

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

As the debate on the fundamental causes of cross-country differences in prosperity lingers hotly in economic literature between two competing hypotheses- Institution vs. Geography- it is without a doubt that the quality of the societal institutional framework influences the sub-structure- economic and political- outcomes. Championing this view are, inter alia, North and Thomas (1973) and Olson (2000). Acemoglu, Simon and Johnson (2009) espoused that a vibrant institutional framework encourages quality investment and promotes sectoral performance, while weak institutions retrogress economic prosperity and breeds operational inefficiency. Institutions, recalling North (1990), are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. This concept yet an important arbiter, manifests itself overtly in the political and economic circles in every country.

What underscores an institution as weak or healthy and its plausible impact on sectorial performance is seismically contingent on how the institutional set-up is being mapped-out, political development and social history, the integrity of the group {or groups} who dictate the operational mechanics; and the rate at which an embedded practices infest personnel of the institution. Indubitably, most economies in Africa have weak institutions, which are not unconnected to corruption or, what can be regarded as institutional corruption. This very characteristic - institutional corruption of most African economies and the third world nations alike has placed them below conventionally acceptable performance benchmark, resulting to sectoral delivery, inefficiency and retarding economic prosperity (Transparency International, 2012).

Corruption, in its entirety, is a social and economic malady. DPS (2007) opines that corruption remains the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development in developing countries. Corruption reduces investment, increases costs, lowers productivity, and belittles confidence in public institutions. Further, the institution {referring to DPS} noted that

developing countries' government have been known for poor performance and poor service delivery to their citizenry, which is squarely attributed to corrupt practices that have dominated their institutional political framework. Corruption weakens the ability of an institution to effectively harness and optimize the resources of an entity due to vested interest and rent seeking activities of officials involved in this social malady. The African Union (2002) has estimated that corruption costs Africa more than \$148 billion a year. No doubt the continent has remained abysmally poor and economically unproductive.

Nigeria remains both a classical and contemporary paradigm of developing nations that epitomize corruption. Developmental economists and administrators are unanimous in asserting that corruption, with its extension impunity, is the major bane of Nigeria's underdevelopment despite her resource potentials. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index placed Nigeria 135 out of 176 countries surveyed in the report. According to the report of Transparency International (2013), Nigeria shares the position with Pakistan and Nepal, to remain one of the most corrupt countries in the

world. The Table below reveals Nigeria's ranking within the last decade.

**Table 1: Nigeria's World Corrupt Ranking -2002-2012**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Country's CPI Ranking</b>	<b>CPI Score</b>
2002	101 out of 102 Countries	1.6
2004	144 out of 146 Countries	1.6
2006	142 out of 163 Countries	2.2
2008	121 out of 180 Countries	2.7
2010	134 out of 178 Countries	2.4
2012	135 out of 176 Countries	2.9

**Source: Transparency International (2013)**

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean.

A look at Table 1 reveals that corruption is a predominant and home-grown feature of the Nigerian public sector. In spite of

meager improvement in the country's CPI score, it remains disheartening that, over a decade, the country is yet to achieve a satisfactory benchmark level of a figure above 3. Like in all parts of the world, institutional corruption manifests itself in varying folds. With special reference to public sector in Nigeria, corruption involves the giving and taking of bribe, illegal acquisition of wealth using the resources of a public office, and including the exercise of discretion.

Institutional corruption in Nigeria is not federally concentrated; this social malady spreads conspicuously and most times uninhibited to both the state and local government levels. For a fact, corruption is most celebrated as one regresses down the hierarchy of political power in Nigeria. Buttressing this, Adeyemi (2012) says corruption is the greatest bane of government administration in Nigeria. At the grassroots level, corruption has been accommodated, entertained, and celebrated within the system. Moreover, in our publicly managed Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) cutting across the strata and levels of government, corrupt practices have become a norm among officials. In Anambra State, they are perceived to come in

the form of giving and taking bribes, in awarding contracts, job recruitment exercises, embezzlement of public funds, favouritism and nepotism, money laundering and advance fee fraud, offering and receiving unlawful gratuity or illegal commission, ghost worker syndrome, diversion of state assets, among others. The worsening of this performance inhibiting factor that has become an un-shameful act in the Nigeria public sector made Olusegun Obasanjo in Akanbi (2005) to state thus: “corruption, the greatest bane of our society today, will be tackled head on. No society can achieve anything near its full potential if it allows corruption to become the full blown cancer it has become”. This statement illustrates the state of pervasion, and decay within the Nigerian public sector arising from widespread institutional corruption.

This study, therefore, while examining corruption in the public sector in Nigeria, will focus on institutional performance of the Anambra State Civil Service within the past 13 years.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Corruption, like poverty, is a global phenomenon. No nation is isolated with regards to this social malady. However, According to Transparency International (2013), corruption is a glaring national trait of most, if not all, developing countries as evidenced in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Corrupt practices have been deleterious, not only because they divert funds from public purposes to private purses but also they undermine the performance of public sector in its operational delivery. Whitton (2012) notes that when corruption is believed to be the way the public sector, or one of its agencies, routinely operates the damage goes beyond the loss of misdirected resources, public administration risks losing both its capacity to be effective and the trust of citizens in the fair and impartial application of public resources and authority.

Nigeria is rich in natural and human resources, with a population of over 150million people; making it the most populous country in Africa (Salisu, 2002). The first decade of independence revealed a promising country, economically viable to becoming a world leading nation. During the oil boom period

of the seventies, Nigeria made headlines with her oil wealth, as a country richly endowed with oil and natural gas resources capable of financing a number of important projects to meet basic consumption and development needs (Salisu, 2002). With per capita income of \$12,000 during the late 1970's Nigeria was regarded as the fastest growing country in the Sub-Saharan Africa (Salisu, 2002), but today, it remains predominantly underdeveloped due to the scourge of corruption that has corroded it (Transparency International, 2013). This situation is alarming and worthy of investigation.

A lot of strategies have been introduced or adapted to curb corruption activities in Nigeria. The institutional model started in 1977 by the Jaji declaration by president Olusegun Obasanjo; the Ethical Revolution of Shagari in 1981; War Against Indiscipline by Buhari in 1984; National Orientation Movement by Babangida in 1986; Mass Mobilization for Social Justice by Babangida in 1987; War Against Indiscipline and Corruption in 1996 by Abacha to the Independent Corrupt Practices (and Other Related Offences) Commission by Obasanjo in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 2002 by



Obasanjo. The institutional strategic model for anti-corruption was therefore fathomed on the wisdom that anticorruption institutions/agencies were established in Nigeria to administer the following policy prescriptions "deterrence, prevention, and public sector reforms". Apparently these efforts have achieved limited success because corruption has continued to thrive. The transparency International (2013) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that between 2002 and 2012, Nigeria's performance in each of the years remained less than 3.0 on a 10 point. This scenario suggests the persistence of a basic flaw that inhibits these efforts from ameliorating the problem of corruption in the economy (The African Capacity Building Foundation, 2007).

Anambra State like every other state in the country is equally enmeshed in corrupt practices which has distorted its efforts at development. Since 1999 the violence, all manner of corruption and "godfatherism" occurring elsewhere in Nigeria have run rampant in Anambra (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Nweke (2010) (cited in Idemobi, Onyeizugbe and Akpunonu, 2011) explains that even reforms in the Anambra State Civil Service have not improved service delivery.

Arguably, there is a public outcry against the abysmal performance of public institutions in service delivery to the citizens. Azeem (2009) informs that harmful effects of corruption are obvious as it takes away public resources from service delivery to the poor and marginalized in society. This practice obviously negates the very essence of public administration. Whitton (1994) regards corruption as antithetical to the purpose of public administration. Thus, it is often referred to as a failure of the institution of the public service and as a betrayal of the essential professional ethic of the public administrator to serve the public “honestly and disinterestedly as trustees of the public interest”. Igbuzor (2015) suspects that major culprits for this could be poor planning; policy discontinuities, reversals and somersault; lack of participatory, open, transparent and inclusive budgeting; diversion of public funds; poor human resource management and poor performance management which have made it difficult for the public sector to live up to its mandate.

Unfortunately, extant literature has not provided convincing empirical evidence on the relationship between

institutional corruption and public institutions, especially the civil service in Anambra State or in any part of the country. This gap among others propel the researcher to embark on the study of institutional corruption and performance of Anambra State Civil Service, with a view to proffer suggestive and lasting solutions to this malady to restore the trust and confidence of the citizens of the state in the Service.

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

The broad objective of this study is to examine the extent to which institutional corruption affects performance of Anambra State Civil Service (2000 – 2013). The specific objectives of this study include:

- i. To determine the extent to which ethnic/religious differences, resource scramble, and people's acceptance of corruption are responsible for institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service.
- ii. To ascertain the effect of taking of bribes, embezzlement and favouritism on performance of Anambra State Civil Service.

- iii. To determine the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies in addressing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service
- iv. To determine the extent to which inappropriate legal frameworks, lack of will power and incoherent process guidelines inhibit curbing of institutional corrupt practices in the Anambra State Civil Service.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

- i. To what extent do the respondents perceive cultural values, cultural practices and weak government institutions as the major cause of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service?
- ii. Do bribery, embezzlement and favouritism have any effect on performance of Anambra State Civil Service?
- iii. Is there any difference on the responses of respondents on the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service?

- iv. To what extent do the respondents perceive lack of moral justification, lack of will power, and incoherent process guidelines as the major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra State Civil Service?

### **1.5 Hypotheses**

The following hypotheses which are in null form are formulated to guide the study.

**Ho<sub>1</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the perception of respondents on cultural values, cultural practices and weak government institutions as the major cause of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service.

**Ho<sub>2</sub>:** Bribery, embezzlement and favouritism have no significant effect on Anambra State Civil Service performance.

**Ho<sub>3</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service.

**Ho<sub>4</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the responses of the respondents on lack of moral justification, lack of will power, and incoherent process guidelines as the major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service.

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

- Theoretically this study is significant because it will contribute to knowledge by supplementing existing literature in emphasizing that corruption is a contagious economic disease that infests on the fabrics of the socio-political institutional framework with a negative concomitant effect of weakening the pillars of the institution.
- Empirically it will address the diverse needs of students, and academics by pooling together and providing the students and academics with disparate strands of thought and authoritative educational material for further research.
- For policy makers, the work will augment the data base and scholarly directions as a useful instrument for

engendering policies aimed at curbing institutional corruption in Anambra state which could also be annexed to other states in the country. Moreover, this study would serve as precursor for further researches in this area of thought.

### **1.7 Scope of the Study**

A discuss on institutional corruption is indeed a broad topic. So, with simplicity as a guide and for detailed investigation, this study is narrowed down to examine institutional corruption in Anambra state civil service performance. Towards achieving the objectives of this work, a statistical survey methodology is adopted in eliciting and evaluating qualitative responses from a sample of respondents selected from actively involved state ministries and parastatals in the state.

### **1.8 Limitations of the Study**

The researcher experienced some hitches in the course of this work notably was the reluctance and refusal of ministry staff to readily supply needed information/documents. It took more than oral appeal to convince respondents to fill the

questionnaire. These constraints notwithstanding, the researcher was able to wriggle through so that the quality of work was not compromised.

### **1.9 Operationalization of key concepts**

**i. Corruption:** Any act of moral depravity, perversion or debasement, unauthorized alteration of accepted norm; an aberration of decency and decorum.

**ii. Corruption:** Wrongdoing by those in a special position of trust, any act of self benefitting conduct by public officials and others dedicated to public service.

**Institutional:** Pertaining to organized establishments, foundations or societies. It also means in this context having to do with public structures as established by Government.

**Institutional Corruption:** Corruption in institutions, social, educational, political etc. Any act of wrongdoing therefore perpetrated by or involving a member or agent of institution.

**Corrupt Practice:** This terminology connotes acts of wrongdoing that have become a custom. This is used synonymously with corruption and institutional corruption.

**Sectorial:** Having to do with a component part (sector).



**Perspective:** Particular evaluation of something or of a situation or facts, especially from one person's point of view, a measured assessment of situation. In our context, we have employed perspective to include a measured and objective assessment of a given situation, giving all aspects of their comparative importance, the appearance of object to an observer allowing for the effect of their distance from the observer.

**Civil Service:** This has been used to mean all the government departments of Anambra State and the people who work in that, in wider parlance of the same context; to mean all paid non-military service in non-elective office in the Anambra State executive branch of government.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter reviews related literature on the study. However, to gain a better insight into the study, this chapter is divided into four subheadings: conceptual framework, theoretical framework, empirical literature and gap in literature.

#### **2.1 Conceptual Framework.**

##### **2.1.1 Corruption: A Conceptual Discourse**

The term “corruption” has been defined by many authors and opinions vary from author to author depending on what perspective it is being considered. Adeyemi (2012) espouses that the definition of corruption is based on the definer’s purpose and perspective. That notwithstanding, some definitions are worth considering as they lend credence to the study under consideration.

According to Ibenta (2011), corruption is a general term for the misuse of a public position of trust for private gain. To elaborate on the definition, Ibenta further listed forms of corruption to include fraud, extortion, favouritism, variants of

bribery such as kick backs, brown envelopes, gratuities, PR and sorting. Indeed, Ibenta's definition above fits in within the framework under consideration. His use of the expression "misuse of a public position of trust for private gain" supports the view in this study.

Lawal (2007) agrees with the above view when he describes corruption as the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral depravity. Osoba (2010) on the other hand posits that corruption is a form of anti-social behavior by an individual or a social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators and such behavior is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethics of the land.

Also, the definition by Ajayi (2013), is no less different when he stresses that any form of behavior that generates private self-serving gains which are not equated with unearned income is termed corruption.

Gboyega quoted in Olasupo (2009), in cognizance of the Nigerian corrupt state, defines corruption as: giving and taking

of bribe, or illegal acquisition of wealth using the resources of a public office, including the exercise of discretion. In this regard, it is those who have business to do with government who are compelled somehow to provide inducement to public officials to make them do what they had to do or grant undeserved favour. It is therefore defined as official taking advantage of their offices to acquire wealth or other personal benefits.

Similarly, Otite (1986) sees corruption as the perversion of integrity or state of affair through bribery, favour or moral depravity. It involves the injection of additional but improper transaction aimed at changing the normal course of events and altering judgments and positions of trust. It consists in doers and receivers' use of informal, extra-legal or illegal act to facilitate matter.

The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2000) (cited in Ghulam and Anwar, 2007) defines corruption as: (a) dishonest or illegal behaviour, especially of people in authority (b) the act or effect of making somebody change from moral to immoral standards of behaviour. According to this definition, corruption includes three important elements, morality, behaviour, and

authority (Seldadyo and Haan, 2006). In the words of Gould (1991), corruption is, “an immoral and unethical phenomenon that contains a set of moral aberrations from moral standards of society, causing loss of respect for and confidence in duly constituted authority”.

Various disciplines have used different approaches to define corruption but in political science; three approaches are used to define corruption; (a) public interest approach (b) public opinion approach and (c) the formal- legal approach. In the first approach, any activity of political or administrative official is considered as improper when it goes against public interest. This implies that public officials do support someone at the cost of public interest to obtain private benefits. But this approach was criticized and argued; which rule should be followed in identifying the public interest [Theobald, 1990], because every act of government goes opposite to someone’s definition of public interest.

The promoters of second approach believe that corruption is what the public thinks it is (Gibbons, 1989). This approach was also criticized on the basis of the word “public”. What does it

mean; the political elite, the politically mobilized citizenry or the whole population? According to last and third approach, the corrupt acts are those; (i) that violate some specific rules through which the public duties should be performed (ii) illegal exchanges of political goods for private benefits (Manzetti and Blake, 1996).

All these definitions face a single problem of how they can be used for empirical purposes across various nations of different cultures. Therefore, for empirical analysis, a definition must have three basic elements. First it has difference between private sector and public sector (Palmier, 1985). Second is the involvement of an exchange; one party offers incentives to a public official in return for special policy or administrative advantage or “political goods” (Manzetti and Blake, 1996). The last element that must be the part of a comprehensive definition of corruption is that such exchanges (mentioned in second) are improper, they deviate from existing values.

At last but not least it is stated that corruption is behavior adopted by a public official that deviates “from the norms actually prevalent or believed to prevail” (Sandholtz and Koetzle

2000), or from “accepted norms” or it is “political conduct contrary to political norms” (Morris, 1991). Considering all these necessary elements, the mostly used definition of corruption in empirical studies, like; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Sandholts and Gray, 2003 is; “the misuse of public office for private gains”.

According to the World Bank and Transparency International (TI), a leading global anti-corruption watchdog, corruption is the abuse of public office for private gains for the benefit of the holder of the office or some third party. In a simplified definition, Nwabueze (2013), says corruption takes several forms: if a public officer embezzles public funds kept in his trust that is corruption. In the same view, if he does unauthorized spending or exceeds approved limits for dubious ends, this is corruption. If he, in defiance of the rules, allocates government land to himself, his wife, his child or friends or otherwise appropriates his position to his or other person’s unfair advantage, it is corruption. If he over values a contract so that he could earn a kick-back, this is corruption.

### **2.1.2 Institutional Corruption**

Institutional corruption is a normative concept of growing importance that embodies the systemic dependencies and informal practices that distort an institution's societal mission (Light, Lexchin, and Darrow, 2013).

Newhouse (2014) informs that institutional corruption concept first appeared in the context of legislative ethics, where Thompson (1995) sought to explain the ways in which institutional corruption differs from individual corruption. Thompson (1995) insists that institutional corruption does not necessarily involve individuals who engage in illegal or unethical conduct. Instead, "institutional corruption" in the context of legislative ethics refers to states of affairs in which political benefits such as campaign contributions, endorsements, organizational support, or media exposure are made available to lawmakers under conditions that, in general, tend to promote private interests at the expense of the legislature's public purpose.

Lessig's (2013) definition is no less similar, when he notes that institutional corruption is manifest when there is a systemic



and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution's effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public's trust in that institution or the institution's inherent trustworthiness. Lessig (2013) goes further to emphasize the following details that are germane in his definition:

(a) **“Systemic and strategic influence”**: There are plenty of influences that subtly weakens an institution's effectiveness or performance such as laziness, money and ideology. Lessig (2013) notes, for example that ideology within a judiciary could be a form of institutional corruption, even without money changing hands.

(b) **“Which is legal, or even currently ethical”**: Here, Lessig (2013) distinguishes institutional corruption from other more familiar forms of corruption. This definition therefore excludes those more familiar forms. And “currently” signals that, as the institution is currently regulated, the influence may well be permitted, but that recognition of this kind of corruption might bring about a change in regulation.

**(a)“undermines the institution’s effectiveness”:** Here Lessig (2013) refers to the effect or consequences of institutional corruption.

**(b)“by diverting it from its purpose”:** One possible consequence of institutional corruption is that the institution is incapable of achieving its purpose. But the definition does not purport to specify the institution’s purpose or even to presume that any particular institution has a purpose. If an institution does not have a purpose, then it cannot be corrupted in this sense. If it does, then corruption is manifested relative to that purpose.

**(c)“or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose”:** Lessig (2013) informs that this specifies a weaker type of deviation by which the influence makes it more difficult for the institution to achieve its purpose, suggesting that the institution might sometimes deviate from its purpose, due to the corrupting influence, and sometimes not.

**(d)“including, to the extent relevant to its purpose”:** According to Lessig (2013) some cases of institutional corruption will involve the public’s trust in an institution.

He however says that part of the definition is technically redundant, but is provided to guide a research program to focus explicitly on ways in which the trust in or trustworthiness of an institution is reckoned.

**(e) “weakening the public’s trust”:** Some institutions, such as the institution of public health, require that the public trust its recommendations. Thus, Lessig (2013) stresses that influences that make it more difficult to trust the recommendations of the institution are therefore corruptions of it.

**(f) “or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness”:** Lessig (2013) Trustworthiness points to the independent indicia of trust in an institution, which operate to give people reason to trust it. Institutional corruption can operate on these, too.

Clearly, Lessig’s (2010) study of Congress is a prime example of institutional corruption in the public sector, where he shows how nonstop fundraising by members of Congress has debased the legislative process, as powerful interests have become increasingly active in “purchasing public policy.” Lessig’s

(2010) description of how members of Congress are elected and conduct their business once in office starkly reveals how lawful relationships with donors, patrons, and lobbyists have reduced public trust in Congress—now below 20 percent, according to various polls. Lessig’s concept of institutional corruption, like Thompson’s, also applies to the private sector. Using examples from the U.S. financial industry and Enron-type breakdowns Lessig (2010) shows how personal and institutional opportunism undermines society’s perception of the purpose and obligation of business institutions and how quickly those institutions can become severely disabled or collapse when key constituencies (including customers, clients, and trading counterparties) start doubting the institutions’ espoused purpose and the way they govern their affairs.

Azeem (2009) notes that in all cases of corruption, individual persons are involved as institutional role occupants and so it is tantamount to institutional corruption. In fact, institutional corruption involves personal corruption. He however stresses that personal corruption, i.e., being corrupted, is not the same thing as performing a corrupt action, i.e., being

a corruptor. So, personal corruption may consist in part in the development or suppression of certain dispositions, but the development or suppression of such dispositions would not normally constitute the corruption of persons. Thus, a person who has a disposition to accept bribes but who is never offered any is not corrupt because he has not had the opportunity. In the case of institutional corruption, greater institutional damage is done than simply soiling the moral character of the institutional role occupants. Institutional processes are being undermined, and/or institutional purposes subverted. Therefore, an act performed by an institutional agent is an act of institutional corruption if and only if the act has an effect of undermining, or contributing to the undermining of, some institutional process and/or purpose of some institution and/or an effect of contributing to the weakening of the moral character of some role occupant of the institution.

In sum, it is clear that institutional corruption involves infringements of institutional norms, rather than just principles of ordinary morality, by the occupants of institutional roles. Thompson (1995) and Lessig (2011 and 2013) are emphatic that

institutional corruption, does not necessarily involve individuals or private persons who engage in illegal or unethical conduct, they do not exclude them either. Institutional corruption is more pervasive than personal corruption in its effect. Though it is difficult in distinguishing between personal and institutional corruption because the former is embedded in the latter as institutional agents, in terms of effect, institutional corruption does not only mar the moral virtue of its agents, it affects the institution as a whole through the collective role played by the corrupt-infested agents in the institution, hence undermining its operations and performance.

### **2.1.3 Causes of Corruption**

Gorta (1998) says that studies generally produce a mixture of situations, attitudes and processes that might be better understood as enabling factors, indicators or conditions that allow or facilitate corruption. Few of these factors can, in isolation, be said to cause a corrupt act to occur. Neither are they strictly causal in the sense that corruption will occur if they are present in a given location. Instead they are observed – or perceived – phenomena which may make it more possible for

corruption to occur. They are similar to risk factors for diseases, or accidents that combine – or align - in a given time and place to create an environment that is conducive to an individual perpetrating a corrupt act. For prevention purposes they “present areas or opportunities to intervene to prevent” something that might happen in future (PIC 2011).

Views about where to look for causes of corruption and how to label them are very much in the eye of the beholder. Explanations vary with the analytical framework applied so that the act of bribing a public official will look to an economist like rent seeking, to a prosecutor like a crime and to a public administrator like a failure of accountability. Each perspective employs a different diagnostic toolkit and is likely to recommend a different kind of response (Larmour 2006).

Quah (2007) cited in Mills (2012) informs that a corrupt act can occur when a perpetrator has a motivation and an opportunity to act corruptly and has considered that the likelihood of detection or punishment is low. Mills (2013) identifies elements that encourage corruption to include low public service salaries combined with opportunities created by

inefficient public sector systems and a low risk of detection and punishment.

Azeem (2009) points out a number of issues that has made corruption endemic in most African countries. According to him, there is lack of political will to fight corruption and too much rhetoric about anti- corruption is in themselves cause of further corruption. There is in existence, a culture where society admires and respects wealth without regard to how and where such wealth is acquired. One can add the lack of a systematic socialization process for inculcating ethical values into those already in the civil service and those desiring to enter public life. Poverty, economic pressures, inadequate remuneration and lack of a conducive environment for public officials to perform their duties effectively, are often advanced as excuses for corruption. Added to this, is the inadequate retirement package for public officials who end up becoming paupers when they leave office (Azeem 2009). Azeem (2009) however notes that much as these factors are significant, using them as excuses for corruption amounts to justifying armed robbery because the perpetrators cannot afford a square meal a day.



On the role of inadequate remunerations and office perks in encouraging corruption, OECD (2007) warns that low salaries are not the only incentive for a public official to act corruptly and the people factors go well beyond the chance of financial reward. A well-paid public sector manager will have different personal pressures than a counter clerk or a politician and may still be susceptible to corruption. Incentives also exist on the non-government or “supply” side of a corrupt transaction. These have been described Rose-Ackerman (1998) as a perceived need to, either, pay for benefits, such as licences or public housing, or to pay to avoid costs such as tax or a regulatory penalty. Indeed, OECD (2007) notes that apart from greed, the list for public officials included personal relationships with suppliers, workplace pressures or dissatisfaction and general personal ambitions (OECD 2007).

In spite of the above, Graaf and Huberts (2008) produces nine propositions about the process of “becoming corrupt” including:

- i. Next to material gain the most important motives for officials to become corrupt are friendship or love, status and making an impression on colleagues and friends.
- ii. Officials “slide down” toward corruption; most processes of becoming corrupt can be considered a slippery slope.
- iii. Often corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities, know how to “get things done”, take or get the freedom to do things independently, and overstep formal boundaries of authority.
- iv. More “business type” public officials bring the risk of more corruption.
  - i. In most corruption cases, supervision of the corrupt official is not strong.
  - vi. In most corruption cases, management has not promoted a clear integrity policy.
  - vii. Because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspicions of another’s corrupt activities.

- viii. The relationship between briber and the official is most often enduring.
- ix. Corrupt officials including those who operate outside so-called corrupt networks, do not limit their corruption to one incident.

In regard to the above, Mills (2012) advise the causal factors to be taken into account in devising prevention policy and interventions can originate with the individuals involved (bearing in mind that there is usually more than one and maybe a network) or the context in which they live and work – whether organizational, political, economic or social. Once identified in a particular context, those factors can be assessed to determine whether they provide incentives or opportunities for corrupt behaviour and whether they allow the conduct to commence or to continue.

#### **2.1.4 Causes of Institutional Corruption**

Corruption is not a self-manifested effect; it has a cause(s). The gamut of possible causes of corruption is infinitely stretched, with most causes tenaciously contingent on the socio-

political, cultural and economic development of the institution/country.

Lessig (2010) notes the seeds of institutional corruption are planted when an entity's behavior becomes rooted in dependent relationships with outside parties that conflict with the institution's intended purpose. Institutional corruption also occurs when an organization's internal "economy of influence" - such as performance measurement and reward systems, and leaders' directives - leads people to act in ways that compromise that organization's essential processes, espoused values, and intended purpose. He notes that the greater the perceived dependence of an institution on external and internal sources of influence that detract from its espoused purpose and compromise its essential processes, the higher the level of public distrust in the conduct and governance of that institution. In the developing country setting, the causes of institutional corruptions are often difficult to separate from drivers of individual corrupt practices. The motivations are often similar.

Quah (2007) cited in Mills (2012) note that the idea that a corrupt act can occur when a perpetrator has a motivation and

an opportunity to act corruptly and considers the likelihood of detection or punishment is low was the basis for the national anti-corruption strategy in Singapore to “minimize or remove the conditions of both incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt conduct irresistible”. Elements that encourage corruption were identified to include low public service salaries combined with opportunities created by inefficient public sector systems and a low risk of detection and punishment.

OECD (2007) however warns that low salaries are not the only incentive for a public official to act corruptly and the people factors go well beyond the chance of financial reward. A well-paid public sector manager will have different personal pressures than a counter clerk or a politician and may still be susceptible to corruption. Incentives also exist on the non-government or “supply” side of a corrupt transaction. These have been described Rose-Ackerman (1998) as a perceived need to, either, pay for benefits, such as licences or public housing, or to pay to avoid costs such as tax or a regulatory penalty. Indeed, OECD (2007) notes that apart from greed, the list for public officials included personal relationships with suppliers,

workplace pressures or dissatisfaction and general personal ambitions (OECD 2007).

In spite of the above, Graaf and Huberts (2008) produces nine propositions about the process of “becoming corrupt” including:

1. Next to material gain the most important motives for officials to become corrupt are friendship or love, status and making an impression on colleagues and friends.
2. Officials “slide down” toward corruption; most processes of becoming corrupt can be considered a slippery slope.
3. Often corrupt officials have dominant and strong personalities, know how to “get things done”, take or get the freedom to do things independently, and overstep formal boundaries of authority.
4. More “business type” public officials bring the risk of more corruption. In most corruption cases, supervision of the corrupt official is not strong.
6. In most corruption cases, management has not promoted a clear integrity policy.

7. Because of loyalty and solidarity, colleagues are hesitant to report suspicions of another's corrupt activities.
8. The relationship between briber and the official is most often enduring.
9. Corrupt officials including those who operate outside so-called corrupt networks, do not limit their corruption to one incident.

In regard to the above, Mills (2012) advise the causal factors to be taken into account in devising prevention policy and interventions can originate with the individuals involved (bearing in mind that there is usually more than one and maybe a network) or the context in which they live and work – whether organisational, political, economic or social. Once identified in a particular context, those factors can be assessed to determine whether they provide incentives or opportunities for corrupt behaviour and whether they allow the conduct to commence or to continue.

### **2.1.5 Consequences of Corruption**

Benign forms of corruption affect the economy much as a tax would. Based on a study of Uganda firms, Fishman and Swenson (2007) show that corruption reduces firms' growth just as taxation can. Corruption changes prices and, hence, the equilibrium due to shifts in the supply and demand of public services. Political corruption affects growth by influencing decisions on resource allocations, by changing prices and by influencing the availability of resources. In addition, corruption hurts the poor more than the other segments of a society. Since the continuation of corruption requires suppression of those who may oppose corruption, it also inhibits the development of social and political institutions.

In the words of Swenson (2005), "corruption is known to deter investment because it can (negatively) bias an entrepreneur's assessment of the risks and returns associated with an investment. Allocation of investment itself will be biased in the presence of political corruption. Corruption may provide incentives to lower public expenditures (Pani, 2009) and may encourage investment in large (inefficient) projects with



concentrated cash flows (and thus more subject to expropriation) than more efficient maintenance expenditures. Corrupt politicians, for example, encourage the building of new schools rather than funding expenditures that would provide books and supplies for the classrooms. Corrupt officials will direct state and private investment to areas which maximize their returns, not those of the society (Krueger, 1993; Alesina and Angeletos 2005).

Furthermore, corruption introduces distortions in factor markets. It can lower tax revenues (and, hence, funds available for public investments) either because corruption induces inefficiencies in the tax-collection system (Imam, 2007) or because corrupt democracies will have incentives to lower tax rates (Pani, 2009). Corruption will direct talent away from productive activities towards rent-seeking activities (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991; 1993).

The negative consequences of appears to be on the poor. According to Azeem (2009), the ills of corruption pose a serious development challenge. In the political realm, corruption undermines democracy and good governance by subverting

formal processes. Corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and officials are hired or promoted without regard to performance. Corruption in the judiciary, no doubt, suspends the rule of law and denies the poor justice and fair play. It has cost some people lives in prison.

Owolabi (2007) notes that corruption is very costly because it undermines confidence in the government, whose moral authority is diminished. Economically, misallocation of resources is worsened by corruption, and government officials will not press for change in the regulations from which they enrich themselves. In fact, officials may press for more of such regulations and license procedures, hoping for more bribes. Corruption aggravates income inequalities and poverty; those who benefit from bribery, kickbacks and preferential deals are not likely to be among the poorest. Corruption adversely affects economic growth, as it acts as additional tax on enterprises, raises costs. Writing in the same vein, Relying on Transparency International (2000) report, Olatunde (2007) notes that the cost of corruption as four-fold: economic, social, political and

environmental in most developing countries. Economically, corruption ranks highest in the construction industry and in the provision of infrastructure; mostly because it is difficult to standardize, and so benchmark costs in this sector. This is why for instance, budget decision-makers are constantly tilting the budgets towards infrastructure spending, thus increasing the opportunities for corrupt enrichment. If one looks at the bigger picture one is appalled at the multiplier effects of this selfish act - if roads are more “lucrative” than say, education or health, then there will be more funds allocated to road construction. And, if there is more gain in road construction than in road maintenance, then surely, roads will be constructed, allowed to disintegrate and the same roads will be reconstructed from scratch. This happens all the time at the expense of less spectacular, but basic projects like schools, hospitals, water and sanitation.

The costs of corruption are readily apparent in the public sector; it undermines public sector productivity and operational performance in delivering quality products to the public. The costs of corruption identified in this period included lost

resources wasted on unproductive expenditure (such as bribes) and misallocated to those with power or money, public official effort diverted from the public interest to self-dealing and, at the political level, unstable government and alienated citizens. Over time other unfavorable consequences of corruption have been documented including increased costs of doing business, unfair allocation of public entitlements, poor quality consumer products and reduced public safety (Rose-Ackerman 1996 and Klitgaard, 1988).

While corruption affects the whole economy, it seems to target the poor. First, consistent with current debate which points to benefits for the poor from economic growth; corruption hurts the poor by lowering an economy's growth rate. Second, corruption introduces costs and benefits that create a bias against the poor (Ahlin and Bose 2007). Third, corruption can be causally linked to the worsening of income distribution. Azeem (2009) agrees with this when he says that

Corruption reduces poor peoples' access to public goods – a segment of society that perhaps needs those goods more than any other. The poor, because of their limited initial wealth, are

not able to pay the bribes required to obtain these services (Foellmi and Oechslin 2007; Kulshreshtha 2007). The Global Corruption Report for 2006 by Transparency International is replete with examples of corruption in health services in countries around the world and its effects on the poor. Mauro (1997) found that government expenditures on education and health were negatively and significantly related to corruption. Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2001), examined a wide variety of social indicators in a sample of 117 countries. They presented survey as well as statistical evidence that corruption leads to inefficient delivery of government social services.

### **2.1.5 Fighting Corruption**

Corruption in its various forms has to be fought in order to realize the goals of development. Rose-Ackerman and Truex (2012) emphasize that understanding the incentives for corruption and self-dealing is a precondition for making progress on the other challenges facing the world. Indeed, those seeking to further economic development need to understand the institutional origins of corruption and to take them in to account in designing policies.

Lorenz-Claros (2014) discusses what he called six complementary approaches to fighting corruption; These include Paying civil servants well; Creating transparency and openness in government spending; Creating transparency and openness in government spending; Cutting red tape; Creating transparency and openness in government spending; Cutting red tape or Replacing regressive and distorting subsidies with targeted cash transfers; Establishing international conventions; Deploying smart technology.

### ***1. Paying civil servants well***

Whether civil servants are appropriately compensated or grossly underpaid will clearly affect motivation and incentives. If public sector wages are too low, employees may find themselves under pressure to supplement their incomes in “unofficial” ways. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) did some empirical work showing that in a sample of less developed countries, there is an inverse relationship between the level of public sector wages and the incidence of corruption. But **Rose-Ackerman<sup>1</sup> and Truex (2012) warns that one** difficulty with proposals to raise wages is the lack of a clear standard for wage levels. Small changes in

wages seem to have little effect, and in many developing countries, public servants, especially women, are quite well paid relative to their private sector counterparts. Thus, intentions to improve wages must be carried out within the context of reforms that will also have private sector component.

## ***2. Creating transparency and openness in government spending***

Subsidies, tax exemptions, public procurement of goods and services, soft credits, extra-budgetary funds under the control of politicians all are elements of the various ways in which governments manage public resources. Governments collect taxes, tap the capital markets to raise money, receive foreign aid and develop mechanisms to allocate these resources to satisfy a multiplicity of needs. Some countries do this in ways that are relatively transparent and make efforts to ensure that resources will be used in the public interest. The more open and transparent the process, the less opportunity it will provide for malfeasance and abuse. Collier (2007) provides persuasive evidence on the negative impact of ineffective systems of budget control. Countries where citizens are able to scrutinize

government activities and debate the merits of various public policies also makes a difference. In this respect, press freedoms and levels of literacy will, likewise, shape in important ways the context for reforms. Whether the country has an active civil society, with a culture of participation could be an important ingredient supporting various strategies aimed at reducing corruption.

### **3. *Cutting red tape***

There is a need to eliminate needless regulations while safeguarding the essential regulatory functions of the state. The sorts of regulations that are on the books of many countries to open up a new business, to register property, to engage in international trade, and a plethora of other certifications and licenses are sometimes not only extremely burdensome but governments have often not paused to examine whether the purpose for which they were introduced is at all relevant to the needs of the present. Rose-Ackerman (1998) suggests that “the most obvious approach is simply to eliminate laws and programs that breed corruption.”



#### ***4. Replacing regressive and distorting subsidies with targeted cash transfers***

Subsidies are another example of how government policy can distort incentives and create opportunities for corruption. According to an IMF study (2013), consumer subsidies for energy products amount to some \$1.9 trillion per year, equivalent to about 2.5 percent of global GDP or 8 percent of government revenues. These subsidies are very regressively distributed, with over 60 percent of total benefits accruing to the richest 20 percent of households, in the case of gasoline. Removing them could result in a significant reduction in CO<sup>2</sup> emissions and generate other positive spillover effects. Subsidies often lead to smuggling, to shortages, and to the emergence of black markets.

#### ***5. Establishing international conventions***

Because in a globalized economy corruption increasingly has a cross-border dimension, the international legal framework for corruption control is a key element among the options open to governments. This framework has improved significantly over

the past decade. In addition to the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention, in 2005 the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) entered into force, and by late 2013 had been ratified by the vast majority of its 140 signatories. The UNCAC is a promising instrument because it creates a global framework involving developed and developing nations and covers a broad range of subjects, including domestic and foreign corruption, extortion, preventive measures, anti-money laundering provisions, conflict of interest laws, means to recover illicit funds deposited by officials in offshore banks, among others. Since the UN has no enforcement powers, the effectiveness of the Convention as a tool to deter corruption will very much depend on the establishment of adequate national monitoring mechanisms to assess government compliance.

## ***6. Deploying smart technology***

Just as government-induced distortions provide many opportunities for corruption, it is also the case that frequent, direct contact between government officials and citizens can open the way for illicit transactions. One way to address this problem is to use readily available technologies to encourage

more of an arms-length relationship between officials and civil society; in this respect the Internet has been proved to be an effective tool to reduce corruption (Andersen *et al.*, 2011). In some countries the use of online platforms to facilitate the government's interactions with civil society and the business community has been particularly successful in the areas of tax collection, public procurement, and red tape. Perhaps one of the most fertile sources of corruption in the world is associated with the purchasing activities of the state. Purchases of goods and services by the state can be sizable, in most countries somewhere between 5-10 percent of GDP. Because the awarding of contracts can involve a measure of bureaucratic discretion, and because most countries have long histories of graft, kickbacks, and collusion in public procurement, more and more countries have opted for procedures that guarantee adequate levels of openness, competition, a level playing field for suppliers, fairly clear bidding procedures, and so on.

Ayobami (2011) is of the view that efforts to prevent corruption from happening at all, Nigerian should emphasis transparency,

integrity, and accountability in all their private and public transaction. He goes further to suggest the following:

- i. Social Transformation. Transformation in education of the public is a necessary factor in social transformation. There is need for formation and reformation, orientation and re-orientation of the minds and heart of Nigerians, for them to see that corruption is the enemy of development.
- ii. Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Law. The law should be enforced to its fullest and without fear and favor. The police, Economic Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences (ICPC) and other anti-corruption agencies should brace up for the challenges of fighting corruption to its logical conclusion.
- iii. Improvement of Sociopolitical and Economic Life. This is another weapon against corruption in Nigeria. The multiplying effects of this improvement will reduce the tendency of public servants to demand and take bribes and get involved in other corrupt practices.

## **2.5 The Nexus between Institutional Corruption and Civil Service Performance**

The Civil Service in every country plays an important role in governance by making sure that government policy is carried out. Although it serves the government of the day, it is politically independent by which it ensures the functioning of the system, stability and security. Thus, Governments, in many parts of the world, are structurally and constitutionally tied to the civil service, irrespective of the system of government (Olagboye, 2005). In addition to implementing the Government policy, civil servants also offer support and advice on policy making to the ministers (Civil Service Commission, 2013). Olagboye (2005) writes that the civil service is the main instrument through which government implements and administers public policies and programmes. This function according to him, usually derives from the constitution and the laws of the land. However, the way and manner civil service in a particular state is managed determines its performance. Thus, civil service has prominent roles to play in service delivery. The development achieved in many countries of the world has been due to the

ability of their civil service to effectively translate the policies of their political leaders into concrete services. Thus, from the conventional administrative perspective, the civil service is an instrument for both policy advice and implementation of the will of the state as determined by a legitimate political institution for which the service most is subordinated and subservient. Therefore, performance of the civil service a critical element in the performance of the government and socio-economic development of the country.

Illallah (nd) notes that the public image of the civil service is its contribution for the maintenance of unity and stability of the country. It is commended for providing the semblance of government order and the continuity when everything about governmental direction seemed lost. In provision of the organizational and technical resources for reconstruction programmed in furthering the inspiring and directing socio-economic development of the country. Their structural and ideological weakness has vitiated to contribute positively to the attainment of national unity and stability. In clear terms so much is expected of the civil service that any distortion of its

operations and system will inflict a damaging distortion on the socio-economic development the country.

It also appears that the structure of civil service itself encourages corruption. Iyanada (2012) posits that bureaucratic structure gave birth to extractive corruption. Indeed, critical observation reveals that the state or some state agents benefit most from extra-legal transactions in the name of the state. This kind of corruption unfolds when institutional decision-makers exploit the government power they are equipped with, to tailored and sustain their self-interest, power, status and wealth. The agents' extractive behavior unfolds towards evading the iron cage of the law thereby instituting conditional reciprocity between the agent(s) and the law breaker. This unwholesome behavior generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment away from education and into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Budget execution cannot bring about the desired outcomes and impacts if corruption eats away the allocated resources. It is even more so if these resources are wasted by public officials that are paid to


ensure that such resources are utilized efficiently and effectively for the benefit of the majority of citizens (Azeem, 2009).

The harmful effects of corruption are obvious as it takes away public resources from service delivery to the poor and marginalized in society. Undoubtedly, corruption is antithetical to the purpose of public administration. Whitton (1994) posits that corruption is often referred to as a failure of the institution of the public service and as a betrayal of the essential professional ethic of the public administrator to serve the public “honestly and disinterestedly as trustees of the public interest. Delivering effective corruption free public services by the civil servant requires transformation at multiple levels – the way public sector organizations behave, how they view their roles, and how they share information between departments, with businesses and with the citizens. A bold and vibrant anti corruption initiatives, an ethical and watchdog infrastructure involving all sectors of society, effective and verifiable disclosure rules, including assets and procurement procedures are indeed very apt.



The table below shows a conceptual schema of the perspectives of institutional corruption on Anambra state civil service performance that will be analyzed in this study.

**Fig 1.** A conceptual schema of perspectives of institutional corruption on Anambra state civil service performance



**Source: Author's own conceptualization, 2013.**

## 2.9 Empirical Literature

Osimen, Adenegan, and Balogun (2013) examined and assessed corruption in the public sector in Nigeria with particular reference to Akure South Local Government Area of

Ondo State. It generated data based on questionnaires, on the public perception and level of corruption in the study area. The questionnaire and the groups tested were segmented. However, it was observed that many factors such as; lack of transparency, moral laxity, weak government institutions, unemployment and poverty etc were significant factors stimulating corruption in Nigeria.

Ogbeidi (2013), investigated political leadership and corruption in Nigeria in time frame spanning through five decades (1960-2010). The paper finds that corruption correlates negatively with economic performance and the bane while the country remains underdeveloped. The paper concludes that for Nigeria to experience sustainable socio-economic development, responsible and credible leaders must emerge to implant the act of good and selfless governance in the country.

In another study, Aije and Wokekoro (2013), examined the impact of corruption on sustainable economic growth and development of Nigeria. Data were drawn chiefly from secondary sources and subjected to econometrics tool of ordinary least square techniques. The major finding among others are weak

institution of government; dysfunctional legal system; lack of transparency, high poverty/unemployment rate and political interference on the operations of anti-corruption agencies constitute the major causes of systemic corruption in Nigeria. The study advanced among other propositions restoration of the lost social value system through the family unit, religion and schools; as well as entrench good governance.

Also, Mikail (2012) assessed the impact of corruption on national development in Nigeria's democratic dispensation. Secondary source of data was employed in this study. The paper revealed that bad governance, poor service delivery, inadequate infrastructural amenities, poor management of public enterprise, moral decadence and general underdevelopment were among the impact of corruption on national development in democratic dispensation. It is recommended that three tiers of government, religious bodies and civil society organizations should organize workshops/seminars frequently to the political leaders and the entire public in order to inculcate in them the spirit of consciousness, probity and accountability so as to reduce the corruption to the barest minimal.

In another perspective, Adeyemi (2013), in his study that adopted an analytical framework on “Corruption and local government administration in Nigeria: A discourse of core issues”, provides evidence that corruption at grassroots level has hindered development and participation at local level. In view of the above, the study recommends an urgent need to put in place an effective and efficient institutional mechanism in all the 774 local government area councils across the country to checkmate the menace of corruption at the local level.

In his contribution to the issue of corruption in Nigeria, Emmanuel (2010) reviews the political economy of corruption and the efforts by the government to combat it by examining the types and forms of corruption and the various perspectives for understanding the causes of corruption. The study while recognizing the importance of the various perspectives, notes that both the institutional and rent-seeking theories offer deeper insights into the systemic corruption activities. Finally, the paper examines the activities of the EFCC and notes that it faces serious challenges, as the configurations of the Nigerian political landscape are uncertain.

Using Engle-Granger co-integration and error correction mechanism (ECM) techniques, Shewu and Akanni (2008), evaluated the impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria. The results show that corruption exerts significant direct effect on economic growth and indirectly via some critical variables examined by the paper which include Government Capital Expenditure, Human Capital Development and Total employment. The paper discovers that about 20% of the increase in government capital expenditure ends up in private pockets. They recommend that the government should consolidate its efforts to fight corruption to a standstill in the country.

Abed and Davoodi (2002), examined the impact of corruption in transition economies using a panel and cross-sectional data for twenty-five (25) countries over the period of 1994-1998. The results show that higher economic growth is associated with lower corruption in both panel and cross-sectional regressions and it shows significance at one percent level.

In another study worthy of note is that of Robert (1993), in which he examined and discussed extensively political

corruption in Nigeria from a historical point of view with heavy concentration on political developments in the country before independence and the activities of Nigerian nationalists' vis-à-vis the colonial masters. His findings were akin with Ogbeidi (2013) that corruption undermines institutional performance and relegates economic growth in Nigeria.

In a nutshell, all the studies reviewed in this section revealed that corruption has negative effect on the performance of civil service and in turn affects the economic growth of the country where such exists. It is on this ground that the researcher embarked on the study of institutional corruption and performance of Anambra State Civil Service.

## **2.2 Gap in Literature**

For a fact, the literature is in a harmonious accord in asserting that corruption crowds out progress and regresses developmental effort as well as undermines organization performance and productivity. It is also obvious that studies on corruption are rife with varying literary perspectives, but there is a dearth of empirical study on institutional corruption as it affects the civil service performance, a gap which this study fills.

For example: Ogbeidi (2013), investigated political leadership and corruption in Nigeria in time frame spanning through five decades (1960-2010); Ajie and Wokekoro (2012) examined the impact of corruption on sustainable economic growth and development of Nigeria; Mikail (2012), assessed the impact of corruption on national development in Nigeria's democratic dispensation. Adeyemi (2012), investigated "Corruption and local government administration in Nigeria: A discourse of core issues"; Emmanuel (2010) reviews the political economy of corruption and the efforts by the Nigerian government to combat it by examining the types and forms of corruption and the various perspectives for understanding the causes of corruption; Shewu and Akanni (2008), evaluated the impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria; Abed and Davoodi (2002), examined the impact of corruption in transition economies. Robert (1993), examined and discussed extensively political corruption in Nigeria from a historical point of view with heavy concentration on political developments in the country before independence and the activities of Nigerian nationalists' vis-à-vis the colonial masters. Osimen, Adenegan, and Balogun (2013) investigated

something similar, but they examined and assessed corruption in the public sector in Nigeria with particular reference to Akure South Local Government Area of Ondo State. They also did not relate corruption to performance of civil service or any government agency. Their study created a literature gap for the present study in two aspects: for one their study was carried out at the local government level and the study was also conducted in south west Nigeria, thus giving the researcher an opportunity to compare the findings of the present study with their findings. Given the large size of the public sector in most sub-Saharan economies, a research in this area is utterly pertinent in unraveling the operational implications of institutional corruption in the Nigerian public sector. Furthermore, in its contribution to the literature, given the dimensions of a discourse of this fold, the study investigates the nexus between institutional corruption and performance of the Anambra state civil service.

### **2.3 Theoretical Framework.**

The study is anchored on the theory of extractive corruption by Inge Amundsen (Amundsen, 1999) to analyse the



relation of state and society in issues of corruption and answers the question of who stands to benefit most. Amundsen (1999), postulated that the state is the stronger and more active party in the corrupted state-society relationship. According to her theory, posits that the corrupted benefit the most from corruption and the corrupters are more or less passive players. The ruling elite is the strongest force in society and this elite or class uses the state apparatus as its instrument to extract resources from society, and it does so for personal benefit. Authoritarian regimes have always been understood and portrayed in terms of some ruling elite or class that uses or misuses the powers of the state primarily to safeguard its own corporate or class interests. This group inevitably does so at the detriment of and in conflict with other groups and interests in society. They use censorship and electoral fraud, to establish unjust laws and disrespect their own legislation, and they may turn to human rights violations, intimidations, imprisonment and torture. The theory of extractive corruption is derived from the relatively stable and flexible neo-patrimonial political systems found in most of Africa and in some Latin America and

Asian countries. Here, public office and position is seen as a personal asset and a personal right, and it is treated as a private resource.

The entire political system is therefore characterized by a deep and thorough privatization and usurpation of public resources. Politics is to a large extent about distributing resources in the form of jobs, contracts, scholarships, gifts and other public resources to one's relatives, friends and political allies. That is, public authority is used by those in leadership position to extract resources from people and from the nation's riches. Public office is used to enforce the collection of rents and gifts of all sorts. Corruption, embezzlement, theft and extortion are used to make private fortunes, and political power is used by power holders to enter into profitable businesses and to establish monopoly rights, tax exemptions and other advantages. The overall effect is that the state apparatus is inefficient and resources are not distributed according to needs. Investments are not made in productive areas and appointments and promotions in the public sector are not based on merit, but on political and economic interests.

## **2.4 Application of the Extractive Theory of corruption to the study**

Any instance a public officer maximizes his position for personal advantage is extractive in nature and outlook. When a public office would perform his official duty only when financially induced or would not be persuaded and guided by the official ethics, his unruly actions are intended to exert undue pressure on the recipient of his services, corruption is in place. When a public servant lives above his income, or throws his weight around, or causes undue delays in carryout his functions, the signal is clear, corruption. A situation where services are rendered on the basis of gratification and/or a recipient is forced to pay for what government has provided or paid for or denied access to such a benefit is extractive corruption. Any policy tailored to suit a particular individual, group or groups, and investments not made *pro bono publico* (for public interest), this is corruption. A government functionary can deliberately cripple a state apparatus to cause unease, create inefficiency or scarcity or create a sense of fear and insecurity for a perceived gain, this

is tantamount to corruption. When a policy is made under the cover of “once and for all exercise”, to promote, favour or compensate a particular person, that is corruption.

The ramifications of corruption enunciated here fall within the ambient of extractive corruption. Unlike the former, extractive corruption appropriately captures our framework. This work is anchored on the theory of extractive corruption. The civil service is a chief employer of labour in the state. The state civil service cut across all economic spheres, and its main function is the execution and initiation of public policy and advising government on the full implication of policy options open to government.

Although the state civil service has gone through metamorphic changes resulting from changes in systems of government; however, its functions remain same. But of interest to public administrators and analysts is the effectiveness of the state civil service. It is a fact that the state civil service has come of age, but its operative transparency has been belittled by institutional corruption. Attesting to the obvious corrupt practices in the state civil service and in an attempt to revamp

the sector, the erstwhile Governor Peter Obi at the Jerome Udoji Secretariat Complex, Awka in 2010 pleaded with workers in the state civil service to re-think their attitude to work. The Governor told them to shun corrupt practices and resist policies and programmes that were inimical to development, asserting that the weak and faulty recruitment process and irregular promotions in the civil service have been sustaining corruption. Buttressing this, Okigwe (2013), highlighting the inefficiency in the civil service, posits that a typical civil servant in the state is lazy, indolent, and joined the service not to serve but to use his strategic position to serve himself at the expense of his organization. The typical worker is money and material oriented, pleasure-seeking and egocentrically wants to get rich quickly Ejiiofor, (2000).

An overview of the civil service in the state shows the applicability of the extractive theory of corruption in practice. Among the attributes of the civil service is impartiality and neutrality facet; however, its practice is lacking in the Anambra civil service because of the strong dominant hold of the executive. In the absence of an effective check and balances, the

structure of the state civil service is robed with corruptive loopholes and impunities. This is an organized corruptive sector where contracts are awarded based on favoritism; promotion and employment selection lacked meritocracy but 'who do you know'.

The effect of this un-professional act is overwhelming- it has succeeded in continuously diminishing the operational effectiveness of the state civil service and relegating optimization of the state resources. Though the current administration is championing a campaign towards cleansing the state of the hold of institutional corruption in its civil service; however, the outcome of such vivid actions remains moot, with some analysts arguing that corruption remains an implicit guild influencing the operations of civil servants in the state.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This chapter on research methodology deals with research design and procedures for treating the data collected. Consequently the following procedures involved in survey research were discussed: Research design, Area of the study, Sources of Data, method of data collection, population of the study, sample size and sampling procedure.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This research work is a descriptive study. It is concerned with the collection of data for the purpose of describing and interpreting existing phenomena. It involved sampling by using structured questionnaire to elicit data that were analyzed so as to get an insight into the topic under consideration.

#### **3.2 Area of the Study**

The area of the study is Awka, Anambra State. Awka is the state capital of the state created in 1991. It is located in the Anambra Central Senatorial Zone of the State. Awka is the seat of the indigenous technology and craft. The people of the area

are known for carving iron and blacksmithing. They are mostly subsistent farmers and traders. Modern industries, hospitals, secondary and tertiary institutions and hotels are scattered around Awka.

### **3.3 Population of the Study**

It is imperative in any study to determine the group or things or persons to be studied. Population of a study has been described in the literature as the “aggregate of individual persons or objects for investigation, or the sum total of the unit of analysis” (Okeke, 2005; Chukwuemeka, 2006). Generally, two main characteristics of the population are that it can be finite or infinite (Chukwuemeka and Oji, 1999; Okeke, 2001, Hair et al, 2005, Agbonifoh and Yomere, 1999).

In the present study, the population comprises of all the employees of the Anambra State Civil Service. The State Civil Service Commission and the ministries/parastatals are charged with the responsibility of planning, organizing, directing and controlling the recruitment, training, compensation and retirement of the civil servants in the state. The population is finite because the researcher was able to obtain the estimate of



the total number of those who are employed in the Anambra State civil Service. The Anambra State civil Service has staff strength of 5327 workers which serve as the population of the study (Anambra state Civil Service Commission annual report, 2012).

The table below shows the staff strength of the Anambra state civil service.

**Table 3.1: Staff strength of the Anambra state civil service**

S/NO	MINISTRIES/NO.MIN.DEPT.	TOTAL		TOTAL
		MALE	FEMALE	M/F
1	OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR	71	80	151
2	OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR	19	33	52
3	OFFICE OF THE SSG	97	127	224
4	OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF SERVICE	110	121	231
5	MIN. OF AGRICULTURE	205	152	357
6	MIN. OF COMM. IND & TOURISM	72	62	134
7	MIN. OF EDUCATION	67	213	280
8	MIN. OF FINANCE	174	249	423
9	MIN. OF HEALTH	66	160	226
10	MIN. OF JUSTICE	50	142	192
11	MIN. OF WORKS & TRANSPORT	91	55	146
12	MIN. OF LAND & SURVEY	115	108	223
13	MIN. OF BASE UTILITY WATER AND COMM. DEV.	119	36	155
14	MIN. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.	45	18	63
15	MIN. OF INFORMATION	61	55	116
16	MIN. OF WOMEN AFFAIRS & SOCIAL WELFARE	34	52	86
17	MIN. OF ENVIRONMENT AND MIN RESOURCES	43	47	90
18	MIN. OF YOUTHS SPORTS & CULTURE	73	63	136
19	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	32	52	84
20	OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR GEN	37	43	80
21	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN FOR LG	23	26	49
22	MIN. OF ECON. PLANNING & BUDGET	50	54	104
23	BOARD OF INT. REVENUE	-	-	-
24	ANAMBRA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY	42	62	104
25	GOVT. PRINTER & STATIONARY DEVPT.	50	44	94
26	MIN. OF SPECIAL DUTIES	-	-	-
27	MIN. OF SCIENCE & TECH	-	-	-
28	MIN. OF L.G & CHIEFTAINCY MATTERS	6	20	26
29	STATE HOSPITAL & MARKET BOARD	372	1129	1501
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2125</b>	<b>3202</b>	<b>5327</b>

**Source: Anambra state Civil Service Commission annual Report, 2012.**

### 3.4 Sample Size

To determine the sample size, for the purpose of questionnaire distribution; the Taro Yamani formula was used.

The formula is stated thus:  $n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$

Where:  $n$  = sample size

$N$  = population

$e$  = Margin of error (5% or 0.05)

$I$  = Constant

Substituting in the above formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 n &= \frac{5327}{1+ 5327(0.05)^2} \\
 &= \frac{5327}{1+ 5327(0.0025)} \\
 &= \frac{5327}{1+ 5327(0.0025)} \\
 &= \frac{5327}{14.3175} \\
 n &\simeq 372
 \end{aligned}$$

### 3.5 Sampling Techniques

For the purpose of questionnaire distribution, the R Kumaison' formula was adopted.

$$n_h = \frac{nN_h}{N}$$

Where  $n$  = Total sample size

$N_h$  = The number of items in each stratum in the population

$N$  = Population size

$n_h$  = The number of units allocated to each stratum

$n$  = 372

$n_h$  =

1 = 151,

2, = 52,

3 = 224,

4 = 231,

5 = 357

6 = 134,

$$7=280,$$

$$8=423,$$

$$9 = 226,$$

$$10=192$$

$$11=146$$

$$12=223$$

$$13=155$$

$$14=63$$

$$15=116$$

$$16=86$$

$$17=90$$

$$18=136$$

$$19=84$$

$$20=80$$

$$21=49$$

$$22=104$$

$$23 = -$$

$$24 = 104$$

$$25 = 94$$

$$26 = -$$

$$27 = -$$

$$28 = 26$$

$$29 = 1501$$

Substituting in the above formula:

$$\text{Stratum 1; } \Rightarrow nh = \frac{372 \times 151}{5327} = 10.5 = 11$$

$$\text{Stratum 2; } nh = \frac{372 \times 52}{5327} = 3.6 = 4$$

$$\text{Stratum 3; } nh = \frac{372 \times 224}{5327} = 15.6 = 16$$

$$\text{Stratum 4; } nh = \frac{372 \times 231}{5327} = 16.1 = 16$$

$$\text{Stratum 5; } nh = \frac{372 \times 357}{5327} = 24.9 = 25$$

$$\text{Stratum 6; } nh = \frac{372 \times 134}{5327} = 9.3 = 9$$

$$\text{Stratum 7; } nh = \frac{372 \times 280}{5327} = 19.5 = 20$$

$$\text{Stratum 8; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 423}{5327} = 29.5 = 30$$

$$\text{Stratum 9; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 226}{5327} = 15.7 = 16$$

$$\text{Stratum 10; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 192}{5327} = 13.4 = 13$$

$$\text{Stratum 11; } \Rightarrow \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 146}{5327} = 10.1 = 10$$

$$\text{Stratum 12; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 223}{5327} = 15.5 = 16$$

$$\text{Stratum 13; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 155}{5327} = 10.8 = 11$$

$$\text{Stratum 14; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 63}{5327} = 4.3 = 4$$

$$\text{Stratum 15; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 116}{5327} = 8.1 = 8$$

$$\text{Stratum 16; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 86}{5327} = 6.0 = 6$$

$$\text{Stratum 17; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 90}{5327} = 6.2 = 6$$

$$\text{Stratum 18; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 136}{5327} = 9.4 = 9$$

$$\text{Stratum 19; } \quad \text{nh} = \frac{372 \times 84}{5327} = 5.8 = 6$$

$$\text{Stratum 20; } nh = \frac{372 \times 80}{5327} = 5.5 = 6$$

$$\text{Stratum 21; } \Rightarrow nh = \frac{372 \times 49}{5327} = 3.4 = 3$$

$$\text{Stratum 22; } nh = \frac{372 \times 104}{5327} = 7.2 = 7$$

$$\text{Stratum 23; } nh = \frac{372 \times 0}{5327} = 0 = 0$$

$$\text{Stratum 24; } nh = \frac{372 \times 104}{5327} = 7.2 = 7$$

$$\text{Stratum 25; } nh = \frac{372 \times 94}{5327} = 6.5 = 7$$

$$\text{Stratum 26; } nh = \frac{372 \times 0}{135} = 0 = 0$$

$$\text{Stratum 27; } nh = \frac{372 \times 0}{135} = 0 = 0$$

$$\text{Stratum 28; } nh = \frac{372 \times 26}{135} = 1.8 = 2$$

$$\text{Stratum 29; } nh = \frac{372 \times 1501}{135} = 104.8 = 105$$

The table below shows the number of questionnaire that was allocated to each ministry/parastatals in the Anambra state civil service.



**Table 3.2: Number of questionnaire to be allocated to each ministry/parastatal in the Anambra state civil service**

S/NO	MINISTRIES/NO.MIN.DEPT.	Population	Sample size
1	OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR	151	11
2	OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR	52	4
3	OFFICE OF THE SSG	224	16
4	OFFICE OF THE HEAD OF SERVICE	231	16
5	MIN. OF AGRICULTURE	357	25
6	MIN. OF COMM. IND & TOURISM	134	9
7	MIN. OF EDUCATION	280	20
8	MIN. OF FINANCE	423	30
9	MIN. OF HEALTH	226	16
10	MIN. OF JUSTICE	192	13
11	MIN. OF WORKS & TRANSPORT	146	10
12	MIN. OF LAND & SURVEY	223	16
13	MIN. OF BASE UTILITY WATER AND COMM. DEV.	155	11
14	MIN. OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV.	63	4
15	MIN. OF INFORMATION	116	8
16	MIN. OF WOMEN AFFAIRS & SOCIAL WELFARE	86	6
17	MIN. OF ENVIRONMENT AND MIN RESOURCES	90	6
18	MIN. OF YOUTHS SPORTS & CULTURE	136	9
19	CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	84	6
20	OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR GEN	80	6
21	OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN FOR LG	49	3
22	MIN. OF ECON. PLANNING & BUDGET	104	7
23	BOARD OF INT. REVENUE	-	0
24	ANAMBRA STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY	104	7
25	GOVT. PRINTER & STATIONARY DEVPT.	94	7
26	MIN. OF SPECIAL DUTIES	-	0
27	MIN. OF SCIENCE & TECH	-	0
28	MIN. OF L.G & CHIEFTAINCY MATTERS	26	2
29	STATE HOSPITAL & MARKET BOARD	1501	105
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5327</b>	<b>372</b>

**Source: Computation for the number of questionnaire allocated to each ministry/parastatal in the Anambra state civil service, 2013.**

### **3.6 Sources of Data Collection**

The researcher explored two sources of data which are the primary and secondary data:

**Primary Source of Data Collection** – The primary data were obtained from 372 employees of the Anambra State civil Service which serve as the sample size of the study - using structured questionnaire.

**Secondary Source of Data Collection** – The secondary data were obtained from existing literature in the field of study which was available to the researcher such as: journals, text books, internet materials, unpublished write ups and other relevant information were obtained from the Anambra State statistical year book.

### **3.7 Method of Data Analysis**

The data obtained were analyzed using simple percentage, mean, standard deviation, and t-test statistics; and they were presented in tables in the subsequent chapter. The analysis of the responses of the staff of the Anambra State Civil Service - which serves as the sample size of the study - on perspectives of institutional corruption in Anambra state civil service were

analyzed using four point summative scale response categories of SA= Strongly Agreed, A= Agreed, D= Disagreed and SD=strongly Disagree. By so doing the respondents will be able to tick the option of their choice. Any item with mean value of 2.5 and above was regarded as agreed while items which have a mean value below 2.5 was regarded as disagree. Mean and standard deviation were used to process responses to ascertain prevalent institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service; to identify the major causes of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service; to determine the effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks for addressing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service; to identify major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service while t-statistic was used to test the hypotheses of the study.

### **3.8 Instrument used for Data Collection**

The instrument used for the data collection was questionnaire which was designed and administered to the employees of the Anambra State civil Service - which serve as the sample size of the study.

### **3.9 Validation of the Instrument**

To ascertain the validity of the instrument developed for the study, the purpose of the study, research questions, research hypotheses and the 20 questionnaire were given to three professors and three associate professors in the Faculty of Management Sciences for face and content validation. They were requested to validate the instrument with reference to the appropriateness of the items, their wordings and construct. The experts were also requested to examine the items in respect of their relevance, clarity, content, coverage and their appropriateness in addressing the purpose of the study. The input of these authorities were incorporated by the researcher in modifying the instrument to its current standard which was approved by the researcher's supervisor who made useful contributions that helped in producing the final copies of the instrument.

### **3.10 Reliability of Measuring Instrument**

The reliability of the instrument was established using test re-test method. Copies of the questionnaire for the study were administered to twenty (20) respondents in Awka South local

government council of Anambra State. The same instrument was administered to the same respondents after two weeks. The coefficient of reliability for their responses was established using Cronbach's Alpha. A reliability of 0.849 was obtained and this is considered high enough for the instrument to be reliable (see appendix 3 for the working details).

### **3.11 Model Specification**

The model below was used to determine the quantitative association between the variables:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + \varepsilon$$

Where  $b_0$ ,  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$ ,  $b_4$  and  $b_5$  are constants;

$X_1$  = Giving and taking of bribes;

$X_2$  = Embezzlement of public fund;

$X_3$  = Inflating of contract fees;

$X_4$  = Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative;

$X_5$  = Favoritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded

vehicles; and  $\varepsilon$  is the error term.

The Statistical Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17.0 generated descriptive statistics and established the relationship between the dependent and the independent

variables of the study. A threshold of 3.5 was used for variable reduction on the prevalent institutional corrupt practices. Consequently only five of the variables [Giving and taking of bribes ( $X_1$ ), Embezzlement of public fund ( $X_2$ ), Inflating of contract fees ( $X_3$ ), Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative ( $X_4$ ) and Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles ( $X_5$ )] met the criteria and they were included the model.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents and analyses the data collected from the field. This is to enable the researcher get an insight into the topic under consideration. This section presents summaries of the analysis of the data collected from the field and they are presented in tables to highlight the major findings.

#### 4.1 Demographic Profile of Respondents

**Table 4.1: Distribution of Respondents According to Gender**

Option	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Cumulative (%)
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	256	68.8	68.8
Male	116	31.2	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Field survey: 2013

As evidenced in table 4.1, the female gender constitutes 68% of the responses to the questionnaire while the male gender constitutes 31.2%.

**Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents According to Age**

<b>Option</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>	<b>Cumulative (%)</b>
<b>Age</b>			
≤20	2	0.5	0.5
21-30	16	4.3	4.8
31-40	72	19.4	24.2
41-50	196	52.7	76.9
51-60	86	23.1	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Field survey: 2013

With respect to age, (table 4.2) majority 52.7% of the respondents fall within the age bracket of 41 - 50 years of age. 23.1% of the respondents are within the age bracket of 51-60years of age. 19.4% of the respondents are within the age bracket of 31-40years of age. 4.3% of the respondents are within the age bracket of 21-30years of age. 4.3% of the respondents are within the age bracket of 21-30years of age. 0.5% of the respondents are less than or equal to 20years of age. However, on the average the respondents have mean age of 45years.



**Table 4.3: Distribution of Respondents According to Marital Status**

<b>Option</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>	<b>Cumulative (%)</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>			
Married	313	84.1	84.1
Single	42	11.3	94.4
Widow/widower	6	1.6	97.0
Divorced	11	3.0	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Field Survey, 2013.

With respect to marital status of the respondents, (table 4.3) about 84.1% of the respondents are married, 11.3% of the respondents are single, 1.6% of the respondents are widow/widower, while 3.0% of the respondents are divorced.

**Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents According to Educational Qualification**

<b>Option</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>	<b>Cumulative (%)</b>
<b>Educational Qualification</b>			
Primary	21	5.6	5.6
Secondary	76	20.4	26.1
Tertiary	275	73.9	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Field Survey, 2013.

With respect to educational qualification (table 4.4) all the respondents had formal education. 73.9% of the respondents

had tertiary education. 20.4% of the respondents had secondary education while 5.6% of the respondents had primary education.

**Table 4.5: Distribution of Respondents According to Work Experience**

**Work Experience**

1-5	4	1.1	1.1
6-10	27	7.3	8.3
11-15	73	19.6	28.0
Above 15	268	72.0	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Field Survey, 2013.

With respect to working experience, (table 4.5) majority 72.0% of the respondents had over 15years of working experience. 19.6% of the respondents had between 11-15years of working experience. 7.3% of the respondents had between 6-10years of working experience while 1.1% of the respondents had between 1-5years of working experience.

**Table 4.6: Distribution of respondents according to prevalent institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service**

<b>S/N</b>	<b>Items</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev</b>	<b>Decision</b>
1	Workers in Anambra state civil service give and take bribes	3.75	0.530	Agreed
2	Staff in mgt. position embezzle public fund	3.70	0.567	Agreed
3	Public servant abuse public power for private gain	2.49	0.907	Disagreed
4	Workers do favouritism and nepotism	3.17	1.027	Agreed
5	Abuse of discretion by workers	2.20	0.827	Disagreed
6	Workers engage in money laundry and advance fee fraud	1.80	0.714	Disagreed
7	Offering/receiving of an unlawful gratuity or illegal commission	2.20	0.811	Disagreed
8	Ghost worker syndrome	2.44	1.237	Disagreed
9	Insider-trading	2.84	0.984	Agreed
10	Extortion in cash or kind in exchange for acting or failing to act	3.18	1.009	Agreed
11	Inflating of contract fees by public officers for private gains	3.77	0.462	Agreed
12	Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative	3.67	0.641	Agreed
13	Claiming lunch allowance while on duty tour and collecting allowances for duty tours not undertaken.	3.32	0.746	Agreed
14	Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles	3.59	0.831	Agreed
15	Nomination of less-deserving and "over-trained" friends and relations for more training/courses while other more deserving persons are neglected	3.18	0.844	Agreed
16	Preferential allocation of estate flats to favoured persons to the detriment of more deserving persons	2.77	1.058	Agreed
17	Selective repairs/refurbishment of staff quarters tilted in favour of friends/executives.	1.82	0.705	Disagreed
18	Diversion of state assets,	2.85	0.836	Agreed
	Grand (x)	2.60	0.82	Agreed

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

As shown in table 4.6, with a mean(x) of 3.75 and standard deviation of 0.530 the respondents agreed that workers in Anambra state civil service give and take bribes. With a mean(x) of 3.70 and standard deviation of 0.567 the respondents agreed that Staff in mgt. position embezzle public fund. With a mean(x) of 2.49 and standard deviation of 0.907 the respondents disagreed that Public servants abuse public power for private gain. With a mean(x) of 3.17 and standard deviation of 1.027 the respondents agreed that Workers do favouritism and nepotism. With a mean(x) of 2.20 and standard deviation of 0.827 the respondents disagreed on abuse of discretion by workers. With a mean(x) of 1.80 and standard deviation of 0.714 the respondents disagreed that Workers engage in money laundry and advance fee fraud. With a mean(x) of 2.20 and standard deviation of 0.811 the respondents disagreed on the item Offering/receiving of an unlawful gratuity or illegal commission by workers in the Anambra state civil service. With a mean(x) of 2.44 and standard deviation of 1.237 the respondents disagreed on Ghost worker syndrome among workers in the Anambra state civil service. With a mean (x) of 2.84, 3.18, 3.77, 3.67, 3.32, 3.59, 3.18, 2.77 and 2.85; and standard deviation of 0.984, 1.009, 0.462, 0.641,

0.746, 0.831, 0.844, 1.058 and 0.836 the respondents agreed that there is Insider-trading, Extortion in cash or kind in exchange for acting or failing to act, Inflating of contract fees by public officers for private gains, Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative, Claiming lunch allowance while on duty tour and collecting allowances for duty tours not undertaken, Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles, persons are neglected, Nomination of less-deserving and "over-trained" friends and relations for more training/courses while others are more deserving, Preferential allocation of estate flats to favoured persons to the detriment of more deserving persons and Diversion of state assets respectively among workers in the Anambra state civil service. However, with a mean(x) of 1.82 and standard deviation of 0.705 the respondents disagreed that Selective repairs/refurbishment of staff quarters tilted in favour of friends/executive workers in the Anambra state civil service.

**Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents according to causes of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service**

S/N	Items	Means	Std. Dev	Decision
1	Ethnic/Religious Difference	3.66	0.647	Agreed
2	Resource Scramble	3.72	0.627	Agreed
3	Culture and Acceptance of Corruption by the Populace	1.80	0.715	Disagreed
4	Poor Pay Incentives	3.15	0.867	Agreed
5	Weak Government Institution	3.32	0.462	Agreed
6	Lack of Openness and Transparency in Public Service	1.80	0.666	Disagreed
7	Absence of key Anti-Corruption Tools and ineffective Political process	3.21	0.988	Agreed
	Grand Mean ( $\bar{x}$ )	2.95	0.71	Agreed

**Source:** Field Survey, 2013.

Table 4.7 reveals causes of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service. With a mean ( $\bar{x}$ ) of 3.66, 3.72, 3.15, 3.32, and 3.21; and standard deviation of 0.647, 0.627, 0.867, 0.462 and 0.988 respectively, respondents agreed on the following causes of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service: Ethnic/Religious Difference, Resource Scramble, Poor Pay Incentives, Weak Government Institution and Absence of key Anti-Corruption Tools and ineffective political process. With a mean ( $\bar{x}$ ) of 1.80 and 1.80 and 3.21; and standard deviation of 0.715 and 0.666. They however disagreed

on Culture and Acceptance of Corruption by the Populace and Lack of Openness and Transparency in Public Service

**Table 4.8: Distribution of mean ratings by respondents according to performance of Anambra State Civil Service in Core Functional Areas (n=372).**

S/N	Items	Means	Std. Dev	Decision
1	Budget preparation	3.1317	1.36430	Agreed
2	Compliance with budget implementation	2.8306	1.33815	Disagreed
3	Contract awards	2.7258	1.14458	Disagreed
4	Staff recruitment	2.7500	1.13953	Disagreed
5	Staff promotion	3.0242	1.26830	Agreed
6	Staff welfare	2.8683	1.26379	Disagreed
7	Service delivery	2.9943	1.05875	Disagreed
8	Handling of official matters	3.1935	1.14462	Agreed
	Grand (x)	2.9405	0.58962	Disagreed

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

From the above table, there is a common view that Anambra State Civil Service has not performed well (grand mean rating of  $2.94 < 3.0$ ). However the respondents agreed that there was above average performance in budget preparation (3.13), staff promotion (3.02) and handling of official matters (3.2). The Civil Service performance was less than average with respect to Compliance with budget implementation (2.8), contract awards (2.73), Staff recruitment (2.8), staff welfare (2.88), and service delivery (2.99).

The implication of these is that the performance of the Anambra state civil service has not been encouraging because of the extent of identified prevalent corrupt practices in the state civil service.

**Table 4.9: Distribution of respondents according to effectiveness of the under listed anticorruption initiative in curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil service.**

S/N	Items	Means	Std. Dev	Decision
1	Media (press & television)	1.76	0.664	Disagreed
2	ICPC	2.24	1.303	Disagreed
3	EFCC	3.00	1.150	Agreed
4	Police	2.05	1.297	Disagreed
5	State Security Services	3.72	0.554	Agreed
6	Public Complaints Commission	1.60	0.768	Disagreed
7	Code of Conduct Bureau	2.46	0.900	Disagreed
8	Courts	3.30	0.679	Agreed
9	State House of Assembly	1.29	0.674	Disagreed
10	Armed forces, military	3.61	0.736	Agreed
11	Nongovernment organizations	3.24	0.767	Agreed
12	Traditional rulers	2.98	0.787	Agreed
13	Religious organizations	3.05	1.192	Agreed
14	Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly	1.82	1.009	Disagreed
15	Office of the Auditor-General	3.11	0.971	Agreed
16	Nigerian Medical Association	3.18	1.009	Agreed
17	Nigerian Bar Association.	2.75	1.079	Agreed
	Grand (x)	2.66	0.91	

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

From table 4.9 the effectiveness of the anticorruption initiative in curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil



service was presented. Apart from Media (press & television), ICPC, Police, Public Complaints Commission, Code of Conduct Bureau, State House of Assembly and Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly with a mean of 1.76, 2.24, 2.05, 1.60, 1.60, 2.46 and 1.29. and standard deviation of 0.664, 1.303, 1.297, 0.768, 0.900 and 0.674 respectively that were items of disagreement by the respondents, they agreed on the effectiveness of - EFCC, State Security Services, Courts, Armed forces, military, Nongovernment organizations, Traditional rulers, Religious organizations, Office of the Auditor-General, Nigerian Medical Association and Nigerian Bar Association- in curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil service with a mean of 3.00, 3.72, 3.30, 3.61, 3.24, 2.98, 3.05, 3.11, 3.18 and 2.75; and standard deviation of 1.150, 0.554, 0.679, 0.736, 0.767, 0.787, 0.787, 1.192, 0.971, 1.009 and 1.079 respectively.

**Table 4.10: Distribution of Respondents According to major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service**

S/N	Items	Means	Std. Dev	Decision
1	Lack of moral justification to carry out a probe	3.73	0.451	Agreed
2	People to conduct probe were beneficiaries of their squander	3.67	0.654	Agreed
3	The fear of the corrupt cartel to probe	3.73	0.482	Agreed
4	Lack of will power to fight corruption	3.50	0.580	Agreed
5	Problem Mutual corruption	3.68	0.645	Agreed
6	I know you syndrome	2.61	1.087	Agreed
7	Dependence of the institution that fight corruption on the powers that be.	3.68	0.613	Agreed
8	The problem of nepotism	2.77	1.060	Agreed
9	Absence of clear anti-corruption legislation	1.82	0.700	Disagreed
10	Insufficient co-ordination of anti-corruption work within the public sector	3.16	0.903	Agreed
11	Poor information about corruption	3.31	0.719	Agreed
12	Weak impact of anti-corruption measures	3.71	0.489	Agreed
	Grand (x)	3.28	75.71	

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

As shown in table 4.10, the perception of the respondents on major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service were presented. Apart from the absence of clear anti-corruption legislation with a mean of 1.82 and standard deviation of 0.700, every other item was regarded as an inhibiting factor in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service. However, lack of moral justification to carry out a probe

and the fear of the corrupt cartel to probe were identified as the major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service.

#### 4.2 Test of Hypotheses

**Ho<sub>1</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the perception of respondents on cultural values, cultural practices and weak government institutions as the major cause of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service.

**Table 4.12: Summary of t-test values on the responses of the respondents on the major cause of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service**

S/N	Items	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Std Error	df	T	sig
1	Ethnic/Religious Difference	372	3.66	0.647	0.034	371	109.138	0.000
2	Resource Scramble	372	3.72	0.627	0.033	371	114.301	0.000
3	Culture and Acceptance of Corruption by the Populace	372	1.80	0.715	0.037	371	48.485	0.000
4	Poor Pay Incentives	372	3.15	0.867	0.045	371	70.028	0.000
5	Weak Government Institution	372	3.32	0.462	0.024	371	157.718	0.000
6	Lack of Openness and Transparency in Public Service	372	1.80	0.666	0.036	371	93.271	0.000
7	Absence of key Anti-Corruption Tools and ineffective Political process	372	3.21	0.988	0.051	371	62.7040	0.000

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

## **Test Result**

From table 4.12 the t-test for the significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the major cause of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service was found to be significant at 0.00 levels. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the major cause of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service.

Being guided by the findings from our study, the second alternate hypothesis: there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the major cause of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service is accepted; although the descriptive statistics revealed that the major causes are Resource Scramble and Ethnic/Religious Difference every other items were also significant indicating that the cause of institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service are rife.

**Ho<sub>2</sub>:** Bribery, embezzlement and favouritism have no significant effect on Anambra state civil service performance.

### **Multiple regression analysis and findings**

In this subsection, multiple regression analysis was used to determine whether independent variables ( $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ ,  $X_3$ ,  $X_4$  and  $X_5$ ) simultaneously impact the dependent variable ( $Y$ ). As a result, the subsection examines whether the multiple regression equation can be used to explain the causal theory of the various factors on Anambra state civil service performance. To investigate the influence of: Giving and taking of bribes ( $X_1$ ), Embezzlement of public fund ( $X_2$ ), Inflating of contract fees ( $X_3$ ), Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative ( $X_4$ ) and Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles ( $X_5$ ) on Anambra state civil service performance, the model used for the regression analysis was expressed in the general form as given below:  $Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + \epsilon$ . For this model, Anambra state civil service performance was used as the dependent variable ( $Y$ ) and independent variables included  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ ,  $X_3$ ,  $X_4$  and  $X_5$ . The relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables, and the results of testing significance of the model have been respectively interpreted. In interpreting the results of multiple

regression analysis, the three major elements considered were: the coefficient of multiple determinations, the standard error of estimate and the regression coefficients. These elements and the results of multiple regression analysis were presented and interpreted accordingly. Table 4.13 below presents the result on the Anambra state civil service performance model.

**Table 4.13: The Anambra State Civil Service Performance Model Summary**

<b>Model</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>R Squared</b>	<b>Adjusted R Squared</b>	<b>Std Error of the Estimate</b>
1	.742	.551	.552	3.0594

**Source: Computation from Field Surveyor, 2013.**

Table 4.13 reports the model of Anambra state civil service performance with the coefficient of determination  $R^2 = 0.552$  at 0.05 at significant level. The coefficient of determination indicated that 55.2 % of the variation in the Anambra state civil service performance for the sample of 372 can be explained by Giving and taking of bribes ( $X_1$ ), Embezzlement of public fund ( $X_2$ ), Inflating of contract fees ( $X_3$ ), Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative ( $X_4$ ) and Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles ( $X_5$ ) while 44.8 %

remains unexplained. The results of the summary Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) are presented and interpreted in Table 4.14.

**Table 4.14: Summary ANOVA**

		<b>Sum of squares</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>mean square</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>Sig</b>
<b>Model</b>	Regression	79.116	5	15.823	15.	0
	Residual	13.751	38	1.020		
	Total	117.867	43			

**Source: Computation from Field Surveyor January, 2013**

Table 4.14 reports the summary ANOVA and F statistic which reveals the value of F (15.513) being significant at 0.05 confidence level. The value of F is large enough to conclude that the set of independent variables: Giving and taking of bribes ( $X_1$ ), Embezzlement of public fund ( $X_2$ ), Inflating of contract fees ( $X_3$ ), Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative ( $X_4$ ) and Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles ( $X_5$ ) as a whole were contributing to the variance in performance appraisal systems.

The results of the Anambra state civil service performance regression model using the five independent variables were presented and interpreted in Table 4.15.

**Table 4.15 Anambra state civil service performance Regression Model**

	Unstandardized Coefficients	
	B	Std. Error
Constant	-2.011	1.532
X <sub>1</sub>	-3.025	0.325
X <sub>2</sub>	-0.258	0.256
X <sub>3</sub>	-0.123	0.145
X <sub>4</sub>	-0.236	0.219
X <sub>5</sub>	-0.367	0.308

**Source: Computation from Field Surveyor, 2013**

Predictors: (constant), Giving and taking of bribes (X<sub>1</sub>), Embezzlement of public fund (X<sub>2</sub>), Inflating of contract fees (X<sub>3</sub>), Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative (X<sub>4</sub>) and Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles (X<sub>5</sub>)

Table 4.15 evaluates and interprets the standardized coefficients of correlation (beta). In estimating the contribution of each independent variable in the study, it was established that all independent variables significantly contributed in variance of the Anambra state civil service performance at significance level



of 0.05. However, the relative importance of each independent variable was different. Also, since the significance values are less than 0.05, the coefficients are significant and therefore the regression equation would be:

$$Y = 2.011 - 3.025X_1 - 0.258 X_2 - 0.123 X_3 - 0.236X_4 - 0.367X_5$$

Giving and taking of bribes was negatively related to Anambra state civil service performance with  $\beta=0.601$  ( $\alpha<.05$ ). Therefore support was found to indicate that giving and taking of bribes has an influence on Anambra state civil service performance.

Embezzlement of public fund was negatively related to Anambra state civil service performance with  $\beta = 0.321$  ( $\alpha<.05$ ). This evidence indicates that embezzlement of public fund has a negative influence on state civil service performance.

Anambra state civil service performance was negatively related to Inflating of contract fees with  $\beta = 0.123$  ( $\alpha<.05$ ). Therefore support was also found to show that there is a relationship between Anambra state civil service performance and Inflating of contract fees which was a negative one.

Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative was negatively related to Anambra state civil service performance with  $\beta = 0.256$  ( $\alpha < .05$ ) Like the previous factors, evidence was found to indicate that Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative has an influence on Anambra state civil service performance. Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles was also negatively related to Anambra state civil service performance with  $\beta = 0.314$  ( $\alpha < .05$ ). Therefore, all the five factors ( $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4$  and  $X_5$ ) have negative influence on Anambra state civil service performance, explaining 55.2 % of the variation in the Anambra state civil service performance.

**Ho<sub>3</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service.

**Table 4.16: Summary of t-test values on the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of Institutional Frameworks for addressing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service**

S/N	Items	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Std Error	df	T	sig
1	Media (press & television)	372	1.76	0.664	0.034	371	51.124	0.000
2	ICPC	372	2.24	1.303	0.068	371	33.177	0.000
3	EFCC	372	3.00	1.150	0.060	371	50.342	0.000
4	Police	372	2.05	1.297	0.066	371	30.884	0.000
5	State Security Services	372	3.72	0.554	0.029	371	129.378	0.000
6	Public Complaints Commission	372	1.60	0.768	0.040	371	40.295	0.000
7	Code of Conduct Bureau	372	2.46	0.900	0.047	371	52.773	0.000
8	Courts	372	3.30	0.679	0.035	371	94.419	0.000
9	State House of Assembly	372	1.29	0.674	0.035	371	36.912	0.000
10	Armed forces, military	372	3.61	0.736	0.038	371	94.601	0.000
11	Nongovernment organizations	372	3.24	0.767	0.039	371	82.247	0.000
12	Traditional rulers	372	2.98	0.787	0.041	371	72.988	0.000
13	Religious organizations	372	3.05	1.192	0.062	371	49.422	0.000
14	Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly	372	1.82	1.009	0.052	371	34.743	0.000
15	Office of the Auditor-General	372	3.11	0.971	0.050	371	61.734	0.000
16	Nigerian Medical Association	372	3.18	1.009	0.052	371	60.851	0.000
17	Nigerian Bar Association.	372	2.75	1.079	0.056	371	49.167	0.000

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

From table 4.16 the t-test for the significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of the

media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practices in Anambra State Civil Service was found to be significant at 0.00 levels. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service.

Being guided by the findings from our study, the third alternate hypothesis: there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the effectiveness of the media, anti corruption agencies and professional bodies for addressing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra State Civil Service is accepted; although the descriptive statistics revealed that the respondents disagreed on some items like - Media (press & television), ICPC, Police, Public Complaints Commission, Code of Conduct Bureau, State House of Assembly, and Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly- but their responses were all significant indicating that they are important in the fight

against institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service.

**Ho<sub>4</sub>:** There is no significant difference in the responses of the respondents on lack of moral justification, lack of will power, and incoherent process guidelines as the major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service.

**Table 4.17: Summary of t-test values on the responses of the respondents on the major inhibiting factor in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service**

S/N	Items	N	Mean	Std. Dev	Std Error	Df	T	sig
1	Lack of moral justification to carry out a probe	372	3.73	0.451	0.023	371	159.329	0.000
2	People to conduct probe were beneficiaries of their squander	372	3.67	0.654	0.034	371	108.140	0.000
3	The fear of the corrupt cartel to probe	372	3.73	0.482	0.025	371	149.227	0.000
4	Lack of will power to fight corruption	372	3.50	0.580	0.030	371	116.298	0.000
5	Problem Mutual corruption	372	3.68	0.645	0.033	371	110.046	0.000
6	I know you syndrome	372	2.61	1.087	0.056	371	46.368	0.000
7	Dependence of the institution that fight corruption on the powers that be.	372	3.68	0.613	0.032	371	115.755	0.000
8	The problem nepotism	372	2.77	1.060	0.055	371	50.344	0.000
9	Absence of clear anti-corruption legislation	372	1.82	0.700	0.036	371	50.100	0.000
10	Insufficient co-ordination of anti-corruption work within the public sector	372	3.16	0.903	0.047	371	67.544	0.000
11	Poor information about corruption	372	3.31	0.719	0.037	371	88.832	0.000
12	Weak impact of anti-corruption measures	372	3.71	0.489	0.025	371	146.375	0.000

**Source: Field Survey, 2013.**

As shown in table 4.17 the t-test for the significant difference in the responses of the respondents on lack of moral justification, lack of will power, and incoherent process guidelines as the major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service was found to be significant at 0.00 levels. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on the major inhibiting factor in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra State Civil Service.

Being guided by the findings from our study, the forth alternate hypothesis: there is significant difference in the responses of the respondents on lack of moral justification, lack of will power, and incoherent process guidelines as the major inhibiting factor in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra State Civil Service is accepted; although the descriptive statistics revealed that the absence of clear anti-corruption legislation is not a major inhibiting factors in curbing institutional corrupt practice in Anambra state civil service but it was significant. However, lack of moral justification to carry out a probe and the fear of the corrupt cartel to probe were identified as the major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra State Civil Service all being significant.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter presents the summaries of the vital findings, conclusion and recommendations made based on the findings.

#### **5.1 Summary of Findings**

From the analysis in the previous chapter, the following findings were made:

1. The major prevalent institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service were inflating of contract fees by public officers for private gains and the giving and taking of bribes. Followed by embezzlement of public fund by workers in management positions.
2. Resource scramble and ethnic/religious difference were discovered to be the major causes of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service. Followed by weak government institution.
3. A number of anticorruption initiatives designed for curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil service were ineffective.

4. Lack of moral justification to carry out a probe and the fear of the corrupt cartel to probe were identified to be the major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service. Followed by weak impact of anti-corruption measures and dependence of the institution that fights corruption on the powers that be.
5. All the five factors ( $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ ,  $X_3$ ,  $X_4$  and  $X_5$ ) examined have negative influence on Anambra state civil service performance, explaining 55.2 % of the variation in the Anambra state civil service performance.
6. From the result of the t-test statistics, all the items processed were all significant.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

From the stand point of Anambra state civil service, corrupt practices take benign forms and perspectives. They are also caused by various factors. Some of the initiatives designed for curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil service were ineffective. Some factors inhibit the curbing of corruption in the Anambra state civil service. These findings are in line with the findings of Osimen, Adenegan, and Balogun (2013) who



examined and assessed corruption in the public sector in Nigeria with particular reference to Akure South Local Government Area of Ondo State. They observed that many factors such as; lack of transparency, moral laxity, weak government institutions, unemployment and poverty were significant factors stimulating corruption in Nigeria.

In addition, the findings from the regression results are akin with the findings of Ogbeidi (2013). He investigated political leadership and corruption in Nigeria in time frame spanning through five decades (1960-2010). The study finds that corruption correlates negatively with economic performance and the bane why the country remained underdeveloped. Other literature reviewed showed that corruption hurts the poor more than the other segments of a society. Since the continuation of corruption requires suppression of those who may oppose corruption, it also inhibits the development of social and political institutions.

Corruption is known to deter investment because it can (negatively) bias an entrepreneur's assessment of the risks and returns associated with an investment (Swenson 2005).

Allocation of investment itself will be biased in the presence of political corruption. Corrupt officials will direct state and private investment to areas which maximize their returns and not those of the society (Krueger, 1993; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

### **5.3 Recommendations**

Based on the findings of this study the following recommendations were made:

1. There is need to change the corrupt orientation of some of the civil servants by embarking on serious orientation campaign in the Anambra state civil service. A full blown anti-corruption campaign programme should be mounted by government to show its determination to deal with corruption.
2. The government should strengthen its anti-corruption initiative designed for curbing corruption in all its ramification in the Anambra state civil service. This can take the form of autonomy, funds and necessary incentives. This measure will help to reduce resource scramble and other causes of corruption in the Anambra state civil service.

3. Effective implementation guide line should be put in place by the government to help bring corrupt civil servants to book.
4. Serious and full blown scrutiny should be conducted in the selection of public officers for top appointments. Any person with dented record must not assume a public office. This will go a long way to affecting the psyche of the Nigerian polity.
5. It becomes pertinent to revisit the laws of the land especially on corruption matters with a view to reforming them to make them functional and pragmatic, especially in the area of implementation.
6. There is the need to jack up wages and incentive packages of public servants to make them comfortable and less prone to corruption.
7. Government should exercise enough political will in the punishment of offenders to serve as a deterrent.

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**APPENDIX 1**

Department of Public Administration  
Faculty of Management Sciences  
Nnamdi Azikiwe University  
Awka, Anambra State

30th November, 2013

Dear Respondent,

**LETTER OF INTRODUCTION**

I am a Ph.D student of the above mentioned department and institution. I am carrying out a research on “**Institutional Corruption and Performance of Anambra State Civil Service**”.

The research is strictly for academic purpose and the confidentiality of your information is assured. Kindly assist me to get the required information for successful completion of my field study.

Thanks in anticipation of your co-operation.

**Yours faithfully,**

**Chukwujindu E. Chukwujindu**

**APPENDIX II**

**DIRECTION:** Please tick (√) as appropriate and specify where necessary.

**SECTION A: BIO-DATA OF RESPONDENTS**

1. Sex
  - a. Male ( )    b. Female ( )
  
2. Age (years)
  - ≤ 20 ( )
  - 21-30 ( )
  - 31-40 ( )
  - 41-50 ( )
  - 51-60 ( )
  - 61 and above ( )
  
3. Marital Status
  - Married ( )
  - Single ( )
  - Divorce ( )
  - Widow/widower ( )
  
4. Educational Qualification:
  - Primary ( )
  - Secondary ( )
  - Tertiary ( )
  
5. Duration of working experience (years)
  - <1 ( )
  - 1-5 ( )
  - 6-10 ( )
  - > 10 ( )



### APPENDIX III

#### SECTION B: CORE SUBJECT-MATTER QUESTIONS

#### 6. How would you agree with the prevalent institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service?

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1	Workers Anambra state civil service give and take bribes				
2	Staff in mgt. position embezzle public fund				
3	Public servant abuse public power for private gain				
4	Workers do favouritism and nepotism				
5	Abuse of discretion by workers				
6	Workers engage in money laundry and advance fee fraud				
7	Offering/receiving of an unlawful gratuity or illegal commission				
8	Ghost worker syndrome				
9	Insider-trading				
10	Extortion in cash or kind in exchange for acting or failing to act				
11	Inflating of contract fees by public officers for private gains				
12	Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative				
13	Claiming lunch allowance while on duty tour and collecting allowances for duty tours not undertaken.				
14	Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles				
15	Nomination of less-deserving and “over-trained” friends and relations for more training/courses while other more deserving persons are neglected				
16	Preferential allocation of estate flats to favoured persons to the detriment of more deserving persons				
17	Selective repairs/refurbishment of staff quarters tilted in favour of friends/executives.				
18	Diversion of state assets,				

**7. How would you agree with the under listed causes of institutional corrupt practices in Anambra state civil service?**

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1	Ethnic/Religious Difference				
2	Resource Scramble				
3	Culture and Acceptance of Corruption by the Populace				
4	Poor Pay Incentives				
5	Weak Government Institution				
6	Lack of Openness and Transparency in Public Service				
7	Absence of key Anti-Corruption Tools and ineffective Political process				

**8. How would you agree with the effectiveness of the under listed anticorruption initiative/body in curbing corrupt practices in the Anambra state civil service?**

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1	Media (press & television)				
2	ICPC				
3	EFCC				
4	Police				
5	State Security Services				
6	Public Complaints Commission				
7	Code of Conduct Bureau				
8	Courts				
9	State House of Assembly				
10	Armed forces, military				
11	Nongovernment organizations				
12	Traditional rulers				

13	Religious organizations				
14	Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly				
15	Office of the Auditor-General				
16	Nigerian Medical Association				
17	Nigerian Bar Association.				
18	Nongovernment organizations				

**9. How would you agree with the major inhibiting factors in curbing corruption in the Anambra state civil service?**

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD
1	Lack of moral justification to carry out a probe				
2	People to conduct probe were beneficiaries of their squander				
3	The fear of the corrupt cartel to be probed				
4	Lack of will power to fight corruption				
5	Problem Mutual corruption				
6	I know you syndrome				
7	Dependence of the institution that fight corruption on the powers that be.				
8	The problem nepotism				
9	Absence of clear anti-corruption legislation				
10	Insufficient co-ordination of anti-corruption work within the public sector				
11	Poor information about corruption				
12	Weak impact of anti-corruption measures				

## APPENDIX IV

## Reliability

Notes		
Output Created		02-Apr-2014 19:44:56
Comments		
Input	Data	C:\Users\good\Desktop\Civil Service.sav
	Active Dataset	DataSet1
	Filter	<none>
	Weight	<none>
	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	392
	Matrix Input	C:\Users\good\Desktop\Civil Service.sav
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all variables in the procedure.
Syntax		RELIABILITY /VARIABLES=Sex Age MaritalStatus EduQualificatn WrkExpDuratn WrkasGivnTakBribe MgtStffEmbPubFund PubServAbuseofPow NepotsmAmgWrkas DiscretnAbuse MonyLaundry IlleglCommsn GhstWrkaSyndrome InsiderTrading CashorKindExtortion ContractFeeInflation FrndsNom LunchonDutytour ItemFavortsm OvaTraindNom AlloctnFavr QuatersRefurbFavr StateAssetsDivert ReligiousDiff RsrceScrambl CorruptnAcceptance PoorPayIncentvs WeakGvtIntstn LackofTransparency KiAntiCorptnToolsAbsence Media ICPC EFCC Police SSS PCC CCB Court AStateAssembly Military NGO TradtnRulers RelOrg PubAccCommmtt AuditorGenOff NMA NBA MoralJustificatn ConductProbe CorruptCartelFear WillPowerLack MutualCorruptn KnwSyndrome FightingInstitutns Nepo AntiCorruptLegislatn IsuffCoordination PoorImfo WeakImpactCub /SCALE('ALL VARIABLES') ALL /MODEL=ALPHA /SUMMARY=TOTAL.

Resources	Processor Time	0:00:00.047
	Elapsed Time	0:00:00.094

**Scale: ALL VARIABLES****Case Processing Summary**

		N	%
Cases	Valid	372	94.9
	Excluded <sup>a</sup>	20	5.1
	Total	392	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

**Reliability Statistics**

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.849	59

**Item-Total Statistics**

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Sex	222.45	805.698	-.878	.855
Age	178.49	1179.183	-.811	.967
Marital Status	222.53	808.881	-.746	.856
Educational Qualification	221.08	797.387	-.460	.853
Duration of work experience (year)	210.44	926.759	-.601	.898
Workers in Anambra state civil service give and take bribe	220.01	758.455	.824	.845
Staff in mgt. position embezzle public fund	220.06	755.606	.861	.844
Public servants abuse public power for private gain	221.27	745.729	.732	.842
Workers do favouritism and nepotism	220.59	728.350	.963	.839
Abuse of discretion by workers	221.56	749.190	.729	.843
Worker engage in money laundry and advance fee fraud	221.96	753.484	.734	.844

Offering/receiving of an unlawful gratuity or illegal commission	221.56	750.635	.709	.843
Ghost worker syndrome	221.32	724.223	.857	.838
Insider-trading	220.92	733.671	.904	.840
Extortion in cash or kind in exchange for acting or failing to act	220.58	729.404	.961	.839
Inflating of contract fees by public officers for private gains	219.99	761.453	.829	.845
Nomination of friends for assignments considered lucrative	220.09	751.932	.866	.843
Claiming lunch allowance while on duty tour and collecting allowances for duty tours nor undertaken	220.44	745.212	.909	.842
Favouritism in the disposal of obsolete items/boarded vehicles	220.17	744.037	.839	.842
Nomination of less-deserving and "over-trained" friends and relations for more training/courses while other more deserving persons are neglected	220.58	738.621	.947	.841
Preferential allocation of estate flats to favour persons to the detriment of more deserving persons	220.99	729.488	.913	.839
Selective repair/refurbishment of staff quarters tilted in favour of friends/executives	221.94	753.751	.737	.844
Diversion of state assets,	220.91	742.534	.868	.842
Ethnic/Religious Difference	220.10	751.405	.873	.843
Resource Scramble	220.05	754.513	.810	.844
Culture and Acceptance of Corruption by the Populace	221.96	753.465	.734	.844
Poor Pay Incentives	220.61	737.704	.941	.840
Weak Government Institution	219.99	761.453	.829	.845
Openness and Transparency in Public Service	220.44	748.285	.907	.843
Absence of key Anti-Corruption Tools and ineffective Political process	220.55	730.367	.963	.839

Media (press & television) in curbing corrupt practices	222.00	755.989	.722	.844
ICPC in curbing corrupt practices	221.52	727.000	.770	.839
EFCC in curbing corrupt practices	220.76	723.408	.938	.838
Police in curbing corrupt practices	221.71	734.087	.679	.841
State Security Service in curbing corrupt practices	220.05	756.728	.845	.844
Public Complaints Commission in curbing corrupt practices	222.16	754.736	.651	.844
Code of Conduct Bureau in curbing corrupt practices	221.30	746.248	.727	.843
Courts in curbing corrupt practices	220.44	749.929	.889	.843
State House of Assembly in curbing corrupt practices	222.47	770.164	.325	.848
Armed forces, military in curbing corrupt practices	220.15	747.181	.872	.842
Nongovernment organizations in curbing corrupt practices	220.49	744.569	.928	.842
Traditional rulers in curbing corrupt practices	220.78	746.149	.838	.842
Religious organizations in curbing corrupt practices	220.71	720.434	.952	.837
Public Accounts Committee of the State House of Assembly in curbing corrupt practices	221.94	745.191	.664	.843
Office of the Auditor-General in curbing corrupt practices	220.65	731.009	.968	.839
Nigerian Medical Association in curbing corrupt practices	220.58	729.404	.961	.839
Nigerian Bar Association in curbing corrupt practices	221.01	728.517	.912	.839
Lack of moral justification to carry out a probe to curb corruption practices	220.03	760.867	.872	.845
People to conduct probe were beneficiaries of their squander to curb corruption practices	220.09	751.492	.861	.843

The fear of the corrupt cartel to probe to curb corruption practices	220.03	759.328	.875	.845
Lack of will power to fight corruption to curb corruption practices	220.26	754.705	.870	.844
Problem of Mutual corruption to curb corruption practices	220.08	752.746	.836	.844
I know you syndrome to curb corruption practices	221.15	730.288	.874	.839
Dependence of the institution that fight corruption on the power that be to curb corruption practices	220.08	753.333	.865	.844
The problem nepotism to curb corruption practices	220.99	729.472	.912	.839
Absence of clear anti-corruption legislation to curb corruption practices	221.94	754.037	.736	.844
Insufficient co-ordination of anti-corruption work within the public sector to curb corruption practices	220.60	735.222	.955	.840
Poor information about corruption to curb corruption practices	220.45	746.043	.922	.842
Weak impact of anti-corruption measures to curb corruption practices	220.05	758.793	.882	.845