueti a vivere con le loro legge et in libertà').[329] He maintains that individual citizens enjoy their liberty securely in an independent republic in which civil life is properly preserved. Machiavelli puts it in a well-known passage from the *Discourses,* the distinctive sign of republican liberty is the absence of the fear of being oppressed: "…the common advantage which results from republican self-government 'vivere libero' is 'the possibility of enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion, for instance, not to fear for the honour of women, and of one's children, not to fear for oneself"[330]. Absence of fear keeps away servility, as was the case with Rome, as long as 'the Republic lasted uncorrupt',

In his defence of the superiority of republican government over monarchy, Machiavelli restates the classical argument that, if deliberations on matters of general interest are entrusted to the many, it is more likely that the common good will prevail over particular interest.[331] And in Book II of the *Discourses,* be puts the point even more forcefully: "…only in republics is the common good 'looked to properly', because only in republics are the deliberations that are conducive to the common good carried out no matter if they hurt this or that private person. In a principality just the opposite is true, for what the Prince does in his

own interest usually harms the city, and what is done in the interests of the city 'harms him"[332]. .

> All cities and provinces that live in freedom anywhere in the world, as I said above, make very great gains. They do so because their populations are larger, since marriages are freer and more attractive to men, and each man gladly begets those children he thinks he can bring up, without fear that his patrimony will be taken from him; he knows not merely that they are born free and not slaves but that by means of their abilities they can become prominent men. Riches multiply in a free country to a greater extent, both those that come from agriculture and those that come from industry, for each man gladly increases such things and seeks to gain such goods as he believes, when gained, he can enjoy. Thence it comes that men in emulation give thought to private and public advantages; and both come to increase in a wondrous manner.[333]

4.4 Deliberative Assembly

Machiavelli fully endorses yet another principle of political liberty which both political theorists and politicians today admirer as a distinctive feature of a free society, namely, freedom of speech. Under a republican government, the citizens can govern themselves and freely express their opinions in public deliberations. Machiavelli offers as an example the Roman Republic, where 'a tribune or any other citizen could propose to the people a law, in regard to which every citizen was entitled to speak either in favour of it or against it, prior to a decision being reached.[334] It is a good thing, Machiavelli comments, 'that everyone should be at liberty to express his opinion', so that, 'when the people have heard what each has to say, they may choose the best plan'[335]. Also, in *Discourses* 10 of Bk. 1 one can read on Machiavelli talking about the Prince:

> let him select in which he would want to be born and in which he would want to be placed. For in those times governed by the good, he will see a ruler secure in thy midst of secure citizens, he will see the world full of peace and justice, he will see the Senate with its authority, the Magistrates with their honor, rich citizens enjoying their wealth, nobility and virtu exalted, he will see every quiet and good; and on the other hand (he will see) every rancor, every license, corruption, and ambition eliminated; he will see that golden era where everyone can hold and defend whatever opinion he wishes: In the end, he will see the triumph of the world,...the people full of love and security.[336]

Machiavelli makes the case that, political liberty is secure and can be enjoyed in its fullest extent only under a republican government, because, in addition to security, a good republic allows the citizens to enjoy a liberty which is precluded under monarchies and principalities that is, the equal liberty to participate in public deliberations and to be called to sit in office and even to attain the highest honours a dimension of political liberty which Florentine republicans praised as a most precious good.[337]

Machiavelli's claims that every city out to have practises that enable the populace to give expression to its aspirations, especially those cities that want to be able to rely on the populace at the time of crisis.[338] Machiavelli subordinates public liberty to the desire of the attainment of the empire. In the Chapter II of Book II of the *Discourses,* Machiavelli outlines his candid reasons for favouring the "public deliberation", the true motive for people to "acquire love for political freedom" is to seize the fruits of the common goods acquired through state's territorial expansion and wealth accumulation.[339] Machiavelli promotes the appeal of political.

In the *History of Florence,* he championed Michele di Lando for his role in the Ciompi revolt of 1378.[340] Michele came from the lowest class, but had served in the army and was a leader among the wool workers. He led an uprising of wool workers and small artisans and, according to scholar Mark Phillips, Michele serves as "the heart" of Machiavelli's History of Florence. Machiavelli was a big proponent of Michele's emphasis on social conflict.[341] When the Ciompi revolt took place, Machiavelli described Michele as: "[accepting] the lordship, and because he was a sagacious and prudent man who owed more to nature than to fortune, he resolved to quiet the city and stop the tumults."[342] Machiavelli said Michele exclaimed to a gathered crowd that Florence was in the people's hands and it was their decision to determine who their leader would be.[343]

Machiavelli's undue admiration of Michele is because he placed such great emphasis on the interest of the populace. Michele is depicted as being unselfish and having great respect for his state. Machiavelli claims that Michele should be exalted because he had the opportunity to make himself a tyrant but chose to be the peacemaker of the Florentines:[344] "In spirit, prudence, and goodness [Michele] surpassed any citizen of his time, and he deserves to be numbered among the few who have benefited their fatherland."[345] Machiavelli's promotion of Michele is yet another example of his penchant for autonomy. However, it must be noted that Machiavelli adds fictional information in his description of Michele in order to portray him under a more favourable republican light. In essence, Machiavelli excessively venerates Michele because of his desire to promote citizen participation. Michele had been recognized with limitations in Bruni's History, but Machiavelli made him a focal point.[346]

The reason why republican government is preferred is not because it provides a freedom to citizens to do as they please, but rather because it does not assume that liberty can be a possession but a constant condition that requires citizens to discharge their own actions to receive or preserve the reward of liberty. As Machiavelli writes, in fact "…the opposite of all these things happens in those countries that live as slaves; and more they fall away from their wanted good, the harder their slavery[347]. This is why Machiavelli expresses the idea of checks and balances, the articulation of powers in such a way that one keeps watch over the other to prevent the republic from degenerating into servitude and tyranny.

4.5 Checks and Balances

The doctrine that the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government should be kept separate is characteristic of liberalism. It is because Locke stood at the explicit source of this teaching that his political philosophy is dubbed liberalism.[348] In modern political parlance the doctrine is called that of separation of powers. It arose in England in the course

of resistance to the Stuarts. Although according to Appadorai, the theory of separation of power was clearly formulated for the first time by Montesquieu inspiration of Locke's notion of sovereignty. On whom does the sovereignty reside in the state of society? Is it on the legislature or on the executive? For Montesquieu there can be no liberty if one person becomes both; for Locke if the two functions belong to one person, there will be abuse of power.[349] The fact is that Machiavelli made the same observation some five hundred years ago. And his conclusion is not far from what underlines the principles of check and balances that defines democracy or republican governments today.

Machiavelli's republicanism is a commitment to a well-ordered popular government. By a well-ordered, or moderated, republic he means, in accordance with Cicero's concept of orderliness or moderation, a republic in which each component of the city has its proper place. Machiavelli is never short of examples, here, he cites Sparta, where Lycurgus introduced a constitution which 'assigned to the kings, the aristocracy, and to the populace each its own function, and thus introduced a form of government which lasted for more than eight hundred years to his very great credit and to the tranquillity of that city', and Rome, which became a perfect republic ('repubblica perfetta') when, after the institution of the tribunes, 'all three humours now had a share' in the government.[350]

The law, however, could be corrupted by the biased interests of various humours or by prominent members of the community. This problem is solved, by-and-large through adequate political (and/or religious) institutions, as described in chapter three. Skinner summarizes Machiavelli's description of the law making institutions of the Republic as follows:

> …under their republican constitution," the Romans had one assembly controlled by the nobility, another by the common people, with the consent of each being required for any proposal to become law. Each group admittedly tended to produce proposals designed merely to further its own interests. But each was prevented by the other from imposing its own

> interests as laws. The result was that only such proposals as favoured no faction could ever hope to succeed. The laws relating to the constitution thus served to ensure that the common good was promoted at all times.[351]

This quote demonstrates the implementation of power relations via institutions such as the law and the division of power. Basically, these institutions constrain individual decision making and determine the freedom of choice. Under these constraints, the participation of various humours in lawmaking and political decision making ends up either in competition and possible conflict, or in bargaining and consent. Obviously, Machiavelli was far ahead of his time in his support of balance of power. His point of departure is the empirical observation and theoretical insight that

> . . . all kinds of government are defective; those three which we have qualified as good because they are too short-lived, and the three bad ones because of their inherent viciousness. Thus sagacious legislators, knowing the vices of each of these systems of government by themselves, have chosen one that should partake of all of them, judging that to be the most stable and solid. In fact, when there is combined under the same constitution a prince, nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will watch and keep each other reciprocally in check.[352]

The Roman Republic had all three elements: nobility and people as its natural components and the princely positions of consuls, tribunes and, in case of a crisis, dictators that derive from its natural components through bargaining, voting, deliberation and other procedures of collective decision making.

More specifically, Machiavelli has recourse to the language of the mixed government he had applied, a "true republic", he writes in the roughly contemporary *Summary of the Affairs of Lucca*: "the *repubblica bene ordinata* is one in which the institutions of government pertain to distinguishable political functions and prerogatives"[353]. Machiavelli's vocabulary, then, directly refers to the distribution of power and the construction of stable constitutional foundations in that these political roles – counseling, deliberation and execution of policies

are strictly separated into different magistracies. Compare to the section of the *Summary* where Machiavelli asserts that "In Rome, the people distributed [offices], the senate counselled, and the consuls and the other minor magistrates executed [laws]; in Venice, the [Great] Council distributes, the Pregadi [the Senate] counsels and the Signoria executes [the laws]."[354]. In view of this, Bock argued that: "The ambition of the nobility would have ruined Rome's liberty much earlier, had not the people kept them in check for 300 years. In several cases, however, it was necessary to restrain the tribunes of the people too, because their ambition was harmful to the common good and the safety of the fatherland"[355].

As an example of a badly ordered republic Machiavelli points to Florence, which never had a constitution capable of recognizing the place of each social group and therefore oscillated in its history between governments that were either too popular or too aristocratic. In the former case, the people deprived the nobility of the magistracies, with the result that the city became 'ever more humble and abject'; in the second, the people did not have a share in the government.[356] Because of its constitutional weaknesses, Florence has never had a republic that was capable of satisfying the humours of the different groups, and has therefore never been a stable republic.

In reference to the Florentine constitution and the state of affairs under the regime of the Medici, Adams asserts, "When the three natural orders in society, the high, the middle, and the low are all represented in the government, and constitutionally placed to watch each other, and restrain each other mutually by the laws, it is then only that an emulation takes place for the public good, and divisions turn to the advantage of the nation.[357]

The point worth underscoring here, is Adams submission that the balance of government is less an institutional premise whereby different powers check one another and more a system of class-specific offices meant to represent the ranks and states of society "the three natural orders in society" into the structure of political power itself.[358]

Similarly, in the brief introduction to the transcription of the *Discourse on Florentine Affairs* a text that Adams labelled "Machiavelli's Plan for a Perfect Commonwealth" Adams quotes Machiavelli's famous dictum concerning the tripartite view of society and politics in full.

> There are three orders of men in every state, and for that reason there should be also three ranks or degrees in a public, and no more; nor can that be said to be a true and durable commonwealth, where certain humours and inclinations are not gratified, which otherwise must naturally end in its ruin. Those who model a commonwealth must take such provisions as may gratify three sorts of men, of which all states are composed; that is, the high, the middle sort, and the low.[359]

Adams does criticize Machiavelli with respect to the institutional configuration of the *Discourse* as he tells us, the appointment of a popular council of one thousand citizens "…would have ruined all the good effects of the other divisions of power" but he praises Machiavelli precisely for having perceived "the necessity of three powers."[360] By invoking this tripartite principle of social and political classification Adams acknowledges and embraces the shift in Machiavelli's social analysis of the state.

Tyranny frequently arises as the result of the conflict of class interests, because of 'the excessive demand of the people for freedom and to the excessive demand to dominate on the part of the nobles' with one or other of the parties lending support to a particular person.[361] Machiavelli also warns of the dangers of excess: when the populace has thrown off all restraint, for amidst such confusion there may come to be a tyrant.[362] So great is the ambition of the great that unless in a city they are kept down by various ways and means, that city will soon be brought to ruin.[363]

Numerically the masses are potentially very powerful. But this strength needs to be organized, for without leadership they will be overcome by indecision and in conflict are

likely to scatter. Machiavelli argued that an excited crowd that wishes to avoid these dangers needs to appoint of itself a leader. 'The plebs united is strong, but divided is weak.' In this, he cited the actions of the Roman plebs, who, following the death of Virginia, to secure their own safety, appointed twenty of their members as tribunes.[364]

These observations of Machiavelli's introduce the principle of checks and balances into Republican government; that is, power should be distributed evenly amongst mutually competing parties to "watch and keep each other in check". The principle of checks and balances is a very important notion in modern political thought, and it was to have a huge impact on America's founding fathers and their subsequent work with the U.S. Constitution as we noted with the contributions of John Adams. So while Machiavelli never got to apply his ideas himself, his ideas have nevertheless been profoundly influential across the world

4.6 Sovereign Power

The question 'who should rule' was also a major concern for Machiavelli. The protection of the rule of law was the main concern in his discussion of the issue of the guardianship of liberty that is, the institution of a specific magistracy with the power of supervising the legality of the decisions of governing bodies modelled after the Spartan ephors and Rome's tribunes.[365] The issue being discussed, as Machiavelli clearly indicates from the beginning, is security ('più sicuramente') that is, whether the usurpation of the constitution of the republic and the imposition of factional interests can be better prevented, and therefore liberty better secured, by entrusting the guardianship of liberty to the populace or to the nobility.[366]

Following the rhetorical method of arguing from both sides, he first presents the argument in favour of popular government: if we consider the goals of the nobility and of the common people, it will be clear that the nobility desires to dominate, whereas the ordinary people desire only not to be dominated and consequently to live free ('vivere liberi'); it is,

therefore, reasonable to believe that the ordinary people will take greater care to protect liberty: 'since it is impossible for them to usurp power, they will not permit others to do so'[367] [emphasis added]. He then presents the reasons of the advocates of aristocratic government, who claim that it is safer to give a predominant role to the nobility because in this way they are satisfied and contented while at the same time the people are deprived of the opportunity of causing endless squabbles and trouble in the republic, as the examples of Sparta and Venice amply prove.[368]

After he has admitted that, 'if due weight be given to both sides, it still remains doubtful which to select as the guardians of liberty', he settles the issue by reframing it in more general terms - that is, by posing the question who are more harmful in a republic: those who wish to have more or those who are afraid to lose what they already possess. Both can cause great turbulence, but the nobles who are afraid of losing what they possess are more dangerous, for 'men are inclined to think that they cannot hold securely what they possess unless they get more at the expense of others', and they have more means than the people to alter the constitution.[369] Everything considered, then, it is wiser to entrust sovereign power in the hands of the ordinary citizens, if one wants to establish and preserve a true civil and free way of living. He affirms that "people are more prudent and more stable, and of better judgement than a prince"[370]. He indicates that populace is more inclined to defend common liberty by "…having less prospect of seizing power for themselves than elite has"[371].

For Machiavelli, it is most important to Rome's prosperity that the guard for liberty is put in the hands of the people, not of the nobility, and it is because of this that Rome can create a free way of life (vivere libero) to maintain "public freedom" (publica liberta) and to seek 'common good' (bene comune).[372] This liberty and common good make it possible for Rome to increase its population, and then for this augmented number of Romans to serve Rome. This is because Rome assures the Romans of the way to political success through

competence, i.e., virtù. This preserves the mode of action as one that does not pursue the private way, but a public one. This is the core of a free way of life. Through this, Rome increases population, and consequently, its army enlarges. This big army enables Rome to manage the necessity of expansion and to become an empire. The reason why Rome can achieve such a great prosperity unlike other countries, such as Sparta or Athens, results 'not from Rome's site's being more benign than theirs, but only from its different mode of proceeding (modo di procedure)'[373]

4.7 Virtue and Education

As we have noted, Machiavelli uses history as a source of experience and as a guide for people to learn from the successes and mistakes of the past. In particular, one of Machiavelli's main criticisms is that the education and mode of proceeding of his times has made men abject and weak. As depicted above, Machiavelli in his lifetime alone experienced numerous regime changes as no leader of his time emerged that was strong enough in virtue and fortitude to hold Florence, let alone unite Italy under one banner. Therefore, Machiavelli discourses at length in both *The Prince* and *Discourses on Livy* about how leaders in principalities and republics ought to act. In doing so he makes the distinction between those who rely on their own virtue and those who submit to fortune. The former find themselves secure and lasting, while the latter find ruin. And a republic as a political system encourages virtue to flourish because it endorses the free way of life.[374]

Machiavelli sees *virtù* (virtue) as a necessary characteristic in order to deal with Fortuna (fortune), the destructive unpredictability of life. This is expressed through his quote in *The Prince* "For Fortune is a woman and the man who wants to hold her down must beat and bully her"[375]. But it is not just a single ruler that can possess and use *virtue* in the tackling of *Fortuna*, Machiavelli believes a democratic group can govern a republic while adhering to virtuous values; "[376]. Machiavelli unequivocally believes in a power structure that respects,

even controls *fortuna* and uses the strength of *virtù*. He sees political systems and civil communities as a means to an end, a way of pooling resources in the pursuit of wealth and riches, and successful implementation of *virtù* as a pre-requisite to that. This is a view that *The Discourses* represents particularly well as Machiavelli comments on the "Wonderful examples" in history of "The prodigies of virtue and of wisdom displayed by the kings, captains, citizens, and legislators who have sacrificed themselves for their country"[377]

Machiavelli sees through the excuses of the 'weak men' and asserts not only that they are accountable for their own actions, but that this is the result of their poor education. He asserts: "For becoming insolent in good fortune and abject in bad arises from your mode of proceeding and from the education which you are raised. When that is weak and vain, it renders you like itself; when it has been otherwise, it renders you also of another fate; and by making you a better knower of the world, it makes you rejoice less in the good and less aggrieved in the bad"[378].

Machiavelli is quite sensible in asserting that bad outcomes are more often than not the result of bad modes of proceeding (i.e. actions), which in turn is often the result of bad education. On the contrary, a proper education leads individuals to make wise and prudent choices, which in turn leads to good outcomes most of the time. "so feeble are men today owing to their defective education and to the little knowledge they have of affairs, that they look upon the judgements of their forefathers as inhuman in some cases and in others as impossible."[379]

This leads to Machiavelli's crucial concern about flexibility and sustainability. For him, the mode of action by nature, either individual's or the group's one, marks such an unsustainability and inflexibility. A more sustainable and flexible mode of action makes room for as many virtuous men as possible to take part in politics, and, furthermore, to be

brought up under proper education to serve the country and the common good. This is only possible under the rule of a republic.

Virtù is constrained by umori, the nearly unchangeable human nature that varies among individuals and is differently able to solve different kinds of problems. This, Machiavelli argues, explains why political constitutions that appropriately govern the state's umori are important: only through good constitutions are different men with their different abilities properly deployed to overcome different sorts of political problems. When a state experiences different crises, Machiavelli says that different modes of action may be appropriate for each. Only by connecting particular modes with particular situations can an individual or state survive and flourish. Virtù is the ability to cope with different circumstances, and therefore signifies proper modes of action; for Machiavelli, political crisis stems from its absence.

4.8 The Machiavellian Agenda: From Principality to Republic

In dedicating the *Discourses on the first ten books of Livy* to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai, two of Machiavelli's good republican friends from the Rucellai Gardens meetings who were both key motivators in his undertaking of the *Discourses*. Machiavelli departs from the "common practices" of those who devote their works to "princes," and praise them when they should be condemned instead.[380] Of course, this may also allude to the fact that Machiavelli himself had dedicated his Prince, first to Giuliano and then to Lorenzo de' Medici the de facto rulers of Florence, and consequently may be hinting at some form of self-reproach all of which may thus suggest that the *Discourses* could be read as Machiavelli's invitation to revisit the points he had made in *The Prince*.[381]

The very fact that Machiavelli ends *The Prince* by claiming that Lorenzo de' Medici, the Florentine leader at the time of writing, is the only man who can quell the tumult in Italy is supportive of the claims made by Jean- Jacques Rousseau; "Being attached to the court of the Medici, he could not help veiling his love of liberty in the midst of his country's

oppression"[382]. Rousseau believed that Machiavelli concealed his true political beliefs in *The Prince*, promoting the political system of the time and currying favour with the ruling class. Much of the text would support this argument, with Machiavelli openly confessing (or perhaps eluding to confess) affection for the Medici; "And if your Magnificence will turn your eyes from the summit of your greatness…"[383] Given that he was initially exiled for plotting against the Medici, it is perfectly feasible that he might have written *The Prince* with such a motivation, effectively validating the content of *The Discourses* as representative of his true views.

The Machiavellian agenda becomes evident when one compares Roman history as interpreted in the *Discourses* with the facts that one learns about Cesare Borgia as selected in *The Prince*. In both cases there is an extremely cruel beginning in which the corresponding heroes violate widely shared norms of the 'human race'.

Concerning the status and evaluation of crimes in this agenda, Romulus, mythic founder of Rome, even killed his brother Remus in order not to share power. He also "consented to the death of Titus Tatius, who had been elected to share the royal authority with him"[384]. In the interpretation of Machiavelli, these murders guaranteed that one (and only one) will define the common good.[385] It is important to note that for Machiavelli Cesare Borgia's cruelties and Romulus's fratricide were violations of moral norms. However, as is notoriously quoted, Machiavelli accepted that the violation of moral norms can have its justification.[386] The period of cruelties and "destructive purification" was meant to be followed, in the case of both Rome and the unified Italy, by peace and order that presupposed protection from external enemies. Thus, "destructive purification" was to the benefit of the people. In the Roman case, the giving of law by the prince was a major component to support peace and order. This princely phase was followed by the division of power together with the introduction of a republican order.

It could be argued that there is conflict between the progressive structures of the state in Machiavelli as outlined here, and the circular view which Machiavelli holds on history: there is growth and prosperity followed by destruction, chaos and possible reconstruction; princely government is followed by tyranny, revolution, oligarchy, again revolution, popular state, and finally the republic which in the end collapses into anarchy waiting for the prince or tyrant to reinstall order[387]. Also, in Machiavelli's History of Florence one can read:

> The general course of changes that occur in states is from condition of order to one of disorder, and from the latter they pass again to one of order. For as it is not the fate of mundane affairs to remain stationary, so when they have attained their highest state of perfection, beyond which they cannot go, they of necessity decline. And thus again, when they have descended to the lowest, and by their disorders have reached the very depth of debasement, they must of necessity rise again, inasmuch as they cannot go lower.[388]

Machiavelli concludes:

> Such is the circle which all republics are destined to run through. Seldom, however, do they come back to the original form of government, which results from the fact that their duration is not sufficiently long to be able to undergo these repeated changes and preserve their existence. But it may well happen that a republic lacking strength and good counsel in its difficulties becomes subject after a while to some neighbouring state, that is better organized than itself; and if such is not the case, then they will be apt to revolve indefinitely in the circle of revolutions[389]

However, despite his circular view of the world, Machiavelli considered political action and constitutional design highly relevant to the course of history and also to what happens today or tomorrow. However, the circular view allows us to learn from history and apply what we learned today in the future. Machiavelli repeatedly urges his contemporaries to study the Romans and to learn from them. In the case of Romulus and Rome, history went on to the evolution of the Roman Republic.

Machiavelli gave an (efficiency) argument why, in the end, the princely government is expected to transform into a republican system as the governmental regime stabilized. In book one of the *Discourses* one reads: "…although one man alone should organize a government, yet it will not endure long if the administration of it remains on the shoulders of a single individual; it is well, then, to confide this to the charge of many, for thus it will be sustained by the many."[390]

Yet, there is another efficiency argument in favour of the republic: it offers a possibility to get the people involved in government. In Discourse 58 of Book I, Machiavelli gives a series of arguments why he thinks that "the people are wiser and more constant than princes"[391] if their behaviour is regulated by law. If his arguments hold, then a state that allows for the participation of the people is preferable to principalities which are dominated by a single despot, a king of divine right, or a small clique of nobles. However, the participation of the people does not exclude the possibility of the emergence of a despot and the transformation of a republic into tyranny. Machiavelli gives several examples for this possibility and the case of Rome is the most apropos. The latter demonstrates the importance of adequate laws and institutional rules to prevent individual citizens from capturing power. These we carefully highlighted above. Machiavelli argues that if "we study carefully the conduct of the Roman republic," we discover that "the prolongation of her military commands" was one of the two reasons "of her decadence"[392].

In Machiavelli's observation, well ordered republics, through the use of elections, enjoy a long succession of virtuous princes.[393] An elective principality addresses this problem but is still defective for another reason: the same man is not suited to all circumstances, to every sort of times. Different times require men of different dispositions or humors. Fabius Maximus (the Delayer) was by nature cautious, and hence was suited to the war against Hannibal in its early phase, when caution was needed. Scipio, on the other hand, was suited

to that war in its later phase, when boldness was needed. "Because Rome was a republic, it could make use of each man as the times required; had Fabius been king, Rome might easily have lost that war. Thus a republic enjoys longer life and more good fortune than a principality".[394]

Machiavelli warns that; "…the founders of new states should resist turning themselves into tyrants, for instead of winning fame, glory, security, tranquillity and peace of mind, they gain instead only infamy, scorn, abhorrence, danger and disquiet".[395] The wise ruler recognizes the importance of prudence and self-restraint. "It cannot be called prowess to kill fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be treacherous, pitiless, and irreligious. These ways can win a prince power but not glory.'[396] This is contradicted by the virtues that define rule which are noted in chapter fifteen of the Prince. Machiavelli takes a stern view of this. At the start of the chapter he details a list of good and bad traits that characterise rulers; "it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity."[397] Machiavelli makes the point that if a sound society can be built from conquest and cruelty, then it must not be evaded. Essentially, when times are good you can afford to be virtuous, when times are bad cruelty is a political necessity.

Despite the evident superiority of republics, a prince, however enlightened, cannot be counted upon to establish one. Romulus prepared the ground for a *vivere libero* by creating a senate, but still established a monarchy rather than a republic.[398] It is not reasonable to expect that a prince would ever voluntarily relinquish authority for himself and his children, or, even if he should do so, that his children would accept his decision. A prince may be indispensable for reordering a corrupt city, for crushing the insolence of the *grandi*, for establishing the rule of law. But once these tasks have been accomplished, he is no longer necessary to the same degree and even becomes an obstacle to further progress. If one

wishes to establish a republic, the prince and his heirs will have to be removed, and in most cases they will have to be removed by force. This helps explain why by far the longest chapter of the Discourses is the one devoted to conspiracies, and chiefly to conspiracies against princes.[399] Suffices that, while republics and princes are in some ways natural enemies, in other ways republics need princes. Those who know how to found and maintain a republic, or how to create new orders, may usefully be described as princes. Thus Machiavelli can speak of the princes of a republic (i principi d'una republica)[400]. It seems that if we want to understand republics, we have to understand princes, too, which suggests that the *Discourses* should not be read in isolation from the *Prince*.

4.9 The Nigerian Republican Experience

For Machiavelli, the fundamental threat to liberty and the communal way of life is not merely posed by the fact of human selfishness; rather, the underlying factor is that, whenever we corruptly permit or pursue such policies hostile to the common good, we begin to subvert the free institutions of our community, and hence our own personal liberty, as well.[401]

The Nigerian experience is a testament to this fundamental problem. Nigerians have been stripped naked by corrupt, selfish, greedy and callous leaders. Yet this is country that became independent in 1960 and went republic in 1963. Although most of these republican experiences have been hijacked by military misrule, the remainder had been a political system "whose voice" according to F.U. Okafor, "…is the voice of democracy but whose hand is the hand of autocracy."[402] Corruption in a political sense means a deviation from the normal moral norms and behaviour expected of the general welfare of the community. John Odey made the observation that: "corruption is not only been institutionalized but is fast becoming a business in Nigeria."[403]

The reason the Roman people were not often ungrateful and corrupt is that it had so many men of outstanding virtue that they held each other in check.[404] Just as James Madison

famously argues in Federalist 10 that the way to limit the evil of faction in a republic is to have many factions, so Machiavelli argues that the way for a republic to avoid being ungrateful is to have many virtuous men, and to find security in their rivalry and mutual jealousy. Rome achieved this end by employing all of its citizens, nobles and plebs alike. In the most glorious enterprises, it opened careers to talent.[405] While the immediate motive for this policy was to appease the plebs, who demanded rewards proportionate to its sacrifices,[406] a consequence of it was that no one individual, cried of marginalisation.

One reason why meritocracy is desirable in Machiavelli's republic is that it can be used to promote equilibrium of political forces. The cries of marginalisation that echoes around the country today and the clamour for restructuring, coupled with the emergence of various separatist and ideological groups attest to the fact of humoural imbalance in the Nigerian polity. Machiavelli warns that corruption and incapacity to maintain free institutions result from a great inequality, and would eventually lead to anarchy and tyranny. Hence, he advocated for egalitarian and meritocratic policy. Diversity is for Machiavelli, as it is for us today, a primary feature of republican life. This is not the first time that we have encountered this suggestion in the *Discourses*: we have seen that liberty itself arises from diversity, or more precisely a conflict of humours.[407] In order words, a republic like Nigeria with diverse cultures must put the best interest of the nation before person and tribe and must ensure adequate political and economic structures to unite and carry everyone along. That is the only way in Machiavelli's submission that the country can flourish when the interest of all factions is protected.

Finally, the analytical framework of this chapter shows that Machiavelli's reference to social categories and groups in the *Discourses* and other texts pertains to their incorporation in a system of sound political institutions where *virtù* flourishes. Since the structure and institutions of power, not the agency of its participants, compels individuals to

undertake political functions with an eye on the common good. In this sense, in the *Discourses*, Machiavelli continues by elaborating a theory of the complex distribution of legal institutions that replaces the thesis of civic conflict and popular 'guardianship of liberty' as the foundational character of a republic.

Moreover, my analysis shows that in Machiavelli's *Discourses*, power of the Roman Republic derives from (a) the recognized duty of the citizens concerning the common good, (b) the law which specifies the duty and (c) political humours that implement the duty in accordance to the law and revise the law in accordance to the duty. Power is an essential element of a republic. Free states are those "…which are free from all external servitude and are able to govern themselves according to their own will."[408] A strong military organization is the indispensable pillar. Only if it exists, citizens can hope "…to live without fear that their patrimony will be taken away from them, knowing not merely that they are born as free citizens and not as slaves, but that they can hope to rise by their abilities to become leaders of their communities"[409]

Finally, the true motive behind Machiavelli's preference for the republic, the necessity of tribunes and deliberative assemblies is not just to "guard liberty" but also to channel individual actions concerned with private interests into the public action thus concerning it with the matters of the state.

CHAPTER FIVE

EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSION

From our discussions in the previous chapters, we observed that Machiavelli in his *Discourses* explored the idea of ancient Rome as the model for republics. He sought to establish a new, more democratic form of republic, revive an imperial republic like Rome, and educate new political elite, because they have not seen the logic that connects the history of political institutions. Machiavelli first argues that the internal liberty of Rome depended on arming her people with laws that protect the common good. He then shows how a modern republic can avoid the destructive effects of Roman imperialism. Finally, with his theory of the humours he teaches his readers how to preserve a republic better than the Romans. Generally, Machiavelli considered republicanism as a better political system; a civil way of life in which power is not absolute within any regime.[410] Conflicts between political humours were good for the republic, since they gave rise to laws in favour of liberty. Liberty was a right given to the public, which encourages civic virtues, religion worked as a political tool and a moral compass, and returning to the original constitution helps to preserve the greatness of the republic.

5.1 Evaluation

As we highlight and evaluate the talking points in Machiavelli's republicanism, a good starting point will be from Machiavelli's method of investigation as it puts us on a proper footing with the logic of his republicanism.

Machiavelli can be seen as the prototype of a modern empirical scientist, building generalizations from experience and historical facts, and emphasizing the uselessness of theorizing with the imagination.[411] He undertook to describe simply what rulers actually did and thus anticipated what was later called the scientific spirit in which questions of good and bad are ignored, and the observer attempts to discover only what really happens.[412]

Machiavelli drew conclusions about the best statesmanship from events, developments and decisions in his time and the past. Fifteenth century Italy afforded a multitude of examples. So Machiavelli emphasizes the importance of starting from what is rather than from what ought to be. But what 'is' for Machiavelli in this regard are his personal experiences and the republican history of ancient Rome.

Machiavelli, regarded historical events and his experiences as verifications of the rightness of his approach, hardly searching for counter-evidence, counter-arguments and falsifications. What would contemporary defenders of republicanism say with respect to Machiavelli's old paradigm of Roman republicanism? How philosophical it is to cite the Romans at every turn. For any comparison to be valid, it would be necessary to have a city with conditions like theirs, and then to govern it according to their example. In the case of a city with different qualities, the comparison is as much out of order as it would be to expect a Nigerian to behave like the French.

This observation nicely reflects, on the one hand, the extent to which the republicanism of Machiavelli relied on Rome as a model of exemplary political principles with Machiavelli allowing himself to reconcile the ancient and the modern worlds as a suitable mode of theorizing. If political and historical analogies are difficult to undertake, Guicciardini observes, "…then Machiavelli's appeal to republican Rome as an exemplar of reform for modern times is an unfeasible enterprise".[413]

However, Machiavelli makes the case that the ancient modes can be and should be imitated by contemporaries. For him, the reason modern man does not learn from the past is because people do not have a "true understanding of books on history."[414] And this misunderstanding arises from the presumption that imitation is impossible, thinking that the past is radically different from the present. But the reality is not only that the heavens, the sun and the elements are the same, but man is the same as well.[415]

For Machiavelli, the man before Christ is exactly the same man after Christ. Nothing has changed. The men from Rome and Greece are the same as those from Florence and Italy, and we can also add Nigeria. And if that is the case, why not imitate the past, especially when that virtuous past brought glorious empires like the Roman and the Greek? The historian of Rome's glory is Livy, and what Machiavelli did in *The Discourses* is to describe Livy's lessons and reduce them to rules readily available to his contemporaries. Rome is the ideal that needs to be imitated and lessons from Rome's histories are the way to do it. Machiavelli illustrates both the virtues and the vices of Rome and from that moral learning shows how to build a republic similar to or even better than that one.

I think these are the political lessons that Machiavelli would want the contemporary republics to imbibe irrespective of culture and place. Because for him man is at the centre of the state and the nature of man remains the same anywhere but his attitude towards politics can be worked on. The task of the intellectual historian or archaeologist is usually to excavate these older, forgotten possibilities, to hold them up to the light of day, and to ask about their worth. For unless we are prepared to argue that the human mind is always progressing, we have to admit that certain older ways of thinking could be more profound than the latest intellectual innovations. Unless we believe in historical determinism, we cannot deny that our present beliefs and way of life are partly due to "…choices made at different times between different possible worlds,"[416] that different choices could have been made, and that one can and must wonder whether the choices made were the right ones. For although past choices cannot be undone, and may constrain us in countless ways, still, we retain the power to question such choices, at least in thought and in action

Secondly, Machiavelli speaks of liberty without speaking of rights. For us today, by contrast, liberty and rights are inseparable; liberty itself is a right, or a collection of rights. Our rights are dear to us, and no one, not even Machiavelli, is going to persuade us that the

concept of rights is dispensable. This does not mean that Machiavelli has nothing to teach us on this subject. Rights are one thing, securing rights is another. Unless rights are secured, they are useless. How, then, are rights to be secured? Assuming our answer is through laws as Kant suggest in his 'theory of rights'[417], Machiavelli will ask us to consider whether all the laws that are made in favour of liberty do not depend on the fundamental conflict which he has described. For example, freedom of political speech is today held to be a basic right, which according to J. S. Mill, fall within the appropriate region of 'civil Liberty'.[418] But this right will be meaningless if laws do not prevent the *grandi* from monopolizing the means of such speech (e.g. newspapers and television). In general, the monopolizing tendency of the *grandi*, which threatens the security or effectiveness of rights, can be checked only by laws proposed by the people and their tribunes. Yet without the counteracting influence of the *grandi*, these tribunes and the people would themselves become a threat to rights. What J. S. Mill would refer to as the "tyranny of the majority"[419]

Although Machiavelli does not speak of rights, he speaks eloquently of the desires of which rights are a juridical expression, including the desire to be free from domination and the desire to acquire. He could easily have developed a theory of rights had he wished to do so. But to believe in rights he would have had to believe in justice: a right is a just possession, a possession that others ought, in justice, to respect.[420] Since Machiavelli regards men's concern for justice as weak and unreliable, he prefers to ask how a beneficial result can be obtained by relying, not on justice, but on motives that reflect the common good and hence reliable.

Certainly Machiavelli represents an alternative to liberalism in some respects. Liberalism in the language of Lock and J. S. Mill, we take to be a political and economic doctrine in which individual rights are paramount and in which self-interest is held to be the chief engine of the common good.[421] Machiavelli, by contrast, does not speak of rights, or of

individuals in the modern sense. The primary components of his republic are not individuals but classes or, to use his own term, humours. Whereas liberalism starts from the common desire for life, liberty and property, Machiavelli starts from two contrasting desires: the desire to dominate and the desire not to be dominated. The well ordered conflict between these two desires, or humours, makes a republic free and powerful. "The art of the founder consists in designing institutions which allow the people to resist the oppression of the *grandi,* without depriving the latter of the opportunity to exercise that prudence and generosity of which they are sometimes capable".[422]

Machiavelli's argument indirectly supports justice. But whereas liberal democracy rests on a principle of justice, namely that all men possess equal and inalienable rights which ought to be respected[423], Machiavellian democracy rests on a principle of necessity which produces something like justice; he is more concerned about goodness. The goodness or, as we would say today, the civic virtue of the people is a factor in the maintenance of liberty; it is by no means the most important one. A more fundamental factor is equality, i.e. the prevention of those gross inequalities of wealth and power which engender private authorities able to compete with the public authority. In the presence of such inequalities, good customs will quickly degenerate. Hence the need, again, for institutions through which the people can restrain the acquisitiveness of the *grandi*.[424]

In Machiavelli's scheme, neither the *grandi* nor the people are particularly public-spirited; each class seeks primarily to satisfy its own humour, its own desire. Yet the conflict between these two self-interested classes produces the common good. Machiavelli's solution was "to engineer a tensely-balanced equilibrium between these opposed social forces."[425] In any case, Machiavelli embraces the dual social antagonism of ancient Rome, and endorses an ideal of freedom as non domination, understood as the absence of subjection from arbitrary power in both public and private forms.[426] Indeed, by accepting the principle of freedom as

non-domination, Machiavelli favours the civic republican belief that the *vivere civile* or the rule of laws, institutions and the existence of common interests ought to be seen as the art of establishing and maintaining a *vivere libero*.

Thirdly, it is obvious from Machiavelli's writings that he did not think highly of ecclesiastical principalities and the papal state. The latter he saw as a major barrier to the unification of Italy. "We Italians with the Church and with the Priests have become bad and without Religion; but we also have a greater one, which is the cause of our ruin. This is that the Church has kept and still keeps this province (country) of ours divided".[427] Part of Machiavelli's dissatisfaction with these particular entities has to do with their lack of sensitivity to the political needs and demands of the citizens and the neighbouring states, i.e., the autonomy of their power. And these attitudes according to Machiavelli, corrupts the republic.

However, Machiavelli does not deny that religious institutions and ethics are integral parts of any human, political society. He recognises the entrenched position of Christianity in his contemporary society and the fact that a prince's claim to allegiance with the Christian fraternity can well act as a shield guarding him from potential hatred from the people that is so anathema to effective rule. Machiavelli recognizes the awe-inspiring character of Christian self sacrifice; he suggests that a no less awe inspiring kind of self sacrifice was already practiced in pagan Rome. Whereas the Roman kind served to perpetuate liberty, because it was self-sacrifice of proud doers, the Christian kind has served to perpetuate despotism, because it is a self sacrifice of humble sufferers.[428]

In order words, Machiavelli believes that the proper use of religion (bene usata),[429] strengthens the goodness of the republic. To use religion well is to interpret it well. The Roman leaders, says Machiavelli, interpreted the auspices according to necessity, i.e.

according to political necessity as discerned by reason. When it was necessary to act against the auspices, they did so, but without showing open disrespect to religion.

Machiavelli's argument is exposed to an obvious objection. If the Romans were justified in using religion for political ends, this was because their religion, the pagan religion, was a false one. But to use the true religion in this fashion would be intolerable. True religiosity requires one to be continually spiritually minded and to live in accordance to divine ordinance. The true religion cannot be used but only revered and obeyed. Hence his argument applies, at best, only to those times and places in which the true religion is not known. Machiavelli himself admits that there are crucial differences between the pagan religion and Christian religion, one of them being that Christian religion has shown us the truth and the true way (la verità e la vera via). This does not mean, however, that there is no question as to how to interpret Christian religion. In fact, Christian religion for Machiavelli has often been interpreted falsely (queste . .sì false interpretazioni) and in such a way as to undermine republican life instead of supporting it. "If the Princes of the Republic had maintained this Christian religion according as it had been established by the founder, the Christian States and Republics would have been more united and much happier than they are. Nor can any greater conjecture be made of its decline, than to see that those people who are nearer to the Church of Rome, the head of our Religion, have less Religion".[430]

As we have seen, Machiavelli holds that our religion must be interpreted *secondo la virtù*, i.e. in such as way as to make men strong and lovers of liberty.[431] For it is not right that the true religion, given for the benefit of mankind, should be interpreted in a way that is destructive of man's political wellbeing. Machiavelli could in this manner justify interpreting even the true religion according to a reasonable understanding of political necessity.

One might also object that by speaking of the use of religion, Machiavelli opens the door to the cynical manipulation of religion by demagogues (as seen in the Muslim world

today). Machiavelli could reply that demagogues need no assistance from him, and that while religion can certainly be used for base and cruel purposes (like terrorism); the Romans showed that it can also be used for purposes of high statesmanship. If someone reproved him for being so frank, he could reply that his historical situation requires it. For he writes at a time when religious authority, instead of serving to oppose corruption, has become itself the primary source of corruption. In such circumstances, he could argue, nothing is more needful than a bold reminder of the proper place of religion in politics.

Of the various reasons why this harsh judgment on Christianity might be held unsatisfactory, the most important for present purposes is that it is difficult to reconcile with the experience of later republics, such as the United States, in which Christianity has proven to be not only compatible with liberty but even indispensable to it. Machiavelli is not, however, unaware of this kind of possibility. He points to the modern Swiss and German republics, in which the Christian religion is practiced in such a way as to support free institutions.[432] He claims in Discourses 2 of Bk. II as we noted above, that the fault lies not in Christianity itself, but in the baseness of men who have interpreted it wrongly. The weakness of liberty in modern times is due (or so Machiavelli seems to assert) not to Christianity but to *queste educazioni e sì false interpretazioni.*

Modern liberal republics take a different view of the proper place of religion in politics. They share Machiavelli‘s premise that politics should serve political rather than religious ends, but instead of subordinating religion to politics, they aim to separate the two. Religion is not to command politics, nor politics religion. This formal separation, however, has not prevented liberal republics from regarding religion as politically useful, nor from openly appealing to religious belief, especially in time of war. In America, religion is regarded as the guardian of morals which in turn sustain the laws and liberty itself. According to George Washington, "…of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion

and morality are indispensable supports."[433] Partly on account of this influence, it has lately become fashionable to speak of our age as post-secular. These facts testify to the continued relevance of Machiavelli's analysis. And if his analysis is relevant to liberal regimes, in which religion is relatively weak, all the more, will it be relevant to certain other contemporary regimes, in which religion is more powerful.

Fourthly, it may appear that today we have not only assimilated Machiavelli's insight, but have transcended it: whereas according to him, every society is composed primarily of two contrasting groups, for us society may be composed of an indefinite number of such groups. Moreover, whereas he refers only to class differences, we include religious and philosophical ones as well. We believe in freedom of religion and speech, and in the possibility of a multi-racial and multiethnic society: none of these beliefs; though endorsed by Machiavelli, is clearly and unequivocally espoused by him. One can excuse Machiavelli on the grounds that he spoke from the language and text of the philosophic content of his age.

Our pluralism, in short, appears to be more sophisticated and enlightened than his. But before we can be certain we have transcended Machiavelli's pluralism, we must be certain we have well understood it. Our analysis of liberty and disunion in the *Discourses*, suggest that Machiavelli had a clearer grasp of the fundamental problem than we do, and that our pluralism, if it is to be successful, needs to remember his insights. For Machiavelli, the fundamental threat to liberty and the communal way of life is not merely posed by the fact of human selfishness; rather, the underlying factor is that, whenever we corruptly permit or pursue such policies hostile to the common good, we begin to subvert the free institutions of our community, and hence our own personal liberty, as well.[434]

For Machiavelli, the aim of politics is that the needs of different social groupings be met as they arise from different temperaments/humours. Social struggles are therefore unavoidable, since different humours are by definition in mutual conflicts. Machiavellian

polity requires a humoural unity, a unity of opposites, and a balance among conflicting humours. Quite unconventional conclusion was reached: the basis of liberty may not just be a self governing regime and a willingness to participate in politics, but may also be conflict and disagreement through which citizens can promote and defend their interests.[435]

Machiavelli's notion of the humours and their conflicts cannot be reduced to a dialectical notion of class conflicts since Machiavelli mentions no necessity of overcoming humoural conflicts and none of eliminating certain humours. In Machiavelli's opinion, each group requires the active opposition of the others as a precondition for its own existence, and the conflict of the humours provides healthy results only when all the humours are preserved through satisfying the needs of each and every single one. For him, each social humour validly exists in a social group; if one group determines to eliminate the other, as happened in Florence, civic freedom will be lost to oppression and domination. The humoural conflict, if it is to produce healthy results, must preserve the identity of all the contestants, and must give due satisfaction to all. Otherwise, the body politic as a whole will suffer. To this extent, Machiavelli is a pluralist. In his humoural theory, normatively, classes do not oppose each other for the purpose of mutual exploitation. Indeed, mutual opposition and mutual toleration can and must coexist in a healthy political system.

In accordance with this analysis, it could be assumed that Machiavelli was a pluralist thinker in the framework of his interpretation of the political humours; in that he significantly envisaged modern pluralist thought, e.g. liberal republicanism. On the track of Held's analysis of deliberative democracy,[436] it could be stated that Machiavelli also anticipated, though quite distantly and only implicitly, deliberative democratic ideas about enacting good laws through the widespread participation of all political agents in the decision making process, and in replacing 'the language of interests with the language of reason'[437]. In this

respect, Machiavelli's ideas on the necessity of cultivating individual civic virtues, as well as his ideas of a participatory society and the rule of law are both entirely relevant.

As already mentioned, Machiavelli considered civic virtues of citizens as crucial for keeping a self governing republic in existence. However, according to Machiavelli's anthropology, 'all men are wicked', 'they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers' and they have 'evil dispositions'.[438] Individuals are generally reluctant to cultivate the qualities that allow one to serve the common good. They tend to be 'corrupt', or by natural tendency ignore the claims of the community as soon as these seem to conflict with the pursuit of their own immediate interests and advantages.

In regard to those mechanisms needed to coerce self interested individuals, religion and the rule of law could be the instruments for cultivating civic virtue. Republican institutions we have said represent the most important mechanism to coerce self interested individuals; more precisely, to involve all political humours into the decision making process and to enact good laws. The main purpose is for an institutional mechanism to check and balance the conflicting interests of different humours. Machiavelli finds the key in the fact that, under the Roman republican constitution, they had one assembly controlled by the nobility, another by the common people, with the consent of each being required for any proposal to become law. Each group admittedly tended to produce proposals designed merely to further its own interests. But each was prevented by the other from imposing them as laws. The result was that only such proposals as favoured no faction could ever hope to succeed. The laws relating to the constitution thus served to ensure that the common good was promoted at all times.[439]

Fifth, Machiavelli is famous for his view of politics as based on the calculation of contending forces, objectives determined by needs of the state, based on cold detachment, without any moral or sentimental judgement impinging.[440] Hence, the famous statement; 'the end justify the means' as an attribute to Machiavelli's political philosophy. However, there is

the need to qualify this statement in the context of Machiavelli's political literature highlighted above.

Machiavelli's works covered both authoritarianism and popular rule because he delighted in letting everyone know that he was a connoisseur of politics. His fascination with politics was so extreme that he preferred being in hell with the great thinkers as to being in heaven with ordinary people. He had a dream that he could spend eternity with the renowned historians and philosophers of antiquity, such as Plato, Plutarch, and Tacitus. Machiavelli envisioned discussing politics with these brilliant men rather than suffering the tedium of heaven.[441] He was obsessed with politics; it did not matter to him if he was talking to republicans or dictators because he felt compelled to offer his opinion. Politics was a game to him and he was intent on mastering it from all angles.[442]

In *The Prince* it is fair to suggest that Machiavelli divorced ethics and politics. He saw what happened to Savonarola who acted and ruled from a Christian basis. Humility and meekness and other Christian principles where in Machiavelli's view a poor guide to rule.[443] Speaking in *The Discourses,* Machiavelli talks about how working for the common good creates a better society. Compare with "The contrary happens when there is a Prince, where much of the time what he does for himself harms the City, and what is done for the City harms him. So that soon there arises a Tyranny over a free society, the least evil which results to that City is for it not to progress further, nor to grow further in power or wealth, but most of the times it rather happens that it turns backward"[444] He defended tyrannicide: 'Against a bad ruler, there is no remedy but the sword.'[445]

Machiavelli's conception of politics and of human nature as depicted above was that it was unchanging. Politics was subject to certain laws, which had to be followed lest unfortunate consequences follow. But these laws are not absolute and account has also to be taken of *fortuna*. The notion of 'necessity' means that the prince cannot be subject to the

same ethical principles that guide individuals in their daily lives. What is not required by 'necessity' cannot be justified, as for example, when an individual seeks dictatorial power for his own vainglory. *Virtù* might be defined in Machiavelli's terms as the recognition of necessity, either by the prince or the people.

Every republic, sooner or later, has to face exceptional circumstances that, if not appropriately dealt with, might ruin it. Machiavelli addresses here the question of the complex and irregular rhythms characterising the political life of a republic and its development over time. Every republic must be able to accelerate its own vital rhythm and political metabolism if circumstances demand it. Such acceleration might help the republic to face the forces that constantly work towards its decomposition, attacking it from both the inside and the outside. Laws are there to perform such a function. However, the ordinary course of law might not be up to the task of exceptional circumstances. Law itself, therefore, must foresee the recourse to exceptional tools that will help it face those exceptional events.[446] Dictatorship is precisely the tool; legal and constitutional with which the republic recognises its own incapacity to face the extraordinary with ordinary means. It therefore makes preparations and sets mechanisms legally ordered and determined for urgent and necessary intervention.[447] The laws will never be able to offer the appropriate response to every event that might threaten freedom and prejudice or even destroy republican institutions. Hence, the extraordinary means that concretely and effectually respond to those events that could not be foreseen in abstract or in advance. "The dictatorship never harmed the republics, because its authority was limited and circumscribed by other powers".[448]

Furthermore, one of the most important phases of Machiavelli's career was in his dealings with Cesare Borgia, who turned out to be the hero of *The Prince*. Machiavelli closely observed Borgia and attributed many of the methods offered in *The Prince* to him.[449] Borgia is given enormous praise and admiration in chapter seven of *The Prince*. Machiavelli

portrays him as the model for princes because of his ruthlessness that supposedly helps establish a powerful state. His handling of Borgia serves as a mystery because it does not seem logical that a person with a republican background would glorify such a cruel autocrat. However, earlier references to Borgia in Machiavelli's writings actually make more sense.

Machiavelli tore apart Borgia in his historical poem *Decennali* in 1504, thus, contradicting the heroic depiction of Borgia in chapter seven of *The Prince*. Also, Machiavelli had written disapprovingly of Borgia in his letters throughout his travels. He could not have possibly made such a drastic change in his thoughts when he wrote *The Prince* in 1513.[450] Hence, *The Prince* was possibly written as a result of the grief Machiavelli had recently endured with his dismissal and torture and because of an unyielding desire to regain a position in the Florentine government. Indeed, he spent the last fourteen years of his life trying to salvage his political involvement. Machiavelli could not accept being out of office and felt like a fenced-in animal on his San Casciano estate.[451] Guglielmo Ferrero put it rather candidly when he wrote, "The Prince was the supreme humiliation of a chained Titan, a mendicant prophet. We feel throughout its tormented pages the anguish of a frightful mortification."[452]

Upon this suggestion, it is clear that *The Prince* should not be considered Machiavelli's primary work. If Machiavelli had to determine his most important works, he would not have included *The Prince*. Machiavelli was simply not what his sixteenth-century enemies made him out to be. He was a devoted republican and, as Mattingly states, he was the "least Machiavellian . . . among his contemporaries."[453]

In fact, Machiavelli probably only deviated from his strong republican beliefs for a "momentary aberration" in the months he wrote *The Prince*. These five months were most likely the only time Machiavelli could ever be referred to as Machiavellian.[454] He believed

that republics were the most dependable forms of government and openly referred to the examples of Rome and Athens as being ideal models.

Machiavelli takes great pride in dedicating the *Discourses* to Buondelmonti and Rucellai. In fact, he deviated from the ordinary process of dedicating works to princes. In so doing he clearly undermines *The Prince* because it is dedicated to Lorenzo, the soon to be ruler of Florence. Machiavelli accuses those who dedicate their works to rulers as being out of touch with reality: ". . . those who write and always address their works to some prince [are] blinded by ambition and by avarice, [and] praise him for all his virtuous qualities when they ought to be blaming him for all his bad qualities."[455] Machiavelli was effectively discrediting his whole dedicatory letter to Lorenzo, which was of the utmost reverence. This is staggering evidence that he had a superior view of the *Discourses*. Moreover, it can be legitimately interpreted that the *Discourses* was a refutation of what he advised in *The Prince* because he repudiates the intentions of *The Prince* by denouncing his dedication to Lorenzo.

His criticism of those who dedicate works to princes is not only an attack on others, but also on himself, thus, destroying the integrity of *The Prince*. Buondelmonti and Rucellai were both known republicans and primary leaders of the Rucellai Gardens meetings who promoted liberty.

Moreover, *Discourses*, 2 of Bk. II contain the most extended argument in favour of republicanism in the entire work. The common good is observed only in republics and only republics grow in power and wealth; a prince or a tyrant, by contrast, serves only his private good and cities under such rulers do not grow but at best stagnate. Free peoples increase marvellously in population, for everyone gladly produces children when he knows that he will be able to provide for them since his patrimony will not be taken away, that such children will be born free and not slaves, properly educated and that by their virtue they may become princes (leaders).[456] The community grows wealthier because everyone works harder

to acquire property which he believes he will be able to enjoy in security. In such circumstances men think of advancing both the public and the private good, and both increase marvellously. The opposite of all these good things, Machiavelli adds, occurs in countries that are servile, and such countries are worse off in proportion to the harshness of their servitude.[457]

In the light of the above arguments, the general understanding of Machiavellianism does not do Machiavelli the justice he deserves. In many ways he believes that the measures he put forward in "*The Prince*" were only desirable in the interests of civil stability. He hated oppression that was not in the interests of the people. It is not by accident that Swiz scholars look on Machiavelli as a peace loving man who enjoyed public order and stability. This is after all a nation that has enjoyed a very long period of peace and arms its citizens in much the same way that Machiavelli had advised in the sixteenth century.[458]

Finally, in the general light of the above discussions, seen from the perspective of humours, The Prince appears to present us with the picture of a body politic whose humours are not in proper proportion, and whose cure would require the intervention of the 'doctor' to prepare and administer purges, strong medicines, or whatever else it might take to improve the health of the organism. Machiavelli's 'new prince' is such a 'doctor', and political ethics appears to acquire the features of a natural science, admittedly a pre-modern natural science. The *Discourses*, on the other hand, presents us with the picture of a healthy body politic. Rome is able to develop itself into a free, virtuous, and expanding republic, precisely because here the humours were operating in an ordered manner. Florence, in its turn, presents us with the picture of a body politic whose humours are malignant, and which is unlucky enough to be without an innovator like the virtuous Roman Princes. And while Machiavelli could not be a new prince for Florence, he could certainly be its legislator. And since he did not think highly of those philosophers who wrote only of imagined republics, he had, to come up with

a *discorso* (*Discourses*) for a real and practical republic that would solve the defective nature of his Florentine republic, and eventually become a model for all republics, because for Machiavelli, history only repeats itself.

5.2 Conclusion

Although this work focuses on the *Discourses*, the primary source for Machiavelli‘s republicanism, we have not hesitated to make use of *The Prince* whenever it appeared illuminating. In so doing, we have assumed that the two books, in spite of some obvious differences, are, at bottom, in harmony with one another. And this harmony as demonstrated throughout this work, points towards republicanism as Machiavelli’s true political ideology.

Machiavelli, it may be said, writes in and for a society that is vastly different from our own; accordingly his problems are different from our problems. Machiavelli‘s Florence is essentially a small, pre-modern city-state; today we live in massive nation-states characterized by forces unknown to Machiavelli: modern science, modern technology, ideology and globalization. It is surely no derogation from Machiavelli‘s greatness as a thinker to admit that while he may have found solutions for the problems of his own time, he can hardly have found solutions for quite different problems which arose centuries after his death. However, drawing on the insights from which Machiavelli sets out his republicanism, insights derived from the theory of humours, and the recommendations which he makes for what he variously calls ‘the perfect republic’ or ‘this republic of mine’ which are also based on the same theory, we can relate on this experience by asking some legitimate questions like: What can Machiavelli teach us today about liberty? How can he guide our practice and understanding of republican politics? For it is not impossible that the basic problems confronted by a past thinker are still problems today.

If *The Prince* is still relevant today, it is not impossible that the same will be true of other works of Machiavelli, such as his *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*. In fact,

the *Discourses* may easily appear to be even more relevant than *The Prince*. For politics today, in the world, is essentially republican (notwithstanding the occasional constitutional monarchy), and it is in the *Discourses*, rather than in the *Prince*, that Machiavelli comes to sight clearly as a republican and a theorist of liberty. Republicanism and liberty seem to be at least as important in defining our experience of politics today as are the admittedly profound influences of science, technology, ideology and globalization.

Diversity is for Machiavelli, as it is for us today, a primary feature of republican life. But for him, the most politically valuable kind of diversity is diversity of dispositions or humours. This is not the first time that we have encountered this suggestion in the *Discourses*: we have seen that liberty itself arises from diversity, or more precisely a conflict of humours.[459]

There is no avoiding the conclusion that Machiavelli is well aware of the truth inherent in the democratic principle that all men are born equal. Machiavelli opposes a rigid class hierarchy because it prevents a republic from benefiting from the virtues of all of its virtuous citizens, and because the people will not make great exertions for the common good if it is not rewarded with great honours. He is well aware, however, that every political elite is to some extent an artificial creation. He knows that insofar as there are qualitative differences between the *grandi* and the people, those differences owe much to education and circumstance. Prudence and generosity are not, for the most part, hereditary virtues, and there is no reason why the offspring of the people should not be capable of them. The same is true of the desire to dominate: although this desire will always arise only in a few, there is no reason why those few should be found only among the nobles. Thus it was not unreasonable that the Roman people should have desired to share in the supreme offices and "honours of the republic".[460]

Machiavelli does not propose to do away with class distinctions altogether, for he believes that this is impossible and that attempting to do so would lead to less virtue rather than more, as in the case of Florence after it eliminated its nobles. He implies that certain kinds of class distinctions are not without their usefulness in fostering certain virtues which, besides being admirable in themselves, are indispensable to the common good. A certain kind of class education seems to be required in order to achieve a government characterized by prudence and generosity. Yet class distinctions can never be accepted as final but must always be contested, as the Roman people contested the exclusive privileges of the nobles.

If we understand things correctly, Machiavelli favours neither a strictly class based society nor a strictly meritocratic one, but a disputatious mixture of the two. It may well be argued that what today is called democracy is in fact a mixture of this kind (though whether it meets Machiavelli‘s standards is another question.

Machiavelli emphasises the importance of *virtu* or civic virtue as the backbone of every republic. For one thing, he believes that goodness or good citizenship entails public service in the sense of active participation in politics. For history shows that when the generality of citizens in a republic fail to take an active part in public affairs, that republic falls under the sway of despots or is controlled by a foreign power.[461] If we are not politicians by choice, we must be politicians by necessity. How true and educative can this be for contemporary republics.

Machiavelli‘s basic claim is that, if we wish to prevent our government from falling into the hands of tyrannical individuals or corrupt groups, we must organize it in such a way that it remains in the hands of the citizen body as a whole. It is only if everyone remains willing to place their talents at the disposal of the community that the *bene comune*, the common good or public interest, can be upheld and factional interests controlled. And it is only if this happens that the personal liberty of each individual citizen can be secured. In

other wise, Machiavelli is restating, freedom as a form of service, since devotion to public service is held to be a necessary condition of maintaining personal liberty.

To put it in Philip Pettit's words, "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance," suggesting that a virtuous citizenry is required to monitor and dispute public authorities so as to preserve freedom and to prevent corruption.[462] "The vivere politico "requires habits of civic virtue both in leaders and ordinary citizens. As Skinner famously observes, civic virtue, "denote[s] the range of capacities that each one of us as a citizen most needs to possess: the capacities that enable us willingly to serve the common good, thereby to uphold the freedom of our community, and in consequence to ensure its rise to greatness as well as our own individual liberty."[463]

Furthermore, Machiavelli warns that corruption and incapacity to maintain free institutions result from a great inequality, and would eventually lead to anarchy and tyranny. Hence, he advocated for egalitarian and meritocratic policy. "Poverty never was allowed to stand in the way of the achievement of any rank or honour, and virtue and merit were sought for under whatever roof they dwelt"[464] Leaders of republics must therefore be wholeheartedly committed to the principle that the republic must offer all its citizens the same opportunities to be rewarded according to their merit and virtue. The import of this speaks volume for the Nigerian republican experience, the cries of marginalization, agitations and the clamour for restructuring are as a result of this basic problem rooted in corruption and nepotism.

Machiavelli also warns of the dangers of recycling leaders "Prolonged commands brought Rome to servitude."[465] Politicians who remain in power for a long time tend to form networks of private allegiances. Through favours and contracts, they often manage to attain the support of many citizens who regard them, not the republic, as the principled object of their loyalty.

Still on leaderships, a worthy leader will be characterized by having a close knowledge of history: As regards the exercise of the mind, the leader should read history, and therein "study the actions of eminent men"[466] writes Machiavelli, in order to examine the causes of their successes and failures, so that they may "imitate the former and avoid the latter."[467]

Finally, What is called 'Machiavellianism' in its 'vulgar' form (examined in chapter one) could be understood to be the reality of political life that has developed in its own content and dynamics throughout history, independent of Machiavelli, and which has been used to transcend or eliminate the regulated political means of political power struggles.

Machiavelli's 'philosophic Machiavellianism', in its form either of the explanation or even of the justification of using unjust means ('culpable evil') in achieving and defending certain political ends ('a blueprint for dictators'), has maintained its actuality due to the persistence of so-called 'vulgar Machiavellianism' in real political life. However, philosophic Machiavellianism is simply not able to have the same meaning and consequences in different political contexts; it is different in historical periods in which limited government is far from achievable in political reality, and in modernity/contemporaneity in which constitutionally limited liberal-democratic government is the paradigmatic mode of political reality.

Machiavelli alone cannot be responsible for what in any political reality could be characterized as "Machiavellianism' in its 'vulgar form".[468] Equally, what could be called 'Machiavellianism' in the real politics of our own time has been the product of modern times; 'vulgar Machiavellianism' in the context of the modern democratic politics cannot be the same as the one valid in Machiavelli's age; insofar as by attacking Machiavelli one cannot 'save the world' from the 'Machiavellianism' of modernity. Generally, 'Machiavellianism' in its 'vulgar' form has developed its own 'life' and doggedness independent of Machiavelli's own opus. *The 48 Laws of Power* by Robert Green, and *The Mafia Manager: A Guide to the Corporate Machiavelli*, by V. A Capo, just to mention a few, highlight this argument.

Machiavelli's 'Machiavellian' ideas are still actual today insofar as they are helpful in understanding contemporary politics according to both the possible dangers linked to political vices and corruption, and the possible slipping of modern democratic government into unlimited state power. Therefore, the notion 'Machiavellianism' has played an important role in contemporary political and academic discourse with good reason. Nonetheless, Machiavelli's republican and pluralist ideas from The *Discourses* have been implicitly modern and essentially relevant from the point of view of contemporary democratic political theory and practice. For this reason, reducing Machiavelli's political legacy to mere 'Machiavellianism' is essentially wrong. Controversies related to the interpretations of Machiavelli's legacy and arguments in favour of its actuality in modernity/contemporaneity hinge between his ideas of unlimited state power and corrupt politics, and his pledging for republican order and just laws (efficient democratic government).

Once again it must be emphasized that the main line of Machiavelli's thought is republican in nature. Even if there are elements of 'power politics' present, the concept of political power as based on a constitution and legal means, including the minimal/ legal use of force, is the core concept of political power in Machiavelli's case. And this can only happen when the law is found wanting. He was a devoted republican and, as Mattingly states, he was the "least Machiavellian . . . among his contemporaries."[469]

Having said this, defending Machiavelli from 'Machiavellianism' is important for the sake of intellectual scrutiny. Still, it is even more important to emphasize the republican legacy of Machiavelli's thought, especially in its modern, pluralist implications. Long before political modernity, Machiavelli closely and deeply anticipated with his theory of humours the contemporary liberal/civic republicanism, constitutionalism and deliberative democracy.

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[291] Ibid. Discourses, 34

[292] Appius' astuteness in acquiring authority is praised in Discourses, 41

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