APPRAISAL OF WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE’S REJECTION OF ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

SOURCE:

Faculty: Arts
Department: Philosophy

CONTRIBUTORS:

Igboamalu B. Uche
Mbaegbu Celestine

ABSTRACT:

Immanuel Kant’s separation of analytic statements from synthetic statements ignited a philosophical debate that still rages on. This debate resulted to the evolution of modern logic among philosophers who offered solutions to the problems raised by such debate. The debate centers on whether or not there should be a separation between analytic statements and synthetic statements. The positivists with their empiricist background favoured a sharp distinction between both statements. Yet, Willard van Orman Quine with the intention of blurring the boundary between speculative Metaphysics and the natural sciences, as stated in his 1951 paper, “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, holds that there is no distinction between both statements. This research assessed Quine’s reasons for rejecting a distinction between analytic statements and synthetic statements. This research made an exposé and analysis of the contributions of many philosophers on both sides of the debate. However, having used the method of logical analysis on those contributions and Quine’s reasons for rejecting the separation of analytic statements and synthetic statements, this research discovered some logical errors in Quine’s defense of his position and also found some of his doctrines very plausible. First, Quine’s rejection of ‘the analytic’ based on the ground that it is impossible to define analyticity without reference to ‘the necessary’ and ‘the a priori’ and because it is wrong to base its meaning on definition and synonymy which lies heavily on recourse to the lexicographer who makes definition based on the general use of the concept is unacceptable in this dissertation. This research takes the stand that the long use of the concept makes philosophers acquainted with the concept and that rejecting the distinction between analytic statements and synthetic statements based on the rejection of analyticity is wrong. This research also found out that Quine’s rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements based on his web of beliefs which holds that the so-called analytic statements and firmly held beliefs, though difficult to revise, are revisable as well as his confirmation holism which says that knowledge is holistic and should not be separated has limitation. One thing clear in Quine’s presentation is that at some points, analytic statements and synthetic statements are interwoven. However, the conclusion of this dissertation is that borderline cases exist in the relationship between analytic statements and synthetic statements. There are points where it would be very difficult to establish a distinction between them. For instance, it would be difficult to consider the difference in the merits of some established beliefs such as “the earth exists” and such expressions accepted as analytic such as “all twinkling self-illumining objects at night in the space are stars” considering that the rejection of any of them results to a contradiction. I recommend that researchers in the future should focus more on the relationship between analytic statements and synthetic statements.